Assessing Psychology's Moral Heritage Through Our Neglected Utopias

J. G. MORAWSKI Wesleyan University

ABSTRACT The increasing interest in the history of neglected past. Reappraisal of such works contrib- psychology has led to recommendations for refining our utes to a more complete story of psychology's past historical methods and thinking about historical knowl- and enriches the context for understanding current edge generally. Solely intellectual or presentist histories theoretical, social, and ethical issues. obscure many of the problems and insights that were experienced by our forebears and deny contemporary psychologists a broader perspective for viewing current Toward More Critical Histories psychological and moral issues. A more critical histor- ical perspective would acknowledge the unexplored fac- Recently historians have begun to reevaluate the ets of psychology's heritage. This study examines earlier conventional history of psychology. For the most proposals for the role of psychology in the betterment part, they have assessed various historical "myths" of American society, particularly as they were mani- perpetuated in our histories as well as the inordi- fested in the Utopias of G. Stanley Hall, William nate concern with psychology's intellectual heri- McDougall, Hugo Miinsterberg, and John B. Watson. tage and consequent neglect of its social and po- The authors' fictional and professional writings include programs for societal improvement that contrast with litical context. For instance, Samelson (1974) in- the image of psychology typically portrayed in conven- vestigated the "origin myths" that date social tional histories—that of a science maturing quite in- psychology's birth with Comte's positive social phi- dependently of societal influences or consequences. losophy. Harris (1979) has shown how the conven- Historical investigations that transcend such conven- tional interpretations of John B. Watson's experi- tional images contribute not only to a more compre- ment with little Albert relate more-to the inter- hensive history but also to a more critical understanding preter's particular theoretical interests than to the of the interplay between psychology and society. actual Albert study. Others have investigated how the expansion and activities of American psychol- The centennial of experimental psychology in 1979 ogy have been shaped by economic and political heightened interest in the discipline's history by events (Camfield, 1969; Finison, 1976; Sokal, 1980). offering the psychologist lore about precursprs, in- Such studies suggest both the inaccuracy of con- novations, controversies, and great achievements. ventional histories and the incompleteness of the Paralleling these centennial events has been a more accurate intellectual histories that represent growing concern with the state of scholarship in psychology as an isolated corpus of ideas or an the history of psychology, particularly with his- accumulation of scientific discoveries. tories that primarily document or celebrate intel- Similar reexaminations have been undertaken lectual milestones. Such ceremonial histories typ- in the history of science (see Agassi, 1963; Brush, ically acknowledge the purported antecedents of 1974; Teich & Young, 1973). A contribution of currently dominant positions within psychology. these studies that has yet to be appreciated in psy- Whether spawned by purely intellectual or par- chology is an understanding of the broader social tisan interests, these "presentist" or "conventional" relations and moral heritage of science. As one histories have yielded an insular conception of psy- historian of science has noted, abeyance of this chology, one that lacks meaning in the broader heritage "deprives scientists of the present time of context of historical events (Stocking, 1965; Young, a historical perspective on their moral problems, 1966). However unintentionally, they have also with the result that their illusion of suddenly lost contributed to psychologists' relative ignorance innocence makes their dilemmas seem unprece- about the social, political, and moral background of their science. The all but forgotten Utopias of Requests for reprints should be .sent to J. G. Morawski, De- G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Miin- partment of Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, sterberg, and John B. Watson comprise part of this Connecticut 06457.

1082 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST Vol. 37, No. 10, 1082-1095

Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/82/3710-1082$00.75 dented and hence worse than they really are" various other mandates affirming that psycholo- (Ravetz, 1973, p. 210). Conventional or purely in- gists "can be most useful to society by staying in tellectual histories of psychology obscure some fun- their laboratories and libraries, there to remain damental issues of the past: the role of psychology until they can come forth with reliable predictions and the psychologist in society, the confrontation and well-tested applications" (Pratt, 1939, p. 179). with ethical problems, the relation of psychology It is with this attitude that conventional or intel- to the humanities and other sciences, and the dis- lectual histories of social psychology would cite semination of psychological knowledge to the pub- F. H. Allport's (1924) Social Psychology as a sem- lic. Thus, the contemporary psychologist may miss inal contribution to the field but would make no both substantive knowledge about the historical mention of his substantial proposals about applying precedence of current social issues and, conse- social psychology to ensure a democratic, egali- quently, the opportunity to assess how these issues tarian, and controlled society. have developed relative to theory and epistemol- This article addresses one unexplored event in ogy. Furthermore, because more comprehensive psychology's heritage. It treats several victims of and critical studies require scrutiny not merely of a historical perspective that is imbued with a New- dusty texts and journals but also of personal papers, tonian image of the science: four Utopias published institutional records, unpublished manuscripts, and between 1915 arid 1930 by the hardly obscure forgotten publications, they attend to the "human" psychologists G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, context in which psychological knowledge is cre- Hugo Miinsterberg, and John B. Watson. These ated. Rediscovery of these historical materials may Utopias clearly reflect Baconian thinking, not in a have sobering effects—as with the cases of Cyril simple resemblance to New Atlantis, but in their Burt and J. B. Watson (Samelson, 1980)—yet there dedication to explaining how psychology, as a sci- is no reason why such excursions cannot have pos- ence, is instrumental to human welfare. For this itive consequences as well. reason alone, the Utopias would have no place in There are several reasons why the conventional