Südosteuropa 61 (2013), H. 4, S. 522-534
perceptIonS of the wArS In YuGoSlAvIA Intellectual relations
NENAD STEFANOV
Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions. Left-liberal Intellectuals and the Wars in Yugoslavia
Abstract. This essay examines the “prehistory” of the relations between German and Yugoslav intellectuals concerning the war in Yugoslavia . In order to understand the “muteness” of German left-wing intellectuals regarding the violence in Yugoslavia, it is necessary to look at the relations during the preceding decades . Such a look reveals that there were contacts and relationships between Yugoslav left-wing dissidents and German left-liberal intellectuals after 1968 and throughout the 1970s and 80s . Against the background of muteness, it is even more surprising that in the 1980s a journal existed that was co-edited by German, North-American and Yugoslav intellectuals. This makes it all the more difficult to answer the question of why, despite such close contact, muteness emerged . The concluding section develops a perspective for further research and argues that attention should be paid to the theoretical framework through which the developments in Yugoslavia were perceived by German intellectuals .
Nenad Stefanov is Research Associate at the Chair for Southeast European History at the Humboldt-University Berlin .
“Daß ich mich nicht theoretisch mit dem Stalinismus auseinandergesetzt habe? Okay, ich akzeptiere den Vorwurf.” Jürgen Habermas in a conversation with Adam Michnik 1993 In his contribution to this issue, Wolfgang Höpken points out that the wars in Yugoslavia came as a great shock not only amongst the Western European public, but also, and with far greater significance, for a large part of Yugoslav society . This experience of shock and paralysis – or, as it is formulated in an- other context – demobilization,1 is a seminal moment in the establishment of ethnically homogeneous communities . As Hannes Grandits demonstrates in this issue, at least one finding of the increasing research on the dynamics of violence is that violence is not caused by assumed “ethnic differences”, but rather the opposite is true: violence serves as a means to create new collectives of victims and perpetrators, and in this way the ethnicization of society . This shock has
1 Valére Philip Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War. Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca/N.Y. 2006 . Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions 523 turned out to be an integral part of the way modern warfare is carried out in creating ethnic homogeneous territories . The destructive force of ethnicized violence caused serious doubts amongst those intellectuals in West Germany who had maintained contact with their colleagues in Yugoslavia for many years . They began to suspect that the former Yugoslavia with its allegedly different socialism was nothing more than a chimera: a beautiful façade that was now in a state of eruption . Starting in 1989 in Eastern Europe, fundamental changes were challenging the convictions of a considerable part of the West-German left-liberal milieu with regards to the so-called “real socialist” societies,2 particularly those left-liberals that had been in contact with Yugoslav critical intellectuals since the 1970s and who found that a completely different picture of Yugoslavia had emerged. Their experiences of the 1970s – e .g . the philosophical summer school on the island of Korčula – were contrary and seemingly without any connection to the current impressions of cruelty and destruction . The predominant reaction to this was one of bemusement and helplessness . How could this basic Ratlosigkeit3 have emerged? It is often mentioned vis a vis left-liberal intellectuals in Germany, and for a considerable time it seemed to dominate their perspective on the war in Yugoslavia. The questions that in particular need to be posed are how such reticence could have emerged after more than a decade of cooperation with the Yugoslavs on a joint and very am- bitious journal, Praxis International . Other questions to be raised are how both of these experiences related to each other, and finally, what thisRatlosigkeit tells us about the intellectual impact of the contacts between intellectuals from West Germany and Yugoslavia . Evaluating the impact of these contacts is a crucial precondition in assessing how left-liberal intellectuals in Germany perceived and reacted to the Yugoslav crisis and war . It will become apparent that for these intellectuals, Yugoslavia was not unfamiliar, as this had been, and still was, a continuous relationship . The contradiction between the comparatively intensive contact until 1989 and the surprising muteness after 1991 will be examined in the conclusion . These are the general questions of this short insight. It will focus on a particular intellectual viewpoint based on the theoretical heritage of critical theory . Nota bene, this orientation consisted (and still consists) of the spectre of different intellectual circles with different inflections. Because Jürgen Habermas has on
