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Sowing the Seeds of Soviet Decline: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Carter Administration: 1977-1981

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Sowing the Seeds of Soviet Decline: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Carter Administration: 1977-1981 Sowing the Seeds of Soviet Decline: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Carter Administration: 1977-1981 Stephen Paul Keville Magdalene College, Cambridge University Re-submission Date: 06/2019 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017) 3 Preface This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. 4 Contents Introduction 7 1) Early Years 19 Formation as a scholar 19 The Permanent Purge 26 Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 36 Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics 49 2) A Budding Political Minor Player 54 Peaceful Engagement 54 Alternative to Partition 61 The Soviet Bloc 70 The Fragile Blossom 77 Between Two Ages & The Trilateral Commission 84 3) The Carter Administration 107 Background 107 Brzezinski and Kissinger: A Comparison 114 Eastern Europe and Human Rights 122 The Third World 137 Normalization of Relations with China 147 The Soviet-Afghan War 166 Assessment 196 Conclusion 208 5 List of Figures 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski & David Rockefeller at a gathering of the Trilateral Commission. P.65 2. The Logo of the Trilateral Commission. P.65 3. U. S. President Jimmy Carter & National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington D.C., 1977. P.66 4. Zbigniew Brzezinski & Henry Kissinger. P.72 5. Zbigniew Brzezinski & Henry Kissinger on the Charlie Rose Show. P72 6. U.S. President Carter, National Security Adviser Brzezinski & Secretary of State Vance. P.79 7. U.S. National Security Adviser Brzezinski & Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, 1978. P.95 8. The Eurasian Chessboard. P.95 9. The Sino-Soviet Bloc and Three Central Strategic Fronts. P.119 10. Loss of Ideological Control and Imperial Retrenchment. P.119 11. President Reagan’s statement on aid to Nicaraguan rebels, February 15, 1985. P.128 12. A Contemporary Photo of Zbigniew Brzezinski. P.236 6 Abbreviations CIA Central Intelligence Agency CEMA Council for Economic and Mutual Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union EU European Union ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ISI Inter-Services-Intelligence (Pakistani secret service) KGB State Security Committee (Soviet secret police) MI6 British security and intelligence service NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NSA National Security Adviser NSC National Security Council PD59 Presidential Directive 59 OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe RDF Rapid Deployment Force SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SDI Strategic Defence Initiative START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty UN United Nations US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 7 Introduction Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the most influential statesmen of the twentieth century yet he is under-recognised for his achievements in the historical record. Unlike Henry Kissinger, Brzezinski has not received a similar level of attention and has not had many works written about him. The purpose of this dissertation is to make the case that under his influence the Carter administration helped to end the Cold War. As Brzezinski was President Carter’s National Security Adviser, he played a leading role in the administration which, in effect, had a significant though yet not fully recognised part in bringing down the Soviet Union. It may be said that Brzezinski was amongst the most far-sighted strategists of his generation, whose influence over US foreign policy had been substantial. The focus of this work more specifically is upon Brzezinski’s career in politics and the world of academia during the period 1948-1981, with a particular focus upon the Carter era. The central argument is that the Carter administration, under the guidance of Brzezinski, sowed the seeds for the decline of the Soviet Union and put in place important policies that would help end the global conflict. This is a matter which has not been given sufficient attention in the historical record. Recent literature is in fact beginning to corroborate this argument, such as Stuart E. Eizenstat’s Jimmy Carter, which argued that Carter and his administration deserve more credit than they have thus far received for their role in defeating the Soviets.1 As Madeleine Albright stated in the foreward to Eizenstat’s work, ‘…history’s verdict on Carter is still being debated.’2 This dissertation is therefore right upon the cusp of new research to prove the Carter administration played a significant and underappreciated role in neutralising the Soviet threat and ensuring the downfall of the Soviet Union. There is a vacuum to be filled in relation to research on the end of the Cold War for, as Ian Jackson wrote, ‘There remains a dearth of declassified primary sources conducive to arriving at confident judgments about the factors leading to the demise of the cold war.’3 This dissertation postulates that the Carter administration and Brzezinski in particular contributed to ending the conflict by supporting dissidents as well as Western radio stations in Eastern Europe, by carrying out the normalization of 1 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter: The White House Years (New York, 2018) p. xv 2 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter, pxvi 3 Ian Jackson, ‘Economics and the Cold War’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford, 2016) p. 59 8 relations between the United States and China, by taking advantage of the Soviet- Afghan conflict and also through strategically upgrading the U.S. military. These were all important factors during the administration in tipping the scales against the Soviets and ushering in the end of the conflict. These factors are not given their due weight, it is argued, in the historiography on the conflict. The economic policies of the Reagan administration are attributed too much credit for, as Ian Jackson wrote: ‘The available evidence suggests that the Reagan administration’s campaign of economic warfare in the early 1980s had a minimal impact on the Soviet Union.’4 While the arms race did play an important role in economically bankrupting the Soviet Union, it is debatable whether it was the principal cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This thesis endeavours to demonstrate that pivotal events in the Cold War took place during the Carter era and were significantly shaped by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Furthermore that these events had an important effect upon bringing the conflict to a close. In relation to the Soviet-Afghan War, Geoffrey Warner has written that ‘The cold war’s climactic Third World conflict, however, occurred in Afghanistan’5 and indeed in military terms, the defeat of the Soviets did in fact take place there, which was the result of a policy implemented by Brzezinski. Significantly, this dissertation seeks to prove that although the Soviets were not beaten militarily by the United States, the conflict in Afghanistan was a military defeat for the Soviets and was in fact one of the chief reasons why their empire collapsed. Emphasising the military defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan as a factor in the collapse of the Soviet Bloc is important and is something that is not addressed sufficiently in the historiography. As David R. Stone has written: ‘Although the cold war fundamentally revolved around a potential East-West military clash in central Europe, military aspects have been strangely divorced from the mainstream of scholarship, echoing a divide between military and diplomatic historians across regions and periods.’6 The dissertation postulates that the Soviet-Afghan War was a chief cause in the breakdown of the Soviet Union and is supportive of the views of others who believe so. As John Prados wrote: ‘Indeed, some analysts maintain that the 4 Ian Jackson, ‘Economics and the Cold War’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford, 2016) p. 63 5 Geoffrey Warner, ‘Geopolitics and the Cold War,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p. 78 6 David R. Stone, ‘The Military,’ in in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p.341 9 proxy war in Afghanistan between Russian forces and CIA-backed tribal and religious rebels had a primary role in the Soviet Union’s demise.’7 This student would concur with such a statement. It is argued that military conflict in Afghanistan broke the resolve of Soviet armed forces and ensured they would not be advanced again to spread or defend communism. It is also worth adding that it is thanks to Brzezinski that the U.S. began to launch covert operations inside the Soviet Union. Brzezinski therefore broke the code of non- interference in the domestic affairs of the Communist Bloc and thereby brought the Cold War to the Soviet home ground.8 This is important as the fomenting of nationalism and in particular Islamic fundamentalism within the borders of the Soviet Union were important additional factors that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. This was a policy that had been thought of before but was never actually implemented.
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