DOCSLIB.ORG

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India. The conflict began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.[17][18] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[19] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Indo–Pakistani War of 1965 Part of the Indo–Pakistani wars and conflicts Geopolitical map of Kashmir provided by the United States CIA, c. 2004 Date August – 23 September 1965 Location Western Front Indo-Pakistani border Line of Control, Working Boundary, Radcliffe Line, Sir Creek, and Zero-Point Arabian sea Eastern Front India–East Pakistan border Result Stalemate (Both nations declared victory) Ceasefire through UNSC Resolution 211 No permanent territorial changes (see Tashkent Declaration) Return to the status quo ante bellum Territorial No territorial changes changes Belligerents India Pakistan Commanders and leaders Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan Ayub Khan (President of India) (President of Pakistan) Lal Bahadur Shastri Gen Musa Khan (Prime Minister of India) (Cdr-in-Chief, Army) Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri Lt.Gen Bakhtiar Rana (Chief of the Army Staff) (Commander, I Corps) Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh Lt.Gen Attiqur Rahman (GOC-in-C, Western Command) (Commander, IV Corps) Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn MGen A.H. Malik (GOC, I Corps) (GOC, 12th Infantry Division) Lt. Gen. Joginder Dhillon MGen Yahya Khan (GOC, XI Corps) (GOC, 7th Infantry Division) Lt. Gen. Kashmir Katoch AM Nur Khan (GOC, XV Corps) (Cdr-in-Chief, Air Force) AM Arjan Singh VAdm A.R. Khan (Chief of the Air Staff) (Cdr-in-Chief, Navy) Vice Adm. Bhaskar Soman RAdm S.M. Ahsan (Chief of the Naval Staff) ((Cdr. Eastern Naval Command) Cdre S.M. Anwar (OTC, 25th Destroyer Sqn) Strength 700,000 infantry (whole army)[1] 260,000 infantry (whole army)[1] 700+ aircraft[2] 280 aircraft[2] 720 tanks[1] 756 tanks[3] 186 Centurions[3] 352 Pattons[3] 346 Shermans[1] 308 Shermans[3] 90 AMX[1][3] 96 Chaffees[3] 90 PT-76[1] 552 Artillery[3] [3] 628 Artillery 72x105mm How[3] 66x 3.7"How[3] 234X25pdr[3] 450x 25pdr[3] 126x155mm How[3] 96x 5.5"[3] 48x8" How[3] 16x 7.2"[3] 72x3.7" How[3] Effective strength on the West Pakistan AK Lt Btys[3] Border[4] Effective strength on the West Pakistan [4] 9 Infantry divisions (4 under-strength) Border 3 Armored brigades 6 Infantry divisions 2 Armored divisions Casualties and losses Neutral claims[5][6] Neutral claims[5] 3,000 men[5] 3,800 men[5] 150[7]–190 tanks[5] 200[5]-300 Tanks[7] 60–75 aircraft[5] 20 aircraft[5] 540 km2 (210 mi2) of territory lost (primarily in Over 1,840 km2 (710 mi2) of territory lost (in Kashmir)[8][9] Sindh, Lahore, Sialkot, and Kashmir [8][9] Indian claims sectors) Pakistani claims 35[10]–59 aircraft lost[11] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft 19 aircraft lost[14] lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft Indian claims shot down.[12] 5259 men killed or captured[13] 520 km2 (200 mi2) territory lost[13] 43[16] −73 aircraft destroyed[13] Pakistani claims 471 tanks destroyed[13] 8,200 men killed or captured[13] 1,735 km2 (670 mi2) territory gained[13] 110[14]–113[13] aircraft destroyed 500 tanks captured or destroyed[13] 2602,[15] 2575 km2[13] territory gained India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared.[20][21][22][23][24][25][26] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,[27][21][28][29][30][31][32] as it had neither succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir[33] nor had it been able to gain meaningful support at an international level.[28][34][35][36] Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent.[37] Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides.[37][38] As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.[38] The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. In spite of improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers to this day.[39][40][41] Pre-war escalation Since the Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.[42] Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965.