2 I use this term here because it appears regularly in contemporary public discourse . 3 Ratlosigkeit is one of the words that is often used in the reactions towards the war in Yugoslavia. As it transports something of the specificity of the relationship towards the war in Yugoslavia, which is not completely synonymous with helplessness, I will use this term in some parts of the text . 524 Nenad Stefanov many occasions been assumed to be the most prominent representative of this viewpoint, this essay focuses on his statements in the conclusion 4. As pointed out, the focus on this intellectual tendency concerning Yugoslavia is no coincidence . A considerable part of this group had been in contact with their Yugoslav colleagues for a long period of time 5. Exchange, transfers and entanglements thereby are important keywords, which describe the story of these contacts . Conceptualizing these contacts in a transnational perspective does not necessarily mean focusing on “successful” exchanges and transfers, but also examining instances where they failed . Meanwhile, it is an integral part of transnational history to focus on all elements and moments of exchanges of ideas, including those which are forgotten, omitted, or modified during the process of adaption .6 When examining the history of instances where such ex- changes ended in failure, a fragile inter-relatedness becomes visible . This will be shown in the following analysis . When discussing contacts between intellectuals from West Germany and Yugoslavia, historians usually focus on the period between 1964 and 1974 . Based on this, it would be reasonable to question why the outbreak of the war was able to cause such deep irritation: this contacts and the discussions about Yugoslav society were part of a distant past, now long forgotten. Yet the curi- ous and paradoxical thing is that cooperation had intensified in 1981 and lasted until 1989, just two years before the outbreak of the war . It is remarkable that Praxis International, a continuation of some kind of the former journal Praxis,7 is rarely quoted by protagonists in West Germany as a medium of contact and exchange with their Yugoslav colleagues . It had existed for nearly a decade, and continued to exist throughout the Yugoslav crisis, yet the journal and its context do not appear in any of the remembrances concern- ing intellectuals in Yugoslavia .
4 Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that within this theory, Habermas’ claim on this legacy was actively contested. There existed serious critique concerning the notion of communicative reason as a neglection of the “limits of enlightenment”, formulated in a self- reflexive direction in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. However, in the general public perception in the 1980s, Habermas was regularly connected with this tradition . Here it is more about a left-liberal public sphere . Cf . GerhardBolte (ed .), Unkritische Theorie . Gegen Habermas . Lüneburg 1989; Helmut Dubiel, Ungewißheit und Politik. Frankfurt/M. 1994. 5 Cf. The memories of Jürgen Habermas concerning his friendship with Gajo Petrović: Jürgen Habermas, U spomen na Gaju Petrovića / Zum Gedenken an Gajo Petrović, in: Lino Veljak (ed.), Gajo Petrović, Čovjek i filozof. Zbornik radova s konferencije povodom 80. obljetnice . Zagreb 2008, 11-18 . 6 Martin Conway / Kiran Klaus Patel (eds .), Europeanization in the Twentieth Century . Historical Approaches . Basingstoke 2010 . 7 Concerning the journal see Gerson S. Sher, Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia. Bloomington/IN 1977. Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions 525
It has to be stressed that this contribution is not about political positions and the pros and cons of military intervention. Instead, it describes the different attempts of West German intellectuals to find terms, notions and concepts for what was happening in a seemingly familiar country in order to overcome their own helplessness . As pointed out, the perception of contacts between Yugoslav dissident intel- lectuals and their colleagues from West Germany is usually placed in a some- what distant time, starting from the end of the 1960s . What is highly unusual, however, is the fact that after four years of inactivity and an exchange which was limited to petitions to Tito against the oppression of those expressing criti- cal opinions, suddenly, in 1981, a new journal, which was produced in a joint effort by western and Yugoslav intellectuals, appeared:Praxis International . In comparison to its predecessor Praxis, Praxis International was far less acknowl- edged by western intellectuals . From 1964 to 1974, Praxis had received a lot of attention for its importance in presenting a potential blueprint for a different kind of socialist project