Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
National Solidarity Programme
Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit (PRDU)
Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity ACKUProgramme (NSP), Afghanistan
May 2006
Evaluation Team Leader Professor Sultan Barakat ACKU Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Solidarity Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation Programme and Development
Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afghanistan
ACKU May 2006
Evaluation Team Leader Professor Sultan Barakat
Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit (PRDU) Evaluation Team
Team Leader: Regional Assessment Team Leaders:
Professor Sultan Barakat Dr Margaret Chard (BA, MA, MSc, PhD) (BSc, MA, DPhil, ICDDS) Dr David Connolly (BA, MA, PhD) Founding Director of the Post-war Dr Richard Jones (BA, MA, MSc, PhD) Reconstruction and Development Unit, Mr Waheed Omer (BA, MA) University of York. Mr Mirwais Wardak (BA, MA).
Specialist in Public Institutions: Regional Assessment Team Members:
Professor Mark Evans (BA, PhD) Mr Khushal Akhtar Head of Department of Politics, Mr Malaiz Daud University of York. Mr Jawed Nader Ms Marina Nawabi Mr Samiullah Nazemi Dr Lida Rahimi Specialist in Mr Qutabuddin Roydar Community Development: Dr Khalid Sharifi Ms Asila Wardak Dr Arne Strand (MA, PhD) Mr Idrees Zaman. Researcher at Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
Specialist in Infrastructure Projects:
Engineer Richard Brown (BSc, MBA, MA, CEng, CDipAF, DipM, FICE, FCILT, MCMI, MCIM) Associate Director, Arup, UK. ACKU
© 2006 Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit (PRDU), The University of York; and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical or otherwise without the prior permission from the publishers – Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit (PRDU), The University of York NSP AFGHANISTAN (see back cover for contact details). Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT Table of Contents
page page Preliminary Pages The role of the NSP Oversight Consultant in programme List of Abbreviations v management and coordination 27 List of Illustrations vi Summary and recommendations Preface vii for national level coordination 34
3. Sub-national Level Coordination Main Report and Operational Delivery of the NSP 37 Executive Summary 1 The MRRD and provincial Programme design and rationale 3 and district government 37 National level programme The provincial OCs and teams 45 management and delivery 4 The role of the Facilitating Sub-national coordination and Partners in NSP coordination operational delivery of the NSP 7 and operational delivery 49 The role of Community Development Councils in programme management 4. The Role of Community and operational delivery 10 Development Councils in Representative Governance The enhancement of and Community Development 69 NSP engineering projects 13 The strategy for evaluating NSP Financial Operations 15 Community Development Community Development Councils 69 Councils and future The Community Development governance in Afghanistan 16 Council Community Power Linkages with the evaluation Survey 70 of other community-driven Principal findings 70 development programmes 17 The Household Survey 77 ProgrammeACKU costs, expectations and impact 17 Conclusions 91 Recommendations for CDCs 94 Findings and Recommendations: 5. An Analysis of National 1. Programme Design Solidarity Programme and Rationale 19 Engineering Projects 97 Analysis 19 Methodology 97 Summary and recommendations Project relevance 97 for programme design and rationale 22 Project quality and sustainability 98 Project management 99 2. National Level Programme Management and Coordination 25 Intangible benefits 99 National level coordination Key recommendations for committees 25 the enhancement of NSP engineering projects 100 page page
6. National Solidarity Programme Annexes Financial Operations 103 A1. General Introduction 135 Financial processes 103 Map of Research Districts 136 Obstacles to effective A2. Evaluation Methodology 137 operational delivery 104 Key recommendations Field Research Findings: for financial operations 105 A3. Badghis Province 143 A4. Balkh Province 163 7. Programme Enhancement 107 A5. Bamyan Province 203 A new institutional venue for the National Solidarity A6. Herat Province 217 Programme 107 A7. Kabul Province 223 Community Development A8. Kundoz Province 245 Councils and future governance in Afghanistan 108 A9. Nangarhar Province 265 Annex 1. Laghman Province 296 The role of the National Solidarity Programme in A10. Paktia Province 301 poverty reduction 110 A11. Paktika Province 307 Measuring the performance A12. Takhar Province 313 of the National Solidarity Programme 112 B1. Terms of Reference 321 Government capacity development in National Solidarity Programme Phase 2 115 C1. Stakeholders Consulted 327 The Management of cultural change in the National D1. References 333 Solidarity Programme Phase 2 116 Gender issues for Phase 2 of the National Solidarity Programme 119
8. In Conclusion – Programme Costs, Expectations and Impact 121 Approach 121 ACKU Programme costs 122 Programme expectations 123 Programme benefits 127 Programme efficiency and effectiveness 130
NSP AFGHANISTAN Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT List of Abbreviations
AKDN Aga Khan Development MISFA Micro Finance Investment Network Support Facility of Afghanistan ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction M&E Monitoring and Evaluation Tr ust Fund MRRD Ministry for Rehabilitation and BRAC Bangladesh Rural Action Rural Development Committee MoU Memorandum of Understanding CBD Community Based NABDP National Area Based Development Development Programme CDC(s) Community Development NEEP National Emergency Council(s) Employment Programme CDD Community Driven NGO Non-Governmental Development Organization CDP Community Development Plan NSP National Solidarity Programme CDSO Community Development OC Oversight Consultant Support Officers OECD Organization for Economic CIDA Canadian International Cooperation and Development Development Agency OM Operational Manual CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance PCU Public Communication Unit DAB Da Afghanistan Bank PO Provincial Office DAI Development Alternatives PRT(s) Provincial Reconstruction Incorporated Team(s) DFID Department For International PRDU Post-war Reconstruction and Development Development Unit, University of York DRRD Department for Rural Rehabilitation and Development PSG Professional Skills for Government EU European Union ACKURAT(s) Regional Assessment Team(s) FHH Female Headed Households RuWATSAN Rural Water Supply and FP(s) Facilitating Partner(s) Sanitation Programme GRSP Ghanzi Rural Support SDF Sanayee Development Programme Foundation GTZ/IS Deutsche Gesellschaft für SO Social Organizer Technische Zusammenarbeit/ International Services UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda IDA International Development Association UNHCR United Nations High Commision for Refugees IDP Internally Displaced Person UNICEF United Nations International JICA Japan International Cooperation Children’s Emergency Fund Agency USAID US Agency for International MHP Micro Hydro Power Development MIS Management Information WB World Bank System v List of Illustrations
page page
Boxes Figures
Box 1. The organizational structure Fig 1. Professional skills of the NSP Oversight for government 116 Consultant, GTZ-DAI 28 Fig. 2. Composition of NSP total Box 2. The training of DRRD costs (Dec 04 to Feb 06) 122 staff in Kundoz 41 Fig. 3. Composition of NSP Box 3. Transportation stress programme delivery costs in Bamyan 42 (Dec 04 to Feb 06) 122
Box 4. Villages unified in Balkh 46 Fig 4. Mapping obstacles to NSP success/failure 125 Box 5. Weak community capacities in Nangarhar 46
Box 6. An integrated approach to Tables DRRD capacity development in Kabul 48 Table 1. The operations of NSP Facilitating Partners 50 Box 7. BRAC in Nangarhar 57 Table 2. The disbursement process Box 8. Identifying community in the context of programme priorities through project development 103 selection – Examples from CHA and UN-HABITAT 61 Table 3. Governance in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 109 Box 9. Examples of the issue of appropriate design and Table 4. The Impact of the NSP construction – CHA on community poverty 111 District Team in Balkh 64 Table 5. Programme obstacles 123 Box 10. Examples of the issue of ACKU appropriate design and Table 6. NSP outputs – September construction – The BRAC 2003 to February 2006 130 Team in Nangarhar 65 Table 7. NSP capacity development 131
Table 8. NSP projects 131
NSP AFGHANISTAN Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
vi Preface
Tw enty-five years of conflict has left munities to social and productive infrastruc- Afghanistan with a profound need for ture and services. extensive intervention to address recon- struction and development requirements, The implementation strategy of the NSP particularly in rural areas, many of which consists of four core elements: (1) facilita- were never reached by consecutive govern- tion at the community level to assist com- mental developmental plans. In 2002, the munities to establish inclusive community transitional administration of the country institutions (CDCs) through elections, recognized that the legitimacy of the new reaching consensus on priorities and corre- government by the rural population sponding sub-project activities, developing depended in no small measure on its ability eligible sub-proposals that comply with NSP to deliver long-awaited assistance to rural appraisal criteria, and implementing communities across the country, and the approved sub-projects; (2) a system of idea for the National Solidarity Programme direct Block Grant transfers to support was born. The Programme was designed rehabilitation and development activities and initiated in 2003 under the Ministry of (sub-projects) planned and implemented by Rural Rehabilitation and Development the elected CDCs; (3) a series of capacity- (MRRD), and was financed by a consortium building activities to enhance the compe- of international donors coordinated by the tence of members of CDCs (both men and World Bank. women) in terms of financial management, procurement, technical skills, and trans- The Programme attempts to target the parency; and (4) activities linking local insti- needs of rural communities by employing tutions to government administration and community-driven development, delivered aid agencies with available services and 1 The other 4 programmes through a collaborative partnership, encom- resources. include: NEEP – the National passing central government, local and inter- Emergency Employment national non-governmental organisations The MRRD recognizes that the quality of the Programme, aimed at assisting (NGOs), and the communities – repre- implementation process of the NSP is the most vulnerable with sented by specially devised Community essential for the long-term sustainability of employment opportunities in Development Councils (CDCs). Today, the community investments and for the overall public infrastructure; WATSAN NSP forms the central component of an success of the Programme. As such, at the – the Rural Water and Sanitation architecture of national programmes community level the identification of priori- Programme, aimed at improving managed by the MRRD, designed both to ties and the planning of sub-projects are health, hygiene and improving help the Afghan people to rebuild their lives based on the basic principles of participa- the child mortality rate; MISFA and nation,ACKU and to demonstrate that the tory planning through: inclusive community – the Micro-Finance Investment Afghan government, with technical assis- meetings and representative elected devel- Support Facility of Afghanistan, tance, could develop the inclusive gover- opment councils; community contributions aimed at improving the lives of nance structures required to sustain a stable to capital costs and operation and mainte- the poor and vulnerable through state.1 nance; and project transparency and the provision of micro credit; accountability to the community. In order to and NABDP – the National As described in the founding document of help the MRRD achieve its targets, an Area Based Development the NSP, the goal of the Programme is to Oversight Consultant (GTZ/IS) was con- Programme, aimed at developing reduce poverty through empowering com- tracted to oversee the overall management the capacity of national, munities with regard to improved gover- and supervision of the NSP. In addition, the provincial, and local authorities nance, and social, human, and economic MRRD has contracted 22 NGOs (both to enable them to plan, finance, capital. It attempts to achieve this goal national and international) and UN- and manage recovery and through pursuing two main objectives: (1) HABITAT to facilitate the delivery of the NSP development interventions. to lay the foundations for a strengthening of in selected districts, across all the provinces community-level governance, and (2) to of Afghanistan. These non-governmental support community-managed sub-projects organizations are termed Facilitating comprising reconstruction and develop- Partners (FPs), and their role is to facilitate ment that improve the access of rural com- community participation in the planning,
vii implementation and management of sub- but also goes further by investigating projects financed by the NSP Block Grants. evidence for qualitative sustainable impacts on the core objectives of the Programme, While the NSP-Oversight Consultant (OC) namely, local governance and poverty has been unable to meet the targets for reduction.3 December 2004 to August 2006 established in its contract with the MRRD, its progress Any evaluation of reconstruction efforts in has nonetheless been remarkable since it war-torn countries inevitably suffers from started in September 2003. Moreover, the the same constraints as the efforts them- importance of the NSP is reflected by its selves: inadequate time and resources, the overt achievements to date. Its reach inaccessibility of key sites, incomplete infor- encompasses 193 districts in all 34 mation and a tight work schedule. With this provinces, and has benefited 10.5 million being a mid-term evaluation, there is the Afghans. More specifically, it has engaged added complication of examining a with 22,500 rural communities covering programme that is very much on ‘the 38,000 rural settlements, which has so far move’: millions of dollars are being resulted in the election of more than 10,000 disbursed as we evaluate, and policy adjust- CDCs. From this, 14,000 projects in 8,000 ments are being made; a new version of the communities have been financed, with Operational Manual has now been Block Grant disbursements amounting to completed; and plans and pledges have US $166.1 million and total Block Grant been made for Phase 2. By way of illustra- commitments of US $214.6 million. Overall, tion, it is noteworthy that several of our rec- more than 4,000 sub-projects have been ommendations in our November Inception completed successfully.2 In addition, this Report have already been implemented – evaluation identifies significant evidence of: testimony to the reflexivity of the OC to (1) increased public faith in the system of issues of programme enhancement. In our government; (2) improved community Inception Report we originally defined the relations; (3) improved state-civil society cut-off point of the period of evaluation (in relations; and (4) the empowerment of terms of data and reports consulted) as the CDCs. end of July 2005. We have subsequently amended the period of evaluation to the In November 2005, the Post-war end of March 2006 to include commentary Reconstruction and Development Unit on some notable developments in pro- (PRDU) at the University of York, U.K., led gramme management and enhancement. by Professor Sultan Barakat, was contracted by the MRRD to undertake a mid-term eval- In addressing these challenges to the nature uation of the NSP over a period of 6 months. of our assessment of the Programme, the The central aim of the evaluation was to PRDU employed a composite and participa- examine the achievements and drawbacks tory evaluation approach. A range of investi- of the Programme two years into its imple- gation methods were used based on the mentation. The midway point for the NSP nature of the data available and the was seen as an opportune moment to questions posed.4 While informed by best reflect on what has been achieved and to practice theory located within specialized make recommendations for improving the ACKUacademic literature, this evaluation is post mid-term evaluation phase (Phase 2) of grounded in qualitative empirical data 2 See NSP OC (2006), the Programme. The PRDU was asked to drawn from: extensive national and sub- Analysis of the Experiences report its findings in relation to the effi- national level interviews, and a series of and Lessons Learned in Program ciency and effectiveness of the implementa- exploration and validation workshops held Implementation, GTZ-IS, Kabul, tion of the NSP as well as its potential with the groups of NSP stakeholders. Within March 2006, pp. 3–5. impact, rationale and longer-term contribu- each of the 11 provinces researched, the tion to governance and development in research teams interfaced with the main 3 See Annex B, ‘Terms of Afghanistan. The team was also asked to NSP actors and their respective levels of Reference’. provide recommendations with regard to: authority (provincial governor, provincial the approach and institutional arrange- and district level RRD, OC and FP).5 The 4 See Annex A2, ‘Methodology’. ments to improve the delivery and impact of scope was then extended to strategically the Programme; and the long-term strategy sampled communities and districts within 5 See Annex C, ‘Stakeholders for the integration of relevant programme these provinces. Both community power Consulted’. functions into the institutional profile of the and household surveys were employed to MRRD. Accordingly, this evaluation report capture a gender-balanced perspective of considers not only the physical outputs and the NSP from the viewpoint of its chief ben- NSP AFGHANISTAN other more tangible programme benefits, eficiaries. The interviews and surveys also Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
viii contained an engineering-based assess- can be used to safeguard and stimulate fur- ment, which provided a technical under- ther policy development and best practice standing of the physical outputs. for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Throughout these integrating levels of inquiry, documentary and multi-level insti- Professor Sultan Z Barakat tutional analyses proved essential. In the NSP Mid-Term Evaluation Team Leader absence of base-line time series data, a PRDU, University of York, York, U.K. pragmatic inclusive approach to evaluating 3 May 2006 programme costs and benefits was deployed to provide an assessment of the overall impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the NSP. The field data was then studied in York during three main stages of analyses.
The PRDU brings to this task 13 years of diverse experience in linking theory to practice in post-conflict reconstruction and development in over 15 countries. This includes expertise both in Afghanistan, and in community rehabilitation and rural devel- opment. As the team leader, I have had the gratification of working with an extremely competent team. At the national and strategic level, the insights of Professor Mark Evans (public institutions), Dr Arne Strand (community development), and Engineer Richard Brown (infrastructure projects) were central to the successful completion of this evaluation. The extensive field research at the sub-national level was equally crucial and was conducted by PRDU Research Fellows Dr Margaret Chard, Dr David Connolly, and Dr Richard Jones. In completing this field research they in turn were joined by an excellent team of Afghan researchers: Mr Waheed Omer, Mr Mirwais Wardak, Mr Khushal Akhtar, Mr Malaiz Daud, Mr Jawed Nader, Miss Marina Nawabi, Mr Samiullah Nazemi, Dr Lida Rahimi, Mr Qutabuddin Roydar, Dr Khalid Sharifi, Mrs Asila Wardak, and Mr Idrees Zaman.
Finally, I would like to express my utmost appreciationACKU to all NSP stakeholders for the cooperation afforded to this evaluation at all levels. This has included the MRRD, donors, OC (national and provincial levels), provin- cial governors, provincial and district RRD staff, the Facilitating Partners (national, provincial and district levels), the NSP com- munities themselves, and even communi- ties not benefiting from the NSP. All of these gave their time unreservedly. In particular, I am especially grateful to HE Hanif Atmar (Minister for RRD), Ehasan Zia (Deputy Minister for RRD), Raz Mohammad (Deputy Minister, Finance, for RRD), Asif Rahimi (NSP Chief Coordinator), Andreas Schild (OC Team Leader), and Jovita Thomas (OC Deputy Team Leader). I hope that the PREFACE learning process captured in this document
ix ACKU
NSP AFGHANISTAN Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT Executive Summary
Since the late 1990s donor support via the the benefits of the NSP justify the World Bank for community participation has overhead costs of the Programme, shifted away from community-based devel- particularly in years one and two of the opment (CBD) with its emphasis on collab- Programme. Moreover, overhead costs oration, consultation and information- should diminish dramatically as a conse- sharing, towards community-driven devel- quence of: a) lesson-learning from Phase opment (CDD) which affords communities 1; b) the elimination of unnecessary control over decision-making processes and bureaucracy through the simplification resources in the design and implementation of delivery systems; and c) the of sub-projects.1 This evaluation argues that provision of political support to remove the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s bottlenecks in the delivery process. National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has the potential to become a beacon of good However, we are also of the view that with practice amongst CDD programmes.2 Phase some fundamental refinements – anchored 1 of the NSP has undoubtedly been a success in improved programme management and given the difficult environment in which it coordination at the national and provincial has operated. Indeed, only a small minority levels, the simplification of delivery systems of our respondents questioned the success and the consolidation of CDCs – the post- of the Programme. It is observed that: mid term evaluation of the NSP (or what we will term NSP Phase 2) could yield some 1 See Independent the establishment of the NSP was a outstanding developmental achievements Evaluation Group (2005), rational and far-sighted response to the in terms of both sustainable institution- ‘The Effectiveness of World Bank need for rapid signs of state building in building and economic growth. Support for Community-based the rural communities of Afghanistan; and -driven Development’, We therefore recommend that the donor ACKU the achievements of the NSP, Washington, World Bank, community should support the NSP for a particularly in terms of building available on-line at http:// medium- to long-term period of 10 years in community and national solidarity www.worldbank.org/ieg/cbdcdd/. order to consolidate its gains and fulfil its through the establishment of potential. During this period a new institu- Community Development Councils 2 Although it should be tional venue will need to be established for (CDCs) and CDD sub-projects, observed that CDD’s are the delivery of the NSP so that the MRRD outweigh its initial design and provided with significant can assume the role of the OC. We operational weaknesses; technical support and it is often recommend the creation of an executive difficult to disentangle the views given the extremely challenging agency, a model of service delivery currently of Facilitating Partners from the environmental constraints that have deployed in most Organization for views of communities. Hence bedevilled the implementation of Economic Cooperation and Development the claim of perfect autonomy the NSP, all stakeholders have a (OECD) member states, as the key features is questionable. good reason to be proud of their of an executive agency fit with the MRRD’s achievements in Phase 1 – Government, immediate institutional and human provisional government, Oversight resource needs. Consultant (OC), Facilitating Partners (FPs), communities and their CDCs; It is also recommended that the NSP coor- and,
1 dination problems that have been experi- to the strengthening of the CDCs, the sus- enced at all levels of governance in Phase 1 tainability of its impact and the long-term need to be dealt with in Phase 2, through capacity development of the MRRD. In par- more effective donor coordination and the ticular, further strategies need to be establishment of a ‘whole government’ developed to enhance the participation of approach to the national coordination of women, both in community governance the NSP as the pillar of a national rural and in project implementation, and the development strategy. This would foster inclusion of the poorest of the poor and dis- multi-level inter-ministerial cooperation and advantaged as beneficiaries. improve the opportunity for more proactive donor support through enhanced collabo- Finally, NSP Phase 2 would also benefit from rative decision structures at the national launching a longitudinal study of the level. In addition, the potential for sharing programme in association with the resources between the two main comple- University of Kabul and other international mentary national programmes imple- centres for the study of reconstruction and mented by MRRD – the NSP and the development, to ensure that lessons learnt National Area Based Development are well documented and that archive Programme (NABDP) – should be fully material is utilized in the training and realized. Our suggestion would be to pool education of Afghanistan’s future develop- some of the Oversight Consultant resources ment cadre. for the two programmes in a manner that ensures effective coordination and There follows an overview of the key economies of scale, and maximizes impact findings of the mid-term evaluation and rec- in terms of economic growth and good gov- ommendations for Phase 2 which corre- ernance at the provincial and village levels. spond to: programme design and rationale; This recommendation could be further national level programme management and articulated as part of the OC exit strategy coordination; sub-national level programme that is currently being finalized. management and coordination; the role of CDCs in programme management and The role of the FPs has been crucial in the operational delivery; programme enhance- social mobilization and capacity develop- ment; and programme costs, expectations ment of CDCs, and will need to continue for and impact. The evaluation draws on quali- the short- to mid-term due to limited MRRD tative data derived from: extensive national capacity at the district and community and sub-national level interviews; two levels. The future role of the FPs rests on workshops held with all NSP stakeholders; a whether the NSP remains purely a develop- community power survey; a household ment programme or whether the gover- survey; an engineering analysis; and docu- nance component of the programme mentary and multi-level institutional assumes a greater role in NSP Phase 2. We analysis. An inclusive approach to evaluating would encourage the latter, in which CDCs programme costs and benefits is deployed are granted a constitutional role with to provide an assessment of the overall statutory responsibilities at the village level. impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the By implication this would involve the NSP. extension of the public administrative ACKU system from the district to the CDC level The NSP is now recognized both by the through the establishment of an elite of people of Afghanistan and the international Community Development Support Officers community as the central policy instrument (CDSOs). The role of the CDSO would be to for Afghan state building and development. assume the role of FPs and provide The MRRD, the NSP OC and the FPs should technical support to the CDC in all of its be proud of their achievements. The core competences. The establishment of following recommendations for NSP Phase 2 this technocratic elite, with attractive condi- aim to build on and consolidate these tions of service, is central to the long-term impressive achievements. However, two sustainability of CDCs and should be a key notes of caution need to be addressed at component of the NSP’s consolidation this juncture. First, it is necessary to strategy. This proposal will also require a emphasize the importance of differentiating long-term capacity development strategy between short- and longer-term recommen- which should be integrated with broader dations, particularly in relation to the MRRD processes of civil service reform. assuming the operational delivery role at the national, provincial and district levels. NSP AFGHANISTAN The programme design itself should also be This will need to be careful phased in, and Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT further developed, with consideration given rests on developing the capacity of MRRD
2 officials to act. Secondly, the consideration the process of programme design and of these courses of action should take into inception, which have created operational consideration the costs of change, which obstacles that need to be surmounted in should be calculated on: a) their capacity to Phase 2. improve qualitative rather than quantitative output, and b) the likelihood that they will survive for a considerable time. Recommendation 1 The political objectives of the NSP (e.g. the establishment of CDCs within the formal system of local governance) need to be Programme design and rationale expressed more overtly within the Programme objectives. The evaluation of NSP programme costs and benefits reveals significant gains to the Afghan people in relation to institution- building (limited democratization), capacity Recommendation 2 development (mainly in skills develop- New ‘simplified’, ‘realizable’ and publicly ment), and social solidarity at the national ‘knowable’ programme objectives and a and community levels (and to a lesser ‘simplified’ and ‘realizable’ set of perform- degree at the provincial and district levels). ance indicators need to be drawn for NSP Impressive benefits have also been derived Phase 2 which express the governance, economically by: creating livelihood oppor- capacity development and economic tunities and direct forms of economic devel- growth objectives of the NSP more explicitly opment through improved productive so that they can be measured over time. capacity and the provision of work in relation to certain NSP projects; and the Monitoring systems should be simplified to provision of indirect forms of economic focus on developing time series data around development, facilitated by increased a simplified set of performance indicators. A economic activity arising from improved coherent and consistent representative infrastructure and savings derived from sample of community profiles drawn to lower costs of production. Important gains common criteria needs to be completed for in gender equality have also been achieved comparative and evaluative purposes. in certain regions.
These benefits justify the overhead costs of the Programme particularly in years 1 and 2 Recommendation 3 of the Programme. Moreover, overhead NSP Phase 2 should be a period of consoli- costs should diminish dramatically as a con- dation rather than expansion. The aim of sequence of: a) lesson-learning from Phase rolling out the NSP to 6,800 communities in 1; b) the elimination of unnecessary bureau- Year 3, despite the considerable backlog of cracy through the simplification of delivery Year 1 and 2 projects, is not tenable. There systems; and c) the provision of political should be a greater focus on quality rather support to remove bottlenecks in the than quantity to allow for effective social deliveryACKU process. However, these achieve- mobilization and institution-building to ments will need to be consolidated in the take root, and for projects to be sustained ways suggested above in order to ensure through high quality community develop- the long-term future of what may be ment planning. A twin track process of deemed a development programme of out- consolidation and expansion should be standing potential. devised. A Phase 2 Consolidation Strand should be aimed at CDCs who have suc- cessfully completed sub projects. An action Design improvements in overview zone approach should be deployed where Overall, Phase 1 of the NSP has undoubtedly appropriate within this strand whereby been a success, given the difficult environ- CDCs sharing common CDP goals should ment in which it has operated. Indeed, only be encouraged to engage in joint program- a small minority of our respondents ques- ming to meet community priorities and tioned the success of the Programme, given achieve economies of scale. The Phase 2 the extraordinary constraints under which it Expansion Strand should focus on the has operated. Nonetheless, several chal- strategic roll-out of the NSP to ensure lenges can be identified in terms of policy nation-wide coverage of the NSP, but with a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY formulation, implementation and monitor- bias towards integrating vulnerable com- ing and evaluation arising from problems in munities.
3 Recommendation 4 National level programme NSP Phase 2 needs to embrace a ‘whole management and delivery government approach’ both in order to gain greater political legitimacy in the eyes This section of the report focusses on the of political elites, and to coordinate management and coordination of the NSP at national development planning and pro- the centre of the Afghan political system gramming more effectively to gain focussing on the work of national level coor- economies of scale and to avoid waste and dination committees, the MRRD and the duplication. NSP OC. The analysis draws mainly on qual- itative data derived from extensive national- level interviews and two workshops held with NSP stakeholders, including represen- Recommendation 5 tatives from: all the core ministries involved An International Comparisons and with the NSP; MRRD and NSP/OC staff; FPs Lessons Learnt Unit should be established and all the participating donors (Canadian in the MRRD to help support effective policy International Development Agency, learning both in Phase 2 of the NSP and the Department for International Development, Ministry’s other major development pro- European Union, US Agency for Inter- grammes. national Development, Japan International Cooperation Agency). The Unit could start by working through the institutional memory of the OC. It should ideally be linked to an independent National Level Coordination academic body, such as Kabul University, to It is observed that the NSP suffers from poor ensure objectivity. coordination at three different levels: donor coordination; inter-ministerial coordination; and large-scale development projects. Poor donor and inter-ministerial coordination Recommendation 6 has clearly presented the NSP with some Phase 2 needs to place a greater emphasis steering problems. While certain of these on increasing the direct economic benefits problems are self-inflicted (e.g. the inactive of the NSP through both incentivizing CDCs coordination committees and lack of and encouraging income-generating pro- strategic thinking across its key develop- grammes to meet its economic growth ment programmes), others are the product strategy. of its success in bidding for external funding, such as petty inter-ministerial jealousy resulting in the deliberate engi- neering of bottle-necks in the delivery Recommendation 7 process (e.g. financial disbursement NSP Phase 2 requires more effective donor processes). These problems can only be coordination. Donors should be aware of dealt with effectively through the establish- the consequences of action when they pick ment of a ‘whole government’ approach to and choose where their NSP funding goes. the management and delivery of Phase 2 of An integrated approach should be adopted ACKUthe NSP which will require the reform of by the donor community, both to ensure existing decision structures. that international funding helps to support national development priorities and to provide for better coverage. Recommendation 8 A new institutional structure is recom- mended for the national level coordina- tion of the NSP. The dysfunctional External Review Committee and the Inter-ministe- rial Committee should be replaced with three new committees – an NSP Steering Committee, a donor Support Group and an Inter-ministerial Committee.
The NSP Steering Committee should meet every two months, it should be chaired by the Ministry with oversight of local gover- NSP AFGHANISTAN nance matters, and be comprised of the NSP Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
4 Coordinator, the first and deputy Minister of Recommendation 10 the MRRD, the OC, the NSP Coordinator, We recommend the establishment of: a representatives from partnering ministries, rational NSP Phase 2 Operational Manual five CDC representatives from NSP regions, with a coherent set of programme objec- and a representative of the facilitating tives which can be measured over time, partners. and a simple set of key performance indi- cators for monitoring progress in relation The donor Support Group should meet to the achievement of these objectives. quarterly; it should be chaired by a presi- dential nominee, and be comprised of all the donor stakeholders, the First and Deputy Minister of the MRRD, and the NSP The Role of the NSP Oversight Coordinator. In addition to ensuring donor Consultant in programme accountability, the role of the group will be management and coordination to convene ‘action-oriented’ meetings with The evaluation of the role of the Oversight minutes in order to support the work of the Consultant in NSP programme management NSP more effectively. rests on an assessment of its ability to deliver on its core responsibilities. While the The Inter-ministerial Committee should NSP-OC has been unable to meet the targets meet quarterly and be chaired by a presi- set for December 2004 to August 2006, dential nominee and include representation established in its contract with the MRRD, from all partnering ministries. Its key role its achievements have nonetheless been will be to identify areas of duplication and remarkable. Since its involvement in waste, potential areas of joint working, and September 2003: NSP input into ministerial development plans and vice versa. Day to day manage- the NSP has encompassed 193 districts ment of the NSP would remain with the in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan; NSP/OC. the NSP has reached 22,500 rural communities covering 38,000 rural This institutional design would provide the settlements; architecture for a ‘whole government’ the NSP has benefited 10.5 million approach to the national coordination of people and established 10,000 CDCs; the NSP, foster greater inter-ministerial and 14,000 projects in 8,000 communities presidential collaboration, and provide for have been financed with Block more proactive donor support. A ‘whole Grant disbursements amounting to government’ approach should be integrated US $166.1 million and total Block Grant at all levels of programme delivery in appro- commitments of US $214.6 million; priate areas of programming. more than 4,000 sub-projects have been completed successfully.3
In addition, this survey identifies significant Recommendation 9 evidence of: We also recommend that the MRRD developsACKU a strategic plan to integrate the increased public faith in the system of NSP with other national programmes such government; as: the Water and Sanitation Programme improved community relations; (WATSAN); emergency employment improved state-civil society relations; (NEEPRA), mostly for labour-intensive road and building; the Microfinance Programme the empowerment of CDCs. (MISFA); the Emergency Response Programme (in Badghis, Bamyan, Herat, In addition, the OC has provided informal Kabul, Kundoz, Nangarhar, Paktia, and ‘on the job’ training, with an estimated total 3 See NSP OC (2006), Paktika), and, in particular, NABDP. It is of 50,000 person training days for MRRD Analysis of the Experiences and crucial to adopt a strategic approach to (central, regional and provincial), OC and Lessons Learned in Program large-scale development programming to FP staff and formal training with approxi- Implementation, GTZ-IS, ensure that a joined-up approach is taken mately 9,000 person days for the same Kabul, March 2006, pp. 3–5. that avoids duplication and waste, and target groups. Information and awareness meets broader national development goals. campaigns are provided by the Public Communications Unit (PCU) to underpin the training activities. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5 It is therefore unsurprising that the overall objectives; b) consistent performance indi- performance of the OC was evaluated as cators could be identified and effective ‘highly satisfactory’ by the World Bank monitoring systems established; c) Supervisory Mission of October/November coherent and consistent community 2006. This evaluation concurs with the profiles completed; d) a capacity develop- general tenor of this assessment. It identi- ment strategy for MRRD staff could be fies four major obstacles to effective developed; e) a human resource manage- delivery. First, the targets for 2004–6 were ment strategy could be devised for NSP OC not developed with a rational understand- staff; f) a rational NSP/OC exit strategy ing of how much time community mobiliza- devised; and g) a logical framework for tion and sub-project implementation takes. implementation completed. Secondly, several bottle-necks emerged in the process of programme implementation, All of these areas of ‘rational’ programme which have undermined the ability of the management are now being attended to, OC to meet targets. Prolonged delays but this does mean that much of the institu- occurred in: the procurement process for tion-building and the capacity development securing critical goods; the disbursement work that needed to be completed to allow process due to the absence of Block Grant for a hand-over to the MRRD in July 2006 is funds, and the inefficient transfer of funds in the process of completion. from Da Afghanistan Bank to CDC bank accounts. Thirdly, long delays have also occurred in the approval of extension Recommendation 11 contracts for existing FPs and the contract- While we recognize that excellent work is ing of additional FPs. Fourthly, it is also being conducted in these areas, the OC evident from our survey that there has been needs to complete its work at the strategic very little ‘political’ help forthcoming from level with regard to the completion of its: the MRRD or the donor community to help human resources strategy; change man- the NSP/OC deal with these bottle-necks in agement strategy; logical framework to the disbursement process. guide programme management around the achievement of milestones; needs However, our evaluation does identify some assessment for MRRD staff; capacity devel- shortcomings in relation to the OC’s role in opment strategy with linkages into the capacity development and programme man- broader process of civil service reform in agement and enhancement which are Afghanistan; a quality assurance strategy largely explained by the need to negotiate to ensure sustainable programming; and a significant programme constraints. Indeed, final NSP/OC exit strategy. it is argued that from the outset it was impossible for the OC to adopt a ‘rational’ approach to programme management for at least 3 main reasons: the obligation to The central institutional venue deliver on output-driven objectives has for operational delivery meant that they had to hit the ground There is currently significant debate within running to establish the delivery system for the MRRD and the NSP/OC over the most the rapid creation of CDCs and the dis- ACKUsuitable institutional venue for the delivery bursement of Block Grants; the absence of of the NSP in Phase 2 once the MRRD has clear programme objectives has meant that taken over the management of the they have always been engaged in institu- Programme. Three options have been tional ‘catch-up’ in relation to new priority debated: full integration; re-tender for a settings identified by the MRRD and donors; new OC; or, create a ‘not for profit’ semi- and the lack of a settled understanding of autonomous organization as a special the role of the OC by the MRRD and the project under the Ministry. The third option donors has meant that they have had to is being proposed by the MRRD as it shift human and institutional resources to provides the Ministry with the ability to support non-core NSP activities in response secure the services of high quality, experi- to changing political expectations (e.g. the enced staff in the field of rural community Management Information System). development who demand high salaries, while simultaneously developing the Hence, the OC was not provided with the capacity of national staff. However, we time to initiate a phasing-in strategy during believe that these aspirations can be met which: a) a rational Operational Manual through a fourth option; the creation of an NSP AFGHANISTAN could be finalized with clear programme executive agency for the operational Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT delivery of the NSP.
