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SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 210

doi: 10.21464/sp31116 of his book is that the movement’s origins are to be found already in the 1790s, in the Frederick Charles Beiser works of , Johann Frie- drich Herbart, and Friedrich Eduard Beneke. They constitute “the lost tradition” which pre- The Genesis of served the “empiricist-psychological” side of Neo- Kant’s thought, his dualisms, and things-in- themselves against the excessive speculative of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel who Oxford University Press, tried to rehabilitate the dogmatic rationalist Oxford 2014 of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff after Kant’s critical project. Frederick Charles Beiser, professor of phi- The first chapter of the first part (pp. 23–88) losophy at Syracuse University (USA) whose is concerned with the of Fries field of expertise is the modern German phi- who tried to base philosophy on empirical losophy, is one of the most erudite historians psychology, and on psychol- of philosophy today. His first book The Fate ogy which could recognize the synthetic a of : from Kant priori but not prove it. His book Reinhold, to Fichte (1987) didn’t only present a fresh Fichte und Schelling (1803) saw the history account of German philosophy at the end of of philosophy after Kant as the “struggle of th the 18 century, but it also introduced a new to free itself from the limits of method of historical research. His more re- the critique”. In his Fries cent works, starting with The German His- was an anti-Semite, but gave the leading role toricist Tradition (2011) until the most recent to public opinion which could correct even Weltschmerz: in German Philoso- the ruler, although he encountered problems phy, 1860–1900 (2016), have focused on the in trying to reconcile his liberal views with th main currents of the 19 century German the social injustice that created. philosophy. This is also the case with The Like all the thinkers of the lost tradition, Fries Genesis of Neo-Kantianism. Spanning over defended Kant’s dualisms against Schelling more than six hundred pages, this book is a and Hegel whose organic conception of na- major contribution to the history of an im- ture he criticized because he saw it only as portant that would another form of the mechanistic explanation dominate the German philosophy after the of . He also criticized Kant’s attempt collapse of speculative idealism in the second to rationalize faith, and he introduced the th th half of the 19 , and the beginning of the 20 of Ahndung, a kind of a feeling on century. The book itself is divided into three which was based, and through which main parts. The first part (pp. 11–205) is con- humans are aware of things-in-themselves. cerned with the origins of the movement, the Fries’ work Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1807) second (pp. 207–453) with its maturation, and tried to bring a new transcendental deduction the final (pp. 455–571) with a new generation of the categories against the skeptical objec- of neo-Kantians that would be active from tions to Kant’s philosophy, but Beiser agrees the 1870s. Therefore, the focus of this book with Cassirer that Fries had failed in such an is on the history of neo-Kantianism before attempt because of his psychologism. the formation of three famous neo-Kantian The second chapter (pp. 89–141) is dedicat- schools: Marburg, Southwestern (also known ed to Herbart who was, according to Beiser, as Baden or Heidelberg school), and the neo- also a Kantian. Herbart defended Kant in his Frisian school. claim that reason deals with (and Beiser defines neo-Kantianism as “the move- not existences), as well as Kant’s dualism of ment in 19th-century to rehabilitate theoretical and , against the Kant’s philosophy”. Although heavily in- neo-rationalist metaphysics of Schelling and debted to previous scholarship on this sub- Hegel. Although a Fichtean in his early years ject, mainly Klaus Christian Köhnke’s book (and later a Romantic), Herbart already then Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus criticized Fichte and Schelling for their foun- (1986), Beiser succeeds in providing a fresh dationalism, and for the concept of the ego account of the genesis of neo-Kantianism. that transcends the boundaries of He challenges the widespread prejudices that and then relapses into dogmatism and falla- the neo-Kantians were unimportant scholars cies of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff. Beiser locked up in their towers divided from the thinks that Herbart didn’t start to develop his world, or that they were unoriginal thinkers new system in his Swiss years, although it who were just repeating what Kant had al- was then that he broke his relationship with ready said. One of the most innovative theses Fichte, but in his Bremen years. It was in SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 211 his manuscript Zur Kritik der Ichvorstellung Beiser’s interpretation, for the breakthrough (1800) that Herbart criticized Fichte’s ego, of neo-Kantianism. Political context which claiming that it is self-contradictory because, prepared such a breakthrough was the fail- as