than the real socialist one that was in power in the Soviet Union . Oskar Negt, for example, spoke with disappointment about the new “Oxford Journal” abandoning its conceptual effort to keep on developing the authentic Yugoslav project with a deeper theoretical scrutiny .8 Another reason for the lack of recognition could be rooted in the circumstances of the re-launch of Praxis in an altered Yugoslav setting. There were basic dis- agreements within the former Yugoslav editorial board about such a project, as it was primarily the idea of some of the Belgrade members of the former Praxis circle . In contrast to their colleagues in Zagreb, nearly all of them had lost their posts at Belgrade University .9 They experienced serious difficulties in maintain - ing contacts with the international scientific community and particularly the intellectuals in the west .Praxis International seemed to promise a possibility for such contact and exchange, but the way in which the philosopher Mihailo Marković first implemented the journal caused many misunderstandings and much personal discord with the Zagreb colleagues involved 10. Of the Zagreb circle, Marković only managed to convince Rudi Supek to take partin the
8 “Es ist sicher eine gehörige Schieflage dieser Oxforder Praxis Zeitschrift […], dass die jugoslawischen Repräsentanten glaubten, mit dem Ende des Realsozialismus gehe die kritische Substanz des Sozialismus selber verloren.” Ursula Rütten im Gespräch mit Oskar Negt, in: Ursula Rütten, Am Ende der Philosophie? Das gescheiterte “Modell Jugoslawien“ . Fragen an Intellektuelle im Umkreis der PRAXIS-Gruppe . Klagenfurt 1993, 173-182, 177 . 9 Nebojša Popov, Contra fatum. Slučaj grupe profesora Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu 1968-1988 . Belgrade 1989 . 10 Nebojša Popov (ed.), Sloboda i nasilje, razgovor o časopisu Praxis i korčulanskoj let- njoj školi. Belgrade 2003, esp. the interviews with Milan Kangrga, Zagorka Golubović, Ivan Kuvačić, Božidar Jaksić and Ante Lesaja. Also in Belgrade, the greater part of the later col- laborators of Praxis International did not agree to the nontransparent way in which Marković had established the new journal . 526 Nenad Stefanov journal . Supek, on the other hand, was widely respected among his western colleagues because he was one of the founders and organizers of the Korčula Summer School. Thus Marković gained credibility forPraxis International be- ing a joint project of the Belgrade and Zagreb intellectuals, but this was only partially true, as important people, including key figures like Milan Kangrga and Gajo Petrović, did not participate.11
Possibilities and Limits of Entanglements
Besides these aggravating circumstances and in contrast to its predecessor, the journal appeared to be a joint western and Yugoslav project . Concerning the editorial of its first issue, it seems that some of the objections of the Zagreb colleagues were justified, for they had criticized the venture as an attempt to pretend that things had not changed since the shutting down of the old journal: “Paxis International, a journal that will seek to carry on the spirit and work of the Yugoslav journal Praxis in the new historical conditions of the 1980s and on a larger international scale in all those countries where progressive intellectuals and independent critical Marxists share similar aspirations and commitments . […] The 1970s have brought into focus a number of issues that were not adequately discussed in Praxis .”12 An example for such issues was the impact of the new social and ecological movements, as well as a deeper interest in the so-called Third World . Interest- ingly enough, circumstances in Yugoslavia were not mentioned explicitly as a topic of much interest 13. Another contrast between the new journal and its predecessor was that an international editorial board in New York and Belgrade had been established. The editors were Mihailo Marković, Richard J. Bernstein from the New School for Social Research and Ferenc Fehér, representing the “Budapest School” in an undogmatic way . The newly launched journal devel- oped into a forum where North American and Western European left wing intellectuals together with their colleagues from Eastern Europe and particularly Yugoslavia tried to elaborate concepts according to the questions put forward in the cited editorial . The “Yugoslav part” in the contributions was remarkably smaller in com- parison to the former Praxis. There was a visible attempt to link different developments in state socialist countries, for example the importance of the
11 See first of all the Statement by the Yugoslav Members of the International Editorial Board of Praxis International, Praxis International 2 (1982), 226f . A series of polemics appeared in the Belgrade-based philosophical journal Theoria, e .g .: Milan Kangrga, Koje su principijelne osnove spora?, Theoria 26 (1983), n . 1-2, 191-199; LjubomirTadić , Prigovori nekim govorima i odgovorima povodom jednog razgovora, Theoria 26 (1983), n . 3, 163-179 . 12 Why PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL?, Praxis International 1 (1981), 1-5 . 13 Ibid . Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions 527
