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"Hermann Cohen's History and Philosophy of Science" Lydia Patton Department of Philosophy McGill University, Montreal October, 2004 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree ofPh.D. © Lydia Patton 2004 Library and Bibliothèque et 1+1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l'édition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada Your file Votre référence ISBN: 0-494-06335-1 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 0-494-06335-1 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans loan, distribute and sell th es es le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, électronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. ln compliance with the Canadian Conformément à la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privée, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont été enlevés de cette thèse. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. ••• Canada TABLE OF CONTENTS AB ST RACT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PREFACE Hermann Cohen 1842-1918 INTRODUCTION PART ONE Cohen and Early Neo-Kantian Epistemology: The Trendelenburg-Fischer Debate Chapter One Questions ifEpistem%gy: Genetic and Critica/ Accounts ifRepresentation 1.1 Hermann von Helmholtz's sign theory 1.2 A debate on Helmholtz's theory of space 1.3 The Trendelenburg-Fischer debate ChapterTwo Genetic and Critica/ Methods in History 2.1 Johann Friedrich Herbart's psychology 2.2 Volkerpsychologie, a Herbartian school 2.3 Cohen's way forward: the historical method for knowledge critique PARTTwo Hermann Cohen's History and Philosophy of Science Chapter Three The ùifinitesimal method 3.1 The Infinitesimal Method 3.2 History and System Chapter Four Cohen 's history and philosopf?JI of science 4.1 Cohen's mature philosophy of science 4.2 Atomism and dynamism 4.3 Hertz's theory 4.4 Cohen's final argument CONCLUSION ApPENDIX BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 AB ST RACT In my dissertation, l present Hermann Cohen's foundation for the history and philosophy of science. My investigation begins with Cohen's formulation of a neo-Kantian epistemology. l analyze Cohen's early work, especially his contributions to 19th century debates about the theory of knowledge. l conclude by examining Cohen's mature theory of science in two works, The Principle of the Irifinitesimal Method and ifs History of 1883, and Cohen's extensive 1914 Introduction to Friedrich Lange's History of Materialism. In the former, Cohen gives an historical and philosophical analysis of the foundations of the infmitesimal method in mathematics. In the latter, Cohen presents a detailed account of Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics of 1894. Hertz considers a series of possible foundations for mechanics, in the interest of finding a secure concep tuaI basis for mechanical theories. Cohen argues that Hertz's analysis can be completed, and his goal achieved, by means of a philosophical examination of the role of mathematical principles and fundamental concepts in scientific theories. Ma dissertation porte sur la fondation de l'histoire et la philosophie de la science présentée par Hermann Cohen. Mon enquête début avec l'articulation de Cohen d'une épistémologie néo-kantienne. Dans ce contexte, j'analyse le travail de Cohen au début de sa carrière, particulièrement ses contributions aux débats de la 19ème siècle à propos des théories de la connaissance. En conclusion, j'examine la théorie de la science mature de Cohen, dans ses deux travails: Le principe de la méthode irifinitésimale et son histoire de 1883, et son Introduction de 1914 au livre de Friedrich Lange, L'Histoire de la Matérialisme. Dans le premier, Cohen donne une analyse philosophique et historique de la méthode infinitésimale dans le mathématique. Dans son Introduction, Cohen présente une perspective détaillée sÛt le livre de Heinrich Hertz de 1894, Les principes de la mécanique. Hertz considère une série des fondations possibles pour la mécanique, avec le but de trouver une fondation conceptuelle. Cohen pense que l'analyse de Hertz peut être complétée avec une analyse philosophique du rôle des principes de la mathématique, et des concepts fondamentaux, dans les théories scientifiques. