DOCSLIB.ORG

Wert, Rechtheit and Gut. Adolf Reinach's Contribution To

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library Wert, Rechtheit and Gut. Adolf Reinach’s Contribution to Early Phenomenological Ethics by James H. Smith, M.Litt. Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Presented to: The Department of Philosophy National University of Ireland, Maynooth 28th February, 2013 Head of Department of Philosophy: Dr Michael Dunne Supervisors: Dr Mette Lebech & Dr Cyril McDonnell Dedicated to the memory of Dr Thomas A. F. Kelly, who taught me what philosophy is and why it is so very important. i C O N T E N T S Preface vii Acknowledgements viii Abbreviations ix INTRODUCTION 1 Section One: Reinach’s Life and Legacy 3 Section Two: Ethics in Reinach’s Philosophy 7 Section Three: The Significance of the Concept of ‘Contribution’ 10 Section Four: Methodology 12 Section Five: Structure 13 CHAPTER I Primary Sources and a Review of 16 Literature on Reinach’s Philosophy Section One: Timeline of Reinach’s Known Works 17 1.1.1 1904–1905 17 1.1.2 1906–1909 18 1.1.3 1910–1911 19 1.1.4 1912–1913 21 1.1.5 1914–1917 24 Section Two: Selected Sources for Reinach’s Work on Ethics 25 1.2.1 ‘Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik’ 25 1.2.2 ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung 29 1.2.3 ‘Grundzüge der Ethik’ 35 1.2.4 ‘Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes’ 39 Section Three: Editions, Biographical Sources and Translations 45 1.3.1 Compiled Editions of Reinach’s Work 46 1.3.2 Biographical Sources 47 1.3.3 English-Language Translations 48 Section Four: Secondary Literature 49 1.4.1 Critical Studies 49 1.4.2 Works Dealing with Reinach’s Ethics 53 1.4.2.1 The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach 54 1.4.2.2 ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische 55 Aspekte in der Rechtsphilosophie Adolf Reinachs’ 1.4.2.3 ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of 57 Law’ Section Five: Concluding Remarks 59 ii CHAPTER II The Philosophical Background to Reinach’s Ethics 60 Section One: What is Early Phenomenology? 61 2.1.1 Origins of Early Phenomenology 63 2.1.2 The Transcendental Turn and Later Phenomenology 68 2.1.3 Characteristics of Early Phenomenology 71 Section Two: Early Influences 72 2.2.1 Aristotle 73 2.2.1.1 Aristotelianism and Phenomenology 73 2.2.1.2 Aristotelian Ethics 74 2.2.1.3 Aristotle and Reinach 77 2.2.2 Kantian Philosophy 78 2.2.2.1 Kantian Philosophy and Phenomenology 79 2.2.2.2 Kant’s Ethics 81 2.2.2.3 Kant and Reinach 83 2.2.3 Franz Brentano 85 2.2.3.1 Brentano and Phenomenology 86 2.2.3.2 Brentano’s Ethics 88 2.2.3.3 Brentano and Reinach 92 2.2.4 Theodor Lipps 92 2.2.4.1 Lipps and Phenomenology 93 2.2.4.2 Lipps’s Ethics 93 2.2.4.3 Lipps and Reinach 96 Section Three: The Phenomenological Movement 97 2.3.1 Early Phenomenological Ethics 98 2.3.2 The Munich Circle 99 2.3.2.1 Johannes Daubert 100 2.3.2.2 Alexander Pfänder 101 2.3.3 Edmund Husserl 102 2.3.3.1 Husserl’s Ethics 103 2.3.3.2 Husserl and Reinach 105 2.3.4 Max Scheler 106 2.2.4.1 Scheler’s Ethics: Christian Values and Ethical 108 Personalism 2.2.4.2 Scheler and Ressentiment 109 2.2.4.3 The Axioms of Scheler’s Ethics 110 2.2.4.4 Scheler’s Value Theory 111 2.2.4.5 Scheler’s Theory of the Person 114 2.2.4.6 Scheler on Good and Evil 115 2.2.4.7 Religion and Scheler’s Ethics 116 2.2.4.8 Scheler and Reinach 117 iii 2.3.5 Dietrich von Hildebrand 118 2.3.5.1 Von Hildebrand’s Ethics 119 2.3.5.2 Von Hildebrand and Reinach 123 Section Four: Concluding Remarks 124 CHAPTER III Critical Discussion of Reinach’s Works on Ethics 125 Section One: The Foundations of Reinach’s Ethics 127 3.1.1 The Meaning of Ethics 128 3.1.2 The Objective Attitude 130 3.1.3 Object and Objectivity 131 Section Two: The Structure of Reinach’s Ethics: The Three Spheres 135 3.2.1 The Sphere of Moral Values 138 3.2.1.1 The Meaning of Value 139 3.2.1.2 The Experiencing of Values 140 3.2.1.3 Value and Demand 141 3.2.1.4 Moral Values and their Bearers 143 3.2.1.5 The Role of Values in Ethics 144 3.2.1.6 Critique 147 3.2.2 The Sphere of Moral Rightness 150 3.2.2.1 The Meaning of Moral Rightness and the Formal 153 Moral Law 3.2.2.2 The Role of the Sphere of Rightness