Winter Readings • Air Base Attack in Desert Storm • Iraqi Air Power
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Winter Readings • Air Base Attack in Desert Storm • Iraqi Air Power Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Jjaoj. Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Gary A. Voellger Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark Associate Editors Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne Capt John J. Doherty Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force, It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1992, Vol. VI, No. 4 AFRP 50-2 Editorial 2 Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Enough 1st Lt Matthew M. Hurley, USAF 4 The Air Force Mission (Singular) Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, USAF 1 7 Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks Christopher M. Centner 2 5 The New AFM 1-1: Shortfall in Doctrine? Lt Col Robert N. Boudreau, USAF 3 7 O Clubs: Tradition or Contradiction? Capt Clay K. Culver, USAF 4 6 Close Air Support: A Doctrinal Disconnect Lt Col Brian W. Jones, USAF 6 0 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 7 5 Notams Notices of Interest 8 8 Index 90 Contributors 95 / EDITORIAL Missing in Action? ECENT testimony before the Senate These “non-MIAs” remained in enemy Select Committee on POW/MIA hands after the war, but a lack of concrete AffairsR revealed that high-level US govern evidence as to their whereabouts seemed ment officials, including two former secre to rule out rescue. The fate of these ser taries of defense, believed that live vicemen is unknown. The slim possibility American servicemen remained under the that some may have lingered on for years control of North Vietnamese and/or is more horrifying than the more believ Laotian forces at the conclusion of able contention that they died quickly in Operation Homecoming (the repatriation captivity. of American POWs) in 1973. Despite this We all realize the inherent risks of being knowledge, the withdrawal of US forces in the armed forces. Indeed, serving our from Vietnam went ahead as scheduled, as country means that sometimes we put our part of the Paris Peace Accords. lives on the line. Whether in peacetime Authorities disagree over whether the training accidents or actual combat, mili Nixon administration intentionally wrote tary people die. We tell ourselves it’s part off these men to expedite the peace of the job and force ourselves to move on. process with North Vietnam or whether On another level, however, some casual they just fell through the cracks. In any ties are more difficult to accept than oth event, it is inappropriate to second-guess ers (witness the incidents of fratricide dur the actions of officials who, at a very diffi ing the Gulf war). cult time in American history, surely did The current revelations are especially what they thought was best for their coun compelling. The possibility that some try. American servicemen remain in Laotian or The number of survivors in question is North Vietnamese hands long after all relatively small. Most of the 300 or so ser POWs were supposedly repatriated is vicemen who disappeared in the jungles deeply disturbing. We can only hope that of Laos are thought to have been killed in this testimony is, perhaps, a final footnote action, but their remains were never to the frustrating tale of our involvement recovered. In the case of missing airmen, in Southeast Asia. The American public the jungle is much like the sea, in that must consider the plight of these service doomed aircraft and crews can seemingly men who may have been left behind and vanish upon impact. Until recently, this appreciate the fact that at a very difficult was a comforting explanation by which time in American history, they did what one could rationalize the fate of MIAs. they thought was best for their country. The Senate hearings, however, revealed We in the Air Force never forgot them . that a few hardy souls evidently survived and never will. JJD their crashes and were taken prisoner. 2 Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- result of the composite nature of the wing. spondence should be addressed to the Editor, Rather, training schedules, reassignment sched Airpovver Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, ules, leave schedules, and so forth, are built Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the around the carrier deployment schedule, which right to edit the material for overall length. is cyclic. Since Mountain Home AFB, Idaho— or any other base—isn't going to put to sea, there is no reason to assume this workup COMPOSITE CONTROVERSY schedule. Instead, training, manning, and, It was with great interest that I read Maj Chris J. therefore, readiness should be no worse than Krisinger’s “A Carrier Air Wing for the Air they are under our current monolithic wing Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing” structure. (Spring 1992). As an exchange officer assigned The bottom line to Major Krisinger’s article is to the Royal Air Force (RAF), I recently had the that there are alternatives to the composite opportunity to present similar views to the wing concept now being implemented and fur RAF Staff College Basic Staff Course. My solu ther questions to consider. As we experiment tion was to create what I called the air task with and refine the composite wing, we might force (ATF). In fact, the ATF sounds surpris also wish to experiment with a geographically ingly like the composite air strike forces separated force such as the CASF or ATF. Gen (CASF) mentioned by Major Krisinger, which Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, has just goes to show that what goes around comes us headed for some turbulent—though excit around. The difference in the ATF organiza ing—times as we shape our new Air Force. tion, however, is that rather than reporting to a “The Boss” has some interesting ideas, but in “paper headquarters” (Nineteenth Air Force) the end what really matters is not who came up for operational control, the ATFs would be with what ideas, but what works! organized around and report to our new Maj David M. Hindt, USAF streamlined, existing numbered air forces. For RAF Boscombe Down, United Kingdom example, an ATF in the eastern continental United States composed of F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, B-52, and KC-10/KC-135 aircraft would report to Ninth Air Force upon activation. The The proposed composite wing at Mountain ATF would have flexibility in composition Home AFB, Idaho, would provide improved (e.g., it might or might not be politically pru command and control, reduced mission-plan dent to “show the flag” with B-52s, depending ning time, increased flexibility, integrated on the situation). Additionally, other highly training, and complete force-packaging advan limited specialty aircraft such as the F-l 17, tages, resulting in a high degree of combat EF-111, EC-130, and TR-1 could be assigned as capability. However, with today’s budgetary necessary or held back for more centralized constraints, a wing of 72 primary authorized control. As the article stated, by retaining aircraft (F-l 6s) with role-specific equipment monolithic functional wings, we could take could provide 80 percent of the Mountain advantage of economies of scale in such areas Home capability for about one-third the price. as supply, maintenance, and training. In both the past and the present, the prime Major Krisinger presents a very well thought argument against using composite wings has out essay, although I believe he makes at least been the support cost associated with main one erroneous assumption in comparing a taining the variety of aircraft types. Utilizing Navy carrier air wing to an Air Force air one type of multirole aircraft with role-specific wing/composite wing. The cyclic readiness equipment could allow support equipment posture of the Navy’s wings is probably not a continued on page 73 3 SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER AGHDAD arose early on 17 JUST HAVING January 1991, rudely awakened by the opening shots of an air AN AIR FORCE campaign unparalleled in history forB its scope, intensity, and overwhelming ISN’T ENOUGH success. Surprisingly, despite the ferocity of Operation Desert Storm, effective Iraqi opposition never materialized. During the 43-day campaign, only 41 coalition air 1st Lt M atthew M. H urley, USAF craft were lost in combat, all to surface-to- air missiles or antiaircraft artillery fire.1 For its part, the Iraqi air force (IQAF) offered only feeble resistance. The IQAF shot down no coalition aircraft in air-to- air combat, conducted no successful air strikes against coalition positions, and put only a handful of planes into the air at any given time. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 5 Where was the IQAF? Why didn’t this secure from the threat of a military air force, perhaps the largest in the region, takeover, and no element of the armed put up a decent fight in defense of its forces has played as prominent a role in homeland?2 The answer may be found in Iraqi politics as has the air force.