-W ^ AIR UNIVERSITY R eview

Roll Call

UMPIRING AND EVALUATING JOINT EXERCISES.. .LESSONS OF LEBANON .. .THE JAPAN AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCE

JULY-AUGUST 1965

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

T — * AIR UNIVERSITY FIeview THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

U mpuung E xehcise Deser t Strike...... 2 Maj. Gen. John C. Meyer, USAF

Air Mo bil it y in the Fie l d Test Laboratory...... 14 Biig. Gen. Andrew S. Low, Jr., USAF

L esson s of Leba n o n : A S tudy in Air Strategy...... 28 Col. Albert P. Sights, Jr., USAF

Air c r a f t Commitments to Rússia : T he M oscow C onference, S eptember -O ctober 1 9 4 1 ...... 44 Dr. Richard C. Lukas

T he Negl ec t ed Tasks of Officer Education...... 54 Lt. Col. Ralph L. Giddings, Jr., USA

Military Affairs Abroad J apans Air Sel f Defen se Force...... 60 Maj. Gilbert \1. Billings, Jr., USAF

Air Force Review Air c r a f t Integrated Data S ystem s...... 72 Maj. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, USAF

T he A viation C adet Procram in R et r o spec t ...... 78 Capt. Maurice G. Stac-k, USAF

Books and Ideas A ron on Nuclear Stratecy...... 91 Herman S. VVolk

T he Contributors...... 9 4

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor, Air Uni- A familiar scene at recent joint train- venity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, ing exercises such as Gold Fire I anil Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the Desert Strike has been the onloading of Government Printúig Office. Washington, D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- airbome troops for rapid deployment versity Book Department, Maxwell Air Force to the operation zone. Major General Base, Ala.: yearly $4.50. back issues 75 John C. Meyer and Brigadier General cents. USAF recurring pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. Andrew S. Low, Jr., discuss umpiring and evaluation of joint exercises in Vol. XVI No. 5 J ui.y-Aucust 1965 this issue of Air Univertily Review. UMPIRING EXERCISE DESERTSTRIKE

M ajor Gen er a l John C. M eyer

N THE late summer of 1963 when the exercise area large enough to give commanders United States Strike Command ( usstri- their head. In years gone by, in all too many com) began planning for its Exercise instances, exercises had been executed by a Desert Strike, the billing stated that it was to set script that spoon-fed field commanders in be the largest exercise ever held within the battle situations. usstricom joint training exer­ United States. In number of men, the 100,(X)0 cises have been characterized by wide-open Amiv and Air Force personnel who partici- and freewheeling situations wherein infantry. pated were some 30.000 short of the force that armored, mechanized, and airborne field com­ had gathered in 1952 in Texas for Exercise manders could make decisions similar to those Longhorn. In exercise area and distances in- required in actual tactical situations. This type volved from one flying unit to another, it was of script again was the aim of General Paul D. without a doubt the biggest exercise ever Adams, Commander in Chief, usstricom, and staged in these United States. Director for Exercise Desert Strike. The Commander, usstricom, wanted an After establishing the Neutral Forces and UMPIRING EXERCISE DESERT STRIKE 3 moving them into the field in January 1964, ver were the Headquarters of the III Corps Brigadier General Patrick H. Devine, Chiei of and the XVIII Airborne Corps, the lst and 2d Staff of SL\th Army, made his headquarters at Armored Divisions from Fort Hood, Texas; the Needles, Califórnia. In April Brigadier General 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort John M. Finn, Commanding General of Fort Carson, Colorado; the lOlst Airborne Division Polk, Louisiana, assumed command of the from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 2d Bri- Xeutral Forces, which approximated 6000 offi- gade of the 40th Armored Division of the Cali­ cers and men. Operating initiallv in downtown fórnia National Guard; the 258th Infantry facilities, he began soliciting exercise rights Brigade of the Arizona National Guard; and from landowners of the contemplated exercise the 191st Infantry Brigade of the U.S. Army area. The greatest landowner was the United Reserve in the Montana-Utah-Arizona area. States Government in the form of Riverside From the Tactical Air Command of the Biu-eau of Land Management. U.S. Air Force carne tactical forces from The exercise area consisted of approxi- George afb, Califórnia; Seymour Johnson afb, mately 12.5 million acres extending from north- North Carolina; England afb, Louisiana; Can- west of Fort Irwin, Califórnia, military reserva- non afb, New México; Holloman afb, New tion eastward across the Colorado River to a México; Shaw afb, South Carolina; Pope afb, point 30 miles north of Kingman, Arizona, then North Carolina; plus key staff elements from southeast following the course of the Big Headquarters tac, Headquarters Ninth Air Sandv River to the Harquahala Mountains Force, and Headquarters Twelfth Air Force. some 65 miles east of Blythe, Califórnia; south Aerial tankers from Strategic Air Com­ and then west to Ripley; northwest along the mand and air defense forces from the Air De- Bullion Mountain Range to a point 18 miles fense Command also participated in the air southeast of Daggett, and north to the Fort operations. sa c and adc officers held key staff Irwin reservation. ( See map on page 4.) positions within the headquarters of the Air Commensurate with other preparatory op- Force forces on either combat side as well as erations by the Neutral Forces, the Riverview with the Director and Controller structure. Airport on the outskirts of Needles was leased The two opposing joint task forces were to provide a tent city for the headquarters of organized and called jt f Phoenix, which de- the Director Controller for the exercise. Here fended the east (Nezona), and jt f Mojave, was located the office of the Chief Controller which defended the west (Calonia). The (Umpire) in near proximity to the Director Phoenix Commander was the Commanding and his key stafF. As the activity of the umpires General, Fifth U.S. Army, Lieutenant General requires minute detail and immediate knowl- Charles G. Dodge, and his deputy was Air edge of the progress of all units to ensure Force Major General Clyde Box of the U.S. effective exercise play, integration of the um­ Strike Command. On the other side Lieuten­ pire forces with the command and operational ant General Charles B. Westover, Vice Com­ element of the Director is considered a pre- mander, Tactical Air Command, commanded requisite. jt f Mojave, and his deputy commander was As it developed, however, this proximity Major General Charles H. Chase, Special As- worked to the disadvantage of the umpires. sistant to the c in c usst r ic o m. Space allocations were at a premium, and pro- An interesting side play—and a most im- fessional interest by the several staff agencies portant one in view of the real-life potential of the Director s headquarters created a minor of Strike Command forces deploying in actual traffic problem and militated toward confu- battle situations—was the simulated national sion within the umpire offices. Future exer- organizational structure devised to achieve cises should isolate the office of the Chief Con­ realism for Exercise Desert Strike. A former troller, yet it should be near enough to the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Director to maintain close liaison. and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major Army units assigned to the maneu- retired General Nathan F. Twining, acted as 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the Foreign Minister of Calonia. General Clyde Calonias mock enemy, the nation of Ne- D. Eddleman, usa (Ret), vvas Calonia’s Min­ zona, had as its Prime Minister General Jacob ister for Defense, and Mr. Henry D. Ramsey, L. Devers, usa ( R et), former head of the Army U.S. State Department Political Adviser to Field Forces. The Nezona Minister of Defense General Adams, was the Foreign Minister. was Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, usaf Their military forces defending the nation of (R et); and Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Calonia were knovvn as Joint Task Force Analyst, U.S. State Department, was the For­ Mojave. eign Minister.

During May 1964 USSTRICOM forces exercised in the U.S. southwestern desert region.

