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India/Pakistan - Description of Events in Indian/Pakistani Conflict, 1965 (From Indian Government)

India/Pakistan - Description of Events in Indian/Pakistani Conflict, 1965 (From Indian Government)

UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 40 Date 30/05/2006 Time 9:39:27 AM

S-0863-0004-01 -00001

Expanded Number S-0863-0004-01 -00001

items-in-Peace-keeping operations - / - description of events in Indian/Pakistani conflict, 1965 (from Indian government)

Date Created 01/01/1000

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0863-0004: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: India/Pakistan

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE CURRENRRENT INDOPAK CONFLICT

S.No. Event Date 1. Pakistan Infiltration In J&K *fth/5th August '65. 2. Attacks on -Leh Road 8th, 9th & 10th August, 1965. 3. Capture of Kargil Posts by 15th August, 1965 Indian troops *K Continuous (*f8 hours) firing in 20th and 21st Chhamb by Pakistan regular troops August, 1965. 5. Crossing of Ceasefire Line in 2^th August, 1965 Tithwal Sector by Indian troops 6. Crossing of Ceasefire Line in 26th August, 1965. Uri-Poonch Bulge by Indian troops 7. Capture of Haji Pir Pass by 28th August, 1965 Indian troops 8. Attack in Chhamb By Pakistan 1st September '65 regular troops with armour and air support* 9. Attack on Amritsar by Pakistan 5th September '65 Air Force 10. Crossing of Punjab border in 6th September, '65 Lahore Sector by Indian troops 11. Paradropping of Pak troops in 6th September, '65 India (night) 12. Bombing ©f Indian Airfields from 6th September, *65 Jamnagar to Kalaikunda by Pakistan. 13* Bombarding of Dwarka Port by 7th/8th (night) . September, 1965 1^. Crossing of Jammu- 8th September, '65 and Rajasthan-West Pakistan borders by Indian troops 15. Bombing of Bagdogra Airfield in 10th September, '65 West Bengal by Pakistan. 16. Bombing of Barrackpore Airfield 1*ith September, '65 (near Calcutta) and Agartala civil Airfield (in Tripura State) by pak Air Force. AGGRESSION BY PAKISTAN

It is clear from an examination of facts that have come to light that Pakistan had deep-seated plans to use force in Jammu and * This is not / only supported by statements made from time to time by persons in authority in Pakistan, but also from other measures that were being taken in the months prior to \ the massive armed infiltration that started from the Pakistani side into Kashmir on 5th August 1965« The expression of pious hopes at the time of signing of the Kutch-West Pakistan cease-fire Agreement, relating to the reduction of tension all along the Indo-Pakistan border, was a camouflage and, indeed, the Pakistani military action in Kuteh Itself was probably a diversionary tactic to take the minds of all concerned off from all that was going on with regard to plans for use of force by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.

2. Reports have been received, since the beginning of the year, about the training of Pakistani personnel in and guerilla tactics, more particularly In and near Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The statements made by Pakistani leaders from time to time also, unwittingly, fit in with the more concrete evidence which has since become available about the plans for the use of force in Kashmir* 3* Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, had threatened an Algerian type of struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. The President of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Abdul Harold Khan,said after meeting President Ayub, that, the Pakistan President "would take more drastic measures to bring about the 'liberation' of Kashmir." (Pakistan Times, Lahore, January 6, 1965). Later Mr* Hamld said that "Kashmiris did not consult anybody in 19^7 while starting Jehad and they would not -2- do so now". (Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 8, 1965)* It is interesting to note that the 19V? action was an armed raid from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir and so also is the phenomena (massive infiltration) that has been observed since 5th August 1965*

M-. Even while the Kutch trouble was not over, Pakistan took certain military steps with reference to Jammu and Kashmir* Gen. Husa, C-in-C of the , paid two visits to the forward areas near the cease-fire line in May 1965 - an extraordinary step in itself. What is more significant, on his second visit, of May 13» he was accompanied by his planning staff and after a conference with senior commanders he said that he was satisfied that all steps had been completed to deal with "any eventuality." (Dawn, Karachi, May 31, 1965). Compulsory military training for students and young men between the ages of 16 and 25 was ordered by the Government of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for the "liberation of Jammu and Kashmir". (Khyber Mall, May 29, 1965). In June, the Pakistan Government promulgated an ordinance making it obligatory on employers to release military reservists on recall. Another ordinance provided for the recall of air-force reservists. The , hitherto a kind of volunteer organisation,was integrated into the Pakistan Army, by being brought under the Pakistan Army Act. Further corroboration Is available from the statements of captured Pakistani armed infiltrators about the measures that had been worked out.