Polish Solidarność movement for Yugoslav society.14 Furthermore, a number of scholars from the Habermas circle used Praxis International as a means of pre- senting their findings. 15 Initial discussions about the meaning and potential of the concept of civil society (presented mainly by the sociologist Andrew Arato) were initiated by the prominent historian E . P . Thompson .16 For the first five years the journal gave the impression of a “peaceful coex- istence” of different theoretical approaches. These included approaches from Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia but also the discussion of civil society from the circle of the New School for Social Research in New York as well as the first deliberations around the notion of communicative reason, recently influenced by Habermas in the Frankfurt/Konstanz group. However, the editors and col - laborators were obviously uncomfortable with this lack of coherence in the contributions and the discussed theoretical framework . It can only be speculated whether the propagated “Marxist humanism” of Mihailo Marković became even more incommensurable with the changing approaches of the western New Left as represented by the New School of Social Research and by the Institut für Sozialforschung, and the change in the editorial board (whose members were replaced by philosophers Seyla Benhabib and Svetozar Stojanović) in 1986 and the letter from the new editors did indeed hint at such a direction: “However, discussions among members of the Editorial Board, usually taking place in conjunction with the course on ‘Philosophy and the Social Sciences’ at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, have led to some refor- mulations and revisions in these original statements . A consensus has eventually emerged that the dominant orientation of the journal would be best characterized not as ‘Marxist humanist’ but as ‘democratic socialist’, since Marxist humanism is one among a number of theoretical orientations compatible with the goals and aims of democratic socialism . At the beginning of this decade, a growing sense of being at the end of a process, at times named ‘modernity’, at others ‘industrial society’, and even ‘Enlightenment’ has spread . Post-modern, post-industrial, post- Enlightenment, post-structuralist, post-analytic, post-empiricist, and post-Marxist are by now familiar terms […] . Taken together, these two sets of issues yield the questions which Praxis International will have to deal with in the coming years: What is the meaning of democratic socialism today, for the late-capitalist societies of Western Europe and North America, for the countries of the Third World […], and for the radical restructuring of ‘really existing socialisms’? Which theoretical framework is most compatible with the ideal of democratic socialism? Yet another question has to be answered: how can we deal with the ideology of ‘really existing
14 Zagorka Golubović, Historical Lessons of the Social Movement in Poland 1980-1981, Praxis International 2 (1982), n. 3, 229-240. 15 Cf . HelmutDubiel , Farewell to Critical Theory?, Praxis International 3 (1983), n . 2, 121-137 . 16 E. P. Thompson, Comment, Praxis International 5 (1985), n. 1, 75-85. Response to A. Ara to / J. L. Cohen, Social Movements, Civil Society and the Problem of Sovereignty, Praxis International 4 (1984), n. 3, 266-283. 528 Nenad Stefanov
socialism’ intellectually when ultimately it has neither intellectual power nor real intellectual quality?”17 The ties to the particular Yugoslav experience (which Negt retrospectively failed to acknowledge in the Oxford Journal) were once again gradually loosened as it became clear that there was only a marginal interest in real socialism and the western contributors were obviously more interested in keeping in touch with western academic discourse . The preoccupation with all the “posts” was ap- parently of greater concern than trying to figure out in what direction societal conditions were changing under state socialism . It is indicative that the term “civil society” was predominantly discussed in an abstract “paradigmatic” way, but not in connection to societal experiences in Eastern Europe or Yugo- slavia 18. At this point, Ratlosigkeit was increasing as far as the developments in Yugoslavia were concerned . Obviously, the new editors, Seyla Benhabib and Svetozar Stojanović, also had difficulties in bringing different societal experi- ences together, although they agreed upon the general outlook . However, the demotion of Mihailo Marković indicated a change in Yugoslavia. Marković obviously could manage without this forum, replacing it by establishing a forum of nationalist intellectuals from all disciplines in Serbia 19.
