Winter Readings • Air Base Attack in Desert Storm • Iraqi Air Power

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Jjaoj. Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Gary A. Voellger

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editors Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force, It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think­ ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1992, Vol. VI, No. 4 AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2

Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Enough 1st Lt Matthew M. Hurley, USAF 4

The Air Force Mission (Singular) Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, USAF 1 7

Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks Christopher M. Centner 2 5

The New AFM 1-1: Shortfall in Doctrine? Lt Col Robert N. Boudreau, USAF 3 7

O Clubs: Tradition or Contradiction? Capt Clay K. Culver, USAF 4 6

Close Air Support: A Doctrinal Disconnect Lt Col Brian W. Jones, USAF 6 0

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 7 5 Notams Notices of Interest 8 8 Index 90 Contributors 95

/ EDITORIAL Missing in Action?

ECENT testimony before the Senate These “non-MIAs” remained in enemy Select Committee on POW/MIA hands after the war, but a lack of concrete AffairsR revealed that high-level US govern­ evidence as to their whereabouts seemed ment officials, including two former secre­ to rule out rescue. The fate of these ser­ taries of defense, believed that live vicemen is unknown. The slim possibility American servicemen remained under the that some may have lingered on for years control of North Vietnamese and/or is more horrifying than the more believ­ Laotian forces at the conclusion of able contention that they died quickly in Operation Homecoming (the repatriation captivity. of American POWs) in 1973. Despite this We all realize the inherent risks of being knowledge, the withdrawal of US forces in the armed forces. Indeed, serving our from Vietnam went ahead as scheduled, as country means that sometimes we put our part of the Paris Peace Accords. lives on the line. Whether in peacetime Authorities disagree over whether the training accidents or actual combat, mili­ Nixon administration intentionally wrote tary people die. We tell ourselves it’s part off these men to expedite the peace of the job and force ourselves to move on. process with North Vietnam or whether On another level, however, some casual­ they just fell through the cracks. In any ties are more difficult to accept than oth­ event, it is inappropriate to second-guess ers (witness the incidents of fratricide dur­ the actions of officials who, at a very diffi­ ing the Gulf war). cult time in American history, surely did The current revelations are especially what they thought was best for their coun­ compelling. The possibility that some try. American servicemen remain in Laotian or The number of survivors in question is North Vietnamese hands long after all relatively small. Most of the 300 or so ser­ POWs were supposedly repatriated is vicemen who disappeared in the jungles deeply disturbing. We can only hope that of Laos are thought to have been killed in this testimony is, perhaps, a final footnote action, but their remains were never to the frustrating tale of our involvement recovered. In the case of missing airmen, in Southeast Asia. The American public the jungle is much like the sea, in that must consider the plight of these service­ doomed aircraft and crews can seemingly men who may have been left behind and vanish upon impact. Until recently, this appreciate the fact that at a very difficult was a comforting explanation by which time in American history, they did what one could rationalize the fate of MIAs. they thought was best for their country. The Senate hearings, however, revealed We in the Air Force never forgot them . . . that a few hardy souls evidently survived and never will. JJD their crashes and were taken prisoner.

2 Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- result of the composite nature of the wing. spondence should be addressed to the Editor, Rather, training schedules, reassignment sched­ Airpovver Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, ules, leave schedules, and so forth, are built Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the around the carrier deployment schedule, which right to edit the material for overall length. is cyclic. Since Mountain Home AFB, Idaho— or any other base—isn't going to put to sea, there is no reason to assume this workup COMPOSITE CONTROVERSY schedule. Instead, training, manning, and, It was with great interest that I read Maj Chris J. therefore, readiness should be no worse than Krisinger’s “A Carrier Air Wing for the Air they are under our current monolithic wing Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing” structure. (Spring 1992). As an exchange officer assigned The bottom line to Major Krisinger’s article is to the Royal Air Force (RAF), I recently had the that there are alternatives to the composite opportunity to present similar views to the wing concept now being implemented and fur­ RAF Staff College Basic Staff Course. My solu­ ther questions to consider. As we experiment tion was to create what I called the air task with and refine the composite wing, we might force (ATF). In fact, the ATF sounds surpris­ also wish to experiment with a geographically ingly like the composite air strike forces separated force such as the CASF or ATF. Gen (CASF) mentioned by Major Krisinger, which Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, has just goes to show that what goes around comes us headed for some turbulent—though excit­ around. The difference in the ATF organiza­ ing—times as we shape our new Air Force. tion, however, is that rather than reporting to a “The Boss” has some interesting ideas, but in “paper headquarters” (Nineteenth Air Force) the end what really matters is not who came up for operational control, the ATFs would be with what ideas, but what works! organized around and report to our new Maj David M. Hindt, USAF streamlined, existing numbered air forces. For RAF Boscombe Down, United Kingdom example, an ATF in the eastern continental United States composed of F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, B-52, and KC-10/KC-135 aircraft would report to Ninth Air Force upon activation. The The proposed composite wing at Mountain ATF would have flexibility in composition Home AFB, Idaho, would provide improved (e.g., it might or might not be politically pru­ command and control, reduced mission-plan­ dent to “show the flag” with B-52s, depending ning time, increased flexibility, integrated on the situation). Additionally, other highly training, and complete force-packaging advan­ limited specialty aircraft such as the F-l 17, tages, resulting in a high degree of combat EF-111, EC-130, and TR-1 could be assigned as capability. However, with today’s budgetary necessary or held back for more centralized constraints, a wing of 72 primary authorized control. As the article stated, by retaining aircraft (F-l 6s) with role-specific equipment monolithic functional wings, we could take could provide 80 percent of the Mountain advantage of economies of scale in such areas Home capability for about one-third the price. as supply, maintenance, and training. In both the past and the present, the prime Major Krisinger presents a very well thought argument against using composite wings has out essay, although I believe he makes at least been the support cost associated with main­ one erroneous assumption in comparing a taining the variety of aircraft types. Utilizing Navy carrier air wing to an Air Force air one type of multirole aircraft with role-specific wing/composite wing. The cyclic readiness equipment could allow support equipment posture of the Navy’s wings is probably not a continued on page 73

3 SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER

AGHDAD arose early on 17 JUST HAVING January 1991, rudely awakened by the opening shots of an air AN AIR FORCE campaign unparalleled in history forB its scope, intensity, and overwhelming ISN’T ENOUGH success. Surprisingly, despite the ferocity of Operation Desert Storm, effective Iraqi opposition never materialized. During the 43-day campaign, only 41 coalition air­ 1st Lt M atthew M. H urley, USAF craft were lost in combat, all to surface-to- air missiles or antiaircraft artillery fire.1 For its part, the Iraqi air force (IQAF) offered only feeble resistance. The IQAF shot down no coalition aircraft in air-to- air combat, conducted no successful air strikes against coalition positions, and put only a handful of planes into the air at any given time. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 5

Where was the IQAF? Why didn’t this secure from the threat of a military air force, perhaps the largest in the region, takeover, and no element of the armed put up a decent fight in defense of its forces has played as prominent a role in homeland?2 The answer may be found in Iraqi politics as has the air force. During the policies of Iraqi president Saddam modern Iraq’s first military coup in 1936, Hussein. Since assuming power, rebellious pilots established the pattern Saddam—driven by a deep-rooted fear of for IQAF involvement by bombing the military coups—has systematically under­ office of the prime minister.3 Similarly, mined the IQAF’s capability in order to the air force inaugurated the short-lived maintain and maximize his personal rule; Baathist regime of 1963 with an attack he therefore bears the responsibility for its against the Defense Ministry in Baghdad.4 failure. This cuticle discusses the dangers Key IQAF personnel or units led further Saddam perceived in a capable air force, attempts in 1965 and 1966, and two years his notions regarding the purpose and later the air force backed the Baath party’s value of air power, and the subsequent second, successful bid to secure the reins measures he took to control the IQAF. It of state.5 then shows that those policies led to the But the IQAF apparently grew dissatis­ gross deficiencies in training, motivation, fied with the government it helped to skill, and employment that lost the air war install. Following Saddam’s ascension to for Iraq. power, coup attempts sponsored or sup­ ported by the air force continued, even at the height of the Iran-Iraq War.6 More Saddam’s Fear recent attempts, including a scheme in 1988 to shoot down the presidential jet­ of the IQAF liner and a reported plot in 1989 to bomb Saddam’s reviewing stand during a Saddam regards the IQAF with an parade, highlight a danger that seemed extreme caution that is rooted in modern unlikely to abate on its own.7 Iraqi history. Since Great Britain nomi­ nally granted Iraq its independence in 1932, no Iraqi regime has been fully 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Besides corrupting the armed forces to powerless.”13 His efforts to that effect the point that “political intrigue became began even before he assumed the presi­ more important to the officer corps than dency in 1979. military professionalism,"8 constant mili­ tary meddling in Iraqi politics has led to a fundamental characteristic of Saddam’s Control of the IQAF rule. Frankly, he fears his own armed forces—especially the IQAF—and is deter­ By 1973 Saddam, then deputy chairman mined to preclude their involvement in of the Revolutionary Command Council future coup attempts. This might explain for internal security, had become the de why the Republican Guard and the Baath facto strongman of the Baathist regime.14 party militia, both established primarily to His position as Iraq’s chief “enforcer” per­ counterbalance the regular armed forces, mitted him both to ensure his ultimate are equipped with antiaircraft weapons assumption of total power and to elimi­ (French Rolands and Crotales), which are nate potentially threatening elements generally considered superior to the within Iraq. Towards that end, he intensi­ Soviet-made weapons of the IQAF’s Air fied a long-running series of military Defense Command.9 purges. Ranking air force officers fre­ quently fell among the victims, including IQAF commander Hussein Hayawi, who Value of the IQAF was unceremoniously dismissed in 1975.15 Though troubled by the IQAF’s rebel­ By the end of the decade, the purges had lious tendencies, Saddam also recognized reached a fever pitch. Saddam’s “cleans­ in air power a potentially powerful asset. ing operation” of 1978 resulted in some 60 Established in 1931 to subdue dissident military executions and the removal of tribesmen, the IQAF had proven useful to dozens of other officers, among them the the British and pre-Baathist Iraqi govern­ latest air force commander.16 Hundreds ments in their quest to maintain central more military officers were imprisoned, control over troublesome regions and dis­ exiled, or killed after Saddam became affected groups.10 Despite his misgivings president in 1979, and heads continued to regarding the IQAF, Saddam relished the roll at a brisk pace during and after the prospect of bombing wayward Iraqis into Iran-Iraq War.17 Even as war with the US- submission. In fact, during three major led coalition approached, Saddam appar­ campaigns—in 1968-69, 1974-75, and ently feared his military leadership more 1987-88—the IQAF was employed against than the impending assault. In December Iraq’s independence-minded Kurdish 1990, he ordered the dismissal of the minority, at times using chemical defense minister and a dozen senior offi­ weapons to suppress the Kurds.11 When cers, while 16 others were put to death for necessary, Saddam has also subjected allegedly “plotting against the regime.’’18 other opposition groups to air attack, as Weeding out a relatively few trouble­ demonstrated by an IQAF strike against some individuals failed to ensure the militant Iraqi Shiites in 1987.12 As a long-term loyalty of the military as potential asset as well as a threat, the a whole, so Saddam engineered a IQAF warranted special treatment from “Baathization” campaign to further Saddam’s regime. He wanted an air force cleanse the armed forces of unreliable ele­ that he could employ or emasculate, as he ments. The party restricted enrollment in saw fit, to preserve his rule—which meant the Iraqi Military Academy to Baathists, that “most of the time it was effectively instructed its military members to ignore SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 7

the orders of suspect non-Baathist officers, appointment as IQAF commander—not for and decreed the death penalty for military any outstanding military or administrative personnel who participated in any kind of qualifications, but because Hayawi hailed non-Baathist political activity. Those from Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and partv members who were thought to be boasted solid Baathist credentials.24 sufficiently reliable to remain in the ranks Regardless of the ties of family or clan, all were subjected to a steady barrage of commanders—including Hayawi—were Baathist indoctrination and propaganda at “continually reshuffled to prevent anyone every turn.19 from establishing a power base within the Of course, lip service to Baathist ideals armed forces.”25 would not fully guarantee the armed forces' loyalty to the regime. To further ensure their political purity, Saddam co­ opted, expanded, and strengthened Iraq’s Effects on the IQAF already formidable network of internal The IQAF’s woes were aggravated when security services. Organizations such as Saddam assumed full operational control the Military Intelligence Department and as commander in chief in 1979. By 1978 Baath Military Bureau screen officer can­ the IQAF’s attack and long-range bomber didates, monitor the military and civilian squadrons had already been placed under activities of Iraqi personnel, and conduct his personal direction to preempt their surveillance in each unit under the guise use in a plot against his regime. To fur­ of “ideological indoctrination.”20 Over­ ther reduce the chance of an IQAF-sup- seeing all intelligence and internal secu­ ported coup, he severely restricted its rity operations is Party Intelligence, which operational training.26 By the beginning also employs agents in the military and of the Iran-Iraq War, the best Iraqi attack directs the party militia.21 pilots—those who would fly the initial It is hardly a coincidence that Saddam’s strikes against Iranian airfields—were half brother, Sibawi Ibrahim, runs Party experienced only in attacking defenseless Intelligence:22 his family has also found a Kurdish villages and dropping dummy home in the Iraqi military. By the time bombs on practice ranges.27 Prospective Saddam became president, most senior Iraqi aces fared little better, for the IQAF military posts were restricted to his rela­ had rehearsed only one-on-one engage­ tives and fellow members of the Tikriti ments above 5,000 feet.28 Iraq might have clan,23 but the process of patronage had begun much earlier. As early as 1969, Saddam sponsored Hussein Hayawi’s Iraqi air force MiG-29. 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Iraqi air force L-39 training jet. insolence, dutifully complied with Saddam’s every whim, all the while pro­ fessing their loyalty to the “president com­ alleviated such shortcomings in training mander.” To deflect suspicion, individual by sending new pilots to its chief sponsor, pilots also directed their energies towards the Soviet Union. However, Saddam proving their devotion to Saddam, rather deliberately curtailed the number of pilots than making the best of what little training sent abroad, fearing that “officers trained and operational planning he had allowed there might become subversives.”29 them.33 To further ensure his domination of the The motivation for these military air force and to reduce pilot independence “reforms” was neither ideological zeal nor and initiative, Saddam tightened the the national interest, but Saddam’s self- IQAF’s Soviet-style system of rigidly cen­ interest. To most observers, a program tralized command and control (C2). designed to render a military force virtu­ Although centralized C2 is characteristic ally ineffective would seem absurd. But to of many air forces, the system imposed on the Iraqi president, who was weighing the the IQAF was far more restrictive—even potential threats against his personal rule, “personalized.”30 Saddam directed the Iraq’s own armed forces posed a greater planning and execution of all Iraqi air danger than did any other likely adversary operations in- detail, a responsibility that and had to be dealt with accordingly. In reflected his desire to maintain full the process, Saddam’s efforts created a cli­ authority over every facet of military mate in which competence, capability, activity.31 During the Iran-Iraq War, this and professionalism were regularly sacri­ system resulted in “rigidly preplanned ficed on the altar of political conformity, missions that originated at high levels of thus breeding servile mediocrity and command and [took! too long of a period reluctance to decide even the simplest to plan,” not least of them the pathetic matters without explicit guidance from counterair “campaign” that opened the above. Although this result was precisely Iran-Iraq War.32 what Saddam wanted, the Gulf war of In such a negative political climate, mil­ 1991—like the Iran-Iraq War before it— itary professionalism and competence plainly demonstrated that political reli­ were bound to suffer. Iraqi commanders, ability and combat effectiveness are not eager to avoid accusations of disloyalty or necessarily compatible.34 SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 9

That Iraq won its war with Iran—insofar persuaded Teheran to accept a cease­ as survival may be equated with win­ fire.41 ning—would seem to refute the theory Once the guns fell silent in the Gulf, that Saddam’s policies had incapacitated however, Saddam again turned a vengeful the IQAF. Many analysts, in fact, cite eye inward. To punish his military com­ Iraqi air power as a major factor in finally manders for their insolence—and for the securing Iranian consent for a cease-fire.35 unforgivable sin of sharing credit for “his” Such arguments ignore the fact that air victory—a new round of purges reverber­ superiority will automatically fall to one ated through the armed forces.42 The contending air force when its opponent political-control mechanisms were also defaults. Following the Islamic revolu­ fully restored, and IQAF training had tion, Iran’s air force had been wracked by again dropped to negligible levels by purges and political devastation which 1990.43 Soon afterwards, as Saddam once even eclipsed like measures that Saddam again dragged his nation into war—this had inflicted upon the IQAF, and by 1986 time against a capable and well-armed some 5,000 Iranian officers had been foe—the deleterious effects of his policies executed, imprisoned, or exiled.36 became readily apparent. Simultaneously, Iran’s arsenal of American-made aircraft and air defense weaponry steadily dwindled because of a lack of spare parts and replacements, and The IQAFs Performance between 1979 and 1983 the number of in the Gulf War operable Iranian combat aircraft fell from over 400 to as low as 70. Iraq, on the The first of 109,876 coalition sorties other hand, had increased its stock of struck just before 0300 Baghdad time on combat aircraft from 332 to 500 by 1986, 17 January 1991, less than 24 hours after adding advanced fighters like the MiG-25 the United Nations’ deadline expired.44 Foxbat and the Mirage Fl to its inven­ Television footage of antiaircraft fire over tory.37 Iraq belied the fact that, despite the inten­ Despite its ever-increasing qualitative sity of the coalition air assault, opposition and quantitative superiority, the IQAF was generally light. Coalition command­ could sustain only a limited and inconsis­ ers initially ascribed the weak response to tent campaign against Iranian targets for “a fairly high degree of tactical surprise,”45 most of the war. Poor training, strict con­ but the pattern persisted and eventually trol, and Saddam’s misguided strategies encompassed the entire Iraqi military. conspired to deny the IQAF a decisive role The IQAF perhaps best epitomized this until Iraq’s near-catastrophic defeat at the trend. In contrast to the 2,000-plus coali­ Fao Peninsula in 1986.38 The loss of Fao tion missions flown on the first day of precipitated a virtual mutiny among hostilities, the IQAF sortied only 24 com­ Saddam’s generals, who demanded the bat aircraft, nine of which never freedom to prosecute the war with a mini­ returned.46 On only four days did more mum of political interference.39 The pro­ than 40 Iraqi aircraft, including support fessional latitude subsequently granted the types, take to the air. Though comparable IQAF, though temporary, precipitated sortie rates had arguably been adequate “quantum advances” in its effectiveness.40 against Iran, the coalition’s aerial For the first time in the war, the IQAF blitzkrieg overwhelmed the Iraqis. After achieved some measure of its full poten­ nine days of combat, the IQAF abandoned tial and thus was able to weaken Iran’s its attempts to intercept coalition aircraft, economic infrastructure and contribute to acknowledging the coalition’s absolute a string of Iraqi battlefield victories that mastery of the air.47 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Iranian air force F-14 (top) and F-4 (bottom). once in the air, Iraqi pilots generally pre­ ferred to avoid direct combat. Rather than The restrictions that Saddam placed on fight the approaching coalition warplanes, the IQAF were most clearly demonstrated most Iraqi fighters would try to run for when Iraqi pilots did fly, particularly in cover before coming within range of air-to-air combat. The IQAF’s tactics gen­ enemy air-to-air missiles.52 As Royal Air erally seemed confused, and its pilots dis­ Force (RAF) Group Capt Niall Irving played poor situational awareness by fre­ remarked, “Every time [RAF Tornado F3 quently allowing coalition fighters to close fighters] went in for attack, the Iraqis to within a few miles before taking defen­ turned tail and put the airplanes back on sive action.48 Iraqi MiG-29 pilots in par­ the ground again.”53 ticular “appeared not to know how to The strongest testimonial to the IQAF’s fly,’’49 as demonstrated by an early engage­ poor performance in air combat is the final ment in which a MiG-29 pilot shot down tally: coalition pilots scored 35 kills his wingman and then flew his own air­ against Iraqi MiGs, Sukhois, and craft into the ground some 30 seconds Mirages—15 in the first three days—while later. Iraqi MiG-29 pilots reportedly flew losing none of their own to Iraqi aircraft.54 with the air-intercept radar button taped Incredibly, in the air-to-ground role the down to lock onto the first aircraft IQAF fared even worse. Its air “counterof­ detected and continually depressed the fensive” was limited to a single, abortive trigger to fire their weapons as soon as Mirage F l raid against Saudi Arabia; a they acquired a target.50 Apparently, all planned Tu-16 chemical attack that never Iraqi fighter pilots practiced these tech­ even made it off the ground; and an niques, for when they managed to lock attempted strike against coalition ship­ onto coalition aircraft, they launched their ping.55 During the entire war, only one missiles at extreme ranges and missed Iraqi surface-attack aircraft—an Exocet- every time.51 laden Mirage F l—even went so far as to Attempts to engage coalition aircraft, launch its weapon, which fell harmlessly however unsuccessful, were unusual; into the sea.56 SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 11

The IQAF’s fourth-rate performance to rely on their own meager skills and suggests that it was unable, unwilling, or initiative—which proved grossly inade­ not allowed to fight. The reality is a quate.63 When employed properly, central­ hybrid of all three hypotheses, and each ized C2 can be a valuable asset, giving the can be traced to the same root cause: commander "positive control and a clear Saddam’s concerns about security and overview of the air battle.’’64 Saddam’s associated military policies. personalized system, however, put the Iraqi armed forces in an extremely vulner­ able position, because “if any prop was IQAF Unable to Fight knocked out, the entire strategy could col­ Saddam’s emphasis on political rather lapse, and it did.”65 than military qualifications had promoted a standard of mediocrity within the Iraqi IQAF Unwilling to Fight officer corps, whose effectiveness was degraded by the "incompetence and lack Saddam’s Baathization campaign was par­ of determination bred by politicization’’ tially successful in one respect: given the that inevitably resulted.57 Still worse military’s political priorities and the type were the training restrictions Saddam had of applicants they attract, many Iraqi offi­ imposed to minimize the chances of an air cers have apparently come to view the attack against his regime. The IQAF’s armed forces primarily as a vehicle for training from August 1990 to January 1991 advancement within the Baath party. As a was “insufficient to maintain an accept­ result, Iraq’s air force is sorely lacking in able level of operational efficiency,”58 and professionalism and esprit de corps.66 any flying activity that did take place Obviously, a combat death—however glo­ appeared “aimless.’’59 For example, IQAF rious—would end a young Baathist pilot’s squadrons shunned joint exercises with career plans; the more appealing option other air or ground units and never prac­ was to withdraw from the field and later ticed in large formations to prepare a coor­ claim a few aerial victories.67 dinated air defense or concentrated Saddam’s efforts to subjugate the IQAF attacks against coalition formations.60 had also further alienated Iraqi officers Perhaps the greatest obstacle hindering who were already opposed or neutral to the IQAF’s performance, however, was the the Baath regime. The parade of air force- operational control that Saddam wielded initiated/executed coup attempts that over the armed forces. His absolute have plagued Saddam’s rule is one indica­ authority at every level of military com­ tion of the chronic dissatisfaction within mand ensured that his orders, however ill the IQAF, a dissatisfaction that intensified conceived, were carried out. The IQAF as Saddam plunged Iraq into another mili­ was made to suffer for his mistakes, for tary crisis. During Desert Storm, disgrun­ Saddam “had no idea what airpower is," tled Iraqi pilots refused to sacrifice their remarked Gen Charles Horner, commander lives to support Saddam’s ambitions and of the coalition air forces during the Gulf ill-formulated strategies, despite any war. “He used his own air force so notions of patriotism they might have poorly.”61 entertained. One Iraqi defector, summa­ The rigid C2 system that Saddam had rizing the view of many of his countrymen forced upon the IQAF—a system that was in the armed forces, complained that crippled with relative ease in the opening Iraqis were being forced to fight “not for hours of the war—proved to be a serious the good of the country, and not to defend liability as well.62 Iraqi pilots, suddenly our own homes, but because of the whim without the direction they had been of just one man named Saddam.”68 taught to depend on entirely, were forced Consequently, many Iraqi pilots “refused 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 to fight for a regime they did not respect Initially, Saddam sought to protect his against an enemy they did,”69 and rumors aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters, but of a wartime IQAF plot to overthrow in late January coalition pilots began strik­ Saddam began filtering out of Baghdad.70 ing those shelters one by one, eventually When the IQAF was forced to fight, the destroying an estimated 141 Iraqi air­ heavy losses that resulted from Saddam’s craft.75 Saddam then sought alternate policies further drained its pilots’ combat­ sanctuaries for his planes, including resi­ ive spirit. Combat against the coalition air dential areas, remote roadways, important forces, whose incessant training could not archeological sites, and previously have gone unnoticed, would be a daunting bombed shelters. Those aircraft, dis­ prospect for even a capable air force. For persed singly and in pairs without logisti­ an Iraqi pilot, whose skills had never been cal or maintenance support, remained allowed to mature, the natural reaction g r o u n d e d f o r t h e r e s t o f th e w a r . 76 was to turn and run. It is tempting to Although of no further consequence in the attribute such behavior to the fear suppos­ fighting, aircraft so disposed did improve edly generated by the coalition’s vaunted Saddam’s chances of retaining a loyal in- technology, but the IQAF itself possessed country force in the event of a coalition some very capable aircraft, such as the victory.77 MiG-29 and Mirage FI. Indeed, those air­ Even more telling, and much more per­ craft were the ones most involved in the plexing, was the exodus of some 148 Iraqi fighting during the first few days, but they aircraft to Iran.78 A number of interpreta­ were also the ones most often shot tions have been offered to explain this down.71 According to the Soviet newspa­ odd development, but it appears that the per Izvestiya, the mounting losses had “a first aircraft were in fact flown by defect­ very dispirited [sic] effect on the psycho­ ing Iraqi pilots. This possibility might logical state of the flight personnel of explain why some of them ran out of fuel B a g h d a d ’s a v i a t i o n . ” 72 G r e a t B r i t a i n ’ s and crashed—indicating poor-to-nonexis- commander in the Middle East, Lt Gen Sir tent planning and a “last ditch” mental­ Peter de la Billiere, summed up the situa­ ity—and why Saddam initially demanded tion more succinctly. The IQAF, he said, the return of these aircraft.79 Shortly was simply “too frightened to fight.”73 thereafter, however, Saddam himself began ordering Iraqi aircraft out of the war zone to preserve “the flower of the air force,” including Iraq’s entire fleet of IQAF Not Allowed to Fight Su-24 strike aircraft and an assortment of Saddam had imposed severe political Mirage Fls and MiG-29s.80 The length restrictions on the IQAF to minimize the and scale of the operation, which contin­ threat it might pose to his regime, but it is ued for some 15 days and in some cases important to remember that he also con­ included entire squadrons, support this sidered the IQAF a valuable asset. explanation, as do reports that Iraqi fight­ Therefore, as losses mounted early in the ers escorted tanker and transport aircraft war and it became apparent that Iraq’s air to the border.81 Captured Iraqi sailors force could not mount a sufficient claimed that they too had received orders defense, Saddam attempted to preserve “from the very top” to seek sanctuary in some measure of air power as a precaution Iranian waters,82 and people who have against future threats. His rationale is not studied the Iran-Iraq War may recall that so difficult to understand, for popular and in 1980 Saddam dispersed Iraqi aircraft to sectarian revolts in the Middle East have friendly regional states to protect them often occurred in the wake of military from Iranian air attacks.83 defeat.74 Whatever the reason, the exodus ulti­ SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 13

mately stemmed from Saddam’s self-serv­ look to the Gulf war as a reminder that ing policies. Whether the pilots in ques­ each threat is different, governed by con­ tion were Iraqis who despaired of their siderations that fall outside bean counting inability to fight and wanted to avoid and the stereotypes we tend to formulate. almost certain death in the air, defectors Only in this way can we avoid the mistake who were simply unwilling to fight, or of planning for the last war, an all-too- loyal officers following their president’s common temptation for victorious forces. orders, the root cause remains the same: A future enemy may not make the same Saddam’s personal security policies drove mistakes, and the methods employed so the air force to Iran, just as they had crip­ successfully against Iraq under such favor­ pled the IQAF over Iraq and Kuwait. able conditions may not work as well against a less shortsighted foe. For Saddam Hussein and the IQAF, two lessons of the Gulf war should stand out above all others. First, war is the province of professional soldiers. The Vietnam Lessons Learned and War, Saddam believed, taught that Relearned Americans would never again tolerate a prolonged or costly conflict. He ignored a Air power advocates hail Desert Storm’s lesson that American commanders had success as the vindication of long-held learned all too well: the chief executive’s beliefs first expressed by the likes of Gen office is a poor place from which to plan William (“B illy”) Mitchell and Giulio and direct a battle. Thus, while President Douhet in the 1920s. Coalition air George Bush vowed that American forces supremacy certainly facilitated the rapid would never again be committed to battle success of the ground campaign, prompt­ “with one hand tied behind their back,”86 ing Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force President Saddam sent his forces into the chief of staff, to proclaim that “this is the fray virtually bound, gagged, deaf, dumb, first time in history that a field army has and blind. been defeated by airpower.”84 Second, just having an air force isn’t Perhaps so, but air power is a relative enough. On paper, the IQAF looked for­ quantity. Coalition forces benefited as midable indeed—both in terms of person­ much from their enemy’s inability and nel and modern equipment. That qualita­ reluctance to fight as from their own skill, tive and quantitative advantage might preparation, and technical prowess. In have been sufficient to prevent an Iranian fact, by the end of the war, more IQAF air­ victory in the 1980s, but against the coali­ craft had been intentionally rendered hors tion air forces the IQAF could offer little de combat by the Iraqi high command more than token resistance. A painfully than had been destroyed by the coali­ obvious lesson of twentieth-century war­ tion.85 Had the IQAF been a competent, fare, proven time and again, is that mod­ capable, and motivated force, it might ern weapons are a waste of resources have wrought considerable havoc on coali­ without operators who are willing and tion forces, but Saddam’s political shack­ able to use them. Saddam serenely defied les relegated any such scenario to the the lessons of history, and Iraq paid the realm of fantasy. price for his ignorance. Therefore, if the By neutralizing his own air force, Gulf war was truly won in the air, the out­ Saddam committed a blunder of a magni­ come was decided long before the first tude rarely seen in military history; hence, shot was fired, for Saddam Hussein did Iraq’s case may prove to be unique. The more damage to the Iraqi air force than US and coalition air forces must therefore did 2,000 coalition sorties a day. 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Notes

1. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait 11. O 'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 151, 155-56; al- (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 353-56. The Khalil, 23; CARDRI, 197; and Karsh and Rautsi, 169. figure of 41 counts only fixed-wing losses, including aircraft 12. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at shot down, aircraft that crashed on return due to battle dam­ War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), 102. age, and aircraft that successfully returned to base despite 13. Friedman, 23. battle damage but could not be repaired. Aircraft lost during 14. Karsh and Rautsi, 60. the war are as follows: 15. al-Khalil, 294. 16. Karsh and Rautsi, 88. USAF (14): 1 AC-130H. 5 A-lOs, 1 EF-111A, 1 F-4G. 17. Ibid., 118. 185. 2 F-15Es. 4 F-16s 18. "Command Purged." Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 January US Navy (8): 5 A-6Es, 1 F-14A, 2 F/A-18Cs 1991. 10. US Marine Corps (7): 4 AV-8Bs, 3 OV-lOBs 19. Chubin and Tripp, 19; al-Khalil, 26-27; Karsh and Royal Air Force (6): 6 Tornado GR Mk Is Rautsi, 88; and CARDRI, 216-17. Royal Saudi Air Force (3): 2 F-5Es. 1 Panavia Tornado 20. CARDRI. 216-17: Lief, 39: and Chubin and Tripp, 19, IDS 115. Kuwaiti Air Force (1): 1 A-4KU 21. Andrew Rathmell. “Iraqi Intelligence and Security France (1): 1 Jaguar A Services," International Defense Review, May 1991. 393-94. Italy (1): 1 Panavia Tornado IDS 22. Lief, 39; and Karsh and Rautsi. 180-81. Before Different sources vary regarding the number of coalition air­ Sibawi—another of Saddam’s half brothers—Barzan al- craft lost during the war. Of those I have seen, this figure Tikriti directed Party Intelligence. represents the “worst case." 23. CARDRI, 216, 222; and Karsh and Rautsi. 190. 2. According to the International Institute of Strategic 24. Marr, 213. Studies, in the summer of 1990 the IQAF boasted some 25. CARDRI, 222. 40,000 personnel and 689 combat aircraft. These included 26. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-lraq 16 bombers (eight Tu-22s, four Tu-16s, four Chinese H-6Ds), War: The First Round," Armed Forces Journal International, 360 fighter/ground-attack aircraft (30 Chinese J-6s, 90 MiG- April 1982, 38. 42; and Jasjit Singh, "Military Dimension," 238, 64 Mirage F1-EQ5S, 30 Su-7s, 70 Su-20s. 16 Su-24s. 60 in Iran-lraq War (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1985), Su-25s), 275 air-to-air fighters (40 Chinese J-7s. 150 MiG-21s, 95. 25 MiG-25s, 30 Mirage Fl-EQs, 30 MiG-29s), 12 reconnais­ 27. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner. The sance aircraft (five MiG-21s, seven MiG-25s), two airborne Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2, The Iran-lraq War (Boulder. early warning aircraft (11-76 "Adnans”). and a number of Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 83. combat-capable trainers. Iraqi foreign minister Ahmad 28. Cordesman, "Lessons,” 38. Hussein Khuddayer al-Sammarai later admitted that Iraq 29. Cordesman and Wagner, 44. actually had 24 Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft. The 30. Yezid Sayigh. “Why Iraq Could Not Win," Middle East International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military International, 8 March 1991, 6. Balance. 1990-91 (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 31. Karsh and Rautsi. 155; al-Khalil, 276; and Friedman, 1990), 106: and James Bruce, “Iraq Lists '148 Aircraft in 247. Iran',” Jane's Defence Weekly. 27 April 1991, 684. 32. Cordesman and Wagner. 458. 3. The Committee against Repression and for Democratic 33. Christine Moss Helms. “The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Rights in Iraq (CARDRI), Saddam's Iraq: devolution or Objectives versus Military Strategy," American-Arab Affairs. Reaction?. 2d ed. (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1989), 206. Summer 1983, 79. 4. Ronald E. Bergquist. The Role of Air Power in the 34. Chubin and Tripp. 116. Iran-lraq War (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 35. See, for example. Efraim Karsh. "Military Lessons of 1988), 22. the Iran-lraq War," Orbis. Spring 1989, 209—23; and Aharon 5. The Baathist coup of 1968 actually occurred in two Levran and Zeev Eytan, "Strategic Air Attacks in the stages. On 17 July the Baath party and military seized power Iran-lraq War: The Gulf Campaign." in The Middle East in a joint takeover. The Baathists, dissatisfied with the Military Balance. 1987-1988. ed. Shlomo Gazit (Boulder, power-sharing arrangements that followed, seized full con­ Colo.: Westview Press. 1988). trol two weeks later. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 36. David Segal, “The Air War in the Persian Gulf.” Air 1961-1970 (Hamden. Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), 140: University Review. March-April 1986, 53. CARDRI. 212: and Phebe Marr, The Modern History o f Iraq 37. Cordesman and Wagner, 162, 466. (Boulder, Colo.: VVestview Press, 1985), 210. 38. For specific examples, see Cordesman and Wagner. 70. 6. Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (London: Brassey’s 81. 481; Cordesman. "Lessons." 47: Karsh and Rautsi. 155, Defence Publishers. 1988), 43. 170-71; al-Khalil. 276; Bergquist, 69; and Chubin and Tripp, 7. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A 61. Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991), 207: 39. Karsh and Rautsi, 192. Louise Lief. "Even Three Sets of Spies Aren't Enough,” US 40. Frederick W. Axelgard. “Iraq and the War with Iran." News &■ World Report, 4 February 1991, 39: and Efraim Current History. February 1987. 90. Karsh. "Regional Implications of the Iran-lraq War," in The 41. David Segal, "T h e Iran-lraq War: A M ilitary Middle East Military Balance. 1988-1989, ed. Shlomo Gazit Analysis," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988, 957; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-lraq War and Western Security. and Zeev Eytan (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 105. 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (New 8. Bergquist. 21. York: Jane's Publishing. Inc.. 1987), 114; Levran and Eytan. 9. Samir al-Khalil. Republic of Fear: The Politics o f Modern Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books. 1989), 31; Karsh 238-40: and Karsh. "Military Lessons." 217. and Rautsi, 190; Lief, 39: and Friedman. 25. 42. Karsh and Rautsi, 185; and Lief, 39. 43. Bill Sweetman and Anthony Robinson. “The 10. Bergquist, 19. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI AIR POWER 15

Mechanics of Interdiction and Airfield Attack.” International "JPRS (Joint Publication Research Service] Report: Soviet Defense Review. May 1991. 472; "Desert Storm: The First Press Coverage of the Gulf War," Foreign Broadcast Phase,” World Airpower journal. Spring 1991. 33; and Karsh Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-UMA-91-008, 18 March and Rautsi, 193. 1991, 10. 44. Thomas B. Allen, F. Clinton Berry, and Norman 68. B. Ivanov. "The Persian Gulf: Negotiations Proceed as Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Publishing. Explosions Rumble,” Izvestiya. 16 February 1991, 4, in "JPRS Inc.. 1991). 142; and Barbara Starr et al., "Success from the Report: Soviet Press Coverage of the Gulf War," FBIS, JPRS- Air," fane's Defence Weekly. 6 April 1991. 531. UMA-91-008, 18 March 1991,19. 45. John D. Morrocco, “Allies Attack Iraqi Targets; Scuds 69. Roberts. 21. Strike Israeli Cities." Aviation Week & Space Technology. 21 70. News of the plot coincided with reports from the January 1991. 20. Soviet news agency Interfax that the commanders of the 46. Steve Morse, ed.. Gulf Air War Debrief (London: IQAF and air defense forces had been executed "for failing to Aerospace Publishing. 1991), 64. 226. perform their duties with sufficient zeal and determination." 47. Starr et al., 531. The alleged executions have never been verified, but at 48. Murray Hammick. "Aerial Views: USAF Air-to-Air approximately that time Gen Mezahim Saib replaced Lt Gen Combat." International Defense Review. May 1991, 744; and Hamid Shaaben al Khazraji as commander of the IQAF. A Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Allied Air Supremacy Keeps Air-to- connection between the two events is possible but difficult Air Engagements Limited." Aviation Week & Space to confirm. Tom Masland. "Seeking Haven in Iran," Technology. 18 February 1991, 46. Newsweek, 11 February 1991, 32; and Morse, 8. 49. Hammick, 744. 71. Of the 15 Iraqi aircraft lost in combat from 17 to 19 50. “Iraqi MiG-29 Shot Down Partner Aircraft, Then January 1991, six were Mirage F ls and five were MiG-29s. Crashed in Early Desert Storm Mission," Aviation Week fr The remainder included two Chinese-built F-7s (MiG-21s) Space Technology. 18 February 1991, 63: and Friedman, and two MiG-25s. Morse, 226. 357. 72. D. Veliky and B. Ivanov, "Persian Gulf: Allied 51. Hammick, 744. Supremacy in the Air and at Sea,” Izvestiya. 4 February 52. Ibid. 1991, 1, 4, in "JPRS Report: Soviet Press Coverage of the 53. “United Kingdom Takes Key Role in Attacks against Gulf War," FBIS, JPRS-UMA-91-008. 18 March 1991, 6. Iraqi Targets." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 18 73. John Boatman et al., "Bombing Campaign to February 1991, 48. Continue." fane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 1991, 135. 54. Morse, 226. 74. Following Iran's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1983, 55. Friedman, 191, 357; and Morse. 53. 80. According to for example, Iraqi Kurds revolted against Baghdad in a rebel­ Friedman, the two Mirage F ls that were shot down on 24 lion that was not suppressed until 1988. Karsh and Rautsi, January—reportedly carrying Exocet missiles to strike coali­ 168. tion shipping—were in fact on a reconnaissance mission. 75. The IQAF had some 594 hardened aircraft shelters, 56. John Roberts. “Gulf War: The Air Strategy," Air 395 of which were hit by coalition aircraft during the war. Forces International, no. 3 (1991): 23. "A Friend in Need," The Economist, 2 February 1991, 19; 57. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay. From Shield to Dunnigan and Bay, 148; and Allen, Berry, and Polmar, 126. Storm (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1991), 75. 76. Helen Dewar et al., "Ground War Not Imminent, Bush 58. Sweetman and Robinson, 472. Says; Allies to Rely on Air Power "For a W hile'," 59. David A. Fulghum. "US Deploys U-2, TR-1 Spy Washington Post, 12 February 1991, A13; and Friedman, Aircraft over Gulf in Intelligence Missions," Aviation Week­ 161, 164. s’ Space Technology. 3 September 1990. 31. 77. John Boatman et al., "Saddam 'May Be Sitting It Out',” 60. David A. Fulghum. “Analysis Indicates Iraqi Air Force fane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 1991, 138. Weak on Innovation. CAS Role." Aviation Week & Space 78. According to an official Iraqi statement, those aircraft Technology. 17 September 1990. 113. This pattern is consis­ included 115 combat aircraft, among them 44 Su-20/22 tent with the IQAF’s performance in the Iran-Iraq War before Fitters, 24 Mirage Fls, 24 Su-24 Fencers, nine MiG-23 1986. In its initial raids against Teheran, for example, the Floggers, seven Su-25 Frogfoots. and four MiG-29 Fulcrums. IQAF employed only three aircraft per attack, while ground Bruce, 684. and air operations appeared to be planned in "virtual 79. Gen Michael Dugan, USAF. Retired, "The Air War," isolation from each other." Nick Cook. "Iran-Iraq: The Air US News Sr World Report. 11 February 1991, 30; and "A War." International Defense Review, November 1984, 1605; Friend in Need," 19. and Bergquist. 47. 80. David Hoffman and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Sheltering 61. Richard Mackenzie, "A Conversation with Chuck More Than 80 Jets at Sites in Iran, US Officials Say,” Homer," Air Force Magazine. June 1991, 60. Washington Post, 29 January 1991, A13: and Bruce, 684. 62. John D. Morrocco, "Allies Shift Air Attacks to Break 81. Morse, 84-120 passim: and "A Friend in Need," 19. Ground Units." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 28 82. Veliky and Ivanov, 6; and "Evasions 'Ordered'," Jane's January 1991, 20-21: idem, "War Will Reshape Doctrine, but Defence Weekly. 9 February 1991, 168. Lessons Are Limited," Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 83. Those sanctuaries included Jordan, Saudi Arabia. 22 April 1991.43: and Starr et al.. 530. Kuwait. Oman, North Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. 63. Starr et al.. 530. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for 64. Ibid. Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 366; 65. Sayigh, 6. O’Ballance, The Gulf War, 32; and Cordesman, "Lessons," 66. Charles Q. Cutshaw. "Lessons from the Gulf—A Time 47. for Caution." fane's Intelligence Review, July 1991. 318; and 84. "Airpower: Desert Shield/Desert Storm," US Air Dunnigan and Bay. 75. Force Internal Information Directorate Backgrounder, 1991, 67. By 11 February, in fact. Baghdad claimed to have shot 7. down 371 coalition aircraft and missiles. "The Losses of 85. Iraq began the war with about 689 combat aircraft. Both Sides Multiply." Izvestiya. 12 February 1991, 5, in Confirmed Iraqi fixed-wing losses include 35 aircraft shot 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 down by coalition fighters, 81 destroyed in the open on the detected not a single IQAF sortie after 12 February. "Desert ground, and 12 captured intact in southern Iraq. An esti­ Storm: Gulf Victory," World Airpower Journal, Summer mated 141 were also destroyed in hardened aircraft shelters, 1991, 20-21, 27; and Allen, Berry, and Polmar, 126. for a total of 269. One hundred and fifteen IQAF aircraft 86. W. H. Parks, "Rules of Engagement: No More flew to Iran, and Saddam grounded the rest. In fact, coali­ Vietnams,” US Naval Institute Proceedings. March 1991, 27. tion airborne warning and control system (AVVACS) aircraft

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Lt Col Suzanne B. G ehr i, USAF

M S SION: The task, together with the USAF MISSION: Our mission—the purpose, which clearly indicates the job of the forces we bring to the fight— action to be taken and the reason is to defend the United States through therefor. control and exploitation of air and —Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense space. Dictionary of Military and Associated —Gen Merrill A. McPeak Terms USAF Chief of Staff 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

OR NEARLY 50 years, the United For all of the controversy he has gener­ States Air Force has been without ated over reorganization, uniforms, and the very essence that defines both the primacy of “manly men,” General military action and institutional McPeak has made a tough and accurate identity. Since 1947 we have organized, call—one that should touch the heart and trained, and equipped air forces without soul of airmen in an institution undergo­ establishing authoritatively the purpose ing massive change in an uncertain world. for doing so. For nearly 50 years, we have He said we need a mission to tell us who been without a mission. we are and what we do, and to bind us We have paid a price—in institutional together. He is right. identity and in our ability to define air What our mission should be and how it power’s unique contributions to joint and should be described are issues for argu­ combined military action. But in the ment and debate. What should not be at midst of turbulence and change, Gen issue, however, is our critical need—as an Merrill A. McPeak, chief of staff of the Air institution facing a future that holds both Force, has offered us a way to break into danger and opportunity—for an official, the clear. His contribution is a compass recognized mission. Woven throughout bearing that gives us a heading into the the chief s speech was his conviction that future—a mission statement for the Air we must generate, along with a shared Force. mission and identity, “a rebirth of the tra­ On 19 June 1992 at Maxwell Air Force ditions associated with the Air Corps Base (AFB), Alabama, in a low-key but Tactical School [ACTS].”4 Of all the powerful message to air power leaders and opportunities presented in his speech, this critics alike, the chief gave his best defini­ one holds the most promise and, indeed, tion of a mission statement by identifying the most challenge. the task ("control and exploitation of air It was no accident that General McPeak and space") and the purpose and reason asked Gen Charles G. Boyd, then commander for the task (“to defend the United of Air University, to host the gathering at States”).1 Maxwell AFB. According to the chief, There is room to critique his choice of The time, the place and the audience for this words, and some people will no doubt address were chosen with care. Some sixty take issue with his audacity in giving the years ago, the Air Corps Tactical School Air Force an operational mission when moved to Maxwell from Langley [Field, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive Virginia]. Here, men like Hal George, Ken 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Walker, and Muir Fairchild laid the theoreti­ Defense and Its Major Components, cal and doctrinal foundations for an inde­ declares us to be a functional department.2 pendent Air Force.5 Others will 'argue that the Air Force Here, General McPeak implied, during a already has a mission (e.g., Global Reach— time that is now recognized as the apex of Global Power; organize, train, and equip; air power vision and debate, the fledgling etc.) or—better yet—many doctrine-based Air Corps defined who it was and what it missions (ranging from strategic attack to did. For a short time, we had an identity, aerial refueling). a purpose, and a clear reason for being. No stranger to controversy, the chief On 15 September 1939, in an Air Corps made clear that he welcomed such debate. Board report approved by the secretary of Having laid his cards on the table, he chal­ war, we “established ‘for the first time lenged the audience to fold, call, or raise what Gen George C. Marshall declared to against his definition of mission: “Discuss be ‘“a specific mission [for] the Air it. Argue about it. Use it to help bind us Corps’.”6 It was a simple statement: “‘Air together.”3 AIR FORCE MISSION (SINGULAR) 19

Power’,” the report declared, “’is indis­ pensable to our national defense, espe­ cially in the early stages of war’.”7 The implications, however, were profound. Air power’s contribution to the Allied vic­ tory over Germany was, to quote the Strategic Bombing Survey, “decisive."8 One of the results of this performance was that the Air Force earned its independence in 1947. But part of the price of independence was the severance of the new Department of the Air Force, as an institution, from its operational orientation, putting into peacetime practice the command logic of World War H. Theater commanders—not individual services—fight wars. Implicit in this logic was the assumption that the services did not need a combat mission statement to rationalize the functions which came to characterize their reason for being.9 Chartered to “organize, train, and equip air forces," the 1947 Air Force, perhaps unknowingly, came out of the starting gate without an operational frame­ work that gave it a purpose for doing these things. In short, the new Air Force had a function but not a mission. It had nothing that told airmen who they were, what they In a low-key hut powerful speech at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in June 1992. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. did, and why. There was nothing to give McPeak proposed a mission statement fo r the US Air Force. shape and dimension to the concept of air power—nothing to give the Air Force an institutional identity. mon destination. Instead of airmen, we As a result, airmen identified with orga­ had MAC, TAC, and SAC troops, with nizations that did tell them who they were infinite and intricate hierarchies within. and what they did: squadrons, wings, Instead of one Air Force, we had many— and—ultimately—major commands (MAJ- each with its own internal identity, mis­ COM). Ironically, each of those organiza­ sion, culture, and agenda for the future. tions was required by regulation to have a No single, unifying mission for the Air mission statement, and the mission of Force as a whole was officially set above each MAJCOM came to define and sepa­ the functions of “organize, train, and rate air power, weapons systems, and air­ equip"—functions which each MAJCOM men, robbing the Air Force itself of an pursued down its own separate road. And institutional identity.10 Instead of inte­ along each MAJCOM road, highway mark­ grated air power, MAJCOMs embodied dif­ ers reflected separate concepts of procure­ ferent air power and support capabilities ment, doctrine, and air power application. (e.g., strategic-nuclear, tactical-conven­ The cumulative effects of 50 years with­ tional, airlift, etc.). Further, the out a common purpose were finally recog­ MAJCOMs developed separate weapons nized in 1989 in an internal white paper system “road maps” that led to no com- produced by Headquarters USAF, Director 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 of Plans. The theme of the paper was not meant to encompass a purpose for an politically correct at the time, but it was institution and its people: “Our mission right: . . . is to defend the United States through control and exploitation of air and The Air Force has lost a sense of its own space.”14 Does the Air Force need a mis­ identity and of the unique contributions air- power makes to warfighting. . . . The lack of sion? Yes. Is this the right mission? For [such) an integrating vision [reveals] a ten­ the first time in 50 years, airmen are chal­ dency to be tied only loosely to the larger lenged and encouraged to debate the fun­ institution, a sense of loyalty more com­ damental and enduring questions of air monly given to airframes or commands, an power to find the answer. inclination to focus on systems before mis­ Will the chief get the quality debate that sions. . . . Fragmentation thus permeates our he and his cause deserve? The move internal planning and consequently the way toward physical integration, reflected in we present ourselves to others." our current restructuring, is fertile ground Graphic evidence of our failure to pre­ for the next logical step: an integration of sent a “coherent, strategic vision” to purpose and spirit. But there is also some Congress, the white paper continued, was cause for concern. Will the “new genera­ the Air Force’s declining budget share: tion of missionaries”15 he is calling for to “Between 1985 and 1989, Congressional preach the gospel of a single mission be cuts to the Air Force budget exceeded stillborn? Will the new MAJCOMs be Army and Navy cuts combined.” Even willing to subordinate their particular more telling, perhaps, was our inability to weapons systems, views of air power, and articulate to what strategic end our demands for resources to the greater inter­ desired billions were going. As a result, est of an Air Force mission? Will senior concluded Inside the Air Force in its Air Force leaders, whose public self- review of the white paper, “without a images often reflect primary loyalty to a clear mission unique to the Air Force, the particular weapons system, foster and— service ends up in a subordinate role to above all—value argument and debate the Army or Navy.”12 After undergoing a about an overarching mission that would “narrow but important” circulation, the relegate their weapons systems to simply white paper, as could be expected, caused one of many means available to achieve a great deal of controversy inside the the mission’s end? Airmen look to their Pentagon. The authors eventually decided senior leaders for priorities, attitudes, not to publish it. identities, and values. If these leaders Nevertheless, they had at least put into give only lip service to the chief’s call for limited circulation a gutsy appraisal of our joining the debate on mission, then the fundamental problem as an institution. debate will be without substance. Where General McPeak both validated and vindi­ they lead, the force will follow. cated their effort on 19 June 1992 when he To arrive collectively at who we are and posed this powerful question to his audi­ what we do as a single, integrated institu­ ence: “How can you reorganize, restruc­ tion, however, requires more than just ture, how can you build a Quality Air individual effort or behavioral change. Force if you cannot say, in clear, simple When the chief called for a “rebirth of the language, what the purposes of our organi­ traditions . . . of the Air Corps Tactical zation are . . . in brief, what our mission School,” he asked for a great deal. What is?”13 The answer he gave to the first part was unique about ACTS was not just the of the question was, You can’t. His quality, vision, and dedication of its fac­ answer to the second part was a simple, ulty and students—it was the extraordi­ clear, and brief statement of the mission, nary value its leadership placed on the efforts of those people. AIR FORCE MISSION (SINGULAR) 21

The spirit of ACTS was one that valued of those who studied, debated, and tested the knowledge and study of air power and the true mettle of air power—and if he the art of warfare as much as it did its exe­ wants them to help him unify the Air cution. George, Walker, and Fairchild, Force under a single, overarching mis­ together with Haywood Hansell, Laurence sion—he must support a change in culture Kuter, and Carl (“Tooey") Spaatz—to among the very leadership of which he is name a few of the great ACTS faculty in the defining example. Senior Air Force the 1930s—were not only warriors, but leaders must reexamine the value they scholars as well. On the eve of World War assign to the study of air power, strategy, II. they put their knowledge of mission, and doctrine—all of which are fundamen­ doctrine, tactics, and training together and tal to our ability to execute our mission, built Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1), but none of which can be done properly the first strategic air war plan.16 Neither unless framed by a mission. Senior lead­ the president of the United States, nor ers must create an incentive structure to General Marshall, nor Gen Henry H. encourage and reward warriors who (“Hap”) Arnold, nor Gen Dwight D. choose to study the strategy, history, and Eisenhower called their effort “ivory- doctrine of air power. tower BS.” The knowledge of air power contained in AWPD-1 and its successor plans was more than valued by these lead­ Gen Henry H. ("Hap"} Arnold, chief of the Air Corps (right, ers—it proved to be invaluable to a nation with Maj Gen Elwood Quesada), charged the best minds at war.17 from the Air Corps Tactical School with devising the first strategic air war plan—Air War Plans Division-1 If General McPeak wants a new genera­ (AWPD-1). This document proved invaluable to the US after tion of missionaries to embody the spirit it entered the Second World War. 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

By asking for debate on the Air Force Appreciation fo r the rigorous study o f air power, strategy, mission, General McPeak has also implic­ and doctrine declined after the heyday o f the Air Corps itly challenged our doctrine to support Tactical School. Current indications, however, point toward this mission in a thorough and systematic a resurgence o f esteem for our colleagues in the "ivorv tower." Aho\’e. doctrine analysts prepare for a planning way. Without the common end of an session in Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine. institutional mission, however, there has Research, and Education (AUCADRE). at Maxwell AFB. been no real anchor for doctrine to Alabama. develop this logical relationship with mis­ sion. Long fragmented among MAJCOMs and the Air Staff, our current process of forces it would require.”19 Arnold con­ doctrine development may not be up to curred, and the board—in precise order— the task of mission support. stated a mission for the Air Corps. This If the chief wants a mission to help gave Spaatz the rationale to task his Air “build a Quality Air Force,” he must also Corps plans section to finish the Air put the Air Force’s process of doctrine Corps’ basic doctrinal manual, which had development to the quality test—for the been stalled for many years.20 two should be linked. In March of 1939, First mission, then doctrine, Spaatz Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring insisted. Once this sequence was estab­ tasked the Air Corps Board to “consider lished, planners were able to build force and recommend the fundamental policies requirements and produce AWPD-1 in just that would govern the tactical and strategi­ nine days. Forty-eight years later, eight cal employment of the Army’s air force days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, under current national policies.”18 In a Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf received and private memo to General Arnold, chair­ approved the first briefing on what man of the board, Colonel Spaatz (who became known as the strategic air cam­ served as a board member) indicated that paign for Operation Desert Storm. Filed the Air Corps Board “could not perform its with that briefing of 10 August 1990 was tasks until it first determined the Air an underlined copy of appendix 4, para­ Corps’ mission, the doctrines for its graph 2, of AWPD-1. Its title? “The Air employment, and the characteristics of the Mission.’’21 With specific national objec­ AIR FORCE MISSION (SINGULAR) 23

tives constituting our mission in the Gulf, mission a chance to work—to make a sin­ the logic of Spaatz’s sequence was gle, powerful, and relevant Air Force out repeated in Desert Storm. Air power doc­ of the many that exist today? We should trine—the fusion of experience and judge­ be more than ready. ment—was the medium used by Desert Storm air planners to translate mission objectives into strategy, and strategy into Notes force requirements. As our victory 1. Gen Merrill A. McPeak. "Does the Air Force Have a showed, the logic of this connection Mission?" text of speech to a dining-in at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 19 June 1992. 5. between mission, doctrine, and force 2. The first major function of the Air Force, listed under requirements is fundamental to both the heading "Primary Functions of the Air Force," is "to strategic success in war and to a coherent, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air." DOD effective vision for the future of air power. Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense And it begins with a common definition and Its Major Components, 25 September 1987. 19. 3. McPeak, 10. of a mission for an institution and its peo­ 4. Ibid. ple. 5. Ibid. Capt Harold L. George, Lt Kenneth N. Walker, and General McPeak has offered us a begin­ Maj Muir S. Fairchild all held faculty positions at ACTS in the 1930s and were considered some of the premier thinkers ning, not an end—a starting point, not a in the fledgling Army Air Corps. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. specific destination. “Understanding our Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air mission,” he said, “will [give] us a steady Force, vol. 1. 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989), 109. compass bearing to get through this heavy 6. Futrell, 95. "Following the practice of other arms and weather and into the clear.”22 But under­ services, an Air Service Board was established at Langley standing our mission means that we must [Field, Virginial in 1922." It was redesignated the Air Corps Board in 1926 and moved with ACTS from Langley to make some fundamental changes to the Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1931. The board was comprised culture of the Air Force as well as to its of those senior Air Corps officers who were available for cre- organization. Organizational restructuring has already begun, and it is a decisive step in the right The coalition victory in Operation Desert Storm showed that the connection between mission, doctrine, and force direction—forging a single Air Force iden­ requirements is fundamental to both strategic success in war tity. The real test will be our ability to and an effective vision for the future of air power. Here, a subordinate command parochialisms to an crew prepares an F-4 Wild Weasel for the trip back home overarching mission supported by a following the conclusion o f the Gulf War. dynamic and effective doctrine. Taking up the chief’s challenge to argue and debate, to restore the spirit of the Air Corps Tactical School, and to derive unity and identity from a single mission requires Air Force leaders who will recog­ nize, encourage, and value the uninhib­ ited, critical study of air power, doctrine, and strategy as much as they have the technical application of air power. General McPeak has called it right. A reorganizing Air Force in an uncertain world must forge a common identity and state an institutional purpose in order to survive. Both identity and purpose are embodied in a mission statement. Are we ready, from the top down, to make the fundamental changes required to give that 24 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 ative thinking in the early 1930s and became, in effect, "an 16. Former ACTS faculty member Lt Col Harold George arm of the Office of Chief of the Air Corps on detached loca­ headed the Army Air Forces Air War Plans Division, which tion at Maxwell Field.” with senior ACTS faculty doubling was tasked on 9 July 1941 by President Roosevelt and the as members of the board. By 1935 the board’s mission War Department to determine the aircraft production and included preparing uniform tactical doctrine for all types of strategic concepts required to defeat potential enemies. Air Corps units, making recommendations on air force orga­ George’s entire Air War Plans Division consisted of only nization. making tactical evaluations of equipment, and three other officers: Lt Col Orvil Anderson, Lt Col Kenneth wrapping all that up into long-range planning. Futrell, Walker, and Maj Haywood Hansell—all former ACTS fac­ 62-79. ulty. Quickly augmented by several other Air Corps officers 7. Ibid.. 95. (including Maj Hoyt Vandenberg and Maj Laurence Kuter), 8. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European the Air War Plans Division began serious planning on 4 War) (Pacific War) (30 September 1945 and 1 July 1946; August 1941. On 12 August 1941, they completed AWPD-1. reprint. Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. October "Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Force.” Futrell, 1987), 37. 109. 9. On 26 July 1947, President Truman signed the National 17. Futrell’s assessment of AWPD-1 reflects not only the Security Act. which “created the National Military value of the plan itself, but the high degree of faith and trust Establishment and made substantial changes in the nation’s placed by the president and General Arnold in the efforts of defense organization to include a separate Air Force . . . a handful of air planners. “The completion of the first major nominated James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense strategic air war plan by the newly formed Army Air Forces and issued an executive order prescribing the functions of staff in only nine days was a notable achievement, which the several armed forces." Futrell. 196. Truman’s executive marked both the apex of prewar air force doctrinal thought order charged the Air Force to organize, train, and equip air and a blueprint for the air war that would follow.” Futrell, forces for air operations, including joint operations. 109. For a short but compelling story of how AWPD-1 was 10. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 20-, 21-. and 23-series created, read James C. Gaston’s Planning the American Air require organization and mission statements for USAF gen­ War. Four Men and Nine Days in 1941: An Inside Narrative eral, department, and field units. (Washington. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 11. "Closely Held USAF White Paper Warned Lack of 1982). Vision Could Cost Service," Inside the Air Force 2, no. 20 (17 18. Futrell. 92. Mav 1991): 13-14. 19. Ibid.. 92-93. 12. Ibid., 12. 20 Ibid.. 93. 13. McPeak, 1. 21. Ibid., 109. 14. Ibid., 5. 22. McPeak. 9-10. 15. Ibid.. 10. ANY observers have declared that the air campaign was the IGNORANCE decisive component of Operation Desert Storm and Mthat air base attacks were a critical compo­ IS RISK nent of the campaign. These attacks helped achieve air superiority, destroy many of Saddam Hussein's weapons of THE BIG LESSON mass destruction, and lessen the long­ term threat that Iraq poses to its neigh­ FROM DESERT STORM bors. The video images from the cam­ paign tend to give spectators the impres­ AIR BASE ATTACKS sion that air base attacks were flawlessly planned and executed. In reality, the anti­ air base component of the air campaign C hristopher M. Cent ner highlighted a major—and dangerous— omission in the US Air Force’s strategic analysis. Specifically, we lack an organi­ zation that studies the design and opera-

25 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

* • tion of foreign air bases for the purpose of exploiting weaknesses. This article briefly describes how the coalition planned and executed air base attacks during Desert Storm and explains how some of the lessons learned are in reality only symp­ toms of this more significant omission.