conventional histories. However, the Utopias and histories of psychology have charted a practically other writings of the four psychologists also belie unidimensional course of psychology's advance. a clear distinction between the Baconiatt and New- Psychology, after all, is a relatively new discipline tonian moralities in psychology. In their episte- seeking recognition as a natural science. Histories mological thinking, the four psychologists essen- detailing the discovery of theories and refinement tially attempted a unification of psychology as a of methods have confirmed its scientific image knowledge system and as a social instrument. Their (Hagstrom, 1965; O'Donnell, 1979). They reified Utopias served to illustrate this unity and, hence, the hopes to establish a true science of the mind, to show the imperative for advancing psychology. sometimes nearly succumbing to what has been The correspondence between their Utopian and called "physics envy." There is perhaps a more professional writings affirms their dedication to specific reason why conventional histories have not these ideas. When viewed in the broader context directly addressed social,- moral, or political issues of the period 1915 to 1930, these writings calindt of the past. Scientists have long subscribed to dis- be interpreted simply as anomalies, as peculiar cordant moral attitudes. These have been de- pastimes of professionals, but must be seen as plau- scribed by Toulmin (1975) as a "Baconian" mo- sible answers to perceived crises both in academic rality, where science serves as an instrument psychology and in American society. When viewed committed to human improvement, and a "Newto- in relation to contemporary psychology, the writ- nian" morality, where science serves the rational ings intimate a continued reluctance to confront pursuit of a true understanding of nature. Scientists such dual moralities. have adhered to the Baconian image principally in the external affairs of science and have done so G. Stanley Hall and the Ideal to secure the societal support necessary to pursue Community intellectual interests. For instance, after World War I, the National Academy of Sciences adopted G. Stanley Hall generally has been applauded for such 'Baconian arguments in order to retain public his strategic role in American experimental psy- support for scientific research (Tobey, 1971). The chology: He organized the first psychological jour- Newtonian image has guided the internal workings nal, the first American psychological association, of science, its organization and operations. It also the first Wundtian laboratory in America, and the has predominated in psychological textbooks and first and only American visit of Freud. In addition

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • OCTOBER 1982 • 1083 to enumerating these accomplishments, most his- able task. After a speculative period, the field had tories acknowledge that Hall also was a versatile emancipated itself from metaphysics and physi- psychologist who promoted genetic psychology ology and "had become a culminating academic and related evolutionary concepts, art interest in theme, the only one which all desired and which psychoanalysis, and the design of questionnaires it was felt needful to know. It was genetic, com- (e.g., Boring, 1950; R. I. Watson, 1971). Except for parative, clinical, and strove chiefly to give self- a biography (Ross, 1972), these histories do not knowledge and self-control" (pp. 57-58). Re- examine Hall's comprehensive view of evolution, searchers of this synthetic psychology were exon- the philosophical assumptions of his theories, and erated from many social duties, supported for their his prescriptions for resolving social problems. work, and "regarded as the light and hope of the Written late in Hall's career, "The Fall of At- state" (p. 56). Psychology was instrumental to the lantis" (1920a) tells of a Utopian civilization. The attainment of the perfect social order, and the story purportedly is narrated by a cultural anthro- psychologist occupied a social role consistent with pologist who visited Atlantis' remains in 2000 A.D. the special obligations of the field. and learned that it had at one time governed the The elevated position of psychology was appar- civilized world with a culture that far exceeded ent throughout the' Atlantean civilization. Juris- any contemporary vision of progress. Atlantis rep- prudence was designed through research on hu- resented human evolution toward perfection in man nature and operated with two rules; the plea- every detail; its language was the most flexible sure and pain principles and the assessment of the expression of the human psyche, medicine had social value of individual actions. Education was excelled to the point of becoming a philosophic structured according to human development re- science, the political structure integrated all known search, and in the universities "the nature of man codes of justice, and education permeated all stages was the culminating study" (p. 34). Even teachers of life. ' \ of religion, the "heartformers," practiced a "higher Atlantis exemplifies the evolution of a society psychology of the folksoul" (p. 80). that eventually becomes unified and recognizes a The tragedy of Atlantis was not a finality be- social consciousness or "Man-soul." Atlantean cit- cause there were survivors who potentially could izens subordinated individual to social desires and transmit the Atlantean heritage and strive for some celebrated a perception of being "uniquely one future Utopia. The fall had resulted partly from with all Nature, the consummate product of her the psychological flaws of individualism and self- creative evolution" (p. 72). They understood the ishness, and the revered field of psychology did nuances of evolution and recapitulation and were not escape these faults. In the midst of Atlantis' devoted to preserving those processes. The fall of degeneration, psychology • was employed "to fit Atlantis was not cataclysmic, but rather a gradual men to be cogs in preexisting machinery" rather degeneration initiated by forces,of individualism than to "develop ever higher powers in man him- and by physical changes in the environment. Social self which impel him to create ever newer and institutions such as medicine decayed as citizens higher institutions as progress demands" (p. 66). and physicians violated communal health regula- The commercial preoccupations of scientists sig- tions for personal profit; law, religion, education, naled the eventual demise of the scientific spirit science, and the family faltered similarly. At the and the collapse of research centers. same time Atlantis began to sink into,the sea, and Hall's Utopian conception of psychology is re- its citizens either drowned Or embarked on sea flected in many of his psychological writings. In journeys in search of new land. his psychology as well as in his administrative and Although not the sole focus of the story, science educational efforts, Hall lauded research as the was lauded as foremost among the achievements "greatest achievement of man" arid the researcher of Atlantis. Scientific discoveries had yielded means as a "superman" who deserved extensiye freedom for the chemical synthesis of diamonds and gold, and support (Hall, 1908, p. 104). His later writings generation of life from crystals, accumulation of emphasized not only the privileges of researchers data on Martians, and the development of new but their leadership responsibilities: "Henceforth, vegetation. But these and other advances were not as never before, progress is committed to the hands the reason for the elevated status of research. In of the intellectuals and they must think harder, Atlantis research was the ultimate expression of the realizing to the full the responsibilities of their new belief in human improvement. And of all scientific leadership. ... In everything it is the expert who endeavors, psychology represented the most valu- must say the final word" (1921, pp. 112-113). If