6 We recommend the creation of an Executive Sub-national coordination agency, a model of service delivery currently and operational delivery of the NSP deployed in most OECD member states and pioneered in the UK context in the late This section of the report focusses on the 1980s. The key features of an executive role of two further groups of stakeholders in agency fit with the MRRD’s institutional and the coordination and operational delivery of human resource needs: the NSP – sub-national governments, Provincial OCs and their teams and facilitat- 1. An executive agency is semi-detached ing partners. from its parent department (MRRD), with its own budget, freedom from some aspects of departmental regulation The role of the provincial MRRD (particularly in relation to recruitment), According to the MRRD respondents and with the organization under the the provincial governors, the NSP has signif- direction of a chief executive and other icantly improved the relationship between unit managers often recruited through the participating communities and the gov- open competition. ernment, in addition to creating stronger intra- and inter-community relations, to the 2. Executive agencies are accountable for extent that cases of conflict management the performance of specific operational have emerged. Furthermore, there is tasks as a corporate unit, including evidence of community empowerment. output-focussed performance targets Government officers at the senior level set by the parent department (in this draw upon development experience from case the MRRD), and the personal the NSP and within the wider national policy accountability of the chief executive framework. Furthermore, there were for meeting performance targets. several instances of institutional coopera- tion and some evidence of institutional 3. Executive agencies are established learning in practice. However, general through a Framework Document capacity levels are poor. The following sig- issued by the minister of the parent nificant deficiencies and threats also department (MRRD). Although the emerged from the analysis, which in turn Framework Document is an official prompt some recommendations: document, it is not a law. Hence agencies are not legally distinct from The cap on the budget allocation the departments that supervise them, (‘regardless of the number of real and of course all of the employees beneficiaries’) has caused significant are public servants, even though the distress within the Programme and managerial élan is often recruited risks causing rivalry and grievance. from outside the public sector. There is considerable frustration with delays in the transference of funds from It should be noted, however, that this the OC to the communities, which proposal is geared towards meeting the par- needs to be continuously reviewed. ticular needs of the MRRD for a form of While the official complaints organizationACKU that will allow it to retain spe- procedure was used, the approach to cialist staff on internationally competitive its implementation varies considerably, salaries to deliver the NSP. This is not to say to the extent that it risks disappearing that executive agencies are not without in some provinces; this is especially their problems – lines of accountability can worrying considering the natural become blurred, and separating policy from barriers to establishing transparency administration can lead to the emergence of and accountability in the context implementation gaps. of a war-ravaged State. There is a need to reconcile conflicting models of governance, both at the Recommendation 12 community and programme design We recommend the creation of an level. executive agency as a new institutional In recognizing the values of fair venue for the delivery of the NSP; a model representation, inclusion and legitimate of operational service delivery currently authority, the role of women in the deployed in most OECD member states (see decision-making processes needs Section 7 for more detail). to be advanced to ensure that their EXECUTIVE SUMMARY development needs are protected.
7 Greater efficiency and effectiveness the role. In the meantime there is an urgent would be gained by improving need to build DRRD management and oper- cooperation between government ational delivery capacity at the provincial departments via inter-ministerial level and to extend it down to the district coordination of development projects. level through a phasing strategy. Until then Operational and human resources are the continued presence of an OC-type limited and unevenly distributed. organization would be prudent to insulate Institutional learning and monitoring the NSP against political pressure and cor- and evaluation also proved uneven. ruption, and to ensure independent quality NSP training was equally patchy in its control and monitoring and reporting to nature and style. donors.
Provincial MRRD staff are optimistic that CDCs will become ‘the government at the district level’. Although the provincial Recommendation 14 MRRDs are confident that a ‘whole govern- The cap on budget allocation (‘regardless ment’ approach to the NSP involving indica- of the number of real beneficiaries’) is tive ministries can be achieved, evidence causing significant distress within the from some FPs, the OC, some of the CDCs, Programme and risks precipitating and national level research would suggest conflict. The problem of budget caps based otherwise. For example, projects have been on poor population surveys needs to be delayed because of inter-ministerial looked at and acted upon by central MRRD arguments over whether the NSP should be as a matter of urgency. building a school, or initiating an agricul- tural project. Moreover, the validity of the NSP itself is continually questioned by other provincial level ministries. This problem Recommendation 15 provides further evidence to support the While the official CDC complaints pro- recommendations outlined above for a cedure is used, the approach to its imple- ‘whole government’ approach to the NSP, mentation varies considerably, to the with full and active presidential support. extent that it risks disappearing in some provinces. This is especially worrying con- While the provincial level MRRD acknowl- sidering the natural barriers to establishing edges that it does not have the capacity to transparency and accountability in the directly implement the NSP, its capacity to context of a war-ravaged state. The com- monitor progress is also questionable given plaints procedure therefore needs to be acute staff shortages, the high number of standardized and entrenched. projects, and its limited understanding of project management and programming on the ground. Recommendation 16 There is a need to reconcile conflicting Recommendation 13 models of governance, both at the A strategic plan needs to be devised by the ACKUcommunity and programme design level. MRRD in order for the provincial level Similarly, the question of sustainability administration to ultimately assume a (CDCs and projects) should also be long-term NSP delivery role. This must addressed at both levels. involve a significant capacity development dimen-sion. Provincial DRRD staff will need to play a greater role in NSP quality control, enhancement and disbursement Recommendation 17 processes by the end of the Programme. Greater efficiency and effectiveness would be gained by improving cooperation However, due to the absence of a culture of between government departments at the sub-national government in modern provincial and district levels, with a focus Afghanistan, it is crucial that the decentral- on coordination. As a minimum require- ization of operational delivery functions to ment, it is important for government DRRD provincial and district officers is departments to have accurate information carefully phased in. Indeed, it should only concerning the responsibilities and opera- occur when it is clearly demonstrable that tional tasks of their counterparts to avoid NSP AFGHANISTAN DRRD officers have the capacity to assume confusion or jealousy. Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
8 Recommendation 18 Recommendation 24 Sufficient operational and human The cap on budget allocation (‘regardless resources need to be provided by the MRRD of the number of real beneficiaries’) is in the field in order to maintain levels of causing significant distress within the Pro- community confidence in government. gramme and risks precipitating conflict. The problem of budget caps based on poor population surveys needs to be looked at and acted upon by provincial OCs and Recommendation 19 teams as a matter of urgency. Connected to Processes of institutional learning need to this, in overcoming project budget short- be standardized and monitored. falls, further action is required to form links to other international donor programmes.
Recommendation 20 The nature and style of training demands The role of the Facilitating Partners consistency and effectiveness, with special The role of the FPs has been crucial in the emphasis on improving the provision of social mobilization and capacity develop- technical skills training. ment of CDCs, and will need to continue for the short- to mid-term due to limited MRRD capacity at the district and community levels. All the FPs have serious doubts The role of the provincial whether the CDCs will be able to function Oversight Consultant without further capacity development and According to respondents, the NSP has sig- direct external support. The future role of nificantly improved the relationship the FPs rests on whether the NSP remains between the participating communities and purely a development programme or the government, in addition to creating whether the governance component of the stronger intra- and inter-community programme assumes a greater role in NSP relations. However, we recommend: Phase 2. If the former applies, then their engagement will be concluded at the end of the project, but if the governance Recommendation 21 dimension is emphasized they will: a) need The capacity development of the DRRDs by to undertake further training to prepare the the OCs needs to be made relevant to the CDCs for taking on such a governance role; implementation environment and the and b) need to be funded to maintain rationale of the NSP in order to avoid insti- contact with the CDCs over a period of time tutional dependency while ensuring the to organize re-elections and complete the Programme advances. further training of the newly elected members. We would encourage the latter, in which CDCs are granted a constitutional role with statutory responsibilities at the Recommendation 22 village level. By implication this would The levelACKU of skills and capacities of involve the extension of the public adminis- community members required by the trative system from the district to the CDC Programme to reach its targets needs to level through the establishment of an elite reflect the actual skills and capacities of of CDSOs. The role of the CDSO would be the community members. The advance- to assume the role of FPs and provide ment of targets would demand training to technical support to the CDC in all of its address the gaps and weaknesses in these core competences. areas, as identified by the OC in consulta- tion with each CDC, DRRD and FP. Recommendation 25 Processes of lesson-learning across FPs should be improved, particularly in areas Recommendation 23 where certain FPs possess significant As a particular concern within the recom- expertise e.g. UN-HABITAT and economic mendation above, the skills and capacities development activity or gender-oriented of women CDC members need to be development programming or BRAC and improved towards ensuring gender-equal working in areas with security problems. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY participation and decision-making at the community level.
9 Recommendation 26 Recommendation 29 A community-based programme requires a The Operational Manual should be changed high degree of trust between the communi- as little as practicable; this would ease the ties, the FPs and the government – this is pressure on the national OC and allow all easier to achieve if the FPs have previous other stakeholders time to consolidate rural development experience in practice.4 Afghanistan. FPs therefore need to be carefully selected; a criteria is suggested below. A national NGO with prior engage- ment in rural development and a profes- Recommendation 30 sional administration and monitoring Some of the administrative forms that capacity is the ideal choice as they don’t require completion by the CDC are too carry overhead costs for expatriate staff, complex for barely literate people to establishing new offices or costly lines of complete. There needs to be a balance communication, and they do have a tested between transparency and expediency, system for community development that particularly for the CDCs. This is especially can be further improved. In second place the case for accounting and procurement would be international FPs with consider- forms and the sub-project proposal comple- able experience working in Afghanistan, a tion form. A failure to adopt a more majority of Afghan staff at all levels, offices realistic approach to capacity develop- and experience of working in different parts ment and community empowerment will of the country with rural development continue to ensure that FPs remain projects. These two categories of FPs are ‘Implementing Partners’. also better prepared to handle and mitigate security risks and have the necessary degree of trust within the communities to evoke community protection. The least ‘cost Recommendation 31 effective’ FPs would be those who are new NABDP and NSP thinking needs to be har- to Afghanistan, overly reliant on expatriate monized in order to join-up Provincial- staff that has a tremendous challenge to District-CDC coordination of development gain the trust of communities and govern- programming to avoid waste and duplica- ment. tion.
Recommendation 27 For some FPs the constant comparison to others working in less difficult areas is dis- The role of Community Development heartening, and in some circumstances Councils in programme management has led to a feeling of a lack of apprecia- and operational delivery tion. Extra support and allowances should be given to FPs working in problematic The following observations about the role of areas, particularly in terms of a more CDCs in the NSP are drawn from two flexible timetable and a reaffirmation of ACKUsources: a community power survey and a the generally good work they are doing in household survey. The community power such trying circumstances. survey was conducted with the principal aim of assessing the extent to which CDCs had been able to assume the two key roles assigned to them by the Programme: repre- Recommendation 28 sentative governance and community devel- The definition of ‘project completion’ opment. In practical terms this involved should be reviewed in consultation with assessing their capacity to function inde- FPs in order to incorporate an apprecia- pendently as a democratic leadership of tion of the intangible outcomes of the NSP their communities and their ability to select, 4 This recommendation has (e.g. community empowerment, ability to plan and manage development projects. been adopted post publication maintain facilities, etc). The household survey was designed both to of the PRDU’s Inception Report, assess the impact of the NSP in respect of its November 2005. goal and objectives, and to provide evidence of progress in developing inclusive community governance as a means of NSP AFGHANISTAN empowering communities to improve their Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
10 lives, as well as detecting changes in public We therefore suggest a broad range of rec- perceptions of government. ommendations for CDCs aimed at improving project delivery through simplifi- In the absence of baseline data, community cation of bureaucratic processes, and leaders and householders in matched com- enhancing gender balanced institution- munities not participating in the NSP were building and developing capacity at the local interviewed with a view to corroborating level through processes of consolidation. the retrospective accounts of the CDC of governance before the NSP, and in order to distinguish between general post-war Simplification trends and changes directly induced by the Programme. It is envisaged that this research strategy will continue to be useful Recommendation 32 for the NSP until adequate baseline data is The Disbursement system is too onerous generated by the Programme through the and should be made in one instalment.5 compilation of enhanced community profiles and statistical records.
It is observed that Programme objectives Recommendation 33 should be re-focussed on the consolidation While the fund transfer mechanism system of the CDCs to ensure the sustainability of has improved through the delegation of the Programme, and that the OC should approval to the Provincial OC, and by seek to simplify unnecessarily complex reducing the number of instalments, we bureaucratic disbursement processes. In still believe that much could still be done to particular, further strategies need to be speed up the approval process and dis- developed to enhance the participation of bursement process through, for example: a women, both in community governance less bureaucratic CDC and project formu- and in project implementation, and the lation processes; allowing villagers to inclusion of the poorest of the poor and establish a bank account where the money disadvantaged as beneficiaries. It is further might be deposited, rather than having to observed that the NSP must be viewed as a bring the money to the village and, not long-term process; the NSP is a radical least, by giving the villagers a fixed date programme in the context of Afghanistan when the funding will be available. and it is unrealistic to expect lasting change within a short time frame. For example, female participation is highly problematic in the eastern region, and Nangarhar in partic- Consolidation ular. The east is a very conservative area and The sustainability and long-term success of FPs and the OC acknowledges that an the NSP can only be guaranteed by the increase in female participation will only development and consolidation of the occur gradually, a point certainly borne out capacity of the CDC. by this research. Nonetheless, NSP commu- nities have far more tools than non-NSP The idea that capacity is essentially communitiesACKU for envisaging problems, concerned with the ability of people to linking priorities and planning. NSP com- function effectively to influence the condi- munities are therefore less reactive and tions of their communities, and ‘implies a more proactive, and have a significantly long-term investment in people and their more favourable opinion of the govern- organizations’, has long been recognized. ment. This is underpinned by optimism for (Eade, 1997:1–3). the future that non-NSP communities do not share. The non-NSP communities have a However, although capacity-building may strong distrust for government and little be concerned fundamentally with investing faith in its ability to address their problems. in the human capabilities of a community or 5 This recommendation has Indeed, there are many misplaced percep- organization, that development also been adopted post-publication tions about the government, and requires the advancement of necessary of the PRDU’s Inception Report, Afghanistan in general, because there has resources and conditions. Failure to grasp November 2005. not been any formal contact with govern- that the capacity, or power, to act effectively mental organizations to clarify the facts. As is conditioned by these circumstances as one villager put it, in a non-NSP community, well as personal knowledge and ability, has ‘the government has done nothing for us’. probably been at the root of many difficul- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ties with capacity-building programmes,
11 where donors have seen the need to Recommendation 35 develop institutional and personal capacity In order to ensure the long-term survival of through “training”, while recipients have CDCs, the NSP process needs to be incen- been focussed on accessing financial tivized. We recommend the use of ‘top-up’ resources. In the field of community devel- grants and ‘matching funds’ to reward opment, promoting the ability of the poor CDC initiatives on NSP priority areas such to take control of resources, access markets as gender based and alternative livelihood and information, and participate in programming. decision-making, or empowerment, is also now widely considered as an important component of capacity-building. Recommendation 36 It is probably for this reason that the term Where appropriate, certain projects should capacity development is now preferred, have a component which should specifi- because it indicates a more holistic cally benefit the poorest of the poor and approach which encompasses all three encourage pro-poor growth. In the future aspects of capacity associated with partici- there will need to be more emphasis on patory development practice: human poverty reduction initiatives that focus on ability, material resources and power livelihoods rather than physical infrastruc- (Whyte, 2004:19). ture. Our research findings suggest that there is a desire to consolidate community In Phase 2 the NSP needs to ensure that the gains made through the NSP with related CDC’s capacity to function in each of these initiatives for employment, income genera- aspects is consolidated and developed by tion and further skills training. However, creating favourable institutional, social and there needs to be a careful balance between economic conditions, as well as opportuni- institution-building objectives and the ties for further skills development. The field establishment of programmes that have a research also clearly indicates that the genuine impact on pro-poor growth. precise combination of strategies required Indeed, in the medium term pro-poor after the completion of Phase 1 will vary growth programmes should only be rolled from one community to another, depending out on a strategic basis in areas where CDCs on their basic level of development and have become socially embedded and are local socio-economic conditions. The capable of acting benevolently. following recommendations are by no means exhaustive.
Recommendation 37 Recommendation 34 Continued support should be given to A greater focus should be placed on women-only CDCs. The gradualist effective social mobilization, capacity approach to more significant women par- development and institution-building. This ticipation within the NSP process should is especially relevant in CDCs where the vast also continue, and where possible women- majority of people are illiterate. Again, a only priorities should be addressed as a failure to adopt a more realistic perspective ACKUpriority. A separate NSP fund for projects will mean that the FPs will continue to be targeting women and children should be ‘Implementing Partners’, placing the long- created and bids encouraged, but this term sustainability of CDCs at risk. A twin needs to be accompanied by the strength- track process of consolidation and ening of women’s capacities within the expansion should be devised. A Phase 2 CDC. These findings support the view that Consolidation Strand should be aimed at separate women’s groups with separate CDCs who have successfully completed sub- project budgets are necessary in the short- projects. An action zone approach should term to develop women’s capacity. At the be deployed where appropriate within this same time this should not be used as a strand whereby CDCs sharing common CDP mechanism for institutionalizing their goals should be encouraged to engage in exclusion from decision-making in the joint programming to meet community pri- general CDC. orities and achieve economies of scale. The Phase 2 Expansion Strand should focus on the strategic roll-out of the NSP to ensure nation-wide coverage of the NSP, but with a NSP AFGHANISTAN bias towards integrating vulnerable commu- Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT nities.
12 Recommendation 38 Recommendation 41 There is significant concern about the long- CDC members have benefited from term sustainability of CDCs once NSP ‘exposure visits’ to other local CDCs. In the projects have been completed. It is spirit of a national programme advocating therefore recommended that CDCs should solidarity, provision should be made for assume a broader range of responsibilities regional or national ‘exposure visits’ to with community development planning enable lessons to be learned and relation- and programming to provide them with an ships to be formed – both of which would ongoing role in community governance. directly contribute to state building. This should be introduced through a phasing process linked to the attainment of certain levels of capacity. The new responsi- bilities could include: resolving internal Recommendation 42 community disputes (e.g. land, water At the community level, training in clerical rights); bargaining with traders; sharing skills is good (to the literate), but training lending risk; bargaining for better share in artisan trades is patchy and inadequate cropping arrangements; bargaining (to the illiterate). Skills acquired should be between CDCs and developing district plans rendered portable by issuance of and projects, thus achieving economies of commonly-recognized certificates for scale; and the registration of births, management, clerical and artisan skills. marriages and deaths. A more ambitious and longer term task, which is nonetheless worthy of consideration, is to use CDCs to collect local taxes on the basis that they would retain the large part of the levy for The enhancement of community development activities, while NSP engineering projects transferring the remaining part to govern- ment. We also undertook an evaluation of the quality of NSP engineering projects. It was observed that standards of project design and construction varied to extremes, Lesson-learning and although most were appropriate and capacity development adequate. At one end of the scale one could See also recommendations 22 and 23 above. cite the impressive micro-hydropower project at the village of Salakhail, Skakardar District (Kabul Province) where relevance, Recommendation 39 specification, design, construction and sus- In relation to engineering projects there is tainability were all covered very well, a need for a formalized system of appoint- resulting in an excellent project all round. At ment for ‘site managers’ by CDCs. Focussed the other end of the scale one could training is required for those appointed. mention the school at Markaz-e- CDCs should provide overall project Dawlatabad, Dawlatabad District (Balkh direction but a separate project manage- Province) where relevance was inadequate, ment teamACKU should be appointed. CDC specification and design were sub-optimal members should remain unpaid (to show (in terms of school size and earthquake mit- commitment to the community) but the igation), and construction standards were project management team should be paid sometimes poor. allowances. There appear to be satisfactory processes for checking engineering designs, particu- larly for infrastructure where failure could Recommendation 40 lead to human casualties. [Particular The recent CDC jirga was very well received emphasis needs to be given to ensure that by rural communities and helped to for structures, adequate provision is made convince the cynics that the NSP was a for extreme snow and wind loads, and for positive step forward. Regional and earthquakes.] However, there was no clear national CDC jirgas should be arranged on chain to ensure that the design (as checked) a regular basis to reinforce the govern- was that which was actually implemented. ment’s position, consolidate the percep- Although difficult to firmly correlate, it did tions of existing CDC members and demon- seem that there were instances where EXECUTIVE SUMMARY strate the government’s support for newly adequate designs were compromised by created CDCs.
13 poor construction – indeed there was at being taken in respect of materials and least one case where it appeared that steel standards that might compromise the reinforcement in a retaining wall had been integrity of the structures concerned. omitted to save money. Auditable records of these inspections should be maintained. It is recognized that In general, there was also a good under- there appears to be a shortage of suitably standing of the need for an operations and qualified engineers in Afghanistan – unsur- maintenance plan; however, there were prising given the scale of reconstruction and mixed responses on how this should be development. Therefore, those projects done – not always was someone nominated where non-adherence to design require- and trained for responsibility, and rarely was ments could lead to catastrophic failure there a contingency or succession plan in should receive the highest priorities for case of incapacity or unavailability of anyone inspections. nominated. Ongoing costs were a big factor (especially for projects that would perpetu- ally rely on an imported fuel supply) and, whereas most CDCs had simple Recommendation 46 physical/financial plans, their biggest CDCs should be encouraged to identify concern was whether the community clearly who is responsible for: savings box would remain adequately filled in the longer-term. A range of recommenda- Project selection and subsequent tions follow for the enhancement of engi- direction (normally the whole CDC); neering projects. Project management (normally a bespoke trained team within the CDC); Site management (normally an Recommendation 43 adequately trained individual The need for mitigation measures against (plus reserve) who is probably natural hazards (particularly earth- not in the CDC). quakes, landslides and floods) should be given a higher profile. General require- ments for all projects (whether by avoidance or mitigation of risk) should be Recommendation 47 highlighted at the specification stage, and CDC members should not receive remuner- all infrastructure projects should be vetted ation for their activities. However, CDC for adequate compliance by an appropri- members or local residents working in ately qualified engineer. project management or site management should be rewarded – so if they are also CDC members, it should be noted that it is for their enablement roles, not their Recommendation 44 empowerment roles, for which they are A Block Grant fund needs to be made being compensated. available to the NSP to mitigate the affects of disasters and terrorist attacks that damage/destroy NSP initiatives. The avail- ACKU ability of such a fund would be extremely Recommendation 48 useful in building social solidarity in times A major initiative should be established to of crisis. A proposal should be made to NSP encourage the introduction of formal donors to set up a Disaster Mitigation Fund training in all the key construction skills, for these purposes. underpinned by the award of appropriate qualifications. The training should be village-based with instructors visiting at regular intervals. Formal instruction need Recommendation 45 not be very long (and could be conducted A more tangible link should be established for groups of villages in collective sessions) between those who design projects and but should be substantial enough to allow those who construct them. There should be for follow-up on-the-job training. For each a mandatory requirement for an engineer skill set, a required standard should be from the designer’s organization to visit defined and a method of testing the projects under construction at appropriate standard required should be established. times, to ensure that respective designs are Initially, this standard should be applied NSP AFGHANISTAN being followed and that no shortcuts are nationally by MRRD and its agencies to all Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
14 those working within NSP. In time, this carefully monitored and contingency plans should be integrated into agreed national for alternative disbursement mechanisms construction training and testing standards. put into place. While it is important to build An important element of the initiative in the capacity of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) order to promote portability of acquired to play a disbursement role, efficient dis- skills would be the award (and registration) bursement processes are axiomatic to the of appropriate certificates (suitably operational delivery of the NSP. As we noted designed to militate against fraudulent use). in Section 5, improvements have also been A similar initiative is needed for training and made with regard to the introduction of a qualifying site managers, though in this case streamlined disbursement process to deal a longer period of formal instruction will be with the problems emanating from the required (say two weeks), and there would initial policy of requiring three instalments be considerable reliance on the individual’s per sub-project. past experience when being formally assessed for the appropriate qualification. Our surveys picked up on very few instances of corruption committed by members of CDCs. Indeed, the evidence from our research is that where you have effective CDCs corruption does not occur. Indeed, NSP Financial Operations the NSP provides an outstanding opportu- nity to learn about how and why corruption Four main obstacles to effective and takes place, and what mechanisms lead to efficient NSP financial management have or prevent corruption. It is therefore been identified in our survey: disburse- observed that corruption can be minimized ment, procurement, liquidity and limited through trust management, capacity devel- evidence of corruption. The NSP-OC’s opment, and social audit. There is evidence, failure to meet its roll-out targets for however, that the capacity of CDCs to December 2004 to August 2006 was partly provide effective reporting to the attributable to prolonged delays that community and to the NSP on project occurred in: the procurement process for progress and the use of funds could be securing critical goods (the responsibility of improved. the MRRD);6 in the disbursement process due to the absence of Block Grant funds (the responsibility of the WB); and in the Recommendation 49 inefficient transfer of funds from DAB to In accordance with the recommendations CDC bank accounts. A further bottle-neck outlined by the OC7 – improvement needs emerged in December 2005 due to the lack to be made to operating processes at the of liquidity in the Block Grant fund. Block national level in relation to the processing Grant disbursements started to slow down of FP contracts, the replenishment of Block in December 2005, reaching a complete halt Grant funds and the payment of invoices. in February 2006. The absence of Block This would be best managed through one Grant funds for disbursement further office under the auspices of the NSP. undermined the ability of the OC to meet its roll-outACKU targets. It is also noteworthy that 6 For example, 40 generators payments to FPs are also seriously behind requested by FPs in October schedule – 93 per cent of invoices received Recommendation 50 2004 were not delivered from FPs for services rendered in the A further capacity development deficit can until December 2005, and second half of 2005 are yet to be reimbursed be identified in relation to the manage- 20 four-wheel drive vehicles (the responsibility of the MRRD). ment of NSP finances. A strategic plan were requested in January 2005 needs to be devised by the MRRD in order by the PO OC but were not It is evident from our survey that there has for its finance team to assume the role of ready for use until June 2005. been very little ‘political’ help forthcoming the OC in the disbursement process. This from the MRRD or the donor community to must involve a significant capacity devel- 7 NSP/OC (2006), help the NSP/OC deal with these high level opment dimension. MRRD staff will need to Analysis of Experiences and bottle-necks in the disbursement and other play a greater role in NSP auditing, dis- Lessons Learned in Program financial processes. It is therefore unsurpris- bursement and other financial processes Implementation, 2003–6, Kabul. ing that targets have not been met. by the end of the Programme. However, the OC has been able to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) from DAB to transfer grants to the provinces EXECUTIVE SUMMARY within two weeks. The situation needs to be
15 Recommendation 51 Recommendation 56 Further training needs to be provided to Federated structures are created at the CDCs on auditing, transparency and district level in order for communities to financial reporting processes. interface with government agencies and development programmes.
Recommendation 52 The NSP provides an outstanding opportu- Recommendation 57 nity to learn about how and why corrup- Community Development Officers are tion takes place and what mechanisms recruited and trained to support and lead to or prevent corruption. Research promote human capital development should be supported by the World Bank in activities in rural development. this area.
Recommendation 58 We therefore recommend that where Community Development Councils appropriate certain projects should have a and future governance in Afghanistan component which should specifically benefit the poorest of the poor and We propose a constitutional role with encourage pro-poor growth. In the future, statutory responsibilities for CDCs at the due to donor mandates, it is likely that village level,8 and the extension of the more emphasis will need to be placed on public administrative system from the poverty reduction initiatives that focus on district to the CDC level through the estab- livelihoods rather than physical infrastruc- lishment of an elite of CDSOs. The role of ture. Our research findings suggest that the CDSO will be to provide technical there is a desire to consolidate community support to the CDC in all of its core compe- gains made through the NSP, with related tences. The establishment of this techno- initiatives for employment, income genera- cratic elite, with attractive conditions of tion and further skills training. service, is central to the long-term sustain- ability of CDCs and should be a key component of the NSP’s consolidation strategy. This proposal will also require a Recommendation 59 long-term capacity development strategy The NSP should foster linkages between which should be integrated with broader sub-projects. For example, the provision of processes of civil service reform. electricity generators would be much more effective if the generators were to power It is therefore recommended that: mills, small manufacturing, or refriger- ated storage rather than focussing purely on the provision of light and the encour- Recommendation 53 agement of a consumer life style. CDCs be institutionalized into the system of ACKU governance.
Recommendation 54 CDC By-laws are extended to include cyclical elections.
Recommendation 55 CDCs are given statutory powers in relation to community development 8 See Recommendation 31. planning and programming in core programme areas (education, health, water, energy, sanitation and basic infra- NSP AFGHANISTAN structure). Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
16 Linkages with the evaluation of other The poorest may not always benefit community-driven development from CDD projects. programmes The sub-project cycle is too short The findings of this evaluation and several to sustainably enhance community of its recommendations concur with the capacity where it is weak or does Independent Evaluation Group’s evaluation not exist. of the effectiveness of World Bank support for CDD. Please consider the following. More changes are needed to improve fiduciary and safeguard compliance in CDD projects. The strengths of community driven development interventions This evaluation lends further support to the Independent Evaluation Group’s recom- Borrower officials believe that a mendations of the need to ensure that: participatory approach can contribute to poverty alleviation. base-line surveys are conducted in CDD projects; CDD projects help to reduce the cost to government of delivering infrastructure. the costs and benefits of undertaking CDD interventions are systematically They have increased access to remote calculated; and communities to service-delivery infra-structure. CDD programmes are integrated into overall country assistance strategies. Capacity-enhancement efforts are likely to be more successful when a bank Indeed, the evaluation advances CDD project supports indigenously matured knowledge in all three respects. efforts or provides sustained, long-term support to communities beyond a sub-project cycle. Programme costs, expectations CDD projects have enhanced and impact government capacity to implement participatory interventions. In an ideal rational-type evaluation a programme should be strictly evaluated against the achievement of its aims and Weaknesses of community driven objectives. However, it is evident from this development interventions analysis of the obstacles to programme delivery that: a) a significant range of Much more success is achieved in obstacles have been confronted by the NSP CDD projects in relation to quantitative which have constrained its capacity to meet goals (such as the construction of ambitious targets; b) although some of infrastructure)ACKU than on qualitative these have been the product of the absence goals (such as capacity enhancement of strategic thinking, the vast majority are or quality of training). outside the control of the NSP/OC and its FPs, and are generally typical of post-war M&E systems do not allow systematic reconstruction development programming; assessment of the capacity-enhancing and c) despite these constraints significant impact of CDD interventions. It is often achievements have been made. This evalua- assumed that meeting the quantitative tion has found evidence of at least 11 sets of goals will automatically fulfil the benefits which have been derived from the qualitative goal; for example, holding NSP: a certain number of training courses is expected to enhance capacity. 1. increased public perceptions of national solidarity achieved through 9 See Sections 3, 4, 5 & 6. Communities need to bear an increased state-building – e.g. the creation of share of the burden for service delivery new institutional architecture at the infrastructure; is this sustainable in the central (NSP-OC, DAB), provincial long-run? (Provincial Office [PO], OC), and EXECUTIVE SUMMARY village (CDCs) levels;9
17 2. improved state-civil society relations impact, although a number of threats to the as a consequence of improvements sustainability of the positive gains were in national solidarity;10 identified.
