A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: the Deobandi-Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia
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Syracuse University SURFACE Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public History - Dissertations Affairs 8-2013 A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: The Deobandi-Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia William Kesler Jackson Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Islamic World and Near East History Commons Recommended Citation Jackson, William Kesler, "A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: The Deobandi-Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia" (2013). History - Dissertations. 102. https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd/102 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in History - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract A Subcontinent’s Sunni Schism presents the first-ever history of the 150-year religio- political rivalry between the Deobandis and the Barelvis—arguably the most important schism in the “Muslim world,” and certainly the most significant within Sunni Islam. More recently, that rivalry has often been expressed by means of bullets and bombs, especially in Pakistan. But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the Deobandi- Barelvi schism lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious antagonism: at first over converts, later for competing visions of the political future, then for a place within a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political structure. For Deobandis, the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a “pure” Islam, as opposed to the Barelvi deviation (plus an unmitigated hatred of the British presence in India); for Barelvis, their right to speak for the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a privilege that the Deobandis had long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout the rivalry’s history, too, were the two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on the subject of how to get there. Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state. A SUBCONTINENT’S SUNNI SCHISM: THE DEOBANDI-BARELVI DYNAMIC AND THE CREATION OF MODERN SOUTH ASIA by W. Kesler Jackson B.S., Brigham Young University, 2004 M.A., Pennsylvania State University, 2010 M.S., Syracuse University, 2011 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. Syracuse University August 2013 Copyright © William Kesler Jackson 2013 All Rights Reserved ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A list of all who have assisted me in the preparation of this work would be near- impossible to construct. To all I express my sincere gratitude. The staff at the dar ul’alwm Deoband’s library were most helpful, as were the teachers and students whom I interviewed. The staff at the dar ul’alwm Karachi were likewise very generous in their assistance, as were the personnel at the Jamia Naeemia in Lahore, the Syracuse University library in Syracuse and the Syracuse University London Center, the Al- Jamiatul Ashrafia in Mubarakpur, the Jamiah Islamiah Talimuddin in Dabhel, the mәsjyd-e-ilyas in London, and the jam’y mәsjyd and connected mәdrәsәħ in Ludhiana. A quick shout-out, too, goes to the Urdu booksellers of Urdu Bazaar Road near Old Delhi’s jam’y mәsjyd. I would also like to thank Muhammad Junaid Swati of Baffa, Faiz Raza Khan of Bareilly, Akhtar Bodla of Islamabad’s NIHCR, Beth Coyle of AES in New Delhi, Ali Zaidi of London, Syed Badar Saeed of Lahore, Jamil Ashraf of Karachi, Abul Qasim Nomani of Deoband, Saghir Aslam of Lahore, the indomitable Welches of Tokyo, Muhammad Hasan Misbahi of Mubarakpur, Christopher Patch of Kathmandu, Abdul Waheed of Lahore, Adnan Hussain and Mansab Nathoka of Sargodha, the DeWaals of Nairobi, Dr. Rasheed H. Jawed of Rawalpindi, Saeed Abdullah of Mansehra, J. Anthon Jackson of Aarhus, Muhammad Usman Rehman of Ludhiana, Shayne and Weston “Dougie” (and their progenitors) of Dalkey, Praveen Beesa of Delhi, Sajid Khan of Mansehra, Sahibzada Qutabuddin of Sial Sharif, and Raghib Hussain Naeemi of Lahore. My appreciation goes out too, of course, to my doctoral advisor and mentor Dr. Subho Basu, as well as to Dr. Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, both of Syracuse University’s Department of History. Thanks to Bill and Ann Jackson for their seemingly unending iv support. And an especially big thank-you to my ever-patient wife, Sarah, and my three incredible children—William, Kasia, and Thomas—who let me truck them all over the world in search of Urdu books, mәdarys, and ‘alәma. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ix Note on Dates, Names, and Transcription x Introduction 1 I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The ‘alym, the Sufi shix, and the “Muslim” State in South Asia 12 Medina: the First Islamic State 16 Muslim Footholds in South Asia 25 Delhi Sultanate 37 The Mughal State 48 The Waliullahi School 57 The Farangi Mahalis & the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group 68 Shi’a Inroads in South Asia 71 The ‘alәma, the mәshayx, and 1857/1273 72 II. GENESIS OF A RIVALRY: The Deobandi and Barelvi Schools, 1866-1921/1283-1340 88 A School is Founded: the Birth of “Deobandism” 90 Counter-Reformation: the Birth of “Barelvism” 109 The Early Disputes I: the fәtwa War of 1902/1320 112 The Early Disputes II: the Battle for History 117 The Early Disputes III: “Rationalist” vs. vi “Transmitted” traditions 124 The Early Disputes IV: Other Points of Doctrine 125 Muslims, Hindus, and Politics: 1875-1916/1292-1334 130 Spreading the Rivalry: the Proliferation of mәdarys Networks 147 Khilafat: Ephemeral High Point of Hindu-Muslim Unity 158 III. A MUSLIM HOMELAND: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition Politics, 1921-1947/1339-1366 180 Naimuddin Moradabadi: Father of Political Barelvism 187 Husain Ahmad Madani: Taking Up the Mantle of Mahmud Hasan 212 Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi: Chief of Islamic Law 245 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: Jinnah’s Gamechanger 262 IV. DEFINING A NEW ISLAMIC STATE: The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics, 1947-1977 291 Constitution-making: A Cold Alliance 393 Distractions from Constitution-Making 332 “Secularist” Patron of pirs: the Ayub Khan Years 352 Yahya Khan, the 1970 Elections, and the Birth of Bangladesh 375 Prelude to “Islamization,” 1970-1977 495 March 1977: “Zenith” of Islam’s “Politicization” 404 V. “ISLAMIZATION” AND WAR: Militarization of the vii Rivalry, 1977-2001 408 Consolidating Power: Zia, Democracy, and the ‘alәma 410 Zia’s “Islamization” Push 421 “Islamic Revolution”: Deobandi-Barelvi Response 418 Soviet Invasion, U.S.-Saudi Response, Deobandi-Barelvi Fallout 435 Proselytizing Deobandism: the Rise and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at 447 ISID Patronage: Growth of mәdarys Networks, Militant Outfits 454 Barelvi Response: Sunni Tehrik, Dawat-e-Islami, et alia 460 After Zia: Deobandi-Barelvi Politics, 1988-2001 466 Post-Soviet Afghanistan and the Establishment of Taliban Rule 473 VI. EPILOGUE 486 The Suicide of Muhammad Siddiq: 11 April 2006 490 The Rivalry Continues 507 Glossary 519 Bibliography 527 Endnotes 548 viii PREFACE The words of Nehru, in reference to relations between “Englishmen and Indians,” might just as well be applied today to those between “the West” and “the Muslim world”: “What a great gulf divided the two…and how they distrusted and disliked each other! But more than the distrust and the dislike was the ignorance of each other, and, because of this, each side was a little afraid of the other and was constantly on its guard in the other’s presence. To each, the other appeared as a sour-looking, unamiable creature, and neither realized that there was decency and kindliness behind the mask.” On another occasion, the Pandit remarked, “An average Englishman, if he were frank, would probably confess that he knows some quite decent Indians but they are exceptions and as a whole Indians are a detestable crowd. The average Indian would admit that some Englishmen whom he knows are admirable, but, apart from these few, the English are an overbearing, brutal, and thoroughly bad lot. Curious how each person judges of the other race, not from the individual with whom he has come in contact, but from others about whom he knows very little or nothing at all.” Apart from any academic aspiration, then, it is my hope that the telling of the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, its long transformation, and its ripples within the politics of pre-Partition India, independent Pakistan, and beyond might in some small measure peel away another layer of that “ignorance”—Nehru’s “great gulf”—yet separating hundreds of millions of Muslims in the East from hundreds of millions of non-Muslims in the West. W. KESLER JACKSON New Delhi, 28 April 2012/6 Jumada II 1433 ix Note on Dates, Names, and Transcription Dates are generally presented through Chapter 3 of this work according to both the Gregorian and the Hijri calendars, respectively, separated by a forward slash symbol (/). Thus, 1857/1273 refers to the Gregorian year 1857 AD, or the Hijri year 1273 AH. The “old” AD signification has been retained (instead of the “new” CE) to add emphasis to both calendars’ religious underpinnings. Where only the Gregorian year is employed, the acronym “AD” is used to so signify. Hijri dates are meant as a reference and are only approximations. From Chapter 4 onwards—chronologically, with the establishment of the Pakistani state—the Hijri references are dropped and only the Gregorian system is used. When introducing proper nouns, where possible I have chosen to use spellings either already in common use or preferred by the person, institution, or organization in question (as shown, for example, on their official websites or in their own correspondence, etc.).