[42][43] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 910 square kilometres (350 square miles) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 9,100 km2 (3,500 sq mi).[44] After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962[45] in the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, code-named Operation Gibraltar.[46] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris,[47] and the operation ended unsuccessfully. War A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian- administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war. On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August.[45] Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir.[48] On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place"[49][50][51] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.[49][52] At 03:30 on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise.[53] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • FINAL COMBINED SENIORITY LIST of Asis (DISTRICT and PAP) AS PER CONFIRMATION
    FINAL COMBINED SENIORITY LIST OF ASIs (DISTRICT AND PAP) AS PER CONFIRMATION Sr No. RANK, NAME & NO/ RANGE DOB DOE CASTE/ LIST C-I LIST C-II ACTUAL LIST D-I LIST D-II MERIT ACTUAL DATE OF ACTUAL DATE OF DATE OF DOP AS S.I REMARKS CATEGORY DOP AS HC NO. AS DOP AS ASI CONF AS CONF DATE LIST E LIST E-II (ACTUAL) P/ASI ASI OF ASI 1 DALBIR SINGH, 292/J BR 13-10-1944 14-06-1963 GC 20-08-1968 01-01-1971 01-09-1980 13-05-1982 01-01-1987 01-01-1987 01-04-1989 16-04-1992 RETD ON 31/10/2002 2 MOHINDER SINGH, 233/PR CP-LDH 29-10-1948 07-11-1969 SC 28-04-1973 19-11-1974 01-04-1982 27-11-1982 01-07-1988 01-07-1988 01-04-1989 14-05-1992 Retd/ on 31/10/06 3 SWARN DASS, 111/PR, 2/R PR 10-04-1951 29-07-1971 SC 02-11-1976 10-11-1976 27-11-1982 01-07-1988 01-07-1988 01-04-1989 14-05-1992 RETD ON 30/04/2009 4 DSP BALDEV SINGH 35/BR BR 16-03-1957 20-02-1976 JAT SIKH 18-12-1981 06-10-1986 05-10-1988 05-10-1988 01-01-1993 19-04-1993 5 SI MOHINDER SINGH 97/FR FR 11-12-1941 12-12-1960 RAMGARIHA 11-03-1971 05-06-1974 01-09-1983 10-11-1984 01-04-1989 06-09-1990 01-04-1991 20-03-1992 RETD ON 31.12.99 6 INSP PRITPAL SINGH PR/CP- 23-02-1964 09-04-1986 - - - - P/ASI 09-04-1986 21-04-1989 21-04-1989 01-10-1990 18-06-1991 266/PR LDH 7 RETD SI BAKHSHISH SINGH JR 01-12-1940 27-11-1962 GC 09-10-1968 02-05-1971 01-04-1982 09-01-1983 01-07-1989 01-07-1989 01-10-1991 28-04-1992 Died on 30.01.94 38/GSP 380/J 8 Insp Ram Singh NO.
    [Show full text]
  • The Epic Imagination in Contemporary Indian Literature
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School May 2017 Modern Mythologies: The picE Imagination in Contemporary Indian Literature Sucheta Kanjilal University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the South and Southeast Asian Languages and Societies Commons Scholar Commons Citation Kanjilal, Sucheta, "Modern Mythologies: The pE ic Imagination in Contemporary Indian Literature" (2017). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6875 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Modern Mythologies: The Epic Imagination in Contemporary Indian Literature by Sucheta Kanjilal A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a concentration in Literature Department of English College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Gurleen Grewal, Ph.D. Gil Ben-Herut, Ph.D. Hunt Hawkins, Ph.D. Quynh Nhu Le, Ph.D. Date of Approval: May 4, 2017 Keywords: South Asian Literature, Epic, Gender, Hinduism Copyright © 2017, Sucheta Kanjilal DEDICATION To my mother: for pencils, erasers, and courage. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS When I was growing up in New Delhi, India in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, my father was writing an English language rock-opera based on the Mahabharata called Jaya, which would be staged in 1997. An upper-middle-class Bengali Brahmin with an English-language based education, my father was as influenced by the mythological tales narrated to him by his grandmother as he was by the musicals of Broadway impressario Andrew Lloyd Webber.
