“Neither Confirm Nor Deny” Doctrine in Danish-American Relations, 1957–1968
DiOllesenemmas and Limits of the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” Doctrine
Tango for Thule The Dilemmas and Limits of the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” Doctrine in Danish-American Relations, 1957–1968
✣ Thorsten Borring Olesen
Introduction
On Sunday 21 January 1968 a U.S. B-52G Stratofortress bomber armed with four 1.1-megaton thermonuclear bombs crashed into the ice in Wolsten- holme Fjord, some ten kilometers southwest of the Thule Airbase in north- west Greenland. A ªre in the aircraft’s heating system caused the accident. When the seven members of the crew realized that the ªre could not be con- trolled, they ejected from the aircraft. Six were recovered safely, but the sev- enth, the co-pilot, who lacked an ejection seat, incurred fatal wounds during ejection.1 The B-52 minus its crew passed straight over the Thule Airbase and made a 180-degree turn before crashing against the frozen surface of Wolsten- holme Fjord. The conventional high explosives in the bombs went off on im- pact, but thanks to the inbuilt safety system no nuclear detonation occurred. However, radioactive contamination from the plutonium in the four wrecked bombs was spread on the ice at the area of impact.2
1. U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) History and Research Division, Project Crested Ice: The Thule Nuclear Accident, Vol. 1, 23 April 1969, in National Security Archive, Washington DC (NSArchive). 2. Ibid.; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 156, 180. To reduce damage from the crash, a cleanup operation, Project Crested Ice, was carried out. Along with bomb and aircraft debris, contam- inated ice crust and snow were removed and shipped to the United States for disposal. Whether all four wrecked bombs were in fact retrieved has been a subject of debate, most recently in November 2008 when the British Broadcasting Corporation disclosed documents from U.S. archives supposedly indicating that one of the bombs might still be buried in the waters below the ice. After the BBC dis- closure the Danish government asked the U.S. government to share the documents examined by the BBC. After receiving the 348 documents, which were largely identical to a cache of 317 documents re-
Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 2011, pp. 116–147 © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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A crash involving a nuclear-armed aircraft is an awkward event. The downing of “HOBO 28,” the call sign of the B-52 that crashed at Thule, was no exception. This accident was especially awkward because it took place in a foreign country. Even though Denmark was a close U.S. ally, ofªcial policy banned nuclear weapons from Danish territory. Moreover, the accident oc- curred less than 48 hours before parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held in Denmark.
The Problem
This article discusses how the Thule crisis was handled by Denmark and the United States. The Danish government seized on the B-52 accident as an oc- casion to renegotiate the 1951 agreement concerning the defense of Green- land, a document that for the past seventeen years had regulated U.S. military activities on the island. By late May 1968 the two governments had agreed to sign a supplement to the original pact. Negotiations had been intense, and the U.S. administration clearly felt that the Danish government was exploiting the situation. This article analyzes the Danish government’s motivations in pressing for a sharp change in the way the nuclear issue was handled in rela- tion to Greenland. The article also explains why the U.S. government ulti- mately agreed to a supplementary document banning the peacetime introduc- tion of nuclear weapons on Greenland territory, including overºights. The Thule accident was a crisis involving two North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO) allies, and the way it was resolved is a reºection of the close allied relationship. The accident was also a crisis between a small state and a superpower and thus demonstrated that under certain circumstances a small power can have leverage when confronting a larger power. Last but not least, the Thule episode represented a clash between two different security policy perceptions: one local, the other global. Taken together, these themes highlight fundamental tenets of Pax Americana during the Cold War. The article is to a large degree based on the detailed analysis presented in a government-mandated report, Greenland during the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy 1945–1968, which the Danish Institute of Interna- tional Affairs (DUPI) prepared for the Danish government in 1997.3 The re-
leased by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1994, the Danish government asked the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) to scrutinize the documents to see whether they contained any new evidence. The DIIS analysis published in 2009 concluded that the large body of declassiªed sources showed that no bomb was left behind at Thule. See Svend Aage Christensen, The Marshal’s Baton: There Is No Bomb, There Was No Bomb, They Were Not Looking for a Bomb (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2009). 3. Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1968, 2 vols. (Copenha- gen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997) (hereinafter referred to as Thule Report, with ap-
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port was based on a large body of Danish and U.S. primary sources, many of them newly declassiªed and never used in research before. Following the com- pletion of the report, other U.S. documents covering the Danish-American negotiations on a supplement to the 1951 Greenland agreement were declas- siªed, and many were published in the appropriate volume of the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) document series.4 My analysis here is based on all of these primary sources as well as on the many new research publications on Denmark and the Cold War that have ap- peared in recent years.5
U.S. Strategic Interests in Greenland
Even in the nineteenth century, U.S. ofªcials viewed Denmark as a country of strategic value. Secretary of State William Seward, who was a driving force be- hind the purchase of Alaska in 1867, also actively promoted the idea of buy- ing Greenland. This idea never came to fruition, but because Danish sover- eignty over all of Greenland was not universally recognized, the Danish government made the sale of the Virgin Islands (then known as the Danish West Indies) to the United States in 1917 conditional on U.S. recognition of Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. The U.S. government agreed but noted that its recognition of Danish sovereignty did not pertain to the right of selling the island to a third party. In a court case provoked by Nor- way, the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague in 1933 ªnally accorded Denmark full sovereign powers over Greenland.6 During World War II Greenland became crucial for U.S. security in two ways. Before December 1941, the U.S. government wanted to keep
propriate volume and page numbers). The concluding chapter 18 of the report was translated into English and published separately under the title Greenland during the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy 1945–1968 (Summary), and published separately. The report was produced by a small group of researchers, including me, and was approved by the DUPI Board before being submitted to the Danish government. 4. The editorial note published as Doc. 1 in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Western Europe (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers), indicates that the publication of these 24 documents was in part a response to the publication of the Danish Thule Report. This FRUS volume is available online at http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2199.htm. 5. Presentations of recent Danish and Nordic Cold War research may be found in Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., The Cold War and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004); and Thorsten B. Olesen: “Under the National Paradigm: Cold War Studies and Cold War Politics in Post–Cold War Norden,” Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 2008), pp. 189–212. 6. Thule Report, Vol. I, p. 50; and Nancy Fogelson, “Greenland: Strategic Base on a Northern Defense Line,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1989), pp. 51–63.
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other countries from gaining military positions on Greenland, close to the Canadian and U.S. borders. Later on, after the United States joined the war, Greenland became a stepping-stone for U.S. offensive activities in the Euro- pean theater. U.S. forces built numerous military bases and meteorological stations in Greenland as authorized by the U.S.-Danish Defense Agreement of 1941. The agreement was legally unconventional, having been signed by Franklin Roosevelt’s administration and the Danish ambassador to the United States, Henrik Kauffmann. Kauffmann signed contrary to orders from Co- penhagen, where the government clung to a ªctitious neutrality despite the German occupation. The preamble stated that the agreement was rooted in the fact that “present circumstances prevent the Government of Denmark from exercising its powers in respect of Greenland,” and therefore U.S. ofªcials treated Kauffmann as a representative of the true will of the Danish king and country.7 Although the agreement was signed with a view to the speciªc war condi- tions, the United States was in no haste to leave Greenland after the war and pointed to the escape clause in Article 10 of the agreement: “This Agreement shall remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed.”8 Despite repeated ef- forts by subsequent Danish governments through 1948, the U.S. government would not concede that “the present dangers” had passed and instead offered to buy Greenland. When this option was ºatly declined, U.S. ofªcials de- manded that a new defense agreement be concluded. This U.S. insistence reºected the undiminished security attraction of Greenland in the postwar period. U.S. military planners were acutely aware that advances in long-range bomber and missile technology could make Greenland vital to U.S. security in the future for both defensive and offensive purposes.9 The inclusion of Denmark in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) eventually solved the problem. In 1951 the United States and Den- mark entered into a new bilateral defense agreement that replaced the 1941 agreement. The new agreement still gave the United States “quite a free hand” in running bases and introducing personnel and munitions into the desig- nated defense areas “free of inspection.”10 The most important aspect of the
7. The Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland is reproduced in both Danish and English in Thule Report, Vol. II, pp. 16–23. See also Bo Lidegaard, Deªant Diplomacy: Henrik Kauffmann, Den- mark and the United States in World War II and the Cold War, 1939–1958 (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 69–108. 8. “Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland,” in Thule Report, Vol. II, p. 20. 9. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 55–62. 10. The expression “quite a free hand” appears in a 1957 U.S. Department of Defense report to Presi- dent Dwight D. Eisenhower on overseas military bases. See Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig: En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961 (Copenhagen:
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new agreement was that it paved the way for the building of the Thule Air Base, which during the 1950s served as a forward staging base for the heavy B-36 bomber, as well as an operating base for reconnaissance aircraft and air refueling tankers. From 1958 through 1965 the air defenses of Thule were nuclearized, and for a brief period in 1958 four hydrogen bombs intended for air delivery were placed at Thule as well.11 The nuclear issue was a sensitive one in the Danish-American relation- ship. However, the irony is that by the time the B-52 crash near Thule in 1968 brough the nuclear issue to the forefront both publicly and in Danish- American diplomatic relations, all other nuclear weapons activities in Green- land (excepting the Airborne Alert Program) had been terminated. Had it not been for the crash, the issue might never have surfaced as a contentious prob- lem until after the end of the Cold War when a dedicated historian might conceivably have come across documents revealing U.S. nuclear activities and the opaque legal handling of this issue between the Danish and U.S. govern- ments.