Beiser summarizes, “thinking of and ure of the Revolution of 1848 which meant being” are not the same and therefore “think- a disaster for the Hegelians in Germany but ing of being cannot be the being thought of”. a victory for the neo-Kantians who were de- Around 1802 Herbart adopted a skeptical fenders of liberal ideals. At the same time, standpoint from which he attacked Kantian– authors like Ernst Sigismund Mirbt, Chris- Fichtean idealism and the Romantics, but he tian Hermann Weiße, Carl Fortlage, and Otto never rejected transcendental philosophy. In Friedrich Gruppe called for a return to Kant. his later years he increasingly identified him- However, the crucial “philosophical develop- self with Kant and was alienated from the ments without which neo-Kantianism would prevailing currents of German philosophy. never have taken place”, Beiser argues, were Thus, in his mature metaphysical writings the rise of and the crisis he defended the synthetic a priori, unknow- of philosophy due to a collapse of specula- ability of things-in-themselves, and the ne- tive idealism and the rise of the empirical sci- cessity, as well as complementarity, of both ences. Two significant factors were the and rationalism for the critical appearance of Trendelenburg and Lotze, and philosophy. However, Herbart recognized the lastly Helmholtz, a formidable and famous problem of formalism or moral motivation in scientist who thought that the natural Kant’s . He held that depends confirmed Kant’s philosophy, or at least its on moral taste and cannot be universal or a empirical side. priori. Like Fries, he thought that psychology The second part of Beiser’s book deals with should be the foundation for philosophy and the “coming of age” of those neo-Kantians that criticized Kant’s antiquated Wolffian scholas- flourished during the liberalism of the 1860s, tic empirical psychology. It was because of a “breakthrough decade for neo-Kantianism”. these criticisms, Beiser thinks, that Herbart Beiser considers five major thinkers: Kuno was (wrongly) not considered a Kantian, but Fischer, , , Jür- concludes that his project failed for similar gen Bona Meyer, and lastly Friedrich Albert as in the case of Fries, for trying to Lange. They have affirmed psychologism of base epistemology on psychology. Helmholtz and the “lost tradition” but wanted Last who belongs to Beiser’s em- to eliminate the thing-in-itself and the ques- piricist-psychological triumvirate is Beneke tion of value. However, some of them have to whom the third chapter (pp. 142–177) is gradually distanced themselves from such dedicated. Beneke was a victim of Hegelian- views because of Schopenhauer’s growing ism (he couldn’t get a post at the University success during the 1860s, and because they of Berlin because of Hegel in 1822), he was wanted philosophy to be autonomous from murdered under unsolved circumstances, and psychology, whose possibility could be prov- was therefore dubbed “neo-Kantian martyr” en only by . by Beiser. He was another staunch opponent Fischer is the first author to whom the first of Romantic enthusiasm and neo-rationalist chapter (pp. 221–254) of the second part is speculative idealism, as well as a radical em- dedicated. This may be a surprise to readers piricist and an ally of the best that the new who think of him as a Hegelian, which is con- natural sciences could give. Accordingly, firmed by Beiser who cites him as the exam- Beneke rejected Kant’s division of judge- ple of a paradoxical Hegelian who also tried ments into synthetic and analytic because the to be a Kantian. In his early work Diotima only criteria for the validity of a judgement is (1849), Fischer espoused his or its confirmation in experience. He criticized for which he was expelled from Kant’s claim that genuine self- Heidelberg. First traces of his Kantianism are is impossible, but defended the of found in his Logik und Metaphysik oder Wis- things-in-themselves against speculative ide- senschaftslehre (1852) where he claims that alists. Beneke tried to base ethics on aesthet- Hegel’s system “must be placed under the ics, and his Grundlegung zur Physik der Sit- control of Kant” because, as Fischer recog- ten (1822) is, according to Beiser, “one of the nized in the late 1850s, only his philosophy most interesting and important works to ap- can solve the problems raised by Hegelianism th pear in the early 19 century”, an attempt to and the empirical sciences. His Geschichte rehabilitate British sentimentalism of Hutch- der neueren Philosophie (18601) was impor- eson, Hume, and Smith. tant for spreading the fame of Kant’s philoso- The last chapter (pp. 178–205) of the first part phy among the reading public. However, by deals with the circumstances that took part in the time of his Kritik der kantischen Philoso- the 1840s and the 1850s, and were crucial, in phie (1883) Fischer had turned a full circle SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 212 because “he had created a Kantian system the limits of knowledge and that his phi- under the control of Hegel” which proved, ac- losophy is a middle path between “a soulless cording to Beiser, that a Hegelian ultimately materialism” and “groundless ” cannot be a Kantian. whose dispute was