    [Show full text]
  • Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962: a Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, No.3 (September 1966): 249-270
    NOTES 1 INTRODUCTION: CONTENDING VIEWS-MILITARISM, MILITARIZATION AND WAR 1. Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no.3 (September 1966): 249-270. 2. Patrick Morgan, "Disarmament," in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),246. 3. Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Mfecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no.2 (June 1992): 309-341,318,330; The remainder of Bremer's study has to do with the impact of military spending and not with variations caused by regime type. 4. Thomas Lindemann and Michel Louis Martin, "The Military and the Use of Force," in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluwer, 2003),99-109,104-109. 5. Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy-The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King Crown's Press, 1958), 3. The concept was subsequently applied by Herbert Spencer, Otto Hintze, and Karl Marx. See Volker Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 6. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Stanislav Andreski, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1969): 499-571. 7. Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 199. 8. Karl Liebknecht, Militarism (Toronto: William Briggs, 1917); Berghahn, 18,23,25. 9. James Donovan, Militarism U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970),25. 10. Berghahn, 19. 11. Dan Reiter and Allan Starn, "IdentifYing the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation," American Political Science Review 97, no.2 (May 2003): 333-337; see also R.
    [Show full text]
  • SELF-DETERMINATION OUTSIDE the COLONIAL CONTEXT: the BIRTH of BANGLADESH in Retrospectt
    SELF-DETERMINATION OUTSIDE THE COLONIAL CONTEXT: THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH IN RETROSPECTt By VedP. Nanda* I. INTRODUCTION In the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War in December 1971, the independent nation-state of Bangladesh was born.' Within the next four months, more than fifty countries had formally recognized the new nation.2 As India's military intervention was primarily responsible for the success of the secessionist movement in what was then known as East Pakistan, and for the creation of a new political entity on the inter- national scene,3 many serious questions stemming from this historic event remain unresolved for the international lawyer. For example: (1) What is the continuing validity of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter?4 (2) What is the current status of the doctrine of humanita- rian intervention in international law?5 (3) What action could the United Nations have taken to avert the Bangladesh crisis?6 (4) What measures are necessary to prevent such tragic occurrences in the fu- ture?7 and (5) What relationship exists between the principle of self- "- This paper is an adapted version of a chapter that will appear in Y. ALEXANDER & R. FRIEDLANDER, SELF-DETERMINATION (1979). * Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, Univer- sity of Denver Law Center. 1. See generally BANGLADESH: CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCES (New Delhi: Deen Dayal Research Institute 1972); D. MANKEKAR, PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE (1972); PAKISTAN POLITI- CAL SYSTEM IN CRISIS: EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH (S. Varma & V. Narain eds. 1972). 2. Ebb Tide, THE ECONOMIST, April 8, 1972, at 47.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan: Arrival and Departure
    01-2180-2 CH 01:0545-1 10/13/11 10:47 AM Page 1 stephen p. cohen 1 Pakistan: Arrival and Departure How did Pakistan arrive at its present juncture? Pakistan was originally intended by its great leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, to transform the lives of British Indian Muslims by providing them a homeland sheltered from Hindu oppression. It did so for some, although they amounted to less than half of the Indian subcontinent’s total number of Muslims. The north Indian Muslim middle class that spearheaded the Pakistan movement found itself united with many Muslims who had been less than enthusiastic about forming Pak- istan, and some were hostile to the idea of an explicitly Islamic state. Pakistan was created on August 14, 1947, but in a decade self-styled field marshal Ayub Khan had replaced its shaky democratic political order with military-guided democracy, a market-oriented economy, and little effective investment in welfare or education. The Ayub experiment faltered, in part because of an unsuccessful war with India in 1965, and Ayub was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, who could not manage the growing chaos. East Pakistan went into revolt, and with India’s assistance, the old Pakistan was bro- ken up with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The second attempt to transform Pakistan was short-lived. It was led by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who simultaneously tried to gain control over the military, diversify Pakistan’s foreign and security policy, build a nuclear weapon, and introduce an economic order based on both Islam and socialism.
