Chapter One Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa
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NOTES Chapter One Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Edited by J.P. Mayer (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), p. 9. 2 For some of the rare examples of scholars systematically using Tocqueville to understand democracy in the non-Western world see Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies: A Response to Tocqueville’s Challenge (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Carlos A. Forment, Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); and Sombat Chantornvong,“Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and the Third World,” in Vincent Ostrom, David Feeny, and Hartmut Picht (eds.), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives and Choices (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1988), pp. 69–99. 3 The metaphor of waves to describe movement toward and away from democracy in modern societies was first popularized by Robert Michels, the German sociologist in 1911, in his Political Parties:A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies (New York:Free Press, 1966). 4 According to Huntington, the Third Wave began with the overthrow of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1975 and was followed by the demise of authoritarian regimes and their replacement by democratic regimes in Europe,Asia, and Latin America. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), p. 17. Huntington had little to say about Africa because the Third Wave did not begin there before 1990. For an overview of the Third Wave in Africa, see Larry Diamond,“Introduction,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Democratization in Africa (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. ix–xxvii. 5 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 58–60. 6 For a discussion of Tocqueville’s overturning of the prevalent European idea of the state and sovereignty,see Larry Siedentop, Tocqueville (New York:Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 41–43. 7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 26. 8 Huntington, The Third Wave,p.16. 9 For a vigorous defense of Tocqueville’s approach affirming the importance of decentralized politics and local self-government in fostering freedom, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville:Threats to Freedom in Democracy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 39–44. 10 Huntington, The Third Wave,p.9. 11 James T. Schleifer, The Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Chapel Hill:The University of North Carolina Press), pp. 263–274. Equality was such a major component of his definition of democracy that Tocqueville once thought of naming the second volume of his study of American democracy,which appeared in 1840, Equality in America. 12 For example, there are no entries for equality in the index of The Third Wave. 13 Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. xiv–xv. 14 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 7–8. Notes 189 15 Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies,p.17. 16 Democratic despotism came to France during the course of the French Revolution. The liberal phase of the French Revolution gave way to the Reign of Terror, Napoleon, and the Bourbon Restoration.The 1830 Revolution failed to transform France into a democracy because it restricted participation to a tiny minority of educated men of wealth and property.As a deputy in the French Parliament (1839–1851),Tocqueville witnessed the overthrow of the July Monarchy in the 1848 Revolution and the 1851 coup d’état engineered by Louis Napoléon that shelved the Second Republic’s embryonic democratic institutions. France did not become a liberal democracy until the establishment of the Third Republic (1879–1940) until twenty years after Tocqueville’s death in 1859. 17 For the coining of the concept and its implication, see Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 62–108. 18 Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, pp. 146–147. 19 This section owes a great debt to the work of Frederick C. Schaeffer’s Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). His book, a linguistic inquiry that uses Senegal as a case study, looks at the interaction of culture and institu- tions and the formation and use of social science concepts like democracy in different cultural settings. 20 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,Tenth Edition (Springfield,MA:Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 1993), pp. 446, 670. 21 Schaeffer, Democracy in Translation, pp. 1–20. 22 Scholars have described countries that hold free and fair elections but restrict civil rights and other basic freedoms as illiberal democracies. Fareed Zakaria,“The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs,Vol.76, No. 6 (1997), pp. 181–195. 