Target: The Iraqi Airfield Network Iraq’s violent past had taught its air force that air base attacks were a grave menace. Iraqi airfields had undergone recurring onslaughts by Great Britain (in repair teams restored the runways in just World War II), Israel, and Iran (during the nine to 12 hours.3 Iran-Iraq War). In particular, the various In Desert Storm, coalition air forces Arab-Israeli conflicts demonstrated to Iraq faced a formidable Iraqi air base network, that wars could be won or lost as a result the product of a massive hardening and of airfield attacks. This fact was most evi­ survivability program that may be consid­ dent in 1967 when, on the dawn of the ered a model for air forces worldwide. For Six-Day War, a surprise Israeli attack instance, the Iraqis had extended their air destroyed the Arab air forces at their air­ base network to include a ring of identical, fields. Arab aircraft were caught parked hardened dispersal bases along their bor­ wingtip-to-wingtip at their main operating der. Each base in this network—known as bases (MOB). They were not in shelters Project 505 and begun during the Iran-Iraq because the Arabs had planned to disperse War—contained 12 widely dispersed them to other bases for wartime survival. HABs with half-meter-thick concrete Consequently, at a cost of only 19 aircraft, walls, eight fuel tanks, two power stations, Israel destroyed 375 Arab aircraft on the and squadron operations facilities.4 first day of the war.1 Buried and hardened airfield support This bitter lesson inspired a sudden components were scattered throughout surge in the construction of hardened air­ each air base, many of which covered craft bunkers (HAB) and personnel 5,000 acres.5 Iraq also organized airfield- bunkers at Arab air bases. Other critical repair teams that were supplied with fast­ airfield components—such as petroleum, setting concrete and other critical mater­ oil, and lubricant systems—were made ial.6 Almost 600 HABs built to NATO more redundant and robust. By the time standards (or better) were constructed in the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 broke Iraq by British. Belgian, French, and out, Israel faced well-protected enemy air Yugoslavian contractors.7 forces. Because their adversaries’ aircraft At the heart of the Iraqi airfield network were now protected by dispersed concrete were three bases built for—and as—strate­ HABs, Israeli pilots resorted to runway gic assets. Planned as early as 1975 and attacks (in conjunction with attacks code-named Project 202, these airfields against command and control [C2] facili­ were designed to function during chemi­ ties).2 These runway attacks were only cal, biological, and even nuclear war and temporarily effective, however, since Arab were dubbed “superbases" by the press. Initial attempts by RAF Tornado aircraft to crater Iraqi runways may have heen ill-ad\ised because many airfields were built to withstand such attacks and continue operating. Left. Iraqi repair teams have filled a crater on the pight line and. right, have installed mobile runway lights to mark undamaged mutes along taxiways at Jalihah Southeast Dispersal Air Base. Iraq.

Construction of these bases for Iraq’s strategic strike aircraft apparently began in the mid-1980s.8 Every airfield compo­ nent was protected by layers of thick con­ crete. “I will admit that this air base liter­ ally overwhelmed me,” declared Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy, a former MiG-29 flight instructor stationed in Iraq. “I had never seen anything like it before, although while serving in the [Soviet! Union I had been in scores of garrisons. and tactics written by analysts at the The equipment, shelters, and blast walls— Foreign Technology Division and Tactical everything was the last word in equipment Air Command were available to coalition and of outstanding quality.”9 The aerody­ pilots, similarly detailed documents on namic-looking HABs at the airfields were I r a q ’ s a i r b a s e s w e r e n o n e x i s t e n t . 12 No “superhardened,” built to withstand all USAF organization was dedicated to ana­ conceivable threats. "As far as I could lyzing air base performance and weak­ see,” said Colonel Bezlyudnyy, “it would nesses, and the few experts on Iraqi air have been virtually impossible to destroy base operations were scattered throughout this [HABJ with tactical weapons, even the globe.13 Fortunately, the coalition had superaccurate ones, and probably only by over five months to consolidate informa­ using nuclear warheads.”10 tion before Desert Storm began. Even so, Desert Storm was to be the first war that critical air base information was still being matched the USAF against an adversary fed into the theater long after the bombs with first-rate, modern air bases. Indeed, began to drop.14 Iraq hadn’t built mere airfields; it had Priorities assigned to particular Iraqi air built fortifications. As described to the US bases reflected the various priorities of Air Staff in December 1990 by an intelli­ the campaign as a whole. Desert Storm’s gence analyst, the air base hardening pro­ primary goal was the liberation of Kuwait, gram had “made [Iraq’s] airfield network a feat which required air superiority over the strongest component of [its] air Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Addition­ force.”11 ally, the campaign sought to neutralize Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (chem­ ical and biological weapons), which Air Base Attack threatened the coalition, Israel, and the Priorities entire region. Finally, planners wished to break the long-term military threat that Planners shaping the coalition’s air base Iraq posed to its neighbors by significantly attacks faced formidable obstacles, the reducing its overwhelmingly large conven­ biggest of which was the meager informa­ tional military force.15 Each of these goals tion initially available on Iraqi airfields. mandated that different, but overlapping, Although documents on adversary aircraft sets of air bases be attacked.

27 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

During the war’s initial phase, planners Damaging these deployment bases would estimated the damage required to render a reduce Iraq’s ability to mount counter- particular air base inoperable and then strikes and would force Iraqi aircraft to created air tasking orders (ATO) that spec­ remain at their MOBs. In short, attacking ified the size of strike packages against the dispersal airfields would decrease the each air base. They also anticipated reat­ Iraqi air threat and increase the value of tacks to maintain the required level of attacks on the MOBs. damage or to destroy particular target sets. Chemical and biological weapons were Bomb damage assessment (BDA) was to be among the greatest threats facing coalition a crucial component in determining fur­ forces. The coalition intended to smash ther attack requirements after the initial Saddam Hussein’s chemical warfare (CW) attacks. capability with swift, massive attacks upon production centers (Samarra and other major sites), storage locations (muni­ tions depots), delivery means (artillery, Air Base Target Sets ballistic missiles, and strategic aircraft), The coalition targeted bases according to and C2 nodes. These goals mandated that their importance to the Iraqi air base net­ CW storage sites at or near airfields be work, their location, the type of aircraft attacked as part of the anti-air base cam­ they housed, and the presence of weapons paign. Additionally, planners targeted air of mass destruction. Planners dropped bases in western Iraq that housed air- many of Iraq’s 66 air bases from ATOs delivered chemical weapons or Scud mis­ because attacking them would not help siles aimed at Israel. Finally, air bases accomplish the campaign's strategic goals. with long-range aircraft (the Mirage F-l During the process of determining the and Su-24 Fencer) capable of delivering amount of effort to expend on a particular these deadly weapons deep into coalition air base, planners paid strict attention to territory were high-priority targets. the base’s geographic location. They tar­ geted Tallil, Jalibah Southeast, and other air bases because they were only a short Individual Target Sets flight from the Kuwaiti theater of opera­ tions. Air bases used to defend Baghdad’s The first Desert Storm attacks were air defense sector and avenues of launched against Iraq’s C2 facilities, which approach, especially bases that housed coordinated operations throughout the advanced aircraft such as the MiG-29, nation’s air defense network. Coalition were attacked early in the campaign. F-l 17s and other aircraft simultaneously Bases north of Baghdad opposite Turkey attacked Iraq’s air force headquarters, the or Iran were a lower priority. air defense operations center, sector opera­ Iraq’s deployment bases situated along tions centers, intercept operating centers, the Saudi border (e.g., As Salman North and observation posts. These assaults and Wadi Al Khirr New) were targeted immediately shattered the formidable Iraqi because of their importance to Iraq’s total air base network into isolated air bases, air base network, as well as their geo­ thus eliminating the enemy’s ability to graphic location.16 In peacetime these coordinate operations.17 By continuing its bases were used infrequently since most of attacks on air force-related C2 nodes Iraq’s aircraft were stationed at interior throughout the campaign, the coalition airfields. However, Iraq’s combat aircraft prevented the Iraqis from reestablishing generally lacked sufficient range to attack any semblance of a unified air defense Saudi targets from peacetime locations. system.18 IGNORANCE IS RISK 29

The Pavement War Balad Southeast Airfield is one o f the finest examples of Iraq's meticulous program o f air base hardening. Hardened The first round of air base-specific attacks aircraft bunkers (HAR) at the ends o f runways are linked by was directed primarily against runways multiple-approach taxiways. and several auxiliary runways and operating surfaces. Planners hoped are available if the main runway is damaged. All other critical air base components are widely scattered and that these attacks would prevent the Iraqi hardened. air force from contesting coalition air superiority. However, Iraq's airfields fre­ quently had two or more widely separated Although trained runway-repair teams and lengthy runways connected by redun­ and repair equipment were present at dant taxiways, at least one of which was Iraqi air bases, the coalition planned no long enough to use for emergency opera­ concurrent attacks against these teams or tions.19 Multiple-approach taxiways con­ their stockpiles.21 Thus, the pavement nected each aircraft bunker to the runway. attacks addressed only half of the prob­ The bunkers were clustered at the ends of lem: the pavement would be damaged, the runway, and each bunker’s approach but the capability to repair it remained taxiway was linked to its neighbor’s, viable. thereby providing redundant means to In the early-morning calm of Desert gain access to operating surfaces. Storm, packages of from four to eight Additional emergency operating surfaces Panavia-built Tornadoes sped over at least were available along highway strips that 10 Iraqi airfields. Flying at levels as low were wide enough to accommodate as 30 meters in pitch darkness, the aircraft Soviet-built 11-76 transports.20 sped along the enemy aerodromes, releas- 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

ing submunitions and mines from JP233 The Arah-lsraeli conflicts taught Iraq to construct HABs to runway-denial weapons.22 The taxiways protect its aircraft. However, the coalition’s hunker-busting between the HAB groups and the runway program effectively ended the enemy air threat by forcing were the attackers’ aiming points. Iraqi aircraft to flee to Iran. HABs at Tallil Airfield. Iraq (above and right), show the damage inflicted by these Determining what effect, if any, the run­ precision attacks. way attacks actually had on the Iraqi air force is difficult. It is true that Iraqi com­ bat sorties declined after hostilities com­ menced. The Iraqis quickly found that Mines—the second component of the challenging coalition pilots was tanta­ JP233—along with cluster-bomb submuni­ mount to suicide and essentially remained tions may have had a more significant inactive throughout the remainder of the impact on air base operations. Indeed, the war. The runway attacks apparently com­ constant reseeding of airfields by aerially plicated Iraqi air base operations, but there dispensed mines and cluster-bomb sub­ is little evidence to indicate they severely munitions may have eventually over­ hampered sortie rates.23 The JP233 sub­ whelmed the capability of any Iraqi explo­ munitions were quite small, creating sive ordnance disposal unit. A Russian quickly repairable scabs,24 and the redun­ account of the campaign describes the dant taxiway system provided ample alter­ coalition’s use of cluster bombs to cover natives to reach the runway. terrain with a dense, lethal blanket that During the war’s first week, Tornado air­ “trapped” personnel and equipment.26 craft attacked daily to hinder Iraqi airfield When US Marine Corps forces attempted a operations. But proper delivery of the night assault against Iraqi-occupied JP233 required the aircraft to fly low Kuwait International Airport, they report­ across the Iraqi airfields, allowing antiair­ edly were held up. not by fierce resis­ craft artillery and short-range shoulder- tance, but by unexploded coalition clus­ fired missiles to take a disastrous toll. In ter-bomb submunitions and mines.27 the war’s opening phase, at least four Photographs taken of captured Iraqi air Tornadoes were lost during ineffectual bases show areas so thick with unex­ airfield attacks, and about 100 JP233s ploded submunitions that they were virtu­ were expended.25 ally impassable. IGNORANCE IS RISK 31

Busting Bunkers time.’’32 On the average, USAF aircraft As Iraq’s pilots learned they were no destroyed 10-20 HABs per night.33 By the match for coalition pilots in the air, they end of the war, about 375 HABs sheltering decided upon a strategy of remaining an estimated 141 aircraft had been within their fortified HABs. Saddam destroyed.34 probably assumed that the bunkers would Despite the bunker-busting program’s protect enough of his air force for it to be initial success, many of Iraq’s most decisive against the inevitable coalition advanced aircraft remained unscathed in ground offensive.28 US Air Forces, Central the “superbunkers” of Project-202 air Command (CENTAF) eventually decided bases. The first attack against a super­ that since Iraq’s air force would not exit bunker, on day seven of Desert Storm, the HABs to fight, the shelters would have failed to penetrate the target. To Iraqis, to be destroyed, one by one. this failed attack must have affirmed the Air Force planners originally formulated HAB’s invulnerability to conventional a quick, massive offensive to destroy the weapons. The second attack, on day nine, 594 Iraqi HABs in just a few days.29 The penetrated the superbunker and pulver­ bunkers would be destroyed in groups, ized its contents. Now faced with certain preventing the Iraqis from playing a shell destruction if they remained in the HABs, game or dispersing their aircraft. The the cream of Iraq’s air force—including actual operation, however, did not go as Mirage F-ls, Su-22s, MiG-29s, and quickly. The target set was too large for Su-24s—began their hasty escape to Iran the limited number of aircraft capable of the next morning.35 The total number of delivering precision guided munitions. advanced aircraft flown to Iran by the end Poststrike BDA was too slow for the rapid of the war was 137.36 According to news combat tempo, resulting in some restrikes reports, on the same day the exodus against targets that were already began, Iraq’s air and air defense force com­ destroyed.30 Inclement weather also manders were executed.37 forced some missions to abort. Once its best bunkers were penetrated, Night after night, F-lllFs dropped laser Iraq dispersed its remaining aircraft in guided bombs on the Iraqi bunkers.31 small groups, parking them near mosques, According to Col Tom Lennon, commander in villages, and close to priceless archeo­ of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, ini­ logical treasures.38 Attacking these air­ tial strike packages consisted of six air­ craft without killing innocent civilians craft, while later ATOs “would put up 20 would have been impossible. Other air­ to 24 aircraft against one airfield at one craft that were spread throughout the 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

in HABs were destroyed during the shel­ ter attacks.

Postwar Assessments Trying to second-guess Desert Storm planners has become a major US pastime. Certainly, air base attacks were the pri­ mary means by which the coalition defeated the enemy air force. Neverthe­ less, we should take note of the following miscalculations that occurred in planning and executing air base attacks: • The initial runway attacks were ill The destruction o f some o f its best IIAlls prompted Iraq to considered because Iraqi airfields were move a number of its aircraft to safer locations near specifically designed to withstand and mosques and villages. However, coalition fighter-bombers operate under the type of attack mounted were able to destroy some of them in transit to these sites. by the Tornadoes. As a result of the effi­ ciency and responsiveness of Iraqi air- countryside could he repositioned faster field-repair teams, damage caused by the than US Central Command could respond JP233 submunition was inconsequential. to information about their position.39 Furthermore, the JP233 delivery profile Nevertheless, this dispersal assured the forced Tornadoes to fly into the face of Iraqi air force's defeat since it could not massive antiaircraft artillery. The fact that conduct combat operations from the dis­ many of Iraq’s frontline fighters were able persal sites. Dispersal did. however, to escape to Iran clearly indicates that allow the aircraft to survive the war. many runways remained accessible and useable, despite the coalition’s best efforts. Other Major Air Base Targets • The bunker-busting program effec­ The coalition also attacked other elements tively ended the threat from Iraq’s aircraft crucial to air base operations at the same by forcing them to flee and disperse. time it attacked runways and bunkers. However, had the coalition used more These strikes were not designed to kill air­ resources to attack the right bunkers ear­ craft maintenance workers, logisticians, lier. Iraq’s best aircraft may not have civil engineers, and other air base support escaped to become a formidable compo­ personnel. Instead, crucial air base sup­ nent of revolutionary Iran’s air force. port components—especially aircraft These issues, however, are actually maintenance and logistics facilities—were symptoms of a far larger and more trouble­ attacked, severely degrading Iraq’s long­ some problem: prior to the war, the USAF term sortie sustainability. By the end of lacked—and still lacks—an organization the war, at least 50 percent of Iraq’s air­ responsible for the study of foreign air craft maintenance facilities were base operations and weaknesses. destroyed. Although coalition warplanes Although the USAF expends considerable generally ignored airfield support vehi­ effort to understand and counter enemy cles, which are critical to nearly all air­ aerial tactics, it remains amazingly indif­ craft maintenance and support functions, ferent to studying a potential adversary's many of these vehicles that were parked air bases, where enemy aircraft spend the IGNORANCE IS RISK 33

majority of their time.40 Consequently, the less likely it is that the kinds of mis­ before 2 August 1990, CENTAF had little takes made by Iraq will occur again.42 information on Iraqi air base design, sup­ The coalition air force exercised initia­ port units, manning, runway-repair capa­ tive, used the element of surprise, and bilities, and unique vulnerabilities. By enjoyed the advantage of overwhelming Desert Storm's D day, the coalition had numbers, technical superiority, and over gathered sufficient information to formu­ five months to prepare for conflict. Future late tactics customized to Iraq’s air bases. USAF budget constraints, the proliferation Nevertheless, time constraints and uncer­ of advanced weapons worldwide, and an tainty over the effect of various tactics increasingly volatile world make such may have pushed some coalition tacti­ advantages unlikely in the future. In cians to resort to ill-suited and nearly future conflicts, successful anti-air base stereotypical solutions, such as runway operations may mean the difference attacks. As a result, despite total air between victory and defeat. A USAF cen­ supremacy and over 3,000 dedicated air ter to study and exploit weaknesses in the base attack sorties, coalition air forces air bases of potential adversaries could defeated but did not eliminate their foe.41 ensure that Desert Storm’s mistakes are Securing victory in future conflicts is not repeated against a more formidable likely to require a detailed understanding foe. of the adversary’s air base operations and weaknesses. Air bases around the world have undergone dramatic, even revolu­ tionary, changes in the decades since the Six-Day War. Had Iraq’s air force been more aggressive or its air defense system Although over 130 Iraq: aircraft escaped the coalition's aerial assault hy Pying to Iran, approximately 141 were more effective, the coalition’s air cam­ destroxed in their HABs. Pictured below is an Iraqi MiG-25 paign may not have succeeded so over­ Foxhat. destroyed in its bunker by coalition precision guided whelmingly. And the more that air forces munitions. Note the bom b’s entrance hole in the roof of the worldwide study Operation Desert Storm. HAB.just above the aircraft. 34 AIRPOWEB JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Notes

1. V. K. B a b ic h . Aviation in Local Wars (Moscow: 20. Dye and Fineman. 1. Voyenizdat Publishing House. 1988). in /oint Publications 21. R. Jeffery Smith. "Iraqi Engineers Quickly Repair Some Research Service IfPRSI Report—Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA- Airfields,” Washington Post, 27 January 1991, A -ll. 89-010-L, 2 October 1990, 51. 22. "Industry Update." Defense Sr Diplomacy 9. nos. 5-6 2. Ibid., 50. (May-June 1991): 4-6. 3. Ibid.. 52. 23. Although not stated publicly, the JP233 attacks were 4. Fred Vandenbussche, “Belgians Helped Build Eight Air probably intended to hinder operations at air bases for at Bases during Gulf War; Iraqi Air Force Tough Nut to Crack," least a day. Instead, runways were reportedly repaired in as Net Volk. 27-28 October 1990, 2. in Foreign Broadcast little as four to six hours. "Air Attack Short of Goal; Information Service cable, 4 November 1990. Hussein's Force Intact, Defense Aides Say Privately," 5. Finaly Marshall. "Giant Bases Protect Iraqi Air Force," Newsday, 24 January 1991, 5. Nexis Information Services (press association news file). 25 24. Any runway damage will slow aircraft operations, sim­ January 1991. ply because it takes time to determine the location and 6. Lee Dve and Mark Fineman, "Decade of Digging Aids extent of the damage. Thus, if an attacker is trying to tem­ Iraq; Hussein Imported State-of-the-Art Bunker Building porarily pin down the enemy's aircraft, runway attacks are Techniques," Los Angeles Times. 26 January 1991, 1. appropriate. 7. Lee Hancock, "Saddam Has Long Readied for the Worst, Modern airfield-attack weapons used by Western forces Experts Say." Dallas Morning News, 30 January 199T, Dye are typically composed of submunitions delivered across and Fineman. 1. operating surfaces, thus ensuring damage in a single pass. 8. "Iraq's Superbase Programme." lane's Defence Weekly, The trade-off for “assured damage," however, is that one 2 February 1991. 133. delivers small amounts of explosive across a large area. The 9. Lt Col Sergey Ivanovich Bezlyudnyy. "I Taught weapons' designers arrive at the submunitions' explosive Saddam's Aces to Fly." Koniosomolskaya Pravda, 23 requirements by determining the minimum amount of explo­ February 1991. 3. in IPRS Report—Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA- sive necessary to upheave a "typical target” pavement. 91-014, ’5 June 1991. 62-63. Runways, however, are unique. They may rest upon soil 10. Ibid.. 62. that ranges from rock-hard permafrost to impact-absorbing 11. Christopher M. Centner, briefing to the LIS Air Staff, sand. Subbases under the operating surface may range from subject: Iraqi Air Base Hardening Program, 26 December only several inches of sand to several feet of lean concrete. 1990. The operating surface may be built of asphalt, reinforced 12. Norman Friedman. Desert Victory (Annapolis, Md.: concrete, or unreinforced concrete. Furthermore, changes in Naval Institute Press, 1991), 169-70. The Foreign operating requirements and simple wear and tear may man­ Technology Division is now the Foreign Aerospace Science date runway renovations with overlays, extensions, and rein­ and Technology Center. forcements (G. 1. Glushkov, Airport Engineering IMoscow: 13. Additionally, many planners selected tactics that were Mir Publishers, 1988], 305-406). Thus, the submunition is appropriate for the traditional European theater but ineffec­ unlikely to encounter anything approximating the pure sur­ tive in the new environment. face for which it was optimized. The damage produced by 14. Author's observation. The lack of a centralized air submunitions can vary from craters to easily repairable scabs base analysis center also hindered organizations trying to or spalls. In contrast, a large precision guided unitary bomb support US Central Command from afar in determining what can ensure massive damage at critical junctures on nearly information was lacking. any surface. 15. Friedman, 180-83. 25. “Air War Doctrine Affirmed." lane's Defence Weekly, 4 16. Frank Chadwick and Matt Caffrey. Gulf War Fact Book May 1991, 738. (Bloomington, III.: GDW, Inc.. 1991). 100. 26. D. Velikiy and B. Ivanov. "Bombs of a New Generation 17. Friedman. 158. against the Iraqis," Izvestiya, 13 February' 1991, 3. in IPRS 18. Some command centers were so deeply buried that Report—Soviet Union, JPRS-UMA-91-008. 18 March 1991. they required specialized munitions. On the war's final 11. dawn, a specialized penetrator. the GBU-28, destroyed Iraq's 27. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz. "Allies Fly Defensive Missions most hardened command facility. In the span of a few' After Air War Smashes Iraq,” fane's Defence Weekly. 11 months, the Air Force Systems Command had constructed March 1991, 18-19 the 5.000-pound weapon from scrap artillery barrels. "It 28. Robert Green. "U.S. Puzzled—But Says It Untazed—by- went through more than 20 feet of reinforced concrete like Iraqi Tactics," Reuter Library Report, 23 January 1991. butter." stated Maj Dick Wright, the GBU-28's program man­ 29. Friedman, 400. ager. “We're now designing for the next generation of hard 30. Further, assessors and planners were discussing differ­ targets and delivery platforms. This is all the more impor­ ent issues. Some BDA reports listed aircraft bunkers as hav­ tant. because everyone now knows we can defeat the current ing "minor" damage because the assessor was reporting technology of hardened, buried facilities." Capt Leah M. damage to the bunker's structural integrity- The planner, Bryant. “Big Bomb Digs Deep.” Leading Edge 33, no. 6 (June however, was more concerned about the aircraft in the 1991): 18-20. bunkers. 19. Airfields in the Middle East frequently have runways 31. Some unoccupied dispersal bases were also attacked well over 13.000 feet long. Qatar's Doha International by B-52s. F-15s, F-16s. and even A-lOs were used against Airport maintains a runway 15,000 feet long (The Air various airfield targets. Traveler's Handbook (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988|, 32. Alfred Price. "Deadly Darkness." Flight International. 16). Sizzling summer temperatures reduce aircraft lift and 10-16 July 1991. 34. thrust, necessitating long takeoff and landing rolls. In Iraq's 33. “USAF Developed 4,700-lb Bomb in Crash Program to case, long runways on military bases allowed airfields to Attack Iraqi Military Leaders in Hardened Bunkers," handle transport and commercial aircraft in emergencies. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 6 May 1991. 67. IGNORANCE IS RISK 35

34. Friedman. 400. weapons and delivery systems or attacks against certain 35. “After the Storm ." 738: Operation Desert Storm HABs and other air base facilities believed to store ballistic Update, on "NBC Nightly News.” 28 January 1991; and missiles. “Interview with Gen Thomas Kelly,” Defense Dialog. 29 42. Other air forces facing the possibility of going up January 1991, 2. against an air campaign like the one waged in Desert Storm 36. Briefing. US Central Command, subject: Operation are already revising their air defense and air base operability Desert Storm Update. 4 March 1991. requirements. As stated by Air Commodore Jamai Hussain 37. "Soviets Say Saddam Had Air Chief Killed." USA in Pakistan’s Defence lournai. no. 8 (1991): 38-39, Today, international edition. 26 January 1991. 3A. 38. "Gulf Peace Plan Weighed As Gulf Ground War We must be able to bear the brunt of the first Looms,” Aviation Week & Space Technology. 25 February assault, absorb losses while inflicting heavy attri­ 1991. 22. tion on the attackers. We must be able to bounce 39. Friedman. 161. back quickly and make the enemy pay heavily in 40. Some Air Force personnel have the attitude that air terms of aircraft and pilots [sic] losses. From then base attacks are irrelevant to ultimate victory. At an airfield- on, our air strategy should become more offensive. attack munitions conference several years ago, when I was explaining the difficulties in cutting runways, a member of Excellence in air combat, good ECM [electronic the conference interjected. "That's OK. give me enough countermeasures) capability, enhanced active and AMRAAMs [advanced medium-range air-to-air missilesl and passive air defence and efficient RRR Irapid run­ I'll lake 'em all out." Despite total coalition air supremacy. way repair] capability are areas which PAF Iraqi aircraft were still able to escape into Iranian airspace. [Pakistani Air Forcel would need to constantly It is doubtful that AMRAAMs would have made much differ­ work at to absorb enemy offensives and retaliate ence. strongly. 41. This number does not include airfield attacks designed to destroy stockpiles of chemical/biological Fall 1992 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Lt Col John G. Humphries, USAF for his article Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Congratulations to Lt Col John G. Humphries If you would like to compete for the Ira C. on his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award win­ Eaker Award, submit an article of feature ner for the best eligible article from the Fall length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, 1992 issue of the Airpower Journal. Colonel Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is Humphries receives a $500 cash award for his for the best eligible article in each issue and is contribution to the Air Force’s professional dia­ open to all US military personnel below the logue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov­ is made possible through the support of the ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester, equivalent. Massachusetts.

