Signposts from the Past: Expeditionary Air Force Operations Revisited

Robert Martyn

Between Machiavelli’s admonition that there is nothing more difficult than taking the

lead in introducing a new order of things, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s oft-quoted witticism that

the toughest part about getting a new idea into a military mind is getting the old one out, air

expeditionary warfare proponents appear to face daunting obstacles.1 Yet, what if Expeditionary

Aerospace Forces are not such a daring new order of things? Are there not previous examples,

which may calm the military sceptic and nay-sayer? This essay will explain what aerospace

expeditionary operations are, and in so doing, illustrate with earlier historical examples that these

structures are a positive contribution to CF Aerospace Doctrine and the way ahead for smaller,

cost-conscious air forces.

So as a starting point, what exactly is meant when bandying about the term “Aerospace

Expeditionary Force”? Military vernacular contains far too many examples of inadequately

understood concepts becoming popular buzzwords, to which anyone grappling with the so-called

“Revolution in Military Affairs” can attest. It has been argued, with some logic, that absent a

credible conventional threat against the North American homeland, virtually every Canadian

military operation has been “expeditionary.”2 A clear difficulty lies in the absence of a coherent

definition in any of the Canadian Air Force’s touchstone doctrine or concept publications.3 We therefore turn to the , a reasonable move given the importance placed upon interoperability with our closest ally, being the nation assuming a greater leadership role in regional and international security engagements.4 Further confusing any debate, some writings appear to use Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF) and Aerospace Expeditionary Forces

(AEF) interchangeably. This paper will assume that EAF relates to the conceptual or doctrinal

1/15 paradigm, whereas AEF refers to the core air combat power, i.e., the tasked, or actually forward-

deployed aircraft, personnel and sustaining capabilities.

The (USAF), which has been working this problem since the

late-1990s, defines Aerospace Expeditionary Forces as:

Tailorable and rapidly deployable air and space assets that provide the National Command Authority and the theatre commanders-in-chief with desired outcomes for a spectrum of missions ranging from humanitarian relief to joint of combined combat operations.5

Syndicate discussion during this symposium reached consensus that one vital aspect of this

definition was lacking: that to be an effective operational force over any appreciable period of

time demands a degree of sustainability. While clarifying that the constituent slices of the

Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are “geographically separated [but] operationally-linked,”

USAF General Michael Ryan merely infers the sustainability issue in his statement that the units

provide both “rotational support to ongoing operations and rapid response to crises.”6 The geographic separation refers only to their peacetime basing; it is assumed that wherever possible, the force package will operate from the same forward location. One way of envisaging this deployed operation is to use USAF General Merrill McPeak’s metaphor, wherein the “best example of a composite wing is provided by the modern aircraft carrier, where the typical deck loading creates a true composite unit with a range of capabilities tailored to the mission.”7 Also,

that the definition states that this force should provide a commander with “desired outcomes” is

pretty much unnecessary typesetting. Assets not contributing to the commander’s expectations

are just taking up highly-valued ramp space and would be quite unwelcome. Thus, a suggested

Canadian definition of Aerospace Expeditionary Force is: “task-tailored aerospace assets, which

are rapidly deployable and able to sustain themselves in operations outside Canadian territory.”8

2/15 This definition conceptually includes the consideration of the various airframes to comprise an

effective force package, as well as the requisite command and control elements, intelligence,

airfield engineers, aircraft technicians and other support and sustainment entities. Another

consideration is the reality that expeditionary deployments may be to very austere locations, with

inherent heightened demands upon sustainment.

The USAF began experimenting with this operational construct for many of the same

reasons that Canada is now examining this issue. The ’s end brought many new crises

to the fore, yet the USAF was contracting as part of the global “peace dividend” imperative.