irresolvable because both Zeller, a great historian of philosophy, is giv- had tried “to conceive the inconceivable”. en his due in the second chapter (pp. Like Fries, he criticized Kant’s rational faith 255–282) and was important, just like Fischer, and encouraged subjective . In Kant’s for his call for a return to Kant in the 1860s. Psychologie (1870) Meyer advanced the In his younger days he was also a Hegelian view that “the greater use of psychology (…) but by the 1840s he became critical of Hegel, would have saved Kant from the formalism of especially his . Histori- his and ethics” and he tried to interpret cal criticism of the by David Friedrich Kant’s epistemological project in psychologi- Strauß had a lasting effect on Zeller who after- cal terms, which is why his views became ob- wards became close to Kant. Unlike Fischer, solete by the end of the 1870s. His Zeitfragen, he thought that the collapse of speculative populäre Aufsätze (1870) are neglected but, idealism was “irreversible and final” and that according to Beiser, “one of the best in the philosophy should become epistemology and neo-Kantian pantheon”. In this work Meyer logic of special sciences. However, he un- put forward his thesis that philosophy should derstood philosophy in psychological terms become psychology, defends the possibility and finally claimed that it should follow the of the freedom of the , and advocates its methods of natural sciences. Zeller criticized with theism. Another two im- Kant’s ethics as formalist and covertly conse- portant aspects of Meyer’s thought are his quentialist, adopting instead the ethics philosophy of religion, which he saw as an of and . unalterable characteristic of human nature Third chapter (pp. 283–327) of the second and a public , and his views on the rise part is focused on Otto Liebmann whose leg- of scientific history which was a neglected acy Beiser rehabilitates and defends against topic among the neo-Kantians. Köhnke. In his famous Kant und die Epigo- The last thinker of this transitional period of nen (1865) Liebmann interpreted Kant’s criti- neo-Kantianism is Lange to whom the fifth cal project in epistemological rather than psy- chapter (pp. 356–397) is dedicated. Beiser chological terms and would therefore precede concludes that his Geschichte des Materialis- in this respect and Wilhelm mus (1866) “overshadows Fischer’s and Zel- Windelband. In Kant he saw the central fig- ler’s 1860 lectures and Liebmann’s 1865 Kant ure of German philosophy whose proper in- und die Epigonen”, all of which advocated terpretation could solve the identity crisis of a return to Kant. However, he also argues philosophy. The main stumble block was (in (against Ulrich Sieg) that he wasn’t the father his interpretation) the thing-in-itself, whose of Marburg neo-Kantianism nor the founder existence he rejected, but he ultimately had of neo-Kantian (against Thomas to admit its existence and his failure to base Willey) because he criticized Kantian reason- philosophy on physiology. Beiser defends ing concerning private ownership and ethics, Liebmann against Köhnke’s accusations of in which he endorsed Smith’s sentimental- chauvinism, concluding that he is a conserva- ism. In his younger days, although he wrote tive liberal, and not a reactionary monarchist. poetry, Lange held positivist views and in his In the 1870s Liebmann discussed Kant’s re- Geschichte he would show, through historical lation to then-contemporary development of critique of materialism, how Kant’s philoso- natural sciences, criticized Naturphilosophie phy could solve the conflict between specu- of Schelling and Hegel, as well as materialists lative idealism and materialism and therefore and positivists, and developed epistemologi- preserve their good sides which have clashed cal interpretation of transcendental philoso- during the Revolution of 1848. Although he phy. Beiser thinks that Liebmann’s Zur Anal- held positive views about materialism whose ysis der Wirklichkeit (1876) is his best work, historical mission was the liberation from su- but concludes that by the time of his Grundriß perstition, Lange thought that Kant’s philoso- der kritischen Metaphysik (1901) he fell into phy drove it into a crisis because it proved that Platonic reasoning beyond the limits of expe- “all sense qualities depend upon our percep- rience and even . tive and cognitive organization”. It is impor- Meyer, a neo-Kantian sceptic, was one of the tant to note that, according to Beiser, most of last who offered an important psychological Lange’s theories failed: his attempt to prove or interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, and is reject the existence of things-in-themselves, discussed in the fourth chapter (pp. 328–355). his interpretation of Kant’s critical project on In his Zum Streit über Leib und Seele (1856) psychological grounds, and his rejection of Meyer thought that Kant’s main goal was to Kant’s “rationalist” transcendental deduction SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 213 of the categories. However, he was also one the age”, which was increasingly unfavorable of the first who recognized the importance of to neo-Kantianism, had already changed. Hume for Kant. In metaphysics he accepted