1084 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST scientific researchers had such responsibilities, then his scientific work as both innovative and influen- psychologists, who studied what Hall called the tial. He has been credited with anticipating the queen of the sciences, certainly held a substantial behaviorist trend later promulgated by Watson, share of the duties. The special responsibilities of and his research in purposive psychology and in- psychologists included the discovery of desirable stincts has earned him recognition as the progen- human attributes and methods for readjusting the itor of the hormic school of psychology. Yet, these environment to human needs (Hall, 1917, 1919a, accounts pay little attention to his social psychol- 1919b, 1928). As "queen of the sciences" psy- ogy, evolutionary theory, and psychology of poli- chology would promote the unity of knowledge, tics and social ethics (see, e.g., Murphy, 1949; Pe- would bridge pure and practical research, and ters, 1962; R. I. Watson, 1971). would embrace a pluralism of systems (Hall, 1906, One of his neglected publications, "The Island 1908, 1919b, 1920b, 1923). Accordingly, he called of Eugenia," is a proposal for a Utopian society the psychologist "a sort of high priest of souls" who founded on eugenic principles (McDougall, 1921). "is not content merely to fit men for existing in- Eugenia is presented as the plan of an academic stitutions as they are to-day" but would "develop scientist who, after 30 years of study, shared his even higher powers, which gradually molt old and ideas with an old college friend who since had evolve new and better institutions or improve old become an affluent philanthropist. The plan is laid ones" (1923, p. 436). Here he also commented on out in a dialogue between scientist and philan- the degradation of American science, particularly thropist, between the "Seer" and the "Practical psychology; he compared intelligence testing to the Man." Eugenia would be devoted to propagating fads of phrenology and palmistry and described "superior strains," which are recruited worldwide it as a product solely of psychologists' economic on the basis of family history, intellectual abilities, interests. and moral qualifications. Candidates for citizen- The correspondence between Hall's Utopian ide- ship would be selected for superb phenotypic char- als and his psychological writings is represented acteristics that supposedly represent exceptional through four basic assumptions about human na- genotypic traits, and some preference would be ture. He held (1899, 1904) that human evolution accorded to preserve the "disappearing" race of is the growth of consciousness (individual and ra- Nordics. cial) and is progressive (upward). Further, evolu- The story resembles the typical utopia in the tion of the race is repeated in the individual; that sense that Eugenia would have an ideal geography is, it involves recapitulation (1904) and occurs in and stable organization. However, only the mea- all human aggregates from the family to knowl- sures for world improvement, for the social envi- edge systems (1907, 1913). Finally, as the highest ronment, and for the role of scientific institutions life form, humans are responsible for guarding and are presented in any detail. The program for hu- guiding evolution, and those in leadership positions man improvement is twofold. The selected breed- have the greatest responsibility (1907, 1908, 1917, ers of Eugenia may reenter the general society to 1919a, 1919b, 1921,1923). Because evolution is of raise genetic fitness by intermarriage or to apply consciousness, occurs throughout all human insti- their superior talents to improve social and political tutions, and requires guidance, psychology is a conditions. Or Eugenians may marry within the priority science and the logical source of coordi- Utopia and contribute to genetic refinement. Thus, nation. With these responsibilities the psychologist, Eugenia would not be a utopia for everyone, but or psychological pedagogue, becomes the "engi- would admit a select group who aim to advance neer in the domain of nature" (Hall, 1919b, p. 99). the lives of all. The scenic physical environment Thus, Hall's assumptions about human nature jus- would comprise a conducive atmosphere for op- tify the unique moral responsibilities associated timal work productivity, monogamous marriages, with psychology. traditional family life, and education. Just as the design of Eugenia required the William McDougall and Eugenics for knowledge of the scientific "Seer," so the mainte- Social Improvement nance of the island depended on science. The pro- William McDougall was British by birth, but his tagonist, a scientist of nature and society, drafted career as a psychologist was spent equally in Brit- plans consistent with his belief in the validity and ain and the United States. Although critical of efficacy of science and accordingly with a convic- McDougalPs teleological thinking and interest in tion that other reform measures (those endorsed psychical research, histories of psychology present by Carnegie and Rockefeller) were merely "social