5* An overall plan known by the name of Operation "Gibraltar" was conceived and worked out through General , GOC 12 of the ... 3A -3-

Pakistan Army, In May 1965. It Is significant that it is the same General who is in overall charge of Pakistan forces manning the Cease-fire line, and thus familiar with the terrain in which the operation was to be launched. Apart from the Headquarters "Gibraltar Forces", field forces by the name of Tariq, Kasim, Khalld, Salahuddin, Ghaznavi and Babar etc. were constituted. Each force commander had under him from three to five companies, organised on the same basis as the normal Azad Kashmir . In fact the companies were substantially drawn from the A.K. (Azad Kashmir) battalions and commanded by A.K. officers and JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers), though there was a sprinkling of officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) from more regular Pakistani forces, like 19 Baluch or the of the Pakistan Army. A number of Majahids were also Integrated into the companies, so as to reduce drawal of personnel of Pakistan and A.K. battalions.

6, It is further known from the statements of captured infiltrators that training was carried on in sector Headquarters in the use of weapons, field engineering, guerilla warfare, laying of ambushes and long marches. Each was provided with sten guns for company and platoon Commanders, one LMG per section <* and Sten or rifle and four grenades per other person. In addition 200 Ibs* plastic explosives, 100 Ibs. detonators, two mines and one blendlcide per company was carried. The tasks allotted were raiding of formation/unit Headquarters and blow up of ammunition dumps, destruction of bridges, laying of ambushes, inflicting of casualties and disruption of lines of communication. Each force commander was given a wireless set for communication with the A.K. commanders and through them with Headquarters of the 12 Pakistan ..-. v- -If-

Infantry division* Transistors were supplied to each company and platoon for receiving instructions in code on given frequencies at fixed times. Rations, medical supplies, currency notes etc* were also provided. Extracts such as statements given by captured personnel given in the Appendix to this note are solid corroboration, if any were needed, for the above details of the plan which was master-minded by the highest in Pakistan.

7. Direct evidence of Pakistan's complicity in the armed infiltration is available from the ammunition with Pakistan ordnance factory markings, recovered from captured personnel (photostats enclosed). It also seems that Pakistan ordnance factories manufactured considerable quantities of unmarked ammunition. Some of the arms have their markings erased and some must have been purchased abroad with foreign exchange supplied by Pakistan. The Pakistan Radio and press have been the main propaganda organs of the so-called revolutionary council and the ghost radio has been operating from near Muzzafarabad, on frequencies allotted to Pakistan. The Infiltrators into the Kashmir valley are people mainly from the other side of the Cease-fire Line and the rest from other areas of Pakistan, without any linguistic or racial affinity to the people of the Kashmir valley.

8. The operation was timed with the observance of a demonstration In Srinagar on the anniversary of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on 9th August. Accordingly, all commanders connected with the operation "Gibraltar" were summoned to Murree in the second week of July 1965* According to statements made by prisoners, President himself addressed the Commanders to explain to them their tasks in Jammu and Kashmir. To enable armed infiltrators to reach their targets in time, the -5-

crossings started on 5th August and came to notice almost immediately. The Indian police forees which were responsible for normal maintenance of internal order were surprised by the infiltrators in one or two incidents but very soon the Indian security forces got a measure of the problem and swung into action against the armed Pakistani raiders. So much so, that even before 9th August a sizeable number of them had been liquidated and considerable numbers had been captured as prisoners. Their acts of depredation, extending from Kargil to | Jaurian along the Cease-fire Line and international border and in a few cases in Isolated places in the valley, failed to achieve their objective. Vlhat is more, not only did the infiltrators not get the expected collaboration of any section of the people In Kashmir, but the persons on whose expected demonstration the infiltrators were given to understand they could capitalise displayed no concern about the task of the infiltrators. On the other hand the people helped the security forces to deal with the raiders.