    [Show full text]
  • Group Identity and Civil-Military Relations in India and Pakistan By
    Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Forces Tribunal , Kolkata Bench Application No
    FROM NO. 21 (SEE RULE 102(1)) ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL , KOLKATA BENCH APPLICATION NO : O.A NO. 117 OF 2012 ON THIS 10th DAY OF APRIL, 2013 CORAM HON’BLE JUSTICE RAGHUNATH RAY , MEMBER (JUDICIAL ) HON’BLE LT GEN KPD SAMANTA, MEMBER (ADMINISTRATIVE) Hav Bal Bahadur Katuwal, Son of Sri Gyan Bahadur Katuwal , Village Upper Dilaram, Chaukidada, P.O. Bagora, Pin – 734 224, District Darjeeling, West Bengal. ……………Appellant -VS- 1. Union of India through The Secretary, Ministry of Defence, South Block, New Delhi. 2. The Chief of Army Staff, Integrated HQ of MoD (Army), DHQ PO, New Delhi. 3. The Chief Records Officers, 39, Gorkha Training Centre, Varanasi Cantonment, Uttar Pradesh, PIN – 221002. 4. The Officer Commanding, 3/9 GR (Chindits), C/O 56 APO, PIN 910 253. ………………. Respondents 2 For the petitioner: Mrs. Maitrayee Trivedi Dasgupta, Advocate For the respondents: Mr. Souvik Nandy, Advocate JUDGEMENT AND ORDER Per HON’BLE LT GEN KPD SAMANTA, MEMBER (ADMINISTRATIVE) This matter relates non-grant of promotion to the rank of Naib Sudedar despite the applicant being eligible for such promotion. The applicant is an ex-Havildar of 3/9 GR (Gorkha Rifles) who had retired in the rank of Havildar though, as submitted by him, he could have been promoted to the next rank i.e. of Naib Subedar that would have automatically enhanced service span as per the stipulated terms and conditions of service. Being aggrieved, he has approached this Tribunal through this Original Application seeking the intervention of this AFT to enable his promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar.
    [Show full text]
  • |||GET||| Defence Speeches 1St Edition
    DEFENCE SPEECHES 1ST EDITION DOWNLOAD FREE Marcus Tullius Cicero | 9780199537907 | | | | | Defence Speeches The real thing is to act like a gentleman in this adverse conditions. Editions with another name on the cover should have that name added as seco Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman philosopher, statesman, lawyer, political theorist, and Roman constitutionalist. In most of it Cicero preaised Milo, condemned Clodius, and pleaded to the senate. Travis rated it it Defence Speeches 1st edition amazing Feb 23, We shall work effortlessly, succeed in all fields Defence Speeches 1st edition learning and combat. Cicero has long and complicated speeches. These stories are about the clean and clear victory although history has something to share in different pace but Pakistani emotion made it on last result basis rather something not relate to start and mid of war. Next Post. Us privateers could help win a war with China. Let others be ashamed if they have buried their heads in books and have not been able to find anything in them which could either be applied to the common good or brought out into the open and the light of day. Jul 25, Assaf Cygelberg rated it liked it. Respected audience! Cem Ucan rated it it was amazing Jul 08, Sort order. That day Pakistanis perform flag holding, March, Army exhibition, awards ceremonies, singing patriotic songs,entertainment and military programs are now being placed all over the country. Dec 22, Zachary Rudolph rated it Defence Speeches 1st edition liked it. Cicero's clients were rarely whiter- than-white; but so seductive is his oratory that the reader cannot help taking his side.
    [Show full text]
  • 19-16930 Connect & Encourage USA Version Spring-Summer 2019-V2.Indd
    Spring/Summer 2019 connect& encourage Write to someone facing injustice for their beliefs. Human rights defenders in South Asia In this issue How to connect & encourage 2 Get writing 3 How to Writing a letter 4-5 Africa & the Middle East 6-9 connect & encourage South Asia 10-11 East Asia 12-17 Many of the people on the following pages are Giulio Paletta/CSW Latin America 18-23 victims of violence, intimidation or harassment. Will my letters actually All of them need your encouragement. Using reach the intended person? Connect & Encourage, you can stand in solidarity Get writing Although some letters may be intercepted, with them in a very special way – by sending cards Is it ok to include Christian and letters of encouragement. most will reach their destination. Even if the greetings and scripture verses? letter doesn’t reach them, it can still have a powerful effect by reminding governments Receiving a personal letter reminds each person who gets Most of the people in Connect & Encourage it that someone, somewhere cares about their suffering. that their case is not going unnoticed by the are Christians, and we encourage you to rest of the world. Connect & Encourage is ideal to use as a group, but we write appropriate scripture verses and encourage you to use it wherever and however you can! Christian greetings. Writing relevant Bible Is it safe to include my name Could you use it at a creative prayer night, as a youth group references is useful for non-English speakers and address on my cards? activity, or at a church mission event? Be as creative in your so they can look up the same scripture encouragement as possible! verses in their own language.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gazette of India
    REGISTERED NO. D-222 The Gazette of India PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY No. 10] NEW DELHI, SATURDAY, MAY 11, 1974 (VAISAKHA 21. 1896) Separate paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation. The undermentioned Gazettes of India Extraordinary were published up to the 28th February 1973:— Issue No. No. and Date Issued by Subject Copies of the Gazettes Extraordinary mentioned above will be supplied on indent to the Controller of Publi- cations, Civil Lines, Delhi. Indents should be submitted BO as to reach the Controller within ten days of the date of issue of these Gazettes. (501) 502 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA, MAY 11, 1974 (VAISAKHA 21, 1896) [PART I—SEC. 1 CONTENTS PART I—SECTION 1.—Notifications relating to Non- PAGE PART H—SECTION 3.—SUB. SEC. (ii).—Statutory PAGE Statutory Rules. Regulations Orders and Orders and Notifications issued by the Resolutions issued by the Ministries of the Ministries of the Government of India Government of India (other than the (other than the Ministry of Defence) and Ministry of Defence) and by the Supreme by the Central Authorities (other than the Court .. .. .. ., joi Administrations of Union Territories) .. 1289 PART I—SECTION 2.—Notifications regarding Ap- PART II—SECTION 4.—Statutory Rules and Orders pointments, Promotions, Leave etc. of notified by the Ministry of Defence .. 191 Government Officers issued by the Minis- PART III—SECTION 1.—Notifications issued by the tries of the Government of India (other Auditor General, Union Public Service than the Ministry of Defence) and by the Commission, Railway Administration, High Supreme Court .