3. greater awareness of the activities of This inclusive approach to evaluating NSP government as a consequence of the Programme costs and benefits reveals signif- work of the PCU;11 icant gains to the Afghan people in relation to institution-building (limited democratiza- 4. the empowerment of rural tion) and capacity development (mainly in communities through the skills development) and social solidarity at establishment of a new legitimate the national and community levels, and to a form of community governance;12 lesser degree at the provincial and district levels. Impressive benefits have also been 5. heightened perceptions of community derived economically by: creating livelihood solidarity achieved through processes opportunities and direct forms of economic of community governance;13 development through improved productive capacity and the provision of work in 6. delivery of governmental capacity relation to certain NSP projects; and the development (provincial and district provision of indirect forms of economic level MRRD, NSP/OC, PO OC, DAB development facilitated by increased and Ministry of Finance staff);14 economic activity arising from improved infrastructure, and savings derived from 7. delivery of FP capacity development lower costs of production. Important gains (training);15 in gender equality have also been achieved in certain regions. 8. delivery of community capacity development (training);16 These benefits justify the overhead costs of the Programme, particularly in years 1 and 2 9. direct forms of economic development of the Programme. Moreover, overhead through improved productive capacity costs should diminish dramatically as a con- and the provision of work in relation sequence of: a) lesson-learning from Phase to certain NSP projects;17 1; b) elimination of unnecessary bureau- cracy through the simplification of delivery 10. indirect forms of economic systems; and c), the gradual development of development facilitated by: a new institutional venue for the delivery of a) increased economic activity arising the Programme. However, these achieve- from improved infrastructure, and ments will need to be consolidated in the 10 See Section 4. b) savings derived from lower costs ways suggested above in order to ensure of production;18 and the long-term future of what may be 11 See Section 2. deemed a development programme of out- 11. improvements in the quality of rural standing potential. 12 See Section 4. life.19 ACKU13 Ibid. As stated in the technical proposal for this 14 See Section 2. mid-term evaluation, it was premature to attempt to determine the impact of the 15 Training in relation to Programme either in terms of achieving its delivering aspects of the NSP. stated objectives (laying the foundations for See Sections 2 & 3. improved community level governance and poverty reduction), or in terms of the over- 16 See Section 4. arching aim of strengthening national soli- darity. Nevertheless, as the evaluators 17 See Section 7.3. expected, it has been possible to identify the above qualitative trends that can be 18 Ibid. attributed with some confidence to the interaction of the Programme with the 19 Ibid. objective socio-economic conditions in the communities and these, if sustained, would be capable of delivering the intended NSP AFGHANISTAN impact. No evidence was found of negative Mid-term EVALUATION REPORT
18 Findings and Recommendations Programme Design 1 and Rationale
The NSP has provided Afghanistan 50 per cent of the annual government with the best chance it has had for budget to be distributed through real development in its modern history. programmes in one ministry. It is our responsibility to seize this (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) opportunity and to make it work. (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) NSP was the only programme that had any real impact so far. The best We are very happy with the NSP; aspect was the CDC which enabled sure there are problems that need looking communities to solve their own problems. at for the second phase, but there have (Deputy Governor) been some very significant achievements. (NSP donor stakeholder) They came together in happiness and sadness and talking with each other The NSP is an outstanding success. to solve problems. It is managed well, funds are delivered (Woman householder to the villages, money is disbursed in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) effectively and good programme outputs are achieved. (NSP donor stakeholder) 1.1 Analysis The principles underpinning the NSP – participation, pro-poor poverty reduction It is self-evident that the Afghan communi- and government ownership – are the first ties, their government and the aid principles of development. The NSP community are facing a formidable task in deservesACKU our support because it is reconstructing Afghanistan. The basic needs the best chance that Afghanistan are great, and the developmental needs has of getting real development. include the immense task of recovering (NSP donor stakeholder) years of lost opportunities while responding to an ever-increasing level of expectations The rapid expansion of the NSP has been brought about by the country’s relative a success but the pace of implementation stability. At the same time reconstruction is creates inevitable problems. The capacity taking place at a time when there has been to deliver the NSP to 6,800 villages is a shift in the way aid to Afghanistan is being simply not there. More implementation considered, the attitude of ‘any help is problems will emerge…we need a more worthwhile’ is changing to recognizing that incremental approach. the future stability of the country relies on (OC representative) appropriate and sustainable systems of gov- ernance and economic recovery. In this The NSP is a success, no rational person context, the NSP represents the flagship would say otherwise, but it needs to post-war reconstruction initiative of the belong to the whole government and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is a dis- not one ministry. It can’t be right for tinctive programme because of the
19 emphasis placed on deploying the rapid dis- placing the communities at the centre of the bursement of Block Grants to rural commu- rehabilitation process NSP potentially offers nities as a policy instrument for both the government and other development ‘bottom-up’ institution building, through agencies the opportunity to adapt their the creation of directly elected CDCs at the responses to the complex dynamics of long- village level, and pro-poor economic term recovery. This is a major shift from the growth. The Programme is also distinctive traditional tendency to rely on quick fixes in that it is implemented through the gov- through ‘top-down’ project-driven relief ernment and has nation-wide coverage. It is programmes with a misguided emphasis on designed both to help the rural communi- short-term indicators (for example, the ties rebuild their lives and their nation, and number of projects delivered, people to demonstrate that the Afghan govern- helped, expenditure targets met, etc.), and ment, with assistance, could develop the the habitual excuse of ‘context constraints’ inclusive governance structures required to and the ‘lack of resources’, that prevent gov- sustain a stable government. These are all ernments and agencies alike from harness- important qualities for empowering institu- ing longer-term developmental potential tions and sustaining development and building a stable and peaceful recovery. outcomes. The real challenge for post-war reconstruc- tion is to develop local institutional capaci- Considering the transitional context in ties for providing assistance to recovery which the Programme was designed, the processes, in a manner that reinforces rationale behind supporting a government- rather than undermines the dynamic of led national programme (thus extending recovery at the local level. This is something the visibility and influence of central gov- that NSP has the potential to deliver. ernment in the provinces) is a commend- able one. It is important to remind However, when it came to implementing ourselves that this occurred at the same the Programme, the NSP faced a combina- time when MRRD, with its limited resources tion of some common implementation and capacities, was rightly being re-oriented problems such as: 1) poor problem and to directing policy and implementing pro- context definition; 2) ambiguous and incon- grammes through partners in the non-gov- sistent objectives; 3) inadequate policy ernmental and private sector rather than design, particularly in terms of capacity implementing directly. The responsibilities development and sustainability; 4) certain of the Ministry include: the formulation of recalcitrant implementing actors; 5) lack of rural development policies, strategies and initial support from some affected commu- guidelines; the coordination and monitor- nities as well as some ministries; and finally ing of other implementing agencies working 6) unstable and uncertain socio-economic in rural development as well as mobilizing and security contexts in a number of the the resources for it. The employment of the provinces. Of course, some of these factors NSP/OC was particularly important for the played a greater role in impeding successful speedy implementation of the Programme, policy implementation than others. and in our opinion can be credited with Similarly, with the national coverage of the much of the achievements so far. Equally Programme and the sheer size of the enter- critical for the comprehensive progress of ACKUprise, unprecedented in the Afghan context, the Programme has been the contracting of it was inevitable that some projects would FPs, many of whom have had extensive be more successful than others and some experience in community mobilization and facilitating partners more efficient than the implementation of development pro- others. grammes. Nevertheless, the main tension between the The initial design of the NSP recognized that rationale of the NSP and its implementation in an operating environment of chronic is derived from the limited time-frame emergencies and media-led donor support, established for its implementation, which community participation is the key to the has had a major knock-on effect on the suc- sustainable and effective rehabilitation of cessful achievement of the original goal of the service sector. It reflects the view that the Programme. It is evident that what is local communities and institutions bear a fundamentally a development programme key responsibility for the rebuilding of their has been rolled-out with a relief mindset, own services and infrastructure, and are leading the MRRD to emphasize increased therefore the real owners of the overall coverage and rapid disbursement of Block FINDINGS AND process of post-war rehabilitation. By Grants to communities. This emphasis on RECOMMENDATIONS
20 disbursement may have been a rational These problems are reflected in the response to the political climate of the time constant changing of NSP objectives and key and have reflected the critical need to performance indicators in the Operational provide a visible governmental presence in Manual in response to new political priori- the provinces, districts and villages of ties.2 For example, NSP’s focus shifted from Afghanistan. It was a conscious political act local governance to rural infrastructure but of state building, seeking to build public the MRRD, NSP facilitating partners and the confidence in an infant government. Nor OC lacked the technical engineering was this relief mindset confined to the expertise needed to support communities.3 national level. Many of the people forming In order to ensure effective monitoring and CDCs were returning refugees, mostly from evaluation, it is now crucial to have a settled Pakistan and Iran, where their situation was understanding of programme objectives in helped by relief efforts. According to many order to achieve desired inputs. NSP FP stakeholders, understandably many people still have this relief mentality and At the same time new realities have have difficulty making the transition to iden- emerged that prompt the need for some tifying longer-term community develop- marginal adjustments to the programme ment priorities. However, from the outset design for Phase 2. These include: certain rudimentary components of programme design, formulation, implemen- the importance of a greater emphasis on tation and management were lost in the quality programming in order to ensure rush to delivery. For example, the NSP/OC sustainable programming – NSPs need was recruited after six months of operation to make development sense; and was expected to disburse Block Grants the implementation of NSP through one immediately. There was therefore no time ministry was a necessity in Phase 1 but for a phasing-in strategy during which: a) a now a ‘whole government approach’ rational Operational Manual could be and greater resource sharing is required finalized; b) consistent performance indica- in order to maintain stable government, tors could be identified and effective moni- build governmental capacity and toring systems established; c) coherent and to deliver on broader national consistent community profiles completed; development goals; d) an effective capacity development communities now have an expectation strategy for MRRD staff could be developed; of the development of NSP income and e) a rational NSP/OC exit strategy enhancing projects, but most projects devised. Moreover, many of the traditional are infrastructural that only provide for nuts and bolts of organizational manage- short-term employment opportunities ment, such as the development of a human and therefore provide a modest resources strategy and logical frameworks contribution to poverty reduction – to guide programme management, took a there needs to be a greater focus on back seat in the drive for CDC creation and livelihood enhancing projects in Phase 2 the rapid disbursement of Block Grants to (e.g. alternatives to poppy cultivation). support NSP projects. Understandably the NSP was formulated in a The NSPACKU was designed on the hoof in very short period of time (two to three response to political priorities and until months). In its formation, it benefited from recently was deficient with regard to its transferring community development policy 1 In our assessment, the World operational, monitoring, quality assurance from elsewhere. However, the short period Bank’s April 2005 Supervision and capacity development activities. While of time allowed for the design of the NSP Mission played an important role the NSP/OC has made concerted efforts meant that there simply was not enough in reinvigorating the process. over the past 6 months to work on these time to pay sufficient attention to investigat- deficiencies, at present the base-line field ing international exemplars of post-conflict 2 A number of FPs have data does not exist to conduct a ‘scientific transition, and therefore the international expressed concern over the evaluation’ of the achievements of the comparisons work that was conducted constant change of the OM. Programme (however significant they may focussed on convenient examples (e.g. be).1 Moreover, the political/security driven Cambodia, Indonesia). The international 3 See NSP/OC, ‘NSP 1: choice of first wave communities for dis- case study evidence suggests that a number Lessons Learned’, 2005. bursement led to the rapid roll-out of the of factors may act as constraints to success- Programme, an over reliance on expatriate ful programme learning in community expertise and the failure to engage in development planning and programming. SECTION 1: effective capacity development at the Some of these factors are evident in the NSP PROGRAMME DESIGN national and provincial levels. context, and need to be investigated further,
21 including: 1) limited search for successful Recommendation 3 and compatible exemplars, particularly in NSP Phase 2 should be a period of consoli- relation to capacity development of govern- dation rather than expansion. The aim of ment departments; 2) multiple goals rolling out the NSP to 6,800 communities in (declared and undeclared), increasing the Year 3, despite the considerable backlog of Programme’s complexity; 3) little or no Year 1 and 2 projects, is not tenable. There compatibility with existing policy systems; should be a greater focus on quality rather 4) resource constraints, including political, than quantity to allow for effective social bureaucratic, technological and economic mobilization and institution-building to resources; and 5) the initial cultural and ide- take root, and for projects to be sustained ological incompatibility between donor through high quality community develop- policy and the dominant value system ment planning. A twin track process of amongst MRRD employees. consolidation and expansion should be devised. A Phase 2 Consolidation Strand should be aimed at CDCs who have suc- cessfully completed sub projects. An action 1.2 Summary and recommendations zone approach should be deployed where for programme design and rationale appropriate within this strand whereby CDCs sharing common CDP goals should Overall, Phase 1 of the NSP has undoubtedly be encouraged to engage in joint program- been a success, given the difficult environ- ming to meet community priorities and ment in which it has operated. Indeed, only achieve economies of scale. The Phase 2 a small minority of our respondents ques- Expansion Strand should focus on the tioned the success of the Programme given strategic roll-out of the NSP to ensure the extraordinary constraints under which it nation-wide coverage of the NSP, but with a has operated. Nonetheless, several bias towards integrating vulnerable com- problems can be identified in terms of munities. policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation arising from problems in the process of programme for- mulation and inception, which have created Recommendation 4 operational obstacles that need to be sur- NSP Phase 2 needs to embrace a ‘whole mounted in Phase 2. government approach’ both in order to gain greater political legitimacy in the eyes of political elites, and to coordinate Recommendation 1 national development planning and pro- The political objectives of the NSP (e.g. the gramming more effectively to gain establishment of CDCs within the formal economies of scale and to avoid waste and system of local governance) need to be duplication. expressed more overtly within the Programme objectives.
Recommendation 5 ACKUAn International Comparisons and Recommendation 2 Lessons Learnt Unit should be established New ‘simplified’, ‘realizable’ and publicly in the MRRD to help support effective policy ‘knowable’ programme objectives and a learning both in Phase 2 of the NSP and the ‘simplified’ and ‘realizable’ set of perform- Ministry’s other major development pro- ance indicators need to be drawn for NSP grammes. Phase 2 which express the governance, capacity development and economic The Unit could start by working through the growth objectives of the NSP more explicitly institutional memory of the OC. It should so that they can be measured over time. ideally be linked to an independent academic body, such as Kabul University, to Monitoring systems should be simplified to ensure objectivity. focus on developing time series data around a simplified set of performance indicators. A coherent and consistent representative sample of community profiles drawn to common criteria needs to be completed for FINDINGS AND comparative and evaluative purposes. RECOMMENDATIONS
22 Recommendation 6 Phase 2 needs to place a greater emphasis on increasing the direct economic benefits of the NSP through both incentivizing CDCs and encouraging income-generating pro- grammes to meet its economic growth strategy.
Recommendation 7 NSP Phase 2 requires more effective donor coordination. Donors should be aware of the consequences of action when they pick and choose where their NSP funding goes. An integrated approach should be adopted by the donor community, both to ensure that international funding helps to support national development priorities and to provide for better coverage.
ACKU
SECTION 1: PROGRAMME DESIGN
23 ACKU
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
24 Findings and Recommendations National Level 2 Programme Management and Coordination
This section of the report focusses on the The External Review Committee needs management and coordination of the NSP at to be more proactive; it should be a the centre of the Afghan political system, problem-solving committee but we are focussing on the work of national level coor- not asked to play this role. dination committees, the MRRD and the (NSP donor stakeholder) NSP OC. The analysis draws mainly on qual- itative data derived from extensive national- We need to be organized; level interviews and two workshops held the present committee is a talking shop with NSP stakeholders, including represen- no more, no less. tatives from: all the core ministries involved (NSP donor stakeholder) with the NSP; MRRD and NSP/Oversight Consultant (OC) staff; Facilitating Partners We can be an important source of (FPs) and all the participating donors support for the MRRD especially in (Canadian International Development their battle with other ministries. Agency, Department for International (NSP donor stakeholder) Development, European Union, US Agency for International Development, Japan The donor community thus calls for an International Cooperation Agency). action oriented coordination committee aimed at providing support for the NSP both in its strategic thinking on broader development issues and in providing 2.1 National level political pressure to remove bottle necks at coordination committees different levels of the delivery system.
The NSPACKU at the national level is in theory The Inter-ministerial Committee includes coordinated through two committees – the the ministries of Finance, Public Works, External Review Committee and the Inter- Women’s Affairs, Public Health, Agricultural ministerial Committee. The External Review Affairs, Education, and Water and Energy. Committee is comprised of NSP donors, UN Once again it is mandated to meet every six agencies (UNAMIR, UNICEF, UNHCR) and months with the aim of ensuring that the the Ministry of Finance. It is mandated to NSP is linked into the work of the respective meet every three months. While the donor ministries. For example, the construction of community is unanimous in its support for a NSP school has to comply with the the NSP it is less flattering on the work of Ministry of Education’s own national plans the Committee: and building regulations, and Memor- andums of Understanding (MoUs) have The NSP needs to institutionalize been set up between the respective min- donors into the deliberative process. istries to achieve this. In practice, this At the moment we are simply not Committee functions in a very limited way. geared to support the NSP effectively. Indeed, three key ministries were not aware (NSP donor stakeholder) of its existence:
25 I can’t recall being involved in any As long as there is greater Inter-ministerial Committee meeting. inter-ministerial cooperation We’ve discussed the NSP in Cabinet the NSP will be of great importance but that’s as far as it goes. to the future of Afghanistan. (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan)
What Inter-ministerial Committee? This change in perception coincided with (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) the London conference in February 2006.
We would like to be involved Our interviews also revealed that the NSP but have never been asked. suffers from poor coordination of its large- (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) scale development projects. For example, there is insufficient integration of strategic Nor did they recognize the importance of thinking with regard to the relationship the NSP’s work: between the NSP and the National Area- based Development Programme (NABDP). We already have our own community Consideration should be given to providing structures; why do we need new ones? Oversight Teams that can look at NSP (at (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) community level) and NABDP projects (at the provincial level), rather than each All the NSP does is complicate matters. programme having its own teams. This (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) could yield both significant savings in time and money and a more comprehensive The NSP makes no effort to understanding of development needs, communicate with ministries working problems and their resolution. Under a in similar areas…this is leading to ‘whole government’ approach the same poor planning and waste. concept could be extended to include the (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) ASP (Afghanistan Stabilization Programme under the auspices of the Ministers for the The NSP needs to recognize that Interior and Communications) which we need to be able to do our jobs; operates at district level. the MRRD gets all the money and we sit here twiddling our thumbs. Collaboration between the various pro- (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) grammes has been minimal so far (even within the same offices in MRRD), but if However, ministerial perceptions of the NSP there were efforts towards developing differ markedly in accordance with the cooperation then the quality of the pro- Ministry’s involvement in the Programme. grammes will improve along with staff satis- There follows a selection of narratives from faction as well as increased efficiency. ministries involved with the NSP: Poor donor and inter-ministerial coordina- CDCs are the best community tion has clearly presented the NSP with structures to work through. some steering problems. While certain of (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) ACKUthese problems are self-inflicted (e.g. the inactive coordination committees and lack Community-based development is of strategic thinking across its key develop- the future for Afghanistan and ment programmes), others are the product this is why CDCs are important; of its success in bidding for external they hold the key to its future. funding, such as petty inter-ministerial (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) jealousy resulting in the deliberate engi- neering of bottle-necks in the delivery CDCs need to be properly integrated process (e.g. financial disbursement into the local system of government processes). These problems can only be because it is the only community dealt with effectively through the establish- structure that works. ment of a ‘whole government’ approach. (Minister, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan)
Despite the initial indifference of certain An integrated approach ministries towards the NSP, it is noteworthy to donor support that by end of the research process these The MRRD needs to integrate donors into FINDINGS AND same ministries had become NSP enthusi- the deliberative process more effectively. In RECOMMENDATIONS asts:
26 terms of donor coordination, here we can isterial coordination. In Phase 1 of the NSP see a policy of dividing and ruling donors. it was necessary to focus on an output- The donors themselves help this process by driven strategy (i.e. the rapid creation of poor coordination of their activities. The CDCs and disbursement of Block Grants) in External Review Committee is a case in order for the NSP to gain a national profile point. There is a need for a formal quarterly and to build credibility. It was therefore meeting: impossible to develop effective inter-minis- terial partnering arrangements at this We would also like to have a juncture. However, for both political and formal quarterly meeting with the MRRD sustainability reasons it will be important to in which we discuss the MRRD develop a more collaborative approach in development programmes and assess Phase 2. This could be achieved through: efficiency issues and share good practice. (NSP donor stakeholder) the MRRD developing strong collaborations with indicative ministries All the donor stakeholders we have inter- (Education, Public Health, Water and viewed argued for more effective donor Energy, Agriculture, Women’s Affairs coordination with regard to development and Interior) in specific areas of NSP programming in general, and the NSP in programming involving national and particular. They argued that this would provincial level steering committees; allow them to: support the work of the NSP the establishment of an NSP unit more effectively; and avoid duplication and in each indicative ministry with the waste and ensure economies of scale in responsibility of coordinating joint development programming. As a case in programming; and point, during a workshop activity which we ministerial membership of an convened to discuss this mid-term evalua- NSP Steering Committee. tion with NSP stakeholders, it was brought to our attention that 4 donors had simulta- neously commissioned mini-evaluations of the NSP, at considerable expense. 2.2 The role of the NSP Oversight Consultant in programme management and coordination A ‘whole government’ approach There is a profound problem in terms of the GTZ/DAI were given the OC role after the inter-ministerial coordination of the NSP. NSP was already up and running… The MRRD is a very effective ministry and ‘deliver, deliver, deliver’ they were told; needs to help develop the capacity of other well it has done that very well but a ministries. There is a great deal of jealousy lot of other things have gone undone in in weaker ministries; ‘they believe that the the process and they have only started MRRD monopolizes the large development sorting them out in the last six months. programmes’ (NSP donor stakeholder). (NSP FP Stakeholder)
The MRRD is a victim of its own success. It Lots of outputs, lots of good things is too ACKUefficient; too effective at talking achieved (which in the circumstances donor-speak and attracting resources and is a miracle) but from the perspective therefore prone to attracting enemies and of performance management and arousing petty jealousies. The position of assessment the NSP is a dog’s dinner. the President’s Office does cause some The strange thing is that despite confusion, the consequence of which is a all the problems it works. political environment where accusations, (NSP donor stakeholder) misperceptions and counter accusations abound. The President’s Office ‘needs to Considering what it has been asked intervene more directly in supporting the to do, the pressures that it has been NSP and broadening it out to a greater under and the obstacles it has faced, number of ministries’ (NSP donor stake- its achievements have been incredible. holder). (NSP donor stakeholder)
All the ministries consulted recognized the The evaluation of the role of the Oversight importance of establishing a ‘whole govern- Consultant in NSP programme management SECTION 2: ment’ approach to the NSP in Phase 2. This rests on an assessment of its ability to NATIONAL LEVEL would necessitate more effective inter-min- deliver on its core responsibilities to:
27 1. contribute to institution-building in the NSP began. The Ministry, through the local governance through the establish- NSP coordination office, retained its leader- ment of CDCs; ship in the areas of policy and programme 2. supervise partnership management with development, local governance, fund man- FPs; agement, inter-ministerial relationships, 3. engage in FP contract screening; interactions with NSP donors, as well as 4. prepare and implement sub-projects dealing with community complaints and with the support of FPs via CDCs and petitions. The organizational structure of disburse Block Grants to support their the NSP OC (as of October 2005) is development needs; presented above. The OC is comprised of 5. provide informal and formal training for 530 staff working in 34 provincial offices and MRRD (central, regional and provincial), 5 regional offices, and with a headquarters OC and FP staff; in Kabul. 6. provide training for members of CDCs; 7. deliver NSP information and awareness The overall performance of the OC was campaigns provided by the NSP’s Public evaluated as ‘highly satisfactory’ by the WB Communication Department; supervisory mission of October/November 8. monitor NSP projects; and 2006. While this evaluation concurs with the 9. prepare for the hand-over of NSP OC general tenor of this assessment, it identi- functions to the MRRD. fies the key obstacles to Programme delivery in NSP Phase 1, and provides a set GTZ/DAI was contracted by the MRRD as of recommendations for programme the OC of NSP to to provide Programme enhancement in Phase 2 of the Programme. oversight for the first three years after the There follows a snapshot of the survey Programme had already been running for findings which are analysed in greater detail six months. The entire MRRD NSP staff was in other sections of this report. integrated within the OC structure when
Box 1. The organizational structure of the NSP Oversight Consultant, GTZ-DAI
ACKU Management Employment Javid Karimi
Training & Capacity Development Hanife Kurt, Lene Petersen
28 Institution-building and preparation The main obstacles to effective delivery in and implementation of sub-projects this area have been ‘at least’ four-fold. First, the targets for 2004–6 were not developed We’ve got to get real about community with a rational understanding of how much governance. They’re asking us to do time community mobilization and sub- in a few months what it has taken project implementation takes. Secondly, the West decades to achieve. several bottle-necks emerged in the process (NSP FP stakeholder) of programme implementation, which have undermined the ability of the OC to meet Yes, policy is made and remade in the targets. Prolonged delays occurred in: the process of delivery. Good practices arise procurement process for securing critical from trial and error during the delivery goods; in the disbursement process due to process and it takes time to disseminate the absence of Block Grant funds, and in the those practices across the delivery system. inefficient transfer of funds from Da As the delivery mechanisms mature so Afghanistan Bank to CDC bank accounts. will our ability to mobilize communities Thirdly, long delays have also occurred in efficiently and effectively. the approval of extension contracts for (OC staff member) existing FPs and the contracting of addi- tional FPs. Fourthly, it is also evident from It is important to keep things simple; our survey that there has been very little to focus on what matters. But this ‘political’ help forthcoming from the MRRD proceeds from the assumption that there or the donor community to help the is a general understanding of what NSP/OC deal with these bottle-necks in the matters. Unfortunately this has not disbursement process. It is therefore unsur- been the case until quite recently. prising that targets have not been met. The best conditions for development arise from all stakeholders having a common view on what matters FP management and focussing on achieving it. In general the OC and the FPs enjoy good (OC staff member) working relations, underpinned by regular meetings and a collaborative approach to While the NSP-OC has been unable to meet problem-solving. It is evident from respon- the targets for December 2004 to August dents that this relationship has improved 2006 established in its contract with the significantly in recent times. Six further MRRD, its achievements have nonetheless obstacles (in addition to the underestima- been remarkable. Since its involvement in tion of how much time community mobi- September 2003: lization and sub-project implementation takes) to effective FP management were the NSP has encompassed 193 districts identified by our sample of respondents.5 in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan; the NSP has reached 22,500 rural First, the relationship between FPs and the communities covering 38,000 rural OC has often been undermined by shifting settlements; expectations of the role of FPs in accor- the NSPACKU has benefited 10.5 million dance with MRRD or donor priorities: people and established 10,000 CDCs; 14,000 projects in 8,000 communities From the beginning the NSP was about have been financed with Block governance. It was never about economic Grant disbursements amounting to growth or pro-poor economic growth or US $166.1 million and total Block Grant poverty reduction or gender inclusion. 4 See NSP OC (2006), commitments of US $214.6 million; These objectives have been parachuted Analysis of the Experiences and more than 4,000 sub-projects have in without any real reflection on how Lessons Learned in Program been completed successfully.4 they can be achieved. Some FPs have the Implementation, GTZ-IS, experience to make progress on these Kabul, March 2006, pp. 3–5. In addition, this survey identifies significant issues but others don’t. This clearly puts evidence of: pressure on the OC-FP relationship. 5 See Section 2.3 for a (NSP FP stakeholder) more detailed exposition. increased public faith in the system of government; There is a tendency for donors to think improved community relations; that they can use CDCs as a ‘cure-all’ to SECTION 2: improved state-civil society relations; deliver on all their in-country priorities; NATIONAL LEVEL and what they need to remember is that this is the empowerment of CDCs.
29 Afghanistan we’re talking about and not systems between NSP stakeholders and the US, Japan, Canada or elsewhere… communities. As one FP stakeholder argues: (NSP FP stakeholder) A fundamental premise in the Technical This problem has been compounded by the Annex of the NSP is that communities are absence of joined-up thinking across devel- trustworthy…as long as communities go opment programmes and the failure to through the process you don’t need the develop effective processes of cross- engineering verification as this should programme learning: happen in the evaluation process… there needs to be an effective balance between There has been a clear lack of strategic the need for a paper trail and expedience. thinking between ministries on rural Tr ust management is crucial to the development and this is reflected in the efficient delivery of the NSP. rural communities themselves. (NSP FP stakeholder) The counter claim to this view is of course that the very act of creating formal The MRRD needs to reach out to achieve processes is a form of capacity development a ‘whole government’ approach and in itself. there is no evidence that it is doing so. (NSP FP stakeholder) Training 6 Thirdly, there has been insufficient lesson- drawing across FPs: The NSP provides: Informal ‘on the job’ training with an In this rush to roll-out the NSP to estimated total of 50,000 person training more and more communities we days for MRRD (central, regional and don’t have time to do enough learning provincial), OC and FP staff; from each other’s experiences. Formal training with approximately (NSP FP stakeholder) 9,000 person days for the same target groups; Hence, the OC needs to play a greater role Members of approximately 10,000 CDCs in generating collaboration between FPs. and communities participate in the training provided by the FPs; Fourthly, bottlenecks in the coordination of Information and awareness campaigns NSP disbursement and procurement are provided by the Public processes have heightened tensions Communications Unit (PCU) to between FPs and communities: underpin the training activities; and FPs also provide training for CDCs in The NSP has created too many key areas of institutional and community gatekeepers who are unwilling to accept development. responsibility but have to demonstrate their power to obstruct. Hence, the capacity development dimen- (NSP FP stakeholder) sion of the NSP is really quite considerable ACKUand should be considered as one of the Fifthly, FPs contend that they are placed most important outputs of the NSP. under significant pressure to implement rather than facilitate the NSP. This ultimately OC understanding of capacity-building limits the benefits that CDCs can derive from the NSP in terms of capacity develop- The emphasis on roll-out and the sheer ment: effort that that has involved has meant that the focus has been on CDCs and FPs The new imperative is sub-project and the OC-MRRD ‘people’ issues have completion, when building the capacity been neglected. We are now working of CDCs is much more important and hard to catch-up. was the original purpose of the NSP. (OC staff member) (NSP FP stakeholder) 6 See Section 2.2 for further The concept of capacity-building employed observations on NSP training. Finally, there is also evidence that the very by the OC focusses on ‘skills and knowledge act of developing westernized formal transfer’ (OC staff member). This rather processes to ensure transparent and narrow understanding reflects the ‘relief’ FINDINGS AND accountable delivery systems erodes trust rather than ‘developmental’ mentality that RECOMMENDATIONS
30 underpinned the operation of NSP Phase 1, nating training. It is envisaged that the and is reflected in the absence of the devel- amount of training delivered at the provin- opment of a strategic approach to capacity cial level will increase accordingly.8 development. On its own admission the OC has neglected the human resource manage- The OC provides high quality training for ment aspect of the NSP but it must be noted CDC members. Indeed, it is our view that that the OC is presently recruiting a human the training packages delivered at this level resource development specialist to design a provide examples of international best human resource strategy.7 There are other practice. The packages themselves are areas that were also neglected at the carefully crafted using culturally sensitive strategic level: role play, team building exercises, and, lesson-drawing exercises. The central A change management strategy wasn’t reason for the success of the training is that developed to deal with the problems of it has evolved from participatory processes cultural change inherent in transforming and is genuinely Afghan in design and old administrative systems; approach. With regard to CDC training A needs assessment wasn’t conducted conducted by FPs, it is evident from our to identify the skills gaps in MRRD staff; survey that the best CDC training is spread A logical framework to guide throughout the programme cycle and programme management around the should not be front-loaded. achievement of milestones was not developed; and How is the impact of training on perform- the OC’s capacity-building strategy, such ance (i.e. programme outcomes) evaluated? as it was, did not have linkages with the The OC uses a testing tool to evaluate the broader process of civil service reform impact of training on output. For example, in Afghanistan. there is significant evidence to demonstrate that engineering training has improved the This third observation is particularly quality of build. important as a large part of the NSP’s training activities involve building the skills Three main gaps can be identified in the of civil servants in the MRRD. However, it training repertoire: strategic capacity devel- has not proved possible to integrate NSP opment training packages for MRRD staff; thinking with MRRD thinking in terms of the absence of effective training in manage- identifying the type of civil servant the ment and leadership skills; and general Afghan government would like to produce, office skills: i.e. the range of skills required to assume a full role in the operational delivery of the In Phase 2 of the NSP, capacity-building NSP. Concerted efforts will need to be taken will become increasingly prescient in all of these areas in NSP Phase 2. because of the impending hand-over to the MRRD. Policy instruments (OC staff member) The training strategy deployed by the OC has focussed mainly on providing training The OC is now planning management packagesACKU to underpin the main areas of the training for unit and provincial heads and NSP’s activities (e.g. accounting, procure- team building training for provincial man- ment, CDC institution and capacity-building agement. A management consultant is being etc.). Effective work and training plans are contracted to advise on the issue. As one provided for each aspect of the Programme. OC staff member put it, ‘the initial emphasis 7 The OC does have an The OC has used a cascade system whereby was on getting things going; now the focus effective performance appraisal ‘trainers train trainees who become trainers’ is on the development of management system for its own staff. in a virtuous circle of capacity development. skills’ (OC staff member). However, the OC has recently decided that 8 See NSP OC (2006), this approach is not working satisfactorily, Obstacles to capacity development Analysis of the Experiences and ‘…the problem with the cascade system is The obstacles to capacity development Lessons Learned in Program that a certain amount of knowledge is lost identified by respondents can be organized Implementation, GTZ-IS, between the layers’ (OC staff member). The into two main categories – problems of Kabul, March 2006, pp. 34–35. OC has therefore proposed a modular bureaucracy and problems of cultural approach (i.e. the development of modules change. The first set of obstacles include: linked to key skills development) to capacity the problem of high staff turnover; the SECTION 2: development which will increase its existence of too many forms; constant NATIONAL LEVEL function in terms of facilitating and coordi- changes to the NSP Operational Manual
31 requiring additional training support; civil editors, and it produces its own television service tenure providing disincentives for programmes, including an NSP soap opera. MRRD staff to engage fully in training activi- Television coverage is considered central to ties or to take initiative in the workplace. the PCU’s work and it has been successful in Issues of cultural change include: the need securing agreements with all the major for MRRD staff to move away from a planned Afghan channels to air NSP programmes on system mindset; the problem of low rates of a regular basis. The PCU also coordinates literacy in CDCs (including social organiz- and stage manages the monthly NSP ers); limited female involvement in training; ‘Roadshow’ which has proved highly and maintaining the interest of CDCs in effective in raising public awareness of the lengthy processes of training. However, the NSP. The impact of the work of the PCU is most serious obstacle to effective capacity monitored using sophisticated content development lies in the poor integration of analysis techniques. The evaluation team MRRD staff into NSP work. As one OC staff has found significant evidence from these member put it: sources of the important work that the PCU has played in both promoting and maintain- We were just given a list of ing public interest in the NSP. Indeed, this is MRRD staff and told to integrate them; a further area in which international best no consultation, no nothing. Integration practices are being delivered. has not been well planned. For example, it hasn’t been linked to the development The only area of concern which should be of the core skills necessary to deliver raised in relation to the work of the PCU lies core NSP functions. We’ve done our in its capacity development strategy for best but without cooperation we can’t MRRD staff. It has proved very difficult for move forward very quickly. the PCU to integrate MRRD staff into the work of the PCU and build their capacity to Summary assume its functions. This has largely been Three main conclusions can be drawn from due to the recalcitrance of MRRD staff. this sub-section. First, the OC needs to Better lines of communication between the complete its work at the strategic level with OC and the MRRD must be established in regard to the completion of its human this area to ease tensions. resources strategy, change management strategy, needs assessment for MRRD staff, logical framework to guide programme Information system management management around the achievement of The OC possesses highly effective informa- milestones, and capacity development tion systems which are extremely well strategy with linkages into the broader managed and are a model of good practice. process of civil service reform in It is, however, a victim of its own success in Afghanistan. This will help to remove the sense that the capacity of the MIS Unit certain of the obstacles to capacity develop- to provide high quality reports is often ment. Secondly, it is evident that the OC is called upon by MRRD staff which takes OC extremely reflexive on training issues and staff away from their core responsibilities delivers best practice in relation to CDC and creates excessive workload demands. capacity development. Thirdly, it is evident ACKUThe staffing costs for the MIS are linked to that sufficient numbers of MRRD staff do the Unit’s core NSP functions, so any addi- not presently possess the skills necessary to tional tasks should be funded from other assume the operational delivery of the NSP sources. or, as an OC staff member put it, ‘they can only do it if they recruit existing Afghan OC Future terms of reference for the MIS and international staff’. should therefore focus on the functions it performs in managing and reporting essential and relevant NSP information. In Public relations addition, the possibility of decentralizing While the Public Communication Unit certain areas of data entry, archiving and (PCU) plays an important role in reinforcing management to OC PO should be explored key messages in CDC training, its main role to assist with the capacity development of is to promote the work of the NSP. It does MRRD staff, to ease the workload burden on this in five ways – via the radio, television, the centre, and to make for more efficient Internet, print and NSP events. The PCU has programme delivery. It is also worth noting its own press agency with 20 full-time that as well as the development of highly FINDINGS AND reporters working in the field and three efficient information systems, there is also RECOMMENDATIONS
32 evidence in this area of effective capacity …on the basis of existing available development of Afghan staff through information from government records shadowing. The Unit’s good practices in (e.g. the list of registered villages from capacity development should be diffused to the 1970s, or the list of villages prepared other units within the OC. for the nomination of the members of the 2002 Loya Jirga). However, since the reliability of the available official data Programme monitoring on villages was inconsistent when the records were established, and since it The OC did not develop a logical is by now outdated due to population framework for the programme, nor did increase and/or displacements, the it develop a coherent monitoring and identification of communities for the evaluation framework…the right data purpose of the NSP would have to reflect does not appear to have been collected the ground realities existing today.9 in relation to the key performance indicators…in spite of this the While the NSP/OC has made concerted outputs have been significant and efforts over the past six months to work on the role of FPs has been pretty good. these deficiencies through the improve- (MRRD representative) ment of forms and the strengthening of post implementation monitoring processes, It is universally recognized that ‘progress’ at present the base-line field data does not should be measured over the life of any exist to conduct a ‘scientific evaluation’ of development programme. This is significant the achievements of the Programme to all investors in managing the Programme (however significant they may be). These from the donor community, to the MRRD, problems have been exacerbated by the to provincial and district authorities, to facil- constant changing of NSP objectives and key itating partners, to the NSP/OC responsible performance indicators in the Operational for maximizing the cost effectiveness of Manual in response to new political priori- interventions of this kind and, most signifi- ties.10 cantly, to people living in rural areas. Relevant and practicable indicators should In order to ensure effective monitoring and therefore have been identified at the outset evaluation, it is now crucial to have: a and their values monitored as the settled understanding of programme objec- Programme unfolded. Unfortunately, this tives in order to achieve desired outputs; was not the case during Phase 1 the establishment of a rational NSP Phase 2 Programme, although there is significant Operational Manual; the establishment of evidence to suggest that major improve- a simple set of key performance indicators ments have now been achieved in this area for monitoring progress in relation to the thanks to the recruitment of a highly achievement of these objectives, which can effective unit head in spring 2005. be measured over time; and the completion of coherent and consistent community Monitoring of the NSP has had a chequered profiles of all CDCs for comparative and history. The original view was that, ‘effective evaluative purposes. This latter task could monitoringACKU could be achieved on the basis be completed by the large cohort of MRRD of quarterly reports from the FPs’ (former monitors (approximately 108). OC staff member), and did not require elaborate systems. Indeed, the argument Monitoring and evaluation is a further area was that detailed evaluation should be where the MRRD lacks the capacity at conducted by independent evaluators on a present to assume the OC’s role, and signif- cyclical basis and that the role of monitoring icant thinking needs to be paid to capacity 9 NSP Operational Manual, should purely focus on whether CDCs were development issues. This is likely to require revised 28 October 2005, making progress. It did not prove possible more effective integration of the monitoring pp. 17–18. to develop an accurate community base-line and evaluation units in the OC and the to monitor progress and indeed compare MRRD, and increased responsibility for the 10 See NSP/OC (2005), progress across communities. This is Rural Rehabilitation and Development PO. ‘NSP 1: Lessons Learned’, because community profiles were not Kabul, NSP/OC. drawn up to common criteria as the Programme rolled-out. The current Exit strategy Operational Manual observes that the It is evident from our investigations that in SECTION 2: communities are defined: the short-term the MRRD will not have the NATIONAL LEVEL capacity to take over the NSP without a
33 continued role for the OC. The Exit Strategy devised; and g) a logical framework for has been devised too late. This should have implementation completed. been considered from the beginning of the Programme. Moreover, the Exit Strategy All of these areas of ‘rational’ programme options should have been reviewed by an management are now being attended to, independent party (i.e. not the OC or the but this does mean that much of the institu- MRRD). Although the MRRD has some tion-building and the capacity development highly effective staff at the senior manage- work that needed to be completed to allow ment level, there is not sufficient talent in for a hand-over to the MRRD in July 2006 is depth to assume the OC role in 2006. in the process of completion.