9. Pakistan seemed to have been taken aback by the failure of what it had considered a well conceived and well planned operation for the use of force by clandestine means. When the infiltrators became hard-pressed, largely in areas close to the Cease-fire Line, Pakistan troops manning the Cease-fire Line stepped up firing all over, to distract the Indian security forces from dealing with the infiltrators. In the area of Chhamb, where a large body of infiltrators had been encircled by Indian security forces chasing them, Pakistan launched a rescue operation through a *t8 hour barrage of artillery fire and, in a measure, succeeded in relieving the pressure on the infiltrators, though at a great cost in loss of life on the Pakistani side also* It will be noticed -6- that the Pakistani connection with armed infiltration has been clear at every stage of "".

10. Indian security forces found that Pakistan had not finished by sending in one wave of infiltrators. A second wave started filtering in, to make up for the losses suffered by the first wave and to fill the void created by the exfiltration of those infiltrators who got demoralised. It was also found that Pakistan still held further reserves of trained personnel of the same type to throw into Kashmir. There was, therefore, no option for the Indian security forces but to try and seal off some of the more important of the several routes of entry which had facilitated the infiltration. The infiltration had become possible because of the unscientific nature, from the security point of view, of the Cease-fire Line alignment. The taking of posts in Kargil, Tithwal and the Haji Pir areas by Indian forces is thus explained.

11. So long as Pakistan disowned all responsibility for the armed infiltration into Kashmir, though since then significant statements have been made by Pakistani leaders (President Ayub - "how India could blame anyone from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, or for that matter any part of Pakistan, for going to the assistance of those brave people of Kashmir .....w), India was forced to deal with the armed infiltrators internally, but Pakistan, in order not to lose the initiative which It had taken, went on escalating the problem. It first stepped up activity on the Cease-fire Line to give solid support to the raiders. On first September, on the excuse of the Indian occupation of some posts on the Cease-fire Line as a limited measure of self-defence, launched a massive attack supported by armour and air power in the Chhamb-Akhnoor area across the international border and -7- the Cease-fire Line* This attack was obviously not merely retaliatory. It was greater in character than the action which India had taken in self-defence. The one purpose of the Pakistani thrust was to cut off the extended Indian line of communication whereafter it hoped that the whole of Kashmir would fall to its forces, irregular as well as regular. Pakistan had also massed other forces in support of its main aim, at Sialkot and in the Lahore sector, which would make short work of any support which India could give to the forces that were resisting the Pakistani thrust in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector. The forces at Sialkot were expected to move into Jammu and cut off Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir and leave them without a line of supply. The forces in the Lahore sector were expected to take Indian supporting forces in the rear and thus neutralise them. In fact, probing of the strength of our rear forces was started by Pakistani aerial action over Amritsar.

12. It is also now clear that Pakistan was prepared to take even more extended military action against India. The diary recovered from the body of a Pakistani pilot whose plane was brought down in the Jamnagar area (vide photostat of a page appended) shows that practice runs for flights over Adampur, Halwara, Ambala, Pal am, Agra, Bhuj and Jamnagar airfields of India had been made by this pilot in the month of April as a part of the Pakistani plans for an all out offensive against India, should this be necessary for carrying through their designs in Jammu and Kashmir.

13. No Government faced with such a military situation could have continued to fight Pakistan on its own terms. Indian forces had to move into the Lahore sector, as well as the Sialkot sector, to deal with the massive concentrations which were poised there for -8- dealing with India's extended defences. The hard battles that have since been fought in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors only prove this view of the situation. The escalation of the conflict is of Pakistan's own seeking. The only surprise may be that events have not turned out the way Pakistan expected them to.