    [Show full text]
  • ORF Issue Brief 17 FINAL
    EARCH S F E O R U R N E D V A R T E I O S N B O ORF ISSUE BRIEF APRIL 2009 ISSUE BRIEF # 17 Military-militant nexus in Pakistan and implications for peace with India By Wilson John n November 26, 2008, 10 terrorists who There is otherwise substantial evidence that shows attacked Mumbai undid in less than 60 the Mumbai attack was planned and executed with Ohours what governments of two the help of present and former ISI and Army sovereign nations had been struggling for over four officers who form part of a clandestine group set up years to achieve-peace and stability in the region. to pursue the Army's duplicitous policy of These terrorists were from Pakistan, recruited, protecting its allies among the terrorist groups trained and armed by Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), a operating within the country while fighting others terrorist group with visible presence across the for the US as part of the Global War on Terror.1 country. The group has clear allegiance to the global terrorist groups like al Qaida and has a presence in This strategic military-militant collusion in Pakistan, over 21 countries. which shows no signs of breaking up, will remain the most critical stumbling block in any future It is well known that terrorist groups like LeT could attempt to mend the relationship between India and not have weathered eight years of global sanctions Pakistan. Arguing the case for dismantling the without the support of the State, and in case of terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan as a pre- Pakistan, it has to be the Pakistan Army and its condition for reviving the peace process, this paper intelligence agency, ISI.
    [Show full text]
  • Aggressor Order of Battle
    .il* VJ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE i or*' DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ■ JUNE 1955 < FOREWORD The country, peoples, forces, or individuals described herein are fictitious. Any resemblance to existing countries, forces, or indi-., viduals is inadvertent and coincidental. *FM 30-103 FIELD MANUAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 30-103 WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 23 June 1955 AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE Paragraphs Page PART ONE. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1,2 3 2. GENERAL — 3-6 5 PART TWO. IDENTIFIED GROUND ORGANIZATIONS CHAPTER 3. MAJOR GROUND UNITS Section I. Army Groups - 7-11 12 II. Armies 12-28 14 III. Corps 29-69 20 IV. Rifle Divisions 70-129 35 V. Mountain Divisions 130-134 69 VI. Airborne Divisions 135-141 72 VII. Mechanized Divisions 142-163 78 VIII. Tank Divisions 164-171 90 IX. Cavalry Divisions 172-176 95 X. Artillery Divisions 177-192 98 XI. Antiaircraft Divisions 193-206 108 CHAPTER 4. GROUND UNITS, DIVISIONAL Section I. Rifle Units 207-214 114 II. Airborne Units 215-230 117 III. Armored and Cavalry Units 231-240 120 IV. Field Artillery Units 241-257 123 V. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 258-269 126 VI. Mortar and Rocket Units 270-281 129 VII. Engineer Units 282-287 131 VIII. Signal Units 288-292 133 IX. Service Units 293-804 134 CHAPTER 5. GROUND UNITS, NONDIVISIONAL (GHQ) Section I. Rifle Units 305-312 136 II. Armored and Cavalry Units 313-317 187 III. Field Artillery Units 318-330 138 IV. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 331-337 141 V.
    [Show full text]