We also noted that there continues to be a There is currently significant debate within high level of political uncertainty regarding the MRRD and the NSP/OC over the most the future of the NSP and the handover suitable institutional venue for the delivery from the OC to the MRRD. This uncertainty of the NSP in Phase 2 once the MRRD has has started to affect the morale of the FPs. It taken over the management of the is widely acknowledged that HE Haneef Programme. Three options have been Atmar is not only a strong supporter of the debated: full integration; re-tender for a NSP but the creative force behind it, and new OC; or create a ‘not for profit’ semi- there are worries that if he moves to autonomous organization as a special another ministry, political support for the project under the Ministry. The third option NSP may well wane. is being proposed by the MRRD as it provides the Ministry with the ability to secure the services of high quality, experi- enced staff in the field of rural community 2.3 Summary and recommendations development who demand high salaries, for national level coordination while simultaneously developing the capacity of national staff. However, we From the outset, it was impossible for the believe that these aspirations can be met OC to adopt a ‘rational’ approach to through a fourth option; the creation of an programme management for at least 3 main executive agency for NSP delivery. reasons: the obligation to deliver on output- driven objectives has meant that they had to hit the ground running to establish the A ‘whole government’ approach delivery system for the rapid creation of – reforming decision structures CDCs and the disbursement of Block Grants; the absence of clear programme objectives has meant that they have always Recommendation 8 been engaged in institutional ‘catch-up’ in A new institutional structure is recom- relation to new priority settings identified mended for the national level coordina- by the MRRD and donors; and the lack of a tion of the NSP. The dysfunctional External settled understanding of the role of the OC Review Committee and the Inter-ministe- by the MRRD and the donors has meant that rial Committee should be replaced with they have had to shift human and institu- ACKUthree new committees – an NSP Steering tional resources to support non-core NSP Committee, a donor Support Group and activities in response to changing political an Inter-ministerial Committee. expectations (e.g. MIS). The NSP Steering Committee should meet Hence, the OC was not provided with the every two months, it should be chaired by time to initiate a phasing-in strategy during the Ministry with oversight of local gover- which: a) a rational Operational Manual nance matters, and be comprised of the NSP could be finalized with clear programme Coordinator, the first and deputy Minister of objectives; b) consistent performance indi- the MRRD, the OC, the NSP Coordinator, cators could be identified and effective representatives from partnering ministries, monitoring systems established; c) five CDC representatives from NSP regions, coherent and consistent community and a representative of the facilitating profiles completed; d) a capacity develop- partners. ment strategy for MRRD staff could be developed; e) a human resource manage- The donor Support Group should meet ment strategy could be devised for NSP OC quarterly; it should be chaired by a presi- FINDINGS AND staff; f) a rational NSP/OC exit strategy dential nominee, and be comprised of all RECOMMENDATIONS
34 the donor stakeholders, the First and Recommendation 11 Deputy Minister of the MRRD, and the NSP While we recognize that excellent work is Coordinator. In addition to ensuring donor being conducted in these areas, the OC accountability, the role of the group will be needs to complete its work at the strategic to convene ‘action-oriented’ meetings with level with regard to the completion of its: minutes in order to support the work of the human resources strategy; change man- NSP more effectively. agement strategy; logical framework to guide programme management around The Inter-ministerial Committee should the achievement of milestones; needs meet quarterly and be chaired by a presi- assessment for MRRD staff; capacity devel- dential nominee and include representation opment strategy with linkages into the from all partnering ministries. Its key role broader process of civil service reform in will be to identify areas of duplication and Afghanistan; a quality assurance strategy waste, potential areas of joint working, and to ensure sustainable programming; and a NSP input into ministerial development final NSP/OC exit strategy. plans and vice versa. Day to day manage- ment of the NSP would remain with the NSP/OC. Recommendation 12 This institutional design would provide the We recommend the creation of an architecture for a ‘whole government’ executive agency as a new institutional approach to the national coordination of venue for the delivery of the NSP; a model the NSP, foster greater inter-ministerial and of operational service delivery currently presidential collaboration, and provide for deployed in most OECD member states (see more proactive donor support. A ‘whole Section 7 for more detail). government’ approach should be integrated at all levels of programme delivery in appro- priate areas of programming.
Recommendation 9 We also recommend that the MRRD develops a strategic plan to integrate the NSP with other national programmes such as: the Water and Sanitation Programme (WATSAN); emergency employment (NEEPRA), mostly for labour-intensive road building; the Microfinance Programme (MISFA); the Emergency Response Programme (in Badghis, Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kundoz, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Paktika), and, in particular, NABDP. It is crucial ACKUto adopt a strategic approach to large-scale development programming to ensure that a joined-up approach is taken that avoids duplication and waste, and meets broader national development goals.
Recommendation 10 We recommend the establishment of: a rational NSP Phase 2 Operational Manual with a coherent set of programme objec- tives which can be measured over time, and a simple set of key performance indi- cators for monitoring progress in relation to the achievement of these objectives. SECTION 2: NATIONAL LEVEL
35 ACKU
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
36 Findings and Recommendations Sub-national Level Coordination 3 and Operational Delivery of the NSP
The MRRD at the provincial level section addresses the entry point for long- does not have the capacity to deliver the term institutional capacity development. NSP…so much work needs to be done This analysis concludes by identifying the to bring them up to speed…there is main achievements and strengths in enthusiasm but no hard skills. addition to deficiencies and threats to the (NSP FP Stakeholder) management of the NSP. The latter are matched by a set of specific recommenda- This section of the report focusses on the tions. role of 3 further groups of stakeholders in the coordination and operational delivery of It should be stated at the outset that this the NSP – sub-national governments (DRRD analysis is partly based on a self-evaluation provincial and district levels), provincial by provincial and district DRRD staff and is OCs and their teams, and FPs. therefore particularly relevant since it artic- ulates their views on potential areas of programme enhancement. Furthermore, it is proposed that these views are representa- 3.1 Sub-national level coordination tive of the wider national dimension and operational delivery of the NSP because all relevant levels of DRRD staff – the MRRD and provincial and (provincial, district, NSP Unit managers and district government field staff) were interviewed across 10 provinces. Some of the findings from the The main challenge for the MRRD in interviews with provincial governors and/or ensuring the sustainability of the NSP is to deputy governors are also included because maintain and improve its capacity to of their insight into the management of the manageACKU the delivery of the Programme’s NSP at the sub-national level. aims and objectives. This involves using its horizontal and vertical institutional linkages within the provincial and district levels of Sub-national bureaucratic elite government, and employing sufficiently perceptions of the impact of the qualified staff to tackle the technical aspects NSP on rural communities of community development. The aim of this Provincial and district level DRRD analysis is to separate some of the salient employees, and provincial governors aspects of this challenge. observed that the NSP was making a positive contribution to the development of This analysis of the provincial and district national solidarity. This is manifested in DRRD staff is divided into three main sub- three interrelated areas: an improved rela- sections. Firstly, it is important to review the tionship between the NSP communities and improved relationship between the NSP the Afghan government; stronger participating communities and the Afghan community relations; and evidence of the government. The second sub-section estab- limited empowerment of CDCs. lishes the entry point for further staff capacity development and the last sub-
37 The relationship between which is considered unprecedented in NSP communities and government Nangarhar. In other provinces, some All provincial and district level staff inter- respondents also point to knock-on viewed for this evaluation have perceived a linkages between the State and civil society significant improvement in the relationship in general. between the participating communities and government. There is general agreement Fourthly, it is argued that the establishment that this shift has been a direct result of the of a complaints procedure is a key element NSP and its activities. The improved rela- of this maturing relationship. Whether used tionship with the communities is connected or not, government respondents asserted to both levels of government: provincial and that the communities respected the district. The sources of this improved rela- provision for redress and found it effective tionship are considered to be four-fold. (Badhgis, Balkh, and Herat). In Balkh and Herat, complaints were divided into ‘direct Firstly, it is defined in terms of the quality of complaints from the CDC and the shura or the contact; i.e. DRRD staff have a clear via the FP’, by the FP, or from miscellaneous understanding of the nature and purpose of community actors. For each type, the initial the relationship and thus the rationale of approach was to hold a meeting with all the Programme. In Balkh, the DRRD officials those concerned (CDC, FP, DRRD and NSP described ‘visiting, advising and directing staff) and the provincial DRRD held a them [CDCs] though not interfering nor ‘weekly meeting every Tuesday for two controlling’. In Paktika, working relations hours’. If unsuccessful, then a case would be with the CDCs are described as ‘friendly and sent up the chain of authority within the cooperative’. In Herat, there is particular MRRD (district – provincial – national). importance attached to the presence of the Director or Deputy Director of the DRRD The provision for addressing complaints during the inauguration of projects. also acted as an important conflict preven- However, in Balkh it was noted that 10 per tion mechanism. For example, in Kabul, the cent of the people are not satisfied because DRRD staff recalled how they conducted the NSP is ‘a very new concept and transparent investigations into the imple- therefore difficult to implement com- mentation of a project’s budget, which suc- pletely’. This is compounded by the cessfully resolved the only two community people’s ‘very high’ expectations of large- registered complaints. The latter example scale development projects. reflected both the establishment of a process of growing trust in the DRRD as The second feature of the improved rela- impartial public servants, but also demon- tionship is the frequent interaction between stration of the barriers to establishing trans- government and communities. The DRRD parency and accountability for an unedu- representatives in Takhar describe how ‘NSP cated and often socially marginalized popu- staff together with the OC team regularly lation. Of course, a degree of suspicion visits the CDCs and discuss issues related to within a community is natural and can also [the] NSP projects’. form a last line of defence against corrup- tion and malpractice. Interestingly, in A third characteristic of this improved rela- ACKUPaktika, respondents believed that there tionship is the provision of incentives for was ‘no standard complaints procedure’ but the communities to participate in the NSP. emphasized that written complaints were Respondents believe that the fundamental received, which were either tackled imme- attraction for communities is the opportu- diately or sent to the MRRD if necessary. nity to play a major and direct role in the local decision-making process and their Inter- and intra-community relations acceptance of the ensuing responsibilities of The NSP is considered to have directly legitimate authority while building upon the strengthened inter and intra-community traditional shura system. At a more basic relations, and has thus furthered progress level, the Programme is considered to have towards greater national solidarity. In partic- enlightened those involved in Herat, ular, it is claimed that both types of thereby causing more activity within the community relations benefited from the communities. Similarly, in Kundoz, an binding nature of the CDCs and the increase in awareness and interaction was projects. noted. In sum, incentives stem from the widespread recognition that the govern- Intra-community relations have been FINDINGS AND ment is interested in the communities, augmented because the NSP encourages RECOMMENDATIONS
38 communities to unify through a democrati- in Takhar felt that the FP had prevented the cally elected and organized CDC, which CDCs from becoming a durable institution. enjoys constitutional status. Respondents in It was suggested that although some CDCs Paktia emphasized the significance of the had the ability to become independent and latter. Furthermore, group cohesion is self-sustaining, the majority still required fostered through the common goal of the funding and technical support and training project. Respondents in Kabul were not from the NSP (Badghis, Balkh, Bamyan, alone in recalling instances of CDCs Herat, Kundoz, and Paktia). Estimates resolving tribal, clan and familial tensions ranged from a further two to three years in even where higher authorities proved inef- Paktia, to 8 to 10 years in Balkh. In Herat, it fective. At the same time, the Nangarhar was felt that further credibility and sustain- case also reveals incidences of power ability was also dependent on the recogni- struggles between community elites, arising tion of CDCs as the key instrument of when community expectations are not met community development by all government (in time) and where a traditional shura feels departments. marginalized by changes in local gover- nance. Government respondents were par- In relation to the second component of ticularly impressed by examples of multieth- empowerment – the foundational values of nic CDCs, as exemplified in Kabul and self-determined community development: Kundoz. Conversely, ethnic tensions were community support (as demonstrated by not completely resolved in Balkh, where the the widespread use of the community Provincial Governor acknowledged, and of savings boxes) and legitimate authority and course rejected, the criticism from Hazaras responsibility (based on the principle of in the province that he had manipulated the equality and fair representation) were selection of NSP villages in response to observed by the vast majority of govern- ethno-political allegiances. ment representatives.
The survey also revealed several examples Thirdly, with regard to the long-term sus- of strengthened inter-community relations. tainability of CDCs, some of the provincial Three insightful cases in Balkh Province governors also stated their belief in the demonstrated the centripetal drive of the long-term prospects of the NSP. For NSP, which encouraged villages of different example, Governor Atta believed that the ethnic groups in Dawlatabad, Charbolak NSP would achieve long-term acceptance in and Kishendeh Districts to cooperate Balkh because of the nature of the projects through joint projects involving the building and the transference of responsibility to the of a school, a well and a road, respectively. communities. In particular, Governor Atta Similarly, in Herat, DRRD staff noted the and the Deputy Governor of Nangarhar greater interconnectedness between ‘sur- focussed on the communities’ involvement rounding villages’. However, there is also in the decision-making process, needs some evidence of smaller communities assessment, and the setting of priorities. being prevented from institution building because of their geographical isolation. Fourthly, in reference to issues of community mobilization, as Balkh and EvidenceACKU of Community Empowerment Kabul DRRD staff noted, unlike the previous The extent of the empowerment of CDCs is donor-driven approach, it was empowering perhaps the most crucial indicator of the that the NSP first surveyed needs, with NSP’s impact, as perceived by the DRRD. NGOs and donors acting as subcontractors This has five key components: the capacity and with the government required at all of CDCs to play the central role in stages in the process. It was felt that this community level governance; the legitimacy developed the capacity of the CDCs to of CDCs as institutions of community level approach other organizations and agencies governance; the longer-term prospects for for ‘top-up’ funding, and even for non-NSP the NSP; the process of community mobi- development projects. As stated in the Goal lization; and issues of gender mainstream- and Objectives of the NSP (I.B and I.B. (ii)), ing. it was designed to create an entry point or environment for poverty reduction through With regard to the first component, all community empowerment and by creating DRRD representatives (except in Takhar) projects to build infrastructure. It was considered the CDCs to be largely well agreed by all respondents in Kundoz and SECTION 3: managed and to possess the capacity to Paktia that the community projects are SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL become permanent institutions. The DRRD helpful in creating job opportunities. The
39 DRRD Director in Bamyan also thought that Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kundoz, Nangarhar, the NSP would enable poverty reduction Paktia, and Paktika. The DRRD in Herat and thus constituted a significant develop- provided examples of substantive overlaps ment programme. between the programmes. Furthermore, several senior management staff noted Finally, approximately half of the beneficiar- important relevant experience gained from ies, some DRRD staff and the Governor of outside the policy framework. For example, Balkh emphasized the need for improve- the DRRD Director in Paktia had worked for ments in the empowerment of women. It 15 years in community development during was proposed that this should occur by and after the war. women gaining a more equal role in the decision-making and implementation However, two caveats must also be noted. processes, in addition to ensuring that Firstly, the DRRD Director in Bamyan delivered projects were responsive to their acknowledged that the NSP complemented development needs. the other programmes, but emphasized that it was qualitatively different. Secondly, the This sub-section has provided a detailed DRRD Director in Kundoz added that most assessment of the scope and intensity of the of the other five programmes are imple- NSP’s impact, as perceived by DRRD repre- mented directly by NGOs and not by the sentatives. The direct emergence of micro- DRRD, whose role remained ‘minor and conflict resolution processes was a crucial mostly superficial’. cross-cutting theme (within the community and between the community and the state). NSP community development experience However, three main concerns were also As a significant institutional indicator, the articulated: the operation of an effective Community-led Development Departments though inconsistent complaints procedure; commenced their activities in 2002–3, with the emergence of intra-community power the latest starting in 2004. Staff could struggles; and gaps in the achievement of therefore rely to a certain degree on strong principles for sustainable development, in institutional expertise and awareness. This particular, the exclusion of women. was reflected by the number of projects and the coverage of the Programme. For example, 400 of the 611 projects were The potential sources for long-term completed in Bamyan, with 324 ongoing ‘staff’ capacity development projects in 7 districts in Kabul. Furthermore, This sub-section investigates the potential all MRRD staff had an extremely positive for long-term DRRD staff capacity develop- perspective on the management and per- ment with the goal of improving the man- formance of the NSP, and there was a agement of the NSP. Accordingly, it common drive to cover other communities compares DRRD staff assessment of: general and districts (for instance, in Bamyan and community development experience; NSP Balkh). This was an important indicator of community development experience; and confident management although it was cir- NSP training. It then highlights the potential cumscribed by resources. sources for improving capacity, which stem from the DRRD’s experience of managing ACKUIn addition to the general supervisory role development projects within the Afghan prescribed by the NSP, some provincial national policy framework and advance- DRRDs emphasized the need for a context- ments in training. tailored approach. For example, DRRD staff in Kabul believed their preparatory peace- General community building work was an important foundation development experience for the subsequent programme activities The DRRD’s community development expe- conducted by the FP. The NSP Manager and rience mainly stems from the concurrent staff in Badhgis claimed to have spent most implementation of five national community of their time in the field supervising the development programmes: the Water and projects. Nangarhar was an exception, Sanitation Programme (WATSAN); emer- where DRRD staff could only recall a more gency employment, mostly for labour- symbolic involvement in the Programme; intensive road building (NEEPRA); the for example, the inauguration of projects National Area-Based Development Pro- and the distribution of certificates. The gramme (NABDP); Microfinance Pro- Deputy Governor of the Province suggested gramme (MISFA); and the Emergency that this was simply a problem stemming FINDINGS AND Response Programme (ERP) in Badghis, from weak capacity. RECOMMENDATIONS
40 For the majority of the provinces (including quately qualified, which ‘limited the transfer each level of staff) interviewed, the quality of knowledge to the CDCs’. Naturally, the (effectiveness) of work was prioritized variation in training meant it was difficult to before the efficiency (number of projects). discern which one was most useful overall. This was best encapsulated by staff in Balkh Apart from the DRRD directors’ cascading when they stated that they ‘emphasize the technique, training was generally delivered capacity development of communities by the OCs and FPs (Balkh, Kabul, Kundoz, rather than spending money’. Other similar and Paktia). qualitative indicators included the benefit to the community (Paktia), the sustainability of the projects (Paktika) and the honesty and Box 2. dedication of the FP (Kabul). Staff in The training of DRRD staff Nangarhar also stated these factors while in Kundoz admitting the number and location of The only training the DRRD received from projects were equally important.11 the NSP was the sending of 3 employees to work with the FP to receive on-the-job NSP training training. This started 7 months prior to the All the members of the NSP teams within research and was expected to last for one the DRRD had received specific training on year. The respondent did not think that managing the Programme. However, the there had been any corresponding increase nature (scope, length, and style), and thus in the capacity of the individuals. standard, of the training varied considerably.
As a minimum, all respondents were trained in the use of the official Operational Finally, two other main weaknesses in Manual. Staff in Nangarhar claimed their training were noted. The Provincial training was restricted to the latter. Governor of Kabul (based on NSP experi- Alternatively, there was greater scope in ence in Nangarhar) concluded that the Badghis, with instruction on community management of the Programme was too mobilization, while the DRRD Director in expensive. While the Deputy Governor of Bamyan was trained in monitoring and Bamyan disagreed (compared to conven- community development. Those in Kabul tional reconstruction programmes by con- and Paktika received a more general NSP tractors and NGOs), both senior representa- orientation and training. The DRRD tives concurred that the best solution was Director and staff in Balkh and Paktia increased capacity development of seemed to receive more specific guidance Afghan/DRRD staff and institutions. on activity training for procurement, programme management, monitoring and Secondly, particular emphasis was placed on 11 In Herat, DRRD respondents evaluation and financial duties. improving technical (engineering and mon- were unable to answer this itoring and evaluation) and computer skills question. The length and style of training was also in addition to English language training, to uneven across the provinces visited. For allow for the provision of more sophisti- 12 As a possible explanation for instance, this ranged from three days to two cated management courses by international the variation, training might have monthsACKU for the DRRD directors in Paktika organizations and agencies. been tailored to the existing level and Balkh, respectively; and from three days of experience of each director to one year for provincial and district staff in In sum, the DRRD representatives relied on and staff, with the aim of Balkh and Kundoz, respectively.12 Paktika three types of relevant development experi- reaching a healthy balance in was in the middle, with two weeks of orien- ence. Overall, training was effective in each DRRD. For example, the tation. For provincial and district staff, in building capacities but it suffered from an Balkh DRRD Director received Badghis and Kundoz the training was on-site uneven application, with a resultant fluctua- two months of training whereas and informal (see Box 2 below), whereas tion in the experiences and training of staff. his provincial and district staff formal workshops and meetings in addition Therefore, long-term improvements in staff claimed three days, but also to the cascading technique from the DRDD capacity development ought to focus on acknowledged continuous director were observed in Balkh, Herat, greater consistency; that is, across the cascading training from the Kabul, Paktia, and Paktika. Balkh district provincial DRRDs and down to the district Director once he returned staff felt that the FPs’ experiences and level. Similar trends, in addition to separate from Kabul. resources provided the best opportunities strengths and weaknesses, are found in an for improvement and thus, ‘met with FPs analysis of the institutional capacity devel- regularly, sometimes daily or weekly, if not opment. SECTION 3: monthly’. However, they also felt that not all SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL the FP community mobilizers were ade-
41 The potential sources for long-term ‘institutional’ capacity development Box 3. An analysis of the key strengths and weak- Transportation stress in Bamyan nesses or strains in programme manage- DRRD officials in Bamyan noted that they ment, as perceived by the DRRD represen- had only two vehicles and a limited budget tatives, uncovers the potential sources for for running costs to cover 6 districts: one long-term institutional capacity develop- was allocated to the central office and one ment. While strengths or opportunities for was for monitoring all the ongoing national capacity development are noted, there were programmes. four main strains in programme manage- ment. The first strain observed arises from a significant shortfall in human and physical resources. Weaknesses in institutional struc- not having enough vehicles and mobile tures represent the second strain and the phones to visit and keep in contact with need to improve cooperation with other communities. For example, the DRRD ministries, and institutional learning is the Director in Kabul noted that his fuel third. The last strain encompasses five key allowance lasted only for half the month, programme design flaws. after which he relies on lifts to carry out supervision. Herat DRRD staff were unique Insufficient human in not having operational problems, for and operational resources example, transportation. However, it should In each province, the problem of insuffi- be noted that they received assistance from cient staff was a recurring complaint, both the FP and OC. in terms of number and relevant technical proficiency. Engineers were specifically and Tensions in the institutional structure repeatedly highlighted in this respect. Some tensions in the institutional structure Respondents believed that these quantita- of the NSP were raised by DRRD represen- tive and qualitative deficits in human tatives. The Provincial Governor in Kabul resources significantly reduced institutional (based on his experience in Nangarhar) rec- capacity, and these gaps were particularly ommended that the conflicting models for obvious when working alongside the MRRD, community and district governance (tradi- OC, FPs, and other international NGOs. For tional shuras of elders versus proposals for example, Balkh district staff stated that elected district councils) should be resolved there are ‘only four of us with the capacity by creating one inclusive structure. to carry out the NSP’ and that some districts did not have DRRD staff. The Director of the Secondly, the provincial DRRD Director in DRRD in Kabul stressed that the ‘MRRD has Balkh preferred that CDCs were not granted 13 The NSP Unit in each the leading role in implementing NSP – complete authority because they tended to province typically consisted of without it the OC and the FP could not lack adequate experience. He used the two staff in addition to DRRD implement the programme.’ Accordingly, he example of a CDC insisting on (and creating staff. For example, the DRRD highlighted the insufficient human the expectation for) an electricity project, in Bamyan had 40 staff of which resources of the indigenous institution but not appreciating that the government 28 were in permanent posts. compared to the supporting agencies. A key was unable to provide the service. They included: 5 engineers, source of this problem was the perception ACKU1 advisor, programme staff, of poor wage-levels in a competitive market, A third weakness, as raised in Balkh, computer operators, and which caused more qualified staff to move Badghis, Kundoz, and Takhar was institu- radio operator. In Badghis, the to international organizations. This was tional jealousy. For DRRD staff, this arose Department was supposed to exemplified by the DRRD Director in Paktia from the frustration of wanting, though have 40 staff but only had 31. who emphasized the difficulty in recruiting being unable, to manage the Programme Herat had 40 staff out of 41 qualified staff, while employees in Kabul alone. For example, DRRD staff praised the available full-time positions, with estimated that the OC does the same job FPs but often felt sidelined and unappreci- 20 others paid on a daily basis. but earns ‘five times their salary’.13 In ated by the communities. The latter was par- Kabul and Paktika both had 28 addition to these human resource ticularly acute in Kundoz, where the DRRD established staff each as well as problems, there was consensus that the department felt excluded by both the OC contracted staff. This included: high number of projects had reduced the and the FP. 1 construction engineer, quality of the work, as emphasized in 2 water supply engineers Paktika and Balkh. Cooperation with and 1 hygiene specialist. other government departments Inadequate operational resources were also Cooperation with other government a recurring complaint and considered a departments was consistently valued as an FINDINGS AND direct constraint on capacity. This included important strength. Hence building on RECOMMENDATIONS
42 existing horizontal and vertical institutional produce closer interaction and better linkages should be considered an opportu- understanding and working relations nity to further capacity and alleviate strains between communities and the different in the delivery system. In demonstrating the layers of the government. former, Badghis recalled attempts to cooperate with the departments of Nevertheless, DRRD respondents over- Agriculture and Health by conducting joint whelmingly stated that institutional learning site visits. Similar stories were told in Balkh was severely restricted. This deficiency and Herat (Education and Health for needs stemmed from the shortfalls in resources assessments; and Energy for project (number of staff and level of qualified approval, respectively). The sharing of training, in addition to physical resources), transport and sectoral coordination meet- as detailed above. While claiming to do their ings with the departments of Education and best, district DRRD staff in Balk noted that Agriculture were described in Kabul and ‘although the NSP projects involve con- Paktia. In Kundoz, respondents pointed to a struction we do not have full engineers, ‘joint commission for emergency response’, only an assistant engineer, an economist which was considered to have a positive and an agriculturalist’. NSP staff in Kabul impact on the NSP. In demonstrating the thought that even the combined DRRD/OC vertical element, the DRRD in Nangarhar team was not sufficient to monitor the was also keen to integrate programme ini- existing 324 projects, never mind the tiatives further, since it appreciated the further 608 just passed. Similarly, it was already improved contact between the claimed that only two out of the 41 DRRD provincial and district levels of government. staff assisted in monitoring the projects and checking the proposals. Similar difficulties However, inter-departmental coordination were relayed in Paktika. was clearly undeveloped, especially in terms of improving project implementation. Flaws in programme design Despite the optimism in Nangarhar, the FP, Firstly, (provincial and district) staff in Balkh OC and CDCs reported a pattern of DRRD and Kabul, in addition to the Provincial inertia. Some of the DRRDs’ perceived Governor of Balkh, emphasized the need to inaction of other government departments, review the restriction in the budget alloca- as voiced in Paktika, forms a second tion of US $60,000 for 300 families. This was obstacle to cooperation. Thirdly, it was because in practice projects with a budget claimed that delays and misunderstandings allocation for 300 families were being used emerged from clashes in departmental by more beneficiaries. This was deemed to bureaucracies and procedures, as exempli- occur for two reasons – large villages were fied by the failed attempts to work with the prevented from splitting into two or more Department of Energy in Balkh and Kabul. by the NSP, and villages where original estimates of population made by the NSP Institutional learning subsequently increased through the return Institutional learning and monitoring and of IDPs and refugees. In particular, some evaluation are essential to consolidating and feared that strains on projects would prove furthering the NSP’s progress, and together a catalyst to intra-community conflict. they formACKU an important provision within the Programme. For example, staff in Bamyan Secondly, DRRD representatives in Balkh, described how they and the FP undertook Kabul, Paktia and Paktika all raised the sig- the documentary process to select projects nificant operational problem of delays in the before being processed by the OC. NSP and transfer and release of NSP instalments. DRRD staff also referred to the use of joint Most seriously, the delays were blamed for monitoring programmes, quarterly reviews damage caused to the quality of projects; for and transparency checks on CDC financial example, where the building of infrastruc- management with the OC and FP. Bamyan ture could not be completed before winter. and Kabul staff listed election observation, and regular meetings and workshops to Thirdly, in Balkh and Nangarhar, there was promote community participation in main- strong support for an increase in the tenance. In Kundoz, it was asserted that coverage of the NSP in each province. issues and problems raised during the implementation of the projects were always Fourthly, as a weakness in the NSP’s aims referred to the district government and, if and objectives, the Provincial Governor in SECTION 3: not solved, to the provincial and central Kabul asserted that the sustainability of SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL governments. This process was claimed to projects was not given enough considera- tion.
43 Finally, the Provincial Director of the NSP While the official complaints advocated the urgency for the DRRD to procedure was used, the approach to explain more about the goals of the second its implementation varied considerably, phase of the Programme. to the extent that it risked disappearing in some provinces. This is especially This sub-section identified two main oppor- worrying considering the natural tunities for long-term capacity develop- barriers to establishing transparency ment: the practice of harnessing the and accountability in the context combined resources from horizontal and of a war-ravaged State. vertical institutional linkages; and the There is a need to reconcile conflicting inherent scope for institutional learning. models of governance, both at the However, long-term institutional capacity community and programme design development will also face several barriers, level. which are all characterized by two types of Similarly, the question of sustainability discord: between Programme expectations (CDCs and projects) should also be or institutional ambitions and actual addressed at both levels. Regardless of resources; and between government and previously stated aims and objectives community approaches to governance and and as a minimum, it is essential to development. recognize that the NSP (to its credit) is progressively creating an expectation for sustainable development in villages. Summary This expectation was voiced above by The fundamental strength of the above government representatives and is findings is that they provide a frank assess- echoed by other relevant actors down ment of progress in NSP management by to the communities. This expectation those responsible for delivering the needs to be addressed and tackled Programme. We must begin this summary either as a matter of defence but, by firstly recognizing the achievements of more preferably, as a pragmatic step the NSP. According to the DRRD respon- towards greater poverty reduction. dents and the provincial governors, the NSP In recognizing the values of fair has significantly improved the relationship representation, inclusion and legitimate between the participating communities and authority, the role of women in the the government, in addition to creating decision-making processes needs stronger intra and inter-community to be advanced to ensure that their relations to the extent that cases of conflict development needs are protected. management emerged. There was also Greater efficiency and effectiveness evidence of initial steps being taken towards would be gained by improving community empowerment. In explaining cooperation between government these developments, the government repre- departments with a focus on sentatives overall could rely on develop- coordination. This would create a ment experience from the NSP and within complementary dimension to the the wider national policy framework. NSP, consisting of a more strategic Furthermore, there were several instances set of interrelationships between of institutional cooperation and some ACKUthe programme and other national evidence of institutional learning in programmes, with the goal of practice. large-scale development programming. This dimension would need to avoid However, the following significant deficien- duplication and address the different cies and threats also emerged from the financing and implementation analysis, which in turn prompt some recom- modalities that might hamper close mendations at the end of Section 3: cooperation in order to meet broader development goals. As a minimum, it is The cap on the budget allocation important for government departments (‘regardless of the number of real to have accurate information concerning beneficiaries’) was causing significant the responsibilities and operational tasks distress within the Programme and of their counterparts to avoid confusion risks causing rivalry and grievance. or jealousy. There was considerable frustration with Operational and human resources delays in the transference of funds from proved weak and uneven. The the OC to the communities, which recommendations above would FINDINGS AND needs to be continuously reviewed. help to alleviate such strains. RECOMMENDATIONS
44 Institutional learning and monitoring of NSP management as the provincial and and evaluation also proved uneven. district DRRD staff. While this stemmed from weaknesses in resources and training (see below), there was also the need to instil Perceptions of the impact of the a standardized set of procedures NSP on rural communities and checks and to ensure these The nature of the NSP impact on rural com- are adhered to. munities was assessed to be generally NSP training was equally patchy in its positive and largely rests on the perception nature and style. Greater efforts should of an increase in national solidarity. An be made to ensure greater consistency improved relationship between the NSP and effectiveness, with particular communities and the Afghan government, emphasis on making technical skills arising from the attractive values ascribed to training more widely available. the NSP process, is observed although both organized and ad hoc opposition was also noted. Similarly, respondents identified a shift towards stronger community relations 3.2 Sub-national level coordination through the incentives provided by NSP and operational delivery of the NSP projects. Nevertheless, this positive impact – the provincial OCs and teams may prove ephemeral, depending on the NSP’s ability to meet the challenges to the The main challenge for the provincial OCs empowerment of CDCs in general, and the and teams, in protecting and strengthening particular problems experienced by the advancement of the NSP, is to supervise women’s CDCs. the management of the Programme while simultaneously developing the capacity of The relationship between NSP DRRD staff to assume operational delivery communities and government responsibilities. While these two tasks are The OCs and teams asserted that the NSP laudable and have achieved some progress, had improved the relationship between the there is an inherent tension between them. participating communities and the govern- That is, the first task concentrates on ment considerably. It was believed that this making sure that short-term targets are met effect stemmed from the opportunity for efficiently, while the latter involves longer- communities to assume local authority and term aspirations. The main aim of this responsibility. In particular, practical incen- analysis is to highlight some of the salient tives involved the participatory, bottom-up outcomes from this tension. and democratic process of defining needs and deciding priorities (Herat, Nangarhar, This analysis of the provincial OCs and and Paktika etc). For example, in Badghis teams first reviews the improved relation- and Kabul, the popular enthusiasm to ship between the NSP participating commu- implement projects was noted, and it was nities and the Afghan government. The asserted that people sometimes con- second sub-section establishes the potential tributed more than the basic 10 per cent. sources for long-term staff and institutional The OCs in Balkh and Kundoz concurred capacityACKU development. This analysis and further claimed an improvement in the concludes by identifying the main achieve- standard of living for some communities. ments and strengths, in addition to defi- ciencies and threats to the role of the OC. In addition, the common perception that The latter are matched by a set of specific the CDCs were democratic was held as the recommendations. key reason for their legitimacy. The OCs also found that the CDCs complemented the tra- In keeping with the previous section, this ditional shuras’ local governance in general, analysis is partly based on a self-evaluation while introducing welcomed values such as by provincial OCs and teams, and is transparency, accountability and representa- therefore particularly relevant since it artic- tive leadership. The CDC was similarly ulates their views on potential areas of welcomed in Bamyam, but because there programme enhancement. It is further was no traditional shura. argued that these views are representative of the wider national dimension because However, opposition to the NSP was noted OCs in nine provinces were interviewed. In and this can be understood in two ways. SECTION 3: general, the provincial OCs and teams Firstly, in Badghis there was deliberate or SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL shared the same concerns and assessments direct opposition from armed groups
45 because the NSP threatened vested Evidence of community empowerment interests. In another case, a mullah The NSP’s determined drive for capacity preached that the NSP was ‘unIslamic’. development was seen as the central oppor- Secondly, there was accidental or indirect tunity for the empowerment of communi- opposition stemming from weaknesses in ties. The OCs perceived this development security through the ongoing low-intensity and the Programme’s long-term potential to conflict and the sensitivity surrounding the be based on its new approach to funding, poppy industry. Nangarhar, especially its the people’s increase in knowledge and more mountainous areas, exemplified this skills through participation, and the official type of opposition. recognition of the CDCs (Balkh, Herat, Kabul, and Nangarhar). Nevertheless, the Inter- and intra-community relations inability to ameliorate weak capacities at the The provincial OCs and teams described community level created significant stronger community relations within partic- obstacles to empowerment (see Box 5). ipating communities, which was commonly characterized by the perception of greater unity. There were also some examples of Box 5. conflict resolution, from between families in Weak community capacities Herat to between armed groups in Kabul. in Nangarhar The OC in Nangarhar emphasized funda- In addition, the OCs found evidence of mental weaknesses in the capacities of the some solidarity between villages where joint CDC members and communities in general projects had pulled people together based as a crucial challenge to the process of on tangible incentives (Box 4 below illus- empowerment. Accordingly, and as echoed trates how and why this occurred). by the OC in Paktika, illiteracy, other short- falls in education and tight timeframes typically resulted in a weak grasp of the Box 4. Programme’s purpose and procedures, and Villages unified in Balkh cast doubt on the levels of substantive par- The Balkh OC and team referred to the ticipation in terms of identifying priorities example of the village(s) of ‘Kashanda and submitting a CDP. It was also attributed Chakinah, where 13 CDCs reconstructed a to the creation of confusion and false hope. 50 km road costing US $240,000’. There Moreover, it was felt that the insufficient were two significant impacts: the project capacities and their implications for was decided and implemented (‘in a proper empowerment were not addressed by the way’) by the community itself not an NGO. NSP. Consequently, the OC believed it was This was crucial as it meant, ‘the CDCs rep- common for the FP to shift from facilitating resented a break from the traditional shura to implementing. Specific recommenda- – a time when village elders and warlords tions included the need for more livelihood were all-powerful.’ Key to this development projects, payment for CDC members and was the ‘secret voting system, which lets improving the linkages between the actors people make their own choices’, thereby in the community empowerment process. granting ‘authority with responsibilities to ACKU the elected representatives’. For example, it was believed that ‘the CDC and its subcom- Building gender-equal capacities forms one mittees can now try to solve the problems of the most crucial elements of empower- of families’. Secondly, it meant the travelling ment. Progress was classified as slow overall time from Mazar was reduced from 21 to 7 based on the assessment of the provincial hours (OC and Team, 26 October 2005). OCs and teams (for example, see Badghis and Kabul provincial field reports). The two main areas of concern were insufficient par- Not all of the provincial OCs reported ticipation in the processes of community stronger intra and inter-community decision-making and project implementa- relations in their respective provinces. tion, and the limited allocation of project Furthermore, it was reported in Nangarhar funds for women. Despite the targets pre- that envy between non-participating and scribed by the Operational Manual, slow NSP villages had resulted in conflict in some progress was attributed either to cultural districts. opposition and suspicion from communi- ties (Nangarhar) and/or insufficient impetus FINDINGS AND from the NSP actors (Balkh). In the latter RECOMMENDATIONS
46 province, the OC estimated that only the The potential sources for small (under US $3000) and non-sustainable long-term DRRD staff and projects for women were accepted by the institutional capacity development communities. Based on these challenges, An analysis of the key strengths and weak- the OCs commonly referred to using a grad- nesses in programme management, as ualist approach towards greater inclusion. perceived by the OCs and teams, reveals the However, there was equal concern that this potential sources for long-term staff and approach was at odds with the time con- institutional capacity-development. In straints of the Programme. addition, the analysis presents the strengths and weaknesses of the OC’s supervisory Whether women and men’s CDCs ought to and capacity-development role. The weak- be mixed or remain separate was a recurring nesses included the tendency for some OCs dilemma for the OCs. Since the underlying to adopt a more managerial function: the theme of the NSP is cooperation, interac- lack of systematic capacity development; tion and the building of social capital, then the inadequate capacity of the DRRDs, espe- the integration of CDCs may be the ideal cially in terms of coordination; and the arrangement. Of course, the main conclu- unrealistic timeframe for the OCs’ exit sion is that approaches to integration and strategy. Despite the positive response to such targets must be tailored to the cultural the eligibility criteria, two key programme mores and capacity levels within each design flaws were noted. province, district and community. For example, the OC in Balkh was confident that Inconsistent perception of the integration of rural-based CDCs would the role of the provincial OC occur in 4–5 years, with evidence of some While the OCs and teams conveyed a already mixed.14 Conversely, the Nangarhar confident understanding of their role in the OC was less optimistic and deemed equal NSP, this role varied significantly between participation to be impossible in the eastern provinces in two main ways. Often the areas of the Province. Moreover, it can be division appeared blurred between super- argued that integration is important and vising the management of the Programme may be necessary, but this dilemma should and actual management. For example, the not mask the real need: building the actual Balkh OC and team defined their role as, capacities and skills of women in the com- ‘giving technical advice, transferring money munities to enable proper participation in to the CDC’, in addition to ‘controlling the decision-making and project implementa- management of the overall programme’ tion in addition to access to project funds. It (OC and Team, 26 October 2005). The OCs is prudent to consider that the latter in Bamyan and Kundoz also described a represent more reliable indicators for more involved role and, in Badghis, the OC empowerment rather than the integration and team presented their role in terms of of CDCs, which can be easily feigned for the direct implementation to the point of outsider. making themselves indispensable to the continuation of the NSP in the province. In sum, the OCs and teams attributed a positive impact on the communities partici- Conversely, in Herat, Nangarhar, Paktika, pating ACKUin the NSP. However, opposition to and Takhar, the OCs denied any involve- the NSP was also a cross-cutting concern. ment in the management of the Evidence for this already existed in deliber- Programme, and each described their role ate and accidental forms, including the as monitoring the projects, providing instances of conflict from envious non-par- technical advice, advising other stakehold- ticipating villages. Furthermore, the inability ers, and ensuring there is coordination and to respond to the low levels of skills and cooperation. Similarly, the Kabul OC capacities prevented empowerment, and believed the management of the NSP was risked creating confusion and false hope. In well coordinated between the three imple- compounding this, the failure to ensure the menting agencies (DRRD, FP and OC), 14 The respondent noted that satisfactory inclusion of women represented which worked as a team. Accordingly, the the villages close to Mazar had additional resistance, if not obstruction, of supervisory role consisted of regular field more mixed CDCs (OC and the Programme’s core aim and objectives. It visits involving scrutiny of the documenta- Te am, 9 November 2005). is now appropriate to establish the OC’s tion and project proposals before being assessment of the DRRD’s management forwarded to central office. However, it was capacity. thought that this level of supervision had SECTION 3: decreased as the number of projects and SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL proposals increased.