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • OCTOBER 1982 • 1085 plasters" (pp. 5-6). The primary institutions in ronmental and eugenic reforms (1921,1931,1933, Eugenia would be the universities and professional 1934b). schools—places where research would flourish. Sci- As exemplified in his psychology, McDougaU's entific studies would center on the science of Eu- epistemology contains three root assumptions: mind genia's initial founding—psychology—particu- evolves in a purposive manner toward some ideal larly in its relations to eugenics! The extensive con- end, science is a product of the evolution of mind, cern with human conditions and not social structure and the veracity of scientific knowledge is deter- followed from the claim that "forms of organi- mined by its successful application (1905, 1923, zation matter little; the all important thing is the 1934a, 1938). These assumptions imply that the quality of the matter to be organized, the quality ultimate purpose of science is the acquisition of of the human beings that are the stuff of our na- knowledge for bettering humanity. They also as- tions and societies" (p. 7). Psychology, especially sert the priority of psychology: If science results as it pertains to genetic issues, would have pre- from purposive striving of mind, then scientists, cedence: "The science of man will for the first time obviously would benefit from knowledge of pur- receive adequate recognition, that is to say, it will posiveness as investigated in psychology. Psychol- dominate the scene. To it all other sciences will be ogy is unique in its relevance to all facets of life duly subordinated" (pp. 24-25). and in its instrumental role in applying scientific McDougall's plan for Utopia parallels both his knowledge to human affairs (1908, 1931, 1934b, philosophy of knowledge and psychology. He had 1937). McDougall consequently realized the need femulated a model of science in which for better psychologists to "make themselves the the sole test of criterion of science, or true knowledge saviors of our collapsing civilization" (1927, 1931, of Nature, is that it shall bring us such understanding 1936). Psychology is essential to humankind's con- of tjie course of natural events as will enable us effec- tinued progress and to the realization of higher tively to intervene and modify the course of such events ideals (1923,1924,1926,1934a). Any contradiction for our own purposes, direct the course of events ideo- between philosophical ideals and scientific facts logically, control them in some degree (however slight) in accordance with our desires and needs. (1934a, p. 15) was resolved by positing a special relation between philosophy and the social sciences. Under appro- Science is an enactment of certain characteristics priate conditions social scientists should implement of human nature, specifically those of purposive- philosophers' specifications for desirable ends or ness. But McDpugall also insisted that science is ultimate values. However, since the right condi- empirical and positive (1905, 1912, 1923) and can tions had not yet arrived and philosophical prog- be distinguished from philosophy, which is criti- ress still required scientific support, there must be cism and evaluation (1929, 1934a). Of all the sci- a different relation between the two fields; Mc- ences, psychology is "the science of the most ur- Dougall suggested that "It is, then, right and well gent importance in the present age, when, for lack nigh inevitable that the social scientist shall be also of sufficient knowledge of human nature, our civ- a philosopher, or, at least, interested in social phi- ilization threatens to fall into chaos and decay" losophy and its problems" (1937, p. 342). Under (1930a, p. 221); such conditions the social scientist is responsible After rejecting mechanism and determinism, for promoting the progress and ideals of human- McDpugall developed a purposive psychology with kind; McDougall broached these responsibilities the underlying assumption that organisms have a through his research and fiction. "disposition" or latent tendency to strive toward Hugo Mtinsterberg and an Ideal some end (1908). He stipulated that the primary focus for psychology should be the study of par- Tomorrow ticular dispositions or "instincts" and innate mental Hugo Miinsterberg has been most commonly iden- processes (1908, 1910,1912) such as the hereditary tified as William James' chosen successor as head basis of will (1912). He tentatively adopted a La- of the Harvard psychological laboratories. Al- marckian theory because it coincided with the though conventional histories acknowledge his premises of purposiveness, holism, and indeter- early psychological theory and diversified interests, minism (1925, 1929, 1930b, 1934a, 1934b, 1936). recognition of these contributions is tempered with Because Lamarckiariism stressed the salience of expressed disappointment concerning Miinster- environmental and genetic influences on devel- berg's performance as an experimental psycholo- opment, McDougall came to advocate both envi- gist. With the exception of a recent biography

1086 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST (Hale, 1980), these studies tend to ignore Miin- these ends: "Movements for vocational guidance sterberg's contributions to American philosophy and vocational education have spread over the and the relation of his political activities to his land. . . . The scientific expert is more and more psychological endeavors (e.g., Boring, 1950; Flugel often called into the service of public affairs" (pp. & West, 1964; Peters, 1962). 153-154). Although Tomorrow contains numerous One of Miinsterberg's attempts to unite political references to such psychological expertise, it is pri- convictions, scientific beliefs, and metaphysics ap- marily an idealist scheme. It is written from the pears in a book-length Utopian program published position that current scientific knowledge is faulty in the last year of his life. Tomorrow: Letters to and that proper science requires a certain philo- a Friend in Germany (1916) proposes social per- sophical understanding. The narrator rejects con- fection through attainment of postwar internation- temporary speculations of a future based solely on alism. The program is delineated in a series of scientific advances and argues that science is an- letters from a German-American psychologist to cillary to absolute knowledge. j a friend and historian in Germany who has re- Miinsterberg's other writings both correspond to quested the scientist's expertise. At the outset, the the Utopia and further explicate his ideals for sci- psychologist acknowledged the circumstances that ence, specifically psychology. Miinsterberg re- permitted him to comment on the future: "You ferred to experimental psychology as "causal" be- turn to me because one whose lifework is psy- cause it is "a science which aims at description and chology may best foresee the days which wait for explanation of inner life" through study of the us, and one who lives in a neutral country may causal connections of its physical correlates (1910b, look with clearer eyes toward the tomorrow than p. 26; 1914). But experimental psychology had lim- those in belligerent lands" (p. 2). The Utopian fu- ited potential and required another type of re- ture, or tomorrow, is the ultimate consequence of search (1898, 1899a, 1899b, 1914). "Purposive" the social advances from nationalism and inter- psychology studies the same inner experiences as nationalism to pacifism. These social changes re- experimental psychology but from the "different quire organized and efficient procedures imple- standpoint" of understanding the meaning or pur- mented through acceptance of certain eternal and poses of inner experiences (1914, p. 