Assessing Psychology's Moral Heritage Through Our Neglected Utopias J. G. MORAWSKI Wesleyan University ABSTRACT The increasing interest in the history of neglected past. Reappraisal of such works contrib- psychology has led to recommendations for refining our utes to a more complete story of psychology's past historical methods and thinking about historical knowl- and enriches the context for understanding current edge generally. Solely intellectual or presentist histories theoretical, social, and ethical issues. obscure many of the problems and insights that were experienced by our forebears and deny contemporary psychologists a broader perspective for viewing current Toward More Critical Histories psychological and moral issues. A more critical histor- ical perspective would acknowledge the unexplored fac- Recently historians have begun to reevaluate the ets of psychology's heritage. This study examines earlier conventional history of psychology. For the most proposals for the role of psychology in the betterment part, they have assessed various historical "myths" of American society, particularly as they were mani- perpetuated in our histories as well as the inordi- fested in the Utopias of G. Stanley Hall, William nate concern with psychology's intellectual heri- McDougall, Hugo Miinsterberg, and John B. Watson. tage and consequent neglect of its social and po- The authors' fictional and professional writings include programs for societal improvement that contrast with litical context. For instance, Samelson (1974) in- the image of psychology typically portrayed in conven- vestigated the "origin myths" that date social tional histories—that of a science maturing quite in- psychology's birth with Comte's positive social phi- dependently of societal influences or consequences. losophy. Harris (1979) has shown how the conven- Historical investigations that transcend such conven- tional interpretations of John B. Watson's experi- tional images contribute not only to a more compre- ment with little Albert relate more-to the inter- hensive history but also to a more critical understanding preter's particular theoretical interests than to the of the interplay between psychology and society. actual Albert study. Others have investigated how the expansion and activities of American psychol- The centennial of experimental psychology in 1979 ogy have been shaped by economic and political heightened interest in the discipline's history by events (Camfield, 1969; Finison, 1976; Sokal, 1980). offering the psychologist lore about precursprs, in- Such studies suggest both the inaccuracy of con- novations, controversies, and great achievements. ventional histories and the incompleteness of the Paralleling these centennial events has been a more accurate intellectual histories that represent growing concern with the state of scholarship in psychology as an isolated corpus of ideas or an the history of psychology, particularly with his- accumulation of scientific discoveries. tories that primarily document or celebrate intel- Similar reexaminations have been undertaken lectual milestones. Such ceremonial histories typ- in the history of science (see Agassi, 1963; Brush, ically acknowledge the purported antecedents of 1974; Teich & Young, 1973). A contribution of currently dominant positions within psychology. these studies that has yet to be appreciated in psy- Whether spawned by purely intellectual or par- chology is an understanding of the broader social tisan interests, these "presentist" or "conventional" relations and moral heritage of science. As one histories have yielded an insular conception of psy- historian of science has noted, abeyance of this chology, one that lacks meaning in the broader heritage "deprives scientists of the present time of context of historical events (Stocking, 1965; Young, a historical perspective on their moral problems, 1966). However unintentionally, they have also with the result that their illusion of suddenly lost contributed to psychologists' relative ignorance innocence makes their dilemmas seem unprece- about the social, political, and moral background of their science. The all but forgotten Utopias of Requests for reprints should be .sent to J. G. Morawski, De- G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Miin- partment of Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, sterberg, and John B. Watson comprise part of this Connecticut 06457. 1082 • OCTOBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST Vol. 37, No. 10, 1082-1095 Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/82/3710-1082$00.75 dented and hence worse than they really are" various other mandates affirming that psycholo- (Ravetz, 1973, p. 210). Conventional or purely in- gists "can be most useful to society by staying in tellectual histories of psychology obscure some fun- their laboratories and libraries, there to remain damental issues of the past: the role of psychology until they can come forth with reliable predictions and the psychologist in society, the confrontation and well-tested applications" (Pratt, 1939, p. 179). with ethical problems, the relation of psychology It is with this attitude that conventional or intel- to the humanities and other sciences, and the dis- lectual histories of social psychology would cite semination of psychological knowledge to the pub- F. H. Allport's (1924) Social Psychology as a sem- lic. Thus, the contemporary psychologist may miss inal contribution to the field but would make no both substantive knowledge about the historical mention of his substantial proposals about applying precedence of current social issues and, conse- social psychology to ensure a democratic, egali- quently, the opportunity to assess how these issues tarian, and controlled society. have developed relative to theory and epistemol- This article addresses one unexplored event in ogy. Furthermore, because more comprehensive psychology's heritage. It treats several victims of and critical studies require scrutiny not merely of a historical perspective that is imbued with a New- dusty texts and journals but also of personal papers, tonian image of the science: four Utopias published institutional records, unpublished manuscripts, and between 1915 arid 1930 by the hardly obscure forgotten publications, they attend to the "human" psychologists G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, context in which psychological knowledge is cre- Hugo Miinsterberg, and John B. Watson. These ated. Rediscovery of these historical materials may Utopias clearly reflect Baconian thinking, not in a have sobering effects—as with the cases of Cyril simple resemblance to New Atlantis, but in their Burt and J. B. Watson (Samelson, 1980)—yet there dedication to explaining how psychology, as a sci- is no reason why such excursions cannot have pos- ence, is instrumental to human welfare. For this itive consequences as well. reason alone, the Utopias would have no place in There are several reasons why the conventional conventional histories. However, the Utopias and histories of psychology have charted a practically other writings of the four psychologists also belie unidimensional course of psychology's advance. a clear distinction between the Baconiatt and New- Psychology, after all, is a relatively new discipline tonian moralities in psychology. In their episte- seeking recognition as a natural science. Histories mological thinking, the four psychologists essen- detailing the discovery of theories and refinement tially attempted a unification of psychology as a of methods have confirmed its scientific image knowledge system and as a social instrument. Their (Hagstrom, 1965; O'Donnell, 1979). They reified Utopias served to illustrate this unity and, hence, the hopes to establish a true science of the mind, to show the imperative for advancing psychology. sometimes nearly succumbing to what has been The correspondence between their Utopian and called "physics envy." There is perhaps a more professional writings affirms their dedication to specific reason why conventional histories have not these ideas. When viewed in the broader context directly addressed social,- moral, or political issues of the period 1915 to 1930, these writings calindt of the past. Scientists have long subscribed to dis- be interpreted simply as anomalies, as peculiar cordant moral attitudes. These have been de- pastimes of professionals, but must be seen as plau- scribed by Toulmin (1975) as a "Baconian" mo- sible answers to perceived crises both in academic rality, where science serves as an instrument psychology and in American society. When viewed committed to human improvement, and a "Newto- in relation to contemporary psychology, the writ- nian" morality, where science serves the rational ings intimate a continued reluctance to confront pursuit of a true understanding of nature. Scientists such dual moralities. have adhered to the Baconian image principally in the external affairs of science and have done so G. Stanley Hall and the Ideal to secure the societal support necessary to pursue Community intellectual interests. For instance, after World War I, the National Academy of Sciences adopted G. Stanley Hall generally has been applauded for such 'Baconian arguments in order to retain public his strategic role in American experimental psy- support for scientific research (Tobey, 1971). The chology: He organized the first psychological jour- Newtonian image has guided the internal workings nal, the first American psychological association, of science, its organization and operations.