Foi-t I r win Ba vier

EdwarAs • A.F6 A R l í O N A

LoèÁngeláÊ. UMP1RING EXERCISE DESERT STRIKE 5

These two govemment bodies acted as necessary to evaluate this exercise. Several war cabinets of the two mythical countries schools were established: namely, an Air Base/ and assisted in transforming decisions of the Air Defense Umpire School, a Ground and For- govemment cabinets into militarv plans and ward Air Umpire School, and a Hawk Missile operations. Thus each cabinet functioned as School. These schools were designed to orient the final executive authoritv of its govemment controller/umpire personnel as to their tasks and as the national securitv council, deter- in Exercise Desert Strike and, further, to pro­ mining, developing, and directing integrated vide adequate instruction and basic ground domestic, foreign, and militarv policy in the rules for the future discharge of their duties best interest of its nation. in accordance with the umpire plan. The use of the political vehicle enabled The Air Base/Air Defense Umpire School this field exercise to be executed along lines was located at Luke afb near Phoenix, Arizona. closer to the situation in which real events Umpires assigned to the joint task forces, the lead to war and are influenced by strategy tactical air control centers, the control and re- and tactics. The end result was to lend further porting centers, the reporting and controlling realism and provide rare training in govem­ posts on air bases involved, and those umpires ment crisis management. who would evaluate in-fiíght activity were With all the detail, effort, and planning scheduled for classes. Each instructor had ade­ for an exercise audited out at approximately quate time for preparation, and the presenta- 48,000,000 tax dollars, assurance had to be tions were sourid. It is of footnote importance pegged to make the effort worth the cost. The to observe, however, that from the time of controlling of exercise play over an area their selection as umpires and instructors in slightly smaller than the State of West Vir­ the preparatory schools they should be re- gínia posed formidable tasks for the scant 600 lieved of all routine duties to enable them to personnel vvearing the traditional white arm concentrate on this work. Further, better pre- bands of the neutral controller ( umpire) force. exereise training of Armv umpires in aircraft The objectives to be accomplished by attack and delivery techniques would ensure usstricom during Exercise Desert Strike from better overall effieiency. Such knowledge 17 through 30 May were: would have improved their abilitv to assess • to train participants in the conduct damages from air strikes. of joint operations, simulating the employment Future air base and air defense umpire of conventional weapons and tactical nuclear schools conducted in pre-exercise periods weapons should include instruction in the area of air- • to train Armv and Air Force person­ ground attack and damage assessment. We nel in active and passive electronic counter- attempted to acquire our ground umpires from measures and in electronic counter-counter- speeific Armv units but, due to other exercise measures requirements, were not entirely successful. As • to stress the conduct of joint and uni­ a result some of our overall effieiency suffered. lateral intelligence operations for the provision Such a selection of ground umpires would of the combat intelligence essential for joint have resulted in familiarity of personnel and conventional and tactical nuclear warfare have alleviated the awkward period of their attaining knowledgeability and conversancy • to evaluate appropriate concepts, op­ with professional capabilities of colleagues. erations, and procedures having joint interest. It was difficult, however, to gather all um­ Soon after mv assignment as Chief Con­ pires functioning in similar assessment areas troller of Desert Strike, I had to outline speeific together to ensure that the rules of the control training obligations for our umpires to elevate of air-ground action were properly prepared, them from line and staff officer assignments presented, and understood. This problem was into knowledgeable observers who could make overcome, and the residts reflected the efforts concrete input into the overall data collection involved. 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The Hawk Missile School was established should include all umpires selected irrespec- at Fort Bliss, Texas. The students were both tive of their technical duties, and each elass Army and Air Force personnel assigned as should be liniited to 50 students. Adequate umpires to Hawk battalions. Through the co- instructor-student rapport is impossible with operation of the United States Army Air De- larger groups. In these schools, instruction fense School at Fort Bliss, a special course was should be given on weapon systems and deliv- conducted from 19 to 23 April 1964. This ery procedures and techniques bv qualified course ran simultaneously with other Hawk and experienced pilot personnel. Basic infor- training programs being conducted at Fort mation on low-angle strafing, napalm runs, for­ Bliss. This afforded the Desert Strike student- ward air controller techniques, and the gamut umpires the opportunity to witness actual fir- of close air support in air-ground operations ing of the Hawk missiles and thus increased should be stressed to all umpires in an exercise. their competence and professional manner As an example, because of the large land mass and acquainted them with the latest techniques involved in Desert Strike as well as the tre- of employing the Hawk weapon. mendous difficulty of having preselected um­ The Ground and Forward Air Controller pires present at an anticipated scene of action, Umpire School, primarily designed for um- situations occurred occasionally wherein the pires assigned to Army ground units, was con­ sole witness to an air strike was a ground offi- ducted at Needles, Califórnia, 4-8 May 1964. cer not thoroughlv versed in close support air I required the attendance of Hawk battalion tactics. umpires and forward air controller umpires In air activity, standard types of ap- at the Needles meeting. The points stressed proaches to denote specific techniques of close at this school were the rules for control of air support activity were agreed upon. A nor­ ground action and signal Communications. To mal straight-in run to the target, for instance, stress the latter, two exercises in the use of was understood to be a normal nonnuclear at- proper signal techniques were conducted, and tack consisting of 2.5 rockets and 800 rounds the students also participated in a reduced- of 20-mm ammunition. Damages, depending scale command post exercise. This exercise was upon terrain, personnel, and equipment in­ a practical summary of the formal instructional volved, were then to be assessed. A major material presented during the school and pro- difficulty in this area was the action of field vided a vehicle for a complete checkout of the commanders and the Direet Air Support Cen- Communications Systems to be used bv um­ ter ( dasc:) in rerouting set missions and chang- pires during Desert Strike. ing the simulated aircraft ordnance loads, thus From December 1963 through March changing the point of attack and the tech- 1964, Strike Command personnel working with nique used. This situation made for erroneous afstrike and arstrike had developed the reporting bv umpires not clued in to the last- Desert Strike controller/umpire handbook. A minute change. pocket-sized document of some 100 almanac- In all too many instances an "X quantitv like pages, this volume included concise and of assessment by ground umpires resulted from detailed breakdowns on Communications as inabilitv to recognize and identify the aircraft well as the rules for control of ground and air involved, the maneuver executed, and the actions. technique used by the attacking aircraft, not Except for an intelligent and penetrating to mention an inabilitv to properlv assess po- program of umpire selection with sufficient tential damage from the air strike. prioritv to preelude substitution, the conduct of the umpire schools is equally as important nuclear damage assessment as the exercise itself. VVithout the formative precedent of the school, resultant errors in Desert Strike was unique, varying from umpire evaluation must be expected. Future other st r ic o m exercises in that there was a schools should be conducted at one place, concomitant escalation in the tactical use of UMP1RING EXERCISE DESERT STR1KE 7

nuclear weapons by both air and ground units. (b ) whether the damage factor alleged was, This posed a distinct problem for umpires. in fact, of value in view of terrain and dis­ The Army Forces ( arfor) and Air Force persai. The umpire of the delivering force Forces ( affor) used most of the complex often did not know the identity of the enemy weapon systems available in the regularly unit out ahead or of the “on-site” umpire as- constituted division/air-wing arsenal. signed to the strike area. In the case of arfor strikes, the umpire Consideration had to be given to delivery with a ground unit had to be the fire marker, of ground nuclear weapons on a set scenario prepare a report, umpire the follow-up action, so as to preclude the confusion generated by and ensure that all units concemed “played fast-moving troops, problemática! cep’s , and the game.” Seldom was there suffieient time to position a marker prior to effective deliverv of the nuclear weapon. Communications within Major General John C. Meyer, Chief Controller (Um- an area the size of West Virgínia, with the pire) of Exercise Desert Strike, leaves the Command ensuing Communications problems in moun- Post of 1203d Tactical Fighter Wing (Prov) after tainous terrain, plus the simple factor of using checking operations and conferring with umpires. 1:250,000-scale maps, often made it nearlv im­ possible to find a ground zero within 100 to 1000 meters in the desert wastelands of the exercise area, let alone report it consistent with a fluid battle situation. The problem was fur- ther magnified by requiring the umpire to leave his parent unit and make a professional assessment of the nuclear strike. The activity of his parent unit directly after a nuclear strike was far from static, and the umpire’s Services were lost during the nuclear strike assessment period. It is fair to state that, considering the number of nuclear strikes used in Desert Strike, the umpires allocated were able to handle them with suffieient knowledgeability to produce usable, aecurate evaluations. The conjecture does exist, however, that had either side, just in the ground battle alone, utilized all nuclear strikes allocated, the force of umpires avail­ able would have been hard pressed to assess the effects properly. Future exercises will have to make full utilization of the Direct Air Support Center’s Communications system to cnable each dasc to contact his opposite number directly and convey umpire information vitallv needed in nuclear strike operations. Partially because of the terrain and the wide dispersion of some of the units and their dvnamic movements, the umpires expressed grave doubt as to their abil- ity to determine accurately (a ) whether the firing unit was indeed able to make good the necessary cep (circular error probable) and 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