11*-. Pakistan has been continuously escalating the fighting. The use of armour and air cover was brought about by Pakistan in the first instance. Pakistan alone has sought to use its Naval strength by bombarding Dwarka. Extended aerial action was started by Pakistani bombing of Indian airfields, from Jamnagar In the west to Agartala and Bagdogra in the east. So far as India is concerned its purpose is limited - to resist and liquidate Pakistani aggression on Indian soil. It is not India but Pakistan that seems bent on territorial gains. India has no intention either to crush or humiliate Pakistan and has refrained, despite provocation, to invoke a Naval retaliation. India has not wanted to involve in the conflict. Pakistan, however, is responsible for possible escalation that may accrue from the armed attacks on Kalaikunda and Bagdogra and flights over the Gauhati airfield and of the Brahmputra bridge near Gauhati. Ehese airfields are not only vital links for supplies to and defence of Assam, but also for the defence of India's northern borders. Extracts from statements of ..captured. Pakistani armed, infiltrators. 1. (XV 780) Captain Ghulaia Hussain of 8 A.K. ""Battalion. Qs Which battalion do you belong to? A: 8 A.K. Infantry Battalion. Q: Have you got regular commission or short service commission? A: There is only one type of commission, that is A.K. Commission. QE Are you entitled to pension? As Yes. QJ How much service have you 'got? At This is the sixth year of my commissioned seryice. Qs Where did you study? A: F.C. College, Lahore. Q: Why did you cross the Cease Fire line? A: I "had a company with me, and I had been given some targets. Q: What targets were given to you? A: The Headquarters, Naushera Bridge, and Banset Bund. Your company was given all these three tasks? Yes. What force do you belong to? A I am from Vatni Force of Gibraltor. Where did you get your training for this task? At Dung. It is in Kotli Quereta Road. About IS miles from Kotli, 4 miles from Quereta. Q: Only your<-company was trained there or the whole force? As The whole Vatni force. Q: What are those courses? A: Basic training. Qt Basic training, I can understand; but what are the other courses? At I had small Arms at Ratankot at the School of Infantry, and Tactics at , and then I did 3" mortar at Cosmando School. Q: In your Infantry ycnool you are doing the course also? As Yes. -2- ' Qs On what date did you cross the-cease fire line? As It was on the night of 4-5th August. Q: At what-place? A": From that side it is in front of That is .a post manned "by 11 A.K. Troops. Qs What happened after that? A: Well, when we crossed the cease fire line the first night, I had to reach, according to planning, the area of Fatehgarh. Qs How many miles was that? As It was about 9 miles or something. Q: The move was at night? A: The move was at night, but we could not cross more than 4 miles. May be 5 miles at the most. Qt Reason? A; It was quite difficult going, and then I had porters with me, about 40, at night, so they could not walk and I had to stop near pahad. It was a hilly area, we have been going from"one hill up and down, and before morning came we went a little back, about 500 yards, to hide ourselves in the jungle. There I left the company and went back myself during day time. That was on the 5th, and contacted 11 A.K. Battalion from there and then Brigade Headquarters, and got ten more porters. We bribed them with .amd distributed the load on those ten also, and started the next 5-6th night from Suknov area. Then to Anup jungle. Again we had to stay, because we could not move further; morning came, and then there was no place to hide. We should have gone 4 miles ahead, and stayed up there. There, there was a small jungle, and we stayed there for the day. That was the 6th. We moved from that area, and came about two miles ahead and came to Tanga, and I sent the porters back. There we dumped our ammunition, and the porters, 50 of them went back. The next day we spent there in Tanga. By that time I had given up the idea of raiding Naushera Brigade Headquarters and the bridge. Qs You originally belonged to the 8th A.K. Battalion? As Yes. Q: Who was the CO? As Lt.Col. Basharkat Ali. Qs What were you doing in that battalion? portfolio? A: I am a company commander. Q: Which Company? A: Bravo company. ! QJ In this mujahid force, did you have all men from your company or they were from the battalion? As Four from my company, five or six from other companies. -3. Q: The nucleus was from the AK Battalion? As That is what it amounts to. Qs That is the NCOs and Section Commanders? As After officers, JCOs and NCOs, plus a few Jawans. Qs Was there anybody from the Pakistan Army? A: Yes, we had three people from the SSG in each company. Q: SSG. What does it stand for? As Special Service Group. Q: Was that part of the Pakistan Army? A: Yes, Qs Which battalion did these boys belong to? A: They were from the 19th Baluch. Qs What was their rank? AJ In my company all the three were NCOs, 2 Naiks and one L/NK. In a few companies they had Jawans also. I don't remember exactly. Qs What was their role? As They actually give us help in training special • explosives and judo, that is all. Qs I understand that some of the senior officers from the Pakistan Army entertained the Company Commanders and others for lunch before this action took place, and they discussed the plan. Did you also attend that lunch? ' A: Yes, I did. I was not somebody particularly from the Pakistan Army. It was a dinner at Div Headquarters." Every force commander with two other officers. They went there for that dinner. Q: You also attended that? As I was one among them. Qs Who is the Div Commander? AJ Maj.Gen. Akhtar Mailk, 12 Div Commander. QJ Where was his headquarters located? As At murree. Q J You went to Murree? AJ Yes. -4V

2. (PSS-4478) Captain Mohammad Sa.1.1ad - 8 Balueh - Pakistan Army CUow AGO - 1867 - 18 AK>.