The last, third part of the book deals with the dualistic views, in his philosophy of religion first decade of “the neo-Kantian period of he rejected noumenal world and rational faith, German university philosophy” (1870–1900) he thought that religion should be “aesthetic or, more precisely, with the “new establish- experience” like poetry, and he reduced mo- ment” of neo-Kantians who marked the final rality to which he in turn reduced to victory of epistemological interpretation of subjective taste. Beiser concludes the chapter Kant: Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windel- on Lange with the observation that philoso- band, and Alois Riehl. In the prevailing lib- phy is for him a which is cut off from eral atmosphere of the 1870s neo-Kantianism metaphysics as poetry and that he therefore flourished as a “bulwark against materialism” “squeezed out” traditional philosophy whose and an established “account of philosophy in place should have been between science and the modern scientific age”, namely, as epis- poetry. temology or logic of the sciences. Although The last two chapters (pp. 398–453) of the neo-Kantians formed an uneasy alliance with second part are devoted to pessimism and during the 1870s, such alliance , both of which became a sig- proved fragile due to growing neo-Kantian nificant in Germany in the 1860s, and involvement with ethical problems and their would therefore challenge the neo-Kantian criticism of positivist “extreme empiricism”, domination. Beiser follows Köhnke in his “naive faith in given facts”, as well as equally claim that pessimism (whose champions were naive “belief in the complete autonomy of the Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann) sciences”. rose because of social, political, and econom- The philosophy of young Cohen, who would ic circumstances. It troubled the neo-Kantians become the father of Marburg school, is dis- because it showed “that all striving for a bet- cussed in the first chapter (pp. 465–491). In ter world is pointless”, but in their answer his early days he was an adherent of Völk- they followed Fichte, not Kant’s strategy es- erpsychologie, but in the summer of 1870 he poused in his Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Ge- wrote Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871) schichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), which wanted to reconstruct “proper histori- which, Beiser claims, was directed against cal Kant” whose critical project was for the Rousseau’s pessimism. Fichte taught the first time clearly understood in epistemologi- neo-Kantians that the better world would be cal rather than psychological terms. The book achieved if people were working “together in also stressed the importance of the transcen- political association”. Last part of the chapter dental for Kant and the central role of the on pessimism considers Schopenhauer’s es- transcendental deduction in the first Kritik, say Über die Universitätsphilosophie which although (ironically) Cohen denied Hume’s lampooned university professors because influence on Kant. Beiser challenges the view they couldn’t teach anything contrary to reli- that early Cohen’s transcendental idealism gion and state, but Beiser thinks that this ac- is “an idealism without the ” and that cusation is unfair because most neo-Kantians Theorie is “the product of Cohen’s mystical were persecuted by the state in the period ” because he emphasized Kant’s from the 1820s to the 1860s. Like pessimism, rejection of intellectual intuition. In his Darwinism also had a quick success in Ger- groundbreaking book Cohen also responded many in the 1860s and it became associated to Lange and Trendelenburg and eliminated with leftism and materialism at first. Lange the threat of materialism which both have left embraced Darwinism and tried to connect open. The former because he thought that a it with his socialist views, although he was priori forms were part of nature and the lat- critical of some of Darwin’s theories, like the ter because he presupposed the independent natural selection as the only mechanism of existence of matter in space. evolution. Meyer was sympathetic but criti- Main topic of the second chapter (pp. 492– cal of the theory of evolution for which there 530) is the concept of normativity in the early was no , while Liebmann works of who would sought to reconcile Darwinism and Aristoteli- become the father of Southwestern school. anism in a kind of a neo-Kantian dualism. The In his 1881 lecture Windelband put forward chapter on Darwinism concludes with the an- “his normative conception of philosophy”. swers of Friedrich Paulsen and Erich Adickes According to him, Kant was the first who had to ’s Die Welträthsel (1899) explained “the possibility of knowledge not which advocated mechanism disguised in through the correspondence of a representa- . Their refutations were theoretically tion with an object but through the conform- successful, but Beiser thinks that the “spirit of ity of representations with rules”. It was here SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 214 that Windelband introduced the term “” firmed the version of realism which claims in the rule: “ is the normativity of think- that