lack of proper marking and Identification ot proclivity during this exercise of overlooking, enemy units. A gross table covering all nuclear on occasion, this vital necessitv. In an actual deliveries had to be developed to apply average nuclear operation the need for supply and re- factors instantly and enable the umpires to supply, plus minimum loading time, as well make generalization, which for exercise play as protection to reduce vulnerability, must be was accepted. In nuclear exercise warfare, each considered. piece of equipment cannot be tagged as a casu- On the Hip side of the coin, Army com­ alty. The application of refined computations manders, again because of the artificialities, under field conditions is not practical. Adher- did not eonsider, or were not plagued with, ence to present policies of evaluation will con­ the necessitv of concern over moving all classes tinue to slovv down the overall objectives of a of supplies from a communication zone into training exercise. the direct combat theater. By this vital lack of practical applications in warfare, the Air Force was prevented from conducting two of exercise artificialities its Basic and classic missions: viz., interdiction In the search for realism, necessarv curbs to isolatc the battlefield through the disruption had to be placed on enthusiasm, scenarios, and of the supply lines and the utilization of assaidt situations wherein reasonable men could fore- airlift to resupply tactical ground forces de- see that hazards to life and limb could result ployed in battle. Umpire observation of the in tragedv. The deplovment of mechanical vital logistic function was thus not covered. armadas into unfamiliar territory leads one to The vitalness of supply and resupply activity the simple assumption that complex exercises was of course grounded in textbook funda­ such as Desert Strike are more hazardous than mentais. The onlv interdiction activity during normal existence on an Army post or an Air the exercise was against bridge targets along Force base. The deplovment into the vast the Colorado River. The only assault airlift wasteland wherein Desert Strike was executed, officially known to the umpires was in conjunc- with numerous varieties of vehicles, ordnance, tion with the entry of the lOlst Airborne Divi- and aircraft, made the observance of safety sion into the exercise. precautions a prime factor in all planning ac- On-Base Aircraft Dispersai. The use of tivitv. This precept, coupled with budgetarv atomic weapons created the mandatory re­ limitations, necessitated certain artificialities quirement on air base commanders to widelv which had to be surmounted to enable this disperse tactical fighters and reconnaissance massive exercise to arrive at its successful con- and assault airlift aircraft. The embarrassing clusion. holocaust at Bien Hoa in South Vi et Nam, by Several factors had to be ignored which, use of eonventional mortar ordnance, creates had the practical requirements thereof been a current insight into the vitalness of the dis­ mandatory, would have given a truer picture persai requirement. In many instances during of our professional worth: Desert Strike professional dispersai plus blast- Logistics. Realistically, a criticai logistic retarding revetments would have placed an requirement exists in the supply and dispensa- entirely different connotation on umpire evalu- tion of nuclear weapons. Because of the ab- ations of time periods wherein an air installa- sence of nuclear logistics, commanders used tion was deemed “out of action.” Had aircraft dispersai bases without due consideration for been dispersed in small groups at distances up the prepositioning of ordnance and trained to two miles apart, most units would have ordnance handling and loading personnel. In continued to have some of their aircraft opera- a true combat situation the lack of a proper tional for practically the entire period of the marriage between nuclear ground handling exercise irrespective of nuclear strikes on their personnel and the Stores themselves would installation. This assumption is valid consider- eradicate the presumption of successful nuclear *ing onlv the number of air strikes made on air- strikes. Air Force field commanders had the fields. This assumption would have decreased UMPIRING EXEHCISE DESERT STRIKE 0

in validitv had the opposing air commander Controller were also a factor. As a point of scheduled a more realistic number of strike practicability, only those areas on an air base aircraft against enemy air bases. assigned to player personnel were attackable From the practical standpoint, because by opposing forces. Since many of the air bases manv air bases used in Exercise Desert Strike used in Desert Strike continued their normal belongetl to major commands other than tac, mission (often other than Tactieal Air Com­ the fundamental mission of those bases neces- mands), sueh isolation and restriction of areas sarilv continued through the exercise. As a were necessary. resuit of tliese practical aspects, Desert Strike Evaluation of air defense activitv posed forces were allocated minute areas of some air several major problems which, through the installations, and the facts of life of atomic course of Desert Strike, plagued the umpires. warfare operated in propinquity with day-to- By direction of General Adams, safety in all day reality. aspects was a major aim in the exercise. In Identification of Aircraft. Units of the Air view of this fact many applieations of air de­ Defense Command participating in the air fense activitv had to be curtailed. Runway alert defense role in Exercise Desert Strike found scrambles were not always afforded top pri- themselves in the anomalous position of par­ ority in the schedullng of take-offs from air ticipating in both actual intercepts and in bases used by Strike Command. Identification Desert Strike missions with the same personnel of enemy aircraft and the kill rate were partially and in many instances with the same aircraft. accomplished by radar assessment. Wben pos- Those air defense aircraft earmarked as exer- sible, aerial umpires observed the activitv in cise aircraft were distinguishable only by their two-place jet fíghters. Occasionally, erratie tail number. As a resuit, the operation of actual communication coupled with tower frequencies mission air defense aircraft and those being being monitored by air defense aircraft un- utilized in the exercise created a near impos­ balanced the normal validitv associated with sible chore for proper umpire evaluation. aerial engagements. Each attacking aircraft checked in with the control tower prior to making passes at airfields. The monitoring of air defense tower frequency by adc defenders often can- Proper scoring of air defense activitv pos- celed out the surprise factor. This area will sibly was the most complicated of all umpire receive study directed toward improving future procedures in Exercise Desert Strike. The basic exercises. problem in air defense is applicable to all um­ Three combat elements were busily en- pire activitv. 1'mpires must obtain advance gaged in air defense. Units of the Air Defense Information from field and air commanders of Command ran radar-controlled intercepts programed missions. Thus the umpire can above 24,000 feet in the maneuver area and ensure adequate assessment coverage in the were engaged in intercepts at all altitudes combat area. immediately outside the maneuver area. adc: In the area of nuclear strikes on air bases, sectors in Phoenix, Arizona, and Reno, Nevada, only by advance information with a precalcu- defended the land mass assigned to Phoenix lated actual ground zero ( agz) and a pre- forces while the Los Angeles, Califórnia, and planned time of the strike was the base umpire Portland, Oregon, adc: sectors defended the able to fire the nuclear simulator at the time Mojave land mass. Through the use of the Con­ of attack, calculate and assess damage, and trol Reporting Centers ( crc ) and the Control make the necessarv reports in sufficient time to Reporting Posts ( crp), umpires monitored make it a major contribution to exercise play. respective radarseopes and assessed damage Swift passage of the vital data through the created by engaged tactieal aircraft within the umpire s Tactieal Air Control Center for relay exercise area. to the opposing tacc rapidly completes the The air defense air-to-air activity used picture. Mandatorv reports to the Director radar in its casualty assessment of engagements. 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Identification friend or foe/selective identifica- on an “on-call” type of mission. Such flexibilitv tion features ( if f /sif ) was the primary means in the utilization of air power in its taetical role of identifving attacking aircraft. As various often did not allow sufficient time for aircraft fixed-place targets, such as Taetical Air Control flight plans to flow through the air-ground net- Centers ( tacc), Direct Air Support Centers work and enable available umpires to be pres- ( dasc), crc’s , and c;rp’s , were attacked, noti- ent to properly evaluate the results. Often fication of the incident was forwarded bv elec- umpires found themselves in the unenviable tronic means, and all available umpires position of attempting to make possible kill cooperated in assessing damage caused bv the analyses which challenged accuracy. Of the air strikes. These evaluations, coupled with 355 air-to-air sorties flown, onlv 50 per cent flight reports made to umpires at the attacking were properly identified and assessed. aircraft s home base, culminated the evaluation. In the Armv Hawk missile area of ground- Invaluable assistance provided bv the Federal to-air defense activity, utilization of operational Aviation Agency ( faa) in routing aircraft data such as “lock-on” and “tone burst” formed simplified, to a degree, the work of the umpires the basis for umpire assessment. Utilizing kill in that Hight-following became less of a specu- probability tables, umpires assessed aircraft lation and more of a forewarned actualitv. damage with relative accuracy. One cause of The system of evaluating air-to-air activity eoncern, liowever, was Armv claims of de- was not without its problems. Timeliness was struetion of aircraft often not specifically iden­ the kevnote, and communication below the tified which passed through the Hawk battal- tacc and the dasc often was not all that was ions area and witliin their range but without anv desired, particularly from an umpires stand- knowledge that tliev were being attacked by point. The limitation placed on umpire Com­ the Hawk missiles. In this area, communication munications is a problem which should be was another limiting factor. These factors led made an item of prioritv in future exercises. to repetitive claims and assessment, often Limiting factors quickly appeared when air giving Hawks “kills” of more aircraft than were strikes were launched from strip or air alert in fact in the area. With better indoctrination of Hawk personnel and common communica­ tion frequencies between the Hawk units and aircraft operating in the maneuver area, more accurate analyses of the Hawk efficiencv would be possible. Conceivably an electronic device could be installed in all aircraft which would increase our Hawk umpire staffs capabilitv to assess kill and damage. The air-to-air activity of opposing taetical fighters in many instances defied accurate assessment. Strip alert scrambles, airborne loi- tering and direction to last-minute targets by the dasc, plus aerial combat generated by armed reconnaissance missions, also defied ac­ curate assessment. This statement is particu­ larly valid as to air-to-air activity occurring in lower altitudes where radar detection was obstrueted by terrain. Further, the swiftness of engagement and break-off often left only pilot reports for proper evaluation. Instances oc- curred wherein ground umpires observing such activity were unable to identify the aircraft, the maneuvers involved, and the numbers of aircraft attributed to either Phoenix or Mojave. UMPIRING EXERCISE DESERT STRIKE 11