36 THE NEW AFM 1-1 Shortfall In Doctrine?

Lt Col Robert N. Boudreau, USAF

N THE early days of World War II, toric, island-hopping campaign in the Alexander P. de Seversky, a prophet Pacific. In essence, he argued for air of air power, wrote that a flawed power with global reach. A different intellectual vision had limited the intellectual vision would have prepared growthI of air power to such an extent that the nation for war management based on only a land- or sea-centered strategy was air power.1 possible to win the war. He believed a dif­ I argue that our vision of aerospace ferent vision would have led to the devel­ power in Air Force doctrine presented in opment of long-range bombers to strike the new Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Japan from Alaska, rather than to the his­ Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United Air Force C -I4ls air-drop paratroopers in a familiar. States Air Force, is likewise flawed "D-ilav style" utilization of airlift forces during Operation because it addresses aerospace power far Just Cause. AFM l-l addresses the role of airlift in armed too narrowly. The critical shortfall is its conflict hut not in supporting tile economic or political interests of the nation. failure to explore adequately the flexibility inherent in aerospace power to achieve national security objectives short of war. Both volumes of the new AFM 1-1 address military activities “below the level of

38 NEW AFM 1-1 39

war."2 However, neither addresses tion into a theater campaign in an armed directly the concept that military power, conflict. The four roles are a meltdown of especially aerospace power, may be used the six basic tasks outlined in our first to influence situations before counterin­ attempt at coherent doctrine published in surgency, counterterrorism, raids, or July 1943 as well as tasks/roles in subse­ unconventional warfare become neces­ quent doctrine manuals, including the sary.3 Our goal should be to achieve our 1984 edition of AFM 1-1.8 Given our new objectives before the situation deteriorates doctrine’s almost-exclusive focus on com­ to the point where we must kill an enemy. bat at the campaign level, airlift, special Aerospace power can be used to support operations, surveillance and reconnais­ the economic, informational, and politi­ sance, and electronic combat fall naturally cal—not just the purely military—instru­ under force enhancement. Of course, it is ments of national power. Our doctrine true that airlift provides the necessary should reflect that breadth.4 My central mobility for time-critical maintenance, example is the shortfall in doctrine con­ munitions, and personnel support during cerning airlift because I am an airlifter. an air campaign in an actual conflict. However, the same arguments could easily In addition to supporting aerospace be made for other elements of American operations during combat, both volumes aerospace powrer, especially special opera­ of the new AFM 1-1 lay out a role for air­ tions, that offer tremendous operational lift in the fast deployment and sustain­ flexibility to achieve objectives short of a ment of surface forces—global reach. resort to armed conflict. Airlift is characterized in our doctrine as Let’s begin by looking at the language of both strategic and tactical (or theater). the new AFM 1-1. It very ably addresses Both types are defined in terms of combat the nature of aerospace power, stating that force support and include strategic “aerospace power grows out of the ability deployment of force from the United to use a platform operating in or passing States to distant theaters as well as the through the aerospace medium for mili­ deployment of tactical airlift assets to sup­ tary purposes.”5 This sentence casts a net port those forces in theater.9 Currently, large enough to encompass all military the C-141. C-5, KC-10, and aircraft of the aviation today and space operations for Civil Reserve Air Fleet perform strategic today and tomorrow. Another statement lift; and C-130s deploy to theaters as part summarizes the key difference separating of theater air forces. The C-17 will com­ air from land and sea warfare: "Elevation bine the roles to a degree, being capable of above the earth’s surface provides relative carrying large payloads directly to forward advantages. . . . Aerospace power’s speed, areas for end use,10 This airlift force struc­ range, flexibility, and versatility are its ture dovetails with the new doctrine. outstanding attributes."6 These statements When the United States military under­ are crucial because they are all-encom­ takes a military campaign against an passing. All aerospace power and its enemy, the airlift force is designed to sup­ potential uses fall within their realm. port (enhance) the deployed combat AFM 1-1 then becomes more specific, forces. AFM 1-1 addresses well the role of dividing aerospace platforms into roles airlift in actual armed conflict at the cam­ and missions. This is the crux of the paign level, but only that role. issue, the area where our new doctrine is Aerospace power, however, has a far too narrow in focus. Four basic roles are broader application as an element of distinguished: aerospace control, force national power than combat operations. application, force enhancement, and force Airlift demonstrates this conclusively. support.' Each of these roles is subse­ Beginning with the Berlin airlift in 1948, quently discussed in terms of its integra­ airlift provided an option other than 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

direct combat for the execution of national operations. Another example of the non- policy. In Berlin, airlift was effectively lethal, constructive use of aerospace used to control the escalation of the crisis. power to achieve national objectives A strong foe was bent to our will without occurred during the 1986 El Salvador applying combat power, but not without earthquake relief effort. El Salvador suf­ applying air power. Roger Launius, histo­ fered tremendous political and economic rian for the Air Mobility Command, wrote upheaval through the eighties, and the that the Berlin airlift was the “first large earthquake threatened the fragile new scale demonstration of the use of airlift in democracy. The United States, using mili­ executing national policy.’’11 tary airlift at the request of the State Although using airlift as an option for Department, was able to provide assis­ executing policy is not addressed in the tance immediately—medical supplies and doctrine, such activities are common. Operation Provide Comfort, mounted from Turkey to feed Kurdish refugees in north­ The Berlin airlift, referred to as tile "first large-scale ern Iraq following Desert Storm, is a demonstration o f the use o f airlift in executing national recent example of aerospace power—air­ policy." allowed the United States to control the escalation lift and special operations forces—execut­ of the crisis without the application of military force. Below. A C-54 touts the success o f the airlift, and right, grateful ing policy rather than enhancing combat Berliners off-load a new shipment o f flour. NEW AEM 1-1 41

teams, food, and building materials. President George Bush, in the National Using Salvadoran government agencies as Security Strategy of the United States, well as American in-theater assets, the August 1991, stated that the foundation central government was able to distribute for peacetime engagement is provided in aid to thousands, saving many lives and our fundamental interest to seek “a stable, gaining political credibility.12 secure world, where political and eco­ Today, with the collapse of the Soviet nomic freedom, human rights and demo­ Union and the end of the cold war, the cratic institutions flourish.”15 world has entered a new era. In this era, The definition of peacetime engagement military power in the form of aerospace is similar to the traditional application of power has a far broader role than combat. military power as part of a national strat­ Influence on the actions and policies of egy that combines and coordinates ele­ foreign nations, hard to measure but even ments of national power—economic, more critical to have in the face of diplomatic, informational, and military— weapons technology proliferation, is a to achieve our national interests in a national policy objective the American region or country. The ultimate goal of military can help achieve.13 The concept using military forces and other elements that most clearly embraces this new broad of national power in peacetime engage­ role is “peacetime engagement.”14 ments is to facilitate the continued growth 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

of democracy and free-market economies. The devastation wrought hy the 1986 earthquake in El The concept is applicable in many areas, Salvador threatened that country’s maintenance o f a democratic gm’ernment. At the request o f the State including the emerging states of the for­ Department, the Air Force airlifted tons of food, medical mer Soviet Union, which only recently supplies, and building materials to the area in support o f the were freed from dictatorships and discred­ relief effort. ited ideologies. An excellent example of an airlift supporting the tenets of peace­ time engagement is Operation Provide national power. The targeting precision Hope, which was flown by C-5 aircrews to and intelligence provided from space key areas in the former Soviet Union.16 operations are essential to special opera­ The airlift provided food to areas where tions and airlift. The use of aerospace starvation and consequent political unrest power in the form of airlift, special opera­ were likely. Such unrest in the collapsing tions, and space is far less provocative empire is in no one’s interest. Aerospace than an air strike or employment of com­ power provides the quickest, most visible, bat surface forces. Our doctrine should and most flexible form of such engage­ explicitly outline this breadth of applica­ ment. tion. Aerospace power should not be cast Airlift provides the glue that sustains simply in terms of a military campaign peacetime engagement, but it is only one against an armed foe in a regional conflict. of the elements of aerospace power Several additions to the current AFM 1-1 involved. Special operations can serve should be considered to achieve the nec­ informational and political elements of essary breadth of thinking. First, enlarge NEW AFM 1-1 43

the discussion of military activities below conflict faced by the nation since Vietnam. the level of actual combat. Specifically, The Berlin airlift, although mentioned link military power and its ability to sup­ once in the essay “Military Activities port other elements of national power. Short of War,” is not mentioned in the air­ Aerospace forces—tasked at the national lift discussions in either volume 1 or vol­ level and employed through the chain of ume 2 of the new AFM 1-1. Strategic air­ command—may be used to support lift is divided into two types—combat achievement of political, informational, insertion and unopposed deployment and and economic goals in a region or country. redeployment, the discriminator being State clearly not only that military forces that one requires defense-suppression sup­ can achieve national objectives by provid­ port. the other does not.18 Many times air­ ing options other than the application of lift is used to achieve policy ends without force but also that commanders and air­ the use of force and only rarely is it called men at all levels should understand this to upon to support a theater campaign be a major goal of aerospace power. against an armed enemy. The other roles Second, enhance the chapter discussing need to be highlighted in the airlift essay. operational art. Place stress on the role Naturally the insertion, deployment, and the air component commander can play in redeployment of combat forces remains a particular theater to bring aerospace the critical task for airlift forces. However, power to bear so that regional goals are such actions, though necessary, may sig­ achieved short of violent conflict. Nation nal the breakdown or failure of our overall building, humanitarian efforts, and other policy of preventing conflict. I will leave host-nation support missions would be for those more qualified to suggest part of the overall aerospace effort to improvements to the discussions in our secure our objectives. The idea is to use doctrine on special operations, space, and aerospace forces constructively. The goal surveillance and reconnaissance. is to help create conditions where the United States military forces are United States can wield such influence employed virtually every day in noncom­ that our objectives are attained and con­ bat activities that support the other non­ flict is avoided. Such an approach, military elements of our national power in included in our formal doctrine and pursuit of national objectives.19 Why, if thereby in the charter of the air compo­ we believe so much in doctrine, is what nent commander, would integrate aero­ we routinely do in practice so poorly space power into the effort to coordinate incorporated in our doctrine? AFM 1-1 national power “so that our programs rein­ must establish the relationship between force one another and contribute to an aerospace power and other elements of overarching security agenda.”17 However, national power. Establishing such a rela­ note that such actions are not entirely tionship would provide a sound founda­ benevolent. A spin-off of such prehostil­ tion for introducing the key idea that air­ ity activities would be that the theater-spe­ lift, spacelift, special operations, and sur­ cific experience gained would make us veillance and reconnaissance offer much much better prepared to apply combat more than mere force multipliers or power if it becomes necessary. enhancement tools. They can function in Third, expand the discussion of airlift, direct pursuit of US economic, informa­ special operations, and space surveillance tional, political, and strategic objectives. and reconnaissance in volume 2. For Some may argue that this proposal will example, the current essay on airlift casts result in a loss of focus and that watering it solely in terms of its most recent accom­ down our doctrine with discussions of plishments in Operations Desert Shield noncombat activities could lead to a focus and Desert Storm—the first major regional on training and activities that lessen our 44 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 capability in wartime. I reject this argu­ Aerospace power should play as vital a ment. In the case of airlift, the wartime role in the open hand of our post-cold war and peacetime missions are very similar. policy as it does in providing a mailed fist. As long as our aircraft are designed to Until such breadth exists in our doctrine, meet the needs of the surface and air com­ there will continue to be a shortfall in our bat forces they support in conflict, inclu­ thinking and our doctrine. sion of peacetime engagement-type options in our basic doctrine will not detract from the central wartime mission. Operations in the target countries will Notes actually improve our performance if a 1. Alexander P. de Seversky. Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster Press. 1942), 335. conflict or contingency arises. 2. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States In the years ahead, much less of our Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 3. combat power will be permanently for­ 3. AFM 1-1. vol. 2. 56. 4. S. ). Deitchman, Beyond the Thaw: A New National ward deployed. The visible flagship of Security (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). 94-96. our national power will often be our aero­ 5. AFM 1-1. vol. 1. 5. space forces, especially our airlift forces. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid.. 7. Our intellectual vision of how to use our 8. Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment aerospace forces requires a broad and flex­ o f Air Power. 21 July 1943. 6. The six tasks listed were (1) destroy hostile air forces: (2) deny the establishment and ible view of aerospace power in war if destroy existing hostile bases from which an enemy can con­ necessary and in shaping peace. duct operations on land, sea, or in the air; (3) operate against hostile land and sea forces: (4) wage offensive air warfare against the sources of strength, military and economic, of the enemies of the United States and its allies; (5) operate as a part of the task forces in the conduct of military operations: The success of the massive airlift effort before and during the and (6) operate in conjunction with or in lieu of naval forces. Gulf war should not dilute the importance i f lessons learned AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States from other major airlift endea\’ors. Here, an assortment of Air Force. 16 March 1984. 3-2. This edition listed nine basic airlifters crowd the ramp at Rliein-Main Air Base. Germany, missions: strategic aerospace offensive, strategic aerospace during Operation Desert Shield. defense, counter air. air interdiction, close air support, spe- NEW AFM 1-1 45 cial operations, airlift, aerospace surveillance and reconnais­ Engagement,” working paper, Washington, D.C., 5 November sance. and aerospace maritime operations. 1991. 9. AFM 1-1. vol. 2. 1992. 186-89. 14. Ibid., 1. 10. Lt Col Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell 15. George Bush. National Security Strategy of the United AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1987), 423. Slates: 1990-1991 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 11. Roger D. Launius. “The Berlin Airlift. 1948-49." Air August 1991), 4. Power History 36, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 8. 16. David Hoffman, "West Begins Aid Airlift to Ex-Soviets: 12. History. Military Airlift Command. 1986-1987. vol. 1. U.S. Planes Ferry Food. Medicine, Take Some Flak from 343-44. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. Critics." Washington Post. 11 February 1992. Sec. A. 13. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 17. "Peacetime Engagement," 11. Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. "Peacetime 18. AFM 1-1, vol. 2. 1992, 188. 19. William Matthews, "U.S. Military 'Nation Building' in Honduras," Air Force Times 52, no. 43 (1 June 1992): 25.

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Capt C lay K. Culver, USAF OCLUBS 47

He have kept at the forefront of our convic- understood. That’s the first step toward tion that the most important part of our busi- dealing with it. Since change affects peo­ ness is the human part. ple and people rate the highest priority, —Gen Merrill A. McPeak certain changes within our Air Force Chief of Staff. US Air Force demand a closer look. Recent difficulties experienced by many officers’ clubs, or O clubs, indicate that HANGE IS inevitable. Some our Air Force is experiencing significant welcome it; others feel very change. Although the nature of this uncomfortable with it. Rarely, change has been debated for years, its however, can anyone stop C effects on the club escape widespread change, especially social change. Rather attention. Basically, professional recondi­ than being feared, change should be tioning within the last decade shifted the traditional definition of officership away from generalist to specialist; and not sur­ prisingly, the club is like a petri dish for studying these divergent officer values. Whether this metamorphosis is deliberate is not clear, but it’s causing confusion among officers and forecasting trouble in the future. Problems such as underfunded club operations and waning officer participa­ tion create headaches for wing command­ ers who need more solutions rather than more problems. Combat readiness, on the other hand, must remain the premier objective for all commanders. Certainly the officers’ club could serve a major func­ tion here. Making the officers’ club a place where attendees learn tolerance of other specialties can encourage cohesive­ ness and enhance combat effectiveness directly. Also, by creating a place where family ties are strengthened, the club would produce an indirect yet positive effect on our combat capability. An understanding of this relationship might lead to an increase in combat readiness as well as fewer club problems. To formulate solutions, we must first examine the tradi­ tional definition of officership.

Tradition versus Specialization

Despite the demonstrated growing concern for officership qualities and professionalism. 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Sociological shifts in American society, such as the women's officership, follow-on training courses movement and the subsequent proliferation o f women in the stress specialized skills. In the traditional­ work force, have contributed to the decline in officer dub participation. Busy working couples prefer quality time with ist camp, generalism reigns; but today’s family over an evening at the O dub. At the end of the duty- high technology demands specialization. day. many parents are found collecting their children from For clarity’s sake, it would be ideal to child development centers, such as the one pictured, on have a perfect model of traditional officer bases throughout the Air Force. roles, but it is extremely difficult to develop a single, all-inclusive definition. the Air Force has not addressed the issue Officer training manuals do, however, pro­ squarely by providing a clear, officially sanc­ tioned statement of expected officer quali­ vide some guidelines.1 ties. Consensus seems to hold that the first three items on an officer’s job description —Maj Richard W. Stokes are (1) take responsibility for your actions, Preserving the Lambent Flame (2) know yourself and seek self-improve­ Many Air Force officers feel caught in a ment, and (3) know your job. But what is philosophical tug-of-war. At odds are tra­ “your job”? Substatements under “Know ditionalism and specialization, each Yourself and Seek Self-Improvement" pulling the officer in opposite profes­ direct officers to analyze the successes sional directions. While commissioning and failures of others, to develop the art of sources emphasize traditional aspects of good writing and speaking, and to OCLUBS 49 increase the scope of their knowledge by In short, historical traditionalism has reading and making new friends. The var­ necessarily yielded to compulsory special­ ious “jobs” of the generalist are apparent. ization, but not without backlash. Along Even today, an officer’s winding career with the generalist, officers’ clubs and path strongly hints of a USAF generalist their patrons are paying a high toll for our philosophy, as stated in The Armed Forces technological edge. Officer of 1950:

In civil life, the man who flits from job to job is soon regarded as a drifter and unstable. In the military establishment, an ability to adjust from job to job and to achieve greater Back to the Club all-around qualification by making a success­ ful record in a diversified experience Clearly, currents of change are churning becomes a major asset in a career. General­ ship, in its real sense, requires a wider up officership roles, and officers’ clubs knowledge of human affairs, supported by tumble along with them. Club activities specialized knowledge of professional tech­ and clientele are shifting. The needs of niques. Those who get to the top have to be older officers and retirees are often differ­ many-sided men, with skill in the control ent from those of lesser rank; and even and guidance of a multifarious variety of among younger officers, marketing sur­ activities. Therefore, even the young special­ veys reveal major differences in club ist who has his eyes on a narrow track, usage. Researching these discrepancies because his talents seem to lie in that direc­ revealed two broad trends strongly influ­ tion, is well advised to raise his sights and encing officer redefinition. First, the soci­ extend his interest to the far horizons of the profession, even while directing the greater ology of the military is changing due to part of his force to a particular field.2 unhampered influences from its parent society; and, second, certain Department But while officers traditionally are of Defense (DOD) policies and Air Force encouraged to be generalists, advanced practices act as catalysts in redefining technologies require specialization that long-standing definitions of officership. tends to contradict generalism. In 1984, Some limited preliminary research, then-Maj Richard W. Stokes wrote, though inconclusive as yet. indicates that ominous qualitative differences in officer From the early Air Force days of the late for­ roles are already entrenched (table 1). ties through the late sixties, our expressed These broad, synergistic trends forecast intent was to commission officers with a decline in O club membership and par­ broad-based liberal arts educations to ticipation by causing a redefinition of offi­ become generalists. The specific require­ cer roles. In fact, they suggest total aban­ ments for technical expertise to support increased technical sophistication has appar­ donment of the club without some sort of ently obviated that practice. . . . The young “strategic and tactical” intervention. people we are bringing into the Air Force as Solutions are at hand; both long- and officers today question the value of tradi­ short-term suggestions for institutional tional officership concepts.3 change are outlined later in this article. Metaphorically speaking, the O club need Not that we could have executed Desert not be an “OK Corral” where officers Shield/Desert Storm-type missions with­ shoot it out over disputed professional out our technical sophistication. The roles; one must only analyze the emerging point here is only “to portray the degree to officer corps and provide a clear defini­ which specialization has altered the com­ tion of officership to resolve current insti­ plexion of the officer corps.”4 tutional disagreements. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

TABLE 1 description for the rated force, and (3) Thoughts of Officers Who Think changes in the Officer Performance Report Officership Is Redefined (61%) (OPR). Exactly how these factors influ­ ence the collective mind of the Air Force officer corps is the crux of the O club • Don’t attend club as much. (When they do. they associate mostly with like specialists.") problem. Of the two major trends, socio­ logical changes in the broader society of • Don't believe club attendance builds which the Air Force is a microcosm, will camaraderie. be analyzed first. One of these three • Don't believe it’s the center of camaraderie for social phenomena is well documented the nineties. due to its pervasive impact on American life-styles. • Two to one believe it's a promotional “square- filler." • Two to one would drop their membership were Societal Change it not for pressure. The women’s liberation movement of • Don't like the way the club operates on several the 1970s forced a final and definite real­ issues. ization that women had a right to work • Do believe officers have responsibility to outside the home. With that fact well change it! established, the Air Force was forced to deal with this issue. While adapting its

Source: Informal survey of rated and nonrated officers structure for working women (child-care taken at McConnell AFB, Kansas, in 1991 by facilities; increased family services; and the author new morale, welfare, and recreation [MWR] activities), our Air Force still hasn’t fully recognized changes in the Catalysts for Change hearts and minds of its people. For instance, whereas colonels and generals The two major trends listed above, soci­ witnessed these changes as adults, cap­ etal change and DOD/USAF practices, are tains and lieutenants literally grew up the simple distillation of numerous other within this social upheaval. To see Mom forces. Understanding these influences is and Dad both working was a natural part basic. Early research generally confirms of their childhood. This was the norm for the hypothesis of the presence and impact them, as it was for their future spouses of these influences by showing a majority growing up then also. Now, 20 years later, of officers (67 percent) wish to be free of the fact that an officer’s spouse works out­ their blue club cards, but not all for the side the home is neither abnormal nor same reasons. Six minor phenomena nontraditional. It should be completely seem to account for the officer redefini­ understandable that since ofttimes both tion and resultant lack of interest in the O partners in civilian couples work outside club. the home, both partners in military cou­ Sociological changes in American soci­ ples would too (table 2). ety. the first major trend, umbrellas three However, the fallout of such an arrange­ social phenomena: (1) working spouses, ment smacks military tradition in the face. (2) a ‘‘New-Dad’’ syndrome, and (3) a bias After work, the majority of couples want against alcohol. The second trend. DOD to relax together and share their day. policies and USAF practices, also has Such behavior strengthens a marriage. three distinct elements: (1) pay raises and One psychologist noted that in families club fund decreases, (2) a shift in job where both parents worked, marriages O CLUBS 51

were under more stress. ‘‘[It] was not (table 3), but a prioritization has taken their division of labor. It was the huge place and the club fell second, behind the amount of time that housework, [chil­ family. This phenomena is even stronger dren], and careers were taking from their when Baby comes along. 4 marriage.”5 A detour to the club While babies haven’t changed, their par­ approaches absurdity in these house­ ents have. The stereotyped family of the holds—not because the military person is "henpecked” but because the couple is TABLE 3 genuinely more interested in each other's Perception of the Unofficial day, even to the point where traditionally Practice of “O Club Blackmail" required “face time” at the club is no longer the stronger influence. Question Answer (%) Yes No TABLE 2 American Family Employment Patterns Do you believe club membership affects promotion? 58 40

Family Type Are you a member because of this belief? 46 31 Single. (22 partially) Traditional Single Level in Company Family (%) Work Dual (%) Parent (%) Would you consider dropping your membership if you thought Top executive 54 39 8 it would have no effect on your career? 62 35 Middle manager 13 50 37 Are you a member solely to Clerical worker — 50 50 appease your superiors? 71 28

Source: Arlie R Hochschild The Second Shift: Work- Source: Informal survey of rated and nonrated officers ing Parents and the Revolution at Home (New taken at McConnell AFB, Kansas, in 1991 by York: Viking Penguin, Inc,, 1989), 287. the author Janet Giele of Brandeis University 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s rarely exists any­ points out that “families are responding to more. In particular, fathers have drasti­ a new social climate, one that recognizes a cally changed their minds about fathering. variety of options, supports individual A N e w -D a d s y n d r o m e has e m e r g e d self-determination, and is supportive of (“evolved" is more accurate since this sit­ the changing realities of family l i f e . A i r uation is the expected consequence of the Force families are no exception. Officers change in attitudes caused by the see these changes among their civilian women’s movement), and Father now friends and expect the same treatment in wants to be Daddy. Arlie Hochschild, in the military. In their study on this sub­ her book The Second Shift, d e t a i l s t he ject. Hamilton McCubbin and Martha evolution of this New Dad: Marsden state that “the conflict between the two social institutions—the military In Ihe history of American fatherhood, there have been three stages, each a response to and the family—over the same resource, economic change. In Ihe first, agrarian stage, the service member, produces strains and a father trained and disciplined his son for dilemmas for all concerned.”7 Does this employment . . . while his wife brought up mean that officers don’t feel the impact of the girls. As economic life and vocational their choice not to visit the club? Make training moved out of the family in the early no mistake; they understand the stakes nineteenth century, fathers left more of the 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

rearing of their children to their wives. . . . home after work to play with their chil­ [In 1 these stages, the father was often distant dren and relieve Mom, who has been with and stern. Not until the early twentieth cen­ the kids all day. This complex relation­ tury, when increasing numbers of women ship has not gone completely unnoticed began to work outside the home, did the cul­ by military leadership. Gen George L. ture rediscover the father as an active pres­ ence in the home, and establish the idea that Butler, then commander of the Strategic "father was friendly.” . . . Today, most fami­ Air Command, acknowledged not only the lies are in the third stage of economic devel­ importance of the family but also how it opment but in the second stage of father­ has been neglected: hood. (However, some menl lead the way into that third stage of fatherhood. But If there is anything I regret in my military they’ve done it privately. . . . Lacking a career, it is that it has taken so long for us to national social movement to support them in properly recognize and care for families. a public challenge to the prevailing notion of Ultimately, as in society at large, the strength of our military comes down to the strength of manhood, they’ve acted on their own.8 the family. If life at home is not well- The New-Dad label also applies to offi­ founded, relationships not strong, values not cers whose spouses work at home. While well-rooted, then ultimately that will spill over into the workplace. With a solid, some fathers maintain the traditional divi­ secure, loving foundation at home, we and sion of family chores, many more race the nation are clearly the beneficiary.9

Officer club revenue fell as a deglamorization o f alcohol Culturally, New Dad is a hit! Fathers consumption emerged in the military. Active drug and receive praise from wife, children, and alcohol abuse awareness programs (below) educate personnel on the effects of overindulgence. society when they take an active role in O CLUBS 53

child rearing. In fact, the nation pleads for free taxi-ride cards make “guilt-free" Dad to come home in order to solve many drinking easier.10 of the nation’s ills. With so much pres­ Given this "permission" for public sure to bring Dad home in the 1990s, it drinking, why then aren’t more officers should be no shock that the club is less flocking to the club? To answer this, first important. Perhaps the traditional man of remember that human behavior synergisti- the house is trading his beer-drinking, cally combines ideas and life-styles in joke-telling buddies for the rewarding such a manner as to derive the best of all pleasures of family and home. worlds (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs Speaking of beer, it’s no joke that the manipulated by smart people). Combined military officer is up against an entirely with the forces mentioned earlier, many different pressure— substance abuse—in officers who do drink want to go home modern America, and herein lies the last and enjoy cocktails with their spouses; or sociological influence. Regardless of one’s perhaps couples will get together at home marital or parental status, drugs and alco­ hol are out in the 1990s. Accordingly, the club loses again. In many ways, younger Officer pay raises in the early 1980s anti a simultaneous rut officers are allowed to drink as much as in appropriated funding put officer cluhs in direct competition with now-affordable off-base eating their superiors ever did; actually, establishments. Many students lunch at the Air University “healthy" diet alcoholic drinks, a nearby Officers Club, below, in part because o f its proximity to the “designated driver” sipping a cola, and various professional military education schools. 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 or elsewhere. And for those health-con­ took a backseat to the more immediate scious officers who feel alcohol is bad problems of the late 1980s that were the news, a workout before going home or a targets of these three policies. To under­ jog after work might seem a better use of stand this complicated interaction, we their time (and, don't forget, the family must study these three policy changes in can be included!). In a phrase. "Just say context. no” translates into “Adios, O club!” In the past, the officers’ club provided a In summarizing the effects of a changing haven for officers, who swelled with pride society on an officer’s self-definition, when hosting family and friends at the analysis of late twentieth-century sociol­ club. Such royal amenities as silver, crys­ ogy could have predicted a decline in the tal, and fine eating for such a low price number of reasons for attending the were a fringe benefit—one not overlooked club—or. more correctly stated, an by accountants when assessing an officer’s increase in the number of reasons for not total compensation. In addition, the attending. So. society is guilty as charged. club’s back-room bars historically But it hasn’t worked alone. attracted fun-loving and rowdy officers quick to share a drink and hair-raising war stories. But all that has changed. Institutional Change Beginning in the early 1980s at the out­ set of the Reagan military buildup, mili­ Obviously, as society changes, so does tary pay rose steeply. Officer pay began to the military. The Department of Defense compete with civilian pay, starting with a and the Air Force have always been 10 percent jump in 1981 and continuing obliged to respond to societal and global since then with raises of 3 or 4 percent change. Unfortunately, many of our insti­ annually. At the very same time, tutional decisions are constructed to solve undoubtedly due to direct competition for immediate shortfalls, and it seems that lit­ funds, Congress decided that taxpayers tle thought is given to the potential long- should not be subsidizing such frivolity as range outcome of such decisions, espe­ military clubs. So, all officer and enlisted cially their effect on the human spirit.11 clubs were dropped from the appropriated “It is noteworthy that both the early Air funds lists and suddenly were on their Force intent to recruit generalists and the own. Consequently, the club fell from recent evolution to specialists appear to grace again from competition with restau­ be reactions to the increasing complexity rants and off-base clubs that were now of aerial warfare rather than a result of affordable to the officer. planning or foresight,” noted Major We can only guess whether Congress or Stokes.12 USAF and DOD officials made the Department of Defense considered the several such decisions in the 1980s. long-term consequence of these two diver­ Three specific policy changes, acting in gent actions. More important, how would tandem with the social forces addressed the Air Force deal with the situation? In earlier, foster this definite and observable all fairness to our Air Force. Congress redefinition of officership. These changes overrode the USAF’s insistence that just include (1) an increase in officer pay com­ such a chain of events would occur given bined with the elimination of governmen­ these circumstances. But we lost, widen­ tal funding of clubs, (2) the elimination of ing the gap between old and new officer additional duties from the young rated definitions. Furthermore, other factors of force, and (3) the introduction of the OPR USAF origin were at play during this with its exclusive emphasis on an officer’s same era. primary duties. This redefinition, assum­ In the mid-1980s, senior USAF leaders ing it to be an Air Force concern, certainly grappling with pilot-retention problems O CLUBS 55