Over the ten-year period ending in 1995, the USAF’s budget was reduced by 40 percent,

accompanied by a personnel reduction from 600,00 to 370,000. During a roughly corresponding

period of reduction, Canada’s Air Force was left with 48 percent fewer personnel and 49 percent less aircraft; those remaining aircraft had flying hours cut by 59 percent. Yet a dramatically increased operational tempo, making demands upon the range of airframes and capabilities available, produced severe negative personnel repercussions through retention and training issues.9 The Chief of Defence Staff, in his 2002 Annual Report, acknowledged the personnel issue: “The reality of post-Cold War military operations has been the repetitive deployment of

CF personnel into very stressful, usually hostile environments. These deployments are taking a toll on our people, who require time to recover, connect with their families, and train between deployments.”10

No one Air Force “community” is bearing solely the burden of these campaigns. The demand for

CF18 Hornets, CH146 Griffons, and their essential personnel, for example, during the 1999

Kosovo operation illustrates the varied force packages commanders require. In order to respond

to similar complex human resource and airframe conditions bedevilling CF planners, the US

3/15 began experimenting with EAF concept. There are two main aspects to this program: rotating the

deployment burden more equitably, and providing more responsive, task-tailored capabilities to

commanders.11

The reduced number of personnel and aircraft available to respond to government

taskings causes recurrent deployments for particular crews and support personnel. This naturally

has a detrimental impact upon skills development and quality of life for those deployed.

Although it seems counterintuitive that deploying on operations degrades operational skills, not

all capabilities are required during deployments. For example, the increased CH124 Sea King

deployments to the Persian Gulf or Adriatic Sea on maritime surface interdiction operations has

eliminated most, if not all, antisubmarine training opportunities. There is a similar dilemma in

developing skilled aircraft technicians, as when trades journeymen endure this same operational

tempo their deployed absence or subsequent release removes that ability to train apprentices.12

The US EAF structure presently consists of 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, each consisting of approximately 175 aircraft and 15,000 personnel. Barring any crises calling for expanded mobilization, as seen in the war, two of the 10 are on heightened alert during a 90- day rotation. This allows for stability and training, because it is forecast well in advance which two elements are “on-call” and which two are recuperating from their 90-day alert shift.

Furthermore, the personnel from the remaining six Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are able to plan various stages of training and professional development.13 On the personnel side, the

Canadian Air Force is experimenting with a “V12” deployment pattern for tactical aviation, in

which a squadron is “on-call” or deployed for 12-months (“12”), with personnel deployed for

variable tour lengths (“V”) ranging from six months for key personnel to 56-day rotations for

other personnel.14 The “V12” arrangement also facilitates Reservist employment on 28-day

4/15 rotations - a potentially huge benefit considering the growing scarcity of suitable Regular Force

personnel in some key positions. This is proving to be an effective use of innovative scheduling

options, aspects of which may be further integrated into a Canadian AEF program.

The desire to create task-tailored packages to respond quickly to theatre commander’s

plans, however, is slightly more problematic for the Canadian Forces than for the USAF.

Contrasted with the USAF’s aforementioned 1,750 EAF airframes, the CF inventory of

equivalent aircraft is approximately 230.15 Therefore, Canada simply does not possess the equipment and skill sets to duplicate an Aerospace Expeditionary Force of 175 fighters, bombers, and the resources associated with suppressing enemy air defences, combat Search and

Rescue, and reconnaissance - essentially the entire gamut of air warfare. Yet we can still task- tailor a suitable package, depending upon the operation undertaken. For example, a humanitarian mission in a semi-benign environment could utilize a force of four to six CF18s for defensive counter-aerospace operations, four to eight CH146s primarily for force protection reconnaissance

/ airfield defence force mobility, but with an on-call task of emergency MEDEVAC or Non-

Governmental Organization (NGO) support, and a requisite number of CC130s for intra-theatre transport and possible air-to-air refuelling (AAR) if required by the Force Commander. For this hypothetical expedition, the Hornets could come from 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron (3 Wing,

Bagotville), the Griffons from 427 Squadron (Petawawa), and the Hercules aircraft from 17

