INDO-PAK WAR 1965 September 2015 was Fundamentally Flawed n By Maj Gen P K Chakravorty (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

HE STATE of Jammu and Kargil on May 16 and 17 1965. A Cease (J&K) acceded to on October Fire agreement was signed on July 1, 26,1947 when Pakistani invaders 1965. The Pakistanis inferred incorrectly were virtually knocking on the about the weak offensive capability of the gates of Srinagar. did Indian Army and started planning on their Tnot accept the accession and it has been cherished goal to liberate Kashmir. It is Pakistan’s aim since then to wrest J&K from important to note that the Kutch issue had India by any means and at any cost. The been resolved and India had withdrawn foreign policy of Pakistan has been to treat from the three posts she captured in Kargil. J&K as the ‘core issue’. To achieve this aim successive regimes in Pakistan have fought wars with India. CONCEPT AND PLAN FOR Operation Pakistan noted with satisfaction that OPERATION GIBRALTAR India had been humbled in the Sino-Indian had secretly Gibraltar was conflict of 1962. Pakistan befriended China approved military plans for a limited war conceptua- and looked for an opportunity to fulfil its in Kashmir by the early summer of 1965. aim militarily. Pakistan was glad that its This was approved despite opposition from lised with northern neighbour, China was more than the Chief of Army Staff, General Musa and the objective capable of standing up to India and there a few other senior Army officers. It has was a common adversary for both states. been confirmed on a later date by General of creating The historic Border Agreement signed Akhtar Malik, General Commanding large-scale between the two countries on March 2, 12 Infantry Division that he was given the 1963 where in Pakistan handed over the authority to plan and execute Operation disturbances Shaksgam Valley of J&K to China further Gibraltar. and many in J&K. It bolstered the alliance between the two senior officers were of the view that India countries. Pakistan felt the time was ripe was in no position to risk a general war and was planned for it to attempt to capture Kashmir before Pakistan had either to act bravely now or to to send the post-1962 Indian Army optimised her allow the initiative to pass to India, which capabilities. would launch an attack at a time of its about 8,000 The operations in J&K in August- own choosing. Accordingly, General Malik Pakistani September 1965 were preceded by the proceeded with the preparation of plans. operations in Kutch which commenced in Operation Gibraltar was conceptualised soldiers and February. The terrain offered advantage with the objective of creating large-scale Razakars into to Pakistan to launch offensive operations disturbances in J&K. It was planned to which were soon brought to a halt by send about 8,000 Pakistani soldiers and J&K disguised the Indian Army. As a strategic response Razakars into J&K disguised as guerrillas. as guerrillas the Indian Army deployed on the border The first phase was to create a shock in Punjab and captured three posts in wave by launching raids on selected

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targets and thereby prepare the ground the Kashmir issue. The operation was Captured arms and for a civil uprising due to the chaos and planned in the beginning of August and ammunition consternation that would be caused in the the Field Marshal addressed the officers of state. The second was the fusion of the the Gibraltar Force about their role, tasks civil uprising with the infiltration operation. and his expectations. This would compel India to take Preparation of Forces by political and military steps to tackle the The planning for the operation having situation, presenting a picture to the world been approved by the Field Marshal, that a problem exists in Kashmir. The armed commenced on May 17, 1965. Major fighters were meant to tie down Indian General Akhtar Malik the chief planner sent forces in a protracted guerrilla war in a a note to senior commanders exhorting manner similar to the war in Vietnam. By them to adopt a more aggressive attitude itself General Akhtar Malik never felt that and discard hopes of peaceful approach Operation Gibraltar would succeed as a to the Kashmir problem. By adopting stand-alone operation. Accordingly, along violent methods resulting in shock action, with Operation Gibraltar he combined India would be compelled to negotiate in which was the plan a chastened mood. The for an armoured thrust across the Cease Commanding Pakistan Forces in Kashmir Fire Line (CFL) with a view to capture was overconfident and underestimated Akhnur, thereby threatening the line of Indian capabilities. supplies from India to Srinagar. The plan The infiltrating force for the operation in principle was accepted by Field Marshal was grouped in Task Forces, with officers Ayub Khan in May 1965. He was convinced and men from the Pakistan Occupied that military action was required to resolve Kashmir battalions for better command and