formulated a new policy called "Depth many junior rated officers will not taste before Breadth.” Among other changes, leadership and management issues until this policy eliminated many additional years later. Many will not have the duties and shifted emphasis to one’s pri­ chance to "cut their management and mary job to the exclusion of all else dur­ leadership teeth” until a time when such ing the first 10 years of service. experience would normally already be Obviously, such action contributes to the expected, a complaint oft voiced by civil­ fundamental redefinition of officership; ian corporations about military managers. and while this may actually be the goal, our Air Force may lose cohesiveness in the long term. In terms of classical Darwinian theory. Air Force officers are evolving into a vari­ ety of highly specialized organisms, com­ fortable performing in a niche designed for their particular type of training. Unfortunately, such specialization is the antithesis of O club involvement. Major Stokes writes, “As we concentrate greater numbers of accession quotas on the tech­ nologists necessary to support the contin­ uing complexity of our weapon systems inventory, we should anticipate even greater difficulty preserving a traditional officer ethos.”13 If officers are no longer rewarded for traditional officer behavior and their largest rewards come from spe At Squadron Officer School, above, students o f all specialties cialization, why attend the club? Simply strengthen their writing, briefing, and planning abilities stated, specialization hurts traditional through various seminar activities. The increased emphasis institutions like the club, and we are on specialization in one's primary job may deny some junior officers the opportunity to de\’elop such traditional, encouraging such behavior in two impor­ generalist officer skills. tant ways. First, slashing additional duties from Fortunately, many nonrated officers have rated officers’ job descriptions directly earlier opportunities to develop leader­ affects their self-definition as officers. The ship and management skills; however, mere deletion of such leadership and man­ rated officers will likely continue to make agement duties from their job description up the bulk of the senior leadership forces officers to develop a stricter job def­ despite the reduced opportunity in their inition than would otherwise be derived. early years. It’s not the deletion of actual duties that Evolving job descriptions send mixed causes consternation but the absence of messages to officers commissioned in the them from a new officer’s internal job 1980s, especially rated officers. In fact, description. Undoubtedly, opportunities the blurry evolution of officer roles can be for management present themselves easily traced using the ongoing series of throughout the year; but knowing such ideal officer slogans: a leader, leader-man­ “occasions" lie outside the realm of one’s ager, leader-manager-warrior, or warrior- primary job furthers the redefinition leader. And now, as if reducing addi­ process. tional duties didn’t elicit the desired Second, no longer having relatively easy response, we started using the OPR, and uncomplicated programs to work, which actually disallows credit for nearly 56 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 everything that has traditionally defined traditional officers, that semblance of an officer. unity and common purpose. Indeed, ini­ The OPR, another mid-1980s invention, tial indications show a majority of club has significantly altered the professional attendees tend to interact only with outlook of officers. Regardless of precom­ friends of similar specialty. Interestingly mission training and despite the enough, more nonrated officers attend the Lieutenants Professional Development club than rated ones; but once there, both Program and Squadron Officer School groups associate with friends of their own dogma, years of strictly structured OPRs specialty by a 3:2 ratio.15 Specialization have “taught” captains and lieutenants definitely affects one’s self-definition. what the Air Force expects of them. Since writing, briefing, and public-speaking skills, community and base involvement, The Problem Revisited as well as limited additional duty credit, are all absent from an officer’s primary The focal point for this entire discus­ performance report, a very limited profes­ sion has been the officers’ club. The O sional definition has developed. club problem is really a symptom of the Moreover, combine this OPR system with officer corps’ unclear self-definition and an “up-or-out” philosophy, the perception identity crisis. In the midst of this crisis, of a "one-mistake Air Force,” and fierce officers are told that being a member of the competition in an atmosphere of unprece­ club is part of being an officer—that mem­ dented personnel reductions, and most bership increases officer corps cama­ officers will not attempt any variation to raderie. And yet, in practice, the opposite this expected professional behavior. “The is perceived. In one preliminary study, 70 only problem is, unless you’re willing to percent of the respondents said they did accept change—or maybe create some of not feel officer camaraderie is increased your own—you’ll never know if things by O club membership. On the other might be better than they have always hand, 67 percent said camaraderie was been.”14 Herein lies the real long-term increased through club participation (club harm for our Air Force. membership is not viewed as analogous to Like the natural selection process in participation). Forty-six percent felt the Darwin’s theory, the OPR now reflects club was not the appropriate center for increased specialization and is used as a developing camaraderie in the 1990s, and guide for weeding out undesirables. If an only 42 percent thought it could be if cer­ officer’s new approaches to problem solv­ tain changes were made. Curiously, even ing are unsuccessful, his branch on the though a majority of officers view theoret­ officer evolution tree is cut and more ical participation in O club events as good “politically correct” branches survive. for esprit de corps, only a minority attend. This “unnatural selection” will explode in In addition, the emerging corps of the coming years, and the generalist will “redefined officers” resents forced mem­ become an “endangered species.” bership since specialization dictates that Perhaps this is the ultimate goal of USAF membership enhances none of the senior leadership, but the result will be a required skills that the Air Force rewards. more pronounced move toward civilian On the contrary, the kind of encourage­ corporateness. ment they receive to accept club member­ Ultimately, culpability for the demise of ship seems to run counter to everything the O club rests equally on the Air Force the commissioned officer represents. and society. Both are responsible for Does this unofficial practice of promo­ “civilianizing” the force. Officers have tional or positional blackmail work? been weaned from that which makes them From a human behavior viewpoint, cer­ O CLUBS 57

tain phenomena can be predicted; unoffi­ about already. But despite the last cial coercion does indeed maintain decade’s move toward corporateness in healthy membership rates, but the psycho­ the Air Force, senior leadership insists on logical realities of specialization and civil­ officer corps camaraderie via formal and ian sociological influences cause sharp informal wing functions; so, for now, the drops in participation. So, predictably, service still requires the club, making this membership is up, participation is down, option improbable. and resentment runs high. • Close the club, bar, dining room, and Without some credible solution that meeting hall. Transfer all of these func­ acknowledges the redefinition of officer- tions to our squadrons (a transitional ship. the O club, like the generalist officer, trend that is already occurring in large will die out. The question is whether numbers, contributing to the further senior leadership can accept the psycho­ reduction of club effectiveness). This logical dynamics that result from societal option is curiously rejected by younger change in combination with directed pol­ officers, products of dichotomous training icy and guide our force out of this situa­ (traditional officership and modern spe­ tion. Common ground can and should be cialization). Not surprisingly, they desire found. monuments of tradition that blend with their specialized work environment—a union unlikely to happen without dis­ Recommendations for unity of the corps. While this option might find favor with some officers, our Change Air Force would not function as a tradi­ An understanding of the human situations tional military unit—a prospect not cur­ associated with the job go far to solve the rently endorsed. technical problems; in fact, such understand­ • Retain the club, eliminate member­ ing may be a prerequisite of a solution. ship status, and run it as a competitive —Joseph M. Juran civilian restaurant complete with large Federal Total Quality rooms available for wing events. This Management Handbook option has merit but would require drastic changes in the way DOD views military It’s not a question of improving the clubs. Most officers do not enjoy the appearance or service of clubs; it’s a ques­ club’s current function or usage and tion of redefining its purpose based on a would not increase their participation redefinition of officers’ needs and desires even if clubs were nicer; however, com­ in combination with the service’s needs. manders must meet operating costs. In light of our changing needs and the Nevertheless, the membership issue is a realization that some clubs are in good wedge that further drives would-be partic­ working order, the following five sugges­ ipants away. This option may be the ideal tions are some options to study for the clubs that are struggling: fix but would require numerous, simulta­ neous adjustments in financing and atti­ • Close the club and retain the building tudes. for a pay-as-you-go bar and meeting hall. • Retain the club, eliminate member­ Any needed food service would require a ship status, and pay for it by reducing offi­ caterer, paid for by the sponsors of the cer base pay by $20 per month and shift­ meeting. In light of all the changes dis­ ing these funds to clubs. We would have cussed earlier (specialization, DOD costs, to convince Congress that the clubs are a membership issue, patrons’ needs), the military necessity and educate officers in pros and cons of this option should be the importance of the club’s existence studied, and indeed have been bandied (i.e., re-redefine officership). This option 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 parallels the last with a possible financial of small children to drop by together after solution included. It also suggests that work and not feel remiss in parental leadership actually take the lead in edu­ duties or marital togetherness. cating Congress and the corps on the pur­ 2. Promote/reward generalist practices pose and traditional role of military clubs. via OPR for such things as lecturing, writ­ If the club’s basic role changes, then so ing, on- and off-base group activities, pro­ must this option. fessional association, Girl/Boy Scout or • Add more diverse "areas” to existing Big Brother/Sister involvement, Little clubs. Have a family hall including a League coaching, and so forth. Such kids’ corner with wipe-off tables and a activities provide nonlike specialties with noisier, well-lit atmosphere. Have a fast- a common identity, and they cultivate food hall to stimulate business at all hours management and leadership skills. Most and to better fit the 1990s life-style. For important, they reduce the trend toward clubs to be most effective, we should con­ overspecialization. “Where legitimate, sider removing competing fast-food appropriate, and realistic prerequisites restaurants on base or at the base exist, we must meet them with a supply of exchange. We could still retain the back qualified candidates, but we cannot afford bar so as not to scare off the after-work to become so enamored with technical crowd. In general, this option is designed credentials that we eliminate room for the to make the club more diverse to fit the generalist in the officer corps. The gener­ different life-styles of its clientele and alists must still offer a balance against a simultaneously promote the club as the total reliance on technology to win our center of base togetherness. McCubbin wars.”17 In other words, “as technology and Marsden write: increases, the need for more personal interaction increases.”18 Generalists in If the military expects to maintain an all-vol­ society tend to remind us of such truisms. unteer force with a select group of motivated 3. Retask additional duties to the rated and skilled professional soldiers, it cannot force. This highly screened and well- ignore the potent influence of the military trained force can certainly concentrate on family. Neither can it fail to shape and pro­ ject the kinds of policies needed to develop a primary duties while learning what it military community that will support the takes to manage resources and to lead peo­ new military. Policies that focus on the supe­ ple, thereby providing self-discovery as rior soldier, the cohesive and effective unit, well as personalized leadership tech­ and the military mission but that subordinate niques that are successful. “The military the family unit can only hamper the mili­ leader needs much more than the basic tary’s effort to achieve its mission and will professional knowledge required to ultimately lead to losses in valuable man­ accomplish his combat mission. Any mil­ power, training, and equipment.16 itary man who hopes to become a great leader must therefore constantly increase Again, changes in attitudes are impera­ the scope of his knowledge and his grasp tive. of techniques.”19 In this way, rated offi­ In addition, certain changes in our own cers become aligned with their nonrated Air Force practices should coincide with counterparts who explore these concepts changes in club structure. The following early in their careers, further promoting three possible options reinforce the club, the idea of an officer corps. make participation more desirable in light of the current social changes, and can be instituted immediately: Conclusion 1. Add a child-care center directly into We know how to change the Air Force to be the club's facilities. This allows parents responsive to a changing world. And we in OCLUBS 59

the Air Force are intelligent enough, mature the perfection of his machine gun, which enough, smart enough and responsible drops the enemy in flaming ruin. Yet vol­ enough to make this change effective and umes are devoted to armament; pages to make the Air Force a smaller but a better and inspiration.20 stronger force. Given the changes occurring in military —Maj Gen Stephen B. Croker Commander, Air Combat Command society and the renewed interest in partic­ (Provisional). 1991 ipative management amid massive person­ nel cuts, we owe our people some smart These recommendations and variations solutions instead of forced ones. of current practices address the trend Whenever a cure for ailing military clubs toward declining participation in the offi­ is prescribed, it necessarily must include cer's club, which indirectly affects our diversification and tolerance as ingredi­ combat readiness. Simply demanding that ents. Acceptable remedies w ill be discov­ officers join and participate in the O club ered by those remaining receptive, even will not increase morale or participation. intuitive, to their changing environment. On the contrary, such policies may These leaders understand that directing or smother individual spirit and directly managing change in the military as an affect our combat readiness. As General inseparable part of a larger society is, in Patton reminds us: effect, their only true job description. The Success in war lurks invisible in that vitaliz­ rest of the work will get done. ing spark, yet as evident as the lightning— The most reliable way to anticipate the the warrior's soul—it is the cold glitter of the future is by understanding the present. attacker's eye, not the point of the questing bayonet that breaks the line. It is the cata­ — John Naisbitt clysmic ecstasy of conflict in the flier, not Megatrends

Notes

1. J. B. Sweet, ed.. Essentials of Military Training: A endorsing alcoholic indulgence, this practice is similar to Manual for Members o f the Regular Army, Army .Motional providing free condoms to high school students. What's a Guard, and Army Reserve (Harrisburg. Pa.: The Stackpole parent or general supposed to do? Company. 1959). 152. 11. American military leaders rarely are tiuman behavior- 2. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer ists or psychologists but generally are engineering, business, (Washington. D.C.: Armed Forces Information Service, or political science specialists well versed in military strat­ 1950). 36-37. egy. Such backgrounds rarely focus on the human dimen­ 3 . M a j R i c h a r d VV, S t o k e s , J r . , Preserving the Lambent sion except as it relates to "the Mission." Perhaps this is Flame: Traditional Values and the USAF Officer Accession now changing with the new emphasis on human personality Program (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, and Total Quality Management. September 1984), 4-5. 12. Stokes, 4. 4. Ibid., 5. 13. Ibid., 10. 5. Arlie R. Hochschild. The Second Shift: Working 14. MSgt Dick Hodgson, "Accepting Change," The Parents and the Revolution at Home (New York: Viking- Peacemaker (Dyess AFB. Texas, base newspaper), 10 lanuary Penguin. Inc., 1989), 162. 1992. 6. Janet Z. Giele, Listening to America's Families: Action 15. The retired officer community is not addressed in this for the 80s; A Summary for the Report to the President. article. Although they impact club activity and revenues, Congress and Families of the Nation (Washington. D.C.: retired officers have little effect on changing officer roles and White House Conference on Families. 1980). 161. the move toward specialization and away from activities 7. H I. McCubbin and M A. Marsden. "The Military such as the club. Family, in The Changing World of the American Military'. 16. McCubbin and Marsden. 215-16. ed Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 17. Stokes, 47. 1978). 211. 18. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 8. Hochschild. 186-87. Inc.. 1982), 53. 9. Quoted in Ll Co) Michael B. Perini, "SAC Adjusts to a 19. Sweet. 152. Post-Cold War Era." Airman 36. no.l (January 1992): 14. 20. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers. 1885-1940, 10 Designated drivers and free taxi service are ideas vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.. 1972). 796-97. highly encouraged by the military. While not specifically CLOSE AIR SUPPORT A DOCTRINAL DISCONNECT

Lt Col Brian W. Jones, USAF

The flashing orange MASTER CAU- HE PRECEDING operational story, TION light burns into your view and though brief, highlights a continu­ traps your attention. Your heart races ing problem that demands high- and time stands still as your tunnel level attention. The challenge of Torchestrating air and ground forces to vision moves to the corresponding achieve military objectives goes back as far warning on the enunciator panel. as World War I and has spawned much Your mind screams, “What’s wrong? rhetoric on the conduct of combat opera­ What’s not working?’’ as the voice of tions. Senior commanders and staffs of the forward air controller rings in your US military forces publish documents that ears: “That com pany’s being over- describe how their forces should operate run!” After you glance quickly at the in armed conflict and thus purportedly flight and engine instruments, your provide a conceptual framework for inter- adrenaline subsides, your stom ach and intraservice combat execution.1 relaxes, and vour eyes return to the Whether or not they fulfill this purpose is DOCTRINAL DISCONNECT light on debatable. the panel. "Press on . . . save that company ... no problem ... or is there?” CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 61

Oftentimes, when the United States application of air support assets through­ must use force to defend its national secu­ out the theater commander’s battlefield,5 rity interests, some analysts seem to and if the organizing, training, and equip­ debate endlessly over whether or not we ping of those air forces for employment is executed the way our doctrine said we heavily influenced by a doctrinal descrip­ would.2 The close air support (CAS) mis­ tion of CAS roles and missions, then the sion represents perhaps the most complex quality of our combat effectiveness aspect of orchestrating air and ground depends upon the quality of our CAS doc­ forces and is usually the cause of such trine. Another way of establishing this debate on the gap between doctrine and link is by noting the bidirectional nature execution. This article will not settle dis­ of the path from doctrine to execution. putes over what we should have done—or In an upward sense, doctrine “may even whether we did what wre said we influence acquisition and joint organiza­ would do—in past conflicts. That discus­ tion.”6 That is, what the service chiefs say sion is necessary and healthy, leading to about the conduct of CAS today should “reexamination of the evidence, and new directly influence the weapons systems reasoning.”3 Instead, this writing main­ and force structure available to conduct tains that to emphasize such concepts as this mission in future years.7 In a down­ proxim ity rather than tactical control in ward sense, doctrine directly influences current CAS doctrine promotes confusion combat execution by using the general rather than clarity and puts our future guidance of senior commanders to formu­ CAS capability at risk. late specific directives on missions, orga­ Now that the US military has begun a nizations, tactics, techniques, and proce­ major restructuring, it is essential that we dures for employing combat forces. clarify our doctrine on CAS if we are to Combat readiness, then, should be the close the gap between doctrine and execu­ measurable product of exercising those tion. Without clear, concise doctrine, our forces in the accomplishment of their pre­ restructured, smaller force—which never­ scribed missions, under valid and realistic theless must perform multiple missions— combat plans.8 It follows, therefore, that will be hard pressed to support the joint effective doctrine leads to effective execu­ battle. In view of these circumstances, tion. However, the effectiveness of doc­ this article defines and discusses the sig­ trine is a function of the clarity of its ter­ nificance of CAS doctrine, points out minology. some disconnects between current CAS We can assess that clarity by noting the doctrine and its execution in Operation definition of CAS in Joint Pub 1-02, Desert Storm, and mentions some institu­ Departm ent of Defense D ictionary of tional efforts to bridge the gap between M ilitary and Associated Terms ("air action current CAS doctrine and execution of the against hostile targets which are in close CAS mission, as well as making recom­ proximity to friendly forces and which mendations of its own. require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces”);9 Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Close Air Support United States Air Force (“[air action that] Doctrine directly supports the surface commander by destroying or neutralizing enemy The link between current CAS doctrine4 forces that are in proximity to friendly and combat effectiveness is evident in the forces”);10 and Army Field Manual (FM) following syllogism: If success in joint 100-5, Operations (“[air action that] sup­ combat depends on centralized, flexible ports land operations by attacking hostile 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 targets in close proximity to friendly sur­ with a more definitive or explicit doc­ face forces”).11 Current joint doctrine trinal concept than proximity to define the offers no definition of the CAS mission, CAS mission.15 other than the general guidance that all A memorandum issued by the Rand joint operations require significant plan­ Corporation in 1970 makes some signifi­ n i n g , c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d c o n t r o l . 12 N o t e cant observations about CAS doctrine: that the term proximity (distance from “Battle relevance rather than battlefield enemy forces in time or space) is common proximity is the useful criterion.”16 The to all three definitions cited and seems to report further stated that time and space be a source of confusion; for example, were not the only criteria for defining these statements might well lead us to method, and that command and control assume that CAS can be used only for might be significant criteria which would those targets in proximity of friendly require specialized training or weapon forces. From a theater command perspec­ system capability. Battle history shows tive, CAS may not rate the highest appor­ that, regardless of the services’ parochial tionment, but ‘‘it may be the most critical arguments over the definition of [of the applications of aerospace forces] by proximity, effective CAS occurs when ensuring the success or survival of surface ground commanders exercise tactical con­ forces.”13 For that reason, it is important trol over air forces in support of ground to avoid the type of confusion that has force objectives.17 Joint Pub 1-02 defines long existed with regard to the term prox- tactical control as the "detailed and, usu­ imity. ally, local direction and control of move­ ments or maneuvers necessary to accom­ plish missions or tasks assigned.”18 Over Execution of the skies of Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, tacti­ cal control was a critical element in defin­ Close Air Support ing CAS. in the Gulf War Tactical air control in Operation Desert Storm was the product of nearly a cen­ Although CAS dates from World War I, tury’s worth of refining the application of it evolved for the most part during the air power, optimized to theater objectives. Vietnam War.14 At that time, aerospace The effectiveness of CAS in the Gulf war doctrine made headway in establishing a provides some classic examples of how link to combat effectiveness by developing tactics and procedures can be effective, and applying better methods of tactical air despite doctrinal deficiencies. That is, the control under a single air component com­ application of aerospace doctrine pro­ mander. Yet, CAS execution was fast duced relatively effective centralized con­ becoming the art of forward air control. trol and decentralized execution for the The notion of proximity and the ability to coalition’s air combat forces. At virtually distinguish between enemy forces and all command levels, controlled interaction friendly forces on a nonlinear, jungle- of air and surface forces provided the canopied battlefield became critical ele­ coordination and control required by our ments in procedural control and execu­ joint doctrine.19 For example, although tion. The inability to understand these we adapted certain processes to the the­ elements, as well as disobedience of rigid ater and mission, the tactical air control rules of positive control for CAS, caused system operated just like it was presented US munitions to fall on friendly forces. In in the Air-Ground Operations School.20 the 20 years since Vietnam, we have Centralized command and control resided argued, pondered, published, and in the tactical air control center, which preached, but we have yet to come up directed air tasking via an air tasking CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 63

Success in joint combat depends on centralized, flexible all of Iraq and Kuwait into targeting areas. application o f close air support (CAS) assets througluiut the Known as “kill boxes,” these areas theater commander's battlefield. Only a unified and clearly allowed flexible tasking against time- defined doctrine can effectively execute the various CAS critical targets such as Scud missiles, field missions During the Vietnam War. CAS execution became the art o f llte forw ard air controller (FAC). Here, an 0-2 artillery, air defenses, armor, supplies, or Super Skymaster and OV-IO Bronco take part in Commando troops such as the vaunted Republican Hunt operations in Southeast Asia. Guard.21 Prior to the execution of the ground campaign, control of air missions order. Collocation and/or continuous in the kill boxes was important to mission communication with Gen Norman effectiveness, but that control became Schwarzkopf and his coalition command­ absolutely essential when coalition ers allowed theater command and con­ ground forces began their rapid movement trol over the airland battlefield. through the kill boxes toward their objec­ Decentralized execution occurred through tives (fig. I).22 subordinate command and control agen­ Of particular significance to these con­ cies. including control and reporting cen­ trol procedures was the fire support coor­ ters, airborne warning and control system dination line (FSCL): aircraft, airborne battlefield command and control centers, air support operations centers, airborne forward air controllers, A line established by the appropriate ground and tactical air control parties. In terms of commander to insure coordination of fire not execution, then, we had our act together under his control but which may affect cur­ rent tactical operations. The |FSCL] is used for CAS. but we have only to look at fire to coordinate fires of air, ground or sea control procedures to begin to understand weapons systems using any type of ammuni­ the nature of the doctrinal disconnect. tion against surface targets. . . . The estab­ To achieve our objective of inflicting lishment of the |FSCL| must he coordinated maximum damage on Iraqi forces, the tac­ with the appropriate tactical air commander tical air control center divided virtually and other supporting elements.23 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Proper fire-support procedure required power should be placed under the tempo­ that any ordnance expended on the rary control of the field commander only friendly side of the FSCL be approved by when hostile targets are in “proximity to coordination with the corps commander’s friendly forces” invites discordant opera­ fire-support element responsible for that tions—the antithesis of joint doctrine. sector.24 Targets beyond (on the enemy Uncertainty with regard to the notion of side of) the FSCL, though they may have proximity can lead air and ground force been nominated by the ground com­ commanders at various levels to either mander, were approved for destruction by overcontrol or—worse—undercontrol air the theater commander through the air assets (e.g., by not using forward air con­ tasking order or—to provide flexibility— trol).27 The former could diminish the by a CINC-designated element of the tacti­ effectiveness of aerospace firepower, and cal air control system, such as the airborne the latter could lead to losses to friendly battlefield command and control center or fire—fratricide—which is clearly unac­ the control and reporting center. ceptable to the American public. Though Doctrinally, missions against targets unavoidable weapons malfunctions may beyond the FSCL are considered air inter­ take their toll, one can minimize fratricide diction or, if the targets are of direct inter­ by following clear, well-rehearsed, and est to (nominated by) the ground com­ jointly accepted procedures for control mander, battlefield air interdiction.25 In a and target identification.28 During Desert simple but very meaningful sense, CAS Storm, coalition ground commanders occurred when the ground commander could move their FSCLs within unreason­ tasked fixed-wing air assets to destroy able distances of the nearest friendly enemy forces short of the FSCL, regardless forces, which induced overcontrol and of proximity to friendly ground forces. thus reduced the effectiveness of air Coordination with the fire and maneu­ power. Their intent was to exercise tacti­ ver of surface forces generally worked as cal control over assets employed within advertised via the intricate but effectively their area of interest.29 In short, they precise procedure of forward air control.26 patched execution to doctrine by labelling The critical element responsible for con­ all targets short of the FSCL as being in the trolling fixed-wing air and for distinguish­ “proximity of friendly forces.” In this ing friendly forces from enemy forces is case, the lack of doctrinal clarity with the tactical air control party on the ground regard to proximity had the effect of or—if available—the airborne forward air degrading the centralized application of controller, both of whom provide the nec­ air power. essary integration of air and ground fire­ Second, tactical control (albeit tempo­ power. Inherent in these procedures are a rary) of aerospace forces by Desert Storm number of disconnects between current surface commanders became a key ele­ CAS doctrine and execution that have ment in integrating the ground and air bat­ implications for the mission’s future effec­ tle. Although procedures for establishing tiveness. Specifically, these are the doctri­ and communicating the position of the nal emphasis on proximity, the lack of FSCL were very important in the mobile emphasis on control, and the potential battle, around-the-clock operations in costs of unclear doctrine. Desert Storm made proper tactical control First, proximity is no longer the pre­ of CAS a vital concern. To improve the dominant factor in determining the effectiveness of air power in attriting the ground commander’s real-time or immedi­ Iraqi army, we tasked fighter aircraft with ate need to increase his or her firepower highly capable sensors and good battle­ and mobility with theater aerospace field coverage to perform armed recon­ assets. To imply that such aerospace naissance in the kill boxes and to relay CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 65 target information to airborne battlefield theater, but decentralized execution command and control centers and/or involves releasing tactical control—if for incoming fighters.30 This “killer-scout” only the time it takes a 500-pound bomb arrangement was ideal for interdiction to fall—to the ground commander, who sorties, but if the FSCL were moved for­ should best know the immediate disposi­ ward too rapidly or if such movement tion of friendly and enemy forces. were not communicated to the appropri­ Procedurally, the US Air Force uses air­ ate parties, we could have quickly fallen borne forward air controllers or ground- into the trap of mistaking friendly forces based tactical air control parties to pro­ for the enemy—in the absence of proce­ vide the operative tactical-control link dural forward air control. Fortunately, between the ground commander and CAS misidentification by killer-scouts never aircraft. This procedure, executed very led to serious consequences, but the possi­ successfully in Desert Storm, shows that bility of its occurrence underscores the control should be a central element in the importance of emphasizing tactical con­ doctrinal description of CAS. trol rather than proximity as a basic ele­ Finally, Desert Storm points to some of ment of CAS doctrine. the pitfalls of unclear doctrine. When tac­ Centralized control may be essential for tical control of fixed-wing air is necessary the optimal application of air power in­ for field commanders to multiply their

Figure 1. Areas of Responsibility in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations Although doctrine may imply that CAS is used only against those targets in "proximity" to friendly forces, such was not always the case in Operation Desert Storm. Often. CAS occurred when the ground commander tasked fixed-wing aircraft to destroy enemy forces short o f the fire support coordination line, even though the targets were not close to friendly ground forces. Here, a well-armed A-10 poses for an aerial portrait during the Gulf war.

significance of CAS because our ground forces had little need for additional fire­ power or mobility in their 100-hour cam­ paign.33 But when we did require CAS, as in the battle for Khafji, Desert Storm taught us that the process of integrating air and land forces—especially at night, in bad weather, and under demanding com­ bat conditions—requires mission-specific training and equipment that must tran­ scend parochial service boundaries. Unless we develop clear procedures for identification and control, the risk of frat­ ricide increases. Clear, concise joint doc­ trine begets clear joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.34 We can justify patting ourselves on our blue backs for the tremendous achieve­ ments of aerospace power in Desert Storm, assuming that we do not ignore the less obvious but critically important CAS mis­ sion. Our success was the product of com­ plex, coordinated, joint and combined operations. The fact that Iraqi resistance was crippled after 38 days of violent and devastating air attacks should not allow us firepower, the CAS mission may deter­ to extrapolate that we should rewrite our mine the success of the battle or—ulti­ doctrine to reflect the total dominance of mately—the campaign.31 Although the one service over another. Such an assess­ services may argue among themselves ment might lead us to the divisive conclu­ over who should provide the “main sion that AC-130 gunships were “domi­ effort," who supports whom in the battle, nated” by US Army Rangers in Operation or who should define CAS requirements, Just Cause or—further down that path— such parochial arguments do not con­ that aerospace doctrine should not even tribute to victory.32 The imperative ques­ apply to such “military activities short of tion for every force commander should be war” as Just Cause.35 Instead, we should who supports what, the latter being the be beating our backs (and our doctrine) objective or mission specified in the oper­ purple to prevent the loss of interoperable ations or tasking order. organizations and equipment that perform An examination of only the Persian Gulf integrated, orchestrated, high-risk forward war may encourage us to downplay the control of aerospace power.