297). Begin- absolute values—through idealism. The national- ning where causal psychology terminates, purpo- ism of European countries, particularly Germany, sive psychology alone can study the absolute ideals and of America comprised the first signs of a new of life. Despite this dichotomous model, Miinster- philosophy and ultimately, of a new world order. berg believed that both psychologies shared an This nationalism fosters unity, which in turn would ultimate end since "The whole elaboration of negate selfish individualism and engender the rec- causal psychology, and that is after all the form ognition of other absolute values. Tomorrow out- of psychology which is traditionally accepted as lines the stages accompanying the realization of the science of the mind, has significance only if idealism. The supraindividual and future-oriented it is ultimately to serve our practical ends" (1914, obligations eventually would serve not a single pp. 345-346). Miinsterberg held that observable nation, but the entire world; all nations would social degeneration and the demands made by "repress" memories of earlier animosities, would other professionals for psychological expertise organize programs for exchange, cooperation, and demonstrated "the duty of the practical psychol- other common purposes, and would constitute the ogist systematically to examine how far other pur- beginnings of "supernational organizations" (pp. poses of modern society can be advanced by the 224-242). The book concludes with a prospectus new methods of experimental psychology" (1913, on postwar reconstruction oriented toward abso- p. 15). Psychology was imperative to successful lute ideals. "If the people of a group, or finally of social control and an ideal social order, and Miin- the globe, are bound by an organization, it de- sterberg made numerous efforts to realize this po- mands in the same way that each subordinate its tential through both his applied and experimental selfish desires to the progress of the whole, to the psychology. Finally, the application of psychology aims of western culture, to the ideals of mankind" was essential to his idealist stance because the cou- (pp. 267-268). pling of theory and practice represented a move According to the plan of Tomorrow, science toward a higher unity, "an ultimate view of pul- would serve these universal ideals. Science, partic- sating reality" (1914, p. 17). Thus the process of ularly psychology, would contribute directly to application requires awareness of certain ultimate

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • OCTOBER 1982 • 1087 ends or values—of purposive psychology—and a sioned a thoroughly behavioristic country with synthesis of theory and these socially desired ends "units" of 260 husbands and wives (and a few ex- (1909, 1910a). tras to serve as "spare" husbands and wives). Each The claims that psychology is essential to the husband and wife pair, aided by a "scientifically success of modern life and that psychologists have trained assistant," cares for three children, al- unique obligations in serving society are consistent though they never know the identity of their bio- with Miinsterberg's theory of knowledge. He held logical children. Offspring rotate among the parent that there exists an absolute knowledge which tran- pairs, spending four weeks at each home, and at scends individual knowledge. The values of truth, the age of 20, "his 260th mother and father pat beauty, harmony, progress, morality, and unity are him on the head and send him out to earn his subject to "the ultimate demand that all the values living unaided" (p. 33). Eschewing religion, poli- become one, that the world remain absolutely it- tics, philosophy, history, and tradition, Utopia's self; and the satisfaction of this demand brings us citizens seek only "behaviorist happiness," and do the values of religion and philosophy" (1906, p. so "by experimentation." Utopia contains both ac- 40; see also 1899b, 1912). The classification and cepted social traditions and innovations. Watson analysis of knowledge are determined on meta- decreed that the country would be monogamous physical ,and not physical grounds, through phi- or "at any rate, I want to see monogamy tried" losophical understanding and not experiences in (p. 32). The social structure is unique in the ab- the physical world. From this position it becomes sence of a "state," judicial system, and clergy. Be- evident that even the causal sciences are purposive cause social rules are developed through experi- and value-laden because they contribute to con- mentation and misbehavior is corrected by retrain- structing an ideal system of the world (1911). The ing, the behaviorist's Utopia has no need for ultimate goal of knowledge seeking is the culmi- political structures or "that abstract entity we call nation of a "Weltanschauung, a unified view of the State" (p. 35). Citizens contribute to society the whole of reality" (1905, p. 95). Both purposive because they are trained to be independent and and causal psychology are essential to the study of absorbed in activities such that in the factories absolute values and ends; the melding of these two "men work harder if anything because they are approaches into applied psychology serves the trained to be absorbingly active all during the striving for a harmonious social order and a unified waking hours" (p. 32). system of knowledge. Instead of the usual professionals, Utopia has John B. Watson and the Hopes of specialists called "behaviorist physicians" who are trained in the methods of behaviorism to "guard Behaviorism the community on the psychological side just as John B. Watson is noted for his zealous commit- they guard it on the medical side. There is a pre- ment to psychology and his role as a proponent of ventive psychology in Utopia just as there is a pre- what was to become for a time its foremost theo- ventive medicine" (p. 34). Among their responsi- retical orientation. He also is credited with per- bilities, behaviorist physicians correct behavior suasively arguing against the validity of conscious- disorders, make decisions regarding euthanasia, ness and introspection as psychological concepts, and treat insanity. In a society where the rearing and for the study of behavior, the use of objective of children is paramount, the behaviorist physician methods,'the recognition of environmental influ- "takes charge" and assists the mother during the ences on behavior, and the practical application early years of the children's lives. The educational of psychological research. Of these kudos, conven- environment is designed for conditioning "emo- tional histories mention little about his dedication tional and dispositional habits" and is equipped to practical psychology (e.g., Boring, 1950; R. I. with such unobtrusive observational devices as Watson, 1971). periscopes. Children begin vocational and profes- Among the products of Watson's interest in the sional training at the age of 16 when, segregated practical applications of psychology that have not by sex, males learn vocations such as medicine, received attention is a Utopian vision based on be- science, and manufacturing while females learn haviorist principles. Originally titled "The Behav- to manage homes, handle men, perfect sex tech- iorist's Utopia," the manuscript was published in niques, and rear children. Behavioral scientists ap- 1929 as a magazine article titled "Should a Chi}d parently do not alter the social and moral standards Have More Than One Mother?" Watson envi- precisely because such standards are identical with

