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Nuclear Risk Reduction Approach for the Korean Peninsula

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Nuclear Risk Reduction Approach for the Korean Peninsula Open Nuclear Network’s NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION APPROACH FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA Open Nuclear Network’s NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION APPROACH FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA September 2020 ABSTRACT Open Nuclear Network (ONN), a programme of One Earth Future, is a non-governmental organisation committed to global peacebuilding efforts via the two-pronged approach explained in this paper. ONN is dedicated to reducing nuclear risks through the use of open source data analysis and engagement with decision makers in areas of conflict. Its focus this year — the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War — is on the Korean Peninsula and the continued tension in the region. This paper examines the complex entanglement surrounding the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear crisis and identifies possible triggers and pathways towards conflict escalation. It serves both as a guide to establishing a general operational concept and as an action plan outline for ONN’s analysts and its Engagement Network to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons may be used in response to error, uncertainty and misdirection during times of crisis. CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 01 II. SIX COUNTRY PROFILES ........................................................................................... 02 A. China .................................................................................................................................................02 B. DPRK .................................................................................................................................................04 C. Japan .................................................................................................................................................07 D. ROK ...................................................................................................................................................09 E. Russia.................................................................................................................................................11 F. United States ....................................................................................................................................13 III. ESCALATION SCENARIOS ........................................................................................ 17 A. Limited Military Exchange ............................................................................................................17 1. Crossing United States' Redlines ............................................................................................... 17 2. Crossing DPRK's Redlines .......................................................................................................... 19 3. Crossing Inter-Korean Redlines ................................................................................................. 21 B. Major Changes in Military Balance .............................................................................................24 1. Nuclear and Missile Testing ....................................................................................................... 24 2. United States Troop Withdrawal .............................................................................................. 26 3. Redeployment of United States' Nuclear Weapons ............................................................... 27 4. Conventional Military Buildup in ROK ..................................................................................... 28 5. Pursuit of Offensive Capabilities by Japan .............................................................................. 28 C. DPRK Leadership Crisis ................................................................................................................28 1. Natural Death of Leader ............................................................................................................ 29 2. Coup d’État ................................................................................................................................. 30 3. Foreign Assassination ................................................................................................................. 30 D. Natural Disasters and Accidents ................................................................................................31 1. Nuclear-related Accident ........................................................................................................... 31 2. Humanitarian Crisis .................................................................................................................... 31 IV. ONN ACTION PLAN ................................................................................................... 33 A. Analytical Work ..............................................................................................................................33 1. Monitoring Activities .................................................................................................................. 33 a. Limited Military Exchanges ..........................................................................33 i. Crossing United States' Redlines .........................................................33 ii. Crossing DPRK's Redlines ...................................................................35 iii. Crossing Inter-Korean Redlines ..........................................................35 b. Major Changes in Military Balance ..............................................................36 i. Nuclear and Missile Testing ................................................................36 ii. United States' Troop Withdrawal .......................................................37 iii. Redeployment of United States' Nuclear Weapons ...........................38 iv. Conventional Military Buildup in ROK ................................................38 v. Pursuit of Offensive Capabilities by Japan ..........................................39 c. DPRK Leadership Crisis .................................................................................39 i. Natural Death of Leader .....................................................................39 ii. Coup d’État .........................................................................................39 iii. Foreign Assassination ........................................................................40 d. Natural Disasters and Accidents...................................................................40 i. Nuclear-Related Accident ....................................................................40 ii. Humanitarian Crisis ............................................................................40 2. Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 40 a. Multilingual Monitoring of Information .......................................................41 b. Satellite Imagery Analysis ............................................................................41 c. Ground Photo/Video Analysis ......................................................................42 d. Text Analysis ................................................................................................42 B. Engagement Network ...................................................................................................................43 1. Members ...................................................................................................................................... 43 2. Interface with ONN ................................................................................................................... 44 3. Activities ....................................................................................................................................... 45 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 47 ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................. 48 ENDNOTES ......................................................................................................................... 49 Open Nuclear Network’s Nuclear Risk Reduction Approach for the Korean Peninsula | 01 While ONN has identified five major contexts I. INTRODUCTION of conflict which could lead to nuclear use, Open Nuclear Network (ONN) is an independent its primary focus at this time is the Korean non-governmental organisation with a mission Peninsula. Should ONN demonstrate positive to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being impact in this context, it will gradually scale used due to error, uncertainty or misdirection, up its work to other conflict contexts: China/ particularly in the context of escalating United States; NATO/Russia; India/Pakistan; conflict. To achieve its goal, ONN has created and Iran/Israel/United States. a two-pronged approach using open source Since the armistice of the Korean War, a number data analysis and the engagement of decision of attempts have been made to fundamentally makers. alter the security environment in Northeast With the help of the Datayo software platform, Asia. Over the years, the nuclear programme which was designed specifically to facilitate of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ONN’s open source data monitoring and (DPRK) has become more sophisticated,
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