“Neither Confirm Nor Deny” Doctrine in Danish-American Relations, 1957–1968
ODillesenemmas and Limits of the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” Doctrine Tango for Thule The Dilemmas and Limits of the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” Doctrine in Danish-American Relations, 1957–1968 ✣ Thorsten Borring Olesen Introduction On Sunday 21 January 1968 a U.S. B-52G Stratofortress bomber armed with four 1.1-megaton thermonuclear bombs crashed into the ice in Wolsten- holme Fjord, some ten kilometers southwest of the Thule Airbase in north- west Greenland. A ªre in the aircraft’s heating system caused the accident. When the seven members of the crew realized that the ªre could not be con- trolled, they ejected from the aircraft. Six were recovered safely, but the sev- enth, the co-pilot, who lacked an ejection seat, incurred fatal wounds during ejection.1 The B-52 minus its crew passed straight over the Thule Airbase and made a 180-degree turn before crashing against the frozen surface of Wolsten- holme Fjord. The conventional high explosives in the bombs went off on im- pact, but thanks to the inbuilt safety system no nuclear detonation occurred. However, radioactive contamination from the plutonium in the four wrecked bombs was spread on the ice at the area of impact.2 1. U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) History and Research Division, Project Crested Ice: The Thule Nuclear Accident, Vol. 1, 23 April 1969, in National Security Archive, Washington DC (NSArchive). 2. Ibid.; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 156, 180. To reduce damage from the crash, a cleanup operation, Project Crested Ice, was carried out.
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