retreat from realism commanders in the field, received armored personnel earriers and tlius were able to keep Another major weakness carne to light in well abreast of the units to which they were the river crossings of the Colorado River and assigned. This alleviated a situation which was the breakouts immediatelv thereafter. This not germane to all ground umpires, yet it makes situation occurred in the opening phases o£ the point! Future exercise activity should take the exercise. During the psychological buildup into consideration the acute problem of rapid between Nezona and Calonia, the latters umpire transportation. This problem can best Mojave forces laid extensive mine fields, built be softened by the assignment of a workable road blocks, and utilized other methods in number of helicopters and adequate communi- creating obstacles to halt, disrupt, and delay cation devices. Phoenix forces from breaking out after Crossing In view of the limitation imposed on the Colorado River border. Much of this ac- proper evaluation of exercise play by umpires ti\'ity was simulated. Where simulation was not assigned to specific units, coupled with austere properly supervised or observed, it was occa- umpire manning throughout, four “scene-of- sionallv ignored in the Phoenix breakthrough. action” teams were organized and based at The resultant rapid advance of units of the 2d Controller Headquarters. These teams were Armored Division during the opening stages under the direct operational control of the of the exercise play was not realistic, and dam- sênior controller. Each team consisted of an age assessment was not commensurate with Army officer, an Air Force officer, and an nco practical probabilitv. who doubled as the jeep driver and radio oper- All obstacles, river crossings, and bridge ator. The controller dispatched the teams to actions required extremelv close umpire con- anticipated points of contact to make rapid trol. evaluation of the exercise plav. These scene-of- Possiblv the greatest weakness encoun- action teams completed 42 assignments in 14 tered in the umpire activity was the lack of days. A serious limitation to their utilization, mobility. A major hurdle was created by the however, was the fact that the teams were fact that fewer than 600 umpires were charged based at Controller Headquarters. As the exer­ with the evaluation of the activity of two Air cise war progressed, travei time from the Con­ Forces and four Army divisions spread over an troller Headquarters to the scene of action often area of as uneven terrain and onlv slightlv involved a two-hour drive by jeep or a 40- smaller than West Virgínia. minute helicopter flight. Future Solutions for Commanders in some instances failed to the proper utilization of these scene-of-action provide necessary cooperation and logistic sup- teams would be to locate them strategically port for the transportation of umpires. This within the exercise area and equip them with failure is understandable in view of the em- helicopter transportation. Swift transportation, phasis placed upon the operational stature and plus adequate nieans of communication, would required mobility of these ground units. increase their efficiency tenfold. The AN/ Tracked vehicles assigned to armored units VRQ-2 radio is sufficient to maintain adequate were particularly adaptable to cross-country Communications with plaver units. However, mobility in desert terrain. The standard vehicle the scene-of-action teams should be assigned assigned to the umpires, however, was the to primarv frequencies, one within the fre- quarter-ton truck pulling a heavily loaded quency band overlap between armor and artil­ trailer. \\ ith such equipment the umpire often lery and the other within the frequency overlap encountered difficulty in keeping up with cross- country movement of armored division com- between artillery and infantry. ponents. The rapid movement of armored combat units at battalion levei and below ivhat voe learned from Desert Strike created difficulties in prepositioning and in marking artillery and nuclear fires. Some um­ Many of the basic evaluations have been pires, through the cooperation of the armored made in previous exercises. In the past two FRE-VIA^RL

In preparation for their role, controllers (umpires) identify likélij battle area for an expected tactical move by forces taking part in Exercise Desert Strike.

years st r ike forces have been tested most ardu- circumspection to any exercise. The degree of ouslv in the rolling hill country of central Wash­ professionalism of our soldiers and airmen in ington during Exercise Coulee Crest, in the the prosecution of the art of war is a national heavily foliaged land of the Carolinas in the hot prerequisite. Without it, we collectively place summer, in the bleak vastness of the Alaskan our heritage in jeopardy. winter during Exercise Polar Siege, and more We within the family of usstricom ap- recentlv in the desert wastes of Arizona and proach all phases of these exercises with an Califórnia. The result is concrete and explicit: absolute seriousness of purpose. We can appre- it is the amalgamation of joint forces of ciate the progress that lias been made in seasoned and tested military personnel capable Strike Command. We recognize the capabilities of deploying on a moments notice to anv place of Army and Air Force forces involved. The in the world and, upon debarking, being eom- vital and dynamic leadership of General Paul bat readv. It’s just that simple. D. Adams is constantly reflected in the forma- The singular importance of all training is tion, training, and prestige generated by joint for naught unless it is properly evaluated. In st r ike forces. all probability only because the umpire area By vigorous application of sound organi- was my primary concern, I feel the essential- zational procedures, limited umpire personnel ness of adequate umpire supervision. The ac- can produce excellent results in the tabulation tivity of the umpire lends validity and of exercise play. The plaguing negative psy- UMPIRINC EXERCISE DESERT STRIKE 13 chology of exercise participants regimented consideration. A professional approach, single- against umpire cooperation can be overeome. ness of unit purpose, and convenience of non- Unit training, Iectures, and internai informa- exercise commitments all contribute to a tion activity can acclimate participating troops cohesiveness of effort. Those individuais se- to the vital necessitv of umpire functions and lected as exercise umpires because of their out- the beneficiai end results of their cooperation. standing qualifications must become a prioritv With educated and cooperative participants, item within the organization. Individuais se- excellent Communications, and accurate pre- lected must meet all pre-exercise schedules. planned positioning of umpire personnel, bet- This alone will guarantee umpire personnel ter results will be achieved in the future. with well-established fundamentais and thus We have much education vet ahead of us contribute to thorough assessment of future in joint operations. This avenue is in the direc- exercises. tion of intimate familiaritv of Air Force forces In the final analysis, the fundamental and with Armv forces and vice versa. Such famili- moving instrument in attaining realistic and arity cannot be overdone. Much of this work usable data for future planning of st bic o m can be accomplished in the pre-exercise class- forces is to be gained from correct umpire room. Split-second decisions and action taken assessments. In peace the umpire is the weapon. in battle presuppose the necessitv of intimacy. VVhen the dust has settled and the crowd dis- Much has been accomplished in this area, but persed, the significant residue is the experience much remains to be done. gained by the commanders, staffs, and partici­ Umpires should come from the same unit pating soldiers and airmen. There is no price if possible. Prioritv of umpire assignment that can be set on this attainment. should overshadow any other administrative Hq Twelfth Air Force (TAC) AIR MOBILITY OME three vears ago, when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asked IN THE S the Secretary of the Armv how avia- tion could be used more imaginatively to en- FIELD TEST hance the tactical mobility of ground units, he set in motion Herculean efforts in both the LABORATORY Army and the Air Force to find the not-so- simple answer to what seemed to be a most straightforward question. This initial request B ricadier Gen er a l Andrew S. L ow, J r . vvas dated 19 April 1962. The Army reacted to the Defense Sec-re- tarvs query bv creation of the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, chaired by Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze. The board sub- mitted its report some four months later, in August 1962. The Howze Board íoresaw an air assault- type division in which almost two-thirds of the ground vehicular equipment usually found in the infantrv division had been supplanted by Annv rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. VVith its organic aircraft, the division would be able to airlift an entire brigade simultaneously, in an air-envelopment operation. Such tactics would provide a new order of battlefield mobil- because the Howze Board had carried out its deliberative work on a unilateral Service basis it íailed to accord full consideration to existing or programed Air Force capabilities. The Air Force was convinced by its study of air mobility needs for ground units that its resource capabil­ ities, refined and expanded where necessary, would ineet Army tactical mobility require­ ments more effectively than those proposed in the Howze Board report. f ;.4- In order to resolve the differing Service positions, the Secretary of Defense directed that a program be established to test and evalu- ate the Armys tactical air mobility concept, and the associated organization, in a joint environment. The Commander in Chief, United States Strike Command ( cincstrike), General Paul D. Adams, was given this task by the Joint Chiefs of Staíf in their memorandum dated 17 January 1963. In this basic document the jcs established six basic requirements against which air mobility concepts would be evaluated: a. Elimination of areas of unnecessary over- lap or undesirable duplication of capabilities. ity, both for maneuver and firepower, and an b. Determination of the best methods of increased capability to operate over distantes exploiting the mutually supporting capabilities formerlv. considered infeasible with ground of the Services involved. vehicles. Further, the board foresaw an air c. Determination of the best methods for transport brigade which would provide a com- eoordinating and controlling the operations of panion logistics svstem utilizing an air line air-ground forces involved. of Communications to match the mobility of d. Determination of the survivability in, and the tactical units. suitabilitv to, varying combat environments. In forwarding the Howze Board report, e. Determination of the advantages and/or the Secretarv of the Army endorsed the air limitations inherent in the Army mobility con­ mobility concept reflected therein but called cept, including deployment, employment, and attention to the need for further reíinement. logistical support of the proposed units. additional elaboration, fíeld experimentation, f. Provision of data for use in determining and finally test and evaluation of the stated total force structure, logistical requirements, concept. The report also indic-ated that the and support requirements. organizational counterparts engendered by the The generation of data to respond to these jcs concept would need similar test and evaluation. requirements has become the foundation of the Anticipating a need to comment on the entire usstricom test and evaluation effort. Armys report, the Air Force in July 1962 con- In order to meet his substantial responsi- stituted a Tactical Air Support Requirements bilities for a comprehensive test and evaluation Board under the chairmanship of Lieutenant program, cincstrike established in the summer General Gabriel P. Disosway. The latter board of 1963 a Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force submitted its report in September 1962. In ( jt e t f ) as a part of his headquarters. As forwarding the report of the Disosway Board, finally approved by the jc s in September 1963, the Secretary of the Air Force concluded that jt e t f had a personnel strength of 74 offieers, 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