Airborne Alert and the Thule Monitor Mission
The Airborne Alert Program had been in operation since the late 1950s and was designed to keep a certain number of U.S. long-range bombers in the air at all times with ready nuclear weapons on board. The initiative was the prod- uct of a growing fear within U.S. military circles that the Soviet Union might launch a surprise attack on the U.S. strategic bomber ºeet at their bases in the United States, destroying them while they were still on the ground.12 One re- sponse was to allow Strategic Air Command (SAC) to have a certain number of its strategic bombers airborne day and night, “bombed up” and ready to attack.13 The number of planes involved in the program varied from twelve daily sorties ºown in 1961, when the program was established on a permanent ba- sis, to four in 1968 when HOBO 28 crashed. However, during periods of ten-
EIRENE, 1995), p. 851. “Free of inspection” is a phrase used in article VII of the 1951 Danish-U.S. Defense Agreement Concerning the Defense of Greenland, reproduced in Danish and English in Thule Report, Vol. II, pp. 144–153. 11. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 219–239, 331–336. 12. See the “Airborne Alert” report enclosed with JCS 1899/597, 22 August 1960, in Record Group (RG) 218, CCS 3340 (23-6-60), Box 21, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, NARA. See also Ofªce of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, “Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command” (Offutt, NE, 1991), pp. 1–4; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 167–170. 13. “Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command,” p. 7.
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sion the number of B-52s on “airborne alert” was much higher. For example, up to 75 sorties were ºown daily during the Cuban missile crisis.14 The sorties were ºown along two main routes: one northern and one southern. The exact coordinates of the routes varied, but the southern route followed a course from the United States over the Atlantic to the Mediterranean area and back, whereas the northern route overºew Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, includ- ing their adjacent waters. Greenland overºights were not included in all sor- ties along the northern route but were included in two to six daily sorties in conformity with the variance in the total number of missions. The daily overºights of Greenland probably were signiªcantly increased during the Cu- ban crisis. On the other hand, they may also have been cancelled for a period in 1966 when the Airborne Alert Program was temporarily halted.15 The Airborne Alert Program was only one of a series of U.S. initiatives devised to counter the Soviet Union’s steadily increasing ability to launch nu- clear air strikes against the United States. Another program was designed to provide early warning of an airborne attack. In the 1950s a series of radars known as the Defense Early Warning (DEW) Line had been deployed in Greenland and Canada to provide early warning of a bomber attack. In re- sponse to the growing Soviet long-range nuclear missile threat, the United States also built three Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) ra- dars to warn against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The main ra- dar of the three, built at Thule Airbase from 1958 to 1960, was essential to se- cure a minimum ªfteen minutes’ warning of a Soviet missile attack on the United States.16 The BMEWS radars were vital for SAC’s ability to assess the nature of an attack and eventually to retaliate. Therefore the BMEWS itself was expected to be one of the ªrst targets in a massive Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.17 Because of this, U.S. planners wanted to safeguard their communications
14. The intensiªcation of the airborne alert program during the Cuban missile crisis is noted in “His- tory of Strategic Air Command July 1962–June 1963,” Historical Study, No. 92, Vol. VI (Exhibits), SAC 1964, in Air Force Historical Research Agency (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL) (AFHRA). 15. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 374–385; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 156–203. 16. In 1968 a joint State Department/Pentagon statement sent to the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen described the essential position of the Thule BMEWS: “Although there are three BMEWS sites, one each located in Alaska, Greenland and England, Thule’s central position provides primary coverage of the most logical approach route for Soviet ICBM’s and covers a gap which exists between the other two sites except at relatively high altitude and extreme range.” See Department of State to American Embassy Copenhagen, Telegram, “Subject: Thule BMEWS Site,” 1 April 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 15 Greenland-US, NARA. 17. Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), pp. 96–99; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 156–203.
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with the Thule BMEWS radar. Beginning in 1961, SAC established a special mission within the general Airborne Alert Program to ensure that an airborne B-52 would always have visual contact with the Thule BMEWS. To fulªll this requirement, SAC arranged an Airborne Alert ºight route over Thule whereby a B-52 on “Monitor Mission” would orbit for hours until it was re- placed by another B-52. The precise purposes of Operation Hard Head, the codename for the Thule Monitor Mission, were: a) Maintaining visual and/or electronic surveillance of the Thule BMEWS site. b) Providing Higher Headquarters with information regarding the status of the Thule BMEWS, including rearward communication, to permit an evaluation of the capability of Thule in providing attack informa- tion over BMEWS. c) Reports submission... d) All supervisory and crew personnel will insure that safe operating pro- cedures are adhered to in all aspects of this operation... e) Conduct airborne alert operations with the capability of destroying se- lected targets when so directed.18 HOBO 28 was ºying such a mission when it went down at Thule in 1968.19 The crash of HOBO 28 underscored the hazards involved in the pro- gram. Two years earlier, a similar accident occurred near the small Spanish ªshing village of Palomares.20 In response to that crash, President Johnson re- duced the Airborne Alert Program from twelve sorties a day to four and can- celled all ºights along the southern route. As far back as 1965, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had advocated a halt to the program, which he increasingly viewed as too costly, too dangerous, and less important in the
18. 4042D Strat. Wing, 1–31 August 1962, Appendix “4042D Strategic Wing—Hard Head—Serial No. 23-62”: “Annex A Air Operations: Mission Requirements,” in AFHRA; also reproduced in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 73, pp. 373–379. 19. SAC History and Research Division, Project Crested Ice, p. 1; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 170–173. 20. The Palomares accident was caused by a collision between a B-52 and a KC-135 tanker jet. The B-52 exploded, and its cargo of four nuclear bombs fell to the ground. One of the bombs disappeared into the Mediterranean Sea, sparking a frantic search operation that lasted three months until the missing bomb was retrieved. The Palomares accident, unlike at Thule, happened in a densely popu- lated area. Moreover, all seven crew members in Palomares were killed, and the cost of the cleanup op- eration in the wake of the accident vastly exceeded that of Thule. See SAC History and Research Divi- sion, Project Crested Ice, p. 39; “Message of Reassurance to Foreign Minister Castiella,” Action Memorandum from John Leddy (EUR) to The Secretary, 1 February 1966, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–73, DEF. 17 US, Box 1716, NARA; and State Department to the Embassy in Madrid, Tele- gram, 20 January 1966, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–73, DEF. 17 US, Box 1716, NARA. See also Sagan, The Limits of Safety, p. 178.
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missile age.21 SAC leaders strongly resisted, but after the Thule accident they had no choice but to give in.22 Even then, for another six months the Airborne Alert continued with B-52s that were not carrying nuclear weapons on board. Eventually SAC es- tablished a new program known as Selective Employment of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA), which limited the carrying of nuclear bombs on B-52s to sit- uations of crisis and high tension.23
Danish Nuclear Policy
The year 1957 marked the beginning of a period in which Denmark ofªcially banned the stationing of nuclear weapons on Danish soil “under present con- ditions,” as was usually added. This policy, which by the beginning of the 1960s was ªrmly entrenched, has been continued to the present day. The es- sential implication of the policy was that Denmark would not receive or store nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime. The initial formulation of this stance occurred as a response to the nuclearization of NATO strategy from the mid-1950s.24 Of the NATO coun- tries, Denmark was the most skeptical about the new strategy, but this stance did not become a point of contention until the U.S. government in March 1957 approached NATO with an offer to supply two nuclear-capable missile systems, Honest John and Nike-Hercules. The U.S. government put consid- erable pressure on Denmark to accept the offer, and the Social Democratic minority government yielded to the pressure and accepted the introduction of
21. Dept. of Defense, “Subject/Issue Consideration FY 1967 Budget,” January 1966, in Record No. 69198 (NSA); and JCSM-872-65, 9 December 1965, “Memo for the Secretary of Defense,” in Record No. 69198 (NSA), Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National Security File, Memos for the Presi- dent (Walt Rostow), Vols. 3, 5, Box 8, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX, (LBJL); SAC History and Research Division, Project Crested Ice;; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 178–79. 22. In early 1968, Brigadier General Marshall B. Garth of the National Military Command Center stated: “On 22 January 1968, SAC terminated the carrying of nuclear weapons aboard airborne alert indoctrination level missions. No publicity is being given this fact.” See “Memorandum for the Re- cord: Subject B-52 Crash,” 24 January 1968, in Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National Security File, Box 168, Folder: Denmark, Cables Vol. 1 11/63–1/69, Doc. 25, LBJL; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 193–198. 23. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 383–84; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 195–198. 24. The following account is based on Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, pp. 499–625; and Thorsten Borring Olesen and Poul Villaume, “I blokopdelingens tegn 1945–1972,” in Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, Vol. 5 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 295–313, 552–575. For Denmark’s general NATO policies, see also Poul Villaume, “Denmark and NATO through 50 Years,” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 29–61; and Nikolaj Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliance: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO,” in G. Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO—The First Fifty Years (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 275–293.