The Approaches to Analyzing the Crisis in Yugoslavia
Nevertheless, from 1986 to 1989 in particular, careful observations on the developments and the growing crisis in Yugoslavia were published in Praxis In- ternational. To follow current developments, a column called “Political chronicle” was established 20. There were also contributions which depicted the situation in all of its details .Praxis International was, particularly in 1989, one of the rare sources from which an interested reader could learn about what was actually happening in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. A text by Mojmir Križan may serve as representative example of such an approach . The author evaluated the discussions on civil society in Yugoslavia in order to measure the potential of possible societal actors promoting ideas of civil society in Yugoslavia . He showed the different motifs for appropriating the concept of “civil society”. Conscious of all “real existing” obstacles, Križan observed a new impact of
17 Editorial to Praxis International 3 (1986) . From this issue on the editors changed, as Seyla Benhabib and Svetozar Stojanović replaced Richard J. Bernstein, Ferenc Fehér and Mihajlo Marković. 18 Cf. Geoffrey Hunt, Gramsci, Civil Society and Bureaucracy, Praxis International 6 (1986), n . 2, 206-219 . 19 Nevertheless, Marković remained present in the journal, and his contributions are indicative for his nationalist stance . 20 Dick Howard, Political Chronicle: France, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Praxis International 7 (1987), n. 3/4, 360-367. Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions 529 those concepts amongst the dissenting groups and organizations in the various Yugoslav republics 21. In the same year, another important contribution gave a critical insight into the growing crisis in Yugoslavia . Although speaking in allusions, Bogdan Denitch’s analysis of the Yugoslav crisis was obviously directed at the former editor Mihailo Marković when he spoke of the “old Praxis circle, and various democratic or humanist-Marxist groupings, [who] still talk in terms of a democratic federal Yugoslav State based on social owner- ship and self-management . They are sometimes more sceptical about the place of the market under socialism than the official LCY and government spokesmen.”22 Denitch saw serious potential for conflict in a politicized economy which fuelled national resentments. He did not explicitly mention Marković, but the circle around Praxis International knew that Marković was one of the most energetic critics of market economy and therefore also of party pluralism . “In a highly politicized economy, what is and what is not “productive” or “efficient” is very often determined by political decisions, about taxes, import restrictions and pressures on enterprises to add to their workforces .”23 In this way, Denitch pointed out how the discussion about the economic mis- ery shifted gradually from its real subject in the sphere of “political economy” (which seemed difficult to grasp) to an abstract sphere where distinct national collectives appeared to get the blame for the crisis. Denitch’s essay was a first attempt to focus on how discussions of responsibility, alternatives and solutions were transferred from economic matters to an ethnicized perception of society. This kind of ethnicization of societal issues can be illustrated by the well-known Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in 1986 . Here, seemingly objective criticism on economic imbalances was connected to a victimization of the “Serbian people”, thus creating the root cause for the ethnicized inter- pretation of the societal crisis . Denitch saw its causes in the ethnicization of Yugoslav socialism itself: “[…] the group identity which is ‘privileged’ is the nation, expressing itself through the Republic in which it is dominant, supplemented by the group identity as
21 “Yugoslav authors dealt with problems of political theory and the practice of western democracies also before 1985, yet from normatively different perspectives, i.e. either neutrally, seeing in them objects of a purely theoretical interest and of no relevance for Yugoslav society, or critically, intending to legitimate local government combined with one-party rule . The present discussion is distinguished by positive evaluation of western theories of civil society, so that it is hardly influenced by former works by Yugoslav authors on the same subject.” Mojmir Križan, Civil Society – a New Paradigm in the Yugoslav Theoretical Discussion, Praxis International 9 (1989), n. 1/2, 152-163, 152. 22 Bogdan Denitch, Yugoslavia: The Present Limits of Communist Reformation, Praxis International 9 (1989), n . /1 2, 164-182 . 23 Ibid ., 168 . 530 Nenad Stefanov
