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Marburg Neo-Kantianism As Philosophy of Culture

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Marburg Neo-Kantianism As Philosophy of Culture SamanthaMatherne (Santa Cruz) Marburg Neo-Kantianism as Philosophy of Culture 1Introduction Although Ernst Cassirer is correctlyregarded as one of the foremost figures in the Neo-Kantian movement thatdominated Germanyfrom 1870 – 1920,specifying ex- actlywhat his Neo-Kantianism amountstocan be achallenge. Not onlymustwe clarify what his commitments are as amember of the so-called MarburgSchool of Neo-Kantianism, but also giventhe shift between his earlyphilosophyof mathematics and naturalscience to his later philosophyofculture, we must con- sider to what extent he remained aMarburgNeo-Kantian throughout his career. With regard to the first task, it is typical to approach the MarburgSchool, which was foundedbyHermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, by wayofacontrast with the otherdominant school of Neo-Kantianism, the Southwest or Baden School, founded by Wilhelm Windelband and carried forward by Heinrich Rick- ert and Emil Lask. The going assumption is that these two schools were ‘rivals’ in the sense that the MarburgSchool focused exclusively on developing aKantian approach to mathematical natural sciences(Naturwissenschaften), while the Southwest School privileged issues relatingtonormativity and value, hence their primary focus on the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). If one accepts this ‘scientist’ interpretation of the MarburgSchool, one is tempted to read Cas- sirer’searlywork on mathematicsand natural science as orthodoxMarburgNeo- Kantianism and to then regardhis laterwork on the philosophyofculture as a break from his predecessors, veeringcloser towards interests championed by the Southwest School. In this paper, however, Iargue that this wayofinterpretingMarburg Neo-Kant- ianism as well as Cassirer’srelationshiptoitthreatenstoobscure oneofthe deep commitmentssharedbyCohen,Natorp, andCassireralike,viz., defending asys- tematic philosophy of culture,which accommodates both themathematicalnatural sciences andthe humanities.Inorder to bringtolight theMarburg commitment to thephilosophyofculture,Ibeginbycalling into question the ‘scientist’ readingof theMarburg School that pits it againstthe SouthwestSchool. Iclaim that although thereare some importantpointsofdisagreementbetween thetwo schools,e.g., with regard to thenotionof‘intuition,’ thereisagreatdealthattheyagree on. In thefirstplace,Ishow that they both endorsethe basictenetsofNeo-Kantianism in general (Section 2). Moreover,Idemonstrate that theMarburg andSouthwest Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS Authenticated Download Date | 6/4/15 10:11 PM 202 Samantha Matherne Schoolswereunitedinrejecting ‘genetic’ interpretations of Kant in favorofan ‘anti-psychologistic’ interpretation,which placed emphasis on thelogical condi- tionsofknowledge in themathematical natural sciences andhumanities alike (Section 3).Oncewebegin to appreciate thecontinuity betweenthe Marburg andSouthwest Schoolsonthese issues,wewillbeinaposition to turn more di- rectly to theMarburg approach to thephilosophyofculture.Tothis end, we will considernot only how theMarburg Neo-Kantians usetheirdistinctive ‘transcen- dental method’ to investigate thevarious regions within culture(Section4), but also theirattemptstoaccount forthe systematic unity of culture as awhole surpris- inglybymeans of adistinctive form of ‘psychology’,which studiesthe conscious- ness of culture (Section 5).Iconclude by claiming that this revisedunderstanding of theMarburg School hasimplicationsfor howweshouldunderstandCassirer’s relation to it:ratherthanreadhis Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as abreak from his Marburgpredecessors, we should treatitasacritical revision of Cohen’sand Na- torp’sattemptstocarry outthe basicMarburg cultural project, whichhecontinued to adhere to (Section 6). 2Basic Neo-Kantian Commitments Let’sbegin by situating the MarburgSchool within the Neo-Kantian movement more generally. In manyways, the Neo-Kantian movement arose in response to aworry about the continued value of philosophyinlight of the rapid advance- ment of science in the mid-19th century:why would we continue to look to phi- losophywhen science appeared to be capable and more reliable in providing an- swers to questions about the nature of the mind and world?The state of philosophyinthe early19th century did nothing to allaythis worry,asthe abso- luteidealismofHegel and Fichteseemed to many to be little more thanabstruse reasoningthat had lost touch with the real world. This led manythinkers to en- dorse the ‘positivist’ idea that we should dispense with philosophyasameans of gainingknowledge and lookexclusively to science to answer questions about the mind and world. The Neo-Kantian movement emergedasareaction against this positivist line of thoughtand as an attempt to justify the need for philosophyinthe face of sci- entific progress.Asthe label for the movement suggests, the Neo-Kantians main- tained that in order to vindicate philosophy, it wasnecessary to go ‘back to Kant’.