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the missile systems. However, the Danes did so only on the condition that the missiles would not be equipped with nuclear warheads, thus forestalling the introduction of nuclear weapons into Denmark. This interpretation was made explicit when the Social Democratic Party in May 1957 entered a majority coalition government with two smaller, cen- trist parties, the Radicals and Retsforbundet. In his opening address in Parlia- ment, Prime Minister H. C. Hansen stated, “During the negotiations on the delivery of modern weapons to Denmark, nuclear ammunition has not been proposed. Should such a proposal come forward, the Government is agreed that it should not be received under the present conditions.”25 Hardly a masterpiece of exactness, the constant repetition of the formula “no nuclear arms under the present conditions” in subsequent years gave it a more solid foundation, not least because the government also acted in accor- dance with it. Even though Danish ofªcials backed NATO’s far-reaching decision at the Paris meeting of December 1957 to place nuclear missile forces under the command of NATO’s Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) and likewise consented to the idea of establishing nuclear storage facilities for individual member-states’ forces, Denmark all the same (along with Norway) declined for its own part to receive and store nuclear ammuni- tion and warheads. This position was further anchored in a broad, ªve-party defense agreement of 1960 that foresaw an increase in Denmark’s conven- tional capability but reafªrmed the earlier decision not to permit the storage of nuclear weapons and ammunition on Danish soil. By being part of this agreement, the liberal and conservative opposition parties stepped into line behind the nuclear ban policy. From then on a broad political consensus ex- isted about this issue. Several factors account for the Danish policy. First, even after joining NATO, Danish policymakers were generally skeptical about inºexible deter- rence policies, in part because they realized that Denmark would be particu- larly vulnerable and exposed in a conºict with the Soviet Union. This percep- tion was motivated by the smallness of Denmark’s territory, by the country’s proximity to the borders of the Soviet bloc, and by the concern that NATO would in the end be unable or unwilling to defend Denmark. The ultimate fear was that, in the event of a nuclear conºict, Denmark would be wiped out on day one.26
25. See the minutes from the Danish Parliament in Folketingstidende (1956–1957), 29 May 1957, Coll. 7. The three coalition parties took a similar position in the mutually agreed, ofªcial government declaration. See Tage Kaarsted, Regeringskrisen 1957: Et studie i regeringsdannelsens proces (Århus, Den- mark: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), p. 157. 26. Recent research has convincingly argued that although the Danish nuclear ban policy was devised with a view to its non-provocative and reassuring dimensions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Moscow’s re-
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Domestic political considerations also played their part. Historically, the Social Democratic Party had been vehemently anti-military, but this stance had been relaxed in step with the progressive “nationalization” of the party in the interwar period (the party was in an uninterrupted government coalition with the Radicals from 1929 to 1940) and not least as a result of the experi- ence of the German occupation of Denmark from 1940 to 1945. Thus, Den- mark was brought into NATO in 1949 by a Social Democratic minority gov- ernment. On the other hand, leading Social Democrats had not abandoned their taste for internationalism, arbitration, and disarmament. They had dis- carded the idea of unilateral disarmament, but the Social Democratic rank- and-ªle were still deeply skeptical about national defense and NATO.27 The parliamentary logic of Danish politics was also crucial in shaping the Danish nuclear policy. Because the Radical Party was the preferred coalition partner of the Social Democrats—and a swing party that usually decided whether a Social Democrat or a Liberal-Conservative government would be formed—its inºuence on the political agenda was disproportionate to its size. The Radical Party was keenly internationalist, but at the same time also strongly anti-military. The party had been formed in 1905 when it broke away from the Liberal Party because of disagreements about defense issues, and it had not reevaluated its positions on security issues after the World War II experience in the same way the Social Democrats had, as evidenced by the Radicals’ opposition to Danish NATO membership in 1949. As a govern- ment coalition partner the Radical Party took responsibility for the new de- fense agreement of 1960, and thus, indirectly, for Danish NATO member- ship, but the party’s indispensability as a coalition partner in the period 1957– 1966, coupled with its pronounced skepticism toward nuclear weapons, was important for bolstering the Social Democrats’ opposition to nuclear weapons on Danish soil during this formative phase of Danish nuclear policy. Finally, in the 1960s additional factors such as the relaxation of interna- tional tensions, pressure from the growing anti-nuclear movement and con- siderations of the so-called Nordic balance further contributed to solidify the Danish nuclear weapons ban. Nevertheless, the policy was contradictory. De- spite the ban on nuclear weapons on Danish soil during peacetime, Danish
lentless and vociferous attempts to inºuence Danish policy were not what prompted the formulation. See Danmark under den kolde krig: Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945–1991, 4 vols. (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), Vol. I, pp. 293–332; and Jonathan Søborg Agger, “Ikke-provokation, beroligelse og afspænding: Karakteren af dansk imødekommende politik over for Sovjetunionen 1949–1969,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Copenhagen, 2007, pp. 115–158. 27. Thorsten Borring Olesen, “Jagten på et sikkerhedspolitisk ståsted: Socialdemokratiet og holdnin- gerne til sikkerhedspolitikken 1945–1948,” in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen, ed., Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politik efter 1945 (Odense: Odense University Press, 1994), pp. 15–54; and Olesen and Vil- laume, “I blokopdelingens tegn,” pp. 91–125.
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armed forces were trained in the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear am- munition storage facilities were built in both Denmark and Norway under the agreement that these facilities would also be constructed to store conven- tional ammunition and that the construction did not entail an obligation to store nuclear ammunition. Most important, of all, the establishment of a Joint NATO Command for the Baltic Approaches in 1961 entailed the setting-up of an integrated Danish-German defense of the Danish-German- Baltic area. This arrangement signiªcantly strengthened the defense of Denmark but also created a dilemma because West German forces were conªgured with nuclear tactical weapons whereas the Danish forces were not.28
Greenland and Danish Nuclear Policy
In domestic Danish debates the dilemmas and contradictions involving nu- clear weapons were less controversial because they did not violate the core of the nuclear policy that nuclear weapons should not be introduced into Den- mark in peacetime.29 Therefore, in the 1960s most attention focused on other aspects of the nuclear issue, such as the Multilateral Force; port calls of nu- clear armed, U.S. naval vessels in Denmark; and the issue of nuclear weapons in Greenland an issue brought to the fore by HOBO 28’s crash. For a while the issue of nuclear weapons in Greenland was out of the public eye, although public attention grew somewhat in the 1960s. The se- crecy stemmed from the controversial nature of the issue and the fact that Danish governments came to apply a double standard in their nuclear policy depending on whether the issue had relevance for Denmark or for Greenland. In that regard, path dependence of the issue, with a double standard intro- duced at the beginning, was decisive. The crucial episode in setting the double standard was the so-called H. C. Hansen paper from November 1957.30 H. C. Hansen was a Social Democrat, a staunch NATO supporter, and both prime minister and foreign minister in the newly formed coalition government with the Radicals and Retsforbundet. The paper was a response to a delicate question which the
28. Olesen and Villaume, “I blokopdelingens tegn,” pp. 552–575. 29. Non-nuclear aspects were often equally controversial. For example, the decision to create a joint Danish–West German command came under heavy criticism, primarily because of concerns about co- operating with German military forces so soon after World War II. 30. The H. C. Hansen paper is reprinted in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 54, p. 301. See also Nikolaj Petersen, “The H. C. Hansen Paper and Nuclear Weapons in Greenland,” Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1998), pp. 21–44.
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U.S. ambassador to Denmark, Val Peterson, had directed to the prime minis- ter: Did the Danish government want to be informed if the U.S. government introduced nuclear weapons into Greenland? The paper—which Hansen characterized as “informal, personal, highly secret,” and which had the form of a unilateral statement in response to “some remarks” made “some days ago” by Peterson—is in many ways a masterpiece of the diplomatic discipline of hide-and-seek. Hansen more or less repeated Peterson’s points of view before concluding: “You did not submit any concrete plans, nor did you ask ques- tions as to the attitude of the Danish Government to this item. I do not think that your remarks give rise to any comments from my side.”31 The U.S. approach to the problem indicates that the U.S. government proceeded from the assumption that it was legally entitled to introduce nu- clear weapons into Greenland.32 This right was seen to be granted in the de- fense agreement of 1951. However, the defense agreement was not clear on this issue, entitling the United States “within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto:...toconstruct, install, maintain and op- erate facilities and equipment...andtostore supplies,” but without any spe- ciªc mention of nuclear weapons.33 Even if a legal rationalization could have been devised, the State Department and especially Ambassador Peterson did not want to go along with the Pentagon’s suggestion that they proceed with- out consulting the Danes. The discussions within the Eisenhower administration reveal that U.S. ofªcials were acutely aware of the Danish government’s dilemma. The admin- istration was up-to-date on the new ofªcially stated policy in Denmark not to receive nuclear weapons, and it was precise in questioning whether the Dan- ish government wanted to be informed if the United States went ahead and stored nuclear weapons in Greenland. This understanding did not restrain the United States in its determination to station nuclear weapons in Greenland, but it helped to shape U.S. strategy. Thus, the main advantages of the admin-
31. The delicate balance between asking and not asking (on the part of the United States) and between answering and not answering (on the part of Denmark) nourished speculation that the choreography of the episode rested on a prearranged diplomatic accord. However, no hard evidence has been found to sustain such an interpretation. See Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 281, 291. 32. The interdepartmental U.S. deliberations on whether to consult the Danish government before introducing nuclear weapons into Greenland can be traced in a series of documents from the U.S. State Department’s Ofªce of the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy (RG59, Lot Files 57D 688, Folder: Denmark, Box 2, NARA). The documents are reproduced in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 57– 60, pp. 305–310. 33. See Article II, 3b(ii) of the “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Concerning the Defense of Greenland,” in Thule Report, Vol. II, p. 146. Nikolaj Petersen, in “The H. C. Hansen Paper” (p. 28), stresses that the U.S. delegation negotiating the 1951 agreement had no authority to negotiate the nuclear issue.