a member of a group in associated labour in one’s self-managing enterprise, and in a more attenuated and indirect manner as a member of the working class. That last, which could have been a cross-cutting and unifying identity, has been submerged in the vaguer category of ‘working people’, which in effect includes everyone employed . That is therefore a ‘soft’ and general identity, whereas the national identity, particularly with the growing secularization of political faith in socialism and Marxism, comes ever more strongly to the forefront . […] The long lived Party power monopoly which eliminated other genuine political alternatives may have left traditional national and religious identification as the most salient and passionately held ones by an increasingly de-politicized people .”24 This description of the developments in Yugoslavia in 1989, in which Denitch expressed serious concerns about the situation in the autonomous province of Kosovo, was not the only one warning about the destructive potential of the crisis, but it was one of the first serious attempts to understand the societal vacuum in which ethnonationalism had appeared . By publishing in this par- ticular forum of left-liberal western intellectuals, Denitch and Križan’s western colleagues were able to gain an insight into the Yugoslav crisis . This was a rare opportunity because it opened a theoretically ambitious, and at the same time empirically based perspective . Above all, it was formulated in a very familiar terminology. All these reflections must have landed on Habermas’ desk and the desks of all the other members of the journal’s editorial board and contribu- tors. As inquisitive intellectuals, they could have found primary evidence for where the crisis in Yugoslavia was going and even how to find a terminology for it – in their own journal . Bearing this in mind, it is even more astonishing how only two years later upon the outbreak of the war, those western intellectuals, who were participating as editors in Praxis International, had become so tight-lipped that they were unable to find notions for what was happening. In this case, it seems as if the “transfer of ideas and concepts” had completely failed . This is even more surprising because it had happened in a shared forum . Here, the contrast to the French context is evident, where reactions from their renowned intellectuals could very soon be heard .25 In a reassessment, there were suggestions to explain this on account of the anti-totalitarian tradition among French intellectuals 26. This reaction is remarkable in the context of the hitherto described contacts between intellectuals from West Germany and Yugoslavia . One would have assumed that the ties between the latter two were stronger than they were between the Yugoslavs and their French colleagues . Amongst the opinions held by the so called “post-structuralist” thinkers in France, there existed an unambiguous
24 Ibid ., 171 . 25 See the contribution of Nadège Ragaru in this volume . 26 Ulrike Ackermann, Sündenfall der Intellektuellen . Ein deutsch-französischer Streit von 1945 bis heute. Stuttgart 2000. Shared Concepts, Diverging Perceptions 531 rejection of state socialism . Franco-Yugoslav communication was rather spo- radic compared to the engagement of West German intellectuals . It seems that in France, intellectuals’ reactions were based on a specific self-understanding that focused on their social responsibility, where it was seen as a matter of prin - ciple to react decisively to state violence . Such unanimous positioning hardly emerged in the West German and North American leftist context, although personal ties to Yugoslav intellectuals did indeed exist . Even more so, they had existed for a whole decade in a shared theoretical forum . Apart from simple regret, a surprisingly long time passed until an attempt was made to grasp the nature and scale of the destruction in Yugoslavia . Of course, there were substantial exceptions concerning such unwillingness to speak out, as this train of thought was rather heterogeneous and not all in- tellectuals chose to remain in silence . In smaller journals such aslinks , a range of contributions from Yugoslav and French intellectuals appeared, trying to analyze the dynamics of the violence in Yugoslavia 27. Such differences, for instance, became visible in May 1992, when the members of the Institut für Sozialforschung tried to revive contacts with their former colleagues . They had organized a conference with philosophers from the Praxis circle who visited Frankfurt after a considerable period of isolation . The student group “Undogma- tische Linke Frankfurt” interrupted the opening session when Hans Eichel, then Prime Minister of Hessen, was about to address the conference . The students criticized the passivity of the German public with regards the war in Croatia and Bosnia . Furthermore, they demanded a profound political intervention . Seyla Benhabib self-critically admitted a lack of awareness concerning the Yugoslav crisis: “Many thoughtful commentators have observed that in the face of the collapse of the Communist regimes which dominated Eastern European countries, the reac- tions of the North American and West German Left, as compared to the French one for example, have been somewhat muted, cautious, restrained and may be even resentful .”28 Nevertheless, the question remains why it took so long and became so difficult to develop an idea of what was actually going on in Yugoslavia .
27 The journal links regularly published contributions about the war in Yugoslavia . Cf . Edgar Morin, Assoziierung oder Barbarei . Maastricht oder Sarajevo, links 10 (1992), 8f . (French original Maastricht, association ou barbarie, Le Monde, 10 .09 .1992, 21); CatherineSamary , Ist der Zerfall Jugoslawiens unausweichlich?, links 6 (1991), 8f .; eadem, Dokumentation des jugoslawischen Vorparlaments in Sarajevo vom 31.08.1991: Kompromiß statt Krieg,links 12 (1991), 10f . 28 Seyla Benhabib, Editorial, Praxis International 11 (1991), n . 1, 1-6, 1 . 532 Nenad Stefanov Silence in Spite of the Contacts?