Wing’s 435 Squadron (Winnipeg), all linked by a deployed headquarters and support staff tasked from 4 Wing (Cold Lake).16 While perhaps not as glamorous as the 12 air-to-air F-15C, 12

PGM-capable F-16CG/F-15E and 6 SEAD F-16CJ (plus assorted CSAR, tanker, C2ISR, and bomber aircraft on-call) that the US sustained in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the CF air package example is nonetheless a capable contribution to a multinational coalition.17 The key

5/15 here is thinking differently; getting as much of the “fighter community” or the “long range

maritime patrol community” into theatre is not the goal. Rather the aim should be to focus on

bringing together the discrete slices of capability, regardless of parochial “community” identity

or Wing geographic location, that most effectively meet the commander’s requirements.

We now have an understanding of contemporary EAF, but is this all new? Unlike land or

sea warfare, one need not read back to Xenophon or the Phoenicians for illuminating examples.

Concepts should be closer to our fingertips because one of airpower’s strengths is that, as a

relatively new form of warfare, it should not have conceptually ossified into “we’ve always done

it this way.” Before we begin searching for lessons from aviation’s first century, however, we

should establish a rough baseline of “where we are” and “where we are likely to go” in order to

guide our quest. As an initial planning hypothesis, it is assumed that Air Force funding levels

will be kept relatively constant in the near term.18 In accepting this premise, it should be noted that despite the rhetoric in the press, the Chief of Defence Staff’s top three capital acquisition priorities are all aircraft related; in fact, over half of the capital projects are directly linked to aerospace capabilities.19 This implies that since no radically new capabilities are likely to

receive financial support, the CF must therefore investigate innovative ways of fulfilling the

government’s operational assignments. One should also not discount the distinct possibility that

continuing to fund initiatives within a fixed budget envelope presages some capabilities being

allowed to wither away. With these caveats in mind, let us look first to the immediate post-First

World War era for signposts towards an aerospace expeditionary capability.

Much of the relevant literature begins (and often ends) with the British air control

campaigns in the 1920s in Somaliland and Mesopotamia. Britain adopted air control as a method

of addressing colonial problems as a political and military necessity following the exhaustion of

6/15 the First World War. Added to this was the simple fact that large-scale ground force expeditions

were becoming financially prohibitive20 - conditions clearly echoed in today’s operational tempo and fiscal restraints.

Garrisoning Mesopotamia, one of the spoils of carving up the vanquished Ottoman

Empire, was drawing heavily upon the land forces and government coffers. The Royal Flying

Corps provided a solution which saw occupying troops cut from 25,000 British and 80,000

Indian troops, to 4,000 and 10,000 respectively, in exchange for 10 fighter-bomber squadrons.21

A distinct airpower example from this campaign is seen in the RAF role in suppressing the 1924 rebellion of powerful warlord Sheik Salim al Khayun. Sheik Salim provoked an open rebellion by the tribes surrounding Iraq’s Hammar Lakes region. Five days following the Colonial government’s edict to cease the revolt, the RAF dropped leaflets warning that further failure to comply would result in reprisals within 12-hours, which in fact, occurred. Less than 60 minutes following the attack on Salim’s estate, his followers compelled him to surrender.22 The military commander in Mesopotamia, Lieutenant-General Haldane, wrote that the few aircraft he had at his disposal throughout the Arab uprising “did invaluable work, and had I had sufficient at the outbreak of the rising I am inclined to believe that it might have been possible to stifle, or perhaps localize it.”23 This recognition of early air operations effectiveness added credibility to

the British case for an independent RAF, but it also highlights the potential benefits of rapid and

early deployment of air power.

Coupled with this acknowledgement of airpower utility, was the aforementioned desire to

reduce spending. The government looked to the earlier military campaign in British Somaliland,

where the “Mad Mullah,” Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan had been evading punitive

operations for several decades. Deploying a self-contained air expedition of 12 aircraft, assorted

7/15 trucks and motorcycles, and 219 all-ranks, the campaign neutralized the Mullah and his

followers in three weeks - 5 months short of their mandate and at a cost of only £77,000.