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istration’s chosen approach were that it presented the issue as if the United States had an indisputable right to introduce nuclear weapons and that it did not furnish the Danish government with precise and burdensome informa- tion. It also established a political alibi in case something went wrong. Hansen’s statement, on the other hand, must be interpreted as an indirect green light to the U.S. plans, although he tried to distance himself from any personal and concrete responsibility in his concluding remarks. But he also went out of his way to make sure that the U.S. government would do every- thing within its power to keep the episode secret.34 Hansen likewise took steps to keep the episode secret within the Danish government. Only the director of the Foreign Ministry’s bureaucracy, Nils Svenningsen, was involved in the drafting of the statement.35 The episode was never brought before the parlia- mentary committee on foreign relations, and even a central ªgure like Jens Otto Krag did not learn about it until some time after he had become foreign minister in 1958. In an entry in his diary dated 25 August 1959, Krag notes that he was “disturbed by H. C.’s, Svenningsen’s tacit green light to the storing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland.”36 Hansen’s and Svenningsen’s decision not to take issue with the U.S. plan to introduce nuclear weapons into Greenland no doubt stemmed from their view that blocking the U.S. initiative would have been impossible on either legal or political grounds (or both). If this was the basic premise, secrecy was considered urgent for two reasons. First, Danish ofªcials wanted to keep the presence of nuclear weapons in Greenland secret from the Soviet Union in or- der to minimize the risk of political and military pressure against Denmark. Second, domestic political considerations necessitated secrecy. Hansen likely feared that informing the coalition partners in his government and the parlia- ment’s committee on foreign relations (which the government was constitu- tionally bound to do) would lead to a split within the government and possi- bly to its breakdown. Security concerns and parliamentary concerns were probably considered to be interdependent. The dilemma was further exacerbated by the U.S. poli- cy of neither conªrming nor denying the whereabouts of its nuclear arsenal. If the Danish government had publicly announced that the United States had obtained the right to store nuclear weapons in Greenland, questions would have arisen about whether this meant nuclear weapons were actually present in Greenland. Failure to provide an answer to this question would have fueled
34. This information is based on Peterson’s communications to the U.S. State Department. See Dep- uty Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansªeld D. Sprague, 26 November 1957, in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 60, p. 310. 35. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 296–299. 36. Ibid., p. 279.
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existing criticism that Denmark was not able to exercise its sovereignty over Greenland. Although the United States did introduce various nuclear weapons sys- tems into Thule, the precise nature of the nuclearization of Greenland was not known by the leading government representatives at the time—nor did they do much to ªnd out about it. On the other hand, some Danish ofªcials, notably the Danish liaison ofªcer at Thule, did send information to senior ofªcials indicating that nuclear weapons were present.37 The “broken arrow” emergency landings (i.e., emergency landings involving mishaps with nuclear weapons, usually minor ones) that took place from time to time at Thule in the 1960s were reported to the Danish foreign minister. Foreign Ministry documents from 1964 and 1967 reveal that these landings were of great con- cern but also that Danish ofªcials believed it would be unwise to seek precise information about the “ºights.” A conªdential Foreign Ministry report from 1967 recommended that emergency landings—if they someday came to pub- lic light—not be considered a violation of Denmark’s nuclear policy but a problem caused by the general lack of airªelds in the Arctic.38 The implied as- sumption was that a B-52 that landed at Thule did so because of a “broken ar- row,” not because the “broken arrow” happened while the B-52 was already ºying in Greenland air space. This assumption was handy but dubious and could hardly have been shared by Prime Minister Krag. During a visit to SAC headquarters in Omaha in 1966 he allegedly watched displays of the Airborne Alert routes and even had telephone contact with one of the B-52s ºying over Greenland.39 This analysis indicates that from at least 1957, Danish governments op- erated with two nuclear policies: one that covered continental Denmark and included a nuclear ban (with a certain pragmatism on the issue of naval visits); and another that covered Greenland and did not include a de facto ban.40 Danish/Nordic concerns related to NATO’s new European strategy in the late
37. For a general discussion of these aspects, see ibid., pp. 421–439. 38. Ibid., p. 396. 39. Ibid., p. 390. This incident is known only from information supplied by Krag’s accompanying permanent under secretary, Eigil Jørgensen, in an interview. 40. The U.S. embassy in Copenhagen reached the same conclusion in an analysis sent to the State De- partment in April 1964: “Denmark’s position in regard to nuclear weapons is somewhat paradoxical. Danish national policy prohibits nuclear weapons on ‘Danish soil.’ On April 8 Prime Minister Krag again reafªrmed this policy before Danish Folketing. However, despite constant reiteration of fact that Greenland is ‘integral part of Denmark,’ there has been no formal or informal mention of implicit nu- clear capability of USAF deployments in Greenland. To date Danes privately and publicly have studi- ously avoided any discussion or comment that could be construed to mean prior knowledge or suspi- cion that as regards Greenland US has, is currently or may in the future violate Danish prohibition against nuclear weapons on ‘Danish soil.’” Embassy Copenhagen to State Department, Telegram (SecState 673), 16 April 1964, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 1 US, NARA.
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1950s, along with parliamentary maneuvering, resulted in the nuclear ban policy. U.S. documents show that leading Danish military ofªcers shared the view that in the 1950s and 1960s Denmark operated a “con” policy for the continental territory and a “pro” policy for Greenland. The Danish ofªcers acknowledged this discrepancy in conversations with diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen in the wake of HOBO 28’s crash, whereas the Dan- ish government defended the “universal” nature of the nuclear ban.41 Some scholars have argued that a closer examination of the precise word- ing used by Hansen, Krag, and other leading government ofªcials shows that they were at least not lying to the public when they presented Denmark’s poli- cy as one of nuclear denial. This type of argument rests on a distinction be- tween the terms “Denmark,” “the Danish Realm” and “Danish territory.”42 In ofªcial usage, the word “Denmark” can designate the entire Danish realm or just one part of it, namely continental Denmark as opposed to The Faroe Is- lands and Greenland. If the term was applied in the more restrictive way, the nuclear ban may have had a certain legitimacy and substance. However, this kind of distinction is too semantically sophisticated to have been grasped by the wider public and is therefore of dubious legitimacy even if it was em- ployed consistently. The questionable legitimacy of the distinction is further underscored by the observation that Danish ofªcials often were unable to keep distinctions clear and increasingly slid from concealment into overt misinformation about the true nature of the nuclear policy in Greenland.43 The Thule report sums up the situation:
The American discretion related to the positioning of nuclear weapons in Greenland and the special conditions applying to the making of Danish nuclear policy had the consequence that only few persons knew with certainty that the Americans had introduced nuclear weapons into Greenland and overºew Green- land with nuclear weapons. Even fewer had precise information about the (polit- ical) foundation for the American nuclear operations in Greenland. On the other hand the group of people who had suppositions about Ameri- can nuclear operation in Greenland must have been very large. It numbered
41. Amembassy Copenhagen to SecState Washington, Telegram No. 3281, Subject: “Danish Nuclear Policy; Remarks of Rear-Admiral Thostrup C-in-C Danish Navy,” 14 February 1968; and Amem- bassy Copenhagen to SecState Washington, Telegram No. 3436, Subject: “B-52 Crash; Danish Nu- clear Weapons Policy,” 23 February 1968, both in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 1 US, NARA. These documents formed the background for an article in the Danish press. See Hans Davidsen-Nielsen and Simon Andersen, “Grønland stod uden for dansk atompolitik,” Jyllands-Posten, 28 June 1999, p. 1. 42. For an elaborate attempt to pursue these distinctions, see Svend Aage Christensen “Den hårde nød: Grønland og dansk atomdoktrin 1957–1968,” Working Paper, Danish Institute for Interna- tional Studies, May 1998. 43. Ibid.; and Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 434–435, 448–450.
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maybe, in fact, all those who worked at the bases in Greenland and those who would come to touch upon this aspect of Danish security policy as part of their work.44 In fact, the group of individuals who suspected that nuclear operations were going on in Greenland may have included most of the politically conscious segment of the Danish population.45 From the standpoint of domestic politics, this situation hardly presented a great problem. Danes from the continent were accustomed to accepting dif- ferent standards and rules for Denmark and Greenland. However, the ofªcial position became vulnerable as subsequent governments, pressured by journal- ists and opposition parties in the 1960s, were forced to issue statements that, despite semantic safeguards, were interpreted to mean that the Danish nuclear policy with its ban against nuclear weapons on Danish soil applied also to Greenland. The full extent of this semantic sleight of hand was revealed by the B-52 crash in January 1968.
The B-52 Crash: Diplomatic Crisis and Compromise
The Danish government was informed of the Thule accident in the early morning hours of 22 January 1968.46 The news was extremely unpleasant in itself and was badly timed because of the national elections slated to be held the following day. Furthermore, the ªrst reports were rudimentary and dis- closed very little about the radiation hazard, the issue that preoccupied the Danish government more than anything else. The immediate reaction of the government was to postpone an ofªcial communiqué about the accident for as long as possible. The U.S. government had forwarded a text for a joint communiqué, but
44. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 438–439. The individuals who knew with certainty about the nuclear overºights or the introduction of nuclear weapons into Greenland varied over time. The group was probably larger in 1967 than in 1960 and consisted of high-ranking military ofªcers, senior civil ser- vants, and a few leading politicians. Documents released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and included in an article in the Jyllands-Posten newspaper give shape to this picture. The documents reveal details about a meeting in Copenhagen in February 1962 between a U.S. military delegation and thirteen high-ranking Danish ofªcers and civil servants from the Foreign Ministry and the Minis- try of Defense. The participants openly asked about the civil implications of ªring the Nike-Hercules ground-to-air-missiles in the Thule area. See Hans Davidsen-Nielsen and Simon Andersen, “Sådan skulle vi lære at elske bomben,” Jyllands-Posten, 4 July 1999, p. 1. 45. In the late 1950s, articles in the Danish and U.S. press hinted at the presence of nuclear weapons in Greenland. Some journalists went further, depicting the presence of nuclear weapons as a fact. Gos- sip among Danish workers returning from Thule probably spawned the rumors, as did the recurrent critical questioning in parliament. 46. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account is based on Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 451–484.