1088 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST those of behavioral science. Both are behavioristic period during the first two or three years of life and without complications inherent in religious, (1928a, Watson & Watson, 1921). philosophical, or political traditions; both embrace Watson did not confirm these assumptions with the Utopian morals of "behavioristic happiness." experimental methods, although he believed con- Watson's Utopian stance on the necessity of psy- firmation was imminent (1921, 1925). Neverthe- chology appears in other nonfictional writings. less, Jthey were used to support a fundamental aim Before elucidating his "principles for the control of his psychology: the control of human behavior. of human action," and even before issuing his be- Watson's advocacy of a scientific method of social haviorist decree of 1913, Watson expounded on control had important and, as he occasionally rec- the practical value of experimentation (1910, ognized, troublesome limitations. He cautioned 1912). He subsequently described the goal of re- that psychology should refrain from framing moral search to be the discovery of adjustments to stimuli, rules or social values because "psychology at pres- adding that "My final reason for this is to learn ent has little to do with the setting of social stan- general and particular methods by which I may dards of action and nothing to do with moral stan- control behavior" (1913, p. 168). The control of dards" (1917a, p. 329). Yet, on several occasions behavior to "aid organized society in its endeavors Watson acknowledged that if society established to prevent failures" was just as much a function social standards by the same hit-and-miss methods of psychology as the formulation of laws of be- that it implemented social control, then successful havior (1917a, p. 329). He argued that society's social standards would be developed only after an leaders had attempted environmental adjustment indeterminable time, if at all (1919, 1924). His through "roundabout, hit-and-miss methods," attempts to resolve this problem included occa- whereas behavior psychology would do so by sci- sional abandonment of the prescribed neutral entific methods (1917a, p. 330). Watson reiterated stance by discussing "behaviorist morals" (1927) claims about the superiority of experimental meth- and proposing that the scientific knowledge of be- ods for attaining social control and the need for haviorists replace the legal system (1925). When trained behavior specialists (1919, 1920, 1924, Watson did maintain his conviction that psychol- 1928a, 1928b, 1928c). ogy refrain from value judgments, he anticipated In addition to the "essential contention" that such judgments in a future "functional" or "ex- psychology was a science (1913, p. 427), Watson perimental" ethics that would establish mores by held several basic assumptions that framed his as- scientific methods, by psychological experimen- pirations for psychology. First, he refrained from tation (1917b, 1924, 1925). A final solution to the compiling a taxonomy of simple and complex be- problem of the behaviorist's role in establishing haviors (which would have been a logical extension moral standards was the creation of a society ac- of his earlier work) in favor of classifying innate cording to experimental findings. This solution was and acquired behaviors. This decision fit with his essentially an extension of Watson's famous state- goals for psychology such that ment, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well- formed, and my own specified world to bring them when we are confronted with the practical and scientific up.in and I'll guarantee to take anyone at random needs of life we are ready to admit that after all what we seek to have psychology busy herself with is just this and train him to become any type of specialist I matter of environmental adjustment; what can man do might select" (1928d, p. 10). He speculated on the apart from his training; what can he be trained to do, feasibility of his "own specified world" with its and what are the best methods for training; and finally, potential contributions to social betterment and how, when the varied systems of instincts and habits have proposed several social experiments, including an sufficiently developed, can we arrange the conditions for calling out appropriate action on demand? (1917a, "infant farm" for behavioral research (1920,1928c; p. 336) Watson & Watson, 1921) and a behaviorist's Utopia. The consequent research, however limited, led Watson to identify three innate emotions (1919, On Utopia and Psychology 1920) and to dismiss the study of inheritance as unnecessary (1924). Watson similarly declared that Hall, McDougall, Miinsterberg, and Watson de- the study of human behavior involved the reduc- vised similar programs for psychology and psy- tion of all complex behavior to simple actions chologists in a Utopian society. However, these sim- (1928d) and that learning occurred in a critical ilarities as well as their relation to comparable pre-

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • OCTOBER 1982 • 1089 scriptions made by other psychologists first should and is absent from conventional histories of psy- be placed within a broader context of the evolving chology is an examination of these four Utopias and interplay between Utopias and psychology. similar convictions about psychology that were not Since More's design of the island of King Utopus, presented in the Utopian genre. Consequently, con- the Utopian format has been used to describe a ventional histories of psychology omit psycholo- variety of extraordinary societies. Since the sci- gists' speculations on psychology's potential power entific revolution, most Utopias have incorporated in the reconstruction of American society. Admit- what has been called a "scientific imperative," a tedly, Bacon's elaborate plans for Salomon's House belief that Utopia cannot carry on without science show that prescribing a structured role for science (Dubos, 1961; Eurich, 1967; Golffing & Golffing, is not new to Utopian thinking. But the human 1971). A liberal form of the scientific method ap- sciences, psychology in particular, had never be- peared when the 17th-century utopists rejected fore received such attention in Utopias; the resem- traditional knowledge of church and state and blance between the ideas of the four