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(SSG) and about 70 Razakars making a total strength of approximately 120. The POK soldiers were mostly from the commando platoons and they formed the core of the company, while the SSG personnel handled the explosives during the demolitions and sabotage. The arms and equipment supplied to these men generally did not bear Pakistani markings. Each member of the force carried a weapon, some ammunition and four grenades. Ammunition was issued on a lavish scale which comprised 200 rounds per rifle, 200-500 rounds per Sten carbine and 750 rounds per Light Machine Gun. Some companies carried 2 inch and 3 inch mortars based on the requirement. Prior to being infiltrated, the personnel were issued civilian clothing – green mazari shirt and salwar along with jungle boots. At the time of infiltration, the men of each force were given seven days composite rations. They were also issued fake identity cards and adequate Indian currency to enable them to make purchases from the locals. Each Company Commander was given Rs 10,000 to meet contingencies. This enabled the infiltrators to subsist on local food supplies for a long period. Rations and ammunition were carried by mules and porters. There was also a plan to supply major groups of infiltrators rations and ammunition by mule convoys across the CFL and arrange for airdrops. Support from locals who were pro-Pakistani, loot and arson were other means of subsistence control. The Razakars, who formed about for the infiltrators. The planning entailed 70 per cent of the force, were raised in creation of small dumps of ammunition Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in August at selected places for subsequent use by 1962. They basically had all able bodied infiltrators. civilians living near the border. Many of The Force Commanders assembled at them had been recruited forcibly by civil Murree during the second week of July authorities. The infiltrators were grouped 1965 and were addressed by the President, into ten forces and each force comprised Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Major General six units of five companies each. Each Akhtar Hussain Malik who was to monitor force was commanded by a Pakistani Army the operations of the infiltrators addressed Major and was allotted a code name. Each the Force Commanders on August 1, 1965 company was commanded by a Pakistani and focussed on issues which merited Army Captain who was called Commander. importance. He exhorted them to do their The Company comprised one to three best as it was their last chance to liberate Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), Kashmir. about 35 key personnel from the Pakistan As the forces had to move close to the Occupied Kashmir (POK) battalions or units infiltration points the move began around of Northern Scouts, and three to four Other July 24. Having reached the Cease Fire Line Ranks from the Special Services Group the infiltration commenced on August 5.

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Initially about 1,500 infiltrators crossed over in small batches and concentrated Gibraltar at selected points in Kashmir to organise themselves into larger groups. They Force concentrated mainly on Kanzalwan, Keran, Tithwal, Uri, Gulmarg, Mendhar, Punch, The Indian he ultimate aim of the Gibraltar Force Rajouri, Naushera and other areas of Army received was to create large-scale disturbances the Jammu region. The second batch of Tin the state of Jammu and Kashmir. infiltrators was pushed in the third week vague Tasks assigned were as under:- of August and comprised 6,000 infiltrators. intelligence l To establish bases for subsequent By the first week of September there was operations at various points within the another group ready for induction but reports of State of J&K with the help and support could not be sent due to counter-offensive training of of local elements. operations launched by India. l To operate from these bases as and The infiltrators worked in small groups infiltrators by when possible in order to commit acts of independently. Subsequently in the hope Pakistan and sabotage and violence. of better results, they changed their tactics l To terrorise peaceful and loyal citizens and started concentrating in selected the possibility as also to provide support to pro-Pakistani areas in larger groups. During the later of them being elements. phase of operations, they were able to l To attack civil and military personnel establish strongholds in some isolated infiltrated and Government institutions in different mountainous regions. The Gibraltar Force into J&K. parts of the state so as to disperse Indian failed to cause an uprising in the State. Army and police forces. About 1,000 personnel were killed, many However, l To create unrest and lawlessness in the managed to exfiltrate back to Pakistan and there was no State with a view to paralyse the internal by mid-October only 500 to 600 infiltrators administration and create a situation of were left in India. The force did succeed ‘actionable’ internal revolt. in committing some acts of sabotage but intelligence. l To facilitate the induction of more it failed to achieve its objectives. armed personnel from Pakistan. General l Demolition of bridges, disruption INDIAN MILITARY RESPONSE Harbaksh of lines of communication, raids on The Indian Army received vague intelligence ammunition and supply dumps. reports of training of infiltrators by Singh, l After carrying out subversive activities, Pakistan and the possibility of them being the Army the infiltrators were to merge with the infiltrated into J&K. However, there was no local population and await further orders. ‘actionable’ intelligence. General Harbaksh Commander The infiltrators were organised in Singh, the Army Commander Western Western ‘Forces’ to operate in different areas of Command stated that it was a tribute the State as follows:- to Pakistan security measures and poor Command l Force Tariq, to operate in Sonamarg, reflection on Indian intelligence operations. stated that it Dras and Kargil. India awoke to something going wrong l Force Qasim, to operate in Kupwara, when on August 5, at a village named was a tribute Gurez and Bandipur. Darra Kassi, which is located south-west to Pakistan l Force Khalid, to operate in Trehgam, of Gulmarg, a young Gujar boy named Chowkibal, Nangaon and Tithwal. Mohammed Din, while attending to his security l Force Salaudin, to operate in Uri and cattle, was approached by two men in measures Srinagar. green salwar kameez. He was offered l Force Ghaznavi, to operate in money for information on deployment of and poor Mendhar, Rajouri and Naoshera. Indian troops. The boy cooked up a story reflection l Force Babur, to operate in Kalidhar and immediately reported the matter to Range and Chhamb. Police Station at Tanmarg. An Army patrol on Indian l Force Mutaza to operate in Bandipur. was immediately despatched to the area intelligence l Force Jacob to operate in Sonamarg. and in the ensuing clash, seven infiltrators l Force Nusrat in Tithwal. were killed. Afew hours later, Wazir operations Mohammed was approached at Galuthi in