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the Danish government found it inadequate. The draft did not address the danger of radiation and what U.S. authorities had done to monitor it. (The Danish government knew this would be the key issue in the Danish media storm when the news got out.) In addition, the draft did not explain that the accident had occurred during an emergency landing. When the U.S. government ªnally issued the communiqué at 3:36 p.m. Danish time (9:35 a.m. U.S. eastern standard time, or EST), the ªrst objec- tion had not really been met, although the text had been modiªed to accom- modate the second. The text read as follows:
A U.S. Air Force B 52 bomber accidentally crashed at approximately 3.40 p.m. EST Sunday on the Ice of North Star Bay some seven miles southwest of the runway at Thule Defense Area, Greenland. The aircraft was attempting an emergency landing. Seven crewmen were listed as being aboard the aircraft which was from 380th bomber wing Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York. There are ªve known survivors who parachuted from the aircraft. Search and rescue operations are continuing. The aircraft was carrying nuclear weapons which are unarmed so that there is no danger of a nuclear explosion at the crash site. There is no damage to civilian property. The cause of the accident has not been determined. An investigation team has been sent to Thule from SAC Headquarters, Omaha, Nebraska. There are no additional details available at this time.47
As expected, the communiqué did not do much in Copenhagen to relieve the domestic political pressure on the Danish government. Both Foreign Minister Hans Tabor and Prime Minister Krag issued short statements less than two hours after the release of the communiqué. They cited the policy banning nu- clear weapons on Danish territory and stressed the incompatibility of nuclear overºights with that policy. Krag’s statement was the shorter and sharper:
It is a well-known fact that, in agreement with the policy of the government, no nuclear weapons are located on Danish territory. This is also true of Greenland, and there can therefore be no overºights of Greenland by aircraft carrying atomic bombs. It cannot however be excluded that American aircraft may at- tempt to land in Greenland in an emergency.48
The central message from Tabor and Krag was implicit but clear: Nuclear overºights were a thing of the past and were no longer allowed. The state- ments were made without consulting the U.S. government in advance, an act uncommon in Danish dealings with the Americans. However, the statement reºected the tough stance taken by the Krag government in the week after the
47. Ibid., p. 457. The communiqué was issued before the sixth surviving crew member was rescued. 48. Greenland during the Cold War (Summary), p. 32.
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crash. The harder line can also be seen in the demands that Danish nuclear physicists and radiation experts be allowed to participate in the technical and scientiªc investigations at the crash site and that Danish journalists be granted access to the Thule base area. After originally opposing these demands, U.S. ofªcials consented. The U.S. government was surprised and confused by Tabor’s and Krag’s statements, as indicated by State Department documents. On 23 January As- sistant Secretary John Leddy met Danish Ambassador Torben Rønne at the State Department. During their conversation Leddy voiced his surprise at the statements. Questioned by Rønne, Leddy repeated several times that the U.S. government did not intend to contradict or challenge the Danish pronounce- ments.49 However, a few days later this position had changed. After checking in archived records, the State Department produced an “informal record of records,” which Leddy presented to Rønne. The compilation not only in- formed the Danish government about (some of) the U.S. nuclear activities in the past but also stated that these activities, including overºights, were legally covered by the 1951 defense agreement. Moreover, the record stressed that Danish governments had known and accepted this interpretation, as evi- denced by the Hansen episode in 1957 and by a conversation in 1964 be- tween the Danish under secretary for Greenland, Eske Brun, and U.S. Am- bassador William McCormick Blair.50 The most telling feature of the U.S. “counterattack” was a “text of in- struction” that the U.S. government wanted the Danish government to follow in its future public statements about nuclear weapons in Greenland.51 This in-
49. Memorandum of Conversation (Rønne, Fergo, Leddy, Stoessel, McKillop, Klebenov), Subject: U.S. Air Force Routes, 23 January 1968, RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 17 US, NARA. Ex- cerpts are published in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 2. 50. Informal Record of Records, presented to Danish Ambassador Ronne by Assistant Secretary Leddy, 27 January 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 4. The record, with Rønne’s own com- ments, is included in a report of the same day from Rønne to Prime Minister Krag that is reprinted in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 97, pp. 451–456. The shift of position was also evidenced during a conver- sation on 28 January 1968 between Rønne and State Department ofªcials. Rønne reiterated that in April 1964 Krag had told the Danish parliament that Danish nuclear policy applied also to Green- land, prompting Leddy to reply that this statement referred to not accepting nuclear weapons on Dan- ish soil. One of Leddy’s aides promptly agreed and asked whether the statement covered Danish air space as well. See Memorandum of Conversation (Rønne, Leddy, Wyle, McKillop, Klebenov), Sub- ject: Danish Government Statement on Nuclear Overºight and Storage, 28 January 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 17 US, NARA. See also Department of State to Embassy in Den- mark, Telegram, 28 January 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 5. However, the State De- partment’s investigation was rather shoddy. The department not only failed to locate the relevant Hansen statement but relied mainly on a conversation in 1964 between the Danish under secretary for Greenland (Brun) and the U.S. ambassador (Blair) that was hardly the most convincing piece of evi- dence regarding the Danish government’s tacit consent to U.S. nuclear activities in Greenland, not least because Brun and Blair disagreed about what was said at the meeting. See Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 390–395, 475. 51. The “instruction” said, “u.s. operations in greenland are the subject of regular consultation be-
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struction was ill received by Rønne and other Danish ofªcials, who disliked being instructed by outsiders how to explain Danish foreign policy.52 More- over, the U.S. instruction implicitly took issue with the previous statements by Krag and Tabor and made clear that the U.S. government had no intention of meeting the outgoing Krag government’s principal demand that the United States should release a statement conªrming that nuclear weapons were not stored in Greenland and that nuclear overºights over Greenland were not be- ing undertaken.53 Because of the strict U.S. policy of neither conªrming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, this Danish claim was the principal item of con- tention between Copenhagen and Washington from the time of the crash un- til the Krag government was replaced by Hilmar Baunsgaard’s government on 2 February.54 Diplomatic contacts during this period were conducted in a tone of rare sharpness, as evidenced by a conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Rønne on 28 January. Rønne told Rusk that his gov- ernment considered the historical observations made in the record of records “to be without importance in the prevailing concrete situation.” Rusk turned down Rønne’s suggestion that Foreign Minister Tabor be sent to Washington for direct consultations by bluntly stating that Tabor would not be welcome.55 Rusk’s refusal to meet Tabor was a clear indication that the U.S. govern- ment was not inclined to help Krag out of his domestic predicaments at the cost of jeopardizing one of the prime pillars of U.S. security policy (the U.S.
tween the two governments and are in accord with the 1951 defense agreement as well as their respec- tive policies. the government of denmark is fully aware in this connection of its responsibilities to the danish people in greenland for their safety and defense. we are fully satisªed that the interests of the danish people are being protected.” Rønne, Personal Report for Prime Minister Krag, 27 January 1968, in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 97, p. 453. 52. Responding critically to the paper, Rønne told Leddy he was dismayed that the State Department wanted to muzzle Danish government statements on nuclear policy in Greenland after an accident for which the United States bore sole responsibility. Ibid., p. 455. 53. On 28 January, after discussing the problem for several days, and after receiving the U.S. State De- partment’s “history” record, Krag presented Ambassador Katharine White with the following text that he wanted the U.S. government to endorse: “The Danish Government which has had contacts with the U.S. government is in a position to conªrm that in conformity with the Danish atomic policy there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland and no overºights of Greenland by planes carrying such weapons are undertaken.” See attachment to Memorandum of Conversation (Rønne, Leddy, Wyle, McKillop, Klebenov), Subject: Danish Government Statement on Nuclear Overºights and Storage, 28 January 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 17 US, NARA. 54. See FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 1, which outlines the background for the Thule crisis and the publication in FRUS. of the documents related to it. On the new Danish government, see Tage Kaarsted, De danske ministerier 1953–1972 (Copenhagen: PFA Pension, 1992), pp. 355–359. The new prime minister, Hilmar Baunsgaard, belonged to the traditional Social Democratic coalition part- ner, the Radical Party. 55. Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark (Concerning Conversation Rusk-Rønne), Tele- gram, 28 January1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc 5. In the Danish version, Rusk’s response to Rønne concerning a visit by Tabor was: “He is not invited to come to Washington, and he is not ex- pected to be seen here.” Thule Report, Vol. I, p. 481.