47 The second function of the OCs’ role was to develop the institutional and staff capacities Box 6. of the DRRDs. In Balkh, Herat, Kabul, An integrated approach to DRRD Kundoz, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Takhar capacity development in Kabul there was evidence of clear cooperation There was a conscious effort to build the between each OC and DRRD, with a delib- capacity of DRRD staff in Kabul by the OC erate effort to build capacities (see Box 6 through the joint supervision and monitor- below). For example, in Balkh, the respon- ing of the projects. The FP (SDF) also con- dents noted the principle of always having tributed crucial peacebuilding and problem ‘two-way communication during training’ analysis methodologies, as well as an and during the weekly meetings. Key understanding (as a national NGO) of the themes were finance, M&E and engineering. culture and moral beliefs of the communi- The Takhar OC had developed an evaluation ties. This enabled greater inclusion of form to assess the training needs of the staff interest groups, with the harnessing of pre- and followed this with workshops, but little existing leadership as an important feature. progress was noted. In Nangarhar, a long- These efforts were further complemented term training programme had been intro- by the provision of practical and political duced for the DRRD to focus on all aspects support by district governors. Overall, it of the NSP. However, it was felt that there was asserted that all parties shared a was too much emphasis on the technical common understanding and enthusiasm aspects and on rural infrastructure at the for the NSP aims and concept, which expense of community development, included the active involvement of the income generation, microfinance and liveli- DRRD Director. This unified approach was hood development. Despite claiming a credited with the creation of tangible close relationship, the Badghis OC did not results in terms of governance and mention any involvement in the capacity community development. For the latter, development of the DRRD. Therefore, the this consisted of the quality of the projects prospect of the DRRD assuming even an in terms of their design, relevance and con- equal role was remote. While the Bamyan struction, as well as their sustainability in OC worked closely with the DRRD there terms of maintenance. In sum, capacity- was no evidence that it had provided such building was described as central to the role training. of oversight consultant and as the core activity of the Programme as a whole. Limited capacity of DRRD The majority of the OCs and teams over- whelmingly asserted that the capacity of their respective DRRD was inadequate because of the number of staff and level of In Nangarhar, the OC noted that the staff expertise, especially in terms of technical management capacity varied, but overall staff to supervise projects in the field. This there was willingness at the provincial level assessment was relevant in provinces, but little capacity to manage the NSP, while whether the role of the OC was managerial the district level was nonexistent in this or supervisory, a builder of capacities or not. sense. The OC and team in Balkh and Herat For example, the Badghis OC emphasized ACKUwere satisfied with the management 15 Based on the data collected, the DRRD’s lack of professional, qualified capacity of the DRRD, and the former the OC teams in each province staff and the NSP Manager’s inadequate believed they were engaged in an active varied between 4–7 staff. For level of education. In completing the vicious learning process involving ‘engineers example, in Balkh, the team circle, this OC blamed the DRRD’s lack of gaining field practice in the NSP, especially consisted of an engineer, capacity as the reason for not being able to in terms of monitoring and evaluation’.15 NSP/OC clerk, a data handler develop capacity systematically. However, it was noted that the lack of (woman), a monitor (woman), technical staff was a crucial restriction. The an M&E specialist, an accountant In turn this was also the OC’s justification Bamyan and Takhar OCs pinpointed a and two other local staff. for assuming full operational control of the similar lack of resources in addition to inad- In Kabul, the operational Programme, although importance was given equate development expertise. The main team consisted of 1 engineer, to developing the capacity of the FP outcome of this weakness was poor coordi- 2 monitors, and 1 through training and direct supervision and nation of the provincial NSP actors (see documentation clerk. One to empowering and developing the capacity Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar, and Takhar provin- of these staff was a woman. of the CDC. While the DRRD was perhaps cial reports). However, it must be recog- informed, it was effectively marginalized nized that the pressure on the OC to meet because the arrangements failed to produce the Programme’s quantitative targets and FINDINGS AND a productive capacity-developing partner- deadlines was also a restricting factor. RECOMMENDATIONS ship.
48 All of the OCs (except Kabul) believed that Summary the proposed timeframe for the exit strategy The fundamental strength of these findings of the OC was unrealistic. However, alterna- is that they provide an honest and open tive timeframes varied from two years in assessment of progress in NSP management Paktika, to 8-10 years in Balkh. Kabul was by those responsible for delivering the the exception although the OC emphasized Programme. We must once again begin this the precondition of needing more staff in summary by firstly recognizing the achieve- order to match the expectation for ments of the NSP. According to the respon- expansion. Moreover, the OCs in Kabul and dents, the NSP has significantly improved Nangarhar asserted that this deadline the relationship between the participating reflected the lack of long-term planning and communities and the government, in direction within the Programme. Both addition to creating stronger intra- and perceived this to stunt performance, for inter-community relations. However, the example, towards the capacity development findings also identify some concerns: of communities and DRRDs. the skills and capacities of community Programme design members were lower than the level All the OCs and teams considered the appli- assumed by the Programme to reach cation of the eligibility criteria to be a its targets; positive feature of the Programme and progress was slow in gender-equal believed that most projects complied. participation and the debate concerning Nevertheless, the first flaw was the delays in CDC integration risked the masking the transfer and disbursement of funds, of real needs; which was experienced by all the OCs there was a risk of institutional except in Kundoz, and to a degree in dependency because the OCs struggled Paktika. Four weaknesses of varying impact both to develop the capacity of the were defined: the DAB for late disburse- DRRDs (which was particularly weak ment; the OC headquarters for their failure in terms of staff numbers and expertise) to renew proposals efficiently; the FP for while ensuring that the Programme sometimes sending late requests for second advanced. In sum, capacity development instalments; and miscellaneous bureau- needed to be made relevant to cratic errors. However, there was optimism the implementation environment that this set of flaws would be corrected by and the rationale of the NSP; and the new electronic tracking system. the budget cap remained a significant and unaddressed programme flaw. The second flaw was the project budget cap While this demanded specific attention of US $60,000/300 families, which meant from the NSP, budget shortfalls for that project budgets sometimes did not projects might be tackled by links to reflect the actual number of beneficiaries. other international donor programmes. Consequently, projects were susceptible to overuse and needs were not adequately met (see Balkh and Nangarhar provincial field reports). 3.3 The role of the Facilitating ACKUPartners in NSP coordination and In sum, further staff and institutional operational delivery capacity development centres on the practical limitations of the OCs’ role of FPs and NSP/OC lack qualified staff having to supervise NSP management and to support income generating activities. build the capacities of the managers. Both We believe that such activities should be roles could not be performed effectively. encouraged in Phase 2 and that suitably Moreover, the capacity of the DRRD (staff qualified staff should be appointed, and quality of staff) was clearly not benefit- i.e. this will need an HR strategy. ing from this level of capacity development. (FP Stakeholder) As a consequence, the timeframe for the exit strategy of the OC was judged unrealis- FPs were selected and in some cases tic. Last, there was a positive reaction to the operational before NSP/OC was eligibility criteria but the Programme was contracted by the government…this flawed in releasing the funds to the CDCs, has severely hampered NSP/OC’s ability and the budget restriction meant some to monitor the performance of FPs. SECTION 3: projects were disproportionate to needs. (OC Stakeholder) SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL
49 Table 1. The operations of NSP Facilitating Partners
FP Province Sub-Projects Block Grant Research Completed Disbursements for the (Afs) Evaluation
AKDN, ACTED, Afghan Aid Badakhshan 0 107,255,946 BRAC, DACAAR Badghis 20 132,139,511 X ACTED, AKDN Baghlan 33 114,826,805 CHA, UN-HABITAT Balkh 40 277,588,719 X AKDN, UN-HABITAT Bamyan 47 261,527,097 X Oxfam Day Kundi 23 101,752,908 UN-HABITAT Farah 193 287,673,313 ACTED Faryab 24 94,294,658 CARE, DACAAR Ghazni 119 241,782,469 Afghan Aid Ghor 40 118,775,568 BRAC Hilmand 170 228,368,554 UN-HABITAT, DACAAR Hirat 166 338,380,889 X ActionAid*, GAA Jawzjan 88 156,614,846 SDF Kabul 81 333,524,864 X UN-HABITAT Kandahar 179 283,918,559 UN-HABITAT Kapisa 66 276,484451 IRC Khost 89 188,129,127 Madera Kunar 0 168,147,988 ACTED, GRSP Kunduz 51 220,574,538 X Madera, DACAAR Laghman 66 150,631,502 X IRC Logar 70 221,848,526 BRAC Nangarhar 103 207,739,408 X Ockenden International Nimroz 148 66,081,563 Afghan Aid, Madera Nuristan 0 39,877,079 BRAC Paktika 326 258,658,970 X DACAAR, PIN, CARE* Pakyta 57 189,829,632 UN-HABITAT Panjsher 16 164,586,986 UN-HABITAT, AKDN Parwan ACKU107 226,442,956 Afghan Aid, BRAC Samangan 78 201,875,668 GAA, ACTED, CONCERN Sari Pul 6 192,901,367 ACTED, CONCERN Takhar 68 167,372,847 X ADA Uruzgan 0 0 SCA Wardak 52 259,861,025 ADA Zabul 69 34,439,190 Totals 2,617 6,314,007,527
Source: NSP Implementation Progress as of September 30, 2005, NSP Oversight Consultant. * Kabul level research only, with CARE and ActionAid.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
50 The Afghanistan Ministry of Rural figures do not provide a clear and fair appre- Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) ciation of the field work conducted by FPs has currently contracted 19 non-govern- as well as the sustainability of the CDC mental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate projects delivered. Nor do they inform our the delivery of the National Solidarity understanding of the strengths and weak- Programme in selected districts/provinces nesses, best practices, and issues to be of Afghanistan. The NGOs are the addressed. This qualitative information is Facilitating Partners (FPs) of the NSP. Table 1 also essential for the OC/MRRC when it shows the FPs, their provinces of operation, comes to preparing the next steps of the the number of sub-projects completed and Programme.17 the amount of Block Grant disbursements as of 30 September 2005. This evaluation provides further confirma- tion of a common observation throughout The research for the evaluation was under- our surveys that the absence of consistent taken with 11 FPs in 13 different areas across and coherent NSP methodology and docu- Afghanistan. Six teams, consisting of 4 mentation creates serious delays in the members each, carried out the research process of operational delivery.18 Many of amongst the FPs in the following locations: the FPs complain of the ever-changing Kabul (SDF), Bamyan (AKDN and UN- requirements and their difficulty in keeping HABITAT), Herat, (UN-HABITAT), Balkh up with the changes. Hence it is crucial that (CHA), Nangahar (BRAC), Badghis (BRAC), any changes to the NSP Operational Paktika (BRAC), Laghman (DACAAR and Manual factors in the costs of implementa- Maderia), Kundoz (GRSP) and Takhar tion. Indeed, a risk assessment should be (Concern). In addition Kabul level research concluded before deciding to introduce was undertaken for CARE and ActionAid. A changes. The eligibility criteria and flexibility list of the stakeholders interviewed can be of projects was not found to be as rigid as found in Annex C. reported in the Altai study. However, FPs still feel constrained by the amount of Following the agreed Terms of Reference, paperwork required for multi-CDC projects, this section sets out to evaluate: the role of and there is a general feeling that the OCs the FPs within the NSP; FP capacity and the do not appreciate the specific local NSP; community participation; and the dynamics of their operations. effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the 16 The final recommendations FPs’ work. The Altai Assessment of the FPs As identified in other sections of this report, identified by Altai 2004:8/10 (Common Final Report II, August 2004) will programme coordination with other gov- identified the need for: be used as a source of comparative evalua- ernmental bodies at the national, provincial subsequent assessment of the tion on the work of FPs.16 However, this is and local levels is essential to the long-term FPs to take into consideration not an evaluation of individual FPs; it would sustainability of the NSP. This would enable more qualitative aspects; be unrealistic to compare relative the FPs to operate with more confidence structural concerns commonly ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ across such a diverse and certainty and to integrate their work shared between FPs and villages and challenging setting as Afghanistan. with other initiatives being undertaken.19 to be taken into account by Hence Table 1 does not break down individ- Moreover, in keeping with the Altai findings the OC/MRRD; implementation ual targets attained by various FPs. This (2004, 10), there exists a strong view that planning to be reconsidered; sectionACKU on the role of FPs in NSP coordina- the long term strategy of NSP should be eligibility criteria and flexibility tion inevitably has many linkages with the shared with FPs. Indeed, there continues to of projects to be reconsidered; analysis of the MRRD/OC and the CDCs. be a high level of uncertainty regarding the improved coordination with Hence many of the implications of these direction of NSP. The above points are other governmental bodies; findings are discussed in greater detail in discussed in further detail in the ensuing sharing the long-term strategy other parts of the report. sub-sections of the report. with other FPs; and sharing experience with other FPs. This evaluation attempts to give more weight to the qualitative aspects of the FPs’ The role of the FPs within the NSP 17 See: Altai 2004, 8–10. work which helps to contextualize their – the ‘bridge’ between the operating environment and give indications government and the community 18 See Altai 2004, 9–10. as to the capacity and sustainability of CDCs. Research with the FPs and amongst the The findings presented here will go some CDCs highlights that the FPs understand 19 See Altai, 2004, p.10. way towards mitigating the fact that ‘many their role within the NSP as identified in the FPs currently fear that MRRD only check Manual. their data and thus does not sufficiently SECTION 3: consider the qualitative and long term All the FPs see their role as facilitating SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL aspects they try to implement’ (NSP FP different aspects of community develop- stakeholder). Furthermore, the quantitative ment, by enabling people to come together
51 to identify priorities, develop proposals and government programme. Feedback from then implement the projects. As the some FPs, notably BRAC in Nangarhar, and Director of BRAC states ‘[W]e help the Paktika and GRSP in Kundoz, highlighted people to develop capacity within their that at first people did not believe that the communities to help them get to a position government was working for them through where a project can be implemented and the NGOs because in the past any develop- sustained.’20 Whilst the Provincial Director mental work was implemented by NGOs of UN-HABITAT described their role ‘as a and did not involve the government. In bridge between the government and the some project sites visited there are signs people to explain the NSP system to the and NSP literature emphasizing and community, conduct training, bring the promoting the role of the government as hardware, guide the identification of needs distinct from that of the FP. and priorities and help the CDCs prepare their CDPs’.21 The Executive Director of The role of the FP as a facilitator of a gov- SDF referred to his role as, ‘the promotion ernment programme is also highlighted of advocacy from people to government and when government officials periodically visit from government to people and capacity the communities to reinforce the govern- development.’22 ment’s overall role within the Programme. In addition the projects are inaugurated and These perceptions of the NSP and the role training certificates are always distributed by of the FP within the Programme were not government officials and not the FPs. just held by those in the higher echelons of the FPs, but seemed to transcend to the The ‘NSP Awareness’ recommendations district level. For example, CHA Provincial from the Altai Assessment have a relevance staff in Balkh described the role of their for improving the role of the FPs. Altai NGO as a: (2004, 3–10) found that the FPs must be given clear objectives in terms of training …bridge for relations between the and communication to make sure that the shura and government, since through communities know about the role of the FP them the community can contact the within the NSP. All the research undertaken government and vice versa and that by the PRDU indicates that both the FPs and the [newly created] CDCs were very the communities were clear that the NSP happy the first time we came and was a government programme. In addition, they think of us as their advisor.23 the recommendation for a ‘simple and clear message emphasizing the government’s District managers of BRAC in Badghis24 role in NSP to be disseminated to all levels’ highlighted how they continually explained also appears to be working. The need for their role as facilitators of a government ‘basic communication tools (posters, infor- programme to the communities. However, mation boards) to better brand the NSP at all the FPs, without exception, confirmed the village level and thus present the FP that at first it was difficult to win the trust of accordingly, i.e. a partner helping the com- the communities until they began to see munities to access a governmental, national visible changes as a result of the projects. programme’, has certainly been imple- 20 Director, BRAC, Their experience therefore confirms the ACKUmented in the majority of the communities 22 October 2005, Kabul. observations of the OC that the social devel- visited. opments of the Programme are achieved 21 UN-HABITAT Provincial through participation in the projects. Some However, other Altai recommendations are Director, 1 November 2005, of the FPs (such as UN-HABITAT) saw their yet to be fully realized. For example, there MeS. role in a more transitional sense and was little evidence that, ‘CDCs were being directed towards a situation where facilita- encouraged to create linkages with other 22 Executive Director SDF, tion between the CDCs and the government programmes and/or local initiatives’. Mohammed Raz Dilili, Kabul. was no longer necessary. It is also worth Moreover, whilst the NSP/MRRD-inspired noting that some of the FPs also view the CDC Jirga in August 2005 was highly suc- 23 CHA District Staff, 27 NSP as an entry point and institutional cessful, there is still room for greater initia- October 2005, MeS. framework for expanding their own tive sharing amongst the CDCs as enabled community development work through the FPs. The MRRD and other gov- 24 District Managers BRAC, ernment departments also have a responsi- Baghis. All the research indicated that the commu- bility to ensure better linkages between the nities know that the FPs work on behalf of CDCs and other development initiatives, the government. The FPs use social mobiliz- and there is only limited evidence of ‘joint FINDINGS AND ers to explain the NSP and their role within field sessions amongst the FPs and the RECOMMENDATIONS it to ensure that people are clear that it is a MRRD teams to transfer know-how’.
52 Top: The end result is frequently that the FPs Promoting NSP actually have to ‘do too much on behalf of through signage the communities’ to be able to meet the in Nangarhar. project requirements. It is not so much a question of having the choice of playing the right role as to being forced into a wrong Bottom: role. The sign for the BRAC office in In some of the areas researched, such as Jalalabad has Nangarhar, Pakita and Laghman, the FPs are been removed working in extremely trying conditions and from outside the are acutely vulnerable to events beyond building, further their control.25 In Nangarhar, for example, demonstrating the communities in Chaparhar, Achin and difficult operating Badakot Districts have accused BRAC of environment that informing ISAF where poppies are grown, many of the FPs or spying on behalf of the CIA. BRAC also experience. have to deal with night letters in Sorkhrod district. In May 2005, the BRAC offices in Jalalabad were attacked following the US soldiers’ desecration of the Koran in Guantanamo Bay, and staff have come under attack in the districts from IEDs. Although relations with the majority of the communities are good BRAC, like other FPs, feel acutely vulnerable to any external occurrence involving ISAF, and especially America.26
FP relations with MRRD/OC The research highlighted an uneven pattern of relations with the MRRD/OC. Many of the FPs and also the MRRD emphasized the need to build up the MRRD presence at the district level, not least to be able to continue the capacity development of the CDCs and The FPs interviewed have played a major to undertake monitoring. However, this role in the CDC elections which appeared to should not mean that, a) another layer be an easier process than many had antici- should be added to the project approval pated. However, there is a major question and disbursement (and corruption) chain, mark as to what extent this has altered the and b) that capacity development should be power balance in the villages. A determining viewed from a political angle, especially factor forACKU the election, facilitation, training, from the other ministries who lack funding the need for technical assistance and ability for establishing ‘their’ district representa- to monitor is: a) the number of literate in tion. In addition, the local woluswals might 25 Another timely reminder of the village and their level of education, and see their power eroded, and thus care the difficult environment within b) facilitation and technical skills among FP should be taken when the system is estab- which the FPs operate is the staff. In both cases the challenge increases lished and presented to other parts of the current vulnerability of DACAAR with the remoteness of the NSP project government. As highlighted elsewhere, one in Laghman after the protests from major cities as literacy levels decrease, of the main concerns from this evaluation is in Mihtarlam (5th Feb 2006). and it is extremely difficult to recruit and that the provincial and district MRRD have keep staff in these locations. In addition, in little grasp of the practical aspects of the 26 The Nangarhar region, some areas the factual project period is only NSP and the problems and prescriptions and Jalalabad in particular, are the summer season as the areas are not required to ensure its effective day-to-day garrisoned by an American led accessible during the winter, increasing the running. ISAF force. challenge. FPs generally maintained that the NSP system is based on a rather inflexible At the Kabul level relations between the FP approach menu – written in English – where and the OC are good. The FP Windows Dept SECTION 3: possibly English skills become more oversees the contracting of the FPs and is SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL important to demonstrate towards the OC seen by many of the FPs as the initial depart- than the FPs’ technical skills. ment to which issues of concern are
53 brought. The OC in general is aware of all In general, relations between the regional the problems that the FPs have, and and provincial OCs and FPs were good, with acknowledge that many of the problems are the FPs seeing themselves as part of a coor- structural and due to the political nature of dinated team dedicated to delivering the the Programme, with its emphasis on Programme in often difficult circumstances. rollout. Most of the FPs appreciated the work of the OC and did not feel overly pressured by the At the provincial level, relations between OCs in terms of the actual day-to-day the FP and the DRRD are generally positive. decisions. However, some FPs are upset The DRRD/OC/FP usually meet on a weekly when comparisons are made between their basis to solve problems and make collective work and that of other FPs. BRAC for decisions. However the FPs, without example, concede that Nangarhar is not exception, consider the capacity of the comparing favourably to other provinces in provincial level MRRD to be weak. Although terms of the NSP; this they claim is because they have more resources than any other of poor security and the low receptive provincial ministry there remain significant capacity of the beneficiaries. In such cir- shortages of technical and physical cumstances some of the FPs feel that more resources. GRSP for example highlight that, practical support should be forthcoming in ‘If we talk about the OC as part of the MRRD terms of a more flexible timetable and extra in Kundoz then one can say that their allowances. capacity is good, but without the OC, MRRD capacity is like the other government The gap remains between the community departments – weak.’27 and local district government, but the contact between the community and At the district level, the FPs also consider provincial government has increased due to the MRRD to be weak. The MRRD often the NSP. Never before have the government does not have an office at the district level been so visible in communities, with and therefore contact between the physical reminders through projects, signs, community and local government is limited. workshops and meetings, etc that In some districts, the district personnel strengthen the link between communities have inadequate access to transport and a and provincial/national government. shortage of skilled staff. In Nangahar, for example, there are only two engineers to cover 5 districts. In addition, some FPs FP capacity to deliver the NSP complain that ‘new district governors Many of the FPs are international NGOs with require a great deal of time to be brought a proven track record of managing up to speed with the NSP.’28 This comment community development in different from GRSP in Takhar was typical: ‘the contexts, and many were already active in capacity of the MRRD at the district is weak, Afghanistan and implement other pro- there is just one vehicle and that is for the grammes as well as the NSP. BRAC for director. The rest of the staff are not allowed example manage a health care programme to use it to travel to project areas.’ In some across their areas of operation, AKDN provinces feedback from the FPs (which was manage rural development and education also confirmed by the CDCs), suggest that ACKUprogrammes, whilst Concern has an district administrators are more concerned extensive rural development programme, with security than development. Some of mainly in the north. The research amongst the FPs, notably BRAC and Maderia, cite this the national FPs such as GRSP, CHA and SDF as being a structural problem within all highlight how useful local knowledge was to Afghanistan, and as such supports the implement NSP based on their ongoing rationale for the newly created CDCs involvement with other programmes across 27 Director, GRSP, becoming the local government at the Afghanistan. November 2005, Kundoz. district level. Some of the FPs, such as BRAC in Nangahar and Maderia in Laghman, are The research found that to varying degrees 28 Regional Manager, BRAC, frustrated that when the district MRRD does the FPs possessed the capacity to manage October 28th, Nangarhar. deal with the CDC-elected representatives the NSP. Some FPs already possessed the within CDC communities, rather they only capacity to incorporate NSP into their 29 Team Leader, SDF, October consult the maliks and not CDC represen- portfolio of activities. BRAC, for example, 20th 2005, Kabul. tatives. The experience of SDF is slightly did not have to increase its capacity as such different as their proximity to the MRRD and to cope with the demands of the NSP, but the OC has meant that they ‘have not expe- had to tailor its resources from existing pro- FINDINGS AND rienced the problems we have heard about grammes. It did not have to recruit more RECOMMENDATIONS outside Kabul’.29
54 staff as they already had specific expertise in ‘to maintain efficiency when the number of relevant areas, e.g. engineering, livelihoods projects was high’. There was also a test for and project management.30 However, some all staff on applying the Operational of the FPs had to recruit additional staff. In Manual. order to take on the NSP in Bamyan, AKDN for example had to advertise and select SO UN-HABITAT’s history of developing the (Social Organizers) and CF (Community CFDO and in providing training material for Facilitators) in each district. AKDN is clearly the NSP meant that they started working on well resourced and pays a great deal of the NSP with extensive experience.33 CHA attention to staff recruitment and training, and UN-HABITAT district staff listed including a comparatively high number of training/workshops on the Operational women field staff. In the two AKDN districts Manual, proposal writing, monitoring, there are 9 women to 16 men. The 4 women book-keeping, finance, human rights, SOs working in Shibar were returned children’s rights, mine awareness, refugees from Iran, where they had some community development and the rule of experience of community work. If the law/constitution. The staff felt that the number of projects increases AKDN have training had been very useful.34 As an the capacity to expand and train the staff.31 example, a social mobilizer for UN-HABITAT AKDN’s field staff believe that their training explained how he was trained to gain and experience of completing one phase of proper access to a village for the first time: the Programme (in Surkpasa District) has equipped them with the skills they need to First, we contact the district head and tackle the second phase with confidence. ask them to invite the village leader to The key skills they cited were: establishing a meeting in the district office to explain relations with the community with cultural the NSP and our aims. If necessary, and social sensitivity, and knowledge of we will also move down the line of development. They had received training authority to find other key persons to on: NSP awareness, community mobiliza- secure permission. When we enter, we visit tion and clustering the communities. Other the elders at a small meeting and then we training related to identifying priorities for a have a community-wide gathering. development plan, and aspects of project (UN-HABITAT District Staff, 30 However, it is noted that the development, proposal implementation and 10 November 2005) OCs recommend that BRAC monitoring were also considered to be increase their staff capacity in useful. SDF has a Capacity-Building Department order to implement the NSP which designs and develops training and more efficiently; it is too soon to The consequences of local staff training can capacity-building for the communities. NSP say if this has been undertaken. be problematic for some of the FPs. As the staff are then trained in these methods BRAC NSP Manager states, ‘We have often before working with the communities. SDF 31 They are in fact waiting found that we spend a great deal of time acknowledge that they are fortunate, in for government approval to and money on training local staff who then Kabul, in being able to recruit staff with at establish 35 more shuras in promptly leave for better paid jobs within least secondary education and often Shibar, covering the most the NGO sector. We are philosophical about relevant experience. For many FPs, the remote communities, and this and acknowledge that at least our capacity development aspect of NSP is seen have started some surveys. trainingACKU is having a trickle-down effect so as the most important: ‘[W]e believe every- that in some way the country is benefiting’. thing we do with them (the CDCs) is a form 32 CHA Provincial Management Even though GRSP in Kunduz experience of capacity building’. It focusses on two Team, 26 October 2005, MeS. similar dilemmas they always try to ensure areas: participatory governance and being that there are experienced staff on the able to manage their projects. Implicit in 33 UN-HABITAT Provincial projects by ensuring teams are mixed with this belief is the need for trained and Director, 1 November 2005, newly trained personnel. capable staff to implement the Programme. Balkh. Other FPs, such as CHA, acknowledge that 34 CHA District Staff, they have had to develop their capacity, CDC training 27 October 2005; CHA District knowledge and skills through various The training of the CDCs is essential for the Staff, 8 November 2005; and training sessions and workshops conducted success of the NSP. There is a basic common UN-HABITAT District Staff, by themselves, OC and MRRD.32 District approach to training given by the FPs. The 10 November 2005. staff concur that they ‘had to learn more problems are first identified and different skills, use more social mobilizers and facili- training is then given to develop capacity as tators, and hire a technician to ensure we necessary for the election of the CDC, for- SECTION 3: kept to the regulations since it is a new mulation of the CDP and then the manage- SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL programme’. This was particularly crucial ment of the project. In the case of some
55 remote communities it has proved mine awareness and natural disaster man- necessary for FPs like AKDN and BRAC to agement. Training was also specific to suit organize and pay for exposure visits to take the particular functions of the CDC sub- the CDC members to neighbouring projects committees (for example, the role of (in one case to Kabul) to broaden their chairmen, secretary etc) and followed the 5 appreciation of NSP. NSP phases. Where possible, in Balkh, training was supplemented by the provision All the FPs echoed the belief of SDF that of satellite radios for the CDC to listen and ‘training and capacity-building are first of all learn from capacity development pro- essential to the process of establishing the grammes.35 CDC. Peacebuilding, based on Islamic prin- ciples, is key to opening the way for the The challenges for many FPs in training the Programme.’ This aspect of SDF’s and other CDCs vary between different places, hence FPs’ approach was referred to by all the it is unfair to compare FPs with SDF or UN- other stakeholders from MRRD to the CDC HABITAT. Many of the FPs complain that members and householders. It is clear that many of the CDC were unable to show a suf- this CDC training groundwork is an ficiently in-depth grasp of key aspects of the important factor in the success of the FPs NSP process such as purchasing, account- work. ing, completing forms and accounting without the help of the FP. This is not nec- SDF provides a good example of effective essarily due to poor training on the FP’s training for CDCs. SDF gives training in all behalf. Without exception these other FPs aspects of CDC functions, record keeping, cited that the main barriers to effective book-keeping and project management, as training are lack of time, especially when outlined in the Operational Manual. These introducing new ideas and skills to less functional aspects had clearly been thor- educated people.36 As established, the NSP oughly transferred to the CDC members in timeframe is very short for the FP to achieve the case of Kabul, where all the CDCs visited their objectives. The community members had a good understanding of the functions also have limited time as they have their of the CDC, the NSP Programme and the own business to attend to. So although FPs management of their projects. Documen- think, with justification, that their training tation of their activities and financial trans- programmes have been very successful, actions was also of a very high standard. The some have not been able to carry out the process was no doubt helped by the good whole of their training plan. This is to the standard of education of the CDC members detriment of the CDCs’ capacity to manage compared to other areas of the country. NSP and survive in the future without the FP. Altai (2004, 8/10) also recommend that SDF, like AKDN, have added other training proper training on accounting needs to be programmes to the basic NSP requirements, longer than previously forecast; several which they think are relevant and help the training sessions have to be considered with CDC to function effectively. These include: longer in-field mentorship. education, health, literacy, Islamic education and human rights awareness. The Altai Assessment (2004, 5/10) makes a Again it was clear from the respondents in ACKUnumber of training recommendations the communities that they had been which stipulate that the training should be exposed to these courses and found them completed in a timely manner and that FPs 35 CHA Provincial Management relevant. Problem analysis using a problem should provide CDCs with refresher training Team, 26 October 2005; CHA tree to discuss the communities’ needs and sessions at regular intervals. Although not District Staff, 27 October 2005; project options is another capacity develop- specifically referred to as ‘refresher’ and UN-HABITAT Provincial ment exercise that was seen to be effective courses, there was evidence from many FPs Director, 1 November 2005. in Godara and other CDCs. that retraining was conducted as the need dictated. However, this is done on an 36 The lack of time becomes Other FPs such as CHA and UN-HABITAT informal ad hoc basis and assumes that: a) even more critical when training emphasized their efforts to deliver adequate the CDCs have acknowledged that they is taking place towards the end training and believed that this proved need training, and b) the FP can give it. The of the allocated time FPs have effective for most CDC members. Such capacity of some FPs is so low that many been accorded to reach their capacity development initiatives ranged CDC members think they can process NSP, target numbers of CDCs. from teaching the general objectives of the but in reality they cannot. Programme to more specific instructions like budgeting, book-keeping and filing, Altai (2004, 5/10) recommends that the FINDINGS AND procurement, children’s rights awareness, most important training for CDC members RECOMMENDATIONS
56 Box 7. BRAC in Nangarhar The experience of BRAC bears testament to many of the issues identified. BRAC have organized training for NSP orientation (which clarifies the NSP, the role of the FPs, community representatives, etc), book-keeping, accountancy, procurement and project proposal writing. BRAC uses master trainers who receive their training from the resource centre in Kabul. The master trainers then train social organizers who in turn train the CDCs. This CDC training also includes operation and maintenance. Training on the whole is suc- cessful, but BRAC complain that often people ignore the training and do what they want. For example, BRAC will inform the people of the main characteristics that make a good CDC rep- resentative (honesty, functional literacy, etc) yet the community still ‘choose’ an illiterate warlord or former commander as CDC representative.
In terms of the skills required by BRAC employees working on the NSP, knowledge about NSP, communication skills, a positive attitude and a good technical grasp are all essential. Although BRAC acknowledge their weaknesses, especially the inadequate number of engineers, their difficulty understanding the Technical Manual and the confusing technical guidelines for engineers (form 7), they nonetheless feel they have the capacity to run the NSP, but would appreciate greater technical training input for specific NSP projects.
