Air Expeditionary Warfare Operations Redux
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Signposts from the Past: Expeditionary Air Force Operations Revisited Robert Martyn Between Machiavelli’s admonition that there is nothing more difficult than taking the lead in introducing a new order of things, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s oft-quoted witticism that the toughest part about getting a new idea into a military mind is getting the old one out, air expeditionary warfare proponents appear to face daunting obstacles.1 Yet, what if Expeditionary Aerospace Forces are not such a daring new order of things? Are there not previous examples, which may calm the military sceptic and nay-sayer? This essay will explain what aerospace expeditionary operations are, and in so doing, illustrate with earlier historical examples that these structures are a positive contribution to CF Aerospace Doctrine and the way ahead for smaller, cost-conscious air forces. So as a starting point, what exactly is meant when bandying about the term “Aerospace Expeditionary Force”? Military vernacular contains far too many examples of inadequately understood concepts becoming popular buzzwords, to which anyone grappling with the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” can attest. It has been argued, with some logic, that absent a credible conventional threat against the North American homeland, virtually every Canadian military operation has been “expeditionary.”2 A clear difficulty lies in the absence of a coherent definition in any of the Canadian Air Force’s touchstone doctrine or concept publications.3 We therefore turn to the United States, a reasonable move given the importance placed upon interoperability with our closest ally, being the nation assuming a greater leadership role in regional and international security engagements.4 Further confusing any debate, some writings appear to use Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF) and Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) interchangeably. This paper will assume that EAF relates to the conceptual or doctrinal 1/15 paradigm, whereas AEF refers to the core air combat power, i.e., the tasked, or actually forward- deployed aircraft, personnel and sustaining capabilities. The United States Air Force (USAF), which has been working this problem since the late-1990s, defines Aerospace Expeditionary Forces as: Tailorable and rapidly deployable air and space assets that provide the National Command Authority and the theatre commanders-in-chief with desired outcomes for a spectrum of missions ranging from humanitarian relief to joint of combined combat operations.5 Syndicate discussion during this symposium reached consensus that one vital aspect of this definition was lacking: that to be an effective operational force over any appreciable period of time demands a degree of sustainability. While clarifying that the constituent slices of the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are “geographically separated [but] operationally-linked,” USAF General Michael Ryan merely infers the sustainability issue in his statement that the units provide both “rotational support to ongoing operations and rapid response to crises.”6 The geographic separation refers only to their peacetime basing; it is assumed that wherever possible, the force package will operate from the same forward location. One way of envisaging this deployed operation is to use USAF General Merrill McPeak’s metaphor, wherein the “best example of a composite wing is provided by the modern aircraft carrier, where the typical deck loading creates a true composite unit with a range of capabilities tailored to the mission.”7 Also, that the definition states that this force should provide a commander with “desired outcomes” is pretty much unnecessary typesetting. Assets not contributing to the commander’s expectations are just taking up highly-valued ramp space and would be quite unwelcome. Thus, a suggested Canadian definition of Aerospace Expeditionary Force is: “task-tailored aerospace assets, which are rapidly deployable and able to sustain themselves in operations outside Canadian territory.”8 2/15 This definition conceptually includes the consideration of the various airframes to comprise an effective force package, as well as the requisite command and control elements, intelligence, airfield engineers, aircraft technicians and other support and sustainment entities. Another consideration is the reality that expeditionary deployments may be to very austere locations, with inherent heightened demands upon sustainment. The USAF began experimenting with this operational construct for many of the same reasons that Canada is now examining this issue. The Cold War’s end brought many new crises to the fore, yet the USAF was contracting as part of the global “peace dividend” imperative. Over the ten-year period ending in 1995, the USAF’s budget was reduced by 40 percent, accompanied by a personnel reduction from 600,00 to 370,000. During a roughly corresponding period of reduction, Canada’s Air Force was left with 48 percent fewer personnel and 49 percent less aircraft; those remaining aircraft had flying hours cut by 59 percent. Yet a dramatically increased operational tempo, making demands upon the range of airframes and capabilities available, produced severe negative personnel repercussions through retention and training issues.9 The Chief of Defence Staff, in his 2002 Annual Report, acknowledged the personnel issue: “The reality of post-Cold War military operations has been the repetitive deployment of CF personnel into very stressful, usually hostile environments. These deployments are taking a toll on our people, who require time to recover, connect with their families, and train between deployments.”10 No one Air Force “community” is bearing solely the burden of these campaigns. The demand for CF18 Hornets, CH146 Griffons, and their essential personnel, for example, during the 1999 Kosovo operation illustrates the varied force packages commanders require. In order to respond to similar complex human resource and airframe conditions bedevilling CF planners, the US 3/15 began experimenting with EAF concept. There are two main aspects to this program: rotating the deployment burden more equitably, and providing more responsive, task-tailored capabilities to commanders.11 The reduced number of personnel and aircraft available to respond to government taskings causes recurrent deployments for particular crews and support personnel. This naturally has a detrimental impact upon skills development and quality of life for those deployed. Although it seems counterintuitive that deploying on operations degrades operational skills, not all capabilities are required during deployments. For example, the increased CH124 Sea King deployments to the Persian Gulf or Adriatic Sea on maritime surface interdiction operations has eliminated most, if not all, antisubmarine training opportunities. There is a similar dilemma in developing skilled aircraft technicians, as when trades journeymen endure this same operational tempo their deployed absence or subsequent release removes that ability to train apprentices.12 The US EAF structure presently consists of 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, each consisting of approximately 175 aircraft and 15,000 personnel. Barring any crises calling for expanded mobilization, as seen in the Iraq war, two of the 10 are on heightened alert during a 90- day rotation. This allows for stability and training, because it is forecast well in advance which two elements are “on-call” and which two are recuperating from their 90-day alert shift. Furthermore, the personnel from the remaining six Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are able to plan various stages of training and professional development.13 On the personnel side, the Canadian Air Force is experimenting with a “V12” deployment pattern for tactical aviation, in which a squadron is “on-call” or deployed for 12-months (“12”), with personnel deployed for variable tour lengths (“V”) ranging from six months for key personnel to 56-day rotations for other personnel.14 The “V12” arrangement also facilitates Reservist employment on 28-day 4/15 rotations - a potentially huge benefit considering the growing scarcity of suitable Regular Force personnel in some key positions. This is proving to be an effective use of innovative scheduling options, aspects of which may be further integrated into a Canadian AEF program. The desire to create task-tailored packages to respond quickly to theatre commander’s plans, however, is slightly more problematic for the Canadian Forces than for the USAF. Contrasted with the USAF’s aforementioned 1,750 EAF airframes, the CF inventory of equivalent aircraft is approximately 230.15 Therefore, Canada simply does not possess the equipment and skill sets to duplicate an Aerospace Expeditionary Force of 175 fighters, bombers, and the resources associated with suppressing enemy air defences, combat Search and Rescue, and reconnaissance - essentially the entire gamut of air warfare. Yet we can still task- tailor a suitable package, depending upon the operation undertaken. For example, a humanitarian mission in a semi-benign environment could utilize a force of four to six CF18s for defensive counter-aerospace operations, four to eight CH146s primarily for force protection reconnaissance / airfield defence force mobility, but with an on-call task of emergency MEDEVAC or Non- Governmental Organization (NGO) support, and a requisite number of CC130s for intra-theatre transport and possible air-to-air refuelling (AAR) if required by the Force Commander. For this hypothetical expedition,