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India/Pakistan - Description of Events in Indian/Pakistani Conflict, 1965 (From Indian Government)

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India/Pakistan - Description of Events in Indian/Pakistani Conflict, 1965 (From Indian Government) UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 40 Date 30/05/2006 Time 9:39:27 AM S-0863-0004-01 -00001 Expanded Number S-0863-0004-01 -00001 items-in-Peace-keeping operations - India/Pakistan - description of events in Indian/Pakistani conflict, 1965 (from Indian government) Date Created 01/01/1000 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0863-0004: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: India/Pakistan Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE CURRENRRENT INDOPAK CONFLICT S.No. Event Date 1. Pakistan Infiltration In J&K *fth/5th August '65. 2. Attacks on Kargil-Leh Road 8th, 9th & 10th August, 1965. 3. Capture of Kargil Posts by 15th August, 1965 Indian troops *K Continuous (*f8 hours) firing in 20th and 21st Chhamb by Pakistan regular troops August, 1965. 5. Crossing of Ceasefire Line in 2^th August, 1965 Tithwal Sector by Indian troops 6. Crossing of Ceasefire Line in 26th August, 1965. Uri-Poonch Bulge by Indian troops 7. Capture of Haji Pir Pass by 28th August, 1965 Indian troops 8. Attack in Chhamb By Pakistan 1st September '65 regular troops with armour and air support* 9. Attack on Amritsar by Pakistan 5th September '65 Air Force 10. Crossing of Punjab border in 6th September, '65 Lahore Sector by Indian troops 11. Paradropping of Pak troops in 6th September, '65 India (night) 12. Bombing ©f Indian Airfields from 6th September, *65 Jamnagar to Kalaikunda by Pakistan. 13* Bombarding of Dwarka Port by 7th/8th (night) Pakistan Navy. September, 1965 1^. Crossing of Jammu-West Pakistan 8th September, '65 and Rajasthan-West Pakistan borders by Indian troops 15. Bombing of Bagdogra Airfield in 10th September, '65 West Bengal by Pakistan. 16. Bombing of Barrackpore Airfield 1*ith September, '65 (near Calcutta) and Agartala civil Airfield (in Tripura State) by pak Air Force. AGGRESSION BY PAKISTAN It is clear from an examination of facts that have come to light that Pakistan had deep-seated plans to use force in Jammu and Kashmir* This is not / only supported by statements made from time to time by persons in authority in Pakistan, but also from other measures that were being taken in the months prior to \ the massive armed infiltration that started from the Pakistani side into Kashmir on 5th August 1965« The expression of pious hopes at the time of signing of the Kutch-West Pakistan cease-fire Agreement, relating to the reduction of tension all along the Indo-Pakistan border, was a camouflage and, indeed, the Pakistani military action in Kuteh Itself was probably a diversionary tactic to take the minds of all concerned off from all that was going on with regard to plans for use of force by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. 2. Reports have been received, since the beginning of the year, about the training of Pakistani personnel in commando and guerilla tactics, more particularly In and near Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The statements made by Pakistani leaders from time to time also, unwittingly, fit in with the more concrete evidence which has since become available about the plans for the use of force in Kashmir* 3* Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, had threatened an Algerian type of struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. The President of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Abdul Harold Khan,said after meeting President Ayub, that, the Pakistan President "would take more drastic measures to bring about the 'liberation' of Kashmir." (Pakistan Times, Lahore, January 6, 1965). Later Mr* Hamld said that "Kashmiris did not consult anybody in 19^7 while starting Jehad and they would not -2- do so now". (Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 8, 1965)* It is interesting to note that the 19V? action was an armed raid from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir and so also is the phenomena (massive infiltration) that has been observed since 5th August 1965* M-. Even while the Kutch trouble was not over, Pakistan took certain military steps with reference to Jammu and Kashmir* Gen. Husa, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, paid two visits to the forward areas near the cease-fire line in May 1965 - an extraordinary step in itself. What is more significant, on his second visit, of May 13» he was accompanied by his planning staff and after a conference with senior commanders he said that he was satisfied that all steps had been completed to deal with "any eventuality." (Dawn, Karachi, May 31, 1965). Compulsory military training for students and young men between the ages of 16 and 25 was ordered by the Government of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for the "liberation of Jammu and Kashmir". (Khyber Mall, May 29, 1965). In June, the Pakistan Government promulgated an ordinance making it obligatory on employers to release military reservists on recall. Another ordinance provided for the recall of air-force reservists. The Mujahid force, hitherto a kind of volunteer organisation,was integrated into the Pakistan Army, by being brought under the Pakistan Army Act. Further corroboration Is available from the statements of captured Pakistani armed infiltrators about the measures that had been worked out. 5* An overall plan known by the name of Operation "Gibraltar" was conceived and worked out through Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division of the ... 