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government also knew that the days of the Krag government were numbered). U.S. policy was summed up in a top-secret weekly report of 2 February from State Department legal adviser Carl F. Salans:
Our Ambassadors in Copenhagen and Reykjavik have been instructed to make clear to their respective Foreign Ministers that the United States is at the present time conducting no operations involving nuclear weapons in Danish and Ice- landic territory, but that our policy of neither conªrming nor denying the pres- ence of nuclear weapons prevents us from making a public statement to this ef- fect or conªrming similar statements already made by the two governments.56
The Danish government had received information about past U.S. nuclear operations in Greenland (information that likely was more precise than any previously conveyed to Denmark) and had also been notiªed that no nuclear operations were going on at present. However, this information had been given on a secret, need-to-know basis. The Krag government, which wanted to calm the Danish and Greenlander populations (and government critics) by offering a U.S.-backed public statement on the termination of nuclear weap- ons activities in Greenland, was not able to obtain even the slightest conces- sion from the U.S. government. Thus, the Danes again had to resort to a uni- lateral statement. The statement issued on 29 January was brief and kept in the present tense: “In regard to current reports that overºights of Greenland are taking place by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the Government conªrms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overºights of Greenland with nuclear weapons.”57 The statement was sent out three days before the Krag government left ofªce. Krag had probably realized by then that he was unable to inºuence matters further. The new Baunsgaard coalition government—comprising the Radicals, the Liberal Party (Venstre), and the Conservative People’s Party— thus inherited the full dilemma. The new government essentially continued in the tracks of its predecessor by operating on the same basic premise that the nuclear ban also had to be ªrmly and explicitly established for Greenland. A statement to that end was included in the new government’s opening address to the Danish Folketing, on 6 February. All the same, the focus of at- tention shifted. When the crisis was most acute, Krag had been obsessed with persuading the U.S. government to issue a declaration of the non-presence of
56. Top Secret Memorandum from Legal Adviser C. F. Salans to the Under Secretary, 2 February 1968, in RG 59, Entry 5048, box 5, NARA. The B-52 crash at Thule attracted considerable attention in Iceland, where the United States had obtained extensive base rights, especially for the Keºavik Airbase, in accordance with a joint U.S.-Icelandic defense agreement signed in 1951. See “Intelligence Note: Implications of the B-52 Crash for US-Scandinavian Military Arrangements,” in FRUS, 1964– 1968, Vol. XII, Doc 6. 57. Greenland during the Cold War (Summary), p. 33.
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nuclear weapons on Greenland territory and in its airspace, whereas the less vulnerable and exposed new government opted for a more comprehensive and long-term strategy involving a general revision of the 1951 defense treaty.58 This strategy was endorsed by the Folketing after discussions in the com- mittee on foreign relations and in the Folketing’s plenary session. On 8 Febru- ary, during the parliamentary debate, the Social Democrats introduced the following motion, which was backed by a large majority, including the gov- ernment:
In that Parliament takes it that the Government, by procuring absolute guaran- tees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland, and by ensuring in order that Greenland airspace remains a nuclear weapon–free zone, that Danish nu- clear policy is upheld in all parts of the kingdom and Danish sovereignty re- spected, the Parliament moves on to debate the ªnance bill for 1968–69.59
The content of this motion was in full harmony with the view presented by the government during a meeting in the parliament’s committee on foreign relations the day before. On 26 February the Danish government handed a conªdential note to the U.S. government asking for talks that would lead to formal recognition of the nuclear ban in Greenland. The U.S. State Department interpreted the Danish note (1) as conceding that the United States had been acting in accordance with the 1951 agree- ment; (2) as citing the inconsistency between the defense agreement and declared Danish nuclear policy, (3) as noting the Danish government’s state- ment at the opening session of parliament on 6 February and the parliamen- tary resolution against nuclear overºights and storage; and (4) as asking that discussions be initiated with a view to supplementing the 1951 agreement to prohibit nuclear storage and overºights.60 After delivering the note, Ambassa- dor Rønne suggested that the proposed supplement could be consummated
58. During the ªrst week of the crisis, Ambassador Rønne warned the State Department that the Dan- ish government might put forth more far-reaching Danish demands if U.S. ofªcials did not respond in a more accommodating manner. See Memorandum of Conversation (Rønne, Føns Buhl, Leddy, McKillop, Klebenov), Subject: Danish Government Request for Public Information on Thule Flights, 26 January 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 17 US, NARA. 59. Greenland during the Cold War (Summary), p. 34. 60. Memorandum from McKillop to Leddy, “Subject: Your Meeting with Ambassador Rønne of Den- mark, May 10,” 9 May 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 17 US, NARA. Comparing the ªrst two points of McKillop’s memorandum with the actual note Rønne gave to Rusk on 26 Feb- ruary suggests that the State Department signiªcantly overstated the Danish government’s readiness to accept the U.S. government’s view that overºights with nuclear weapons were authorized by the 1951 agreement. What the note actually said was that the Danish government had considered the lack of consistency between the Danish government’s declared policy on the one hand and the agreement of 27 April 1951 on the other. See Note from the Danish Ambassador [Rønne] to Secretary of State Rusk, 26 January 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 11. The note with the Danish govern- ment’s instruction to Rønne is also reproduced in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 100, pp. 463–466.
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through an exchange of notes and reiterated the Danish government’s request for U.S. participation in a public statement conªrming the nuclear supple- ment to the agreement. The approach chosen by the new Danish government reºected two fundamental developments: ªrst, the Baunsgaard government realized that the B-52 crash and the ensuing public debate necessitated the application of a uniform nuclear policy to the different parts of the Danish realm, which im- plied that Denmark, as the Folketing was demanding, receive “guarantees” that nuclear weapons would not be introduced into Greenland in the future; second, the U.S. government had been forthcoming in dealing with the new government. During a conversation between Rønne and U.S. Under Secre- tary Nicholas Katzenbach on the same day that the new Danish government took over, Katzenbach not only had assured Rønne that no nuclear activities were taking place on or over Greenland at the time; he had also afªrmed that the present condition could be reversed only through joint Danish-U.S. con- sultations.61 The rationale behind this change in the U.S. approach is probably dis- closed in a State Department intelligence report from 31 January. The report surveyed the implications of the B-52 crash for U.S.-Scandinavian military arrangements, concluding that if the Danish (and possibly also the Icelandic) government failed to receive adequate assurances, it “may have great difªculty in withstanding public pressure for forcing renegotiations of current base ar- rangements to have explicit guarantees against such overºights and storage of nuclear weapons written into them. If relations reach this point, Denmark and Iceland might also seek to assume greater control over all U.S. activities at Thule and Keºavik.”62 The analysis in this report underscores the State Department’s realization that public concern over the incompatibility between declared policy and ac- tual practice in Greenland in the wake of the Thule crash was widespread and, if not adequately tackled, might further deepen the Danish-U.S. crisis, with potentially grave consequences. The Danish Foreign Ministry, for its part, was considering which steps to take if the United States rejected all attempts at a dialogue. The Danes in the end decided to seek ofªcial talks to achieve a modiªcation of the 1951 defense treaty as foreseen by Article XIII(3) of the treaty. If the United States had not agreed, Denmark could in principle have
61. Thule Report, Vol. I, p. 485. 62. “Intelligence Note: Implications of the B-52 Crash.” See also Assistant Secretary of State for Euro- pean Affairs (Leddy) to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke), 17 April 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 16, in which the same rationale is stressed in U.S. interdepartmental discussions on signing a supplementary agreement with Denmark.
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terminated the agreement by leaving NATO, but this option was never seri- ously contemplated by the government.63 The core negotiations to emerge from the Danish note of 26 February were initiated in May 1968 after the issue had been debated by U.S. foreign policy and military ofªcials. The climate of discussion was generally relaxed despite some Danish impatience with the lengthy procedure and the recurrent mention of the Article XIII(3) alternative when the talks threatened to stall. There were two main areas of friction. The ªrst concerned the absoluteness of the future guarantees against the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Greenland. The second was the question of U.S. participation in a public dec- laration concerning the scope and validity of the assurances granted.64 The compromise the two parties ªnally reached consisted of a supple- ment to (not an amendment of) the 1951 agreement in the form of an ex- change of notes.65 The agreed text read,
The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the Agree- ment of April 27, 1951 concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nu- clear weapons or overºy Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons with- out the consent of the Government of Denmark.66
However, the signing of the supplementary agreement was accompanied by a U.S. oral statement rendering the text less ªnal. At the signing, Leddy insisted that in a situation of “grave and sudden threat” and under “circumstances be- yond our control,” the United States wanted to retain the right to undertake overºights with nuclear weapons without prior consultation. The Danish
63. Article XIII(3) of the 1951 agreement stipulated, “The two Governments agree to give sympa- thetic consideration to any representations which either may make after this Agreement has been in force a reasonable time, proposing a review of this Agreement to determine whether modiªcations in the light of experience or amended NATO plans are necessary or desirable. Any such modiªcations shall be by mutual consent.” The agreement is reproduced in Thule Report, Vol. II, pp. 144–153. Arti- cle XIII(3) is on p. 152. The conclusion of a lengthy Danish Foreign Ministry analysis of the legal im- plications of a unilateral termination of the 1951 agreement was that Denmark could in fact bring the defense agreement to a halt by leaving NATO. See Thule Report, Vol. I, p. 493. 64. Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark, Telegram, 13 May 1968; State Department to the Embassy in Denmark, Telegram, 18 May 1968; and Brieªng Memorandum from the Under Sec- retary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), 29 May 1968, all in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Docs. 19–21. 65. The question of whether the new settlement should be an amendment or a supplement was closely related to the question of the ªnality of the U.S.-granted guarantees. The ofªcial U.S. view was that the drafts of the Danish note anticipated such absolute guarantees that these could not be accommo- dated in a supplementary agreement and would thus necessitate an outright amendment of the 1951 agreement. U.S. ofªcials were opposed to making any amendments not only because they did not want to provide absolute guarantees but also because they did not wish to enter into a process that would open the full treaty for discussion. See ibid. 66. The note is reproduced in Thule Report, Vol. II, App. 101, pp. 467–471, and in FRUS, 1964– 1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 22.