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This text was written at McGill University with the support of the working group "Kant et N éokantisme: Vers une Lecture Intégrée." My fInal term of work in 2004 was supported generously by the David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton Disser­ tation Fellowship. Previous years were supported by McGill Major Fellowships (1997-2000) and a Max Binz Recruitment Fellowship (1996-7). At McGill, l am indebted above aIl to Alison Laywine, whose friendly aid and precise comments were invaluable to my work on ali aspects of the thesis-where these covered as wide a range as discussions of the Trendelenburg-Fischer debate, of HeIrnholtz's work in physiology, and of Cohen's work and the history of neo-Kantianism in generaL Michael Haliett's stimulating comments made my work much more precise, and he steered me toward crucial texts that l would otherwise have been in danger of over­ looking. Emily Carson gave ever helpful and encouraging comments on various drafts, and helped me to sharpen my argument along the way. Claudine Lefort was an indispensable source of information about the ins and outs of McGill. Don Howard never wavered in his support for my project, whether that support took the form of suggestions on the direction or focus of my research, or of providing penetrating comments on Cohen's argument and its historical context. Stephen Menn's frequent curiosity about what, exacdy, was at issue between Trendelenburg and Fischer helped bring my argument into sharper focus. My correspondence with Ulrich Sieg "aus den stillen Marburg" provided many inteliectualleads. Daniel Breazeale was always available for discussions of things transcendental. Brian van den Broek worked with me through the texts of the background to the development of the calculus. Ulrich Sieg, Klaus Kühnke, Jean Leroux, and Claude Piché provided important manuscripts of their work. Jamie Tappenden offered valuable comments and information on the 19th century context. l am grateful to Alex Barber, Alan Kim, Brian van den Broek, and Rene Jagnow for comments on drafts and for stimulating discussion of Cohen's thought. Eddie Paul and Sharon Lax of the Jewish Public Library in Montreal and Viola V oss of the Leo Baeck Institute in N ew York provided access to archives of German Judaica and materials on Cohen. As always l am grateful for the support of my family. 3 PREFACE Hermann Cohen was born on the 7th of April 1842 in Coswig. His father, Gerson Cohen, was cantor at the synagogue and teacher at the local Jewish school, and was in fact Cohen's first teacher.1 The senior Cohen was the only teacher at the yeschiva in Coswig.2 Cohen belonged to one of the first generations of Jewish students in Coswig to whom a secular education was available.3 In 1853 Cohen attended the gymnasium in nearby Dessau, supported by the income from his mother's hat shop. In 1857 he moved to the rabbinical seminary in Breslau, from which he soon departed in favor of secular philosophy at the Breslauer Universitiit.4 There he had 1 In the foIlowing biographical sketch 1 have taken the foIlowing as basic sources: Orlik 1992, Sieg 2003, Cohen 1939. Aiso see KinkeI1924, Liebeschütz 1970, Rosenzweig 1937, Cohen 1928. AIl translations from these sources are my own. 2 Heymann Steinthal, one of the founders ofVolkerpsychologie, was also a student of Gerson Cohen's. He undertook a study of the Coswig yeschiva upon Hermann Cohen's death, and has the foIlowing to say: "Der Vater hatte eine Jeschiwah besucht und war in profanen Wissenschaften ein Autodidakt. Er hatte diese aber so gründlich betrieben, dafi er franzosischen Unterricht ebensogut erteilte wie hebraischen und deutschen, dafi er le guide des égarés ebenso flott las wie den More newuchim [that is, he read Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed in French as weIl as in Hebrew] ... Gerson Cohen, der Vater des groBen Philosophen, lehrte aber nicht nur fleillig, sondern er 'lernte' noch viel mehr. Wenn man ihn nicht in einem groBen Folianten vertieft fand, so war er mit einem deutschen Klassiker oder mit einem naturwissenschaftlichen Buche beschaftigt. Er war in politischer Beziehung Demokrat. .. Er war aber auch Sozialist: Sein Dienstmadchen mufite am Familientische die Mahlzeiten mit einnehmen. Endlich war er Patriot. lm J ahre 1870 ging er trotz seiner groBen Frommigkeit an dem bei Beginn des Krieges abgehaltenen Bettag in die Evangelische Kirche, da fur die nur noch wenigen jüdischen Familien in der Synagogue kein Gottesdienst abgehalten werden konnte" (SteinthaI1918, 223).
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