3A -3- Pakistan Army, In May 1965. It Is significant that it is the same General who is in overall charge of Pakistan forces manning the Cease-fire line, and thus familiar with the terrain in which the operation was to be launched. Apart from the Headquarters "Gibraltar Forces", field forces by the name of Tariq, Kasim, Khalld, Salahuddin, Ghaznavi and Babar etc. were constituted. Each force commander had under him from three to five companies, organised on the same basis as the normal Azad Kashmir Battalions. In fact the companies were substantially drawn from the A.K. (Azad Kashmir) battalions and commanded by A.K. officers and JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers), though there was a sprinkling of officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) from more regular Pakistani forces, like 19 Para Baluch or the Special Service Group of the Pakistan Army. A number of Majahids were also Integrated into the companies, so as to reduce drawal of personnel of Pakistan and A.K. battalions. 6, It is further known from the statements of captured infiltrators that training was carried on in sector Headquarters in the use of weapons, field engineering, guerilla warfare, laying of ambushes and long marches. Each company was provided with sten guns for company and platoon Commanders, one LMG per section <* and Sten or rifle and four grenades per other person. In addition 200 Ibs* plastic explosives, 100 Ibs. detonators, two mines and one blendlcide per company was carried. The tasks allotted were raiding of formation/unit Headquarters and blow up of ammunition dumps, destruction of bridges, laying of ambushes, inflicting of casualties and disruption of lines of communication. Each force commander was given a wireless set for communication with the A.K. battalion commanders and through them with Headquarters of the 12 Pakistan ..-. v- -If- Infantry division* Transistors were supplied to each company and platoon for receiving instructions in code on given frequencies at fixed times. Rations, medical supplies, currency notes etc* were also provided. Extracts such as statements given by captured personnel given in the Appendix to this note are solid corroboration, if any were needed, for the above details of the plan which was master-minded by the highest in Pakistan. 7. Direct evidence of Pakistan's complicity in the armed infiltration is available from the ammunition with Pakistan ordnance factory markings, recovered from captured personnel (photostats enclosed). It also seems that Pakistan ordnance factories manufactured considerable quantities of unmarked ammunition. Some of the arms have their markings erased and some must have been purchased abroad with foreign exchange supplied by Pakistan. The Pakistan Radio and press have been the main propaganda organs of the so-called revolutionary council and the ghost radio has been operating from near Muzzafarabad, on frequencies allotted to Pakistan. The Infiltrators into the Kashmir valley are people mainly from the other side of the Cease-fire Line and the rest from other areas of Pakistan, without any linguistic or racial affinity to the people of the Kashmir valley. 8. The operation was timed with the observance of a demonstration In Srinagar on the anniversary of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on 9th August. Accordingly, all commanders connected with the operation "Gibraltar" were summoned to Murree in the second week of July 1965* According to statements made by prisoners, President Ayub Khan himself addressed the Commanders to explain to them their tasks in Jammu and Kashmir. To enable armed infiltrators to reach their targets in time, the -5- crossings started on 5th August and came to notice almost immediately. The Indian police forees which were responsible for normal maintenance of internal order were surprised by the infiltrators in one or two incidents but very soon the Indian security forces got a measure of the problem and swung into action against the armed Pakistani raiders. So much so, that even before 9th August a sizeable number of them had been liquidated and considerable numbers had been captured as prisoners. Their acts of depredation, extending from Kargil to | Jaurian along the Cease-fire Line and international border and in a few cases in Isolated places in the valley, failed to achieve their objective. Vlhat is more, not only did the infiltrators not get the expected collaboration of any section of the people In Kashmir, but the persons on whose expected demonstration the infiltrators were given to understand they could capitalise displayed no concern about the task of the infiltrators.
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