What is there to conclude from the social and intellectual context of the jour- nal? First of all, there was no meeting point for certain lines of discussion in the journal . Debates on “democratic socialism” and “civil society” were carried out parallel to one another . Second, when a discussion about civil society was initiated, as seen in the case of Mojmir Križan, it was not systematically adapted by the western political scientists . Instead, they seemed to be preoccupied with the “change of paradigms” . On the other hand, Yugoslav society increasingly became a terra incognita for western collaborators of Praxis International, as the “paradigms” of communi- cative reason apparently could not be applied here . Towards the end of the Bosnian war, Jürgen Habermas was interviewed by the Spiegel and confronted with Srebrenica, and admitted his Ratlosigkeit: “Spiegel: Warum haben Sie wie die meisten deutschen Intellektuellen zu den täg- lichen Gräueln geschwiegen? Habermas: Ich habe seinerzeit Genschers Politik der Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens mehrmals kritisiert . Aber später – was sollte ich mich zu einer so schwerwiegenden Alternative äußern, solange sie noch nicht unausweichlich zu sein schien? […] Ich sah keinen Grund, irgendwen mit meiner Stimme, die ja sowieso nicht zählt, in einen Krieg zu treiben. […] Aber erst nach Srebrenica und Žepa ist diese Alternative unausweichlich geworden. […] Die Dynamik der Selbstzerstörung auf dem Balkan erinnert uns ja an die fast naturgeschichtliche Dramatik unseres eigenen Nationalismus, des europäischen Nationalismus im 19 . und frühen 20 . Jahr- hundert. Wer war denn hier verantwortlich für 1870/71, für 1914/18 und 1939/45, wenn nicht die Beteiligten selbst?“29 In this issue, Wolfgang Höpken discusses the question regarding the engage- ment of intellectuals in favour of a military intervention . In contrast, I deal with how the developments in a disintegrating Yugoslavia were analyzed and which notions were used by the very same intellectuals . Habermas’ response is not an indication of a lack of self-reflection or disinformation, but summarizes very well the representation of important liberal and intellectual as well as public opinion in West German society . The perspective of this thinking on the war in Yugoslavia is exemplified in this statement. In a somehow parenthetical way, Jürgen Habermas qualifies the substance of the wars in Yugoslavia by relating it to a “naturgeschichtliche Dramatik unseres Nationalismus” . It is remarkable that in this case he is not using his regular categorical apparatus as he normally does to describe societal crisis . Obviously, it is appealing to relate the unsettling dynamic of societal destruc-
29 Ein Abgrund von Trauer . Interview mit dem Philosophen Jürgen Habermas über die Intellektuellen und den Balkan-Krieg, Der Spiegel, 7 August, 1995, available at
30 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg. Frankfurt/M. 1993. 31 Peter Handke, Gerechtigkeit für Serbien: Eine winterliche Reise zu den Flüssen Donau, Save, Morawa und Drina, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14 January, 1996, 1-4 (Feuilleton Supple ment) . 32 It is no coincidence that Emir Kusturica’s film “Underground”, which allows such interpretation, received many positive reactions . 33 For another approach see the work of Siebo Siems, who conceptualizes the carrier of the keyword collective identity in Germany, relating it to the discourses about the war in Bosnia: “Unübersehbar hat sich nach dem Ende des short century die Wahrnehmung und die Realität von Gewalt verändert: Vor allem ‘Jugoslawien’ kann als Chiffre für diese Erfahrung gelten, die sowohl ans Alltagsbewusstsein als auch an die sozialwissenschaftliche Reflexion neue Anforderungen stellt .” Siebo Siems, Die deutsche Karriere kollektiver Identität: Vom wissen- schaftlichen Begriff zum massenmedialen Jargon. Münster 2007, 195-200. 534 Nenad Stefanov other parts of Europe fifty or a hundred years earlier and which the West had long since overcome . In this way, the investigation into the experience of vio- lence in Yugoslavia was not related to a critical assessment of the fundamental changes starting in 1989 . For a better understanding of the relatively long period of silence, it was pointed out here that it is important to also focus on the earlier history, i .e . the relationship of this group of left-liberal intellectuals with “real socialism” . With- out this history, their reaction towards the war cannot be properly understood if we centre exclusively on the West German background to the discussions . A first step in this direction was the evaluation of the contacts and relations between them and intellectuals from Yugoslavia . In the future, a possible second step would be a complete examination of the terms and notions that circulated among left-liberal intellectuals in Germany in order to assess more thoroughly their conceptualization of the processes within the societies of “real socialism” . As seen, a preliminary conclusion could be that there was indeed potential to understand the Yugoslav crisis in its full complexity, namely through per- sonal contacts with former colleagues . Yet, western intellectuals perceived the Yugoslav society as enigmatic, and at the same time as a tragedy that needed to be deeply mourned, but about which nothing could be done . Although there obviously were feelings of solidarity with former colleagues and co-editors, particularly those that had suffered from the violence, even against this back- ground the question or contradiction, namely why such practical solidarity was not transformed into a theoretical effort to fully understand the complexities of this crisis, remains unresolved .