BRAC originally received NSP training from UN-HABITAT and the OC training department. The training mainly concerned the five steps to NSP, engineering and irrigation principles, interpretation of the Technical Manual and other NSP guidelines such as procurement and proposal writing. All this training has proved very useful for BRAC to facilitate the NSP. However, much of the training does not benefit all the people who require training. The OC only allow two people from the FP to be trained, yet BRAC is operating in 5 provinces across the country and does not have the time to train others whilst simultaneously rolling out projects. In addition a BRAC engineer stated: ‘[T]he main training problem for us is that the procurement policy is designed in Washington and bears no reality to conditions here in Nangarhar. Even BRAC with all our expertise and resources find it extremely difficult to get CDCs to understand the procurement policy and accounting guidelines!’ Regardless of where the procurement guidelines originate, it remains a complex procedure with which BRAC struggle. In addition, training the CDCs to complete sub-project proposal forms is also very difficult, as one member of BRAC stated: ‘the CDCs are constantly asking for our help with the sub-project completion form, we show them, yet still they ask because their capacity is so low, what will happen when we (BRAC) leave? They will not be able to cope.’
is on accounting and book-keeping. This Altai (2004, 7/10) also recommended that in should be completed before the disburse- order to solve the engineering shortage ment of Block Grants and refreshed at each various possibilities, including recruitment phase ofACKU the implementation. This evalua- from Tajikistan, the creation of an ‘NSP tion endorses Altai’s recommendation but University’ and a loyalty grant on top of the adds that whilst training for book-keeping engineers’ salary, should be pursued. This and accounting is conducted before the dis- research has not seen any evidence of these bursement of the Block Grant, it is not initiatives being undertaken. always refreshed at the other stages for the reasons highlighted above. This evaluation also agrees with Altais’ (2004, 5/10) recom- Community participation mendation that intensive CDC training Arguably the most essential role of the FPs is should start after project approval as this to generate a representative level of will ensure better assimilation considering community participation; this firstly the existence of direct practices of training includes community sensitization to the points. However, in some cases CDC NSP, and then mobilization to enable the training has begun, the projects approval community to vote for CDCs. The chal- has been delayed and there is no practical lenges inherent in this process are many – application for recently trained CDC high levels of illiteracy, cultural barriers, SECTION 3: members to apply themselves, and the geographical constraints etc. This sub- SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL training and momentum is lost. section will outline the role of FPs in
57 encouraging general participation, and the Many of the FPs used innovative salutations participation of women in particular. in ‘marketing’ the NSP to communities. SDF in Kabul set up peacebuilding workshops as In the majority of cases there was initial the first step in establishing the CDC to resistance to participation in the NSP; some ensure that all sections of the community FPs ascribed this to people’s ‘low level of participated from the start. The field staff education’ (awareness?). In some areas, and CDC members interviewed explained Badghis for example, different groups found that the former traditional council leaders it difficult to participate in the CDC because are generally included in the CDC in some of long-standing enmities and conflicts, way (on committees etc.), if not actually until proportional representation was nego- elected. Occasionally a CDC head proves tiated. Influential individuals whose power unacceptable to one part of the community was challenged by elected CDC also tried to and the conflict has to be resolved in ensure these divisions remained. In Jawand, another workshop. religious leaders also resisted the Programme as ‘infidel’ and ‘anti-Islam’. In The participation of vulnerable groups Paktika, there were participation problems (excluding women – see section below) is experienced at the beginning in 2003. mixed. In Nangarhar, for example, most of Community members thought that the NSP the projects have a component for a per- was ‘an American trick to trap them’. centage of vulnerable people who must benefit (whilst this was fixed in the past at The management at the CHA admitted 10 per cent, now it is left up to the there were three barriers to participation community to decide). There was evidence across Balkh Province, with the 12 per cent through the research to show how, for literacy rate in general representing the example, widows, orphans and the disabled most significant. District staff claimed that were specific beneficiaries of some initia- ‘80–85 per cent of members find it difficult tives – e.g. sheep rearing in Sholana. to understand completely all the forms and they should be in very simple/local language The recommendations from the Altai to be made accessible’. It was therefore rec- Assessment (2004, 4/10) cover various ommended that the skills of the CDC aspects of community participation. In the members needed to be improved and that first instance, Altai (2004, 4/10) recommend there needed to be an increase in the distri- using PRA tools in order to facilitate census. bution of ‘working’ satellite radios. There was evidence from this research to suggest that formal PRA methods were in Management staff hoped that this barrier use, with each FP facilitating consensus as was alleviated by their methodology and the situation dictated. Some FPs, such as approach to training; that is, by starting at SDF, used a ‘problem tree analysis’ but no the elite level within the CDC and then social mapping or resource mapping 37 CHA Provincial Management moving down gradually. Using the local exercises appeared to be employed. Altai Team, 26 October 2005; language also helped the people under- (2004, 4/10) also presented recommenda- and CHA District Team, stand.37 UN-HABITAT ‘anticipated that illit- tions for improving community mobiliza- 31 October 2005. eracy would be a barrier’ and joined the NSP tion: to prepare instructive pictures/cartoon ACKU38 The FP Director noted magazines. Accordingly, ‘each phase has a FPs should be selected on a basis of that in general the treasurer and cartoon handbook, in particular, for the an historical presence in the area or, the secretary have to be literate election of the CDCs, and this has proved as a minimum, on its experience in and educated and this is a useful for the educated and the unedu- rural development and community prerequisite for these posts in cated’.38 mobilization; the election. Alternatively, it was Local leaders should be used to asserted that “most chairmen The time of the year formed the second, champion the NSP; tend to be uneducated”. though variable, barrier. That is, people Close contact with the communities (UN-HABITAT Provincial were typically ‘too busy with farming during on the status of their project must Director, 1 November 2005). the spring and summer months to partici- be ensured; and pate in the NSP’. Implementation can thus The presence of other development 39 UN-HABITAT Provincial be limited when the men are unable to programmes and the involvement Director, 1 November 2005, conduct large meetings. Conversely, winter of CDCs in these programmes Balkh. is more conducive for such community par- (project identification and management) ticipation but access to communities more can be a real asset to strengthen difficult. The third barrier to participation the role of CDCs and keep the FINDINGS AND was that CDC positions were not salaried.39 level of motivation high. RECOMMENDATIONS
58 Although the NSP is more advanced than their behalf. This process is universally when Altai undertook the evaluation, some accepted by the women in the sites visited. of their recommendations have yet to be Women do not have a direct say in the fully integrated. All of the FPs we worked process of prioritization and project with had either an historical association selection. Feedback from the women with an area or a high level of expertise in suggests that their male relatives inform rural development and community mobi- them as the decision is being made. This lization. Even though, for example, GRSP was also universally accepted by the women had not worked in Kundoz before the NSP in the sites visited. However, women do they are highly experienced in rural devel- have their own sets of priorities for gender- opment. GRSP ran a number of training specific initiatives – health training, micro workshops in preparation for the rollout in enterprise and literacy, which remain largely Kundoz. However, this evaluation has high- unaddressed. lighted that ‘success’ is dependent upon many external factors beyond an FP’s own In Paktika, the FP encountered similar experience. DACAAR, for example, have problems; the men were not ready to relevant experience in Laghman and rural register the names of their women for the development but their work is nonetheless Programme. For instance, once the then- affected by external factors beyond their Deputy Governor of Paktika learned that control. Certainly the use of local leaders the names of some women were registered, can be positive from the FP’s viewpoint; he complained to the FP that ‘they would however, care should be taken over just report (the women) to Americans who will how much influence these local leaders make them come out of their houses and go have – do they rule by fear? The household to schools’. The situation is now different surveys showed that in some areas people and there is more willingness amongst the are still cowed by local warlords who are population to allow women to be registered now on the CDC. Again this research shows for the NSP that communities are reasonably content that communication between the FP and In Kabul, SDF confirmed that although the the CDC is adequate. However, feedback initial NSP concept was to have mixed from the FPs indicates that they often find CDCs, it didn’t work. SDF now have a themselves in a difficult position when women-only CDC with their own projects, delays occur because they are held person- but there is cooperation between the two. ally responsible for disbursement problems. The women are assisted by the men’s CDC In some areas CDCs are being used by other on the logistics, such as purchase of goods. programmes (e.g. USAID’s Alternative The women’s CDC for their part often con- Livelihoods Programme in Nangarhar), and tribute financially to the projects of general feedback suggests that as more develop- community benefit run by the men (see mental programmes evolve and the capacity again Godara women’s CDC). In Kabul, at of CDCs increase the linkages will become least, after initial scepticism the men have greater. accepted the concept, especially when they saw the money coming in and projects Women’s participation being implemented. This seems to be There remainACKU significant cultural barriers to further evidence of the importance of the women’s participation in many of the projects as vehicles for promoting social southern provinces of Afghanistan. change. However, gradual change is occurring. The experience of BRAC in the Achin District of Even in the more conservative areas in the Nangarhar was typical, where men were south where women are allowed to register refusing to let their wives/female relatives for the NSP, they experience one key even be considered on the survey sheet for benefit. Until the female-only CDCs were the NSP preparation, but this is slowly established, women were not allowed to changing, as the NSP gains acceptance. mix outside of their household. Now, However, there is no occurrence of men through the CDC, women can meet to and women sitting together to formulate discuss NSP matters. The female-only CDCs the CDP. Without exception, all members of have become a forum for discussion on the senior CDCs are male. Women have other relevant issues (health, domestic formed their own CDCs (as specified by the violence, literacy, etc) that women could not Manual). However, the women give their discuss before for want of a reason; this is a SECTION 3: votes to their male relatives, who vote for direct result of NSP. A common observation SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL the all-male members of the senior CDC on from many of the FPs and this research was
59 that the more people see the benefit of the Identifying projects as community priorities CDC and what it can bring, the more both The projects are identified through a PRA- men and women want to join. type process with focus groups identifying problems and ranking priorities for sub- The Altai (2004, 5/10) women’s participa- project proposal. As many of the FPs tion recommendations highlight several key acknowledge, and the household surveys areas that should be addressed to improve indicate, in some instances traditional elites women’s participation. Altai recognize that such as warlords still dominate proceedings. it is best if men and women meet separately In such cases some FPs get people to write before convening at a common consulta- or draw their priorities on paper so they will tion, as this is more respectful of the not be directly influenced by the elites. cultural separation between men and Often though, people are too cowed to women, and it allows women to raise a respond independently. Conflicts of interest louder voice and to express more freely can also occur when a decision on a than when mixed with men. community priority is evenly split, i.e. where there is a substantial minority who have not Women’s groups for selection of projects, got what they want. women’s committees with separate budget, and the increased use of women’s staff, are The project will only proceed if it is: a) tech- all concepts that appear to be accepted by nically acceptable; b) costed within the the FPs, and in broad terms it certainly defined budget; and c) if there is adequate seems that where possible the FPs are attention given to issues of future mainte- following this advice. The exceptions nance. It is often necessary for FPs and remain in the more conservative areas of sometimes the Provincial OCs to assess for the south. Here it is recommended that the mine risks, undue political pressure, and gradual approach to women’s participation environment factors other than the ones is maintained; clearly anything that is seen identified during the feasibility study. For to be ‘imposed’ will only be met with example, in 2005 a CDC in Nangahar wanted hostility. to initiate a project to generate income through the construction of kilns used for firing bricks. After an environmental assess- The efficiency, effectiveness and ment the project was turned down because relevance of the FPs work of the negative impact associated with The research findings observe that from the increased incidences of land slides, and the viewpoint of the FPs there are several key exacerbation of soil erosion due to the need factors which impact upon the efficiency, for wood to fire the kilns. In addition, rela- effectiveness and relevance of their work. tively intense fires in the arid conditions of The approach to identifying the projects as Nangarhar are not appropriate. community priorities, the eligibility criteria, delays, problems associated with the high Eligibility criteria number of projects, allocation of staff and FPs found that whilst it is easy to apply the skills shortfalls, appropriate design and con- eligibility criteria to the intrinsic project it is struction, the project relevance and mainte- not always easy to present this criteria to the nance and sustainability all have their ACKUcommunity. In Balkh, for example, the CHA strategic and operational basis in the management team and the UN-HABITAT MRRD/OC rubric, but nonetheless are Provincial Director felt there was no central to FP’s operations. problem in applying the criteria to the needs of the communities. CHA district staff Central to the role of the FPs is the agreed but admitted it was difficult at the Operational Manual. All the FPs believe start presenting it to the community. In that the Manual is a clear working Nangarhar, the first project people often document. However, the majority of FPs want is a mosque. As a BRAC community complained that the manual is changed too mobilizer related: ‘We tell the communities frequently, which in the past has meant that to work together and identify priorities, to work has been initiated on the basis of listen to each other and they tell us they guidelines that are then altered or want a mosque, even though we have said cancelled. For example, SDF undertook a from the start that we cannot give them a great deal of work preparing communities mosque, and they ask us where is the for income generation projects that were ‘democracy’ in our thinking, denying them then stopped. This created great disap- something they all agree upon to be a FINDINGS AND pointment. FPs felt that changes to the priority. We are then accused of trying to RECOMMENDATIONS Manual do not take place in a consultative impose Christianity!’ way. 60 Box 8. Identifying community priorities through project selection – examples from CHA and UN-HABITAT In Markaz-e-Dawlatabad, CHA recalled that the community originally wanted a generator for electricity but the people realized they could not raise the additional US $40,000 to meet the US $100,000 total costs (Dawlatabad is the size of a small town although is classified as a village). Although there was already a school in the community, the people opted for an addi- tional school as their second priority because there was need for more space. The present school had only 16 classrooms. Nevertheless, the new school would only have 8 classrooms, which meant “the number of rooms was still an issue” (CHA District Team, 31 October 2005).
In Choba Temorak Karni Khail, CHA noted that their first task was consulting the CDC and to encourage them to prioritize the needs of the community. The people then gave their input on the list and the CDC made the final decision: “[t]he people sat and thought, ‘we have a school and road but we need a community centre’. The technical engineer estimated the cost and detailed a budget.” (CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005). In Yakdan, similar processes of consultation were noted (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005).
For Aliseena, UN-HABITAT described the first phase as ‘identifying the priorities of the com- munities, categorizing the problems, and deciding which projects can be done’. Unlike Markaz-e-Dawlatabad, Aliseena were able to choose their first priority, followed by a school and then electricity. The district staff recalled that, ‘as soon as the community reached their conclusion, we had a large gathering and some problems were raised by CDC members con- cerning the identification of their priorities’. In Alichopan, the people rejected the CDC’s original proposal and asked for water supply instead (UN-HABITAT District Staff, 10 November 2005).
It was estimated that 16 villages would use the school in Markaz-e-Dawlatabad; 900 people to use the community centre in Choba Temorak Karni Khail; all 218 families benefited from the bridges and aqueducts and expected to receive electricity in Yakhdan; and it was hoped that all the residents in Alichopan (306 families) and Aliseena (426 families) would benefit from the water supply projects (CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005; CHA District Team, 31 October 2005; CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005; and UN-HABITAT District Staff, 10 November 2005).
All the district staff for both CHA and UN-HABITAT admitted it was likely that the projects would pull people in from outside the community – new residents and/or returnees (CHA District Team, 31 October 2005; and CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005). For Yakhdan, CHA acknowledged that the electricity ‘will have high impact, the people will be more civilized and since most left their houses originally because there was no electricity, they will come back’ (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005). UN-HABITAT developed this point further by raising ACKUtwo interlinked barriers: ‘no one can prevent people from coming in and we have received no guidance although we have already told the MRRD and the World Bank, and donors know about it’. Furthermore, strains could emerge since the project budget was based on the original community profile and there were no provisions for re-adjustment (UN-HABITAT District Staff, 10 November 2005). The respondents could not suggest possible solutions based on the strict guidelines of the NSP. For example, it may be possible to ensure that water supply is restricted to the original beneficiaries by piping the water into their homes. However, this option would be very expensive to construct and maintain (UN- HABITAT District Staff, 10 November 2005).
Attempts to be inclusive The school in Markaz-e-Dawlatabad could not be completely inclusive because there were only 8 classrooms to accommodate the children of more than 1000 families. Poor roads would also have hampered access for those on the outskirts (CHA District Team, 31 October 2005). Conversely, the community centre in Choba Temorak Karni Khail, the bridges and electricity project in Yakhdan and Aliseena’s and Alichopan’s water supply projects had the potential to be inclusive (CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005; and CHA District Staff, 8 SECTION 3: November 2005). SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL
61 In terms of gender equality, the NSP clearly promoted men’s and women’s CDCs and both FPs had encouraged women’s CDCs from the start. However, power and influence in the project process was typically limited to the men. There were two approaches to this imbalance – mixing or continuing the segregation of the CDCs. For the former, CHA was optimistic that CDCs would merge in the future but assured the researchers that this was completely impossible at the start of the NSP and for villages initially. Instead, the FP’s approach was to start small and encourage integration, and staff believed that there was the potential for this to increase (CHA Management Team, 8 November 2005).
Assessment of political, economic, sociological and technological factors The non-budgetary reason for choosing the school in Dawlatabad was the lack of access to proper schooling outside of the home and mosque (CHA District Team, 31 October 2005). Before proposing the centre in Choba Temorak Karni Khail, the community valued a tangible presence of the government (CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005). In Yakhdan, it was believed that the projects would increase people’s general awareness and improve basic access (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005).
The researchers were assured that the construction of the community centre in Choba Temorak Karni Khail would enjoy similar checks in addition to the support and interest of the people (CHA District Staff, 27 October 2005). Yakhdan also had two monitoring teams consisting of CHA staff (technician and evaluator) and the community (engineer and foreman) (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005). UN-HABITAT stated the projects in Aliseena and Alichopan would have “three sub-committees for procurement, finances and monitor- ing”. Monitoring would be supplemented by the OC, MRRD and UN-HABITAT, but the researchers raised the weakness in the M&E capacity of the MRRD. The respondents argued that capacity had improved but accepted the limitations overall and added that probably ‘the best way was for the people to monitor’ (UN-HABITAT District Staff, 10 November 2005).
FPs found the eligibility criteria to be most excessive length of time it takes for the useful in determining limits and clarifying Block Grant to be processed by the OCs, specifications of more technical projects. and the protracted process of dispersal of Some CDCs want large-scale infrastructure funds through the DAB. However, many FPs projects such as dams which, due to cost like CHA and UN-HABITAT in Balkh and scale, fall outside the remit of the NSP commented that the delays in disbursement (US $60,000). Many people ask for carpet- were becoming less; however, they recom- weaving projects but these have proved to mended that 100 per cent of the funds be very difficult to bring forth a positive should be transferred once the project is change because, whilst the intrinsic carpet- approved. Other FPs such as BRAC in weaving is straightforward, the marketing Nangahar maintain that over the last 6 and distribution of the carpets is far from months these delays have worsened, but easy. FPs clarified that the eligibility criteria ACKUthis is due to the worsening security sit- is most relevant to the micro hydro and uation in the Eastern region and the uncer- diesel generation projects, as are cross tainty that surrounded the election process. sectoral projects such as health initiatives On occasions BRAC has to wait up to 6 which need to be sanctioned by the Ministry months for the Block Grant to arrive; these of Health and not the NSP. delays cause tension between the CDC and BRAC. For example, the increment for the Delays intake project in Sholana was delayed by 6 There are many reasons for delays – delivery months, during which time the community of materials, security problems, weather, was again flooded because the protection geography, problems of disbursement and had only been partially constructed. poor CDC/FP management. The period of time between identification of The most common source of delays is the the project and project completion varies disbursement process. Once a sub-project considerably between FPs. For BRAC in proposal is submitted, the OC check the Nangarhar and GRSP in Kunduz the time proposal in order to make a decision on between project identification and imple- FINDINGS AND whether the project should be sanctioned. mentation is typically around 3 months, and RECOMMENDATIONS The prime reason for delay is due to the in Herat UN-HABITAT the period of time
62 between identification and implementation organizations feel they have the capacity to is 5 months. According to the NSP-OC, the administer and implement the intrinsic NSP, average time from implementation to com- they find it difficult to keep up with the pletion is meant to be 2–3 months, but the rollout pressure. This causes them to work process can take considerably longer. In the quickly with the CDCs to make sure the case of the school in Dawlatabad, 9 months proper OC procedures are followed; FPs lapsed between identification of the project acknowledge that this often means that in and the start of implementation. the long-term the CDCs will not have the Implementation started on 24 April 2005 capacity to cope in a future without the FP. and the first instalment was spent. Construction had stopped as the CDC had Allocation of staff and skill shortfalls been waiting 3 months (at the time of The FPs allocate their staff in the most research) for the second instalment. The efficient way possible; however, due to the MRRD in Kabul were initially blamed for this general shortage of engineers there are delay but it then transpired that CHA had inevitably increased pressures on some staff made an administrative error, which appar- members. Some of the FPs, especially at the ently had been recently corrected.40 SDF district level, felt that their ‘relevant skills maintain that the ‘centralization of decision- were weak at the start of the NSP’. While making on project proposals and the this gradually improved, they still desired dispersal of the second and third Block more skills training, ‘for example, in Grant instalments costs too much time and community development monitoring and effort. It would be more efficient to decen- methodology’. In particular, the staff tralize the decision-making authority. suggested that ‘social organizers need more training about women’s rights and mine Problems associated with clearance/awareness’ (CHA District Staff, 27 processing the high number of projects October 2005). Some of the FPs experienced problems in processing the high number of projects; CHA and UN-HABITAT provide a good these problems were not intrinsically linked example of staff allocation. For Charbolak to the number of projects but, rather, FPs District, CHA allocated 6 core staff for the felt that due to pressures to implement NSP consisting of finance, administration, projects it was difficult to ensure that the engineering (junior and senior) personnel CDCs had sufficient capacity to act without and a senior supervisor/manager. Only one the influence of the FP. For example, CHA of these core staff was female. In addition, district staff noted that there are many diffi- there were 16 social organizers. Each culties at the beginning of the implementa- project typically had 6 staff, 4 salaried tion, especially during the elections of the (engineer, storekeeper, finance and CDCs and the writing of the CDPs.41 UN- foreman) and 2 from the CDC with no HABITAT was reaching this busy stage and salary. Projects in Dawlatabad District had 1 was thus concerned about ‘the next three to senior and 1 junior engineer, 1 facilitator, four months’. The Director also noted and a district officer. UN-HABITAT claimed 40 CHA District Team, problems at the start when the communi- 18 staff were allocated to the NSP, including 31 October 2005, MeS. ties found it difficult to understand the pro- managers, engineers, social mobilizers, ceduresACKU of the NSP. He estimated that reporting officers, and administration and 41 CHA District Staff, ‘40–45 per cent of the 13,000 projects are of finance. Eight staff members were female.43 27 October 2005, MeS. good quality, but for the others there is The Director’s account conflicted with this concern that the quality will not be as good total, noting that, ‘for 18 CDCs, we have 1 42 UN-HABITAT Provincial because the CDCs have insufficient engineer in addition to 23 field and support Director, 1 November 2005, capacity’. He therefore recommended that staff. The Director estimated that they Balkh. ‘it is better to start with two to three assigned “1 social organizer to 12 CDCs, projects with the CDCs and with a small who would cover 2 CDCs each day and all 43 UN-HABITAT District Staff, grant of US $20,000 maximum so that they 12 CDCs each 6-day working week’. 10 November 2005, Balkh. can learn the necessary skills gradually’. Nevertheless, he admitted candidly that ‘we, Alternatively, he thought it was better for like all FPs, have problems’.44 44 UN-HABITAT Provincial the government and/or the UN agencies to Director, 1 November 2005, implement the US $60,000 projects. The CHA provided the following description of Balkh. two problems were the ‘delays in instal- the main project skills needed; these were ments and weak monitoring’.42 echoed by other FPs: Social Organizer – community develop- SECTION 3: Other FPs felt that there are significant ment, working with the community, SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL problems associated with processing the knowledge about the 5 phases of the high number of projects. Although both NSP and the culture of the community.
63 Senior Engineer – to check the proposal and the NSP Programme methods. Box 9. Engineer – to know about the NSP, Examples of the issue of appropriate design and construction engineering issues and construction. – CHA District Team in Balkh District Officer – to know all about First, the school in Dawlatabad was built strategically at the centre of the the NSP, management, finance, community. Second, technical engineers were hired to complete the administration, and methodology design. This was ‘approved by Kabul and is based on normal standards of establishing elections. although we also have a Safety Standards Theory’. The Department of Monitor – to be skilled in the approach Public Health also issued a code. Following this, the relevant CDC sub- to monitoring, proposal writing, committees discussed the need for skilled labour and then found skilled feedback, relations between the district labourers, foremen and extra monitors within the community. They had office and the district government. purchased the materials from the local market (CHA District Team, 31 Community Development Officer October 2005). Despite the efforts of the community and all the NSP – how to develop the community, actors, the construction of the school was flawed; in particular, there was get a full picture of the community insufficient mortar used between the bricks, nor were the structures of and check the community proposal. the three buildings strengthened. However, it was unclear if this was the NSP Manager – full responsibility, result of poor construction or the effect of the CDC trying to save money knows about all the programmes, the in anticipation of the delay. Regardless of blame and the delays (past and methodology of NSP, relations between future), it was certain that the construction would not be able to continue the OC and the office and how to until after winter (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005). resolve problems. Office Manager – to manage and assist The construction of the school in Markaz-e-Dawlatabad had reached a the NSP Manager.45 midway point. CHA noted that they had ‘technical monitors, engineers and a monitoring team (members of the CDC) to check the quality and UN-HABITAT provided a similar overview, management of the project during weekly visits’. (CHA District Team, 31 noting orientation training, how to mobilize October 2005). the community, how to select the CDCs and prepare the elections, CDP training, project Pre-construction, for the community centre in Choba Temorak Karni management, evaluation, implementation, Khail, the CHA district staff could only refer to ‘having our own engi- procurement and accounting.46 neering standards and public health norms and standards’. While CHA had already found skilled labour, they were trying to find more from the The SDF field staff thought that the main community and to give them cost-effective training. The community also requirements for the job were: that all planned to utilize the procurement subcommittee to purchase the except the drivers and guards should have a materials locally. The community and CHA believed it was unnecessary to secondary school certificate (baccalaure- consider mitigation/defensive measures against natural disasters as there ate); staff need a good understanding of the were no previous similar disasters in this area (CHA District Staff, 27 society and should know and respect the October 2005). culture and traditions of the communities; they should have good communication In Yakhdan, the community worked with the CHA and the Department of skills, including knowing the local dialect or Public Health to design the 13 bridges and aqueducts. The relevant gov- at least understanding it; conflict resolution ernment standard was used and technical experts from the OC and the skills are also necessary. MRRD also had input on site. In particular, the CHA designed the aqueducts and obviously assessed the natural supply of water. There was Before going to work in the field they ACKU a monitoring schedule (for quality and quantity) for both organized by received orientation on the NSP concept the OC and the NSP. The procurement committee within the CDC and training in community mobilization, purchased the material and hired the engineers. The community and communication, problem analysis, conflict CHA also believed mitigation/defensive measures against natural disasters resolution and peacebuilding. Of these, were relevant (CHA District Staff, 8 November 2005). community mobilization and conflict resolu- tion had proved most useful. For example, The extensive interviews with three levels of the FPs clearly uncovered a they have been called on by communities to range of salient design and operational issues. Several positive features resolve conflicts because their expertise is were noted, including a clear understanding of their role and function known. with the NSP, a resultant increase in capacity and instances of co- operation with the OC and RRD. However, the most fundamental weakness concerned the projects. This included widespread inefficient Appropriate design and construction implementation and instances of poor design. Moreover, it was The appropriateness of the design and concluded overwhelmingly that the sustainability of the projects was not method of construction are essential to the envisaged by the relevant actors. efficiency of the project. Examples are used from Balkh and Nangarhar to illustrate the experience of the FPs.
64 Altai (2004, 8-10) recommend that standard- ized designs should be created to avoid the Box 10. great loss of time, due to the fact that the Issues of appropriate design and construction engineers of each FP are making almost the – the BRAC Team in Nangarhar same technical design for a school, bridge To ensure efficiency within the actual design and construction of the or well. Providing simple engineering facility, BRAC always undertake a feasibility study to clarify if the proposed software, along with adequate training, project is appropriate and sound. A BRAC engineer, working on occasions would hasten dramatically the feasibility with OC/MRRD representatives, will carry out the feasibility study to studies. This research would certainly survey the design, implementation and maintenance of the project in endorse these recommendations; however, accordance with the Technical Manual. BRAC acknowledge that this whilst there is evidence of standardization process requires qualified engineers who are in short supply. Local capac- of design within the FP, it is too early to say ities are assessed, but due to the shortage of engineers not all people are whether these recommendations have been up to the task, hence the role of BRAC as the overseer working through fully implemented. a technical checklist takes on an increased importance. Once the project has received sanction, purchasing of materials takes place in three key Relevance ways: direct (>Afs 500), quotation (>Afs 5000-250,000) and bidding SDF staff thought that judging the FP per- (>Afs 250,000). formance (or efficiency) on the quantity of projects completed does not value their Mitigation measures for earthquakes and floods are incorporated in both quality. Rather, quality issues such as the architectural and engineering aspects of the design. For example on relevance/utility to the community, appro- a 300 m protective wall in Sholana expansion joints are placed every 15 m priate design and sustainability are more to allow for seismic movement, and buildings tend to be low and wide. important. To this extent the research Problems during construction include strict supervision for mixing/timing showed that all the FPs facilitate a range of of the cement, as one BRAC engineer complained, ‘Engineers in projects including irrigation, water intake, Afghanistan do not allow for curing because of the lack of water; this diesel generator, protective walls, roads, causes problems such as weak cement, flaking and cracking etc.’ boring wells, culverts, sheep rearing, school construction, community centre construc- BRAC feel that to increase the project efficiency the training needs to be tion and self-help. more comprehensive and include more NSP-specific projects. Currently there is flexibility for BRAC engineers with autocad experience to design The projects have a direct relevance to projects that are not covered in the Technical Manual but have nonethe- community needs although some FPs such less been chosen by communities and received sanction from the OC. as BRAC acknowledge that projects such as water intake are more universally beneficial The usual considerations of quality, costs and time are of course relevant than others. The most relevant projects to the efficiency of the project. The delays in disbursement causes costs demonstrate clear linkages between the to increase. For example in one site at Dago, Chaparhar, an original newly created CDC and its capacity for estimate for the price of a bag of cement doubled during the period of community development, and the intrinsic time from project submission to first disbursement. Fortunately there is project with other forms of community provision for such occurrences within the incremental process that development. enables increased amounts for the second and third instalments. However the Provincial NSP Manager of BRAC summed up, ‘The real There is a problem of understanding in problem is that the BRAC is involved with 348 projects and the OC/MRRD many of the communities. For example, at the Provincial level only have 2 engineers to visit all the projects and ACKUpeople want light but many have no appre- give feedback; the OC/MRRD at the provincial level simply do not have ciation of how the light appears, and how the capacity to check the number of projects.’ the generation of light needs to be main- tained/sustained, and for the poorest power On larger projects there is some effort made for safety of workers, but is not a priority. In the experience of some there are few concessions; no helmets, basic site safety etc. of the FPs the poorest communities are more likely to ask for an economic activity rather than an infrastructure facility, but the same communities often feel deluded when 45 CHA District Staff, tangible results do not happen overnight. 27 October 2005, MeS. Although as yet there is no country devel- 46 UN-HABITAT District Staff, opment document like a PRSP, the intrinsic 10 November 2005, Balkh. projects are broadly integrated and relevant to national development plans of reducing poverty and improving infrastructure. SECTION 3: SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL
65 Maintenance and sustainability 3.4 Recommendations for The research with the FPs highlighted the sub-national venues for importance of the initiation of several the coordination and the measures to ensure that NSP projects can be operational delivery of the NSP 47 maintained. The cost of the maintenance, as well as the depreciation of the asset, should be included within the project cost. The The role of the provincial MRRD community (per household that benefits) pay a fee either in cash or in kind once a month to enable appointed technicians to Recommendation 13 maintain the facility, provide for fuel for the A strategic plan needs to be devised by the project if necessary and to cover deprecia- MRRD in order for the provincial level tion costs. These costs typically account for administration to ultimately assume a long- 20 per cent of the overall investment. term NSP delivery role. This must involve a significant capacity development dimen- In theory, local technicians and not profes- sion. Provincial DRRD staff will need to play sional personnel maintain the facility, and a greater role in NSP quality control, the money saved up through the monthly enhancement and disbursement processes payments scheme ensures that when the by the end of the Programme. facility is beyond repair a new facility can be purchased. However, at this relatively early However, due to the absence of a culture of stage many FPs are not optimistic that this sub-national government in modern system will work, fearing that even if funds Afghanistan, it is crucial that the decentral- are collected, the cash will be spent ization of operational delivery functions to elsewhere and the facility will fall into DRRD provincial and district officers is disrepair. Unfortunately, this is also carefully phased in. Indeed, it should only testament to the limited capacity of certain occur when it is clearly demonstrable that CDCs. DRRD officers have the capacity to assume the role. In the meantime there is an urgent Sustainability is also an important factor in need to build DRRD management and oper- relation to economic activities, but much ational delivery capacity at the provincial more difficult to measure than infrastruc- level and to extend it down to the district tural projects. Even BRAC, with its tremen- level through a phasing strategy. Until then dous experiences of working in rural com- the continued presence of an OC-type munities, is unsure how microfinance initia- organization would be prudent to insulate tives implemented through the CDCs can the NSP against political pressure and cor- help to reduce poverty. ruption, and to ensure independent quality control and monitoring and reporting to donors. Summary All of the FPs have serious doubts whether the CDCs will be able to function without further capacity development and direct Recommendation 14 external support. The future role of the FPs ACKUThe cap on budget allocation (‘regardless of rests on whether the NSP remains purely a the number of real beneficiaries’) is causing development programme or whether the significant distress within the Programme governance component of the Programme and risks precipitating conflict. The assumes a greater role in NSP Phase 2. If the problem of budget caps based on poor pop- 47 Please note that the former applies then their engagement will ulation surveys needs to be looked at and consideration of these courses be concluded at the end of the project, but acted upon by central MRRD as a matter of of action should take into if the governance dimension is emphasized urgency. consideration the costs of they will a) need to undertake further change, which should be training to prepare the CDCs for taking on calculated on: a) their capacity such a governance role, and b) be funded to to improve qualitative rather maintain contact with the CDCs over a than quantitative output and period of time to organize re-elections and b) the likelihood that they will then undertake further training of the newly survive for a considerable time. elected members.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
66 Recommendation 15 The role of the While the official CDC complaints pro- provincial OCs and teams cedure is used, the approach to its imple- mentation varies considerably, to the extent that it risks disappearing in some provinces. Recommendation 21 This is especially worrying considering the The capacity development of the DRRDs by natural barriers to establishing transparency the OCs needs to be made relevant to the and accountability in the context of a war- implementation environment and the ravaged state. The complaints procedure rationale of the NSP in order to avoid insti- therefore needs to be standardized and tutional dependency while ensuring the entrenched. Programme advances.
Recommendation 16 Recommendation 22 There is a need to reconcile conflicting The level of skills and capacities of models of governance, both at the community members required by the community and programme design level. Programme to reach its targets needs to Similarly, the question of sustainability reflect the actual skills and capacities of the (CDCs and projects) should also be community members. The advancement of addressed at both levels. targets would demand training to address the gaps and weaknesses in these areas, as identified by the OC in consultation with each CDC, DRRD and FP. Recommendation 17 Greater efficiency and effectiveness would be gained by improving cooperation between government departments at the Recommendation 23 provincial and district levels, with a focus on As a particular concern within the recom- coordination. As a minimum requirement, it mendation above, the skills and capacities is important for government departments of women CDC members need to be to have accurate information concerning improved towards ensuring gender-equal the responsibilities and operational tasks of participation and decision-making at the their counterparts to avoid confusion or community level. jealousy.
Recommendation 24 Recommendation 18 The cap on budget allocation (‘regardless of Sufficient operational and human resources the number of real beneficiaries’) is causing need to be provided by the MRRD in the significant distress within the Programme field in order to maintain levels of and risks precipitating conflict. The community confidence in government. problem of budget caps based on poor pop- ACKUulation surveys needs to be looked at and acted upon by provincial OCs and teams as a matter of urgency. Connected to this, in Recommendation 19 overcoming project budget shortfalls, Processes of institutional learning need to further action is required to form links to be standardized and monitored. other international donor programmes.
Recommendation 20 The nature and style of training demands consistency and effectiveness, with special emphasis on improving the provision of technical skills training.