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government accepted this statement because Leddy had stressed that the note text would be the governing instrument and that the United States “would abide by it to full extent of our ability to do so.”67 Leddy’s caveat proved to be only a minor blow to the Baunsgaard govern- ment. More serious was the government’s lack of success in persuading the U.S. government to issue a public statement underscoring its commitment to the nuclear ban. As Leddy told Rønne: “We cannot...fracture our global policy on the U.S. nuclear deterrent by publicly conªrming such a state- ment.”68 The Johnson government even demanded that the exchange of notes be kept secret. This left the Danes the option of issuing one more unilateral statement on the nuclear situation in Greenland, and they did so without prior consultation with the U.S. State Department. The central paragraph underlined that consultations in Washington had “created accordance be- tween the Greenland Defense Agreement of 1951 and Danish nuclear policy, and thus guarantee in international law that this policy be respected in Green- land.”69 This portion of the statement probably went beyond what the State De- partment would have preferred. Although the statement did not explicitly mention the supplementary agreement, its references to a guarantee in inter- national law must have fueled suspicion in Moscow and elsewhere that the Danish-U.S. consultations had been far-reaching. On the domestic scene the statement and the government’s report to the parliament’s committee on for- eign relations did their job. The Greenland question ceased to be a major area of political friction in Denmark until the 1990s, when its skeletons, spurred by critical questioning and research, were let out of the closet. The supple- mentary agreement probably also did its job. The Thule Report concludes, on the basis of all existing evidence, that the United States did observe the ban on nuclear overºights of Greenland from 1968 on.70
Conclusions and Perspectives
HOBO 28’s crash at Thule initiated a process that is aptly described as a dip- lomatic crisis. The term is appropriate not because of the existence of serious
67. Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark, Telegram, 13 May 1968; and State Department to the Embassy in Denmark, Telegram, 18 May 1968. 68. Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark, Telegram, 13 May 1968. 69. Greenland during the Cold War (Summary), p. 36. 70. Thule Report, Vol. I, pp. 384, 526. The Danish government was further heartened when Secretary of State Rusk assured Foreign Minister Poul Hartling during the latter’s visit to the State Department on 6 June that the United States had not conducted chemical or biological warfare tests in Greenland
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disagreement between the two states. Such disagreements had been experi- enced before, both over NATO policies and over the handling of U.S. inter- ests in Greenland. Rather, what turned this episode into a crisis—or at least a “critical period in relations between Denmark and the United States,” as it is described by the editors of FRUS 71—was, on one hand, the impossibility of keeping the dispute behind closed diplomatic doors and, on the other hand, the reactions of the Krag government, which surprised the Johnson adminis- tration and put the United States on the defensive. During the crisis Danish- U.S. differences were not only presented in carefully worded diplomatic ex- changes but were accompanied by unilateral actions and, on the part of Den- mark, threats to act. However, the concept of crisis is often relative, and both parties, after the initial stress in the wake of the crash had abated, were inter- ested in ªnding a compromise. Also, the Danish government never sent an ofªcial note of protest to Washington. The crisis was handled as a crisis be- tween allies. The U.S. government considered itself legally entitled to carry out opera- tions with nuclear weapons on and over Greenland and to enjoy such rights not only because of the 1951 defense agreement but also because Danish gov- ernments had tacitly accepted this interpretation. The behavior of the Danish government during the Thule crisis did not openly contradict this interpreta- tion. Its basic contention was that “history” was of no relevance because the crash had changed the situation. Thus, according to the Danish view the dis- cussion was not about U.S. rights in the past but about deªning these rights for the future. Prime Minister Krag’s claim on 22 January 1968 that nuclear weapons were not present on Danish territory, including Greenland, “and therefore overºights of Greenland cannot take place,” was deceptive because Krag was one of the few Danes with intimate knowledge of the legal background for these overºights. He knew about Hansen’s tacit acceptance in 1957 of the U.S. interpretation and possibly had obtained detailed information about the Airborne Alert Program and overºight routes. But several factors induced him to disregard the limitations of such knowledge and to try instead to set a new agenda by acting swiftly and with resolve in managing the crisis. First, the crash put him and his government in a serious dilemma. The elections scheduled for the following day forced him to act with determina- tion to counter his own and his party’s fears that the crash would produce an electoral backlash. The logic of the situation provoked a reaction that might
and would not do so in the future without prior consultation with the Danish government. See Mem- orandum of Conversation, Rusk-Hartling, 6 June 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 24. 71. “Editorial Note,” in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 1.
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have been less hurried under more favorable circumstances. However, there is good reason to believe that Krag would have chosen the same path regardless of whether elections were pending. Over the previous ten years, in his unin- terrupted tenure as foreign minister and then prime minister, Krag had been responsible for designing Danish foreign policy, including its nuclear policy. He appears to have been concerned about the inconsistencies of the Danish nuclear policy from early in his tenure. Already in 1959 he had conªded in his diary that he was worried about Hansen’s “tacit green light.” From a political point of view, the double standard had been a growing liability that came to the fore with the HOBO 28 crisis. Thus, Krag had compelling political rea- sons for bold action. Second, the determination to act boldly was helped by a sober analysis of the risks and opportunities of the moment. Krag was an experienced politi- cian with an intimate knowledge of U.S. policymaking and political culture. He sensed how awkward the U.S. position was with four damaged nuclear bombs in the ice near Thule, and this vulnerability convinced him and For- eign Minister Tabor that this was the right moment to push for a major change. Third, the statements by Krag and Tabor sent a clear message to the Dan- ish public and the United States that the Danish government was determined to end the nuclear overºights and for the ªrst time bring uniformity to the handling of the nuclear issue within the Danish realm. By stating this pub- licly, the government had also pre-committed the U.S. government to honor the policy in the future. The State Department did not react in full to this catch-22 situation for a couple of days. The belated U.S. response was the in- struction of 27 January, which was seen by Danish leaders as a condescending guide on how to speak about the Greenland question in the future. By this point, the Danish government could not turn back—even though it was al- ready acting as a weak caretaker government during the interim period after the election. Fourth, in addition to publicly notifying the Danish public and the U.S. administration, the unilateral Danish statements probably also served useful purposes with regard to the Soviet Union. The opposition to hosting nuclear weapons on Danish territory had always been rooted in a double rationale: on the one hand, a reluctance to accept nuclear weapons as such; on the other hand, the belief that Denmark would be further exposed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union if it allowed nuclear weapons onto its territory. The steps taken by the Krag government also effectively tied the hands of the new Baunsgaard government. Because of public pressure in the wake of the crash, the new government would have found it impossible to change course. Not that it needed much persuading. The new prime minister came
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from the “paciªst-inclined” Radical Party.72 However, the Baunsgaard govern- ment was not operating under the same time pressure as the Krag govern- ment, and it therefore aimed for a compromise and a more formal long-term solution that—after a series of tough but forthright negotiations—resulted in the supplementary agreement to the 1951 defense agreement signed by the two governments on 31 May 1968. From the Danish government’s point of view, a positive compromise was thus reached, limiting the boundless regula- tions of the 1951 agreement. But why did the U.S. government agree to this limitation if it was con- vinced that the 1951 agreement accorded the right to deploy nuclear weapons on and over Greenland? Several factors, short-term as well as long-term and structural as well policy-oriented, contributed to the U.S. willingness to com- promise. The Thule accident was but one among several “hot-button” foreign pol- icy problems demanding attention from the Johnson administration in late January 1968. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam was unfolding at the same time, seriously threatening to undermine the U.S. and South Vietnamese position in the war. In addition, two days after the Thule crash, the Pueblo crisis erupted when North Korean naval vessels seized a U.S. spy ship in interna- tional waters off the coast of North Korea. Both crises preoccupied decision- makers in Washington considerably more than did the Thule crash.73 All the same, the Thule crash was by no means a negligible affair. The United States had serious public relations and policy problems related to HOBO 28’s crash—problems that made it very difªcult to decline a request for negotia- tions. Second, the international ramiªcations were different in 1968 from those of 1951. The international climate had shifted from Cold War confrontation to détente, at least in Europe. Probably more important, the technological leap from the bomber era into the missile era had largely eliminated the need for nuclear operations in Greenland. The Thule crash was even seized on by some ofªcials in the Johnson administration who had long wanted a halt to the costly and dangerous Airborne Alert Program.74 Thus, changes in both technology and strategy, in combination with bureaucratic rifts within the ad- ministration, were essential for paving the way for a compromise. Third, the willingness to compromise was further stimulated by the spe-
72. “Paciªst-inclined” is the expression used in a U.S. intelligence note. See “Implications of the B-52 Crash for US-Scandinavian Military Arrangements” (see note 56 supra). 73. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), pp. 380–401, 532–538; and Dean Rusk, As I Saw It: A Secretary of State’s Memoirs (London: Tauris, 1991) pp. 335–340. 74. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
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ciªc form of the compromise. Reading the State Department’s evaluation of the new accord, one almost gets the impression that U.S. ofªcials saw it as an improvement over the existing conditions.75 The department’s evaluation has an element of “marketing” to it, but that may have been because the depart- ment had to win support from agencies (especially SAC) that were unenthusi- astic about accepting the supplement.76 A more detached analysis would have indicated that the supplement was a successful damage-control solution be- cause by signing it the U.S. government prevented a renegotiation of the en- tire 1951 agreement and thus ensured that it would retain extensive rights in Greenland. The resolution of the crisis also ensured that the activity of great- est military importance to the United States, the Thule BMEWS radar, would be left untouched.77 Equally important in the U.S. evaluation was the fact that the supple- mentary agreement did not impose an absolute ban on nuclear operations in the future. Nuclear activities could be resumed in the future if the two gov- ernments agreed. If an emergency arose, Leddy’s oral statement even allowed for unilateral action. Vital ºexibility was thus retained. Finally, the agreement was seen as a necessary and opportune tool for diverting public attention in Scandinavia away from the strong focus on the deployment and movement of U.S. nuclear weapons. Fourth, and crucial for the State Department, was the fact that the sup- plementary agreement did not bind the United States to issue public declara- tions about its nuclear weapons policy relating to Greenland. On the other hand, the Danish government’s insistence on issuing a unilateral statement, particularly such an outspoken statement, was not much appreciated by Washington. Thus, a multilayered complex of structural, technological, legal, political, and personal impulses and developments, sparked by an adscititious event (the B-52 accident), led to the signing of the supplement to the 1951 agree- ment. Furthermore, the handling of the crash episode was exceptional in comparison to how the Greenland issue was normally handled in postwar Danish-U.S. diplomatic relations. In the period 1945–1968, the United States generally held the upper hand and forced Danish governments to ªght a rearguard battle on questions of U.S. military facilities and activities in
75. Brieªng Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Un- der Secretary of State (Katzenbach), 29 May 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 21. 76. The Department of Defense in particular had doubts about accepting the new condition of the supplementary Agreement. See letters exchanged between Leddy and Warnke, February–April 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Docs. 10, 12, 16–17. 77. The high military value of the BMEWS radar is stressed in Department of State to Amembassy Copenhagen, Telegram, Subject: The Thule BMEWS Site, 1 April 1968, in RG 59, Decimal Files 1964–1973, DEF 15 Greenland-US, NARA.