10 enlisted and 18 civilian personnel. To ensure of these two service organizations also carry the wider probable acceptance of its technical in- titles and responsibilities of Commander in puts and results, jt e t f was to be supported Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Strike Command scientlfically bv 14 professional personnel, on ( ciNCARSTRiKE), and Commander in Chief, contract from the Planning Research Corpora­ U.S. Air Force Forces, Strike Command ( cinc- tion. AlI test and evaluation tasks were to be afstrike), respectively. accomplished by joint military-scientific teams. With respect to jt e x Gold Fire I staff plan­ The total usstricom test and evaluation ning, jt e t f was responsible for determining program under which jt e t f functions includes what data were needed, in what form they not only joint field tests but also map exercises would be collected, what purpose they would and collateral studies. The latter category in- serve, how the data-collection organization cludes analytical studies and Computer simu- would function, how the data would be syn- lations which are being conducted, for the most thesized with other data for final evaluation of part, by selected industrial contractors to ex­ the concept, and how all this would be reported. amine those facets of the Air Force concept The jt e t f had expended its principal which cannot be probed realistically, or do not early efforts researehing available documenta- lend themselves to valid evaluation, in peace- tion on the Air Force concept. It had established time field test exercises. Such subjects as air a liaison team with the Tactical Air Warfare base vulnerabilitv, aircraft survivability, and Center ( tawc) at Eglin Air Force Base, the influence of differing geographical environ- Florida. The latter unit had been established ments on the concept are examples of areas by the Air Force principally to develop its con­ requiring such collateral efforts. cept; refine it by theoretical and practical appli- In his guidance to jt e t f , cincstrike eation of units, procedures, and equipments; placed primary emphasis on joint field testing, and test these developments on a unilateral and thereíore the predominant funding support service basis in the Eglin maneuver area. The has been directed toward th is phase of evalu­ liaison team monitored TAWc-eonducted test­ ation. ing related to the Air Force concept and re­ The joint field tests of the Air Force con­ ported the results to jt e t f for use in the cept, as designed by cincstrike, were given the planning of Gold Fire I and in later evaluation titles of Joint Test and Evaluation Exercise of the Air Force concept. ( jt e x ) Gold Fire I for a brigade-size test and Fundamental to any evaluation must be jt e x Gold Fire II for division-size. The purpose a concise statement of what is to be evaluated. of this paper is to discuss how cincstrike per- As required by the jt e t f mission, it was to be formed his test and evaluation of the Air Force concept of air mobility, with emphasis on the planning and conduct of jt e x Gold Fire I. In preparing for Gold Fire I,° each of the joint staff agencies of usstricom accomplished those actions normally assigned to it during planning and conduct of tvpical field exercises. Much of the actual detailed work pertaining to the Army and Air Force participating units was accomplished through the service-desig- nated headquarters responsible for joint Army/ Air Force operations, i.e., the Continental Army Command for the Army and the Tactical Air Command for the Air Force. The commanders

8A report entitled "Exercise Gold Fire I” by Major Robert G. Sparkman appeared in Air University Rcview, XVI, 3 (March- April 1965). 22-44. AIR MOBILITY IN THE FIELD TEST 17

a concept promulgated bv the Air Force which jt f Sioux represented the military forces would use units and procedures produced by of Argentia, a mythical country unfriendly that Service to enhance the mobility and com- toward Oroland. jt f Sioux was assigned the bat effectiveness of Army ground units in joint task of creating appropriate tactical situations operations. for the test, and jt f Ozark would react, thereby In its concept, the Air Force stated that demonstrating the Air Force concept. The Test it planned to work with the standard bo a d Director exercised general eontrol over jt f infantry division (fíeorganization Objective Sioux’s operations. Army Division) to provide a more practical The foregoing concept enabled jt f Ozark and economical means for attaining tactical to react to or exploit the tactical situation, as mobility than would be the case with the spe- appropriate, with considerable freedom of cialized force, the air assault division being action and opportunity to exercise imaginative evaluated by the Army. The concept vvent on tactics. The concept enabled the Test Director to profess that “this would provide, by the to observe jt f Ozark operations under four process of selective tailoring of appropriate different conditions: resources, combat force capabilities ranging a. As a counterguerrilla/counterinsurgency from a relativelv light air mobile force to a force free from involvement in conventional force capable of sustained combat.” operations. b. As an inferior force conducting with- drawal and delaying operations. exercise frametcork c. As an equal force conducting defensive jt e x Gold Fire I was cast in the mold of operations. a typic-al usstbicom contingency operation. The d. As a superior force conducting offensive scenario postulated that, at the request of a operations. small nation allied to the United States for military assistance, a reinforced infantry bri- data collection and evaluation methodology gade and appropriate tactical air forces were strategically deployed for a simulated over- jt e x Gold Fire I was designed to enable water distance of 2200 nautical miles, emplov- various aspects of the Air Force concept to be ing ma ts and tac airlift. A few items not so seen in action and to permit the gathering of deployed, principally heavv engineer equip- data on performance. Two basic data-collection ment, were transported by a simulated sealift, methods were used. First, subjective question- which required nine davs. naires were filled out by sênior members of the The exercise took place in a 2-million-acre data-collection organization based upon per- tract of leased land in south central Missouri sonal observation and interpretation of what contiguous to Fort Leonard Wood. It com- occurred. Second, data-collection forms de­ menced on 29 October with a three-day deploy- signed for electronic data processing were used ment phase and concluded at 1700 hours on 11 to collect hard, or measurable, data relating November 1964. The employment phase was primarilv to times, quantities, and locations. conducted as a continuous, two-sided, semi- The data to be eolleeted by questionnaires and controlled exercise extending ovcr an eleven- forms were packaged by functional areas of day period without interruptions or administra- combat. By usstbicom definition these are Fire tive breaks. The Test Director was cincstbike. Support, Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Aer- Joint Task Force Ozark, the force being ial Battlefield Surveillance ( t a ba bs), Tactical tested, employed the Air Force air mobility Air Movement, Logistics, Strategic Air Move- concept with minimal eontrol from the Test ment, and Command and Control. Director. jt f Ozark represented the U.S. mili­ In order to ensure generation of adequate tary force deployed to the mythical friendlv data to provide a valid statistical basis for country of Oroland in response to a request for evaluation of the Air Force concept, a table military assistance. of minimum events was developed prior to the m u 'it..u vi IUU*'MUUI. I»»» ,11111 m\m\\ mwww íiinw m

líu ru ü i

\Y llll\ U H U U u \ A i uwn\\\\\\feüVj , .m*\ miDr.ui. ' Intelligence Processing and Display A Combat Rcporting Center of Gold Fire I (Icft) illumimted for night operations ... A Zuni rocket canister is loadcd with reconnaissance photo- graphs for parach ute deliverij to front-line ground commanders.

An intelligence expert studies an imagerij for accurate information. Joint Test and Emluation Task Force personnel inspect a Direct Air Support Center.

start of the exercise. For each element of the relative to the six jes requirements and the Air Force concept, the table specified the mini- suitability of the Air Force concept in joint mum number of oceurrences of the element de- operations. Suitability was considered within sired during the exercise. For example, a mini- the context of evaluation criteria (readiness, mum number of 25 deliveries bv the auxiliary Hexibility, mobility, command and control, low-altitude parachute extraction method from combat Service support, and unitv of effort) the C-130 vvas required. cincstrikes mission employed by usstricom for assessing the pre- letter to the commander of the tested joint task paredness of assigned forces. force enclosed the table of minimums and charged the commander with accomplishing organization the desired number of oceurrences or events. The scenario and exercise control by the Test Data requirements stemmed from a de- Director manipulated the aggressor, jt f Sioux, tailed study of the jes requirements placed in such a way as logically to allovv the accom- upon cincstrike and of the Air Force concept plishment of the prescribed events within each of air mobility. These requirements were ex- tactical situation by jt f Ozark, the tested force. amined through the framework of the func­ Within each functional area of combat, the tional areas of combat. For the purposes of this questionnaires and hard data forms vvere de- exercise Strategic Air Movement and Tactical signed to elicit information and generate data Air Movement were combined into a func- C-130, CH-3C, and UH-1B aircraft operate from a Golã Fire 1 assault landing zone.