what we know “of in itself is only ing”. He defined philosophy as the science of its existence, not its nature or ” and norms because it “makes appraisals, determin- which, Beiser claims, corresponds to Kant’s ing what should be or have a value”. When formal idealism. Unlike Cohen and Windel- a critical philosopher makes an appraisal, band who claimed that the thing-in-itself is according to Windelband, “he assumes that only a “goal of enquiry”, Riehl tried to prove something should be recognized as valid for its existence and failed, but like them he was everyone”. In his interpretation Kant was the bothered by Kant’s practical or noumenal one who held that philosophy should make a realm where he placed morality and religious in the world, but there was a gap belief in such a problematic way, relying their between the normative (what should be) and existence on “mere logical possibility”. Ma- the natural (what is) which young Windelband ture Riehl saw as epis- tried to cross with his compatibilist theory of temology, a servant of the natural sciences, freedom. In his early works he also advocated but as a noble “guide to , syncretism of epistemology, life”, and practical philosopher as “a moral psychology, and metaphysics, as well as the legislator and guide”. However, Beiser con- impossibility of the thing-in-itself. In the cludes, Riehl’s big weakness was a huge last part of this chapter Beiser clashes with divide between his theoretical and practical Köhnke’s theory of Windelband’s intellectual philosophy. development, which claims that he had con- It is impossible to give full to profes- ceived his normative conception of philoso- sor Beiser’s bold attempt to sketch the gen- phy only in 1878, after assassination attempts esis of neo-Kantianism, nor to fully discuss on Kaiser Wilhelm I, as a bulwark against the all the topics of his splendid book in this re- socialists and democracy. Beiser proves that view. Instead, only a few more important as- Windelband had formulated such a view be- sessments can be given. Positive aspects, like fore 1878 and that he was actually advocat- the rehabilitation of all the thinkers and their ing a “full enlightenment” which would make philosophical relevance mentioned above, “every individual think for himself”. definitely give his book the highest value. The last chapter (pp. 531–571) of Beiser’s Therefore, only some problems and issues book is dedicated to Alois Riehl, who, un- that were encountered during the reading will like Cohen or Windelband, never became the be given below. father of a neo-Kantian school but had a big One of the characteristics of Beiser’s general following. His major work was Der philoso- overviews of particular periods or movements phische Kriticismus in three volumes (1876, in the history of philosophy is his heavy focus 1879, 1887), “one of the classics of the neo- on theoretical philosophy which leaves his Kantian tradition” whose goal was to affirm readers with an impression that practical phi- the existence of things-in-themselves and to losophy is of lesser importance. This is par- reinterpret Kant’s philosophy in the spirit of ticularly sensitive in the case of Kant who did modern science. Beiser challenges the com- gave priority to theoretical philosophy, but he mon view that Riehl was a positivist and also gave the primacy to practical philosophy. throughout the chapter stresses both positiv- Kant’s first Kritik clearly shows that empiri- ist and anti-positivist sides of his philosophy. cal sciences threatened to destroy the unique He finds the first traces of Riehl’s realism in place of philosophy and its question of value his early work Realistische Grundzüge (1870) already in the 18th century. However, most of and stresses that in his early years he adopted Beiser’s book is concerned with metaphysics , opposed to dualisms, and epistemology and the reader is left with a and . According to Beiser, Riehl pre- false impression that the neo-Kantians didn’t ceded psychology of and the really concern themselves with ethics or aes- interpretative psychology of thetics which were cut off from their theoreti- with his conception of philosophy whose ob- cal deliberations. This is a false impression ject should be the content of consciousness. because Beiser completely left out those neo- By realising the tensions between his defini- Kantians whose main field of expertise was tion of philosophy as psychology and his ad- practical philosophy. In the first place one mittance that Kant’s project was essentially should mention Austrian philosopher Robert epistemological, Riehl’s conversion to Kant Zimmermann who opened philosophically became complete, which can be seen in the interesting debates in aesthetics but was men- first volume of Der philosophische Kriticis- tioned only in a footnote as a teacher of Riehl mus. In the first part he followed Cohen in (the same case was in Köhnke’s book). In re- reconstructing the historical Kant but gave ality Zimmermann was active at the time of much more importance to British empiricism, Fischer and Zeller, he would hold lectures on through which he criticized positivists. He af- the history of philosophy for decades in Vi- SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen 