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Korean Unification Prospects and the United States' Policy

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Korean Unification Prospects and the United States' Policy Ad Americam. Journal of American Studies 14 (2013): 37-49 ISSN 1896-9461 DOI: 10.12797/AdAmericam.14.2013.14.03 Marcin Grabowski Institute of Political Science and International Relations Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland Korean Unification Prospects and the United States’ Policy Korean unification seemed a conceivable prospect at the turn of the century, especially after the Inter ‑Korean summit in 2000. This is not the case nowadays, however, in light of the provocative behavior of the North Korean regime in 2010, 2012 and 2013 (especially the declarations made in March 2013). Since such an option seems likely in the future, U.S. foreign policy ‑makers should ana‑ lyze possible scenarios for Korean integration and its influence on the regional system. The costs of such an endeavor are hard to estimate, although using German unification for comparison, we may expect that such a process could ruin the economies of both Ko‑ reas, as well as the socio‑political systems of both countries. There are even greater doubts concerning whether there is any actor in the regional scene that could support Korean unification. As for the main regional players – China, Japan and the United States – such a change would be a serious challenge. This is why it is important to focus on the German example in order to strengthen the regional trust and alliance system. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the crucial Northeast Asian challenge of American foreign policy, present the possibilities of Korean unification, assess its costs, use German unification as a point of comparison, and assess the possible influence of Ko‑ rean unification on the regional system and the approaches of regional powers towards the process of creating a New Korea. espite its limited potential in terms of population and territory, the Korean Pen‑ Dinsula seems to be a crucial factor for regional and even global strategic rela‑ tions, as well as a balance of power. Having in mind the North Korean declarations of March 2013, including declarations of preemptive nuclear strikes against the U.S., withdrawing from the non ‑aggression pact with South Korea, and eventually end‑ ing the armistice of 1953, it is hard to imagine further cooperation or integration leading to unification of the Koreas. Former events, such as North Korea’s rocket launch of 2012 (proving it is capable of producing intercontinental ballistic missiles), or the sinking of a South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island in November 2010, have increased fears concerning peace and 38 Marcin Grabowski stability in Northeast Asia and the chances for Korean unification in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as between North and South Korea, will be restored in the future, as there is support from the American administration (especially the newly appointed secretary of state, John Kerry) and newly elected South Korean President Park Geun ‑Hye (unlike her pre‑ decessor, President Lee Myung ‑bak). Such dialogue seems a remote prospect at the moment, due to the provocative behavior of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong ‑un. It is worth noting, however, that such behavior could be connected with the succes‑ sion of power from Kim Jong ‑il to his youngest son, Kim Jong ‑un (including an in‑ ternal power struggle between Kim Jong ‑un and the military1), therefore we should perceive it as merely a temporary disturbance in the regional system. The unification of the two Korean states, the Republic of Korea and the Demo‑ cratic People’s Republic of Korea, is not an easy process due to more important, structural factors that will be characterized here. The costs of such an endeavor are hard to estimate, although when German unification is used as a point of compari‑ son, we may expect that such a process could ruin both economies, and subsequently the socio‑political systems of both countries. There are even greater doubts whether there is any actor on the regional scene that could support Korean unification. As for the main regional players – China, Japan and the United States – such a change would cause a serious challenge. This is why it is important to focus on the German example again and increase the regional trust and alliance system. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the crucial Northeast Asian challenge of American foreign policy, present possibilities of Korean unification, assess its costs, use German unification as a point of comparison, present possible models of inte‑ gration, and assess the possible influence of Korean unification on the regional sys‑ tem and the approaches of regional powers towards the process of creating a New Korea. For an analysis of the regional system, the regional powers (triangular per‑ spective) and regional organizations modified systemic theory (as well as mixed approach) will be used. scenarios of unification There are three basic scenarios of Korean unification analyzed in various sources and presented in the Institute of International Economics Report (Noland ed.), as well as the CSIS analysis (A Blueprint for U.S. Policy) and RAND Corporation analy‑ sis (Wolf, Akramov), although a bit differently.2 As for the U.S. policy, the Council of Foreign Relations Task Force analyzes four policy options connected especially with the North Korean nuclear program, including explicit acquiescence, containment 1 It is worth noticing, however, that we should not expect important changes within the North Korean system in the short term. However, in the long term, Kim Jong‑un may be open to some, especially economic, reforms, as it may help him gain proper legitimacy (Lankov). For more about power transitions, including the role of military provocations and changes in military cadres, see Jin ‑Ha Kim. 2 An additional, fourth scenario of disequilibrium and potential external intervention is discussed in Pollack and Chung Min Lee (75‑82). Korean Unification Prospects and the United States’ Policy 39 and management, rollback, and regime change. Of these, containment and manage‑ ment or rollback are advised (U.S. Policy Toward 11 ‑19). The first scenario is based on the assumption of peaceful integration of the Korean Peninsula, and is defined as a “soft landing” by the CSIS. It requires cooperation from both Korean and international actors (especially four powers: the U.S., Japan, China and Russia), based on acceptance of the status quo by all important actors, mutual dip‑ lomatic recognition, a formal peace treaty, the prolonged peaceful coexistence of the Koreas, accompanied by greater integration between the two Korean states (starting from, and based on, economic interaction) and structural change (similar to the “one country – two systems – two governments” model adapted from China) with eventual unification.3 Charles Wolf and Kamil Akramov suggest adopting and implementing China’s economic model, with liberalization of the economic system, opening capital and trade transactions, and decentralizing the economic system. Economic interaction and cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan can serve as an example for this model (Wolf, Akramov 22 ‑23). This scenario seems to be the most likely and the most beneficial for the regional system, including regional organizations and great powers of the region. This is the sole scenario which would guarantee stability of the regional system, although it presents certain risks for American regional policy, including its alliance with South Korea, which would be affected by North ‑South tensions.4 The second scenario is integration “by default,” as described in CSIS analysis and based on the collapse of North Korea, especially its economic system, followed by the collapse of the state and absorption of the North by South Korea. Paradoxically, despite the total disintegration of the North Korean economy, the state cannot be perceived as a fallen state, since the state apparatus, supported by a strong military, is still capable of functioning.5 In the model presented above, the regime collapses as a result of a triggering event (either from below, such as mass protests, or from above, such as a change in the elite), resulting in sudden unification without proper preparation. Such a process would probably require limited external intervention to restore order in North Korea (it is disputable whether only South Korean or joint U.S. ‑South Korean intervention would be necessary, and if so, how it would influ‑ ence the regional system), and high priority interim measures of population control would probably be unavoidable (such as border maintenance, refugee processing, control of labor migration). Integration in all spheres (political, social and economic) would be acute, and such a scenario seems to be very dangerous for the Korean Peninsula and the regional system, as well as the international system in general.6 3 This model is based on economic interactions and the following integration, accompa‑ nied by social and political interaction, resulting from economic cooperation (See A Blueprint for U.S. Policy 3 ‑4). Such a gradual model of unification is perceived as the sole model for U.S. policy goals towards the Korean Peninsula, since it takes into consideration many dangers and dilemmas. The model is analyzed in Snyder (1998: 39‑50). 4 Lee Myung ‑bak’s policy supported the best South Korea ‑United States alliance rela‑ tions in history (see Manyin et al. 1). 5 North Korea is ranked 22nd in the Failed States Index 2012 prepared by the Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, scoring 95.5 (The Failed States Index 2012). 6 See A Blueprint for U.S. Policy (3 ‑4). A. Foster ‑Carter perceives such a scenario as the most likely, and thus suggests undertaking all measures preemptively in order to ensure a softer landing for the North Korean part of the Peninsula (Foster ‑Carter 27 ‑38).
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