Contrast this with the Imperial General Staff plan requiring 12 months, two divisions, and

several million pounds to build railways, roads and supporting garrisons.24

What these early campaigns demonstrate is the efficacy of rapidly deploying composite

air formations early in a crisis. There is clear potential for helping reduce the financial and

personnel burden. Additionally, the smaller aviation garrison “footprint” reduces frictions with

the local inhabitants, which negatively affect obtaining a political solution. Lessons regarding

political constraints upon air expeditions can be readily garnered from the experiences of US

Marine aviation in late-1920s Nicaragua.25 In fact, current abilities allow this footprint to be completely eliminated by basing it in a country divorced from actual operations, such as seen in

Aviano for the Kosovo campaign. If we now look to the Second World War, we find other precursors of EAF concepts.

Constructive precedents can be grasped in the US Air Commando Groups established in the Burma and Philippines theatres. Flying an assortment of airframes, including medium bombers, fighters, transports and even gliders, the Groups conducted and supported interdiction operations deep behind Japanese lines. In one particular undertaking, they secured airfields deep within enemy territory and used them as staging areas for offensive counter-air operations in regions the Japanese had believed out of harm's way.26 Operating for extended periods out of

lodgements deep in the jungle or in rugged, mountainous terrain, the Air Commandos exemplify

our current thinking on austere field endeavours. They also worked very closely with land forces,

such as the Office of Strategic Services and Merrill’s Marauders, in the type of joint operations

envisaged in CF doctrine.27 These forward locations were, of necessity, very lean establishments;

8/15 significant maintenance and support had to be acquired from the major bases back in friendly territory. This presages USAF Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan’s comments that a major

Expeditionary Aerospace Force “concept is to reduce our forward footprint,” which again ties in with the envisaged austere operations.28

Perhaps one of the most illustrative historical examples of today’s Expeditionary

Aerospace Force operations can be seen in the USAF’s Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) of the 1950s and 1960s. In response to the Korean-war induced realization that retaining a strategic nuclear arsenal did not eliminate the need for conventional military responses, the Tactical Air

Command began developing a “quick response force that could deploy on short notice to bases with minimal facilities in the event of hostilities.”29 In keeping with the concept of

“geographically separated/operationally-linked,” one CASF plan provided for the amalgamation of assets seen in Table 1 below.

ASSET SOURCE HQ and Command Nineteenth Air Force (Randolph Field, Texas) KB-50D/J Tanker Sqn 405th Fighter-Bomber Wing (Langley AFB, Virginia) Composite (RB-26, RT-33) 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Shaw AFB, South Reconnaissance Sqn Carolina) 2 x F-100 Fighter-Day Sqns 450th Fighter-Day Wing (Foster AFB, Texas) 3 x F-84F Fighter-Bomber Sqns 366th Fighter-Bomber Wing (Alexandria AFB, Louisiana) 2 x B-66B Bomber Sqns 17th Bombardment Wing (, Florida) Tactical Hospital 366th Fighter-Bomber Wing (Alexandria AFB, Louisiana) 4 x Weapons Maintenance Tms 2nd Tactical Depot Squadron (home station unknown) Composite Communications Sqn 8th Communications Group and 507th Tactical Control Group (home stations unknown) Table 1 - CASF “BLUE BLADE” Plan30

For the CSAF, 1958 proved to be a milestone year with major crisis responses to conflicts in the Mediterranean and Far Eastern theatres. In Lebanon the government was coming under increasing destabilizing pressure from the newly established United Arab Republic. The

Americans sought to bolster the regime by deploying the Sixth Fleet Marines, with Army troops

9/15 coming from Europe and continental United States. To support this operation “CASF-Bravo”

was alerted and deployed to Adana Air Base in south-central . And F-100 fighters were

on-scene 13 hours after the alert. Within 48 hours of receiving orders, 95 percent of the CSAF

were in-theatre: two F-100 squadrons, a B-57 squadron, a reconnaissance squadron, and three

troop-carrier squadrons for the army paratroops. In total, “100 aircraft, 1,400 people, and

1,662,000 pounds of equipment” had deployed.31 Air support for the Marines was thus available a short 15-minutes’ flying time from . The goal to which current Aerospace Expeditionary theorists aspire had been accomplished almost a quarter century ago.