Q: How many children you have? As Sir, I have got four children. I have got two daughters and two sons* Qs Are they studying? As Ytes Sir. They are studying in Quetta Convent School Sir. KG-3, KG-2 and KG-1 and the next son is not studying sir. My daughter is studying in Jhelum in the Convent School,Jhelum* Qs: Which sattalion do you belong to? A: 8 Balueh Sir. Qs And your present Battalion? As Posted to 18 A.K, Qs Was there any personnel from Pakistan Array in your Battalion? As CO Sir, ; Adjutant and myself* Qs How come you were made a Company Commander? As Our CO, Sir, he was newly promoted and took over the charge of the battalion and when he came to the battalion he probably did not want to change the Quarter-master because the Adjutant was from the Pakistan Army and the Quarter-master was from the AK and probably he wanted him to stay on for some period* Qs Who was the Adjutant? As Iqbal Beg, from Frontier Force, Q: How much service have you got? ! i As 14& years* Qs What have you been doing during the last 14£ years? Where did you spend these long 14 years? As Last four years I spent in EME Centre. Sir. One Battalion EME Centre. Then two years in 8 Balueh, Three years and nine months in Balueh Centre and then five years in the battalion (8 Balueh) from 2nd/Lt.to Captain. This is the old 1st Bahawalpur (State Forces) Battalion. Qs With the 8 Balueh did you carry out any training? As Ho, Sir. I did not* Qs Where was the battalion located? As When? Qs When you were with the battalion? A: East Pakistan,Sir, -s-

Qt You have been to East Pakistan? A; Yes* QJ How long were you there in Bast Pakistan? AJ About two years* Q: What American weapons did you see? As 106 recoilless rifle in the battalion (8 Balueh) and the blendicides* Q: What is a blendicide? A: This is an anti-tank weapon,Sir* Qt What is the range? A: The range is up to 200 yards accurate* i 3. Mo. f 2421'T "Su'b'eda'r "gli'er" XT-aim "of "9 _A .K. Sattalion. What was the name of the Sector Commander? A: He is called Khilji, Sir. I do not know his full name. Q: What is his rank? A: Brigadier Sir, Brigadier Khilji. To which Division is he posted and in which Sector? A? Sir, in the 12th Division, in Murree. 0: What is the name of the Division Commander? A: Malik Akhtar Hussain. Q: What is his rank? A: Malik Akhtar Hussain, Sir. Q: Where was the rest of the Force, which was to cross the line, raised? A: Sir, our Unit was raised at Shankiari and the second one was raised at Moong Bajri and we have come along with the latter. To which Unit did they belong? A: I do not know about the Unit. They belonged to the Balooch Dn but I am not definite about it. To which group did they belong? A: Sir, they belonged to the Balooch Group. To whom did the Company report there? A: There was another battalion there, No. 2 battalion. It is named Sallauddin battalion, Sir. This was a new battalion that was raised. What was the function of this battalion, why was it raised? A: Sir, it was raised for this very purpose. What purpose? A: To cross the cease-fire line. Q: Where did the Salla-ud-din battalion cross the line? A: I think from Chor Panjal hillock towards Gulmarg. It is called Chor Panjal but I do not know its exact name. GO; .you must have heard about the task before the A: No Sir. I know nothing about the task because the Co. Commander did not tell me about that. Q: "What must have it "been in your opinion? A: I think, Sir, it was to open fire at the Divisional | HQr and inflict maximum losses "by LMG and rifle* 1 We could not have wiped off all. However, I do not ! know whether we were to aim at the ammunition dump ! or what I cannot say anything about this. We were j to go to Baramula about which the Co. Commander i told us. Q: What were the arms with you? A: Sir, we had rifles, LMGs, sten-guns and grenades. Q: How many LMGs were with you? A: Every Section of the Co. had one LMG. Q: What was the total? A: 9 LMGs in one Co. Sir. Q: Was this carted in bulk by the coolies or the por- ters were provided with? A: We had some porters. They threw it away, some of it, on the way, Sir. They dispersed there and threw it there, Sir. Q: How many porters were provided? A: Sir, we had Co.-wise 8 or 10 porters. Q: What was the quantity of ammunition that you received along with your arms? A: Each ^awan had 200 rounds for a sten-gun, 200 rounds for a rifle and 450 rounds for a LMG. Q: Did you meet anybody here after coming to India? A: I did not talk to anybody personally but our men used to bring rations after paying the persons here. Q: Did the people of the area help you or not? A: No Sir, they did not cooperate at all. My company had already dispersed. Si, I did not get assistance from anybody. Q: Did you not get any assistance? A: No Sir. Q: Where from did you purchase this flour etc. A: We gave handsome amount to the shepherds, P",10/- for every 5 seer of flour and thus could purchase with difficulty some ration. We never complajned about the dearness of it. Q: Who had. this money? A: Sir, the money was with the Platoon Commander or the Company Commander. -8-