SECTION 3: SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL
67 The role of Facilitating Partners Recommendation 28 The definition of ‘project completion’ should be reviewed in consultation with Recommendation 25 FPs in order to incorporate an apprecia- Processes of lesson-learning across FPs tion of the intangible outcomes of the NSP should be improved, particularly in areas (e.g. community empowerment, ability to where certain FPs possess significant maintain facilities, etc). expertise e.g. UN-HABITAT and economic development activity or gender-oriented development programming or BRAC and working in areas with security problems. Recommendation 29 The Operational Manual should be changed as little as practicable; this would ease the pressure on the national OC and allow all Recommendation 26 other stakeholders time to consolidate A community-based programme requires a practice. 48 high degree of trust between the communi- ties, the FPs and the government – this is easier to achieve if the FPs have previous rural development experience in Recommendation 30 Afghanistan. FPs therefore need to be Some of the administrative forms that carefully selected; a criteria is suggested require completion by the CDC are too below. A national NGO with prior engage- complex for barely literate people to ment in rural development and a profes- complete. There needs to be a balance sional administration and monitoring between transparency and expediency, capacity is the ideal choice as they don’t particularly for the CDCs. This is especially carry overhead costs for expatriate staff, the case for accounting and procurement establishing new offices or costly lines of forms and the sub-project proposal comple- communication, and they do have a tested tion form. A failure to adopt a more system for community development that realistic approach to capacity develop- can be further improved. In second place ment and community empowerment will would be international FPs with consider- continue to ensure that FPs remain able experience working in Afghanistan, a ‘Implementing Partners’. majority of Afghan staff at all levels, offices and experience of working in different parts of the country with rural development projects. These two categories of FPs are Recommendation 31 also better prepared to handle and mitigate NABDP and NSP thinking needs to be har- security risks and have the necessary degree monized in order to join-up Provincial- of trust within the communities to evoke District-CDC coordination of development community protection. The least ‘cost programming to avoid waste and duplica- effective’ FPs would be those who are new tion. to Afghanistan, overly reliant on expatriate staff that has a tremendous challenge to ACKU gain the trust of communities and govern- ment.
Recommendation 27 For some FPs the constant comparison to others working in less difficult areas is dis- heartening, and in some circumstances has led to a feeling of a lack of apprecia- 48 This recommendation has tion. Extra support and allowances should been adopted post publication be given to FPs working in problematic of the PRDU’s Inception Report, areas, particularly in terms of a more November 2005. flexible timetable and a reaffirmation of the generally good work they are doing in such trying circumstances. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
68 Findings and Recommendations The Role of Community Development 4 Councils in Representative Governance and Community Development
CDCs are generally viewed as an 4.1 The strategy for evaluating effective mechanism for reaching the Community Development Councils people, targeting development and producing quick, tangible results. The following observations about the role of The coverage of the NSP is outstanding. CDCs in the NSP are drawn from two (NSP donor stakeholder) sources – a community power survey and a household survey. The community power We want to see NSP move mainly to the survey was conducted with the principal governance side…CDCs are a vehicle for aim of assessing the extent to which CDCs local governance…people have very high had been able to assume the two key roles expectations and we need to see the assigned to them by the Programme: repre- creation of sustainable structures. sentative governance and community devel- (NSP donor stakeholder) opment. In practical terms this involved assessing their capacity to function inde- The CDC is our representative. pendently as a democratic leadership of It is our government. their communities and their ability to select, (Male and female householders plan and manage development projects. in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) The household survey was designed both to assess the impact of the NSP in respect of its We have improved in terms of security, goal and objectives, and to provide but other improvements will take a long evidence of progress in developing inclusive time. In my opinion, reconstruction in community governance as a means of a 25-years war-ravaged country won’t be empowering communities to improve their a simple task. We have lost our national lives, as well as detecting changes in public constitution,ACKU our army, our police, our perceptions of government. education system and the most important, our national unity all over the country In the absence of baseline data, community and trust in each other; therefore I can’t leaders and householders in matched com- say that our lives have improved in a munities not participating in the NSP were short period of three years. interviewed, with a view to corroborating (Male householder, the retrospective accounts of the CDC of Bardowlet Khil CDC, Paktia) governance before the NSP, and in order to distinguish between general post-war trends and changes directly induced by the Programme. It is envisaged that this research strategy will continue to be useful for the NSP until adequate baseline data is generated by the Programme, through the compilation of enhanced community profiles and statistical records. A detailed presentation of the methodology employed can be found in Annex A.
69 4.2 The Community Development the capacity of CDCs to process NSP Council Community Power Survey documentation and maintain accounting and reporting systems; the ability of CDCs to forge effective Sample and key indicators relations with governmental for evaluation organizations; Comprehensive interviews with either the the ability of CDCs to forge effective principal office holders or, in some cases, all relations with Facilitating Partners; and the members of the CDC, were conducted the capacity of CDCs to be engaged in in 18 CDCs in 9 provinces. Of these 3 were gender mainstreaming. mixed shura in Bamyan, Balkh and Kundoz, while 4 were divided into separate men’s and women’s shura (3 CDCs in Balkh and 1 in Kabul). In 3 of these both men’s and Principal findings women’s shura were surveyed, and in one community in Balkh only the women’s shura. In 12 other communities in Badghis, On leadership of the community Balkh, Herat, Kundoz, Nangarhar, Paktika Eight of the 18 CDCs surveyed appeared to and Takhar men only CDCs were surveyed. be, as they said, the sole leadership of their communities. In the case of the 3 majority The majority ethnic groups in the CDC Hazara communities in Bamyan and Balkh, communities visited were Arab, Pashtun, the CDCs were not otherwise well estab- Tajik and Hazara. In Badghis, Balkh, Kundoz, lished, for example, in terms of project Nangarhar, Paktika and Takhar two CDCs in implementation, but there appeared to be the same area and working with the same no pre-existing formal institutions of gover- FP, but at different stages of development, nance. In Kundoz and Nangarhar, two estab- were surveyed for comparative purposes. In lished CDCs felt that they were fully in Bamyan, Herat and Kabul only one CDC was charge, but they had clearly had to surveyed in depth. negotiate with pre-existing authority figures. In the majority Arab community in A further 4 CDCs were visited and briefly Balkh, the traditional shura had disbanded interviewed in the course of the engineer- when the village joined the NSP, and this ing specialist’s fieldwork in Kabul. was also the pattern in Kabul where the Additional CDCs were also visited in peacebuilding exercises in preparation for Nangarhar (8) and Laghman (8). In addition, the elections to the CDC had involved nego- for comparative purposes, leaders of 6 com- tiating the inclusion of traditional leaders in munities not included in the NSP were inter- the CDC, which then became the sole insti- viewed, and household surveys were tution. conducted in the same communities. These were in the same geographical areas as Contested leadership – the role of women CDCs where interviews and household in Community Development Councils surveys were conducted, and matched as far In all of the communities with established as possible in relation to common indicators CDC leadership except in Nangarhar of socio-economic conditions and ethnic ACKU(discussed below), women CDC members composition. The communities were clearly had a leadership role for the women located in Badghis, Balkh, Herat, Kabul, in the community and were able to discuss Kundoz and Nangarhar, and had either Tajik and represent women’s interests. However, or Pashtun majority populations. they clearly did not have a role as leaders of the whole community, even when they sat The key indicators that were operational- in a mixed shura. Cultural limitations to the ized in order to provide an overall assess- acceptance of women in such a role were ment of CDC capacity were: evident in all communities (apart from factors such as relative lack of education and the capacity of CDCs to exercise knowledge, discussed below). For example community leadership; in Kundoz, the two women CDC members, the capacity of CDCs to represent for cultural reasons, could not participate in the community as a whole; CDC meetings but made representations on the commitment of CDCs to behalf of women individually to elders or the enhancement of democratic male relatives on the CDC. In Bamyan, governance; although formally the deputy leader of the FINDINGS AND the quality of the role of CDCs in project CDC is a woman who participates fully in RECOMMENDATIONS management;
70 the meetings, householders only referred to work for change. As they put it, ‘Some the male office holders as leaders. people try to exert their influence but we hope things will change gradually.’ In Nangarhar at the other extreme, no practical role was ceded to women. They In another CDC in Takhar, which claimed to were were kept informed of CDC business be the sole form of government in the but excluded from it, including even from village, the researchers nevertheless voting directly for its members, being observed that, ‘Despite the absence of any obliged to transfer their vote to a male other form of government in the village, the relative. CDC members are under the influence of other elders and the mullah of the mosque.’ Nevertheless, the NSP had created the The CDC members themselves said nothing opportunity for women (especially younger could be decided without consulting them. women) to meet and discuss their concerns. As the women in Kabul also The exclusion of women from leadership pointed out, previously women had no In these communities the leadership role of contacts outside their own homes. women had little or no recognition. In the Takhar community cited above, for example, These cultural realities were the reason there was little evidence of women’s partic- given by the rather capable women in a ipation and the separate women’s CDC women’s shura in Balkh for wishing to appeared not to have any influence in remain separate, ‘It would be very difficult decision making. In two CDC in Balkh the to sit with the men...then they are superior women’s CDC, though with clear ideas of and we would have no voice in decision their own on village issues, had clearly been making. For now it is better to work sepa- excluded from the decision-making process. rately.’ In one case they said they did not have access to the documentation of the CDC, Shared and contested which nevertheless was maintained to the community leadership required NSP standards by the men. In In a further 8 communities in Badghis, other communities where only men were Balkh, Nangarhar, Paktika and Takhar, a tran- interviewed it was difficult to detect any sitional phase of shared leadership with the activity by women’s leaders in the CDC. pre-existing traditional councils or leaders (arbabs/maliks and mullahs) was evident. In these villages there was clearly a process On representative governance of negotiation and cooperation, with some Setting aside the issue of the full represen- individuals belonging to both authorities. tation of women discussed above, in almost On the whole, the CDC authority was fully all cases (16 of the 18 interviewed as well as recognized in the area of democratic partic- the majority of those visited) the CDCs were ipation in community development, while found to be representative of their traditional figures retained the political lead- community, often bringing together ership (representation to government and different family and tribal groups that had arbitration of disputes). However, CDC previously been antagonistic, by means of membersACKU described how they were increas- the cluster of representatives and negoti- ingly called on to fulfil these roles because ated sharing of the leadership roles. they often enjoyed more trust from the villagers. Some of these CDC thought it was The evaluation team was doubtful in only simply a matter of time before the CDC two cases about the inclusiveness of the assumed a complete leadership role. Others CDCs. A community of 375 households in a thought the two authorities were comple- remote area of Badghis had apparently mentary. excluded 75 families from the CDC in order to comply with NSP guidelines. Although it In a recently formed CDC in Kundoz, the was otherwise representative of the 300 process was more conflictual. The CDC households included, it was not clear from clearly enjoyed a good deal of acceptance by the CDC or the FP how the 75 households the general population, but its authority to were selected for exclusion, or how the represent the community was contested by community had reacted. A CDC surveyed in some influential individuals with close (and Paktika failed to demonstrate exactly how it allegedly corrupt) links to the district had been constituted and since no SECTION 4: administration. However, the CDC household survey was conducted, there was THE ROLE OF CDCs members were prepared to be patient and no other means of verification.
71 Although the evaluation team was satisfied number (5 per cent) seemed to have little in the majority of cases, on the basis of understanding of the CDC concept, observation and testimony, that the CDC regarding themselves as more of a project was not only representative but perceived management committee. The women’s as such by the villagers, there were only 8 shuras that were surveyed had successfully cases where the election process had involved and communicated with other certainly met the criteria set out in the NSP women in their communities by creating guidelines; that is, by secret ballot forums for discussion of community issues, monitored by external scrutineers (FP, OC, but as discussed above were not fully DRRD). In at least 5 cases, due to the illiter- empowered. acy of the majority of voters, various strate- gies for assisting the voters had been Only one of the CDCs interviewed (in adopted, such as instructing another Paktika), adopted a traditional approach to member of the community, an FP staff decision-making by deciding the priorities member or some other person to vote for within the CDC without reference to the them. In Nangarhar, as already stated, general population, on the basis of their women were required to instruct a male ‘expertise in issues relating to the relative to vote for them. In Bamyan, community’. However, the vast majority of women (who were almost all illiterate) were CDCs showed, through their descriptions of given assistance in the electoral process by how they worked in the community, that their shura by assigning a separate ballot they thought that they should act with the box to each candidate, who identified it by consent of the whole community. However, standing beside it. In the remaining cases, for a minority of CDCs the process of the CDC itself or the householders if community involvement in setting priorities surveyed, gave only vague accounts of the was seen as a consultative rather than an election. actively participatory process. One CDC in Kabul consulted residents through their representatives about their problems, then On the commitment of Community established the priorities in a problem tree Development Councils to enhancing exercise in the CDC, and reported back to community ‘democratic’ governance the residents. One CDC in Badghis also The extent to which the CDC are develop- ‘consulted everyone’ and then set the prior- ing into truly democratic institutions of ities in the CDC. However, they recognized community governance has to be judged by that in the future decisions might be chal- their ability to communicate with, and lenged and they would have to decide in the promote participation by, the whole community on ‘a majority-minority basis’. As community, as well as the transparency of already noted, the participation of women their decision-making processes and trans- outside their own shura did not occur in actions on behalf of the community. The CDC in provinces such as Nangarhar, evidence from the household survey Kundoz and Takhar, but men in these com- outlined in Section 3.4 below shows that the munities were actively involved in the dis- NSP has had a significant impact in this cussion of priorities for projects and in regard, but that further consolidation is implementing the projects. In other com- needed. The Community Power survey ACKUmunities in Kabul, Bamyan, and Balkh, sought to establish to what extent council women had varying degrees of participation members see participatory governance as in setting community priorities, but not in an essential aspect of the CDC concept that the work of the projects. they will need to sustain after facilitation is withdrawn. CDCs in the early stages of development might still be fully conscious of the impor- Participation tance of promoting inclusion and participa- Fifty per cent of the CDCs surveyed demon- tion, but had not yet fully established strated an understanding of and a commit- regular meetings and other means of sus- ment to the democratic governance model taining participation (for example the involving participation and accountability to recently constituted CDC in Badghis). When the whole community, as introduced by the it came to participation in and benefit from NSP. Others appeared to be committed to the projects, most CDCs at this stage were serving their whole community honestly consciously trying to allocate paid labour on and accounting for their decisions as an equitable basis, and had complied with elected representatives, but did not see the the guidance to select projects that would need for general participation. A small benefit the whole community. There
72 appeared in most cases to be a genuine implementation were already competent. commitment to this aspect of the NSP The reasons for this go beyond the quality concept. of the facilitation, though this is clearly one factor. While project management capacity Communication and transparency is clearly developed as a result of the NSP The understanding of the need for trans- experience and CDC members frequently parency by keeping clear records of described this, the level of existing skills and meetings, decisions and financial transac- experience in the community (educational tions was clear in all but three of the CDCs, level, former work experience etc.), as well but (see below) not all were able to fulfil this as the level of economic development and task or if they were, the majority of their proximity or ease of access to urban constituents were unable to read or fully markets, were also seen to be significant understand the records. Often no conscious factors. effort was made to overcome this problem. For example, three of the CDCs with good However, in those CDCs fully committed to project management capabilities (in transparency, various oral methods of Badghis, Kabul and Kundoz) were able to accountability were also in practice. For draw on the skills and management experi- example, in the largely illiterate community ence of community members, as well as a visited in Bamyan, communication with the higher than average educational level villagers was both through their cluster rep- amongst CDC members. They were also in resentatives and by briefings at monthly reasonable proximity to their provincial meetings attended by most householders. capitals. In contrast, longer established CDC In other communities, CDC announce- in remote areas of Badghis and Bamyan had ments are made in the mosque, as well as much greater difficulties with project man- (in those communities with higher levels of agement, and were clearly going to find it literacy, such as Kabul and Nangarhar) by difficult to pursue further projects without using public notice boards. Nevertheless, as some assistance. the household survey also reveals, even with the best intentions it can prove difficult to communicate adequately with dispersed On processing NSP documentation and poorly educated villagers who are and maintaining accounting extremely busy getting on with their daily and reporting systems lives. One area of competence that is critical both for purposes of transparency within the community and in order to satisfy accounta- On the quality of bility requirements of any future govern- project management mental, donor or NGO partners, is that of Seven CDCs (in Badghis, Balkh, Herat, recording the decisions, agreements, and Kabul and Kundoz) were found to have resolutions of the CDC as well as financial developed the necessary competences to book-keeping to an acceptable standard. manage projects: planning relevant projects involving the whole community; organizing Nine CDCs maintain records to at least the and supervisingACKU the work of implementa- standards set by the NSP. In some cases tion; managing paid and voluntary labour (such as in Kabul) land deals negotiated for from the community; raising monetary con- the purposes of project implementation and tributions from the community; managing minutes of all meetings with outside bodies, and accounting for the project budget or in other cases (such as in Kundoz) agree- (negotiating and recording purchases etc.); ments reached in the arbitration of forward planning for maintenance and disputes, were also meticulously recorded. working towards future projects. Two In addition, two CDCs yet to implement recently established CDCs in Balkh and projects did not have a complete set of Kundoz, that had planned but not imple- records, but on the basis of the records kept mented a project, also seemed likely to to date and their educational level, were develop the necessary management skills likely to meet the required standard. within the project timeframe. However, in the other 7 CDCs and the As in the case of democratic governance, women’s shura either very little was not all CDCs nearing the completion of recorded or the records were clearly kept by SECTION 4: projects had achieved this level of compe- the FP staff. In most cases, this was directly THE ROLE OF CDCs tence, while others in the earlier stages of related to the level of education of CDC
73 members. In the CDC in Bamyan, for made a complaint to the Minister on his visit example, only 5 members (4 men and 1 to the Province. Similarly, one CDC in Herat woman) are literate, and have little further and one CDC in Balkh felt that relations, schooling. They acknowledged that they though good, could be improved by better needed help. The women’s shura in Kabul, coordination and more frequent contact as unlike their well-educated male counter- there was a lot that the communities were parts discussed above, have only two prepared to do to support the government. literate members. One of these, the treasurer, is receiving help from the men’s Relations between the CDC and district treasurer and the FP’s social organizer administrations in Kundoz, Nangarhar and keeps some brief notes on the meetings. In Takhar, were clearly poor and characterized a CDC in Takhar the evaluation team by lack of trust and accusations of lack of observed well kept records but realized that recognition, corruption and nepotism. In they were the work of the FP staff, because Kundoz, in particular, this was clearly the CDC members’ level of literacy was very creating difficulties for the development of low. the CDC. In Takhar, apart from lack of trust there appeared to be very little contact or In other cases the lack of records was due to knowledge even of the DRRD. issues of governance and negotiated leader- ship. In one CDC in Badghis, educated members of the council had accepted the On Community Development Council election of a poorly educated member as – Facilitating Partner relations secretary in the interests of unity and The relationship with the FP was considered respect for democracy. This meant from two perspectives by most of the CDCs: accepting for the time being less than the FPs commitment and ability to form adequate documentation. In Balkh, as good community relations, and their already discussed, women’s lack of empow- capacity to facilitate the Programme. In 9 erment was a factor. CDCs these criteria were deemed to have been met. All the CDCs visited in Kabul, for example, commented on the commitment On Community Development Council and competence of the FP. However, other – Government relations CDCs, often working with the same FPs that Improving relations between the communi- other CDCs viewed as highly effective, had ties and government is both an objective of some reservations. For example, in Badghis the Programme and a necessary condition both CDCs were satisfied with their for the successful functioning of the CDC. relations with the FP but one detected that The critical relationship as far as the CDCs their engineering capability was not are concerned is that with their nearest level adequate. In Balkh, the men’s CDCs were of government – district administration very satisfied, but the women thought that (where it functions) or the provincial gov- they could have done more for them. A ernment. In one CDC in Balkh and one in further 9 CDCs made this kind of assess- Kabul, both the men’s and women’s CDCs ment of their FP. In several of these cases, it felt that they had good relations with the seemed that this was as much an indication district administration. The Kabul women ACKUof the CDC’s growing knowledge and also described contacting the provincial capacity for management as of deficits in the health authority over staffing of a maternity performance of FPs. clinic. However, in two other CDCs in Balkh, though the men were satisfied with their In Takhar, however, in addition to the lack of relations with government, the women contact with the government, the two CDCs thought that they did not get enough surveyed did not seem to have adequate support, though one CDC said relations support from the FP. The relationship was were improved. Both CDCs in Paktika char- essentially mutually cooperative, but very acterized their relations with district admin- little time was being given to training and istration as good. capacity-building. Visits from FPs were brief and informal and directed at implementing Five CDCs in Badghis, Balkh, Bamyan and the projects. It is evident that the staff to Herat observed that their relations with gov- community ratio in these FPs are very low ernment had greatly improved as a result of compared to others. One CDC did not the NSP. However, in Badghis, they thought criticize this situation but the other was dis- the government should give community satisfied. It is noteworthy that the more FINDINGS AND relations more attention, and one CDC had aware CDC expressed criticism. RECOMMENDATIONS
74 On gender relations This community showed an unusual degree The evidence suggests that where the CDC of internal cohesion, forged by their shared has assumed a full leadership role in the life in exile and close kinship. community, women’s leadership of women is more commonly recognized, though they Mixed but majority Pashtun and Tajik com- still have a subordinate role in regard to munities in Balkh and Kabul had obviously general decision-making. Where leadership convened a number of traditional leader- is shared with traditional authority figures, ship figures and other influential figures and in spite of the existence of formal when re-establishing civil governance after arrangements for women’s representation, the war. In Balkh, they included ‘elders of they have little influence and may be specif- the camps, mullahs, respected persons’. In ically excluded from participation in Kabul the District Governor of Kalakan had community decision-making. Women’s convened a council made up of members of ability to overcome these cultural con- various district and local committees straints are further hampered by their (village committees, scholars’ council, relative lack of education and knowledge of health and education councils). They public affairs. included elders, teachers, a mullah and a former commander.
The findings of the survey of Development needs and assistance leaders of matched communities Since the communities were matched with in non-NSP communities neighbouring CDCs, they defined their These communities were found to share development needs in very similar terms. many post-war development needs with Most communities lacked basic amenities their CDC counterparts and to be seeking to such as clean drinking water and housing, meet them, through various forms of tradi- social infrastructure and viable livelihoods. tional and ad hoc governance. Their discus- The leaders had all made attempts to attract sions of governance were particularly useful assistance, but only the community in Herat in shedding light on attitudes and expecta- had obtained significant assistance from tions that were still evident, as their CDC DACAAR and USAID. Most described neighbours negotiated new forms of gover- receiving insignificant amounts of relief aid, nance while seeking to avoid a confronta- or said they had received no assistance since tion with traditional authority and powerful the end of the war. The community in individuals. Nangarhar attributed this to their location in the dangerous border area with Pakistan; Community governance others in Kabul and Kundoz felt discrimi- While governance in all the communities nated against by government. was strongly shaped by traditional concepts, it was clear that war experiences had also Relations with government and modified it in some cases. A Tajik perceptions of national solidarity community in Badghis had the most The leaders of most of these communities formally constituted and probably long- had come to expect little from government. standing form of governance: a council of In Nangarhar they said that they had arbabsACKUand elders meeting to deal with adequate relations in that the district gov- general issues affecting the community, and ernment informed them of important a council of clerics responsible for hearing policies, such as poppy eradication, and legal cases. In Herat, another Tajik they got a response if they contacted them, community also had a council of elders but but they knew government could not help it was led by the Qaria Dar (headman) who them in any other way as it was fully was their spokesperson to government. occupied with security. Other communities in Badghis and Balkh described relations as At the other extreme, a Pashtun community good, but governmental contact as insignifi- in Nangarhar had no regular council cant. In Kabul and Kundoz they felt they had meetings but the Imam and elders met been unfairly excluded from the NSP. Only when problems had to be dealt with. in Herat did they speak of a partnership Similarly a community of Pashtun-returned with government. refugees in Kundoz had no formal gover- nance but the elders of the extended In a similar vein to the CDCs, their percep- families who, as the household survey tion of government was naturally influenced SECTION 4: revealed, were highly respected, met to by their experience of local government. In THE ROLE OF CDCs discuss and resolve community problems. Kundoz, as with their CDC neighbours, this
75 had been negative: ‘...we do not expect arrangements for community governance, them to be supportive. There is no partner- not only out of self interest (many would be ship between government and the likely to be elected to a CDC) but also due community.’ In other communities such as to the strength of traditional custom which Balkh, Badghis and Nangarhar the govern- has held communities together in the ment was simply perceived as weak. The absence of any national cohesion. response seemed to be to expect more from NGOs than government and to try to resolve problems themselves within the In summary – community. On the general capacity of Community Development Councils Nevertheless, the majority clearly thought Capacity is a product of the interaction that a closer and more supportive relation- between the Programme and the objective ship with government should be the norm. circumstances of each community. Hence In Badghis they said ‘government and capacity in some aspects of CDC functions people should be constantly in may be successfully developed while others contact...government should know about continue to need support. As a result it is our needs.’ This translated in most cases not always the case that the longest estab- into a desire to be included in the NSP. lished CDCs are the most developed. The more disadvantaged or politically or socially Community perceptions of the National contested CDCs take longer to achieve full Solidarity Programme without Community capacity in every aspect of community Development Councils development and governance. Never- All the leaders except those in Nangarhar theless, there was clear evidence in every were aware of the NSP, and those in Kabul case of progress towards both representa- and Kundoz were actively seeking to be tive governance and community develop- included. The project funding aspect of the ment. NSP was clearly very attractive, given their failure to get other assistance. This was Five of the CDCs interviewed (in Badghis, probably uppermost in the minds of the Balkh, Herat, Kabul and Kundoz) were Kabul leaders, most of whom showed little assessed as able to function without facilita- interest in the changes in governance tion by the end of the project. Three of the involved. In Kundoz, community leaders 5 were established CDCs nearing comple- were also interested primarily in develop- tion of a project. These CDCs nevertheless ment assistance but recognized that by had outstanding issues to tackle on the channelling funding through a representa- inclusion of women, communication with tive council in the community itself, NSP the whole community, final transfer of full provided a means of implementing projects leadership and some minor administrative without corruption. In Badghis, the concept matters. They will also continue to need of a council was welcome but it was technical assistance for complex engineer- assumed it would complement, not replace, ing projects. Seventy-five per cent of the the existing councils. Similarly in Nangarhar, CDCs visited in the course of the engineer- when NSP was explained to them, the ing survey in Kabul were also judged to have leaders were attracted to it but also had ACKUachieved this level of capacity, as well as a doubts about it replacing their leadership. CDC visited in a rapid appraisal in Laghman. In Balkh on the other hand, the leaders expressed interest in NSP both for its devel- The majority of the CDCs interviewed (13 opment potential and the contribution to including one women’s shura in Balkh), national solidarity. They were also prepared were assessed as ‘able to function but with to consider new forms of governance, difficulty’ due to their own lack of manage- including participation by women. In Herat ment and leadership skills, lack of women’s they fully understood the NSP and were participation and/or external political and ready to sign up to it. economic constraints. They were therefore thought likely to require at least some Although this was a small and therefore further facilitation beyond the conclusion of unrepresentative sample, the responses the current project. The CDC visited in the indicate a broadly positive attitude to rapid appraisals in Nangarhar also fall into improving relations with government and to this category. the NSP (in part due to observing its progress in neighbouring communities), The four remaining women’s shura that it FINDINGS AND but a reluctance to see it replace current was possible to assess were deemed not RECOMMENDATIONS
76 able to function as envisaged in the Manual, how they had experienced the process due to lack of knowledge (as in Kabul) or of setting up the CDC and the choice exclusion (as in two CDCs in Balkh and one of projects; in Kundoz). Indications from the rapid the extent of their participation in appraisal in Laghman are that women’s governance and project implementation CDCs have a similar potential to those in today; Balkh. However, women’s shura in other their perceptions of the wider national locations, such as Nangarhar, were even less governance including recovery and empowered. This is in no way an indication development plans; and of lack of progress, rather an indication of their outlook on the future. the scale of the social impediments to their inclusion. As discussed below, continuing Since there is no comprehensive baseline facilitation in support of women’s role in data for the NSP, as well as the retrospective the CDC is necessary across the whole enquiry in the CDC communities and use of programme. information provided by the FP, a sample of householders in matched neighbouring These findings support the view that communities not participating in the NSP separate women’s groups with separate were interviewed to provide another means project budgets are necessary in the short- of distinguishing the impact of the NSP from term to develop women’s capacity. At the general trends towards recovery. same time this should not be used as a mechanism for institutionalizing their Random sampling was not feasible due to exclusion from decision-making in the the lack of accurate sampling frames for the general CDC. communities visited and the time con- straints of the evaluation. The strategy The findings from interviews with leaders of adopted was first of all to develop a matched communities with no CDCs community profile from the testimony of reinforce the evidence from the CDCs and the staff of the Facilitating Partner working householders that traditional forms of gov- with the community, and then refine it in ernance, though in some cases manipulated the light of the description given by the by self-interested individuals, also CDC (or community leaders in the case of a commonly embody important aspects of matched community without CDC). These community identity and traditional were then asked to arrange for contacts knowledge that need to be incorporated in with representatives of households to the new governance. For this reason the reflect the different economic, social and gradualist and negotiated approach to ethnic groups in the different clusters establishing the CDC, adopted in most cases making up the community. A comparison of by the FP, is most appropriate. the actual samples with the recorded profiles after the conclusion of the fieldwork showed this method to have been broadly successful. In all the samples the 4.3 The Household Survey ‘typical households’ made up the majority, ACKUbut minority groups were also represented. Sample and key indicators As regards representation of ethnic for evaluation diversity, respondents from the following The household survey was designed both to ethnic groups were interviewed: Pashtun, assess the impact of the NSP in respect of its Hazara and Tajik majorities in their commu- goal and objectives, and to provide nities; Pashtun, Arab, Tajik and Uzbek evidence of progress in developing inclusive minorities in their communities. However, community governance as a means of in one respect, the survey suffered an empowering communities to improve their unavoidable bias. It was not possible, due to lives. To this end the interview schedule local cultural factors, to interview men and sought responses from a sample of house- women householders in equal numbers. holders on a number of key issues: The first limitation was the number of women researchers it was possible to take their experiences in the war and the to the field, which was constrained by the immediate post-war period including limited locations where it would have been economic conditions and forms of possible for them to work at all, and the SECTION 4: governance (the baseline from which cultural constraints on them working in a THE ROLE OF CDCs the Programme had to work); mixed team without either an accompany-
77 ing escort or another female researcher. As Secondly, different ethnic groups, a result one team of two women and one depending on their location, suffered most man worked in Bamyan and Kabul and was in different phases of the war. Pashtun able to interview a sample of equal numbers residents in Nangarhar remember the of men and women representing different attacks by Soviet forces as the time when households, and a second team of two they were under most threat, while the women and one man in Balkh interviewed period of Taliban rule, though harsh socially men and women from the same house- and economically, was relatively stable. holds. All-male teams in Badghis and Other ethnic groups, such as Tajiks in Kabul Kundoz found that they were able to and Hazara in Bamyan, experienced ethnic interview widows if they were heads of cleansing at the hands of the Taliban during household, but in Herat, Nangarhar and the war with the Northern Alliance. Paktia only men were interviewed. I have heard with my own ears from The resulting sample was as follows: 73 men Taliban that we should go to Tajikistan. and 13 women representing households in (Householder, Godara CDC, Kabul) communities with a CDC were interviewed individually in 7 of the provinces and in the Most communities were sporadically eighth province (Balkh) men and women in affected throughout the war by direct 30 households were interviewed. In violence, looting and destruction of addition, 33 men and 7 women represent- property, as well as intimidation or forced ing households in matched communities recruitment to local militias. However, some without CDCs were interviewed in the 7 stated that they were only indirectly affected provinces and 6 households in a matched on the grounds that no one in their family community in Balkh. In all, the sample rep- had been killed. The indirect effects can be resents 162 households. summarized as chronic insecurity and impoverishment. Many responded to the The principal findings of the household violence and/or economic hardship by survey are presented below in accordance migrating but these experiences also varied: with the key indicators of evaluation from hiding in the mountains for short or outlined above: the communities’ experi- prolonged periods, migrating to other safer ence of the war and immediate post-war villages and the urban areas, to emigrating period, including economic conditions and for all or most of the war to Iran or Pakistan. forms of governance; how the communities experienced the process of setting up a During the war against the Soviet invasion, CDC and the process of community devel- one Pashtun community in Kundoz was opment planning; the extent of community ‘oppressed by the Soviets and the participation in governance and project Mujahideen’ and abandoned their homes; implementation; community perceptions of and bombing, violence and looting affected wider national governance, including two Pashtun communities in Nangarhar, so recovery and development plans; and that some were driven to migrate. In the community outlooks on the future. war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, two Tajik communities in Kabul, a ACKUHazara community in Bamyan and a mixed The communities’ Pashtun, Usbeck and Tajik community in experience of the war Kundoz were violently driven from their Communities in different areas of the homes, which were destroyed. Six Pashtun country and in different locations in the communities in Balkh, Kundoz, Nangarhar same province experienced the war differ- and Paktia, and 4 mixed communities in ently. Two main observations can be drawn Balkh said they were affected throughout here. In the first place, their pre-war condi- the war by sporadic violence, looting and tions were also different. Remote rural areas intimidation. Three Tajik communities in in Badghis or Bamyan, for example, had Badghis, and 1 Pashtun community in experienced little development before the Nangarhar described being affected indi- war and are still poor and under-developed rectly throughout the war. today. Householders in rural Kabul, however, remember being prosperous and These different experiences have clearly having access to education and urban resulted in wide variations in the capacity of markets before they were affected by war, both individuals and communities to and are striving to recover the lives they recover from the war, and consequently the FINDINGS AND once had. extent to which they have been able to par- RECOMMENDATIONS
78 ticipate in and benefit from the NSP. One of only 4 householders, all in a community the strengths of NSP has been the ability of without a CDC, thought security had the local management teams (DRRD, FP and improved. Others in that community and OC) to adapt the NSP concept to these the CDC communities argued that security different levels of capacity. was worse. However, in the three communi- ties in Nangarhar and two in Kundoz, a total of 11 householders said that they were now The communities’ free to lead their lives without interference post-war experience or bullying by warlords, or in other cases the The communities’ post-war experience has Taliban. been conditioned by how the war affected them as well as the present conditions in Economic opportunity their area. For example, communities in The next most commonly cited improve- Kabul and a community of returned ment (though the majority stressed that refugees in Kundoz had returned so conditions are still poor) was the increase in recently that they were still experiencing opportunities for work and economic problems of shelter. Communities in activity, largely due to freedom to circulate Nangarhar whose homes were destroyed in or work free from threat. Thirty-five per the earlier phase of the war had been able to cent of the CDC householders made this rebuild their homes, though not recover point but only two householders in a non- livelihoods, during the Taliban rule. Others CDC community (4 per cent). In the CDC in Badghis who had not migrated had expe- communities, 8 householders specifically rienced little change other than improved mentioned the NSP as having materially security. However, the overwhelming improved their lives. Seven referred to the majority (88 per cent) of householders did NSP projects in their village and two to think that their lives had improved since the infrastructure projects elsewhere as end of the war. The remaining household- evidence of economic improvement. Eight ers said that their personal (usually householders in both CDC and non-CDC economic) circumstances were unchanged communities noted increased international and only a few said things were worse. assistance to the country as a whole or in Those in communities without CDCs were their personal experience. as likely as those with CDCs to say that their lives had improved. Changes in governance In the CDC communities, 2 men (in Badghis Security and Nangarhar) and 4 women (all in Bamyan) cited the creation of a democratic We have improved in terms of security, shura as leading to an improvement in their but other improvements will take a long lives. Three householders in non-CDC com- time. In my opinion, reconstruction in munities in Kabul and Nangarhar, and 1 in a a 25-years war-ravaged country won’t CDC in Badghis, cited having an elected be a simple task. We have lost our national government as an improvement in national constitution, our army, our their lives. police, our education system and, the most ACKUimportant, our national unity all Other improvements over the country and trust in each other. Other improvements cited were clearly Therefore I can’t say that our lives have influenced by the householders’ particular improved in a short period of three years. circumstances. The 20 householders in (Householder, Bardowlet Khil CDC, Paktia) both CDC and non-CDC communities in Kabul unanimously said that just being able The majority of all householders cited to return home was the first improvement greater security/peace/stability as the main for them. A single householder in improvement in their lives. However, those Nangarhar expressed the same sentiment. communities without CDCs commonly Four householders in non-CDC communi- cited very little else that had improved. Sixty ties, 2 of them teachers, mentioned that per cent of households in CDCs and 76 per schools are functioning. Householders cent of those not in CDCs cited improved (including women) in one CDC in Balkh security as the main improvement. Fifteen welcomed freedom for women. per cent in CDC communities and 36 per cent in non-CDC communities said this was SECTION 4: the only improvement. In Nangarhar THE ROLE OF CDCs (reflecting the current level of insecurity)