psychologist- adopted a new epistemology. They held that utopists and many of their contemporaries inti- knowledge could be acquired by humans through mates several distinct reasons for this new concern. empirical methods using sensate experience to ob- serve, record, and analyze human conditions. Just Reform, Social Control, and American as the 18th- and 19th-century utopists continued Psychology . this fascination by exploiting ideas from the phys- ical sciences, so late 19th- and early 20th-century The American progressive era spanned the years utopists contemplated the sciences of humankind from 1900 to 1917, a period when it had become (R. P. Adams, 1949; Manuel, 1965; Passmore, 1970; increasingly evident to many Americans that the Roemer, 1976; Walsh, 1962). nation's growth had not always been equitable, Concepts and technical terminology borrowed moral, or without adverse costs. The realization from the burgeoning science of psychology sup- ushered in a series of reforms, often organized by plied a means for making Utopian fiction appear citizens and marked by beliefs in efficient and or- authentic and plausible. Notions of hypnotism, derly social progress, equality, national unity, and trance states, and brain surgery could explain how citizen participation (Gould, 1974; Hofstadter, the narrator was transported to the new world 1955, 1963; Wiebe, 1967). The perceived decline (Bellamy, 1888; Merrill, 1899), and concepts of in enthusiasm for reform during World War I typ- telepathy, clairvoyance, group mind effects, mind- ically is interpreted as a marker for the end of the controlling drugs, prenatal education, and eugenic progressive era. However, interpreting postwar breeding could account for the protean powers of disillusionment as the terminus of these social re- the Utopian citizen (Bulwer-Lytton, 1871; Gregory, forms obscures half of what Morton White (1957) 1918; Hudson, 1906; Lloyd, 1895; Taylor, 1901- has labeled the "double effect" of the war: a re- 1902). The continuing reliance on psychology for newed optimism regarding reform. In fact, of all designing superlative societies and extraordinary the histories of the 1920s none give interpretations beings prompted a historian of Utopias to call re- as optimistic as those accounts written in the de- cent Utopian formulas "eupsychias" (Manuel, 1965). cade itself (May, 1956). The Utopias of Hall, McDougall, Miinstergerg, Nevertheless, the war had brought a shift in re- and Watson require analysis beyond a place in the form involvement when the new specialties and development of eupsychias. These men were psy- techniques anticipated by prewar progressives chologists themselves, and in addition to joining were actually tested. The progressives had asserted the ranks with other psychological thinkers who the eventual necessity for scientific guidance in prepared Utopian speculations, such as Leibnitz, social and political life (Furner, 1975; Haber, 1964; Turgot, Comte, Galton, Tarde, and Haldane, they McCraw, 1974; Wiebe, 1967), but the war pro- were unique in their tendentious belief that their pelled scientific research and eventually corrobo- own profession was absolutely essential to improv- rated the idea, held by scientists and laypersons ing society. The seriousness of this belief is evi- that specialists had a fundamental role in the fu- denced in the correspondence between their Uto- ture of America (Dupree, 1957; Kaplan, 1956; pian visions and many of their scientific and Tobey, 1971; Yerkes, 1920). professional writings. The assertion that scientific techniques imple- What has no obvious place in histories of Utopias mented and administered by scientific experts

1090 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST were essential to realizing social reforms is evident conventional images of psychology as an experi- in many of the writings of Hall, McDougall, Miin- mental science often served personal and political sterberg, and Watson. Especially in their Utopias, interests (Danziger, 1979; O'Donnell, 1979). More these four psychologists advocated social change recent studies have found that, at least after the according to the wisdom of their science and the war, psychologists were as concerned with applied guidance of its experts. Their speculations were issues as with experimentalisrh (Camfield, 1969, shared by other intellectuals, by trained psychol- 1973; O'Donnell, 1979; Samelson, 1978) and were ogists, and by the average citizen, all of whom enmeshed in economic, occupational, and political appeared to be captivated by the dazzle of the new realities of their discipline (Danziger, 1979; Sa- scientific psychology. Even acrimonious commen- melson, 1975, 1978, 1979; Sokal, 1980, 1981). tators such as Floyd Dell (1926) lauded the new These activities within the psychological com- scientific professionals who "undertake therapeu- munity reveal a commitment to an ordered and tically the tasks of bringing harmony, order and efficient society and a belief in the possibility of happiness into inharmonious, disorderly and futile developing scientific measures of control, specifi- lives" (p. 248). Other social critics and intellectuals cally through the appropriate psychological ad- also believed that scientists, notably from the hu- justment of individuals to the environment. This man sciences, would provide what Walter conviction implied that psychologists could and Lippmann (1922) described as leadership by "in- should contribute by extending their scientific ex- terposing some form of expertness between the pertise to the management of society. In the words private citizen and the vast environment in which of James McKeen Cattell (1926), "Scientific men he is entangled" (p. 368). And John Dewey (1922) should take the place that is theirs as masters of concurrently announced that bettering of democ- the modern world" (p. 8). Applied psychology text- racy and social relations depended on the growth books published between 1925 and 1938 give am- of a "scientific social psychology" (p. 323). Like ple evidence of these appeals for a well-adjusted many natural scientists of the period (Tobey, society, the development of personalities suited to 1971), American intellectuals thought that society the social order, and public recognition of the es- would move toward efficiency, order, and unity. sential participation of psychologists in such efforts Science, guided by expert minds, would enable the (Napoli, 1980). control of social phenomena, primarily by adjust- Psychologists with reputations as experimental- . ing people to their changing environment. They ists were not exempted from making these appeals shared with philosopher F. C. S. Schiller (1924) the for reform. For example, Knight Dunlap (1928) hope that "a pragmatically efficient psychology endorsed the development of social psychology might actually invert the miracle of Circe, and primarily in terms of its potential contribution to really transform the Yahoo into a man" (p. 64). /understanding social