in Ethics 156 3.2.2.3 Moral Obligation and Duty 158 3.2.2.4 Critique: The Inaccessibility of the Formal 161 Moral Law 3.2.2.5 Burkhardt’s Criticism 166 3.2.3 The Sphere of Goods 170 3.2.3.1 The Role of the Sphere of Goods in Ethics 173 3.2.3.2 The Potential of the Sphere of Goods 174 Section Three: The Mechanics of Reinach’s Ethics: 178 Motivation, Reflection and Freedom 3.3.1 Autonomy and the Personal Structure 179 3.3.2 Action versus Project 181 3.3.3 Consequences and Value-Modification 182 3.3.4 Moral Value and Personal Interest 184 3.3.5 The Structure of Willing 186 3.3.6 The Ethical Significance of Reflection 188 Section Four: Analysing Reinach’s Work on Ethics 194 3.4.1 The Question of Objectivity 196 3.4.2 The Question of Fallibility 198 Section Five: Concluding Remarks 200 iv CHAPTER IV Assessing Reinach’s Contribution to Early 201 Phenomenological Ethics Section One: Preparing for the Assessment 202 4.1.1 The Meaning of a Contribution 202 4.1.2 Ethics and Meta-Ethics 203 4.1.3 Reinach’s Ethics as a Phenomenological Ethics 206 Section Two: The Originality of Reinach’s Work 207 4.2.1 Reinach and Scheler: Comparative Discussion 209 4.2.2 Values and Their Role in Ethics 213 4.2.3 The Sphere of Rightness and the Formal Moral Law 214 4.2.4 The Sphere of Goods 216 4.2.5 Meta-Ethics 217 4.2.6 The Theory of Social Acts 220 4.2.7 The Concerns of Ethics and Those of the Philosophy of Law 222 Section Three: The Influence of Reinach’s Ethics 225 4.3.1 Dietrich von Hildebrand 226 4.3.2 Edith Stein 229 4.3.2.1 Stein and Ethics 230 4.3.2.2 Stein’s Value Theory 231 4.3.2.3 Community Ethics 234 4.3.2.4 The State and Law 235 4.3.2.5 Stein and Reinach 236 4.3.2.6 The Influence of Reinach’s Ethics on Stein’s 237 Philosophy 4.3.3 The Wider Field of Phenomenological Ethics 239 Section Four: Towards Assessing Reinach’s Contribution to Ethics in General 242 4.4.1 Criteria for Assessment of an Ethics 243 4.4.2 Questions Facing a Reinachian Ethics 247 4.4.2.1 Does Reinach plausibly answer the questions of 247 ethics? 4.4.2.2 Does a Reinachian ethics provide a basis for 248 making normative statements? 4.4.2.3 Does a Reinachian ethics provide a means of 249 resolving moral dilemmas? 4.4.2.4 Is a Reinachian ethics capable of accounting for 250 ethical disputes? 4.4.2.5 What do Reinach’s comments on ethics have to 252 offer the wider field? Section Five: Concluding Remarks 253 Conclusion 254 Bibliography 259 v A P P E N D I C E S Appendix (I) Preface to the Translations 270 Glossary of Terms 271 Appendix (II) ‘Grundbegriffe der Ethik’/ ‘The Basic Concepts of Ethics’ 276 Appendix (III) ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung’/ 284 ‘Reflection: Its Ethical and Legal Significance’ Appendix (IV) ‘Grundzüge der Ethik’/ ‘Basic Features of Ethics’ 375 vi PREFACE This thesis contains references from sources in both English and German. Where titles or quotations from German texts are given in English, the translation is my own unless otherwise indicated. I have also quoted from existing translations of Reinach’s works where it is possible and appropriate to do so. The thesis also contains quotations of passages from the works translated in the appendices. These are referenced to the relevant page and paragraph of the source text in volume I of Reinach’s Sämtliche Werke (S.W.). These page numbers are reproduced in line with the text of the translations in the appendix indicated. Some passages quoted from the Sämtliche Werke contain notes inserted by the editors. Likewise, some quotations from existing translations contain notes inserted by the translator. For clarity, these notes have been left in the original square brackets, i.e. [], while my own editorial notes are indicated with braces, i.e. {}. Italic text in quotations from appendices (II) and (IV) does not indicate emphasis, but instead distinguishes between the transcripts used to reconstruct the texts in Sämtliche Werke. The precise meanings of these typefaces and other formatting details in the translations can be found in appendix (I). vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank, first of all, my co-supervisors, Dr Mette Lebech and Dr Cyril McDonnell.
Recommended publications
  • Empathy, Mirror Neurons and SYNC