79 The establishment of A full understanding of the purpose of the Community Development Councils election was much less common. Only 30 per cent understood not only the election The CDC is our representative. itself but how it had been set up, including It is our government. the selection of the electoral commission, (Men and women householders and/or the scrutiny role performed by FPs in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) and DRRDs. A further 30 per cent had a partial understanding of the process, but a Our National Solidarity Council. belief in its legitimacy. Twenty-three per cent It is there to help us build our village had no understanding of how the election with our own hands and make sure that was run or, even if they had voted, exactly we don’t go back to the times of war and what it was for. devastation. It helps us stay united. (Householder in Hoftoi Sofla CDC, Herat) Pre-existing community power structures When asked about the pre-existing decision- CDC is NSP and the NSP means projects. making bodies in their communities, 58 per (Men and women householders cent described various forms of traditional in Yakhdan CDC, Balkh) council or community leaders (elders, maliks, arbabs, mullahs): Sixty-nine per cent of the householders in CDC communities had a good general We had a traditional council that was understanding of the development purpose responsible for decision-making at the and representative nature of the CDC. A community level, but definitely it was further 17 per cent had a vague or partial not as organized as the NSP one. understanding, often seeing it as simply a (Woman head of household, project management committee, or ‘some Dour Robat CDC, Kundoz) sort of council’. Nine per cent did not know what it was exactly, though they were aware A small number (4 per cent) thought that of its existence. Estimates as to how long decisions were referred to the district the CDC had been operating tended to vary, administration or the governor. It was suggesting that different people became evident that in a number of communities aware of the process at different times, or this traditional leadership was still in place dated the CDC’s establishment from their and often still representing the community first contact with it or from the inception of to the district government. In some of the elections. Where separate samples of indi- most disrupted communities, particularly vidual interviews with men and women those that had abandoned their villages for were possible, women were found to be as a number of years, traditional leadership likely as men to have a good understanding was not acknowledged. Fifteen per cent of of the purpose and principles of the CDC, respondents said that there was no means and often showed considerably more of decision-making before the CDC, while 7 enthusiasm for the democratic nature of the per cent stated that warlords or command- process. Elderly widows were the least ers had controlled them. For example, all engaged. the community members interviewed in ACKUBamyan who were driven from their homes There was a high level of participation in the into the mountains said there was no lead- elections. Eighty-three per cent said they ership before the CDC, though some had voted and many added that their whole women said the men had ‘discussed things’ family had voted, men and women. Women but they were not party to it. The CDC in the sample participated in the elections members also said there had been no in the same proportion as men. Of the 17 formal governance and that anyone with per cent who did not vote, most were any means (the class that are often leaders prevented by absence or sickness or the fact elsewhere) had not bothered to return after that they had only returned to the the war. community after the election. Several of these respondents also mentioned relatives In Kabul, on the other hand, residents in the who had voted and were aware of how the CDC village visited either said there was no election had been carried out. However, leadership or said that warlords had there were a few cases of people who chose dominated them. Nevertheless, this CDC, not to vote, or believed they had been con- like all the others visited in the Province, sciously excluded, or were simply unaware included elected or co-opted elders who FINDINGS AND of the electoral process. had at some time in the past formed a tradi- RECOMMENDATIONS
80 tional council, though they said several had had been functioning. Other critical factors died. It seems clear that after the forced that emerged during the interview process abandonment and return several years later, included: the nature of the particular the traditional leadership was no longer in community and its particular geographic, charge and military figures had dominated. economic and political context; and the success of the NSP facilitation in responding to these factors when establishing the CDC. Community perceptions of the role of Community Development Councils Eighteen per cent of respondents (in one In this section we report community CDC in Badghis, Balkh, Kundoz and in attitudes on the legitimacy of CDCs, Paktia) stated unequivocally that the community awareness of the work of CDCs, community was led by traditional leaders, community participation in NSP projects, though on the whole they also welcomed community understanding of the financial the CDC as a development council: management of NSP projects and community perceptions of the impact of Our tribal leader leads. CDCs. He is not a CDC member. (Householder in Issues of Legitimacy Bar Dawlet Khil CDC, Paktia) It is evident from the householders’ responses that CDCs were on the whole However, the CDC in Paktia was the only considered beneficial to the community and one where all respondents expressed this were gaining community standing. Sixty-five view. A further 11 per cent of respondents in per cent (including several traditional these communities described various col- leaders) expressed general satisfaction with laborative arrangements between the CDC the CDC. In some cases (9 per cent) criti- and the traditional councils, with some cisms of the CDC were couched in terms of members sitting on both: its need to prove itself in the long term. However, there were only 3 respondents In the past, local warlords and elites who expressed actual hostility to it. A larger used to run the affairs for us, but now group (33 per cent) avoided giving an the members of CDC, with the help of opinion, either because they wanted to ‘wait some other community leaders, and see’ or claiming that they did not know. lead the community here. Although many of these responses can be (Householder in taken at face value, some undoubtedly Dai Zangi CDC, Badghis) indicated a degree of dissent or unease. When the householders were asked directly From this perspective they ascribed a con- who now constituted the formal leadership tinuing political role (representation and of the community, this ambiguity became arbitration) to the traditional councils, and a more apparent: development role to the CDC. A similar number of respondents in these same com- They all represent and manage our munities also chose not to give an opinion community. There is no one outside on the matter. These responses confirm the the CDCACKU who represents the community evidence from the CDC, district and provin- to the outside Afghanistan. cial government, and FPs that where tradi- 49 The role of the NSP (Householder in Godara CDC, Kabul) tional leadership is not only entrenched but management teams, particularly is also still respected by communities (par- the FP is clearly critical in this Fifty-eight per cent said unequivocally that ticularly those composed of relatively process, some such as SDF the CDC was now the sole representative cohesive kinship groups), a gradual transfer in Kabul prepare for the body and this view was unanimous in two of authority is being negotiated with a introduction of the CDC CDCs in Balkh, one in Bamyan, one in Kabul degree of goodwill on both sides. A number with peace building exercises. and one in Nangarhar. In this last case, of traditional leaders have also clearly rec- See also the recognition by however, they stressed that the maliks or ognized that it will be in their interests to non-CDC communities that warlords were no longer the leaders, sug- accept the CDC and find a role in it.49 existing leaders are likely to gesting that the leadership had been or feel threatened by a CDC might still be contested. Community awareness of the work and seek to prevent it. of Community Development Councils The household survey provided no Seventy-eight per cent of householders evidence to suggest that there was a clear were aware of the meetings of the CDC, SECTION 4: relationship between unanimous accept- though not always the exact timetable. In a THE ROLE OF CDCs ance of the CDC and the length of time it number of cases this seems in any case to
81 have been variable. There were suggestions understanding of a development plan or from some that they felt excluded or delib- participation in priority setting. Forty-two erately uninformed. Others thought, since per cent seemed well-informed and 19 per they were not members that they did not cent vaguely aware of plans. There were two need to know exactly when it met: exceptions to this trend – a recently formed CDC in Kudoz, where it was perhaps too The CDC knows, not me. soon to expect long-term plans, and the (Householder in Dai Zangi CDC, Badghis) CDC in Kabul, where householders were not informed beyond the two projects More significantly, however, the majority already in hand, although the CDC was had little idea of what was done in CDC already negotiating further projects. In 5 meetings or how the CDC works. Forty- communities the householders all said that seven per cent had no idea and 33 per cent the CDC was not making contact for further only gave quite a vague explanation. Only 19 project funding, and overall only a quarter per cent seemed to be actually following the of the respondents were aware of such work of the CDC. Nevertheless, most approaches. believed it was working in their interests: The majority of householders, however, I am mostly at home and do not were observing and being informed of the have information about the CDC. contact between their leaders and govern- The members are good people ment. In those CDCs where the leadership and wholeheartedly work for was making these contacts, 80 per cent of the benefit of the community. the respondents were aware of it. In the (Severely disabled young man community with the most recently formed in Godara CDC, Kabul) CDC in Kundoz, and one of the CDC com- munities in Nangarhar, the respondents In only 5 CDC communities did the respon- were all aware that the traditional leaders dents refer to any public meetings of the continued to be the ones to do business CDC. In Bamyan 90 per cent of those inter- with district government. In a second CDC viewed and all those in Herat said they community, the majority said that the CDC attended monthly meetings where the CDC worked with government but one dissenter reported on what it was doing. In Kabul 20 said it was the malik. In Paktia, they were per cent mentioned monthly meetings. equally certain that the CDC had no contact Respondents in the most established of the but the malik might. two CDCs in Kundoz all spoke of meetings where they participated with the CDC and On all of these aspects of the functioning of in Paktia 4 out of 6 respondents mentioned the CDC women were more likely than men attending meetings. However, there were to be amongst the least informed. comments in several communities suggest- ing a perception of exclusion: Community participation in NSP projects As described above, direct community par- They don’t listen to us when planning. ticipation in planning the projects and their (Householder in implementation is clearly happening in Bar Dawlet Khil CDC, Paktia) ACKUsome communities; in others they were consulted by the CDC and then informed of They don’t let the poor participate. decisions. A minority of householders felt (Householder in Mobarak Shah CDC, that they had not been involved. Where Badghis) householders had been actively involved in planning a project that had yet to be imple- In any case there was no obvious correlation mented (4 CDCs in Balkh, Bamyan, Kundoz between the mention of meetings and the and Nangarhar) there was a high expecta- level of awareness of CDC business. In some tion that respondents themselves and all cases where meetings are held most respon- the community would participate in the dents did feel informed. In other cases, such implementation, though in Balkh two as the CDC in Paktia, noted above, they did households expect to be excluded. not. Meanwhile, communities in Balkh, for example, did not mention public meetings, The level of actual participation by those but were generally well informed. interviewed and their fellow villagers where projects were under way varied from CDC Community awareness of the future plans of to CDC. In one CDC in Balkh half the house- FINDINGS AND the CDC was higher, suggesting some holds interviewed were not participating. RECOMMENDATIONS
82 Two respondents in Paktia said they were Public understanding of the not available to participate and one respon- financial management of NSP Projects dent in a third CDC in Balkh, and one in an In the recently formed CDC of Dour Robat established CDC in Kundoz, simply said in Kundoz, householders did not know the they had not participated. However, the source of the funding for community devel- majority of villagers were participating in opment projects, and since the money had the work: 56 per cent were participating not yet been received, they could not say with paid labour (mostly also contributing how it was managed, though one knew that some voluntary days or repaying some a treasurer had been chosen by the CDC. wages as a cash contribution); 12 per cent, Another said, ‘[W]e have many illiterate mostly the better off, were contributing people in the community and would ask voluntary labour or, in the case of one the CDC to give time and verbally explain disabled and one elderly respondent, how the grant is spent and give a chance to voluntary supervision; 18 per cent said they the poor people to work and get daily were contributing 10 per cent (in one case labour.’ Of the remaining respondents, 54 20 per cent), that is, to the community con- per cent of men and 41 per cent of women tribution to project costs. Most had no com- interviewed individually understood that plaints about how the work was allocated, the money came from international aid and though two in Paktia said it was difficult to was channelled by government through the make time for voluntary work, and one in FP to the CDC. All the male and female Kabul thought he had been unfairly treated householders interviewed in the longest- when the foreman had to reduce the paid established CDC in Balkh also understood labour force. this to be the case. Most of the other house- holders (42 per cent of men, 41 per cent of All the women interviewed individually in women and 56 per cent of households in communities implementing projects Balkh) understood that the money came in adopted by the general CDC (all infrastruc- some way from government. Ten per cent of ture projects) said they, as women, were not men, 17 per cent of women and 10 per cent able to participate themselves but referred of the Balkh households did not know to male relatives who were. Women in Kabul where the money came from. One man in said they expected to participate in Yakhdan, Balkh, said it was ‘because no one women’s projects when these were set up. tells me’. When it came to discussing the level of par- ticipation by the community as a whole, When it came to understanding the financial only two CDCs (in Badghis and Herat) were processes, such as procurement and alloca- said to have had no problems with partici- tion of the Block Grants few householders, pation. In all the other communities, and particularly very few women, felt able to respondents described problems in getting follow the work of the CDC. Only one a minority of residents to participate. woman, a member of the CDC in Bamyan, Barriers to participation were identified as: though illiterate said: lack of time and poverty/needing to give priority to main livelihood, objections to I am sitting in the shura and paying contributions, illiteracy and lack of making the decisions with the men. awareness:ACKU(We) all sit together to make the decision on how to spend the money. Some people are not aware. They use The treasurer tells us how it the bridges every day but never think has been spent. who built them or how they were built. (Householder in Yakhdan DC, Balkh) Tw o other women in Bamyan thought they were informed as much as they could be in In Kabul and one of the CDCs in Kundoz, the monthly meetings. The 10 other women participation from some segments of the interviewed (77 per cent) said they had no village community was limited. One respon- understanding of how the finances were dent in Kabul said he would not work on managed. Only 19 per cent of the men felt the current project because it did not able to follow the transactions, either in the benefit his part of the village, but would par- account books or from the treasurers’ ticipate on the next one. In Balkh one reports. However, nearly half (42 per cent) householder stressed the fact that women had some idea of how the money was being were discriminated against. handled, while 36 per cent had no idea: SECTION 4: THE ROLE OF CDCs
83 AKDN ... helps us a lot because we are The NSP has helped a lot, unfamiliar people and don't know we are more united as a community anything about city issues. and have a project that gives us (Male householder hope and I can grow more wheat. in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) (Male householder in Sholana CDC, Nangarhar) In Balkh, 7 per cent of households were able to explain the financial management, In this section we present the findings of 46 per cent had some knowledge, and 14 the household survey with regard to had none. Forty-seven per cent of all community perceptions of the impact of respondents said they left it to the CDC and CDCs on enhancing community gover- its treasurer to manage the finances, which nance, deriving material benefits for they themselves could not follow in detail: community members, providing new learning opportunities, building national Well, they gave us reports on the solidarity and improving community per- expenditures; even if we ask them ceptions of government. about it every day. I don’t know how they manage it amongst themselves Community attitudes on the impact of though. Do I need to know? Community Development Councils in (Male householder community governance in Dai Zangi CDC, Badghis) The impact of the NSP on community gov- ernance was remarked on by a large More than half the women expressed this majority of the householders. This was most view. However, the expression of senti- commonly expressed as ‘unity’, ‘solidarity’, ments of distrust was rare, but those that or ‘working together’. Eighty-six per cent of expressed it also said they had no the respondents (90 per cent of women) knowledge of how the CDC works: volunteered this description of the impact of the CDC on their lives. Notably, in Godara I know that the money is given to those CDC in Kabul, the women said they had not who do some job but only Allah knows even known each other, though neigh- of what happens behind the curtain. bours, until they were able to meet in the (Male householder in Godara CDC, Kabul) women’s shura. A further 8 householders (7 per cent), when asked directly, agreed This lack of capacity has implications for that there is more unity as a result of setting ensuring accountability to the general up the CDC. Six respondents in Badghis, public, which clearly has in most cases to be Herat, Kabul and Kudoz specifically noted by oral communication, and for accountabil- that the creation of the CDC had reduced ity to funding agencies which relies on the influence of the warlords: written records that only a minority can handle. This is the key area in which there is No more use of the gun! virtually no capacity amongst women, which (Male householder in turn (see Godara CDC) limits not only in Mobarak Shah CDC, Badghis) their general participation, but the capacity of those elected as CDC representatives to ACKUWe are no longer vulnerable function effectively. to those who want us to fight. (Male Householder in Hoftoi Sofla CDC, Herat) Community perceptions of the impact of Community Development Councils A smaller majority (56 per cent) spoke of the CDC as a new system of community gov- They came together in happiness ernance that is transforming decision- and sadness and talking with making. Twenty-eight of these (24 per cent) each other to solve problems. also referred to the project management (Woman householder role of the CDC. However, only a minority in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) (15 per cent) saw the CDC only in terms of its project management role. An even It is a body that has united three villages. smaller minority of 11 per cent, some of (Male householder them in the more recently formed CDC, in Chogha-e-Sofla CDC, Kundoz) were unable to say what the NSP/CDC meant to them. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
84 Community attitudes on detailed knowledge of even one other gov- material benefits derived from ernment development plan. One of these the National Solidarity Programme respondents from Nangarhar was alarmed Sixty-five per cent of householders in all the that the government planned to eradicate communities (except the recently estab- poppy cultivation; his main source of lished Dour Robat CDC in Kundoz, where labouring work. The other two in Badghis nothing was said on this issue) said that and Kundoz provided details of several they had received some material benefits reconstruction projects in their province. from the NSP or were confident that projects in progress would benefit them kin Nevertheless, nearly half of the sample (49 the future: per cent) had a general impression that the government was working to rehabilitate the Everybody uses the road without country, although 4 respondents in discrimination, even the poorest. Nangarhar suggested that it did not have the (Male householder capacity to implement its plans. Three other in Balla Dehe CDC, Nangarhar) members of the same community were adamant that the government had no plans: However, 8 respondents in 5 of the CDC communities said that the CDC had not Government is busy arranging security changed their lives materially. One of these for the people and it has no time in Balkh specifically stated that the CDC had to think about other aspects of life. not benefited women: (Male householder in Sholana CDC, Nangarhar) The NSP just built the wall but it has not changed my personal situation. The remaining 47 per cent of respondents (Chogha-e-Sofla CDC, Kundoz) simply said that they had no knowledge of government plans, often saying they were Six respondents in the more recently illiterate, too poor or too busy. Women were formed CDC in Balkh and Kundoz, as well as particularly likely to give such responses. the more established CDC in Bamyan and Nangarhar, mentioned that the NSP had Community attitudes towards Government increased learning opportunities: A much larger number (77 per cent) asserted that the government is interested We have seen what in their community. A quarter of these cited we can do as a community. the NSP work in the village as evidence of (Male householder that interest. Others cited other infrastruc- in Balla Dehe CDC, Nangarhar) ture projects such as roads or surveys as evidence: Skills and knowledge acquired through the CDC work and through literacy and If it were not interested, you would not increased interest in education including have been asked to interview me. women’s enrolments. Electricity projects (Male householder were expected to help both children and in Dour Robat CDC, Kundoz) adults study.ACKU Nine other respondents were unsure of the Community attitudes on government’s interest, particularly those issues of national solidarity who were not fully aware of the govern- ment’s role in NSP: Building our country, building our village through our own people. We hope it is. It seems to be. (Male Householder We receive promises but nothing is done. in Hoftoi Sofla CDC, Herat) (Male householder in Chogha-e-Sofla CDC, Kundoz) NSP works to unite people and remove anarchy in Afghanistan. A total of 10 respondents said the govern- (Male Householder ment had no interest in their community. in Dour Robat, Kundoz) They were all from the two CDCs in Kundoz, the most recently formed CDC in Fifteen per cent of respondents saw the NSP Nangarhar, and the CDC in Paktia. It was SECTION 4: as contributing to national peace and soli- clear from their other responses that this THE ROLE OF CDCs darity. Very few respondents (three) had any attitude was associated with ignorance of
85 the government role in NSP or lack of If government found vocational training understanding of the Programme, and deep courses for women, especially widows, distrust of government due to bad past the women in this community can be experiences of government, particularly, self-sufficient in the next few years. local government: (Woman householder in Dour Robat CDC, Kundoz) Whoever started NSP it can’t be government, otherwise the money In one community in Balkh all the respon- would have gone to warlords or dents identified schooling as a priority. A district administration. small number of respondents (8) looked to (Male householders the wider picture, seeing improvements in in Dour Robat CDC, Kundoz) security, economic growth and governance at the national level as offering the best For example, 7 respondents in the recently hope of future prosperity: formed Dour Robat CDC had a very negative view of the district government, Empowerment of the government... which they accused of extorting bribes and as the government gets stronger, other forms of corruption. Three respon- we become more prosperous. dents said that the government had no (Male householder interest in their community. However, 4 in Hotoi Sofla CDC, Herat) respondents distinguished between the local government and national government, Fifty-nine per cent of the householders in which had demonstrated some interest. If the CDC communities declared themselves work starts in the village they will be optimistic about the future: convinced of government interest. I am very optimistic about the future because what I have today is beyond my Prospects and plans for the future wildest dreams. I even didn’t imagine When asked what would most improve their I would be back in my own birthplace lives, 89 per cent of respondents cited one day. I pray Allah almighty for developments that would affect them listening to our prayers. I always tell my directly in their daily lives. Various types of sons and grandsons to work for our infrastructure were the most commonly country and not let it be destroyed again. mentioned. Highest on the list were first (Male householder in Godara CDC, Kabul) schools and then clinics. Clean drinking water schemes were also very commonly While for a few (11 per cent) this was mostly mentioned. Respondents in 4 communities a matter of faith in God, the others also mentioned irrigation schemes and advanced some objective reasons for their roads. Electricity was mentioned by a few. confidence: One or two respondents in the poorest communities mentioned food aid. God knows better about the future. (Male householder The need for work was another priority. In in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) one CDC in Nangarhar it was the primary ACKU need. In the communities where women I think people are tired of war were interviewed the need for work for and want to live in peace both women and men was stressed: and construct their country. (Male householder in Godara CDC, Kabul) Work for men and women. (Woman householder About a third (29 per cent) said that things in Godara CDC, Kabul) were generally beginning to improve. Twenty-eight were optimistic as a direct Others identified livelihoods for both men result of the NSP Programme in their and women, such as agriculture and carpet- community. Twenty-two per cent thought weaving as priorities. The one social need the whole recovery process, economic identified as a priority in more than half the recovery, reconstruction, security, govern- communities was education, including ment and international commitment, was schooling, literacy and skills training, espe- working: cially for women and girls: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
86 The mechanism appears to be working. The findings of the Household Survey (Male householder of non-NSP matched communities in Mobarak Shah CDC, Badghis) The purpose of including these communi- ties in the evaluation was to compare them Others were much less enthusiastic; 18 per with the CDC communities in relation to a cent said they were confident that at least common set of indicators, in order to disen- there would not be a return to war, and a tangle changes observed by the CDC com- further 18 per cent cited improved security munities which can be ascribed to the as the main reason why they could get on impact of the NSP from those which are with their lives: attributable to general post-war trends. This required that communities should be We hope that the government changes for selected that matched as far as possible the the better and we pray for its stability. geographic location, ethnic mix and socio- People are satisfied with their lives economic conditions of at least one of the today and hopeful about the future. two CDC communities researched in the (Householders same region. Moreover, it was also in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) important, for purposes of impact assess- ment, that the communities should also A further 30 per cent said they were hopeful share similar experiences of the war and or conditionally optimistic about the future, immediate post-war period, including still clearly fearful that the improvements economic conditions and forms of gover- they have experienced could be reversed: nance.
I don’t know but I am happy The following analysis therefore examines our village should be supported. those aspects of community life and per- (Woman householder ceptions that the NSP aims to transform, in Shah Qadam CDC, Bamyan) and compares the responses in these com- munities with those of the CDC communi- The 7 per cent who expressed pessimism ties discussed above. about the future gave quite specific reasons for their opinion. For a widow in Badghis, Pre-existing community power structures the economic prospects for her and her Descriptions of the character of community children were so bleak she could only fear leadership in these communities were for the future. One respondent in Herat said similar to their CDC counterparts. Forty- the future now depended on the govern- three per cent of respondents (all men or ment and how strong it could be. Four mixed household groups) said that a respondents in Nangarhar and Paktia council of elders or of elders and clerics thought that the power of the warlords governed the community. In some cases, would prevent any improvement. A house- such as Kalakan in Kabul, these had recently holder in Kundoz could see no prospect of re-established a council after the end of a better future as long as the local govern- Taliban rule. They were described as: ment was ruled by corrupt individuals. Another householder in the same village Talented custodians, honest and sincere. feared ACKUthat the CDC might also be taken (Male householder in Mangal Abad, over by corrupt maliks: Kundoz describing the 3 leaders of the community interviewed by the I am not very confident because the research team) government offices particularly at the district level are filled with the Mosque leaders, commanders and now corrupt and illiterate Jehadi people. they call themselves representatives. (Male householder (Widow in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) in Dour Robat CDC, Kundoz) Fifty per cent of respondents, including all I can predict that while the warlords the women interviewed, referred not to a are in power, our country can’t improve. council but to one or two powerful individ- (Male householder uals, with titles such as ‘malik’ or ‘arbab’ in Bar Dawlet Khil CDC, Paktia) (though notably members of the same community did not always name the same leaders). For example, in the community SECTION 4: visited in Nangarhar, where 5 men named THE ROLE OF CDCs leaders in this way, others said that there
87 was no formal leadership, and later others The community in Kundoz, like their CDC described the existence of conflict over counterparts, deeply mistrusted the district community leadership. This lack of administration, and 6 respondents stated consensus, together with the evidence of that their leaders did not work with govern- disputed leadership, supports the con- ment. Three householders in Nangarhar tention that this is the failed character of also said that their leaders did not work with Afghan governance that CDC community government. Again the level of contact with members believe needs to be overcome government, or at least the level of trans- through the NSP. parency about the nature of contact, is in stark contrast with the CDC communities Community participation where it was 80 per cent. When it came to in community governance awareness of their leaders’ representations When describing how priorities were to funding agencies for assistance, 28 per decided in the community, 43 per cent said cent (all men and mixed household groups) the leaders decided and only 13 (28 per were aware of these invariably unsuccessful cent) mentioned any form of consultation. efforts. One man in Nangarhar, however, Eight of these were in a community consist- also said that they were just pursuing their ing of a single kinship group. This is in own interests. Seventy-one per cent contrast to levels of participation in CDC (including all the women) said that they communities that ranged from 50 to 90 per were not aware of any approaches to cent: funding agencies for assistance, did not know, or were certain there were none. The arbab gathers people Again, although awareness of these activities and people agree with him. in the CDCs was not universal, it was much (Male householder in Yaka Dokan, Herat) higher: 42 per cent of respondents were aware of specific approaches and 19 per Our elders take decisions and all the cent were vaguely aware. people sit together in the mosque and focus on the problems. Community perceptions (Woman householder of community solidarity in Kalkan Centre, Kabul) The majority of householders (73 per cent) described their communities as united: Thirty-nine per cent of householders (all men or in mixed household groups) said By the grace of God, Kalakan is united. they had participated in community work. (Male householder Fifteen per cent said they had not partici- in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) pated. Another 15 per cent said they were willing but had not been asked. A third of However, this has to be seen in the light of the respondents did not answer this the fact that 50 per cent said they all question. Participation in community belonged to the same kinship group and projects in the CDC, in contrast, was found were therefore naturally united. If there to be over 80 per cent. were any disagreements they were clearly unlikely to discuss them with strangers. In a Community-Governmental Relations ACKUmixed community in Kabul, opinions were Fifty-six per cent of householders in the divided. Men associated with the council of non-CDC communities said that their elders declared the community united, leaders contacted government as represen- while poor women denied any unity: tatives of the community: No there is no unity. If they receive Of course they work with government. anything they keep it for themselves, That is their job, but we don’t have not for poor families to address to know about it. their problems. (Male householder in Yaka Dokan, Herat) (Woman householder in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) However, two women in Kabul suggested that it was aimed at serving their own Other women spoke only of social solidarity. interests, while 13 per cent were unsure if Six men in an ethnically homogeneous there was any contact: community in Nangarhar nevertheless saw their community as deeply divided, politi- How should I know? cally and socially. FINDINGS AND (Widow in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) RECOMMENDATIONS
88 The elections divided us into Community awareness of the NSP small pieces. The elders say they Thirty-five per cent of the respondents had unify us but they do not. Too many heard of the NSP and understood its basic people think they are in charge. purpose. All of the respondents thought the (Householders in Bahsawal, Nangarhar) community would welcome the NSP and many were keen to be included in the Seventeen per cent of the respondents said Programme: that their community was not united and a further 10 per cent said nothing on the Yes, we would be happy to have subject. In contrast, CDC members were CDC/NSP in our community to improve almost unanimous in describing their com- like Shakardara, Estalef and the others. munities as united or more united as a (Woman householder direct result of setting up the CDC. In only in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) one case did a respondent say that they were already united because they were one Twenty-eight per cent had heard of it but kin. said they did not really know what it is for, or had misunderstood its purpose. In some Community perceptions of Government cases this lack of knowledge was perhaps Only 13 per cent of respondents had any more a case of not wanting to know. Eight detailed knowledge of government plans (in members of this group (all men) were several cases because they owned a radio). doubtful that a CDC would be welcomed in A further 17 per cent of respondents their community because they foresaw a (including one woman) had vague ideas conflict of interest with the existing about government policies. A large majority community leadership: (69 per cent) either said they had no knowledge of government plans or thought It would be difficult to convince the the government had no plans for the malik and elders...if there was a CDC country. Thus, while the level of knowledge with everything transparent (they) of government plans and policies is similar would lose their lucrative positions. to that in the CDC communities, the per- (Male householder ception of government is clearly different. in Mangal Abad, Kundoz) In the CDCs, the majority believe that the government has plans for reconstruction, Thirty-nine per cent had not heard of the while in the matched communities most NSP. After it was explained to them, 6 respondents had no belief in government: households in Balkh and two women in Kabul said they would certainly welcome it. The government has no plan for us. Throughout our history the Prospects and Plans for the Future government has never helped us. When asked what would most improve their (Male householder in Bahsawal, Nagarhar) lives, like their counterparts in the CDC communities, the respondents in matched Government is not interested in communities identified mainly material our affairs, the seniors are good people, inputs and their priorities were also broadly butACKU all juniors are corrupt in the similar: clean drinking water (54 per cent); present government. irrigation schemes (34 per cent); social (Male householder infrastructure such as schools and clinics in Mangal Abad, Kundoz) (32 per cent); employment and support for livelihoods – notably mentioned by half the Not surprisingly, 26 per cent of the respon- women (28 per cent); and roads (8 per dents in matched communities thought that cent). Two communities of recent return- the government had an interest in their ees, however, felt that there was still a need communities. Fifty-two per cent thought for basic relief assistance to help them the government had little or no interest and rebuild their houses. A much smaller pro- a further 19 per cent (including 2 women) portion than in the CDC communities (8 either gave no reply or said they did not per cent), spoke strongly of the need for know if the government is interested. In education, especially for women. contrast, 77 per cent of respondents in CDC communities believe that the government cares. SECTION 4: THE ROLE OF CDCs
89 If our children were educated, I think we have a bright future they would be able to help us. If I were because we have a powerful state educated, I would have responded (to the now. The NGOs help us and so does the survey) from the top of the mountain. international community. The parliament (Widow in Chaar Sangi, Badghis) is being established. We will certainly live a better life after this. Women’s vocational training and (Male householder literacy...would help the population which in Kalakan Centre, Kabul) is deprived and unaware of their rights. (Male householder I don’t see any light. in Mangal Abad, Kundoz) (Male householder in Bahsawal, Nangarhar) Only two men spoke in terms of the broader national political and economic context. The proportion expressing pessimism Significantly, 11 per cent said that getting about the future (15 per cent), though a the NSP into their community would make minority, was twice that in the CDC commu- the most impact. nities. Personal circumstances were the reason for this view in several cases. Widows Yes, I am optimistic. in two Balkh households saw their We are developing as a nation. economic prospects as bleak, and one I am in my home country now. returned refugee in Kundoz had obviously I didn’t have anything to enjoy in exile. not been ready to return when compulsorily (Male householder in Yaka Dokan, Herat) repatriated. The political context was the other reason for pessimism. Yes, because I believe in my god and have never been disappointed whatever Afghanistan’s political situation is not has happened to me in my life. stable. I returned because I was forced (Male householder in Mangal Abad, by the Pakistani authorities to leave. Kundoz) Those who work in the higher positions are living out of the country and ask If the government focusses on and deceive the poor to return. our community we will be (Male householder optimistic, otherwise no. in Mangal Abad, Kundoz) (Woman householder in Kalkan Centre, Kabul) Altogether, these communities shared some of the optimism created by the end of the I am optimistic as long as our war and signs of general recovery with their government continues to work as it CDC neighbours, but they were less likely to has in the last 3 years otherwise things view the future with confidence. Many fewer can reverse and Afghanistan will were prepared to express optimism for the again be a place of war. future based on a positive assessment of (Male householder, Mangal Abad, Kundoz) their current circumstances (rather than on faith alone or the absence of war) and more Forty-eight per cent of the respondents said ACKUwere uncompromisingly pessimistic. they were optimistic about the future. A further 32 per cent (including 5 women) In sum, the evidence from the matched said they were hopeful or conditionally opti- non-NSP communities suggests that the mistic. The main reason for expressing NSP bridges a vacuum in community gover- optimism or cautious hope was the feeling nance in the sense that it provides for that things were generally improving. greater community participation, public Twenty-eight per cent (5 women) expressed legitimacy, faith in the system of govern- this view. Another common reason for hope ment and confidence in the future. was the belief that at least there would not be a return to war (21 per cent gave this response). A rather higher proportion than in the CDC communities (19 per cent), and all the men were optimistic solely on the basis of their faith. As in the CDCs (17 per cent), some respondents were confident for the future as a result of their assessment of FINDINGS AND the general process of recovery. RECOMMENDATIONS
90 4.4 Conclusions The following observations on the character of community governance are central to our In this section summary, general conclu- considerations on the efficacy of the NSP as sions are drawn regarding: the public a mechanism of institution-building: acceptance and institutional legitimacy of CDCs; gender inclusion in CDCs; project elites inevitably tend to dominate the implementation, monitoring and sustain- CDCs – traditional leaders remain ability; perceived benefits of the NSP, and influential, the new leaders are chosen the relationship between CDCs and FPs and from the well educated and articulate, government. men predominate over women. Nevertheless the NSP process is seen by the public to be reducing the power The institutional legitimacy of of warlords and corrupt elites over the Community Development Councils communities and establishing a form of The CDC have the trust and acceptance of governance that they trust to represent the majority of the community members, in their interests. most cases (58 per cent of those ques- tioned), as their sole representatives and all the established CDCs could explain means of internal governance. the NSP process with reasonable confidence, and understood the Nevertheless, although establishing the importance of documentation and legitimacy and acceptance of the CDC is a for transparency and accountability. process that begins with the first contacts However, though many were able to with the NSP Programme and continues maintain excellent records, the extent through the election of the council, the def- to which all the communities could inition of community priorities and the undertake such an exercise in the implementation of successful projects, it is future without an effective FP is not the NSP process by itself, or the skill of highly questionable. the facilitators alone that determine the point at which a full leadership role is Participation in decision-making and assumed. The research evidence suggests collective effort for the community is that it is the interaction between the NSP greatly increased by creation of the CDC intervention and very specific local condi- (participation in discussing community tions (of geography, development, social, priorities ranged between 50 and 90 per cultural, economic and political realities) cent in CDC communities, compared to that determines the rate of progress the matched communities where 28 per towards fully representative governance. cent described limited consultation only, Above all it is a process of negotiation and the majority had no participation. between different interest groups in the Eighty per cent in CDC communities community. Thus, for example, some CDC participated in project implementation, achieve legitimacy within their community but only half that number (all men) did at an early stage of the process, while others any community work in the matched may still share the leadership with tradi- communities. Nevertheless, whilst at the tional authorityACKU figures in the final stages of moment voluntarism is accepted, many successful project implementation. CDC members wanted some form of future financial incentive to compensate In the communities where the CDC have for the time taken from their main taken over as the primary community livelihood activities. decision-making units they are widely accepted as a positive agent for change by the recent CDC Jirga in Kabul (August all groups, and often incorporate respected 2005) was cited by many CDC members traditional leaders. In the communities to be a defining factor that influenced where the NSP concept has not been fully their perception of the NSP. People were taken up the tendency is for the CDC to be encouraged by hearing the Minister and seen as responsible for the implementation the President talking about the NSP. of a community development plan, while traditional leaders (arbab, malik, clan elders) and religious leaders continue to Gender Inclusion represent the community to government The NSP has undoubtedly strengthened the SECTION 4: and arbitrate disputes. In some cases this is role of women in governance, with the THE ROLE OF CDCs a negotiated and collaborative arrangement; election of some mixed CDCs and separate in others it is conflictual. CDCs. However, even in the most progres-
91 sive areas there is a gap in capacity between was excessive optimism regarding what the men and women, both in terms of personal community could contribute, and in some skills and empowerment. The inclusion of cases individuals have reneged on their women in the NSP in some of the conserva- promises and this has caused some division. tive areas is not as advanced as other areas. The delays in disbursement are considered For example in the Province of Nangarhar all by the CDCs to be the major problem expe- members of the CDCs are male. Women rienced. When the projects are delayed have formed their own CDCs (as specified costs rise since the original estimates were by the Manual). However, the women give undertaken, and momentum is lost. their votes to their male relatives who vote for the all male members of the CDC on their behalf. The women in the sites visited Project monitoring universally accepted this process. Please In all the field sites visited there was consider the following observations: evidence of a monitoring procedure as defined in the Manual. However, FPs play Women often do not have a direct say in the main monitoring role. In some the process of prioritization and project locations, the community’s monitoring is selection. It appears that their male complemented by whiteboards at the key relatives inform them as the decision is construction site, showing all literate being made, but feedback from women community members an updated cost, in Balkh, for example, suggests that this community contribution, instalment process of exclusion is probably causing number and targets. This reinforces latent resentment.50 ownership and transparency.