tional area, Mobility, Tactical and Strategic. Mobility, Tactical and The design and formation of the jt e x Gold Fire Strategic Assault Airlift I data-collection organization, therefore, fol- Logistics lowed these amended functional lines. It is noted in this regard that the usstricom break- The joint data-collection organization was out of functional areas of combat is not iden- headed by the Director of the u sst r ic o m Joint tical to that employed in the official statement Test and Evaluation Task Force, Major General of the Air Force concept. A correlation can William B. Rosson, usa, and consisted of 862 easily be made of the existing functional area personnel, who were distributed to permit relationships as follows: manning on a joint basis of: a. A data-collection headquarters at Fort USSTRICOM USAF Leonard VVood, Missouri. Command and Control Command and b. A data-collection fíeld team for each of Control the functional areas. Fire Support Close Air c. A photo documentation section centered Support at Fort Leonard Wood, with joint teams at each Tactical Air Reconnaissance Tactical Air Air Force base and station and throughout the and Aerial Battlefield Reconnais­ ground maneuver area. Sur\’eillance ( tarabs) sance The data-collection organization provided near A Tactical Air Command C-130 flies at five feet and 120 equality in numbers of Air Force and Army miles per hour to unload cargo bij the low-altitude para- evaluation personnel and incorporated civilian c h u t e ex traction system (L A P E S ). . . . PO L in 500 -g allon scientific and technical representation. Person­ drums requires careful palletizing for safe extraction. nel sources are reflected in the table on page 23. Personnel requirements were filled to the maximum degree possible from resources with- in Headquarters vsstricom and in particular from jt e t f . All remaining requirements were placed upon the Services through afstrike and arstrike. Detailed study of the functional areas of combat and the administrative support field established specific personnel requirements in terms of grade, qualification, security clear- ance, and Service. Nineteen Air Force and Army personnel were placed on temporarv duty with j tetf 45 davs prior to the exercise in order to develop materiais for use in a training program for data collectors. This combined group formed the nucleus of the data-collec- tion organization and reported for duty well in advance of the arrival of the bulk of the data collector personnel to ensure development of proper supervisory and analytical skills and techniques.

training In August 1964 a map exercise based on the field test scenario was conducted at jt et f Air Civil Contract Force Army Service Personnel Data collectors: _ — Field-grade officers 53 60 Company-grade officers 84 88 — — Noncommissioned officers 50 86 — — Subtotals 187 234 Photo operations 142 106 13 Supervision & support 19 33 5 — Planning Research Corp. — —— 8 Drivers — 115 —— 348 488 18 “8 headquarters. This exercise was held to enable collector’s handbook, maps with overlays, code planners to check provisions being made for books for use during radio transmissions, and data eollection and exercise control and to de­ a photographic key to aircraft recognition. termine the soundness of the scenario. Players Data collectors and evaluators reported for were drawn from those personnel designated the exercise with personal field equipment and to participate during the exercise on the Test were then provided with collective gear for Director s staff as controllers, as data collectors, each field team, generally a quarter-ton vehicle or as members of the opposition jt f staff. with trailer, tentage, a stove, and rations to Ten days prior to the field test, data collec­ permit each team to be independent of player tors were assembled at Fort Leonard Wood for support during the exercise. Three base camps training and equipping. Training consisted of were conveniently located in the maneuver two days of general exercise orientation in the area to permit supply replenishment, radio and post theater, three days of functional area spe- vehicle maintenance, and general support as cialized training in classrooms, and a three-day needed. Aircraft were centralized at Fort Leon­ field command post exercise ( cpx) over the ard Wood to support data eollection, mobile actual terrain to be covered later by the player target teams, and supervisory personnel. Ma­ forces. Thorough training in the details of the jor items of equipment included the following: Air Force air mobility concept was accom- Tactical vehicles 186 plished through the participation of a sênior Rental sedans 47 briefing team from the Tactical Air Warfare Rádios 145 Center during the general orientation. The ef- Aircraft 26 fectiveness of this instruction covering test objectives, t\pes of data to be obtained, and Additional special items of recording the use of special data forms and question- equipment such as high-speed cameras on jet naires was measured by classroom testing and aircraft, vibration-dampened cameras mounted again during the field-conducted command in helicopters, trailer-mounted motion pieture post exercise. cameras with telescopic lenses, and electronic Tactical vehicles with one or two radio data recorders at Hawk missile sites were in- sets provided excellent support for each of the stalled, as necessary, to assist data collectors. data collector teams in the field. Training in the proper use of this equipment was continu- data eollection ous throughout all three phases of the training program. For field use, a number of aids were The basic nuinerical data collected in each provided to each field team, such as a data of the functional areas of combat were recorded 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

in terms of time, quantity, and location. Repe- been anticipated for the type of operation that titions of actions were necessary to provide suf- was considered before the exercise as the ficient density of certain types of data. The planned Air Force modus operandi. number of repetitions of events vvas controlled Another problem experienced was in the through manipulation of the aggressor, jt f editing of the hard data collection results. It Sioux, by the Test Director, using as a guide his was planned that automatic editing routines list of minimum essential events. As forms were which had been prepared for the Computer completed by various field data-collection would detect the bulk of errors that would teams, they were assembled at collection points probably occur in the completion of a large throughout the ground maneuver area and at volume of forms by data collectors operating the outlying Air Force bases, for daily pickup under field conditions. It was decided that this through a centrally controlled aerial collection would be the quickest way to achieve a gross svstem. Following daily receipt of forms at the edit and that such manual editing as was re- data-collection center at Fort Leonard Wood, quired should follow. However, the volume of each was checked by a functional area super­ forms so far exceeded the number anticipated visor for completeness and correctness, then during the planning phase that the capability released to the Computer analysis section for for punching the Computer cards was not suffi- key-punching and subsequent entrv into the cient to remain current. This resulted in a con- electronic data bank, a 1401 ib m Computer with siderable backlog of unedited data forms and four tape drives. Data purification was accom- a significant slowing of the final data-reduction plished as the bank expanded during and after process. It became quite clear that either a the exercise. This wealth of statistical data, careful manual edit must be accomplished combined with the subjeetive data from teams prior to the time data forms are key-punched or of sênior personnel examining each functional that a completely adequate key-punch capabil­ area in detail, became the basic material from ity must be provided which is able to stay which analysis of jt f .x Gold Fire 1 would be abreast of the load to ensure that error edits accomplished. The complete data bank pro- are accomplished on a timely basis. \ ides a reservoir of the latest statistics relating Much valuable subjeetive information can to the Air Force concept and is available for be obtained from key commanders and staffs. use in accomplishing map analyses, Computer However, during the conduct of the exercise simulations, and analytical studies. these individuais are extremely busy and are Despite well-laid plans, execution of oper- pressed to make time available for interview by ations often goes awry. data collectors. To ensure that essential infor­ The several functional-area hard data col­ mation is gathered, subjeetive data collectors lection Systems were similar in concept. Very must be of sufficient rank to gain the audiences soon after the exercise began it became appar- required. ent that the more flexible a data system was, the In an effort to economize on the number of more responsive it could be to last-minute data collectors required, personnel for exclu­ change. The Air Force concept, though funda- sive employment during the strategic air move- mentallv unchanged, was continuallv being ment phase were not requested. Instead data modified with respect to techniques. An exam- collectors from the other functional areas were ple of such modification was the introduction used, with the thought that they could continue of KC-135 tankers for the air-to-air refueling of directly from the terminal end of the strategic fíghter and reeonnaissance aircraft. Refueling deployments to their assigned exercise loca- resulted, on oceasion, in a single aircraft s fly- tions. This arrangement, though reasonably ing what was equal to several missions until successful, did complicate coverage of the de- such time as its ordnance or film load had been ployment and the initial part of the exercise expended or until it was necessary to relieve employment phase. Furthermore these person­ the crew. Gathering data on this type of oper- nel were not available to the strategic deploy- ation was a somewhat different task than had ment functional area chief during the prepara- Mission completed, an RF-101 pilot of JTF Ozarlc reports the information he has gained to Armij and Air Force interrogators, for evaluation of its accuracij and reliability. tion of the initial reports and editing of the and seizure of river Crossing sites. hard data forms and subjeetive questionnaires. Attaeks across an obstacle and deep into A lesson learned is that personnel for the ex­ enemy territory; envelopment. clusive purpose of covering the strategic de- Exploitation of nuclear weapons effects, ployment phase should be requested separately protection of the corps flank, and at­ from those assigned to other data-eollection tacks across obstacles. duties. Capitalizing on the earlier Gold Fire I planning, a usst r ic o m Joint Evaluation Group was formed around a nucleus of 9 officers and the Army concept 4 Planning Research Corporation ( pr c ) scien- cincstrike was directed by the Joint Chiefs tists from jt et f and was augmented by 85 of Staff on 6 Üctober 1964 to conduct a sep- additional personnel from other directorates of arate and independent evaluation of the Armvs Headquarters usstricom and from afstrike unilaterallv conducted test exercise, Air Assault and ARSTRIKE. II. This exercise was conducted during the pe- The principal operating elements of the riod 14 October to 12 November 1964, con- Joint Evaluation Group were a Data Collection currently with Gold Fire 1, and was comprised Center, which was staffed with 2 officers and 4 of the following operational phases: pr c scientists, and a Joint Field Team Coordi- nator Section comprised of 5 functional area Initial contact with the enemy, teams, 4 of which were manned by 8 officers mobile defense, and conduct of delay- each, and the fifth by 12 officers. The task of ing action. the Data Collection Center was to synthesize Antiairbome operations, envelopment data collected and made available by the Army 26 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