Contemporary global instability, which necessitates concurrent expeditionary deployments, is also not a new concept. The other major 1958 expeditionary-type operation occurred less than six weeks into the Turkish/Lebanon deployment. Following a destabilizing troop build-up, the mainland Communist Chinese began shelling the Taiwanese islands of Matsu and Quemoy. “CASF-XRay Tango” was stood up using the same planning documents as CASF-

Bravo and ordered overseas. F-100 fighters arrived within 96 hours of the alert, having been delayed in Guam by a typhoon, with remaining assets deployed and operational within a week.32

This show of force, demonstrating US resolve to act in support of diplomatic efforts proved

sufficient to deter further Communist hostilities. This reveals the flexibility inherent in having an

operational contingency plan upon which to react during crises. Had Nineteenth Air Force’s

planning cell done a less effective job in preparing to deploy CASF-Bravo, ’s

effort to generate CASF-XRay Tango would have been considerably more difficult, and may not

provided a decisive political statement. Crisis resolution was made possible only through fast-

acting, flexible air forces.

10/15 While some aspects of expeditionary-type operations, with attendant lessons begging to

be learned, can be teased from the US involvement in Vietnam, the 1990-91 Gulf War, or the

operations in Kosovo, suffice it to say that Expeditionary Aerospace Force and its underpinning

concepts are far from new. Numerous aspects of this model have been played out since almost

the creation of armed flight; some have gone so far as to point to General Pershing’s use of

reconnaissance aircraft in his 1916 Mexican expedition against Pancho Villa as an example of air expeditionary warfare.33 So as not to draw misleading examples from history, we have compelling evidence that the concept retains all of its validity in the post-Cold War environment.

In enforcing the UN “no-fly zone” over southern Iraq, AEF II, “deployed to Jordan non-stop in

13.5 hours, launched an air tasking order (ATO) combat package of 14 aircraft into southern Iraq on an Operation Southern Watch mission five hours after arrival (total of 43 hours from execute order), and maintained a 98.6 percent mission-effectiveness rate during a three-month deployment.”34

Without a doubt, the EAF concept’s aims are achievable. Not only are task-tailored aerospace

assets rapidly deployable and able to sustain themselves in overseas operations, but also Canada

is eminently capable of plugging into just such a US-led system.35 This capability, however, is critically dependent upon the political will to ensure the sustainability issues are addressed in a

timely manner.

As warfare becomes more convoluted, so too does the planning problem and force

package complexity, as General McPeak notes, “longer range to the target means more tankers;

modern defences mean more CAP and sweep, more electronic warfare support, and so forth.”36

Even the planet’s most powerful Air Force lacks the complete depth of desired equipment and personnel to carry out a major operation entirely on its own, particularly during crises-initiated

11/15 surge levels.37 Given the long distances involved in many operations, and with substantial loiter times becoming the norm, specialized assets like tankers they are essential. Thus, while Canada is not likely to contribute a wholly unique air capability to a multinational coalition, it is increasingly customary for the CF to provide additional assets to augment a leading ally’s capacity. This further strengthens the underlying mantra of “interoperability” and the

requirement to remain technically relevant to our major allies.

However despite the declared DND policy of interoperability with our allies, we must

understand the Canadian political reality in which higher strategic guidance is frequently absent.

As Dr Richard Gimblett has noted, “implicit in all official and analytical works on Canadian

defence policy is the notion that there is a national strategy. But if one does exist, nowhere has it ever been articulated.”38 While firm direction from the government could reduce much speculative planning, this is unlikely to happen any time soon. Therefore one must garner what lessons can be learned as our future structures evolve. In addition to scarce government direction, another Canadian tendency is the almost Pavlovian need to sell itself as the world’s peacekeeper.