Do you know how much money did they have? I know, Sir. They got a few thousands of rupees each in my presence and the Company. Commanders gave one thousand rupees each to the Platoon Commander. How much money the Company Commander received, I cannot say. Were you given any lectures before starting? No Sir, we were not given any lectures at any time. The Divisional Commander visited us. He came during the Sv,inkiari term. He inspected the parade. Which Divisional Commander came? A: Major General Malik Akhtar Hussain, Sir. Did Major General Akhtar Hussain tell you any thing about what you had to do? -A: Sir, he inspected the parades in each company. Some 2 companies were at firing practice, some were using their LMGs. Who others were along with Major General Akhtar Hussain? A: There was a brigadier whose name I do not know. How did these Razakars come? Were they volunteers? A: No Sir, they were not volunteers 5 in my opinion their names were somehow sent. I don't know how. They were under training in the beginning and were sent to the post for 2 months. They were given rifles after training of 2 or 3 weeks,

Q: How were they brought? A: How can I tell you. However, they volunteered at Shinkiary. But you must have been told whether they are volunteers or not? A: As a matter of fact, they were Shinkiaries - Razakars. And their organisation sprang up there and they were formed in a company there. They met us at Shinkiary. But were you aware that these volunteers who had come along \tfith you had volunteered to cross the cease-fire line. A: What can I say about this, Sir. However they r.jere with us in the company. Q: No, let me know your real opinion? A: I have nothing to hide and no opinion of my own. But I think they must have volunteered. They had no discipline at all. Had they not fled away, we might have killed them or done something. -9-

How many of those who crossed over were the regulars? What percentage of these was of the Razakars? A! Sir, it is difficult for me to let you know of the percentage. But I can tell you that there were 39 to 40 Razakars in a company. The others were regulars. x However do you think they had come as volunteers or they had been accompanying per force. What was in your opinion their objective of coming here? Do you think those who had crossed over to this side were volunteers. A; As far as the men of the armed forces are concerned, they were not volunteers. They simply belonged to Army. Were they not volunteers? A: No Sir, I can definitely tell you. Were these Razakars volunteers? A: I cannot say whether they were mercenaries or volunteers. I don't know whether they were called volunteers or not. They must be getting some sort of pay? A Yes Sir, They did get their pay. So, do you think the aim in the heart of their hearts was that they would emancipate their bretheren on this slide? A: No Sir. There was nothing except greed with which they were actuated. Had they not been getting their remuneration, r,7e would have really known whether they wanted to come of their own accord or not. As they were getting their remuneration, they had to come across as it the lust of money that makes people do any thing. .what in your opinion was the real task to be done? A: Sir, it is also my opinion that it was to spread confusion by firing and thus creating chaos. This we could not think of capturing or staying there permanently because we had no gunnery or artillery. \ -19-

Shah Mohammad, Razakar - 1st Company in 3 A.K. Battalion. Do you belong to the Azad Kashmir Battalion or you are a Razakar? As Razakar. When I was sent I was with the 1st Company in 3 A.K. Battalion. Q: Now tell me if you joined voluntarily or you %fere caught by force? A: The police caught me and brought me by force. Q: From which village? A: Dhanna. Q: Where is Dhanna. A: Dhanna is in Tehsil Kotli. Q: What did they say when they brought you? A: They said I must join. | Q: If you had not joined what would happen? A: They said they would beat me and will not leave me, Q: Did they say anything about pay? A: When they took me they said I would get some pay. But I got nothing. Q: Why then did you not run away? | A: Sir, they do not allow us to run. It is their way, I Q: You could have gone left or right? | |. A: No. We had a military Government. They do not I allow anyone to go near even for one minute. i .Q: So you think all Razakars were conscripted by force? A: Yes. All Razakars. If there are two men in the house, two are taken away. If there are three, three are taken away. 1965 110-255 IBZHHaj 20 TUESDAY u tv D

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