61 (1/2016) pp. (207–220) 215 enna, and in them he would give central place didn’t prevent him from claiming, for exam- to Kant. Moreover, Zimmermann would in- ple, that Lange was at first a Herbartian and fluence generations of through- only later became a Kantian (pp. 359, 463). out the Habsburg Monarchy and that means a The second is Beiser’s claim huge part of Central Europe. This opens an- that a “good Kantian” adheres to Kant’s ethics other problem, and that is Beiser’s exclusive (p. 403), although all of the thinkers he dis- focus on Germany, while the Habsburg Mon- cusses actually rejected his formalistic ethics archy, which would reform its universities ac- and some of them embraced sentimentalism cording to Humboldt’s in the or . Similar, but minor examples Revolution of 1848, was completely left out. can be found in the chapter on Meyer who advocated theism but adored Voltaire and de- There is also an issue concerning Beiser’s ism (pp. 348, 351), or on early Windelband lack of interpretations and a conclusion to the who thought that logic should completely book. Although there are many places where steer away from metaphysics and psychol- he engages in fierce debates, there are also ogy but warned that it should “not completely many places where he just reiterates works at isolate itself” from them (p. 521). There are length without discussing their philosophical also some minor mistakes in historical facts, importance or his own stance, for example, for example, claim (p. 255) that Zeller is fa- parts of Herbart’s metaphysics or Beneke’s mous for his Grundriss der Geschichte der rejection of universal moral principles. Some griechischen Philosophie (his most important of his interpretations are antiquated, which work is actually Die Philosophie der Griechen is mostly seen in his interpretation of British in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung) or that philosophy. Thus he follows older scholars the Second Reich existed already in the late in claiming that Hume’s Treatise of Human 1860s (p. 349). Beiser also sometimes men- Nature has an anthropological foundation, tions important facts for neo-Kantianism but although most contemporary scholars agree leaves them unexplained, like the Kantian that Hume is thinking of philosophy of school of orthodox dogmatic theologians (pp. and epistemology rather than philosophical 365–366). It should be noted, however, that when he is discussing the “hu- those are rare examples in Beiser’s otherwise man nature”. There are similar issues when it consistent account. comes to a discussion of Hume’s skepticism, The book itself is clearly and beautifully the sentimentalism of Hutcheson, Hume, and written. There are only a few mistakes like Smith (as if they held completely identical repeated (“that that” /p. 158/ “upon upon” /p. views), or their “relativistic” ethics (pp. 164, 488/) or dropped words (“[in] Lange’s later 171, 282). Beiser has also left out detailed philosophy”, /p. 362/). There are some prob- historical connections between philosophers, lems with German and translation, like the reaction of speculative idealists to for example, it should be Auflage der Ges- arguments of the “lost tradition”, or the fact chichte des Materialismus, not Auflage des that some neo-Kantian philosophers, like Zel- Geschichtes des Materialismus (p. 83), Jahr- ler and Fischer, were also important for the hundert, not Jahr hundert (p. 145), der alles philosophers of the “new establishment” and Zermalmende (!) means the all-crushing, not were active during that time, which alters the “old destroyer” (p. 208), zweite Auflage chronological structure of the book. Some- instead of Zweiter Auflage (p. 312), and so times it seems that the book was written with on. A bigger difficulty might be the index of an intention of being a contribution to con- names which is incomplete and so the reader temporary Kant scholarship in the USA as cannot find important figures like Marx, En- much as a historical investigation. However, gels, or Zimmermann that are mentioned in a this doesn’t have to be an issue and Beiser’s book. Concerning the physical aspects of the book doesn’t have to be read as a detailed hardcover volume, the binding seems reliable historical study, but as a series of elegantly and the design of the dust jacket stands out and seriously written philosophical portraits among the editions of the Oxford University or essays which are connected by some major Press. themes like the decline of psychological in- It can be safely concluded that the positive terpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy aspects greatly outweigh the flaws of profes- th in the 19 century Germany. sor Beiser’s book which will become una- Careful readers will also encounter some con- voidable for anyone who wants to understand tradictions and in the book. One not only the neo-Kantian movement but also contradiction is a constant tension between much of which emerged defining Herbart as an independent thinker from the ruins of speculative idealism in the and a Kantian, and philosophers under his in- second half of the 19th century. fluence as Herbartians or Kantians. Although Beiser thinks that Herbart was a Kantian, that Matko Globačnik