While I am hesitant to advocate any particular niche capability without further research, some

authors emphasize the concept of a “humanitarian AEF.”39 CF budgetary constraints would likely see this implemented at the expense of war fighting; as a concept, however, it warrants further study and may make future transformations more politically palatable.

Notwithstanding any unique Canadian conditions, many expeditionary lessons appear

“constant.” Dean’s assessment of British 1920s Air Control policies note that it “took a very sophisticated combination of superb intelligence, communications, and psychological warfare coupled with a judicious application of firepower to achieve the desired outcome: pacification…. with minimum violence, lasting results and minimum costs.”40 This rings true over eight decades

12/15 later. Some of the finer details in understanding an Expeditionary Aerospace Force, such as

sustainment or command and control, will be addressed in subsequent papers. But the

overarching concepts behind fielding such an expeditionary capability have been proven as valid

responses to the very issues currently vexing commanders and their staffs - whether force

generating or force employing. If nothing else, these historical antecedents should assuage the

fears of the military sceptic and nay-sayer.

Whether steadfastly adopting American policies while foregoing critical examination of

their Canadian applicability, or more thoughtfully appraising the actions of comparable allies

such as Australia or the Netherlands, the rationale remains unchanged.41 Expeditionary

Aerospace Forces provide a construct for rationalizing the burden of deployment rotations.

Providing more stability to CF personnel provides for greater retention, with consequent affects

upon recruit-, basic-, and advanced-training requirements: in effect, large cost savings.

Operationally, Canada has a tradition of engaging in broad-based coalitions and alliances, and

responding to crises and emergencies with the military hardware and personnel at hand.

Moreover, the Expeditionary Aerospace Force configuration provides increasingly responsive,

task-tailored capabilities to commanders, which is, at the end of the day, the raison d’être of

armed forces everywhere.