66 CLOSE AIM SUPPORT 67

Despite the shortcomings of our doc­ serve to close the gap between doctrine trine, the execution of CAS missions in and execution. These modifications Desert Storm was highly successful. What include Air Force reorganization, the knowledge, then, of the proper application future tactical air control system, and con­ of aerospace power do we take from the cepts for new US Army doctrine. deserts of the Middle East to the battle­ Recent restructuring of the US Air Force fields of the twenty-first century? aligns combatant commands by theater mission (e.g., Pacific Air Forces and US Air Forces in Europe) and by functions of Close Air Support US-based “force providers” and “force augmenters” (e.g., Air Combat Command for the Future and Air Mobility Command).36 As we refine our structure under the direction of As mentioned earlier, the evolutionary Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of nature of our CAS doctrine can serve to staff, we are improving mission capability optimize future mission execution. That by grouping mission-related air assets into is, CAS combat capability can be signifi­ objective, or composite, wing structures— cantly enhanced by modifications that witness the reorganization of the 23d Wing with attack assets such as A-10, OA-IO, F-16, and AC-130 aircraft, as well Centralized command and control (C2) existed at the tactical as elements of the tactical air control sys­ air control center, which directed implementation o f the air tem. Collocation of that wing with the tasking order. Other C2 entities, such as the airborne 82d Airborne Division and the XVIII Air­ warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and tactical air control parties on the ground, handled decentralized borne Corps increases our peacetime execution. Here, crew members on an E-3A AWACS opportunities to conduct joint exercises in monitor their screens during Operation Desert Storm. CAS. Such joint alignments with objec- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

tive wings will further enhance our capa­ bility of the tactical air control system bility in multiaircraft composite opera­ would provide optimal support to combat tions such as joint air attack tactics, tacti­ commanders in their areas of responsibil­ cal airlift escort, combat search and res­ ity.40 As a follow-up to this reorganiza­ cue, or gunship support. Current joint tion, the chiefs of staff of the Air Force doctrine makes only a broad reference to and Army should approve the Air Attack the fact that coordination and employment Action Plan, a concept originally pub­ of such composite missions are the lished by Tactical Air Command and the responsibility of the air component com­ Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, mander, and aerospace doctrine speaks of which addresses aerospace force applica­ these missions only in general terms.37 tion on the future battlefield. This con­ Historically, surface-attack air forces, cept specifies tactics, techniques, and pro­ especially those that may be tasked pri­ cedures (TTP) that link CAS doctrine and marily for CAS, will be the air component execution, thereby enhancing combat commander’s choice for such composite capability. In addition to providing a con­ missions as air-assault escort or drop-zone solidated TTP manual for joint CAS opera­ preparation (as in Vietnam) or combat tions, the Air Attack Action Plan pro­ search and rescue (as in Desert Storm).38 poses a more integrated planning process Service doctrine must concisely describe for air tasking orders and ground-force the synergistic nature of these composite operations orders, improved training in missions in force-application or force- joint air attack tactics, and helicopter- enchancement roles. borne forward air controllers.41 Also Basic Air Force doctrine says that “Air under development in joint TTPs are Force forces should be organized to improvements to CAS procedures, such as enhance centralized control and decentral­ the data-burst integrated data modem—a ized execution.”39 Our restructuring efforts are attempting to tailor tactical air control elements to objective wing struc­ The author's suggestion that the joint force commander release temporary tactical control o f CAS assets to a surface tures so that loss of combat capability is force commander may enhance aerial support to the ground held to a minimum. Recently, tactical air pounders. Here, tanks from the US Army's 3d Brigade roll control wings redistributed their resources past a burning Iraqi T-72 tank a few kilometers outside of so that the deployability and combat capa­ Kuwait. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 69

device for transferring a forward air con­ definition to serve its powerful, bidirec­ trol briefing—and better methods of iden­ tional purpose. And it must be unified— tifying friendly ground forces to high-tech, consistent in both its joint and service-par­ long-range sensor systems.42 ticular manifestations. Rear Adm U. S. The most recent development in updat­ Grant Sharp said it best: “In combined ing US Army doctrine is found in an operations, keep it simple!”48 Army publication titled AirLand With unity, clarity, and simplicity as Operations: A Concept for the Evolution doctrinal objectives, service doctrine of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of should support joint doctrine by speaking the 1990’s and Beyond:43 I t s p u r p o s e i s t o to specific mission and organizational “set the general azimuth for the evolution capabilities. Each service must simplify of doctrine, organization, training, mate­ its doctrine by describing unique and rial, and leader development by [the Army interoperable missions, and must forgo and the Air Force].”44 Of significance to arguments that favor parochial interests. CAS doctrine, AirLand Operations men­ Descriptions of CAS in FM 100-5 and tions the “joint battle area,” a zone in the AFM 1-1 must be clear and consistent. not-necessarily-linear battlefield of the The principles of centralized command future where Army and Air Force capabil­ and decentralized tactical control, autho­ ities overlap and where CAS should rized by the theater CINC, distinguish this occur; however, AirLand Operations does unique mission and underlie the success it not provide a definition of CAS. An enjoyed in Iraq, Vietnam, Korea, or any updated version of FM 100-5, which will victorious campaign. Such is the way we incorporate airland operations doctrine, will execute CAS in the future. For that should certainly include a joint definition reason, I propose a new definition of CAS: of CAS.45 Close air support missions integrate aero­ space assets into the fire and maneuver plan of surface force commanders at all levels; Principles of War and the toward that end. the joint force commander procedurally authorizes temporary tactical Essence of Control control of CAS assets to surface force com­ manders for specified mission execution. President Abraham Lincoln wrote the Emancipation Proclamation in about 120 Service competition over both the com­ words—less than two written pages. Gen mand and control of assets should thus George C. Marshall described the give way to the joint pursuit of combat Command and Employment of Air Power objectives. in 1943 in just over 13 pages.46 By way of But what if it doesn’t? What if we contrast, today’s primary joint and service ignore that DOCTRINAL DISCONNECT doctrine publications (i.e., Joint Pub 1, caution light? As we have seen, the Joint Warfare o f the US Armed Forces; effects of unclear, unrefined doctrine on AFM 1-1; and FM 100-5) total 583 pages. the mission capability of CAS are pre­ Their sheer bulk alone suggests that our dictable and damaging. The answers to doctrine does not exemplify those very two fundamental questions effectively principles which it extols: economy, sim­ summarize the potential impact of this plicity, and unity.47 Effective communica­ doctrinal disconnect: (1) Will the CAS tion is not well served by redundancy, mission disintegrate for lack of motiva­ excess, and overstatement. It is time to tion, men, or machines? and (2) Will CAS weed the garden. Doctrine needs to be mission effectiveness be significantly clarified and simplified. The term doc- degraded? The answers, respectively, are trine itself must have a clear, consistent no and yes. 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

The CAS mission will remain necessary Mission effectiveness, however, is to operations in the nonlinear battlefield degraded by ineffective doctrine. of the future. “The joint battle area is Historically, two unerring axioms of CAS where Army forces fight to the depth of all apply to every conflict. First, reduce the their weapons systems and where Army threat to friendly ground forces by maxi­ and Air Force capabilities overlap.”49 mizing firepower to kill as many targets as Therefore, even if we do not lay a clear possible. In 1950 Maj Louis J. Sebille gave foundation for CAS in our doctrine, the his life to that honorable goal and was mission will still be critical.50 Much less posthumously awarded the Congressional critical is the weapon system, for the mis­ Medal of Honor.52 Second (and perhaps sion is more important than the machine. more significant), kill no targets rather For example. Desert Storm had F-16s than risk the accidental killing of friendly pointing out battlefield air interdiction tar­ forces. Expert, effective control is essen­ gets to A-lOs and had OA-lOs providing tial to successful CAS, and such expertise forward air control to any fighter tasked is a direct product of good doctrine. f o r t h e C A S m i s s i o n . 51 B u t a t a n k a t f i v e Disagreement over a proper doctrinal defi­ miles looks the same in the infrared nition of CAS leads to disjointed control Maverick scope of an F-16 as it does in the procedures, which in turn can lead to frat­ scope of an A-10. Pilots who provided ricide on the battlefield—something we all CAS to coalition forces in the deserts of abhor. Although composite wings of the Kuwait and Iraq are warriors who will future may be less experienced than the fight the battle with whatever sword they units that fought in Desert Storm, they are given. Perhaps one sword performs will certainly have broader missions; better than another for a specific mission,' moreover, future fighter squadrons and but that does not change the fact that the detachments may be unable to pick up mission will be accomplished, regardless where ineffective doctrine leaves off. of the doctrinal disconnect. The disconnect is real.

Notes t. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine 7. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Restructure, of the United States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992. v-vii; and white paper, September 1991. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, May 1986. i. 8. FM 100-5, 6; AFM 1-1, vol. 1, vii; and Joint Test Pub 2. Lt Col Edward C. Mann. "Operation Desert Storm? It 3-0. Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. January 1990. Wasn't AirLand Battle," Air Force Times, 30 September n-i. 1991. 27. 61. 9. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 3. Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt Col Charles M. Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989, 70. Westenhoff. “Air Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted 10. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 6. Climb," Airpower Jaurnal 5. no. 3 (Fall 1991): 14. 11. FM 100-5.49. 4. In this article, doctrine refers to information in AFM 12. Furr. 43; and Joint Test Pub 3-0. III-12. 1-1. FM 100-5. and joint publications of the 3-series (opera­ 13. AFM 1-1, vol. 1.13. tions). CAS doctrine refers to descriptions of this term in 14. Dr Richard P. Hallion. "Battlefield Air Support: A the preceding documents. For information on the produc­ Retrospective Assessment." Airpower Journal 4, no. 1 tion of joint doctrine, see Lt Col William F. Furr, "Joint (Spring 1990): 161; and Gen William W. Momyer, Airpower Doctrine: Progress. Prospects, and Problems," Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Journal 5. no. 3 (Fall 1991): 38-39; and Lt Col Edward C. Force, 1 January 1978), 258-62. Mann, "Beyond AirLand Battle: Concepts for the Future." 15. For a much more detailed and complicated doctrinal Air Force Times, 16 December 1991,1. proposal, see Lt Col Gary Dikkers, "Battlefield Air Support 5. War Department FM 100-20, Command and (BAS)—A Doctrinal Definition," AirLand Bulletin, 31 Employment o f Air Power, 21 July 1943, 7; and Col James A. December 1990, 3-7. Mowbray. “The Fabric of Air Warfare Doctrine, Operational 16. Edmund Dews, A Note on Tactical vs. Strategic Air Experience, and the Integration of Strategic and Tactical Air interdiction, Rand Memorandum RM 6239-PR (Santa Power from World War 1 through World War II" (Paper pre­ Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. April 1970), v, 3. sented to the Airpower Symposium, Maxwell AFB. Ala., 17. The following discussion details the effectiveness of March 1988). CAS in Operation Desert Storm, as well as tire principles of 6. Joint Pub 0-1, "Basic National Defense Doctrine.” final tactical control that were responsible for the mission's suc­ draft. July 1990,1-3. cess. The number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 71

artillery pieces destroyed by A-10 and OA-IO operations A irland Battle for the Strategii: Army of the 1990's and alone lends credibility to such claims of effectiveness. See Beyond. 1 August 1991, 11. "A-10/OA-10" fU), Tactical Analysis Bulletin (U) 91-2 (July 32. Mann. 31. 1991): 6-1 through 6-20. (Secret) Information extracted is 33. Friedman. 198-203. unclassified. Further. General Momyer relates numerous 34. Furr, 40-41. examples of the significance of tactical control in conducting 35. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Power in Desert Storm CAS in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. and the Need for Doctrinal Change," Airpower lournul 5, no. See Momyer. passim. 4 (Winter 1991): 33; and |Lt Col) Rfichard] B. Cllarkl, “The 18. Joint Pub 1-02. 361. Confidence of Quality." Airpower lournul 5, no. 4 (Winter 19. Joint Test Pub 3-0,11-1; and AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 113. 167. 1991): 2. 20. For a detailed description of the tactical air control 36. Air Force Restructure, 6. system, see Maj Thomas H. Buchanan, The Tactical Air 37. Joint Test Pub 3-0, 111-12. In AFM 1-1, the closest one Control System: Its Evolution and Its Need for Battle comes to a description of these composite missions is in the Managers. Research Report no. AU-ARI-87-1 (Maxwell AFB, remarks on force enhancement. See vol. 1, pages 13, 106. Ala.: Air University Press. May 1987): 29-38; see also 186. and 193. “A-10/OA-10" (U), 1-5. (Secret) Information extracted is 38. Earl H. Tilford. Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in unclassified. Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University 21. Col William A. Scott, commander, 4th Tactical Fighter Press, June 1991), 69-70; and Malcolm McConnell. "Rescue Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah, interview with author. January in Iraq," Reader's Digest. June 1991, 75-82. 1992; Dr Norman Friedman. Desert Victory': The War for 39. AFM 1-1, vol. 1. 18. Kuwait (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1991), 75-76; 40. Lt Col David Tillotson III. commander. 729th Tactical and Maj fames Blackwell. Thunder in the Desert: The Control Squadron, Hill AFB. Utah, interview with author, Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War (New York: January 1992. Bantam Books. 1991), 163-65. 41. “Air Attack Action Plan—Operational Concept." 22. The illustration shows only generic areas of responsi­ AirLand Bulletin, 30 September 1990, 3. bility in-theater and is not intended to depict the specific 42. See Furr, 43, for more information about joint TTPs. operations of any particular unit in Iraq or Kuwait. 43. TRADOC Pam 525-5. 23. Joint Pub i-02. 144. 44. Ibid., i. 24. Joint Pub 3-09, “Joint Fire Support," is currently under 45. TRADOC Pam 525-5, at 45 pages, is almost three times development. Outside of Air Force tactics manuals. US as long as the section on "AirLand Battle" in FM 100-5. In Army FM 6-20. Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, the interest of clarity, one might hope that the US Army 28 January 1983, J-13, contains the best description of the would consider a less lengthy rendition of its current doc­ basis for this procedure. trine for AirLand Battle. 25. AFM 1-1, vol. 2.165. 46. War Department FM 100-20. 26. The conceptual basis for this procedure is in FM 6-20. 47. Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare o f the US Armed Forces, 11 E-4. November 1991, 21. For example, the nine principles of war 27. AFM 1-1. vol. 2, 165. found in Joint Pub 1 are repeated in AFM 1-1 and FM 100-5. 28. Richard MacKenzie, “A Conversation with Chuck 48. Joint Pub 1. 65. Horner." Air Force Magazine, June 1991,63. 49. TRADOC Pam 525-5, 11. 29. Scott interview. 50. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, outlines the significance of the mis­ 30. Ibid. sion to the US Air Force (page 13). 31. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 13; and US Army Training and 51. Friedman, 176. Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Parn) 525-5, 52. Joint Pub 1, 59. AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of 72 A/RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

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Ricochets From the perspective of O-O-D-A, ABCCC II’s continued from page 3 strength was its communications suite and commonality, resulting in a decreased support crew composition. Specifically, friendly budget and a reduced logistics tail. ground and air elements provided ABCCC II The advanced medium-range air-to-air mis­ with information via radio. The crew could sile, low-altitude navigation and targeting then plot an excellent orientation of the battle­ infrared for night system, reconnaissance pods, field situation. This was enhanced by the all-weather munitions guidance systems, and ABCCC intelligence officer and technician, autonomous equipment for suppression of who not only received timely updates on bomb enemy air defenses allow the F-16 to perform damage assessment and hostile intelligence, the counterair and force-application roles, as but were trained to fuse this information into a well as some elements of the force-enhance­ current picture. To support decision making, ment role. Force-enhancement electronic ABCCC II battle managers were trained to countermeasures and force-support tanking; adjust the combat flow on a real-time basis. logistic support; and command, control, com­ The linchpin was the director of the airborne munications, and intelligence would still be battle staff, a fighter-qualified crew member required. These elements could be identified who lent the viewpoint of the action agencies by task and could train with the F-16 wing as (strike aircraft) to each decision. If necessary, required, allowing the exercising of large force ABCCC could be manned with an airborne packaging. command element to provide expanded author­ This proposal would not be quite the same as ity. operating from the Mountain Home wing; One hundred and ten days after ABCCC III however, it could be much more cost-effective was delivered to the government, we success­ and could offer numerous advantages of its fully deployed two of these systems to Desert own. Eighty percent of the capability for one- Shield. The O-O-D-A cycle takes even longer. third the cost makes sense today. The battle staff now has computer and software tools optimized to support the orientation and Maj B. Courts, USAF decision processes. For example, during mis­ RAF Brampton, United Kingdom sion planning, the 800-page air tasking order is Maj William Courts, USAF reformatted in minutes for the crew’s use in Huntingdon Cambridge, United Kingdom flight. Once airborne, the crew has software tools which permit rapid matching of assets against targets. The computerized map display can be customized within seconds to support O-O-D-A LOOP TOOLS any orientation objective desired. Still, as with Thanks to 1st Lt Gary A. Vincent for his excel­ ABCCC II, the key elements are extensive com­ lent article, "In the Loop: Superiority in munications, crew manning, and training. Command and Control,” in the Summer 1992 Lieutenant Vincent’s article suggests that the issue. The Observation-Orientation-Decision- ability to execute faster cycle times is limited Action (O-O-D-A) loop provides a useful tool by command and control. In such target-rich for analyzing command, control, communica­ environments as Iraq and Kuwait, ABCCC (II or tions, computers, and intelligence (C4I) III) could provide targets much faster than processes and tools. strike assets could be made available. This I was disappointed that Lieutenant Vincent was further complicated by the desire of strike made no mention of the airborne battlefield aircraft to work missions “as fragged”; diver­ command and control center (ABCCC). sions from ABCCC to unfamiliar targets ABCCC II was fielded in Vietnam in the mid­ entailed new unknowns and risks. I submit sixties. It used paper charts, plastic tags, and that ABCCC—with observation data from air­ grease pencils to track friendly and hostile borne warning and control system aircraft, joint forces. ABCCC II saw action in Grenada surveillance target attack radar system aircraft, (Operation Urgent Fury), as well as Panama and so forth—has demonstrated O-O-D-A (Operation Just Cause). Five ABCCC II aircraft cycle times in hours. The decision cycle is were deployed to Operations Desert Shield/ strengthened by placing an airborne command Storm and were key C4I nodes in the events element on ABCCC. But this still leaves a described in Lieutenant Vincent's article. problem that was evident in the desert: How 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 do we provide strike-aircraft crews (the action doctrine. The 1984 version of AFM 1-1 guys) with the same orientation to a pop-up devoted three pages to the definition of doc- target received from ABCCC as they get for trine—from basic through tactical levels. The targets that have been fully mission introduction to volume 1 discusses the term, planned/briefed? We in the C4I business are but volume 2 merely gives us a handful of exploring possibilities, but that truly is the quotes. Why is this important? As Colonel “long pole in this tent.” Meilinger’s article stresses, airmen have a diffi­ cult time explaining our doctrine. I contend CMSgt Mark D. Doiron, USAF Midwest City, Oklahoma that if our basic doctrinal manual does not have a solid definition of the beast, our young airmen will have a very difficult time describ­ ing what it looks like. WHERE IS OUR DOCTRINE GOING? Additionally, the new volume 1 may ask more questions than it answers. The section on The last few issues of Airpower Journal have “Airmindedness” states that "this viewpoint is sparked the beginning of what I hope is a long not presented here as doctrine" (italics in origi­ debate on Air Force doctrine, especially the nal). Then why is it in AFM 1-1? Chapter 2 new two-volume edition of AFM 1-1, Basic introduces “tenets," which were not in the Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air 1984 version. Volume 2, which is not “doc­ Force. My interest began when Lt Col Phillip trine,” is required to completely understand S. Meilinger explored “The Problem with Our the new tenets of air power. Logistics, which Air Power Doctrine” in the Spring 1992 issue. was a “principle” of air power in the 1984 ver­ When I arrived at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, sion, is relegated to the last few paragraphs of for a year at the Advanced Operational Studies the 1992 edition. Fellowship, I was handed a copy of the new The Army is currently revising Field Manual AFM 1-1. Coming from the "trenches,” I did (FM) 100-5, Operations (to become Airland not even know we had a new manual. Lt Col Operations). The Training and Doctrine C. J. Bohn III and Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd Command team is wrestling with several tough opened the discussion about doctrine even fur­ concepts, including operations short of war, ther with their letters to the editor in the conflict termination, and the role of airland Summer 1992 issue. operations in future conflict—namely, major My major criticism of AFM 1-1 is best regional crises. The latest AFM 1-1 mentions summed up in General Boyd’s comment that operations short of war but, at least to me, we must reach “personnel at the wing level and looks to the past, not the future. below—the ‘shop floor,' if you will—so we can 1 know criticism comes cheap. I do not have produce a living document of which every air­ all the answers. But I totally agree with man is an integral part." The new manual is General Boyd’s assertion that we must have a not something that is going to be discussed at a doctrine that is discussed and, more impor­ squadron staff meeting. tantly, understood at the grass-roots level of Does volume 2 contain doctrine? According the Air Force. Military doctrine has two pri­ to the purpose’ stated in its introduction, the mary functions: to guide actions in wartime answer is no. Volume 2 is, however, an excel­ and to provide a focus for training in peace­ lent collection of articles about air power and time. Squadron commanders need a doctrine goes a long way toward explaining operational that will guide their entire organization. We art and the tenets and principles of air power. need more than a “roles and missions” docu­ So where does that leave us? Volume 1 should ment that is used to design the air tasking be the encompassing doctrinal guide for the order at the operational command. Don’t take Air Force—something, as General Boyd sug­ so much out of AFM 1-1 that it becomes a hol­ gests, that should reach down to, perhaps, the low shell that must be supplemented bv sev­ flight commander. eral volumes or clarified in other manuals. The new volume 1 does not, in my opinion, Give the captains, majors, and lieutenant give an adequate definition of the term doc- colonels in the trenches a doctrine they can all trine. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense sink their teeth into, no matter their career Dictionary o f Military and Associated Terms, field—from pilot to public affairs. One need devotes one and one-half pages to defining only read Sen Sam Nunn’s speech on roles and RICOCHETS 75

missions to the Senate on 2 July 1992 or study as academia, and they could easily make the the debate on the budget in the out years to transition to university life. Intellectual offi­ realize that we—and our doctrine—must be cers simply bring "an intellectual dimension to looking 10 to 20 years down track to keep the [their] job[s]." They can critically analyze Air Force a strong, vibrant force ready to exe­ things such as air campaign plans or doctrine. cute our national strategy. 1 feel that AFM 1-1 will stand a better chance In the last chapter of his book The in reaching the grass-roots level if it is written Professional Soldier: A Social and Political by intellectual officers instead of military intel­ Portrait. Morris Janowitz suggests that within lectuals. the military there are “military intellectuals” Lt Col Jeff Kohler, USAF and “intellectual officers.” Military intellectu­ Fort Leavenworth. Kansas als are usually associated with activities such

NET AM E N T

On Silver Wings: The Women Airforce offered her; she then extends this first experi­ Service Pilots of World War II, 1942-1944 ence outward among her fellow classmates. by Marianne Verges. 201 E. 50th Street, New For instance, she recalls one particularly York 10022: Ballantine Books, 1991, 255 demanding instructor through the narratives of pages, S20.00. various students. Through chapters with titles such as "How It Women Pilots of World War II by Jean Hascall Began," "Cross-Country and Advanced Cole. 101 University Services Building, Salt Training," and “B-26 School,” Cole tracks her Lake City, Utah 84112: University of Utah classmates’ progress through the phases of their Press, 1992, 165 pages, S19.95. training on through their experiences and adventures once they began their service, including night flights, midair collisions, in­ These books tell of the women who flew all flight emergencies, and an encounter with the manner of military aircraft on a variety of mis­ as-yet-unidentified jet stream. sions for the Army Air Forces during World Women Pilots focuses exclusively on the lives War II. As the Women Airforce Service Pilots of one class of the many women who trained at (WASP), they ferried and tested aircraft and Avenger Field, whereas On Silver Wings offers a towed targets, providing essential support for more complete historical summary of the WASP the military war machine and freeing men for as a whole, based on personal interviews, pri­ combat duty. vate papers, and government files. Verges’s text The stories of these women, who served for begins with an incident portrayed in the film “God, country, and the thrill of it." comprise Tora! Torn! Tora!: flight instructor Cornelia the core of Verges’s and Cole’s texts, which Fort, flying over Hawaii with her student, fuse individual accounts into narratives captur­ encounters the waves of Japanese aircraft attack­ ing the mission of the WASP and the mood and ing Pearl Harbor. From that incident. Verges milieu of the time. The authors provide valu­ then backtracks to provide earlier details of able texts for reference, as well as information Fort’s flying career and expands to the other on the social experiment the WASP repre­ women who became the nucleus of the WASP sented. Both books have been extensively and experiment. Verges also gives a "time capsule” well researched, though the authors write from of the decades before Pearl Harbor—of the divergent points of view. events and the aviators who were extending the Cole begins her oral history with the memory barriers of aviation. of her first flight and the freedom she felt it Because of its greater scope, On Silver Wings 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 provides a more detailed portrayal of the WASP tion, and capture the sense of “pushing the program and the policies and politics that cre­ boundaries” which Women Airforce Service ated the program but which also plagued it. In Pilots themselves felt. addition to numerous profiles of lesser-known Capt Elise A. Rowe, USAF individuals, Verges carefully outlines the inter­ USAF Academy, Colorado play between the “rascal” Jacqueline Cochran, who promoted the idea of a women’s flying Military Ethics: Looking toward the Future by corps in 1940, and Nancy Harkness Love, a Nicholas G. Fotion. Stanford University, woman of “cool detachment," who was first Stanford, California 94305: Hoover appointed to oversee women pilots in the Ferry Institution Press, 1990, 122 pages, $12.95. Division of the Army Air Forces (pages 11-12). She also documents the roles of Gen Henry H. In Military Ethics, Nicholas Fotion invites us ("Hap”) Arnold and Col William Tunner, and to closely examine, based on information about the battle over militarization that contributed to past wars, the relationship of the military- the demise of the WASP. industrial-political complex to modern warfare. Sim ilar details are condensed in Dora To determine the nature of military ethics, we Dougherty Strother’s foreword to Women are asked to assume the philosophical perspec­ Pilots. Strother's contribution gives depth and tives of pacifist, realist, and just-war theorists. background to Cole’s text by describing the We must then decide whether modern military structure, requirements, and training of the technology has increased the lethality and WASP, as well as conclusions regarding the probability of war and, if so, whether it has effectiveness of the organization. Cole’s intro­ forced nations to constantly prepare for war or duction also summarizes additional historical engage in war. information, such as the sources and causes of Although he recognizes the concerns of the resistance to the militarization of the WASP. realist and just-war theorists, Fotion concen­ Both texts reveal the effect of five decades of trates on the “big argument”—the pacifist per­ social evolution in attitudes toward women’s ception of ethics and warfare. The “big argu­ occupation of challenging positions and tradi­ ment” can be subdivided into four parts: the tionally masculine roles, and the destructuring destructiveness of modern weapons: the mone­ of work and social roles which the war tary and social costs of maintaining a military allowed. The members of the WASP—a group establishment and the latter’s tendency to trig­ of women from diverse backgrounds—were ger warfare; the monetary and social costs of individuals for whom "flying was a passion, maintaining an industrial establishment and and some combination of daring, rebellion, and the latter's tendency to trigger war: and the determination took [them] into the air” (Cole, costs of lost opportunities while a country page 7). The sense of puzzlement, frustration, wages war or maintains the constant vigilance and resentment which these “rebels” and their needed to preserve peace. The author does not male counterparts sometimes experienced in approve or disapprove of any particular theo­ their encounters with each other is frequently rist: instead, he attempts to retain the docu­ documented. Ultimately, these women avia­ mented truth of each theorist’s position, assim­ tors won the admiration and acceptance of ilating all of them in his conclusion. their peers by flying missions which men did Against the backdrop of the “big argument," not want and by flying reputedly dangerous Fotion examines the entire range of modern aircraft which the men feared, such as the B-26 weaponry, countermeasures, and counter-coun­ and B-29 bombers. termeasures, discussing their lethality in every Besides their value as research and reference facet of warfare—from unconventional to aids, these two texts also provide a revealing nuclear. One of the most intriguing debates glimpse into an era when women’s abilities in involves the unique qualities of nuclear, chem­ flying military aircraft were unacknowledged, ical, and biological weapons and their effect on then soon forgotten. The WASP, due to its a nation’s strategy of deterrence. Finally, he accomplishments, was an organization which reflects on the evolving nature of the people military women frequently credit with paving who control the military-industrial-political their way into today’s military aircraft. complex and the ability of that entity to make Women Pilots and On Silver Wings thus record significant contributions to sustain peace an era of adventure, excitement, and dedica­ between wars. NET ASSESSMENT 77