problems (p. 355). Floyd All- Concurrent with these more or less enlightened port (1924) devoted a major portion of his text, mandates grew a keen interest in psychology Social Psychology, to the study of social control, among the populace. Articles on personality, men- which he thought corresponded with the "basic tal tests, psychoanalysis, hormonal processes (gland requirements for a truly democratic social order" psychology), and behaviorism were consumed with (p. 415). Because psychology was seen as integral such fervor by the lay public (G. Adams, 1934; to implementing reform measures, many psychol- Hart, 1933) that one historian called the preoc- ogists acknowledged the social responsibility of cupation a "national mania" (Leuchtenburg, 1955, members of their science: "It is the outstanding p. 164). Along with all its novelties and promises, feature of our reconstructed psychology that it re- the new psychology also captivated those Ameri- alized and accepted the obligation to apply ... cans of the 1920s who were enraptured by the the conclusions arising from the study of the men- personal, by the "cult of the self" (Baritz, 1960; tal side of man" (jastrow, 1927, p. 170). Joseph Burnham, 1968). Jastrow (1928) accordingly argued that the psy- Psychologists were not excluded from such dis- chologist "should join the small remnant of cre- cussions on the prospects for psychology and social ative and progressive thinkers who can see even improvement. Although traditional histories view this bewildering world soundly and see it whole. the period as one of theoretical fermentation and Such is part of the psychologist's responsibility" the accumulation of scientific techniques, other (p. 436). When writing on social reform in the historical studies suggest that at least some of these 1920s and psychologists' fundamental part in it,

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • OCTOBER 1982 • 1091 Jastrow conceded that he was "not optimistic values suggests two dangers. It perpetuates the enough to indulge in Utopias" (p. 436), so his pro- utilization of psychology in ways relatively outside posals were prepared in the format of professional the province of psychologists' activities and thus commentary. Just -as clinicians and applied psy- augments their unsophisticated and perhaps cred- chologists contemplated the future social adjust- ulous acceptance of such utilization. It also height- ments and the reconstruction of society, so exper- ens the probability that novel or creative ideas suc- imental psychologists made comparable proposi- cumb to the expediency of other objectives. Not tions despite the fact that they may not have been the least of neglected ideas are the attempts to directly involved in such applications. To this list confront psychology's moral dualism in the Utopias must be added the names of Hall, McDougall, presented above. Although not a subject of the Miinsterberg, and Watson: Their Utopias comprise present study, even a cursory examination of Miin- entertaining pronouncements on psychology's ul- sterberg's proposal for both an objective and pur- timate contribution to a better society and the tech- posive psychology, Hall's genetic epistemology, niques tha.t should be implemented by psycholog- and McDougall's model relating psychology and ical experts. social philosophy illustrates how potential inno- vations can be buried by externally- or pre-deter- A Dual Morality and the Function of mined objectives. More Critical Thinking This study has not attempted to trace the per- sistence of a dual morality in thinking about psy- Utopias become excellent vehicles for exploring chology nor has it sought to formulate alternatives the utility of scientific knowledge because they to the dualism. Anyone familiar with the subtleties implicitly demand the "application" of knowledge of psychology's most noted Utopia (Skinner, 1948) to improving society. The fictions of Hall, Mc- and the author's later expositions of its premises Dougall, Miinsterberg, and Watson expose Bacon- (Skinner, 1971, 1981) can appreciate the complex- ian thinking about a science in the service of so- ities inherent in such tasks. However, on, another ciety. Analysis of these Baconian statements has front an increasing number of researchers are ex- revealed that, despite disparate psychological the- ploring this duality and its consequences. They are ories, the four' psychologists shared a vision for an examining how psychology's moral heritage has ordered, harmonious, and unified society in which been obscured by 20th-century attempts to devise psychology is a special science and in which psy- an objective science (Leary, 1980), the extrasci- chologists provide expert leadership and imple- entific determinants of research (Cowan, 1977; ment scientific measures of social control. Without Gorman, 1981; Morawski, 1979; Samelson, 1979, embarking on fiction, other psychologists suggested 1980; Steiner, 1974; Steininger, 1979), and the similar measures. These findings stand in contrast manners in which psychological questions have to the conventional accounts of psychology's sci- been pretermitted or disregarded (Apfelbaum & entific achievements and striving toward an ob- Lubek, 1976; Buss, 1975,1977; Lubek, 1979). Such ' jective and experimental enterprise, and they con- historical awareness has enabled other researchers tribute to a largely untold story about American to systematically examine how models of human psychology in the decade following World War I. nature and its potential have been constricted by The Utopias and the nonutopian proposals for re- a tacit striving for relevance and agreement with constructing American society both affirm the ex- prevalent social ^morality (Argyris, 1975; Gadlin istence of a dichotomy between Baconian and & Ingle, 1975; Gergen, 1978; Gilligan, 1977; Ho- Newtonian thinking and exemplify the dangers of gan & Emler, 1978; Moscovici, 1972; Sampson, such a dichotomy. The social ideals of these psy- 1977, 1978; Sarason, 1981; Shotter, 1975). chologists mirrored popular notions of reform. It The continuation of such critical thinking, both is interesting and. alarming to discover that, re- historical and interpretive, is imperative to the gardless of grossly different assumptions about hu- health and integrity of psychological knowledge man nature and the appropriate form for psycho- (Samelson, 1980). It not only informs us about the logical inquiry, psychologists essentially concurred social context of our research activities (Buss, 1975, about the social ends that psychology should serve. 1979) but also can contribute to advances in re- There existed implicit agreement that psychology search programs (Harre & Secord, 1972) and in was a technique in the service of particular ends. metatheories (Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Israel, Such a Baconian and Newtonian dichotomy of 1972; Morawski, in press; Rommetveit, 1976; Ros-

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