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Hudiara Bridge: A Span the Mendhar sector. He too alerted HQ 120 Meanwhile 17 PUNJAB in Kargil was blown up by retreating Infantry Brigade who despatched a column performed an outstanding task by Pak Forces that fought the intruders and compelled capturing Point 13620, Black Rocks and them to exfiltrate. Three days later, on Saddle. These posts were attacked on the August 8, two POK officers were captured night of August 14 and captured by next near Narian. The officers during their day morning. On the same day Pakistani interrogation made astounding revelations artillery directed by an Air Observation about the entire operation. The documents Post, shelled the Indian post at Dewa held by them revealed detailed plans for where an artillery ammunition dump was the execution of Operation Gibraltar. located. A stray shell blew up the dump The Pakistani infiltrators were spread and killed the Commander 191 Infantry thinly from Kargil to Akhnur. The only place Brigade, Brigadier B F Masters. Six guns they received support from the local people of 14 Field Regiment were destroyed. was in the areas of Mandi, Narian and Due to the explosion Palanwala post Budhil in 25 Infantry Division sector. During was abandoned. Immediate orders were this period, 8 KUMAON Battalion base at given by the Army Commander to move Naugam was attacked at 0600 hours on a Brigadier, an infantry battalion and a August 13. The Commanding Officer was battery of Guns from 26 Infantry Division. killed and the Second in Command was Further they were ordered to recapture injured. The situation was retrieved but the lost positions. raiders also attacked a military convoy and The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Army it took some time to control the situation. Commander and the Corps Commander Next day, it was decided that a separate HQ met at Jammu on August 17. The overall should be established for dealing with the situation was discussed. The COAS felt infiltrators in the Valley. HQ Sri Force was that Pakistan would continue to pursue the designated under Major General Umrao infiltration campaign, without recourse to Singh to undertake operations against the open warfare as such a course of action infiltrators while HQ 19 Infantry Division would fulfil its intention of compelling India moved back to Baramulla to plan for to discuss Kashmir. offensive operations. By August 18, there was a perceptible

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decrease in the tempo of infiltration and coin. Pakistani Generals and writers the focus gradually shifted to offensive have accepted that Operation Gibraltar plans. On August 21, it was assessed by was a failure and failed to achieve its Operation the 15 Corps Commander, that there were objectives. The only area it met with Gibraltar was six columns operating in J&K. Each column success was in the area of Mandi in the had eight Companies but all the Companies Jammu Division in 25 Infantry Division an audacious had not been employed till then. At a where the infiltrators were able to get operation meeting on August 21-22, the COAS and the cooperation of the local people the Army Commander directed that 15 and offer resistance to the Indian Army. launched Corps with its own resources eliminate The operation lost its sting as Pakistan’s by Pakistan, the infiltrators and launch operations to ensuing Operation Grand Slam was capture Hajipir Pass. delayed to September 1, by which time which failed Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh,the Western Army most of the infiltrators were killed or to achieve its Commander, read the infiltration campaign exfiltrated. India achieved its objectives correctly. He analysed that apart from by capturing areas which dominated the objectives. eliminating the infiltrators there was a need infiltration routes, thereby causing the Credit must to undertake offensive operations at Hajipir entire process to be terminated. and across the Kishanganga to counter Operation Gibraltar was an audacious be given to Lt the infiltration. Despite the reluctance of operation launched by Pakistan, which Gen Harbaksh the Corps Commander, he convinced the failed to achieve its objectives. Credit must COAS who issued directions in consonance be given to Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, Army Singh, Army with the plan of the Army Commander. Commander, for his comprehension of Commander, The success achieved in capturing critical the situation and responding offensively areas in Hajipir, the Kishanganga Bulge resulting in the capture of the Haji Pir Pass for his and Kargil helped to contain the infiltration and Tithwal. The post-1962 army was comprehen- and enhanced the morale of troops in the tested and found to be ready to face the ensuing operations against Pakistan which emerging challenges. sion of the commenced on September 1. situation and A British review of the 1965 War – Maj Gen P K Chakravorty (Retd) commented that Pakistani planning and is former Addl DG Arty (Ops) and responding execution of this aspect of the war was in Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is former offensively effect calling tails with a double headed Director, CLAWS, New Delh. resulting in the capture of the Haji Pir Pass and Tithwal

‘Patton Nagar’ (The Graveyard) At Bhikiwind Village

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