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Greenland. The U.S. reluctance to leave Greenland after World War II, with the Truman administration even attempting to buy the island from Denmark (without asking the Greenlanders and thus disregarding the administration’s own otherwise high anti-colonial proªle at the time); the U.S. refusal to mul- tilateralize Greenland’s defense within the setting of NATO; and the approach taken to obtain Hansen’s green light for introducing nuclear weapons into Thule are all signs of the U.S. deªning role on issues related to Greenland.78 The traditional accommodating line taken by Danish governments vis-à- vis U.S. defense wishes in Greenland reºected the asymmetric power relation- ship between the two states. During the early phase of the Cold War, the para- mount task for the Danish government was to ensure that the United States was actively committed to the defense of Denmark. Although the U.S. activi- ties in Greenland were considered to expose Denmark as a target for Soviet war planners, the government reasoned that the greater risk lay in opposing or confronting these activities and thus alienating (and potentially being aban- doned by) the only state considered capable of guaranteeing the safety of Denmark against the Soviet Union. However, the general validity of this in- terpretation does have limits. Researchers have amply documented that Den- mark on numerous occasions did not refrain from opposing U.S. positions within NATO to the extent that it earned the reputation of a “reluctant ally.”79 Until Krag turned the tide, however, such opposition did not include issues related to Greenland. It is tempting to see this difference as the result of a disposition among leading Danish politicians to accept a double standard in the way they han- dled military issues in continental Denmark and Greenland during the Cold War. Although this explanation cannot be entirely discarded, the picture has more than one facet. The most important relates to the fact that Greenland generally was much more vital to U.S. security and strategy than continental Denmark was. Not only did U.S. ofªcials want to deny the Soviet Union any access to the island, they also regarded Greenland as a stepping stone or for- ward staging base and, increasingly, as a crucial early warning site for U.S. global military planning. Hence, the United States normally stuck rigidly to a hard line on Greenland defense issues, making it difªcult for Danish govern- ments to resist. The 1968 episode thus represents the exception to the general rule because Denmark in this case operated as the agenda-setter. U.S. security policy was shaped by a global approach, but this was only
78. For these episodes, see Thule Report, Vol. 1, pp. 72–100; Nikolaj Petersen, “Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects,” in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–28; and “The H. C. Hansen Paper” pp. 21–44. 79. See Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, pp. 841–866; and Danmark under den kolde krig, Vol. 1, pp. 719–720.
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partly the case for Danish policy. U.S. ofªcials saw no inherent contradiction between the national and the global. Rather, because the United States was a superpower, ofªcials in Washington believed that U.S. national security inter- ests were reinforced by a global approach, a link further strengthened by the technological advances in weapons of mass destruction. Containment and nuclear deterrence were instruments in this global strategy, and the mere fact that the United States in January 1968 came close to political overstretch as a consequence of the simultaneous Tet, Thule, and Pueblo crises is a reºection of the global involvement and reach of U.S. policy. As an ally, Denmark was integrated into this global strategy, but being a small state close to Soviet borders and with a strong national tradition of pre- ferring internationalism and lightly armed neutrality to power politics and military deployments, the U.S. global strategy was not always fully appreci- ated or understood in Copenhagen.80 Because of national traditions and capa- bilities, Danish decision-makers often viewed defense policy in the light of lo- cal needs and gave priority to détente over deterrence. Whereas U.S. military planners might ponder strategies for nuclear warªghting, Danish ofªcials could hardly conceive of such activities. Avoiding nuclear war was seen as the only Danish way of survival. Therefore, international conªdence-building and a rejection of nuclear weapons on Danish soil were integral parts of Danish security policy despite their mismatch with ofªcial NATO policies. By drawing on adaptation theory in a modiªed version of the classic model developed by James Rosenau and combining it with Glenn Snyder’s alliance theory, we can produce a triangular framework that helps to encapsulate Danish security policy during the Cold War (see Figure 1).81 Framed within the context of such conºicting goals, games, and consid- erations—between long-term UN internationalism and short-term adapta- tion of international and national conditions—it is no wonder that Danish security policy often contained a few contradictions. During the Thule crisis,
80. On the Danish foreign policy and defense tradition, see Hans Branner, “The Danish Foreign Pol- icy Tradition in a European Context,” in Hans Branner and M. Kelstrup, eds., Denmark’s Policy toward Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options, 2nd ed. (Odense: University Press of Southern Den- mark, 2003), pp. 185–220; Olesen and Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, pp. 746–754; and Kristine Midtgaard, Småstat, magt og sikkerhed: Danmark og FN 1949–1965 (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2005), pp. 334–375. See also Carsten Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), which presents a different interpretation from the one presented here. 81. On Rosenau, Snyder, and the general application of adaptation theory to the study of Danish for- eign policy, see Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, “Denmark’s Foreign Policy since 1967: An Introduction,” in Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, eds., Adaptation and Activism: The For- eign Policy of Denmark, 1967–1993 (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 1995), pp. 11–54; Nikolaj Petersen: “National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Theory,” Journal of Com- mon Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1998), pp. 33–54; and Danmark under den kolde krig, pp. 79–85.
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Figure 1. Determinants of Danish Security Policy-Making This ªgure is a revised version of the original in Kristine Midtgaard, Småstat, magt og sikkerhed: Danmark og FN 1949–1965 (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2005), p. 371. The distinction between the long-term ideals and short-term adaptation is inspired by Hans Branner, “The Danish Foreign Policy Tradition in a European Context,” in Hans Branner and M. Kelstrup, eds., Denmark’s Policy toward Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options, 2nd ed. (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2003), pp. 185–220.
the Johnson administration repeatedly highlighted these contradictions with particular reference to Danish nuclear policy. The director of the U.S. State Department’s Ofªce of Scandinavian Affairs, David McKillop, noted: “Dan- ish nuclear policy encompasses one basic ambiguity; i.e., on the one hand they wish to demonstrate that all Danish territory is free of nuclear weapons; on the other hand they realize that Denmark’s security ultimately depends on the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”82 At the same time it is important to recognize that Danish opposition to aspects of Western strategy and its implementation also had roots outside the security framework presented above. Concerns over national sovereignty played an important role, too. Such concerns were important in relation to
82. Action Memorandum from McKillop to Leddy, 13 February 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 8.
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the Danish refusal to host foreign troops on (continental) Danish territory during peacetime. The sovereignty issue was likewise very important each time the U.S. military presence in Greenland was debated. Tokens of U.S. formal recognition of Danish sovereignty were probably the area on which Danish negotiators were most insistent when countering U.S. demands in Greenland. The Danish reaction to the Thule crash must therefore also be un- derstood as strongly inºuenced by the fear that the accident and the U.S. re- actions to it would reveal to all the world that the Danish government did not exert full sovereignty in Greenland. The Danish local approach and the U.S. global approach clashed more fundamentally over the status of Greenland than over any other issue. Green- land had a global strategic importance that continental Denmark did not have. Therefore, the ofªcial Danish security policy doctrine, which had been shaped primarily with a view to continental Danish conditions and require- ments, was ill-suited to tackle the speciªc situation of Greenland. Greenland was simply too big, too strategically sensitive, and too far away to ªt into the local approach. Realizing this dilemma and pressured by the U.S. government for mili- tary concessions in Greenland, Danish governments accepted treating Green- land as an exception. This exceptional status also applied to the question of nuclear weapons, but only de facto, not ofªcially. Over time and after re- peated denials that Denmark operated with two nuclear policies, the contra- diction became a growing domestic liability until it was exposed by the Thule crash, which came as a blessing in disguise, both furnishing the opportunity for action and forcing the government to act in an effort to end the anomaly. Danish governments could have confronted the dilemma in a more straightforward manner earlier, either by developing an ofªcial strategic doc- trine afªrming that Greenland was part of Denmark or by renouncing its ambitions to sovereignty by selling Greenland to the United States. Because history is generally the result of more than just one-dimensional, rational cal- culation, Denmark did neither—until 1968, when HOBO 28 called the Danish bluff.
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