with those data acquired hy the Joint Evalua- nel had returned to their headquarters in St. tion Group field teams. Petersburg, Florida. Both evaluation groups The Joint Field Teams, operating in their faced the task of preparing an exercise report respective functional areas of interest, ob- on their particular test. By 10 January 1965 served key activities throughout the exercise both had completed their reports, which were period. Their observations and reports were then sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although guided by detailed subjective questionnaires. these reports contained many significant find- Such matters as selection criteria and train- ings on each exercise, it must be borne in mind ing of data collectors, field operations support, that cincstrike’s test and evaluation plan of the and data-eollection management techniques Air Force concept, not unlike a jigsaw puzzle, were sufficiently similar to those employed in is comprised of many interrelated parts. The Gold Fire I as not to require separate discus- results of Gold Fire 1 and Air Assault II, as im- sion. It is noteworthy that the data-collection portant as they are, will achieve their greatest force reported for duty in the maneuver area significance when combined for a total per­ just one week after usstbicom received the formance evaluation with the results of collat- jcs message to perform the evaluation. This eral studv efforts, map analyses, Computer sim- achievement was possible because of the prior ulations, and analvtical studies. The narrow. Gold Fire I èxperience accumulated at jt e t f direct applicability of field test results occa- and the splendid support rendered by arstrike sioned by such inherent limitations as a single and afstrike in promptly moving in highlv environment and absence of live ordnance will competent personnel to help. be broadened through collateral studv analyses and in comprehensive evaluations. Independently evaluating Air Assault II evaluation process was an ad hoc task for jt e t f , and its contribu- Shortly after 15 November, jt e t f person­ tion to the evaluation of the Air Force concept is not direct. Certainlv there are common oper- operation is the realistic training which partici- ations and procedures in both concepts, and in pating units undergo. The teamwork, coopera- these areas data from two difFering sources pro- tion, and understanding achieved among player vide a most valuable eross check. commanders and their staffs will pemieate the It was determined that sufficient data for Services now and in the future as these per- Joint Chiefs of Staff purposes had been ob- sonnel move on to other key assignments. “This tained from exercises Air Assault II and Gold was how we did it in Gold Fire I” will be heard Fire I, and therefore Exercise Gold Fire II was time and again from Korea to Germanv. This is canceled. how air mobility was looked at in the field test laboratory.

A bo n us derived from field testing in a joint Hq USSTRIC.OM LESSONS OF LEBANON A Study in. Air Strategy

C olonel Albert P. S ig h t s, J r .

N MONDAY morning, 14 July 1958, ord of events contains useful lessons still appli- Camille Chamoun, President of Leb- cable to problems which face us today. O anon, handed the American ambassa- President Chamouns appeal carne as a dor an urgent request for United States military tactical surprise to military planners, but it assistanee within 48 hours. A little more than merelv climaxed a long period of strategic 24 hours later our troops occupied the airport warning: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise of south of Beirut, Lebanon’s capital city. Then pan-Arabism, the waning influence of former carne a rapid buildup of powerful land, sea, colonial powers, the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian and air forces in the eastern Mediterranean, an arms deal, the abortive Anglo-French invasion area more than 5000 miles from the United of Suez, the virulent anti-Westem propaganda States. This deployment, at that time the largest Lssuing from Cairo, growing fears of Commu- since the Korean War, gave an impressive dem- nist-inspired rebellion against the pro-Western onstration of the readiness of our armed forces governments of Lebanon and other Middle to react swiftly and strongly in an emergency. East countries—a pattern of trends and events Also it stands today as a classic example of hovv that clearly portended more trouble to come. military and political actíons may complement In March 1957 the U.S. Congress issued a and reinforce one another in resolving an in- joint resolution, known as the “Eisenhower ternational crisis without war. Doctrine,” authorizing the President to em- Since our forces were not engaged in ac- ploy American armed forces in support of anv tual combat, the political aspects of the opera- Middle Eastern nation “requesting assistanee tion have tended to receive major emphasis. against armed aggression from any country Yet professional airmen will find many points controlled by international communism. 1 Still of interest in a re-examination of the purely more explicitlv, Secretary of State Dulles de- military aspects. The operation provided an clared publicly and periodically reaffirmed in initial try-out of new concepts for worldwide the spring and early summer of 1958 that Amer­ employment of tactical air forces; it demon- ican military assistanee would be fumished if strated possibilities and revealed limiting fac- requested by Lebanon. tors in mounting large-scale airborne assaults Following an outbreak of armed rebellion over great distances; and it highlighted the in Lebanon on 9 May 1958, heavy fighting de- difficulties of combining land-based air forces veloped in various parts of the country. 1 he with other arms and Services to form a single insurgent forces, apparently receiving arms and cohesive instrument of military power. The rec- assistanee from outside sources, aehieved such LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATECY 29

striking initial success that the lawful gov- quent buildup of forces. Initial objectives were emment seemed to be seriously threatened. to secure the airfield and port at Beirut. There- Charles Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, after control might be extended into other even suggested at this time that a U.S. Marine parts of the country as necessary to carry out Corps division might be required to preserve the mission. Land-based air forces would bring the government.2 in the airborne units and join with carrier- As a precautionary measure, orders went based forces to perform the customary tasks out to U.S. Army and Air Force commanders of air power: establishing air superiority in the in Europe to place one battle group and as- objective area, fumishing air cover and close sociated airlift in a state of readiness for im- support to the ground forces, and providing mediate deplo\anent to Lebanon. In the United aerial reconnaissance coverage of the entire States the Tactical Air Command ( tac ) placed area of operations to indude, of course, sur- fighter units on alert for possible movement to veillance of national frontiers for any indica- the European area, and the Military Air Trans- tions of outside interferenee. port Senice ( mats) dispatched C-124 trans- Overall command of the operation was ports from zi bases to augment the airlift re- vested in the Commander-in-Chief, Specified sources of U.S. Air Forces in Europe ( usafe). Command Middle East ( cincspecomme).° Ac- Within three davs the Army battle group and cording to plan this joint commander and his Air Force transports were standing by at de- staff would proeeed immediately from perma- parture airfields ready for any eventualitv. The nent duty station in London, establish a head- situation in Lebanon eased, and toward the end quarters in the Middle East. and take over of May military forces reverted to normal alert direction of the various task units as thev ar- status. rived in the area. Responsibility for providing For a time relative calm prevailed, raising usaf units to cincspecomme devolved primar- hopes that Lebanon would find a solution to ily upon the major air commands usafe and her internai problems. Then carne a severe, tac, whose supporting plans embodied two wholly unexpected political earthquake in a separate but related air operations: the airlift nearby quarter. In the early hours of 14 Julv of Army forces from Europe and the deploy- a revolutionary group overthrew the pro- ment of combat air power from Europe or the Western government of nearby Iraq in a bloodv United States. coup. When word of this reached Beirut, Presi- For the airlift operation, troops were to dent Chamoun took instant alarm. The violent assemble at designated departure airfields near upheaval might well send a tidal wave of Munich, Germanv. Concurrently usafe trans- Communist-inspired insurgency throughout the port aircraft, supplemented by ma ts transports Middle East that would sweep all before it, from the United States, would also converge including his ovvn government. His plea for on these airfields. After loading out, transports help was not long in coming. When it reached would fly the first battle group via the most Washington, military staffs were ready vvith direct route over non-Communist territorv to carefullv laid contingencv plans for just such the forward staging area at Incirlik Air Base, an emergency. Adana, Turkey ( hereinafter referred to simply as Adana), some 200 milesnorth of Beirut. The second battle group would follow on the same Operation Blue Bat transport aircraft when thev became available after turnaround. Support troops and Army The operation in Lebanon, given the code name Blue Bat, was designed to support and assist the Lebanese government in maintaining °Actnally in the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces East- cm Atlantic and Mcditcrrancan (C1NCNELM), who occnpicd or restoring order. U.S. troops would enter the a dual position as the naval component commander in the U.S. European Command and as a JCS specified commander for country by airborne or amphibious assaults to contíngency operations in the Middle East. While functioning in the latter capacíty, CINCNELM was to assume the title establish airheads or beachheads for subse- CINCSPECOMME. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