    Empathy, Mirror Neurons and SYNC

    Mind Soc (2016) 15:1–25 DOI 10.1007/s11299-014-0160-x Empathy, mirror neurons and SYNC Ryszard Praszkier Received: 5 March 2014 / Accepted: 25 November 2014 / Published online: 14 December 2014 Ó The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract This article explains how people synchronize their thoughts through empathetic relationships and points out the elementary neuronal mechanisms orchestrating this process. The many dimensions of empathy are discussed, as is the manner by which empathy affects health and disorders. A case study of teaching children empathy, with positive results, is presented. Mirror neurons, the recently discovered mechanism underlying empathy, are characterized, followed by a theory of brain-to-brain coupling. This neuro-tuning, seen as a kind of synchronization (SYNC) between brains and between individuals, takes various forms, including frequency aspects of language use and the understanding that develops regardless of the difference in spoken tongues. Going beyond individual- to-individual empathy and SYNC, the article explores the phenomenon of syn- chronization in groups and points out how synchronization increases group cooperation and performance. Keywords Empathy Á Mirror neurons Á Synchronization Á Social SYNC Á Embodied simulation Á Neuro-synchronization 1 Introduction We sometimes feel as if we just resonate with something or someone, and this feeling seems far beyond mere intellectual cognition. It happens in various situations, for example while watching a movie or connecting with people or groups. What is the mechanism of this ‘‘resonance’’? Let’s take the example of watching and feeling a film, as movies can affect us deeply, far more than we might realize at the time.
  • Tomasz Bekrycht*

    Tomasz Bekrycht*

    ACTA UNIVERSITATIS LODZIENSIS FOLIA IURIDICA 90, 2020 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6069.90.05 Tomasz Bekrycht* https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8944-6257 THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMIZING LAW IN ADOLF REINACH’S PHENOMENOLOGY Abstract. When speaking about legitimizing law we can mainly mean analysis which concerns metaphysical justification for what is called the phenomenon of law. From the metaphysical point of view, the justification of law means indicating the foundation of its existence. It is about seeking (indicating) an esse (essence) basis of law, in line with the task set by the metaphysical analysis, namely seeking an answer to the question: Why does object X exist? And in the answer, there will appear a formula indicating the final reasons for its existenceratio ( essendi). The same ideas that we can find in Adolf Reinach’s principal work,The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law, provide a possibility of better understanding this important issue of legal philosophy, namely the question of legitimizing law (justifying law). The aim of this article is to present that argument. Keywords: legal phenomenology, legitimizing law, positive law, speech acts theory, soziale Akte. INTRODUCTION The same ideas that we can find in Adolf Reinach’s principal work, The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law, provide a possibility of better understanding an important issue of legal philosophy, namely the question of legitimizing law (justifying law). If we enrich and complete these ideas with similar remarks from Roman Ingarden’s ontology, we can, in my opinion, give quite a coherent and convincing argument on this issue. In the introduction to his main work, Reinach stated “[…] we may hope that the apriori theory of right (die apriorische Rechtslehre) can here and there make a clarifying contribution even to the history of law.
  • Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow*

    Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow*

    1 Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow* Raphaël Millière École normale supérieure, Paris – October 2011 Translated by Mark Ohm with the assistance of Leah Orth, Jon Cogburn, and Emily Beck Cogburn “By metaphysics, I do not mean those abstract considerations of certain imaginary properties, the principal use of which is to furnish the wherewithal for endless dispute to those who want to dispute. By this science I mean the general truths which can serve as principles for the particular sciences.” Malebranche Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion 1. The interminable agony of metaphysics Throughout the twentieth century, numerous philosophers sounded the death knell of metaphysics. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and, henceforth, Hilary Putnam: a great many tutelary figures have extolled the rejection, the exceeding, the elimination, or the deconstruction of first philosophy. All these necrological chronicles do not have the same radiance, the same seriousness, nor the same motivations, but they all agree to dismiss the discipline, which in the past was considered “the queen of the sciences”, with a violence at times comparable to the prestige it commanded at the time of its impunity. Even today, certain philosophers hastily spread the tragic news with contempt for philosophical inquiry, as if its grave solemnity bestowed upon it some obviousness. Thus, Franco Volpi writes: ‘Grand metaphysics is dead!’ is the slogan which applies to the majority of contemporary philosophers, whether continentals or of analytic profession. They all treat metaphysics as a dead dog.1 In this way, the “path of modern thought” would declare itself vociferously “anti- metaphysical and finally post-metaphysical”.
  • Reinach and Kantorowicz: Justice, Phenomenological Realism and the Free Law Movement

    Reinach and Kantorowicz: Justice, Phenomenological Realism and the Free Law Movement

    ACTA UNIVERSITATIS LODZIENSIS FOLIA IURIDICA 90, 2020 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6069.90.07 Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray* REINACH AND KANTOROWICZ: JUSTICE, PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM AND THE FREE LAW MOVEMENT Abstract. Adolf Reinach met and befriended Hermann Kantorowicz in one of Lujo Brentano’s political economy seminars during the 1901/1902 academic year at the University of Munich. After Munich, Kantorowicz would go on to be a major contributor to the Free Law Movement (Freirechtsbewegung) in Germany and play an important role in the development of the sociology of law in the 20th century. Reinach encountered the work of Edmund Husserl while studying with Lipps and later became central to the phenomenological movement in Göttingen. But all the while he remained interested in and focused on issues related to justice. His last scholarly publication before leaving for battle in WWI, Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (The a priori Foundations of Civil Law, 1913) published in the very first edition of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) is a testament to this. Here we see Reinach taking his phenomenological education and applying it to entities of justice. I believe Kantorowicz inspired this lasting interest in matters of justice. This essay will focus on the influence of Kantorowicz on Reinach, and while doing so attempt to flesh out and contrast the ways in which these two men sought to overcome the problems of justice (Recht) of their time. Many of these problems still continue to be relevant today. Keywords: Reinach, Kantorowicz, Justice, Free Law, Phenomenology.
  • Chapter IV Positive Law and the Idea of Freedom

    Chapter IV Positive Law and the Idea of Freedom

    http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-410-6.04 Chapter IV Positive law and the idea of freedom Tomasz Bekrycht* 1. Introduction The content of this study is provided by the analysis of the phenomenon of positive law as a precondition for implementing one of the fundamental values of our culture, namely the idea of freedom. This analysis will be undertaken according to the assumptions of the method of the phenomenological analysis as a methodological tool for describing the basic concepts of the selected areas of reality. The purpose of this method is to cognitively reach the fundamental ontological categories and to describe this result by means of possibly unambiguous terms, so that — as the phenomenologists assume — firstly, there was fully revealed to us the object of cognition and, secondly, to avoid the errors of categorical transition, namely in order not to relate the cognitive results of a given ontological category to another category. The fact that in the history of jurisprudential thought there is being constantly analysed the issue of a full understanding of the phenomenon of positive law, is the outcome of a certain need resulting, on the one hand, from continuous efforts to develop unambiguous answers to currently posed questions and, on the other hand, from the fact that the object of cognition escapes our understanding. This dialectical movement which has been given to us for at least twenty-five centuries, not only in relation to the concept of positive law, but also to a number of basic categories analysed in the context of the social sciences and humanities, and which since the Enlightenment has appeared with the ideal of the so-called scientific knowledge and the program of ‘disenchantment of the world’,1 affects * University of Łódź; The following text was prepared as a part of a research grant financed by the National Science Center (Poland), No.
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Copyright C 2020 by the Publisher 2.4 Collective Intentionality and Social Ontology