¹ But whyKant?For the Neo-Kantians, there are at least tworeasons: In Kant und die Epigonen (1865), OttoLiebmann critiquespost-Kantian idealism and con- Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS Authenticated Download Date | 6/4/15 10:11 PM MarburgNeo-Kantianism as Philosophy of Culture 203 first,Kant’sphilosophygives us reason to doubtthe underlying philosophical commitments of positivism, and, second, it offers amore satisfying analysis of how knowledge,whether in mathematics, natural science, or philosophy, is pos- sible at all. With regardtotheir criticisms of positivism, the Neo-Kantians arguethat its proponents oftenmake problematic assumptions with regards to metaphysics and epistemology.Onthe metaphysical side of things, the Neo-Kantians claim that manypositivists are committed to aposition we could call ‘naïve realism’, accordingtowhich subjects and objects form two ontologicallyindependent realms.² On this view,neither the existencenor the properties of the entities in these realms depend upon each other.Epistemologically, the Neo-Kantians claim that positivists tend to endorse what we could call the ‘copy theory’ of knowledge,which characterizes knowledge as aprocess in which our minds form amental ‘copy’ of mind-independent objects.³ Accordingtothe Neo-Kantians, however,ifwego‘back to Kant’,then we will discover thatendorsing either of these positions undermines one’sability to give asatisfying account of how we come to have knowledge,eveninmathematics and natural science. To appreciatethis, afew remarks about the basic Kantian framework for knowledge are in order.For Kant,knowledge is amatter of form- ing judgments that are objectively valid,i.e., they ‘agree’ with objects, and are necessarily universally valid,i.e., they are judgments that anyjudgeratany time ought to make.⁴ As such, from aKantian perspective,any satisfying theory of knowledge must explain how we are able to form judgments that are valid in these ways. YetbyKant’slights, theoriesofknowledge that rest on naïverealism and the copy theory fall short on both of these counts.With respect to objective validity, Kant worries that if naïverealism is right,then it does not seem as if our judg- ment could ‘agree’ with objects: how could something non-mental agree with something mental?⁵ As for necessary universal validity,Kant maintains that if cludes each chapterwith the phrase “Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden.” While this is often cited as the origin of the phrase ‘back to Kant’,Willey (1978), 80 and Köhnke(1991), 128 note that this phrase does not originatewith Liebmann,but had been used earlier by Kuno Fischer and Eduard Zeller. Not all positivists adheretothis view:Ernst Mach, for example,endorses some version of phe- nomenalism. See, e.g., Cassirer’sIntroduction to the first volume of TheProblem of Knowledge in Cassirer (1957). See, e.g., Kant (1902a), §18. Kant (1902a), 282. Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS Authenticated Download Date | 6/4/15 10:11 PM 204 Samantha Matherne the copy-theory is correct,then our minds must conform to objects; in which case, the onlyaccess we have to objectsisinthe course of experience. But,echo- ing Humean worries about induction, Kant claims that if judgmentsarise onlyin the course of experience,they could never be necessary: “experience teaches me what there is and how it is, but never thatisnecessarilymust be so and not oth- erwise.”⁶ Hencewewould not be able to assert necessary universal validityof our judgments. This line of thoughtrepresents aweapon for the Neo-Kantians to yield against positivism: insofar as positivism endorses some combination of naïvere- alism and the copytheory of knowledge,itwill be in no better aposition to ex- plain how knowledge is possible than, say, Hegel or Fichte. What is needed in- stead, they argue, is amorephilosophicallyviableaccount of knowledge,which can explain how objectively and necessarilyuniversallyvalid judgmentsarise.To this end, they appeal to Kant and his so-called ‘Copernican Revolution’: As Kant famouslysaysinthe Prefacetothe Bedition of the first Critique, up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition [Erkenntnis]must conform to the ob- jects;but all attempts to find out somethingabout them apriori through concepts that would extend our cognition have,onthis presupposition,cometonothing. Hence let us oncetry whether we do not getfarther… by assumingthat the objects must conform to our cognition.⁷ As we see in this passage, for Kant,aslongaswesuppose thatour minds con- form to objects (á la naïverealism and the copy theory), then we cannot make headwayinour account of knowledge [Erkenntnis].
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