13/15 ENDNOTES

1 Peter Tsouras, ed., Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book (London: Cassell/Arms & Armour, 1992), 62-3. 2 Richard Gimblett, “Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces: Where Are We Now? (And in the Foreseeable Future).” Presentation to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa. 21 February 2002. Available online at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2002/gimblett.htm, accessed 9 April 2003, 2. 3 Neither Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces, The Aerospace Capability Framework (Draft) dated 21 January 2003, or Air Force Strategy 2025: The Air Force Implementation Strategy (Draft) dated 22 January 2003 provided any illumination on this topic. 4 Canada, DND, Aerospace Capability Framework, 16. 5 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 1: Summary, SAB-TR-97-01, November 1997, iv. 6 Michael E. Ryan, Commander’s NOTAM 98-4, 28 July 1998. Available online at www.issues.af.mil/notam984.html, accessed 6 March 2003. 7 Merrill A. McPeak, “For the Composite Wing,” Airpower Journal 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990), 9. 8 There was some discussion on the definitional proviso of “outside Canadian territory.” While northern Canadian operations unquestionably involve deploying to austere and often difficult environments, there was consensus that operations directly supporting homeland security need not be further addressed here. 9 Michael J. Nowack, “The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?” USAF Air University, Air War College, April 1999, 20n. Canada, DND, Air Force Strategy 2025, 3, 5. 10 Canada, DND, At a Crossroads: Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2001-2002 (Ottawa, 2002), 11. 11 Paul Killingsworth, et al, Flexbasing: Achieving Global Presence for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces. RAND, MR-1113-AF: 13. 12 Discussion between author and LCol Paul Hudson, Canadian Forces College, 5 March 2003. Canada, DND, Air Force Strategy 2025: 5, Annex B - “Air Force Training.” 13 William Dowdy, Testing the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept: Air University CADRE Paper 2000-01, 17. 14 Thierry Gongora, “The Meaning of Expeditionary Operations from an Air Force Perspective.” Paper presented at the Seapower Conference 2002, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 7-9 June 2002, 9. Available at Hhttp://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/legacy/gongora.docH. 15 Air Force Strategy 2025: Annex A - “Comparison of 1989 and Early-21st Century Air Forces.” For comparisons, the list is limited to: 80 CF-18 (48 operational), 16 CP-140, 29 CH-124, 75 CH-146, 5 CC-150 and 32 CC-130. 16 This example is merely illustrative of the concept, and does not consider variable factors or complex calculations, such as the role of Aircraft Unit Establishments, in determining force generation. 17 Michael J. Nowack, “The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?” USAF Air University, Air War College. April 1999, 24. 18 Scot Robertson, “The Defence Review: Attacking the Strategy – Resources Mismatch,” Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 21. 19 Canada, DND, At a Crossroads: Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2001-2002, 2002: Annex B - “Capital Procurement (Equipment)”, 39-41. The top three priorities are Maritime Helicopter Project, Aurora Incremental Modernization, and CF18 Incremental Modernization. The list also includes Airlift capability and Strategic Air-to- Air refuelling, in addition to several space-related programs. 20David Dean, “Air Power in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience,” Air University Review 34, no. 5 (Jul-Aug 1983), 24-5. 21 Peter Gray, “The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 3 (Fall 2001), 25. 22 George Gagnon, “Air Control: Strategy for a Smaller USAF,” USAF Air University, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, May 1993, 9-10. 23 Aylmer Haldane, “The Arab Rising in Mesopotamia, 1920,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 68, no. 469 (February 1923), 68. 24 Dean, “Air Power in Small Wars,” 25. 25 Wray Johnson, “Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927-33,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 2 (Summer 2001), 32-41, especially page 36. 26 Curt Van de Walle, “Back to the Future: Does History Support the Expeditionary Air Force Concept?” Air University, Air Command and Staff College, April 2000, 17-18.

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27 For greater detail, see Merrill’s Marauder’s Association, available online at http://www.marauder.org/history.htm and Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Enemy Lines in Burma,” Studies in Intelligence, no. 11 (Fall-Winter 2001) (Unclassified Edition), available online at http://www.ocdi.gov/csi/studies/fall_winter_2001/article07.html. 28 Michael Ryan, “EAF for America,” Keynote address to the National Air Force Association Convention, Washington, 1998. Available online at http://www.afa.org/media/press/keyadd98.asp, accessed 7 April 2003. 29 Van de Walle, “Back to the Future,” 21. 30 Ibid., 21. 31 Jack Shulimson, Marines In Lebanon, 1958 (Washington: HQ US Marine Corps, nd), 24. Leverett Richards, TAC: The Story of the (New York: John Day, 1961), 171-2; and Nowack, “The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?” 17. 32 Nowack, “The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?” 17-18. 33 Van de Walle, “Back to the Future: Does History Support the Expeditionary Air Force Concept?”: 6. 34 William R. Looney, “The Air Expeditionary Force: Taking the Air Force into the Twenty-First Century,” Air Power Journal 10, no. 4 (Winter 1996), 9. 35 See David Deere, ed., Desert Cats: The Canadian Fighter Squadron in the Gulf War (Stoney Creek, ON: Fortress, 1991), and David Bashow, et al, “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 55-61. 36 McPeak, “For the Composite Wing,” 5. 37 Major-General Tim Peppe (USAF, AF/CC-AEF), PowerPoint Presentation, CFC Air Symposium, 4-5 March 2003. 38 Gimblett, “Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces,” 3. 39 See, for example, Nowack, “The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?” Ch. 5. 40 Dean, “Air Power in Small Wars,” 29. 41 See, for example, the unpublished three-part study conducted for the DCDS in 2002 by J and L Associates, “CF Concept of Operations for Expeditionary Operations,” which looks extensively at how the Netherlands, Australia, and to a much lesser extent, Nigeria, are addressing expeditionary issues.

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