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Copyright C 2020 by the Publisher 2.4 Collective Intentionality and Social Ontology

    pdf version of the entry Edith Stein https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/stein/ Edith Stein from the Spring 2020 Edition of the First published Wed Mar 18, 2020 Stanford Encyclopedia Edith Stein (1891–1942) was a realist phenomenologist associated with the Göttingen school and later a Christian metaphysician. She was a Jew of Philosophy who converted to Catholicism in 1922 and was ordained a Carmelite nun in 1933. She died in Auschwitz in 1942. She was subsequently declared a Catholic martyr and saint. She campaigned publicly on issues relating to women’s rights and education. Stein is known philosophically primarily for her phenomenological work on empathy and affectivity, her contributions as research assistant to Edmund Husserl, and her Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson philosophical anthropology. She was in discussion with leading Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor philosophers of her day, including Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Conrad- Editorial Board https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html Martius, Ingarden, and Maritain. Her work contains original approaches to empathy, embodiment, the emotions, personhood, collective intentionality, Library of Congress Catalog Data and the nature of the state. In her later work, Stein developed an original ISSN: 1095-5054 philosophy of being and essence that integrated Husserlian Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- phenomenology and Thomist metaphysics. bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized 1. Life and Work distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the 2.
  • Reinach and Bolzano: Towards a Theory of Pure Logic

    Reinach and Bolzano: Towards a Theory of Pure Logic

    Reinach and Bolzano: Towards A Theory of Pure Logic KIMBERLY JARA Y, WHfrid Laurier University The work of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) on states of affairs, judgment, and speech acts bears striking similarities to Bernard Bolzano's (1781- 1848) work in the area of general logic. It is my belief that these similarities suggest that Reinach used Bolzano's logical work to assist with his own. Three considerations support this view. First, Bolzano's work in Die Wissenschaftslehre ( Theory of Science) was considered by Husserl to be the necessary foundation for any work in logic. Second, Bolzano's logic was a suitable alternative to Immanuel Kant's in that he formulated his essential relations as inexistent yet real, not Platonic or belonging to a transcendental realm. Third, Reinach did not openly criticize Bolzano 1 in the manner he did the Austrians of the Brentano school, suggesting that Bolzano's logic was more complementary with his own. 2 Due to his untimely death in 1917, Reinach's work on states of affairs and logic remains incomplete, some of it even lost or destroyed. I shall here offer a few brief remarks about Husserl as he was Reinach's mentor and friend, but an in depth discussion of the differences between Rein­ ach and Husserl will not be offered in this paper. Secondary literature tells us that Reinach admired Husserl's Logical Investigations, in which phenomenology was said to concern itself with "primarily the discovery of the terra firma of pure logic, of the Sachen (things) in the sense of objective entities in general
  • Adolf Reinach: an Intellectual Biography1

    Adolf Reinach: an Intellectual Biography1

    Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography1 Karl Schumann and Barry Smith From: K. Mulligan, ed., Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1987, 1–27. §1 PROLOGUE As early as 1741 a Jekel Reinach is mentioned in the Memory Book of the Jewish community in Mainz, and by the end of the century the Reinachs were already one of the most notable and well-to-do Jewish families in the city.2 The Record of Names of 1808 lists Salomon (formerly Seligmann) Reinach, Jacques (Mayer Herz) Reinach, Marx (Mayer Herz) Reinach, and Bernard Jacques (Beer Jacob) Reinach.3 The descendants of Jacques Reinach spread from Mainz to Frankfurt and from there to Paris. His grandson Adolf von Reinach (1814-1879), Belgian consul in Frankfurt, was created an Italian Baron in 1866, and founded 1 The few existing published biographies of Reinach are, if not unreliable (Oesterreicher 1952), then at best very succinct (Avé-Lallemant 1975, 172-74, Crosby 1983, XI-X). In compiling the present essay we have used in particular Reinach’s letters to Husserl (Husserl Archives) and to Conrad and Daubert (Bavarian State Library, Munich). We draw further on Avé-Lallemant’s Catalogue of the Münchener Phänomenologennachlässe, on Schuhmann’s Husserl-Chronik (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), and on the pertinent Vorlesungsverzeichnisse of the University of Göttingen. We have also profited from the “Historical Introduction” to Brettler 1974, 1-15. References not given in full here are to be found in the Reinach bibliography on pp. 299-332 below. We would like to thank the Bavarian State Library, the Husserl Archives, Louvain, and Oberarchivrat Schütz of the Stadtarchiv Mainz for providing copies of relevant materials.
  • Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values Dale Hobbs Jr

    Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values Dale Hobbs Jr

    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values Dale Hobbs Jr. Marquette University Recommended Citation Hobbs, Dale Jr., "Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values" (2017). Dissertations (2009 -). 740. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/740 INVESTIGATIONS OF WORTH: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUES by Dale (D.J.) Hobbs A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, WI August 2017 ABSTRACT INVESTIGATIONS OF WORTH: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUES Dale (D.J.) Hobbs Marquette University, 2017 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a clear and compelling account of the existence and nature of values within a phenomenological context. Values such as beauty or virtue are certainly a major part of our experiential lives. After all, what would life be worth if we could never describe a painting as beautiful, for example, or a beverage as delicious? Nevertheless, understanding what these values are on their own terms has historically been a rather difficult task. Certainly, they are not ordinary objects that could be seen or heard, touched or tasted, like the physical objects to which they seem to be connected in some mysterious way. In this dissertation, I argue that a phenomenological approach enables us to give a solid account of the role that values play in experience. Working in dialogue with Husserl and other phenomenologists and related thinkers (especially Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann), as well as with recent commentary, I develop my own account of values as lying on the phenomenological “horizons” of experience.
  • Eugen Enyvvari's Road to Göttingen and Back

    Eugen Enyvvari's Road to Göttingen and Back

    Final submitted version, published as Varga, Peter Andras: “Eugen Enyvvari’s Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian Participation in Early Phenomenology (with an Appendix of Edmund Husserl’s Two Unpublished Letters to Enyvvari).” Studies in East European Thought 69, no. 1 (2017): 57–78 [publication date: March 2017]. © All rights reserved by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Deposited in the Open Access repository of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (http://real.mtak.hu/) under obligation imposed by the employer, in accordance with the Copyright Transfer Statement. Unauthorized copying is forbidden. Please quote the final published version! “The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11212-017-9272-2”. Eugen Enyvvari’s Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian Participation in Early Phenomenology Abstract: Despite attending Husserl’s classes, his participation in the discussions of the Göttingen phenomenological circle, and his prolific writings on phenomenology, Eugen Enyvvari (1884-1959) seems to have been virtually ignored by phenomenological scholarship. I use an array of unpublished sources and a survey of his juvenilia to reconstruct Enyvvari’s biography and intellectual formation, including his confrontation with Melchior Palagyi’s critique of Husserl and Bolzano. Based on both his reports and records from the Göttingen University Archives, I attempt to establish the influences to which he could have been exposed in Göttingen. I rely on a careful micro-analysis of the development of Husserl’s notion of noematical meaning around Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen in order to asses Enyvvari’s specific contribution to phenomenology and his significance from the point of view of the general historiography of phenomenology.
  • 101 Empathy and Dyspathy with Androids: Philosophical

    101 Empathy and Dyspathy with Androids: Philosophical

    Konturen II (2009) 101 Empathy and Dyspathy with Androids: Philosophical, Fictional and (Neuro-)Psychological Perspectives Catrin Misselhorn University of Tübingen The fact that we develop feelings towards androids, i.e., objects with a humanlike appearance, has fascinated people since ancient times. However, as a short survey of the topic in history, science fiction literature and film shows, our emotional reactions towards them are ambivalent. On the one hand, we can develop feelings of empathy almost as we do with real human beings; on the other hand, we feel repulsion or dyspathy when those creatures show a very high degree of human likeness. Recently, Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori coined the term “uncanny valley” to refer to this effect. The aim of this essay is, first, to give an explanation as to why we feel empathy towards androids although we know that they do not have feelings themselves. This presupposes a perception-based concept of empathy which is going to be developed on the basis of some of Theodor Lipps’ ideas. The second question to be answered is why empathy with androids turns into dyspathy when they become very humanlike. As I will argue, this is due to a particular kind of interference between perception and the imagination when confronted with very humanlike objects. This makes androids quite special objects right at the divide between humans and non-humans. They are non-human, but we feel ill at ease when treating them as mere objects. 1. Emotional responses towards androids The human capacity to feel emotions towards inanimate objects that are humanlike – emotions which we normally only feel towards real humans—has fascinated people since ancient times.
  • Forthcoming in T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds

    Forthcoming in T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds

    Forthcoming in T. Szanto & H. Landweer (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge, 2019. Dietrich von Hildebrand Jean Moritz Müller It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “[t]he philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work1 and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In the following, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject.2 1.