23 For an analysis of the trend to differentiate among different strands of democracy by adding an adjective in front of the term, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky,“Democracy ‘with Adjectives’: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics,Vol.49 (April 1997), pp. 430–451. For a review of the literature on these themes and a spirited defense of the use of clientelist democracy, see Linda Beck, Clientelist Democracy, Unpublished paper for a conference on “Mapping the ‘Gray Zone’: Clientelist Democracy and the Boundary between Democratic and Democratizing,” Columbia University,April 4–5, 2003. 24 For critiques of the Western developmental model based on the nation-state, see Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden:Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, 1992; Sheldon Gellar,“State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa,” Building States and Nations: Models, Analyses, and Data Across Three Worlds,Vol.2 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 384–426. 25 Gerti Hesseling, Histoire Politique du Sénégal (Paris: Karthala, 1985), p. 349. 26 For a detailed discussion and analysis of the different usages of the term démocratie by politicians from the ruling party and the opposition, see Schaffer, Democracy in Translation, pp. 21–36. 27 In recent years, there has been a new literature arising that looks at local understandings of democracy in Africa. For example, see Maxwell Owusu,“Democracy and Africa—A View From the Village,” The Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.30, No. 3 (1992), pp. 369–396; Mikael Karlstrom, “Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratization in Buganda,” Africa,Vol. 66, No. 4 (1996), pp. 485–505; and Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden. 28 Schaeffer, Democracy in Translation,p.84. Chapter Two Point of Departure 1 Tocqueville, Democracy in America,p.26. 2 For discussions of Senegal’s geographical features and the physical environment shaping Senegalese history and culture, see George E. Brooks, Landlords and Strangers: Ecology,Society,and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630 (Boulder:Westview Press, 1993); Philip D. Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), pp. 13–29 and Paul Pélissier, Les Paysans du Sénégal: Les Civilisations Agraires du Cayor à la Casamance (Saint Yrieux: Imprimérie Fabregue, 1966). 190 Notes 3 Nehemia Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali (London: Methuen, 1973) and Djibril Tamsir Niane, Le Soudan Occidental au temps des grands empires (XIe-XVIe Siècles) (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1975). 4 The tiny band of fertile land touched by the overflowing of the Senegal River was called walo, while the land outside the flood plain was designated diéri. 5 Even today,these regions remain relatively marginalized, especially in the political arena. Inhabitants of the Casamance region still speak of going to Senegal when leaving for visits to Dakar and other locations to the north. 6 For a detailed description of the Diola rice civilization, see Pélissier, Les Paysans du Sénégal, pp. 646–689. 7 On this point, see Pathé Diagne,“Pluralism and Plurality in Africa,”in Dov Ronen (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986), pp. 68–69. 8 For more on this theme, see Sheldon Gellar,“State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa,” pp. 384–426. 9 See Cheikh Anta Diop, L’Afrique Noire précoloniale (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1960). 10 The term Halpulaar refers to people who speak the Pulaar language. For many years, distinctions were made between the sedentarized Halpulaar, called Tukulor and the nomadic Halpulaar called Fulbe or Peul in French.Today,the census statistics list both groups as Halpulaar. 11 For the history of Tekrur, see Abdourhamane Ba, La Takrur, des origines à la conquête par le Mali (VIe-XIII siècles) (Nouakchott: Imprimerie Nouvelle, 2002). 12 Gajaaga was reputed to be what was left of the ancient Ghana Empire. Boubacar Barry, La Sénégambie du XVe au XIXe siècle:Traite négrière, Islam, conquête coloniale (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1988), p. 40. 13 Jean Boulégue, Le Grand Jolof (XIII–XVIe) (Blois: Editions Facades, 1987). 14 For the evolution of the two Serer kingdoms, see Pathé Diagne, Pouvoir traditionnel en Afrique occidentale (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1967), pp. 56–94. 15 Charlotte Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia:Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion (London: Longman, 1972). 16 For details on the revolt of the Lebus, see Mamadou Diouf, Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle: pouvoir ceddo et conquête coloniale (Paris: Karthala, 1990), pp. 96–103. 17 Malick Ndiaye has labeled this school the Dakar school and has been critical of historians like Boubacar Barry,Abdoulaye Bathily, and Mamadou Diouf for exaggerating the impact of external forces on Senegalese society. See Malick Ndiaye, L’Ethique Ceddo et la Société d’Accaparement ou les conduites culturelles des Sénégalais d’audjourd’hui (Dakar: Presses Universitaires de Dakar, 1996), pp. 79–86.