What does he conclude? Pacifists may well hide in the bathroom whenever room service be correct in their criticism of the self-serving, delivered meals. Such secrecy was encouraged myopic nature of individuals who control the by his publishers and supported by his lawyers elements of the military-industrial-political lest the manuscript and its associated research complex. On the other hand, realist theorists fall into the hands of North’s persecutors (aka are equally correct in the certainty of the cold, prosecutors). calculating decisions often made by combatants. Released in October 1991 with much fanfare, In turn, just-war theorists are correct about the including extensive excerpts in Time maga­ decisions of conscience made by military and zine, Under Fire tells Ollie North's story from civilian leaders to limit unnecessary destruc­ his “nearly idyllic childhood” to the dismissal tion. Ultimately, the increased lethality of mod­ of all criminal charges against him. In em technology has not made warfare deadlier between, we learn that North, the quintessen­ than it was in the past. Still, Fotion realizes that tial workaholic and can-do Marine who none of the many elements contained within excelled in combat, almost ruined his marriage, each theorist’s argument are static. Indeed, he found God, and unselfishly carried out believes that a periodic review of all the argu­ President Reagan’s policies in Iran and “Nica- ments will be necessary in the future. wog-wa," as CIA director William Casey always A detailed and thought-provoking work, mispronounced it. We are painted a picture of Military Ethics takes the reader into uncharted a loyal, patriotic American who was aban­ territory. As with an adventure, there are per­ doned, betrayed, hounded, persecuted, and ils—becoming lost is probably the greatest. A prosecuted for his role in what became known comprehensive understanding of the many as the Iran-Contra affair. types of pacifist, realist, and just-war theorists The book begins with a description of the would reduce confusion and would allow one cast of characters, including North’s lawyer to focus solely on the author’s thesis. Without Brendan Sullivan, who is described as “not a this foresight, the reader must undergo Fotion's potted plant.” It ends with a recap of what short course on philosophy to become familiar happened to these characters, including with the rudimentary elements of his discus­ Lawrence Walsh, “the vigilante who rode into sion. Still, Fotion’s descriptions are thorough town in 1986 as the special prosecutor [and| and precise, making his book well suited for remains at large." In between, we are treated to anyone interested in military’ history. Perhaps, North’s depiction of the events and major play­ like the Sherlock Holmes series of books, ers in the Iran-Contra affair and the subsequent Fotion's sequel will provide us with a new, hearings and trials. In these depictions, North intellectually seasoned adventure! constantly lets his emotions and prejudices Capt Roy F. Houchin II show through. For example, he says that Auburn, Alabama President Reagan must have known all about Iran-Contra but should be excused for not remembering because he “didn’t always know Under Fire: An American Story by Oliver L. what he knew.” He describes both the congres­ North with William Novak. New York sional hearings and the special prosecutor as 10022: Haper Collins Publishers, 1991, 446 “ways for Congress to criminalize policy differ­ pages, S25.00. ences between coequal branches of govern­ ment.” He reserves especially strong contempt William Novak has done it again—helped a for Lawrence Walsh and his staff, stating, for celebrity turn a personal story into a very read­ example, that “unlike other public prosecutors, able book. Novak’s past efforts include helping who are required to take cases as they come in, Lee Iacocca. Nancy Reagan. Tip O’Neil, and these guys were more like a lynch mob in pin­ Sydney Biddle Barrows (the Mayflower striped suits.” Madam) tell their stories. This time, however, If you are looking for new insights or an in- his collaboration with Mr Smith (Ollie North’s depth analysis of the Iran-Contra affair, this pseudonym during the writing of the book) had book will be a real disappointment. We saw all to be done as a covert operation. Novak and that Oliver North has to offer on television in North (oops, Smith) would meet once a week the summer of 1987. There is no "smoking in a ground-floor room at the airport Marriott gun,” although North does try to convince us Hotel in Washington, D.C., where Ollie would that a tape recording of a telephone conversa­ 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 tion between two unidentified men proves that these blunders highlights a flawed organiza­ an unrevealed conspiracy exists. On the other tional structure or, in today’s buzzwords, an hand, providing you are not tired of hearing “informal delayering without properly empow­ about the Reagan years and Iran-Contra, Under ering those tasked to achieve the objectives.” In Fire is an interesting tale which can provide short, as the author recounts, Headquarters US some food for thought regarding what is impor­ Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) bypassed Third tant in life. As Ollie North discovered, there Air Force and worked directly with the 48th must be a balance between duty and family. TFW without formally informing Third Air Lt Col William F. Furr Force. This left the 48th TFW with the less- Maxwell AFB, Alabama than-quality relationship of trying to serve two primary masters in a timely manner, There were clearly two right ways to handle this setup, Raid on Qaddafi: The Untold Story of History’s but the bypassing appears to be a wrong way Longest Fighter Mission by the Pilot Who that fell in the middle. Directed It by Col Robert E. Venkus, USAF, Third, the book does a good job of describing Retired. 175 Fifth Avenue, New York 10010: the mind-set of the attackers—their dedication, St. Martin's Press, 1992, 175 pages, $21.95. fears, and exhilarations. Colonel Venkus also Raid on Qaddafi is a recounting of the 1986 offers his personal, subjective explanation for raid on Libya (Operation El Dorado Canyon) by the one aircraft lost during the raid. the man who was then vice-commander of the On the negative side, there are some sections 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), based in that don’t seem to fit into the theme of the Lakenheath, England. The book is interesting in remainder of the book or that become a bit too that it offers the reader a tactical perspective of venomous. Examples include discussions of the the events leading up to, during, and after the lack of medals awarded to the wing, a personal raid and keeps the operation very personal. It vendetta against painting Lakenheath’s build­ puts the reader in the boots of the senior wing- ings in the standard “TAC tan” colors, and a command staff and the crews who flew the mis­ quick shot at the new Air Force uniform. There sion. However, this intriguing tale is told with a is also an awkward comparison between thread of the author’s bitterness woven through­ Operations Desert Storm and El Dorado Canyon out. and if his attitude is not taken in stride and that makes the author sound defensive. While recognized as a chance for the reader to learn, it discussing the results of the mission, Colonel could be a serious detraction. Venkus uses some bombing-accuracy percent­ From a positive perspective, there are several ages and comparisons that lack definition, com­ lessons to be learned. First, the book reaffirms plete reference sources, and some degree of the importance of considering the human accuracy, thereby detracting from the point he dimension of war—that is, the fact that great tries to make. Finally—and this is a point that plans have a knack for changing or going awry, I’m sure can be attributed to publisher hype— and when they do, it’s the well-trained people at part of the subtitle of the book [by the Pilot Who the point of the spear who make them work. In Directed It) will probably not get past military this case, the size of the raid was tripled (from readers without causing at least a slight raise of six to 18 F-ll'lFs) within 48 hours of takeoff, the eyebrows. At best, since he was the vice- and several glitches occurred during the mission commander, it should read, by the Pilot Who itself. But by showing great flexibility, the wing Helped Direct It. maximized results. In summary. Raid on Qaddafi is a quick, easy Second, the book presents an excellent read that gives a tactical perspective of “between-the-lines” study of organizational the­ Operation El Dorado Canyon, but it also con­ ory and the chain of command. This is the tains implied lessons at the operational level. I source of the author’s bitterness. It appears that recommend the book, but one should heed the he was unable to keep his chain of command author’s own warning in the preface that this is (specifically, the commander of Third Air Force) a personal, subjective account. With that in adequately informed during those periods mind, the reader will be able to learn much from when, as the vice-commander, he was left in this retired warrior who has obviously served charge of the wing. He openly discusses three his nation well. faux pas that clearly led him to be considered Col Jack L. Johnson, USAF noncompetitive for wing command. One of Maxwell AFB. Alabama NET ASSESSMENT 79

The German High Command at War: pletely out of touch with the conditions at the Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World front, yet the tactical and training directives of War I by Robert Asprey. New York 10019: 1917- 18—which Asprey shows little under­ William Morrow and Co., 1991, 558 pages, standing of—show that Ludendorff had a better S27.00. grasp of the conditions of modern warfare than most of the Allied generals. Historical writing often moves in interpretive Asprey’s work is flawed by numerous the­ cycles, and this is especially true of World War matic, stylistic, and research problems. His I history. For the first decade after the war. book is filled with a kind of military puritanism. military historians and commentators praised A major theme is his continually expressed out­ the wisdom and competence of the senior com­ rage at Hindenburg’s and Ludendorffs wartime manders. A reaction to this soon set in, so— life-styles. The senior German commanders beginning with Sir B. H. Liddell Hart’s The made their headquarters well behind the front Real War. 1914-1918 (1930)—most of the gen­ lines, lived in comfortable villas, ate good food, erals came to be viewed as heartless incompe­ and had champagne on their birthdays while the tents whose blunders slaughtered a generation. foot soldiers fought in the hell of the trenches. Later, starting with Corelli Barnett’s The Actually, this sounds like the life-style of all the Swordbearers (1963), a more sympathetic senior commanders in World War 1 and, for that approach was taken in analyzing the World matter, World War II. Asprey also regularly War I commanders. The commanders had reminds the reader that Hindenburg and human flaws and made some poor decisions, Ludendorff were extremely egotistical. Readers but Barnett refused to characterize them as of military history will scarcely be shocked. I heartless or foolish. Rod Paschall’s The Defeat suspect that most generals of the last 3,000 years of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918 (1989) argues have usually possessed a more-than-average strongly that the military leaders of the First dose of egotism. World War were imaginative and capable pro­ The discussion of important issues and events fessionals who were simply faced with impos­ in The German High Command at War lacks sible political and military situations. depth. Barnett and Paschall are far better at With Robert Asprey’s The German High describing the strategy of 1918. The superb col­ Command at War. the interpretive cycle has lection of documents on the German collapse of turned back to the 1930s image of the incompe­ 1918— the original eight-volume Reichstag tent, callous, and glory-seeking world war com­ Committee reports published in 1928—was not mander. Of the senior commanders of that war, used in the research. Instead, Asprey relies on only Gen Ferdinand Foch and Gen Aleksei the two-volume edition of translated excerpts. Brusilov are presented in a favorable light. As Asprey gives only a few of the German tactical for Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Gen manuals and directives even a cursory examina­ Erich Ludendorff, the villains of the piece, they tion. In short, the research is far inferior to are not only incompetent, unfeeling egomaniacs, many works that are already available. but are “pigheaded, blind and greedy" as well. The subject of the German High Command in Asprey’s examination of World War I is sim­ World War 1 is important enough to merit fur­ plistic in the extreme. The reader is left to won­ ther study and analysis. Unfortunately. The der how an outgunned and outnumbered German High Command at War falls short in German army fighting a multifront war could every respect. Indeed, its approach to the sub­ have ever come so close to victory when it was ject represents a regression in historical analy­ led by the two Hunnish dunderheads that sis. I do not recommend this as a work of mili­ Asprey describes. Most military historians tary history. would agree that Ludendorff had a terribly flawed personality and that the German offen­ Dr fames S. Corum sive of 1918 was a grand strategic mistake. But Maxwell AFB, Alabama Asprey goes too far in minimizing the impor­ tance of Ludendorff s accomplishment in estab­ lishing a radically new system of offensive and Low-Aptitude Men in the Military: Who defensive tactics and effectively training the Profits, Who Pays by Janice H. Laurence and whole army in those methods from 1917 to Peter F. Ramsberger. New York 10010: 1918. Asprey describes a High Command com­ Praeger Publishers, 1991, 185 pages. $41.95. 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

In the early 1950s, the Air Force began study­ are myopic, crafty, dumb, and unfeeling. In ing the effect of assimilating low-aptitude one instance, the authors suggest—without recruits into its ranks. Air Force researchers hard evidence—that Air Force and Marine found that most “marginals” were suitable only recruiters (hypothetically, of course) purposely for nontechnical jobs in food preparation, secu­ perpetuated fraud, thus skewing Project rity police, and administration. Many low- 100,000 data. In this scenario, "clever” aptitude recruits, who could neither read nor recruiters told brighter applicants to purposely write, were often found to be incapable of ren­ do poorly on tests, thereby allowing them to fill dering any type of functional work. One seri­ quotas for low-aptitude recruits with standard ous problem was that technological growth and personnel. In another instance, Laurence and a career system based upon occupational skill Ramsberger accuse the Air Force Recruiting and promotional ladders left scant opportunity Command of mounting a campaign to discredit for people with rudimentary skills and abili­ the recalibrated ASVAB test. Because the new ties. In the nuclear and jet age, the Air Force test was more stringent and thus portended had little use for “career privates." tough times for recruiters, the command felt In Low-Aptitude Men in the Military, Janice “desperate” and attempted to prove that the H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger recap ASVAB test should not be changed, contrary to much of the research on the use of marginals in known facts. the military and address the issue of whether Unfortunately, the authors fail to recognize or not military service has benefitted low-apti­ that the military is much like a large corpora­ tude servicemen during their lives. The first tion with competing philosophies, organiza­ three chapters cover the connection between tions, and personalities. Given the turnover in military selection and social welfare programs, leadership, the lack of a long-term corporate the history of Project 100,000, and the Armed memory, outside social and political forces, Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and the "turf” struggles incumbent within a misnorming of the mid-1970s. The final chap­ bureaucratic hierarchy, planners are neither ters analyze data that compare low-aptitude very “clever” nor “dumb” but only seek to veterans and nonveterans. The authors’ conclu­ make their institution productive. sions are not surprising and echo many of the Despite these insensitivities, Low-Aptitude findings of Air Force personnel planners over Men in the Military is an important book sim­ 35 years ago. Marginal personnel tend to be ply because it serves as a corporate memory for one-termers who perform poorly, even after congressional and military policymakers who extensive training. Recruits of higher mental will undoubtedly face the prospect of using quality are easier to train and retrain, and have marginal recruits at some future time. For greater potential for promotion. now, however, in light of the manpower reduc­ Chapter 5, the most original part of the book, tion in the Department of Defense, the book contrasts the postservice lives of low-aptitude simply reiterates what many astute observers of veterans who entered the military during American life already have postulated—the Project 100,000 and ASVAB misnorming with New' Deal and the Great Society are dead. If the lives of low-aptitude nonveterans from this is the case, then the military is the place roughly the same cohort. Using “traditional for the up-and-coming, not the socially measures of success” such as postmilitary deprived. employment, income, education, and family Capt Mark R. Grandstaff, USAF variables, the data demonstrate that military Washington, D.C. service did little to enhance the marginals’ opportunity to perform well in civilian society after discharge. In most cases, people with mil­ itary experience had no advantage over nonvet­ Hitler Slept Late and Other Blunders That Cost erans. Him the War by James P. Duffy. New York The authors do well when they analyze the 10010: Praeger Publishers, 1991, 176 pages, results of their data but begin to wander when $19.95. they attempt to ascribe causality. The problem is that they are insensitive to the workings of An author who decides to write on the the military bureaucracy. Military planners are Second World War takes on a formidable task, stereotyped as one-dimensional characters who especially with the recent outpouring of works NET ASSESSMENT 81

in honor of various 50th anniversaries. Unless ble. Duffy also tends to begin a number of sen­ one possesses a highly specialized knowledge tences with "Hitler knew"—for example, of some facet of the conflict, or manages to find "Hitler knew full well the weakness of the some previously unpublished primary source French mobilization. . . . He also knew that the material, or has the intellectual horsepower to bombing of German cities . . . would not mate­ achieve some new interpretation or synthesis rialize" (pages 11-12). Without support for of existing material, one’s work is apt to be old these assertions, it is hard to believe that Hitler news. James P. Duffy’s Hitler Slept Late is knew' these things as facts. He may have hoped touted on the jacket as providing a “surprising thev were true or gambled on their being true, reinterpretation of Hitler's impact on the out­ but to say he knew them stretches credulity. come of WYV II" and as “offering new insight The third major weakness of Duffy’s work is into Hitler as a military leader.” In my opin­ errors of fact, examples of w'hich include his ion. there is nothing surprising, reinterpretive. assertion that “mostly buried in the millions of or new about it—in other words, it is old news. pages written about World War II is the fact To be fair, Duffy makes no claims of provid­ that Hitler threw aw'av a real opportunity to ing a definitive assessment of Hitler's military defeat Stalin by his insistence that the ’eastern leadership, and the jacket comments can be peoples’ were subhumans” (page 98) or his dismissed as publisher’s puffery. This leaves claim that "|Hitler’s] first tactical error was to us with a slim volume that summarizes the assume, without any evidence, that the standard wisdom regarding Hitler’s impact on Normandy invasion wras a feint" (page 123). the course of the war. For readers unfamiliar The effect of Hitler’s mistreatment of the Slavs with this field of study, this is as good a place is common knowledge rather than being as any to start. “buried in . . . millions of pages.” and to claim Duffy identifies two major character flaws that Hitler regarded Normandy as a feint with- which prevented Hitler’s conquest of Europe. out any evidence is to ignore completely the The first of these was his propensity to "flv bv extensive and successful Allied deception the seat of his pants." In other w'ords, Hitler plan, the purpose of which w'as exactly that— never developed any truly long-range plans or to get Hitler to think Normandy was a feint. strategy. The second was his insistence that he One final criticism, again from an academic could make things happen by the force of his perspective, is Duffy’s annoying habit of pro­ own will. Within this framework, Duffy then viding footnotes only for direct quotes. He devotes a chapter apiece to eight blunders that, thus undermines his own credibility by pre­ he says, cost Hitler the war. These are (1) the venting the reader from assessing his sources. failure to destroy the British Expeditionary Although this critique is rather harsh, I don’t Force, (2) the failure to invade England. (3) the mean to imply that there is no worth in this change of objective during the Battle of Britain, book. As mentioned above, if one is unfamiliar (4) the failure to take Moscow, (5) the mistreat­ with this subject. Hitler Slept Late is a good ment of people in occupied countries, (6) the place to start. In fact, in some respects, the declaration of war against the United States, (7) very academic weaknesses of the work make it the delay in response to the Normandy inva­ easy to read and digest. The military reader sion, and (8) the attempted extermination of intent on enhancing professional knowdedge, the Jew's. however, should seek more in-depth analyses Duffy is not a historian. Rather, this work is of these topics. a result of his lifelong interest in military his­ Capt Karen S. Wilhelm, USAF tory. There is nothing inherently wrong w'ith USAF Academy, Colorado this, but his lack of academic rigor does result in a tendency to oversimplify, a tendency toward unsupported assertions, and a number of errors. For example, he oversimplifies the Haig’s Command: A Reassessment by Denis explanations of Hitler’s decision making that Winter. New' York 10010: Viking Press, resulted in these blunders, blaming everything 1991, 302 pages, S27.95. on Hitler personally. In fact, these were very complex decisions in which the German mili­ In a damning indictment of Douglas Haig, tary leadership played a crucial role, even commander in chief of the British though Hitler was indeed ultimately responsi­ Expeditionary Force (BEF), and the military 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 system that advanced him to command, Haig’s are conducted, it is implicit in Clausewitz’s Command: A Reassessment uncovers patterns paradigm that the adaptation to those new con­ of career falsifications, battlefield ineptness, ditions likewise be the responsibility of com­ and a deliberate cover-up after World War I manders. Military leadership at the highest designed to perpetuate the Haig myth. This levels demands both moral and physical well-researched and fascinating reassessment courage, objectivity, and imagination if it is to sheds new light on Haig the commander and be capable of comprehending changing condi­ illuminates the fallibility of a closed institution tions. modifying operations in the conduct of without vitality in its thinking. war, and influencing people who execute the Denis Winter discloses the fabrication of war. An interesting question raised by the Haig's career record, examines his personality, book is. Can the perceptions of war as con­ recounts the benefits that Haig received ceived by military leadership and influenced through the patronage system, and demon­ by institutional biases be modified to reflect strates how ill suited Haig was to command tbe reality of war, or does a military institu­ during three crucial battles in the British sec­ tion's inertia make it unable to change its tor: the Somme, Passchendaele, and Cambrai. thinking during the conduct of war? Haig The bottom line is that Haig was unable to cope undoubtedly was not conditioned by the with the new conditions of war. Written from British system to be forward thinking and capa­ unpublished material recently released for pub­ ble of change. lic scrutiny, Haig's Command: A Before the war, Haig was quite sure he had Reassessment appraises Haig’s personal and uncovered all the rules of war. He wrote, "The professional credentials, finding that he was fundamental principles of war are neither very the wrong man for command. Winter shows numerous nor very abstruse.” Continuity was that Haig’s meteoric rise to commander of the paramount in Haig’s thinking about the con­ BEF was based on marriage ties, patronage, and duct of combat. This thinking became dogma a seniority promotion system, and "owed little in the form of the Field Service Regulations to proven professional competence and much (FSR). Compiled in 1909 under the supervi­ to good fortune, good looks, ambition, and sion of Haig, FSR was key to understanding skilled diplomacy.” Haig’s mind-set because it shaped the British Winter clearly shows that due to profes­ army throughout the war and explained many sional immaturity and infertile intellect, Haig of the features that blunted the army’s cutting failed to appreciate the conditions on the edge. When viewed against FSR's dictates on Western Front in 1916, even after subordinates battle, command in war. and the infantryman’s proposed new training and tactics to meet the role, Haig’s weaknesses begin to make better challenges of the battlefield. According to this sense. As Winter comments, FSR explains the account, Haig continued to wage war based on selection of commanders from professionals outdated perceptions and not on the actual sit­ alone, the low regard for machinery, and the uation confronting his army. As a result, he denigration of the infantryman and is set in the did not modify operations, tactics, or training context of a philosophy that bore no relation to within the BEF through the end of the war. the age of barbed wire and machine guns. The consequences of his myopic thinking and putrefied methodology was 60,000 British Where Haig's Army differed was in its inertia. The French and Germans changed tactics and organiza­ casualties on the first day of the Somme, a bat­ tion continuously, searching for the best shapes. tle based on unrealistic artillery techniques and The BEF alone remained substantially the same. faulty logistical assumptions formulated by Hai g wa s t h e i n c a r n a t i o n o f F S R . . . . He fought bv Haig. According to Winter, it was a battle that a book of rules. His mind ran on rails. never should have occurred. Carl von Clausewitz, the preeminent military Indeed. Haig had "the mind of a commander theorist, places the moral obligation of under­ whose thinking had stopped in 1909," and he standing the nature of warfare and conducting perpetuated that sterile thinking throughout his combat within those conditions squarely upon command. the shoulders of senior civilian policymakers According to Winter, Haig's maladroitness and military commanders. Even though war­ affected his decision making and underscored fare is a complex human endeavor and sudden his pedestrian battlefield performance when changes affect the circumstances wherein wars circumstances dictated dynamic thinking and NET ASSESSMENT 83

realistic battlefield solutions. His miscon­ Anglophobes, but by all Air Force officers who ceived judgment was three-fold: faulty selec­ wish to gain a clear appreciation of how insti­ tion of the battlefield, inability to break the tutional influences could affect their under­ crust of the enemy’s defensive position at the standing of the conduct of war. outset, and failure to exploit the infrequent, Maj Michael R. Terry, USAF fleeting opportunities for breakthrough when Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota they occurred. He failed to comprehend the need for centralized command to penetrate the defenses and decentralized execution to exploit the initial breakthrough. Compounding the Force and Accommodation in World Politics faulty selection of the battlefield, the force by Stanley E. Spangler. Maxwell AFB, wielded by Haig was inappropriate for the task Alabama 36112: Air University Press, 1991, at hand because it was poorly trained and ill 346 pages, S15.00. equipped. The reluctance of British leadership to deal with the revolution in firepower that Stanley E. Spangler can’t predict what the had transformed the battlefield through tactics, new world order will look like after the equipment, and training meant that the BEF as breakup of the Soviet Union. However, his molded by Haig was indeed “the bluntest of book Force and Accommodation in World swords." In Winter’s analysis, Haig epitomizes Politics is an excellent starting point for fresh a generation of static-thinking senior military and new approaches to international relations. officers who continued to use the prongs of a Dr Spangler writes that "the United States will claw hammer to extract a screw from a piece of achieve more desirable results by following wood. from the outset a policy of positive diplomacy Equally damning was Haig’s distortion of the rather than an inflexible policy based largely command’s performance as distilled in the offi­ on military coercion, or even deterrence.” cial histories, taken to be the sacrosanct Positive diplomacy is Spangler’s term for an account of British leadership on the Western approach to adversarial relations that empha­ Front. By rewriting portions of his personal sizes mutual benefits and negotiation first and diary’, by influencing the chief historian char­ force or coercion second. tered to write the official histories, and by edit­ The book is divided into three major sec­ ing the drafts of these histories, Haig—sanc­ tions. The first section covers the factors that tioned by his government—falsified the record initially inhibited accommodative diplomacy. to guard his battlefield performance. Haig was Section two contains five case studies, and the more adept in rewriting the analysis of the con­ last section summarizes the lessons to be duct of the war and in preparing for postwar gained from the previous chapters of the book. historical confrontations and character assassi­ Overall, Spangler’s writing is understand­ nations than he was in readying his army for able. However, this book is not light reading. the horrific battlefield conditions in Flanders. Because it is written from an academic view­ Haig was a man intent on protecting his battle­ point, a reader with little or no background in field image at the expense of future genera­ international relations or political science may tions' learning the historical truth. In support­ miss some of Spangler's finer points. For ing the histories, the British government faced example, he takes great care to distinguish his the crucial dilemma of exposing its profes­ approach to international bargaining from the sional army’s disastrous faults on the Western method of appeasement used by Great Britain Front when it expected a resumption of the in the thirties. The primary difference, accord­ same war within 20 years. The government ing to Spangler, is that Great Britain was not chose to subvert the truth in order to shield its able to balance the accommodative steps taken military institutions. Winter’s exposure of a to appease Hitler with coercive threats. In the bankrupt "elitist" organization and introverted end, Spangler acknowledges that, in some promotion system provides a cautionary note cases, the only way to deter an individual bent to all military institutions to reassess their on war is through the outright threat of mili­ process of grooming and selecting officers des­ tary force. tined for high command. On the other hand, Spangler’s distinction Denis W inter’s enlightening new book between coercive and positive diplomacy is not should be read not only by historians and as clear. He splits fine points that may be 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

important to a political-military theorist but derived from writers such as Spangler will be easily missed by a casual reader. He writes, valuable. This book will not be superseded by current events. The two strategies are similar in that they both employ force with restraint; both seek to persuade Maj Nick Clemens an opponent to follow certain actions rather than Maxwell AFB, Alabama bludgeoning him into doing so; both rely heavily on effective communication for success; both rely on threats and inducements (sticks and carrots) to Captive Warriors: A Vietnam POW’s Story by achieve their objectives; and both are highly con­ Sam Johnson and Jan Winebrenner. Drawer text dependent. The differences, however, are sub­ C, College Station, Texas 77843: Texas A&M stantial. The chief difference is that whereas coer­ cive diplomacy is basically a coercive strategy with University Press, 1991, 301 pages, $24.50. an element of accommodation, positive diplomacy The striking aspect of most POW stories is is basically an accommodative strategy with an ele­ ment of coercion. the resiliency of the human spirit. Despite bru­ tal circumstances, the human spirit soars to The Quemoy crisis of 1958 (territorial dis­ new heights previously unknown to the bearer. putes between China and Taiwan), the Berlin This perhaps underscores the Creator’s wis­ blockade of 1958-59, the Berlin Wall crisis of dom or at least stands as a clear contrast to, 1961, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam and a strong refutation of, the claims of the War are the five events reviewed in the book. many doomsayers of today who doubt and Except for his coverage of the Vietnam War, deplore humankind’s ability to survive in Spangler has done a good job of integrating adversity. This new book is a fine example of these historical examples into his theory. this observation. Spangler contends that coercive diplomacy The book is very straightforward, beginning often overshadows positive diplomacy because with a predictable view of the events that got people tend to remember the military force the United States involved in Vietnam and the associated with coercive diplomacy. Reading errors that the politicians in general, and the case studies provides a wealth of material President Lyndon Johnson in particular, com­ to correct this situation. mitted in the conduct of the war (i.e., opera­ The problem Spangler confronts with the tions directed from the White House, limita­ Vietnam War is that it was not a crisis. tions placed upon airmen, political considera­ Further, the problems associated with the use tions above operational requirements). of force there are diffuse and perplexing. For “Extremely conscious of public opinion, LB J. . . example, Harry G. Summers, Jr., and Andrew worked to soften the visual effects of the war F. Krepinevich, Jr., have devoted entire books by limiting or prohibiting the use of the [On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the weaponry necessary to end it” (page 8). Vietnam War and The Arm y and Vietnam, However, the authors make some blanket state­ respectively) trying to define exactly what type ments which, although possibly justified by of war was fought. In The Limits of Air Power: anger, seem to this reviewer to be somewhat The Am erican Bom bing of North Vietnam, unfair: "Concern for U.S. interests and the pro­ Mark Clodfelte'r exhaustively covers the strate­ tection of U.S. fighting men hung low on his gic bombing campaign in an effort to define [Johnson’s] priority ladder. Again and again what can and cannot be done in such a war. the military objectives of the war had been sac­ Spangler’s treatment of the Vietnam War is rificed for the sake of public opinion” (page superficial, adds few new insights, and does 24). The book never defines what the military not contribute to the overall understanding of objective of the war should have been, his accommodative political theory. although it obliquely implies that we should Force and Accommodation in World Politics have at least pondered the possibility of using is not a history or military science book. It limited nuclear weapons to end the war: attempts to explain the proper role of diplo­ LBJ's advisers convinced him that if the United macy and force from a policy perspective. States employed limited nuclear warfare, China Spangler puts forward a controversial but would retaliate. Despite the fact that China had no unique way of dealing with international such weaponry or capability for retaliation (which crises. As the old world order changes around is incorrect for the first Chinese atomic explosion us in the coming months and years, insights occurred on October 16, 1964, and their thermonu­ NET ASSESSMENT 85

clear test in June 1967|, LBJ announced that the ror of captivity and of the honor of those who United States would not employ limited nuclear served our country dutifully under the most weapons . . . the world's strongest military power trying circumstances. Of even more signifi­ was then forced to fight with one hand tied behind cance, the book serves to remind us that we its back. (Pages 7-8) should never forget those warriors who may These views really reflect the American mili­ have been left behind and that we should con­ tary’s frustration in having to wage a limited tinue to demand full accountability of those war for limited aims against an enemy for responsible. After all, it could be one of us whom the war was indeed total. This is the someday whose duty will involve serving as a legacy of Vietnam that I believe we have not POW. Would you want to be forgotten? yet fully dealt with. Capt Gonzalo I. Vergara, USAF The main part of the book deals with Colonel Castle AFB. California Johnson’s story from the time of his capture on 16 April 1966 to his homecoming in February 1973. As in most POW stories, two aspects particularly stand out. One is the strong belief Sitting It Out: A World War II POW Memoir in God and country, which provides the basis by David Westheimer. P.O. Box 1892, for knowing that what you did is right and hon­ Houston. Texas 77251: Rice University orable and that this knowledge will help carry Press, 1992, 358 pages. $24.95. you through hell and back. The second is the need for communicating with others and. as a This kind of prison camp memoir, even if subset of this, keeping a sense of humor despite written by an airman who spent more than two the awful circumstances of imprisonment. The years in German prison camps constructed book is filled with the anguish felt by the specifically for captured aircrew members, author while in isolation where even being appears not to be terribly relevant or meaning­ called to be quizzed by his captors was ful to today’s airmen, especially now that the regarded with an “ambivalent excitement” cold war has ended. It is hard to think of a because “1 felt stimulated at the thought of similar situation of thousands of American air­ human contact, even if it was with the enemy” craft going down over enemy territory and (pages 139—40). But the communication among thousands of crew members incarcerated for prisoners, using the famous tap code, was what months and even years. If anything, the mem­ kept them together. As part of the communica­ oirs of Vietnam imprisonment would seem to tion process, humor is also of great importance, have more application for airmen. for it is central to the human condition, and On the other hand, incarceration is a com­ this is something that needs to be stressed very mon denominator, an occupational hazard that strongly as a means of resistance in a POW sit­ all flyers have to face when they participate in uation. Colonel Johnson recalls that he and his offensive air operations. Air missions com­ roommate, Jim Lamar, were directed by the monly go deep into the enemy territory, and if Vietnamese to write a history of the United an aircraft breaks down or is destroyed by States Air Force: enemy fire, capture and imprisonment of the crew is likely. How do young, dedicated, ener­ We decided we would produce a "history" of the getic airmen hold up to captive conditions? U.S. Air Force, but it would be unlike anything the One answer, reiterated by Westheimer. is that U.S. military had ever envisioned. . . . It had origi­ the prisoners will survive, filled with a lifetime nated during the Civil War . . . with the confeder­ memory of their fearfulness and highly skewed acy’s use of hot air balloons. . . . The Yankees dis­ living conditions. covered it and began making their own balloons. The first recorded "dogfights" took place in the air The concept and writing of Sitting It Out are somewhere over the Mason-Dixon line. (Pages first class. A journalist, novelist, and 110- 11) scriptwriter, Westheimer has written about prison life before, including a novel made into The book has a happy ending in that Colonel a movie. Von Ryan's Express. Now in com­ Johnson was able to come home and tell his memoration of the anniversary of World War story. The years of trial and tribulation are II, he has compiled this account of the two over after going to hell and back. However, years, four months, and 18 days he spent as a this book should serve to remind us of the hor­ prisoner of war. His B-24 went down on a raid 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992 against Italy in early December 1942. A couple of nearby bombings almost frightened Eisenhower and Spaatz were just building up the airmen senseless. The author learned later their forces in northwest Africa, hardly more that army ground personnel were not so terror­ than a month after the November 1942 Torch ized, as they had become used to artillery and landings. Captured and imprisoned by the air attacks. The air war was different from the Italians, then the Germans. Westheimer missed ground war, whether the warrior was flying or the entire war. except from the disadvantaged in prison. point of various Italian stockades and German Dr Daniel R. Mortensen stalaglufts that had to be constantly expanded Bolling AFB. Washington, D.C. to contain burgeoning numbers of downed air­ crews. This memoir is a fascinating account, replete with minute details of daily life. One will get Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in occasionally annoyed with the minutia, but the Presidential Foreign Policy Making by drama of the event, the realism, and curiosity Robert A. Strong. Route 9W, Englewood to find out what happens next carries the Cliffs, New Jersey 07632: Prentice Hall, reader forward. We learn what the men ate, 1992, 237 pages, $22.35. how they played cards and other games, how they developed crude craft skills, how they Robert Strong’s book contains eight case read to fill in the time, and how it all changed studies involving nine American presidents over time. The author includes an intriguing from 1945 to 1990. The case studies illustrate description of the nightly rituals of finding the how the scope of presidential power, the deci­ way to the bathroom (the diet made everyone sion-making process, and the personality of susceptible to constant urination in the night, American presidents shape American foreign and night lights were forbidden in the barracks policy. as well as in the horribly smelly and vile facili­ The strength of Strong’s book lies in the ties). importance of the cases he has chosen, vis-a-vis There is repetition when the author is moved US foreign affairs, and the political analysis he to new camps and repeats similar stories of has provided. His research is reminiscent of daily life. The fact that this is a firsthand Graham T. Allison’s classic, Essence of account by one who took notes and wrote Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, stories, names, and dates in a manuscript form published in 1971. The broad scope of Strong’s shortly after the end of the war, nearly 50 years work permits the reader to contrast different ago, gives this autobiographical study special presidential operating styles as well as the cachet as well as objective credibility. unique problems faced in each of the adminis­ A number of things were surprising to me. trations, such as the Iran-Contra scandal. The flyers were always hungry, but probably For me, the most interesting aspect of less so than the German civilians suffering Strong’s treatise was his highlighting of presi­ from food shortages later in the war. dential personalities. A case in point was International Red Cross personal parcels pro­ President Jimmy Carter, whom Strong vided the basics for survival in the form of described as a man more concerned about food, clothing, medicines, and assorted sun­ doing what was morally right than what was dries. including cigarettes, which were the politically expedient (page 157). Even though most important item of trade. It was surprising Strong amply identifies the strengths of that the prisoners got the recurrent Red Cross Carter’s character, he fails to explore why packages while the guards did without. Some Carter did not become the great statesman he prisoners tried to escape, often unsuccessfully, could have been, given his strong sense of especially from the camps so deep inside moral justice and America’s place as a leader Germany. Often guards could be bribed with a in human rights. From reading Strong. I cigarette or two. and outright fraternization had should have come away with an understanding to be checked bv authorities on both sides of as to why Carter was the wrong messenger the fence. with the right message, but I did not. Prisoners were fearful of being bombed by An in-depth analysis was probably lacking their fellow airmen, especially later in the war because of Strong’s shotgun approach. The when bombers appeared overhead continually. author’s broad coverage was a strength and also NET ASSESSMENT 87

