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The Phenomenological Spring: Husserl and the Göttingen

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The Phenomenological Spring: Husserl and the Göttingen ͠ Symposium THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SPRING: ͦͦͥͧ͟͟͟͞Ǥ Logical Investigationsǡ HUSSERL AND THE GÖTTINGEN CIRCLE ͧͧ͟͟͟͞͞͞ Ǥ ǣ Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray and Jeff Mitscherling Logische Untersuchungen (Logical InvestigationsȌǥ ǡǤϐProlegomena zur reinen Logik (Prolegomena to Pure LogicȌ e- ͦͥͦͦͦ͟͟͟ǡ ͧ͟͞͞ǡ i- Ǥ ͦͦ͟͟ǡ ǡ Investigations in Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledgeǡͧ͟͟͞Ǥ at he ͦͦ͟͡Ǥϐǡ s- ǡ e- ͦͧͤ͟ȋ ͦ͟ǣ͟͠Ǣ͢͠ǣͣͥȌǢ ǡ ͦͦ͟͢ǡ Ǥ ǡn of a mathesis ǡ s- universalisǤ ͦͧͤ͟ n- Ǥ1 ͦͦͤ͟ǡ ǡ Ǯϐ c- Habilitationsschrift ǡǡ- ǡ Ǥ ǯǤ ͟͠ n- ͦͦͥ͟ ǡÜber den Begriff der Zahl. Psycholo- ͦͧͥ͟ Ǯc- gische Analysen (On the Concept of Number. Psychological AnalysesȌǡ - ǯǡ m- ȋ Habilita- ǡǡ ȋBriefwechselǡͣǣ tionsschriftȌǤ ͢͡ȌǤ2 ǯ ϐ ǡ Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen (Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Pro- Logical InvestigationsȌǡ ͦͧ͟͟Ǥa- fessor Extraordinarius3 Džǡ e- ǡ Privatdozentǡ ͧͧͤ͟͟͟͟͞ǡ ǡ ϐ ǡ ͧͦ͟͠Ǥe- sent ǯ Džn- 1 Ǥ recordsǡ ǡ Dzo- seminars of Brentano: dzǤ4 ͦͦ͟͢ȀͦͣǣȋȌ ǡȋȌ s- ǡȋȌ ǯEnquiry concerning Human Understand- ing; ǡ ǯ Logical Investigations that ͦͦͣ͟ǣȋȌ ǡȋȌ ǯEnquiry concern- i- ing the Principles of Morals; ͦͦͣ͟Ȁͦͤǣ ȋȌ ǡ ȋȌ ǯ Die 2 ǡ Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology ȋǣ Tatsachen in der Wahrnehmungǡ ȋȌ ǡͣ͠͞͞Ȍǡ͠͠Ǥ Ǥ 3 Professor Extraordinarius Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano ȋ ǣ Professor Ordinariusǡ e- ǡͧͧͧ͟Ȍǡ ͥ͟Ǥϐ ǡ ǡ ǤPrivatdozent The Development of Husserl’s Thoughtǡ ȋǤȌ ǡPrivatdozent is often ȋ ǣ ǡ ͧͥͦ͟Ȍǣ Dzǥ ǯ Ǥ 4 ǡ The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical ǤdzȋȌ Introduction ȋ ǣǡͧͦ͟͢ȏ͡rd ǤȐȌǡͤͤ͟Ǥ The Phenomenological Spring ͡ ͢ Symposium Ǥ Ǥ7 he ǡ ǡ to the ǡ DzOn the g dz8ǡ ǡ Ǧ i- ǡDz ǯ Ǥ tein eǦ Ǥdz9 Logi- ǡLogical Investigations DzǮ i- cal Investigations ǡ ǯ Ǯ ǯ ǡn- ǮǯǤ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǡ than a re Ǥdz5 Ǥ10 ͧ͟͢͞ ȋͤ͠–͡͞Ȍǡ ǯ Ǧ Dz fundierte Vorstellungen ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ ǡ Ȍ had come to characteris ǡ Ǥdz11 By ͧͣ͟͞ǡ ǯ Dz ǡdz Džǡϐ ǡ ǡ ͧͤ͟͞ ǡ Ǥ ͧͥ͟͞Ǥ12 ͧͥ͟͞ began Dž ϐǡ Ǥ 7 ͦͧ͟͢ǡǡ Džǡ y that characterised the formed the Akademischer Verein für Psychologie ȋ Ȍǡ Ǥ ͧ͟͞͠ ǡ ǡ ǡ itz ǡ ǡ e- ͧͤ͟͞Ǥ DžǤ ͧ͟͞͠ ǡ Džͧͤ͟͞ȋ ǡ ͧ͟͡͠ȌǤ ǡ ǡ ǤDžǯǡPhenomenol- ͧ͟͞͠ ȋ ogy of Willingǡ ǡ Dz d- ȌǤͧ͟͞͠ Ǥdz ǡ Dz e- 6ǡ ǡdz The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological ͟͞͞ the Philosophy II ȋ͠͞͞͠Ȍǡ ͥͤǤ m- Logical Investigations Ǥ Ǥ -time e- ͧ͟͡͞ǣDz ǡ o- ȋ ǡǤǤǡ Ȍ Ǥdz 8 ǡ ϐ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǯ ǣ Ǯ ǡǯdz Husserl 5 ǡ Life in a Jewish Familyǡ Ǥ ͟ The Collected Works of Edith Stein Studies ͠ȋͧͦͣ͟Ȍǡͤͥ͠–ͧ͞Ǥ ȋǣ ǡͧͦͤ͟Ȍǡͣ͠͞Ǥ 9 ǡ Dz ǡdz 6 ǯ i- Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsideredǡ ȋǤȌ ȋ ǣ arry ǡ͠͞͞͡Ȍǡ͟͟͟ȋȌǤ ǡDz ǣ Ǥ ǯ ǡdzϐ 10 ǡͤͧ͟Ǥ Review of Metaphysics ͧ͡ ȋͧͦͣ͟Ȍǡ ͥͤ͡–ͧ͡ǡ 11 Ibid.
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