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Nuclear Threshold Lowered? Print ISSN 2433-4189 / Online ISSN 2433-4197 グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書 第6号 GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 6 NDA-FOI Joint Seminar Nuclear Threshold Lowered? Coedited by Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström 防衛大学校先端学術推進機構 グローバルセキュリティセンター © National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense 1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239-8686 JAPAN Global Security Seminar Series No.6 NDA-FOI Joint Seminar Nuclear Threshold Lowered? Coedited by Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström March 2021 Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy Yokosuka, Japan i CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 Frank A. Rose Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review? 7 CHAPTER 2 Hirofumi Tosaki Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: 20 A Japanese Perspective CHAPTER 3 John Rydquist Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and 38 Strategic Stability post-INF CHAPTER 4 Naomi Koizumi Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence: 50 From Strategic Nuclear Deterrence to Hybrid Warfare CHAPTER 5 Masahiro Kurita Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia: 63 Emerging Risks CHAPTER 6 Johan Englund China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino–Indian Relations in the 77 Nuclear Realm CHAPTER 7 Hideya Kurata Escaping from the Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox: 93 The DPRK’s Initial Escalation Ladders in War Strategy CHAPTER 8 Jerker Hellström North Korea’s Nuclear Posture after the Summit 105 Meetings: A View from China CHAPTER 9 Takeshi Watanabe South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain behind 110 Coercion: A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances CONTRIBUTORS 124 ii GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security. The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This series consists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of the authors. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy (NDA) and Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launched a joint research project, called NDA-FOI Joint Seminars based on the Memorandum of Understanding between Japan Ministry of Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense cooperation. This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA-FOI Joint Seminars on “Nuclear Threshold Lowered?” held on March 5, 2019. Most of the chapters are revised or up-dated to reflect the views expressed during the course of the seminar. On behalf of GS and FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not only to the contributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of this publication, but also to all those who attended the seminar and participated in the discussions. The views expressed in each of the chapters, however, strictly represent those of the respective authors, and so go the credits. We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of discussion among readers. Comments and suggestions on our joint research project are more than welcome. March 2021 Hideya Kurata Director of Center for Global Security National Defense Academy Copyright ©2021 by National Defense Academy of Japan. Published by the Center for Global Security, Institute for Advanced Studies, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, JAPAN. iii Introduction (Kurata, Hellström, Rydqvist and Englund) 1 INTRODUCTION Hideya Kurata, Jerker Hellström, John Rydqvist, Johan Englund Nuclear dilemmas in East Asia and the transatlantic region have continued to abate. However, the problem has been closely connected to the widespread political contention and hostile behavior from two major authoritarian regimes, namely, Russia and China, which continue to prioritize the modernization of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Missile build-up has been of particular concern due to the dual nature of the systems. With their superior regional nuclear forces, Russia and China may intend to deter allied countries, such as the United States (U.S.), from intervening with its ally countries, should they determine that a local war of aggression is in their interest. Such examples include, but are not limited to, China’s invasion of Taiwan or the Russian war against east European NATO countries or allies. In war, missile forces can contribute to regional area access and denial because they can provide these powers with the capability to target strategic assets with high precision. At the same time, nuclear forces can be used to control escalation, such that war remains limited and winnable within terms favorable to China or Russia. In addition, the need to offset continued American superiority in terms of conventional strike capability can partially explain the focus on regional nuclear forces. Such regional strategic priorities are in contrast with arms control measures in several aspects. Therefore, Russia opts to breach its obligations to several arms control treaties, which led to the collapse of old arms control regimes, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Conversely, China continues to reject any serious dialog on regional and strategic nuclear balance, let alone accept participation in any new arms control regimes, whose fate is tied to the evolving European and East Asian developments. Failure from the Russian and U.S. 2 Introduction (Kurata, Hellström, Rydqvist and Englund) sides to negotiate a follow-on treaty to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which is due to expire in 2021. The treaty can be prolonged for up to five years. However, regardless of agreement after the 2020 U.S. election, a new formula should be established if strategic arms were to remain restricted in the long-term. Inherently, the nuclear dilemmas faced by the democratic alliance are a consequence of the ambitions and goals entertained by China and Russia. In their unique ways, they aim to reshape and dominate regional and global orders by changing norms and challenging the rights and interests of neighbors through military coercion or force if necessary. Hence, the free world is left with no choice but to react and resist the detrimental behavior of the two powers. In short- and medium-terms, such a scenario will necessitate reinforcement of deterrence across conflict domains, including extended nuclear deterrence. In the current situation, this scheme is the only means for ensuring strategic stability. Alternatively, North Korea continues to develop short-, medium-, and long-range nuclear strike capabilities. In other words, the nuclear ambition of the regime in Pyongyang remains a major threat to international security. New initiatives by the Trump administration to find solutions to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, such as two U.S.–Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) summits, prove to be null. In addition, although North Korea has refrained from nuclear or long-range missile tests since 2017, it will undoubtedly continue to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. The jury is out to determine whether any progress can be made in the final year of the Trump administration. Therefore, any deal acceptable to North Korea should include a form of step-by-step sanction relief in return for a step-by-step complete, irreversible, and verifiable disarmament. Outside of North Korea, the world remains skeptical about its sincerity and, therefore, is reluctant to reward North Korea before the existence of a proof of substantial progress toward denuclearization. The track-record of the Kim regime, lack of trust between parties, and security dilemmas guiding the behavior of North Korean renders continued nuclear build-up an extremely more likely scenario to the detriment of other countries. Introduction (Kurata, Hellström, Rydqvist and Englund) 3 Many of the abovementioned issues were discernable even in early 2019 during a seminar convened by the Center for Global Security at the National Defense Academy (NDA) in Japan and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) to address security threats and responses to such challenges. This publication is based on papers presented at the joint seminar and subsequent discussions. The chapters presented herein provide various perspectives on security challenges as depicted by scholars from Japan and Sweden with special participation from scholars from the U.S. In Chapter One, Frank Rose of Brookings (assistant secretary for arms control, verification, and compliance under the Obama administration), provides an assessment of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Rose concludes that although the NPR of the Trump administration is indeed responsive to threats faced by the country and its allies, the President’s controversial public statements and heavy price tag of the strategic nuclear modernization program challenged the bipartisan consensus on the nuclear policy. He notes that the chances of success of the Trump administration may improve with the calibration of its public messages; effective engagement of the U.S. Congress, general public, and allies on the importance of nuclear deterrence; advance pragmatic arms control and non-proliferation initiatives; and enhancement of strategic stability with potential adversaries, such as Russia and China. Chapter Two features Hirofumi Tosaki of the Japan Institute of International Affairs who addresses the U.S. NPR of 2018 and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the INF Treaty, and Japan’s positions.
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