a weakness. Although Strong may not have Twelve years in the making and growing out needed to limit his thesis to one case study, as of the intention to tell an oft-neglected Air Allison did. his inclusion of eight studies and a Force story in the Pacific, The Pineapple Air ninth in the epilogue may have been too many. Force provides future historians of the air war a Again, using Strong's depiction of Carter’s per­ much needed source book and point of depar­ sonality as an example, I would have preferred ture. For Lambert, this was a labor of love to to see the author describe not just Carter’s “chronicle . . . the pursuit units of the old strengths but to explore why Carter was not Hawaiian Air Force and their evolution as the able to capture the American imagination as Seventh Fighter Command . . . through the could President Ronald Reagan or even words of the participants—the alternating ter­ President George Bush, whose charisma is not ror, boredom, humor—so that . . . the telling that of Reagan’s. Strong also fails to delve into would impart . . . a true sense of this 1940s power politics as much as I would have liked epic, the war that changed the world." and overlooks other variables impacting "per­ Although part of the coffee-table, heroic genre sonality’’ or "process." His study would have celebrating those who fought in “the last good been more comprehensive if he had devoted war," The Pineapple Air Force contains much more attention to group dynamics as was pro­ insight into the mundane life of the aviator vided in Victims of Groupthink by Irving Janis. who had to learn to cope with faulty equip­ whose exploration of foreign policy fiascoes ment. flawed doctrine, uneven leadership, con­ was very instructive. fusing strategies, and hit-and-miss tactics. In spite of the above criticisms, students of There is much anecdotal evidence here to rein­ national security affairs and political science force the belief that survival in this far-flung will find Strong’s book highly readable and an watery theater rested either on a reliable wing- invaluable reference source, specifically man or the ability to fly by the seat of the because it explores the constitutional powers of pants. Especially for the fighter pilot, survival the president, analyzes the decision-making was as much happenstance, luck, and just process, provides insight into presidential per­ plain muddling through as anything else. Yet sonalities, and includes a listing of chronologi­ the Pacific forced these aviators to solve new cal events and related documents for each case challenges. In doing so, they pioneered night study. While Strong doesn’t proffer any con­ fighting and long-range fighter operations over clusions as to which approach—power, an ever-present ocean. process, or personality—may be most relevant As with any collection of first-person narra­ to the study of decision making, his analysis tives, the story line is often diffuse and uneven seems to suggest all are inextricably connected but never becomes boring. From the story of a in the shaping of American foreign policy. whale that kept sharks away from a downed Capt Lili D. Mann, IJSAF American pilot to the heroic flying of the leg­ Pacific Grove. California endary Japanese ace Sada-aki Akamatsu, who “made us look like a bunch of truck drivers,” each page is filled with the "real stuff" of unit The Pineapple Air Force: Pearl Harbor to history that seldom makes the printed pages Tokyo bv John W. Lambert. 105 1 Marie devoted to war’s "big picture." On occasion, Avenue, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55118: when sources permit. Lambert incorporates the Phalanx Publishing Co., Ltd., 1990, 214 view from the enemy's cockpit; his chapter pages, no price available. entitled “December 7. 1941" brings to particu­ lar life the air action over Oahu on that day of This is a book for both the buff and the seri­ infamy. For those of us who will always asso­ ous historian of World War II air power in the ciate the beginning and end of World War II Pacific. John Lambert's The Pineapple Air with the Pacific, The Pineapple Air Force is a Force: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo covers "a lot of fascinating record of the personal sacrifice and action" and “a lot of territory” with first-person achievement of those who were always flying narratives and previously unpublished pho­ over water and who deserve a greater place in tographs and gun-camera stills. Lambert the annals of aviation combat history. addresses an often overlooked theater of World War II aviation and caters to those who enjoy Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, USAF war stories telling it "the way it really was." USAF Academy, Colorado s

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncommer- cial nature should be sent to the Editor, Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

USAFA Instructor Opportunities History Division at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are cospon­ The Military Studies Division at the United soring a symposium on “Presidential States Air Force Academy is seeking highly Leadership, Congress, and the US Space qualified captains for instructor duty. This Program ” at Am erican University in duty involves motivating and teaching cadets Washington, D.C., from 25 to 26 March 1993. in university-level courses that stress air The purpose of this symposium is to explore power, the art of war, military theory, doctrine, the degree to which presidents have been able and force employment. Since its inception in to exercise leadership within the government 1980, the curriculum in professional military and in Congress with respect to the space pro­ studies has evolved into one of the most inter­ gram. There will be separate panels on the esting and demanding areas of study at the administrations of Eisenhower. Kennedy, and academy. A master’s degree is required of all Johnson; the 1970s; and congressional relations applicants. Preferred degrees for military stud­ and international aspects of the space program. ies instructors are in history, military history, Among the people presenting papers at the political science, and international relations, or symposium are Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton in area studies of the former Soviet Union, University; Robert Dallek. UCLA; Joan Hoff, Eastern Europe, or the Middle East. Experience Indiana University; and Robert H. Ferrell, in tactical or strategic operations or in opera­ Indiana University. For information, write tionally related specialties is highly desirable. Roger D. Launius, NASA History Division, The division can sponsor a few highly quali­ Code ADA-2. Washington, D.C. 20546. or call fied applicants with the appropriate back­ (202)358-0384. ground for a master’s degree through the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), with a follow-on assignment to the Military Studies New and Forthcoming Publications Division. Applicants should have three to from Air University Press seven years of commissioned service, an out­ Scheduled for release in late 1992 or early standing military record, and impeccable mili­ 1993 is The Future of Air Power in the tary bearing and appearance. Interested indi­ Aftermath of the Gulf War edited by Richard H. viduals should consult chapter 8 of AFR 36-20, Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. This Officer Assignments, for application proce­ book is a collection of essays by participants in dures or write Capt Jeff Coben, Headquarters the 1991 conference on “The United States Air USAFA/CWIS, USAF Academy CO 80840-5421 Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in or call DSN 259-3255/3258. the 1990s,” sponsored by the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher Presidential Leadership Symposium School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts The Center for Congressional and Presidential University; the Air Staff; and Air University. Studies at American University and the Among the subjects addressed by the authors

88 NOT AMS H9

are strategic factors that will influence future Other recent monographs: roles and missions, extended deterrence, Tailoring the Tactical Air Control System for power projection, future aerospace force struc­ Contingencies by Lt Col Robert (. Blunden, tures. low-intensity conflict, and acquisition USAF, 1992 (monograph). priorities. Unit-Level Automation for Air Force Contingency Operations in Low-Intensity A special series of 16 CADRE (Center for Conflict by Maj Mark A. Cochran, USAF, 1992 Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education) (monograph). The Future of the Air Force papers titled con­ Principles of Information Resource fronts issues that are of interest to policymak­ Management: A Foundation for the Future by ers as they plan for the role of the US Air Force Maj Paul D. Condit, USAF. 1992 (mono­ in the so-called postcontainment world. graph). Decisions about these issues will determine the course of the Air Force not only for the rest of To obtain a complete list of available publi­ this decade but well into the early years of the cations or to order any of the above publica­ next century. The authors address a variety of tions. contact the Air University Press. topics, ranging from cooperation between the Publication Support Branch, CADRE/PTPB, USAF and Soviet air forces in World War II to Bldg. 1400. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532 or the applicability of chance and luck to the call DSN 493-6452 or (205) 953-6452: FAX high-technology systems utilized in space. number: DSN 493-6739 or (205) 953-6739. AIRPOWER JOURNAL Volume VI

AUTHOR INDEX

Boudreau, Lt Col Robert N. “The New AFM 1-1: Gehri, Lt Col Suzanne B. “The Air Force Mission Shortfall in Doctrine?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. (Singular)," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 17-24. Centner. Christopher M. “Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Hough, Maj Paul G. “Financial Management for the Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks," no. 4 New World Order,” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 43-54. (Winter 1992): 25-35. Humphries, Lt Col John G. “Operations Law and the Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "The Decisiveness of Air Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield Power" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1992): 2. and Desert Storm," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 25—41. ------. “Where Would You Like to Go?” (editor­ Hurley, 1st Lt Matthew M. "Saddam Hussein and ial). no. 3 (Fall 1992): 2-3. Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Cooper, Capt Lawrence A. “Assured Access to Enough,” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and Jones, Lt Col Brian W. "Close Air Support: A Launch-on-Demand," no. 2 (Summer 1992): Doctrinal Disconnect," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 60-71. 47-56. Kirtland, Lt Col Michael A. "Planning Air Crowder. Col Ed. “Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in and National Security Decision Making,” no. 1 the Korean War," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37-46. (Spring 1992): 55-65. Krisinger, Maj Chris J. "A Carrier Air Wing for the Culver. Capt Clay K. “O Clubs: Tradition or Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing," Contradiction?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 46-59. no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. Doherty. Capt John J. "Missing in Action?" (edito­ Loh. Gen John M. “Advocating Mission Needs in rial). no. 4 (Winter 1992): 2. Tomorrow's World," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4-13. ------. "A Terrible Choice" (editorial), no. 2 Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. "The Problem with Our (Summer 1992): 2. Air Power Doctrine," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24-31. Dougherty, Gen Russell E. "Roots and Wings: A Moorman, Lt Gen Thomas S., Jr. “Space: A New Perspective on Reorganization,” no. 2 (Summer Strategic Frontier," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 14—23. 1992): 4-14. Rinehart. Capt Graham W. “A New Paradigm for Drew, Col Dennis M. "Desert Storm as a Symbol: Organizational Structure," no. 1 (Spring 1992): Implications of the Air War in the Desert." no. 3 43-53. (Fall 1992): 4-13. Temple. Lt Col L. Parker III. "Of Machine Guns, ------. "Jointness: The Fundamental Problem— Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine," no. 2 (Summer A Review of Joint Pub 1." no. 2 (Summer 1992): 1992): 26-36. 58-62. Todd, Greg. "Becoming a Better Military Writer,” no. Fawcett. Maj John M.. Jr. "Which Wav to the FEBA?" 3 (Fall 1992): 69-77. no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. Vincent, 1st Lt Gary A. "In the Loop: Superiority in Fracker, Maj Martin L. "Psychological Effects of Command and Control." no. 2 (Summer 1992): Aerial Bombardment.” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 56-67. 15-25.

TITLE INDEX

"Advocating Mission Needs in Tomorrow's World," "Desert Storm as a Symbol: Implications of the Air Gen John M. Loh. no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4—13. War in the Desert," Col Dennis M. Drew, no. 3 "Air Force Mission (Singular), The." Lt Col Suzanne (Fall 1992): 4-13. B. Gehri. no. 4 (Winter 1992): 17-24. “Financial Management for the New World Order.” "Assured Access to Space: The Dilemma of Maj Paul G. Hough, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 43-54. Reconstitution and Launch-on-Demand," Capt "Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Lawrence A. Cooper, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 47-56. Storm Air Base Attacks," Christopher M. Centner, "Becoming a Better Military Writer," Greg Todd, no. no. 4 (Winter 1992): 25-35. 3 (Fall 1992): 69-77. “In the Loop: Superiority in Command and Control, "Carrier Air Wing for the Air Force. A: Challenges 1st Lt Garv A. Vincent, no. 2 (Summer 1992): for the Composite Wing," Maj Chris J. Krisinger, 15-25. no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. “Jointness: The Fundamental Problem—A Review of “Close Air Support: A Doctrinal Disconnect." Lt Col Joint Pub 1." Col Dennis M. Drew, no. 2 (Summer Brian W. Jones, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 60-71. 1992): 58-62. “Decisiveness of Air Power. The" (editorial), Lt Col "M issing in Action?" (editorial). Capt |ohn J. Richard B. Clark, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 2. Doherty, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 2.

90 INDEX 91

“New AFM 1-1. The: Shortfall in Doctrine?" Lt Col "Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine, The,” Ll Col Robert N. Boudreau, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. Phillip S. Meilinger. no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24-31. “New Paradigm for Organizational Structure, A," "Psychological Effects of Aerial Bombardment,” Maj Capt Graham VV. Rinehart, no. 1 (Spring 1992): Martin L. Fracker, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 56-67. 43-53. "Roots and Wings: A Perspective on Reorganiza­ “O Clubs: Tradition or Contradiction?” Capt Clay K. tion," Gen Russell E. Dougherty, no. 2 (Summer Culver, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 46—59. 1992): 4-14. “Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and "Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just Having Doctrine." Lt Col L. Parker Tem ple III, no. 2 an Air Force Isn't Enough," 1st Lt Matthew M. (Summer 1992): 26—36. Hurley, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. "Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in "Space: A New Strategic Frontier,” Lt Gen Thomas Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," Lt Col S. Moorman. Jr., no. 1 (Spring 1992): 14-23. John G. Humphries, no. 3 (Fail 1992): 25-41. "Terrible Choice, A” (editorial), Capt John |. Doherty, "Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation no. 2 (Summer 1992): 2. Strangle in the Korean War,” Lt Col Michael A. "Where Would You Like to Go?" (editorial). Lt Col Kirtland, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37-46. Richard B. Clark, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 2-3. "Pointblank: A Study in Strategic and National "Which Way to the FEBA?” Maj John M. Fawcett, Jr., Security Decision Making." Col Ed Crowder, no. 1 no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. (Spring 1992): 55—65.

SUBJECT INDEX

Air Base Survivability Dougherty, Gen Russell E. "Roots and Wings: A Centner, Christopher M. "Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Perspective on Reorganization,” no. 2 (Summer Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks," no. 4 1992): 4-14. (Winter 1992): 25-35. Kirtland. Lt Col Michael A. "Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in Air Force Organization the Korean War," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37—46. Dougherty, Gen Russell E. "Roots and Wings: A Air Superiority Perspective on Reorganization," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 4-14. Loh, Gen John M. "Advocating Mission Needs in Gehri, Lt Col Suzanne B. "The Air Force Mission Tomorrow’s World,” no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4-13. (Singular),” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 17-24. Budget/Planning Process Krisinger. Maj Chris J. “A Carrier Air Wing for the Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing,” Hough, Maj Paul G. "Financial Management for the no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. New World Order," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 43-54. Airlift Close Air Support Boudreau, Lt Col Robert N. “The New AFM 1-1: Fawcett. Maj John M., Jr. “Which Way to the FEBA?" no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. Shortfall in Doctrine?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. )ones, Lt Col Brian W. "Close Air Support: A Air Power Doctrinal Disconnect," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 60-71. Boudreau, Lt Col Robert N. "The New AFM 1-1: Command and Control Shortfall in Doctrine?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "The Decisiveness of Air Vincent, 1st Lt Gary A. "In the Loop: Superiority in Power" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1992): 2. Command and Control," no. 2 (Summer 1992): Dougherty. Gen Russell E. "Roots and Wings: A 15-25. Perspective on Reorganization." no. 2 (Sum m er Defense Reform 1992): 4-14. Krisinger, Maj Chris ). "A Carrier Air Wing for the Drew. Col Dennis M. "Desert Storm as a Symbol: Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing," Implications of the Air War in the Desert," no. 3 no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. (Fall 1992): 4-13. Meilinger. Lt Col Phillip S. “The Problem with Our Doctrine Air Power Doctrine," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24-31. Boudreau, Lt Col Robert N. "The New AFM 1-1: Shortfall in Doctrine?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. Air Power History Cooper, Capt Lawrence A. "Assured Access to Crowder. Col Ed. "Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and and National Security Decision Making," no. 1 Launch-on-Demand," no. 2 (Summer 1992): (Spring 1992): 55-65. 47-56. 92 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1992

Drew, Col Dennis M. “Desert Storm as a Symbol: Leadership/Management Implications of the Air War in the Desert,” no. 3 Dougherty, Gen Russell E. "Roots and Wings: A (Fall 1992): 4-13. Perspective on Reorganization." no. 2 (Summer ------. "Jointness: The Fundamental Problem— 1992): 4-14. A Review of Joint Pub 1," no. 2 (Summer 1992): Rinehart, Capt Graham W. "A New Paradigm for 58-62. Organizational Structure," no. 1 (Spring 1992): Gehri, Lt Col Suzanne B. "The Air Force Mission 43-53. (Singular)," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 17-24. Jones. Lt Col Brian W. “Close Air Support: A Legal Issues Doctrinal Disconnect,” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 60-71. Humphries, Lt Col John G. "Operations Law and the Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. "The Problem with Our Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield Air Power Doctrine,” no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24-31. and Desert Storm," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 25-41. Temple, Lt Col L. Parker III. "Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine," no. 2 (Summer Management/Organization 1992): 26-36. Hough, Maj Paul G. "Financial Management for the Editorial New World Order,” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 43-54. Krisinger, Maj Chris J. “A Carrier Air Wing for the Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “The Decisiveness of Air Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing,” Power," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 2. no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. ------. “Where Would You Like to Go?" no. 3 Rinehart, Capt Graham W. “A New Paradigm for (Fall 1992): 2-3. Organizational Structure,” no. 1 (Spring 1992): Doherty, Capt John J. "Missing in Action?" no. 4 43-53. (Winter 1992): 2. ------. "A Terrible Choice,” no. 2 (Summer Middle East Affairs 1992): 2. Hurley. 1st Lt Matthew M. “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Foreign Military Forces Enough,” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. Hurley. 1st Lt Matthew M. “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Military Education Enough,” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “Where Would You Like to Go?” (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1992): 2-3. Intelligence Military Thought Centner, Christopher M. "Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks,” no. 4 Dougherty, Gen Russell E. “Roots and Wings: A (Winter 1992): 25-35. Perspective on Reorganization," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 4-14. Interdiction Gehri, Lt Col Suzanne B. "The Air Force Mission (Singular)," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 17-24. Kirtland, Lt Col M ichael A. "Planning Air Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. “The Problem with Our Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in Air Power Doctrine," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24-31. the Korean War." no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37-46. Temple, Lt Col L. Parker III. “Of Machine Guns, Interservice Conflict Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 26-36. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “The Decisiveness of Air Vincent. 1st Lt Gary A. “In the Loop: Superiority in Power" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1992): 2. Command and Control," no. 2 (Summer 1992): Drew, Col Dennis M. "Jointness: The Fundamental 15-25. Problem— A Review of Joint Pub 1,” no. 2 (Summer 1992): 58-62. Morale Culver, Capt Clay K. "O Clubs: Tradition or Joint Operations Contradiction?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 46-59. Drew. Col Dennis M. "Jointness: The Fundamental Doherty, Capt John J. "A Terrible Choice" (editorial), Problem— A Review of Joint Pub 1.” no. 2 (Summer no. 2 (Summer 1992): 2. 1992): 58-62. Fawcett. Maj John M., Jr. “Which Way to the FEBA?” National Security Policy no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. Boudreau. Lt Col Robert N. “The New AFM 1-1: Shortfall in Doctrine?” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 37-45. Korean War Cooper, Capt Lawrence A. "Assured Access to Kirtland, Lt Col M ichael A. “Planning Air Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in Launch-on-Demand," no. 2 (Summer 1992): the Korean War." no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37—46. 47-56. INDEX 93

Crowder, Col Ed. "Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Professionalism and National Security Decision Making.” no. 1 Culver, Capt Clay K. "O Clubs: Tradition or (Spring 1992): 55-65. Contradiction?” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 46-59. Loh, Gen John M. “Advocating Mission Needs in Tomorrow’s World," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4-13. Psychological Factors in War Fracker, Maj Martin L. "Psychological Effects of Naval Operations Aerial Bombardment," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 56-67. Krisinger, Maj Chris J. "A Carrier Air Wing for the Recruiting/Retention Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing.” no. 1 (Spring 1992): 32-42. Doherty, Capt John J. "A Terrible Choice” (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1992): 2.

Persian Gulf Conflict Space Operations Centner. Christopher M. “Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Cooper, Capt Lawrence A. “Assured Access to Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks,” no. 4 Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and (Winter 1992): 25-35. Launch-on-Demand," no. 2 (Summer 1992): Drew, Col Dennis M. "Desert Storm as a Symbol: 47-56. Implications of the Air War in the Desert.” no. 3 Moorman, Lt Gen Thomas S., Jr. “Space: A New (Fall 1992): 4-13. Strategic Frontier," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 14-23. Fawcett, Maj John M., Jr. “Which Way to the FEB A?” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. Strategic Bombing Humphries, Lt Col John G. "Operations Law and the Fracker, Maj Martin L. “Psychological Effects of Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield Aerial Bombardment," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 56-67. and Desert Storm,” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 25—41. Hurley. 1st Lt Matthew M. “Saddam Hussein and Strategic Operations Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Centner, Christopher M. "Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Enough," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks," no. 4 (Winter 1992): 25-35. Personnel Issues Crowder, Col Ed. "Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Culver,,Capt Clay K. "O Clubs: Tradition or and National Security Decision Making,” no. 1 Contradiction?" no. 4 (Winter 1992): 46-59. (Spring 1992): 55-65. ' Doherty, Capt John J. “A Terrible Choice” (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1992): 2. Strategy Crowder, Col Ed. “Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Planning and National Security Decision Making," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 55-65. ’ Centner, Christopher M. “Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Loh, Gen John M. “Advocating Mission Needs in Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks," no. 4 Tomorrow’s World,” no. 1 (Spring 1992): 4-13. (Winter 1992): 25-35. Moorman, Lt Gen Thomas S., Jr. “Space: A New Crowder, Col Ed. “Pointblank: A Study in Strategic Strategic Frontier," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 14-23. and National Security Decision Making," no. 1 (Spring 1992): 55-65. Tactical Air Control System Humphries. Lt Col John G. “Operations Law and the Fawcett, Maj John M.. Jr. “Which Way to the FEBA?" Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. and Desert Storm,” no. 3 (Fall 1992): 25—41. Kirtland. Lt Col M ichael A. “Planning Air Tactical Air Power Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in the Korean War," no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37-46. Fawcett, Maj John M., Jr. “Which Way to the FEBA?" no. 3 (Fall 1992): 14-24. Jones, Lt Col Brian W. "Close Air Support: A Political-Military Relations Doctrinal Disconnect,” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 60-71. Doherty. Capt John J. "Missing in Action?" (edito­ Kirtland, Lt Col Michael A. "Planning Air rial), no. 4 (Winter 1992): 2. Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in Hurley, 1st Lt Matthew M. “Saddam Hussein and the Korean War." no. 2 (Summer 1992): 37-46. Iraqi Air Power: Just Having an Air Force Isn’t Enough.” no. 4 (Winter 1992): 4-16. Vietnam War Doherty, Capt John J. “Missing in Action?” (edito­ POW Issues rial), no. 4 (Winter 1992): 2. Humphries, Lt Col John G. "Operations Law and the Doherty. Capt John J. "Missing in Action?" (edito­ Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield rial). no. 4 (Winter 1992): 2. and Desert Storm," no. 3 (Fall 1992): 25-41. 94 A1RPOWEB JOURNAL WINTER 1992

World War II Writing for Publication Crowder. Col Ed. "Pointblank: A Study in Strategic and National Security Decision Making," no. 1 Todd, Greg. "Becoming a Better Military Writer,” no. (Spring 1992): 55-65. 3 (Fall 1992): 69-77.

I Can Write Better Than That! OK. then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airjyower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. C N T TORS

Forces. Hickam AFB, Hawaii; com­ mander of the 62d Transportation Squadron, McChord AFB. Washing­ ton; and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, USAF Academy- Colonel Gehri is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Lt Col Robert N. Boudreau (BS, University of Massachusetts- Amherst: MA. Naval Postgraduate School and East Carolina Univer­ 1st Lt Matthew M. Hurley (USAFA: MA. University of Washington) is an sity) serves as military adviser to the intelligence applications officer with chief. Arms Control Verification the 436th Airlift Wing {Air Mobility Policy, Office of the Secretary of Command) at Dover AFB, Delaware. Defense (OSD), Washington, D.C. A command pilot with more than Lieutenant Hurley was the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for the Winter 4,300 hours, he has also served at 1989 issue of the Airpower Journal. OSD as an assistant to the secretary's representative to the Strategic Arms Christopher M. Centner (BFA. Reduction Talks in Geneva, Maryland Institute College of Art; Switzerland. Other assignments MS. Defense Intelligence College) is include the 21sl Tactical Airlift an arms control negotiations adviser Squadron. Clark AB, Philippines, with the Department of Defense. He and the 41st Tactical Airlift has also served as chief of the Squadron, Pope AFB, North Combined Arms Branch and as a tac­ Carolina. He was operations officer tical threat analyst with the Air and later commander of the 37th Force Intelligence Support Agency, Tactical Airlift Squadron. Rhein- Fort Belvoir. Virginia. Mr Centner Main AB. Germany, commanding was one of a select group of analysts the squadron through its deploy­ who provided daily intelligence ment to Al Ain AB. United Arab briefings to the Air Force chief of Emirates, for Operations Desert stall and the secretary of the Air Shield/Storm .and to Incirlik AB. Force during Operation Desert Turkey, for Operation Provide Storm. Comfort. Colonel Boudreau is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Stall College, and Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri (BA. Air War College. University of the Pacific; MA. University of California. Berkeley) is a military doctrine analyst at the Airpower Research Institute. Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, and Education. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Pre­ viously, she was chief of Transpor­ tation Combat Readiness and Resources. Headquarters Pacific Air

95 fournal o f Electronic Defense. His article on the B-lB appeared in the 50th anniversary issue of the Navigator. Captain Culver is a grad­ uate of Squadron Officer School.

Capl Clay K. Culver (BS. Memphis Stale University; MA. National University at Sacramento) is a flight commander and B-lB defensive sys­ tems officer, 28th Bombardment Lt Col Brian W. Jones (USAFA; MS. Squadron. Air Combat Command. Purdue University) is deputy com­ McConnell AFB. Kansas. He previ­ mander of the 355th Operations ously served as an assistant opera­ Group. Davis-Monthan AFB. tions officer. 453d Flying Training Arizona. Previously, he was com­ Squadron. USAF Electronic Warfare mander of the A-10 Division. USAF School, and as an advanced elec­ Fighter Weapons School. Nellis tronic combat and navigator instruc­ AFB, Nevada, and assistant profes­ tor at Mather AFB, California. At K. sor of aeronautics at the US Air 1. Sawyer AFB. Michigan. Captain Force Academy. Colorado Springs, Culver was a squadron executive Colorado. Colonel lones is a distin­ officer and a B-52H electronic war­ guished graduate of the US Army fare officer with the 644th Bomb Command and General Staff College Squadron. He has published in the and a graduate of Air War College. Tear Out and Remove □ □ Detach one itof fill cards, these Enclosed is my check for $13.00 for each subscription ordered ($is $13.00 subscriptionordered for for check Enclosedeach my 16.25 mail). international for Processing Order Code Ilike would topurchasea one-year subscription to the *5151 Enclosedischeck tor$my 13.00($16.25 forsubscription forinternational each orderedmail). Ilike would to purchase a 013 GIFT FOR: GIFT FOR: Mail to: New Orders. Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, 371954, Box P.O. Documents, of Superintendent Orders. New to: Mail Documents of Superintendent to:payable checks Make Mail to:New Orders, Superintendent of Documents,P.O. Box 371954, Make checks payable to: Superintendent of Documents Documents of Superintendent to:payable checks Make PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PRINT

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I11 BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr., USAF, C hief o f Safety, Headquarters USAF Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Dr Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

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