resupply would move by air or sea, depending clearly lifted tacs aspiration into the realm on the situation in the objective area. of practical possibility. Adana vvas also to be the main operating Early in 1952 the 20th Fighter Bomber base for Air Force combat elements, including Wing deployed overseas with specially modi- tactical fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance fied F-84G s, the first tactical aircraft in oper- aircraft. Two altemative methods were pre- ational units able to deliver atomic weapons. scribed for constituting this force. If time per- Then in July Colonel Dave Schilling, usaf, led mitted, tac units would flv in directly from 68 F-84s of the 31st Fighter Escort Wing on an the United States while usafe forces remained 11,000-mile flight from Turner afb, Geórgia, to in place in Europe. On the other hand, if time Yokota, Japan, making seven stops but using was criticai, usafe would deploy its own com­ aerial refueling over the long stretches of the bat units initially and then return them to Pacific. These deployments confirmed that in­ Europe after tac units had arrived in the area tercontinental range of atomic delivery capa- and been phased in as replacements. The ques- bilities would enable tactical aircraft to reach tion of whether time was or was not criticai any part of the world quickly, in small numbers could hardlv be answered in advance of the but with enormously destructive firepower. crisis itself. Hence the advantage of retaining Recognizing these potentialities, usaf di- these options was offset to some degree by the rected tac in early 1953 to organize a mobile disadvantage of deferring until the eleventh atomic force of fighters prepared for world­ hour a very important decision—one made dou- wide deployment. Three years later usaf ex- bly difficult because it involved the first appli- panded the requirement from a single fighter cation of a new Air Force concept. unit to a balanced tactical air task force. This led to the promulgation in 1956 of tacs now Composite Air Strike Force familiar Composite Air Strike Force ( casf) concept. In essence, this was a scheme for For several years prior to the Lebanon rapid assembly and overseas movement of crisis, Air Force planners had been at work on balanced-force packages comprising tactical a new scheme for worldwide employment of fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, and support tactical air forces. As the growing might of aircraft together with the personnel and equip- strategic air power tended to reduce the Iike- ment needed to sustain them in the field for lihood of general war, attention shifted toward periods up to 30 days. The size and composi- the problems of dealing with piecemeal aggres- tion of these preplanned force packages var- sion aimed at limited objectives. The need for ied according to projected areas of operation a rapid militarv response became apparent, not and the nature of anticipated threats. casf onlv to counter threats of a fait accompli but Bravo became the basic priority force for the also to stabilize quickly anv crisis situations Middle East. Its major elements at the time of which, if unchecked, might mushroom into the Lebanon crisis were a casf command ele- general war. ment stationed at Hq Nineteenth Air Force, By the early Fifties the Strategic Air Com- Foster afb, Texas; two squadrons of 24 F-100’s mand already had attained a quick-reaction ca- stationed at Cannon afb, New México; a com­ pability. Local-war situations, however, would posite reconnaissance squadron of 6 RF-101 s, call for tactical fighters primarily and strategic 6 RB-66’s, and 3 \VB-66’s stationed at Shaw bombers only secondarily if at all. tac aspired afb, South Carolina; and a squadron of 12 to become usafs primary local-war force, but B-57’s stationed at Langley afb, Virgínia. KB- skeptics doubted its ability to deploy any sub- 50's at Langley would support Atlantic cross- stantial tactical air strength from the United ings with refuelings near Nova Scotia, Ber- States to distant overseas areas in sufficient time muda, and the Azores. The code name adopted to counter a sudden aggression. Many consid- for casf deployments was Operation Double ered the difficulties insuperable, but the year Trouble, derived from the exhortation, Where 1952 brought two noteworthy events which there s trouble, get there on the double. LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATECY 31 quick reaction the United States was obliged by treaty to notify its nato allies, some of whom might ob- With the perfection of aerial refueling ject to the withdrawal. techniques and the acquisition of improved On the other hand tac forces represented KB-50 tankers, tac concentrated on increas- an uncommitted U.S. strategic reserve. They ing the readiness and reducing the reaction could go directly to the trouble spot. The time of its forces. Indeed quick reaction be- theater defense posture, as well as U.S. rela- came the central objective in Double Trouble tionships with nato, would remain undis- planning. The time element was basic to the turbed. Surely this was the simple and obvious idea espoused by General O. P. VVeyland, Com- solution. Yet there was still the nagging ques­ mander of tac, that the way to deal with a tion of time. local war, or the threat of one, was to get forces usafe units based in Europe could reach on the scene quickly. He believed it was more the Middle East sooner than tac units coming important to get a small force in place rapidly from the United States, some from as far away than a large force leisurely. as New México. But how much sooner? Com- However, there were limiting factors. One parative distances can be deceiving because of was the shortage of aerial tankers and the need the high speeds of modern aircraft. Actual en­ to preposition them at enroute bases before route time might be relatively short compared movement of the main force could begin. An- to ground preparation time, which remains other was the substantial tonnage of support- more or less constant irrespective of distance to ing personnel and equipment which would be flown. In a real local-war crisis, would the have to accompany the force and the uncertain possible saving of a few hours make very much availability of ma ts airlift; still another, the difference? Perhaps not. But could tac actually requirement, only partiallv satisfied, for air meet its programed schedules? They had never bases in the objective area already manned and been eonfirmed by test in a real emergency. equipped and adequately stoeked with bulk Such were the problems that occupied Air Force supplies such as po l , ordnance, food, water, planners as the Lebanon crisis approached. and general Stores. Finding these problems difficult but not in- the situation on 14 July solvable, tac progressively reduced its planned reaction times. Under the latest schedules, one On 14 July carne Lebanons call for help— F-100 squadron of casf Bravo would arrive in expected in a general way yet unexpected in the Middle East 17 hours after an execution circumstance and timing. Plans for various hy- order and all combat aircraft within 48 hours. pothetical contingencies now had to be trans- Moreover tac planners were already consider- formed quickly into blueprints for action in a ing further refinements to permit a 36-hour specific real-life emergency. deployment of the entire force under condi- Intelligence information showed consid- tions of no prior waming. These anticipated erable ground and air strength in and around capabilities were impressive, but the question the objective area. By Western standards, most whether tac or usafe forces would support the of these Middle East forces were poorly trained Middle East contingency plans remained an and equipped. In view of their limited combat open one. potential, the possibility seemed fairly remote usafe forces were oriented toward a pri- that they would offer active opposition. Even mary threat. They were already in place, trained, so, the military planners knew from long experi- and equipped for this role. To pull out some of ence never to disregard the fighting capabilities these forces and send them into peripheral of any potentially hostile forces whatever the areas would correspondingly weaken theater apparent intentions of their government. defense. Also there were poíitical complications First was the question of how the Leba- in the use of forces already committed to Allied nese themselves would react when U.S. forces Command, Europe. Before withdrawing them, appeared. True, President Chamoun had in- USAFE 322d Air Division C-130’s stand rcadij to airlift troops of the 24tf Deployment Infantry Division from Furstenfeldbruck Air Base, Germany, to Lebanon.. . B-57's on flight line at Adana, Tttrkey, being checked for flight to Beimt “Welcome to Lebanon” greets U.S. Army personnel as their jeeps roll from a USAF C-130 at Beirut International airport on 18 ]ultj 1958. ... An Army Task Force with its gear offloads from C-119's after landing at Beirut.

fi

i í 34 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW vited them into his country, but one of the estimate was faulty on two counts: first, U.S. problems involved vvas the extent of the dis- naval forces were much closer than this and, affection resulting from insurgent action. Ru- second, had they actually been near Spain, they mors were circulating of a possible coup by the could not have reached Lebanon in 48 hours. Lebanese army. There were some five to seven One thing was clear to high U.S. officials. thousand armed insurgents in Lebanon. These Chamoun thought his position precarious and rebel forces controlled large sections of the wanted help from friendly quarters as soon as country, including part of Beirut itself, and he could get it. were sustained, according to claims of the Lebanese government, by a steady flow of arms the alert and equipment from neighboring Syria.3 Rebel leaders had said publicly they would drive War plans for future contingencies are back into the sea any U.S. forces that attempted secure. However, once a military operation to land.1 begins, hundreds of people at all echelons from Whether or not any Lebanese elements re- highest to lowest must know who, what, when, sisted, there was the possibility of outside in- and where. Moreover the sudden alert of units tervention. The United Arab Republic ( uar) in a peacetime posture invariably becomes had substantial air strength in jet fighter and public knowledge, whereupon speculation or light bomber aircraft on Syrian and Egyptian rumor may supply the purpose and objective as bases, some within easy range of the Levant surely as an oíficial press release. coast. The bulk of Syria s army, adequately U.S. forces in support of Operation Blue equipped with tanks, artillery, and transport, Bat were scattered throughout western Europe was deployed along the Israeli border not too and the Mediterranean. (See Figure 1.) Some far from Beirut. Of course intervention by the were in the United States. The military unit uar seemed improbable, but conceivably its nearest Lebanon was a Navy transport amphi- forces might undertake a delaving action to bious squadron ( traxsphibron-6) carrying a buv time, counting on early U.S. submission to battalion landing team ( bl t 2/2) of some 1800 neutralist or Communist propaganda or to Marines. transphibron-6, operating in the area some other form of Soviet pressure. Onlv two south of Cyprus, was onlv 12 hours from Beirut vears before, the LhS.S.R. had received wide- but lacked any air cover, since usafe had no spread, though misplaced, credit for halting the combat air power in the eastern Mediterranean Anglo-French incursion into Suez. and Sixth Fleet carriers were bevond support- Bevond these threats of armed opposition ing distance. AIso transphibron-6 was minus lay another potential obstacle to the attainment its underwater demolition team, shore party, of Western objectives in the Middle East: and beach group as well as some of its tanks specifically, that insurgent elements might oust and artillery because the LSD Plymouth Rock, President Chamoun, install a new government, whieh carried these important elements, was and withdraw the request for outside assistance en route to Malta for repairs.0 before it arrived. An awareness of this possi­ For the airborne operation two Army bat- bility doubtless accounts for the inclusion of tle groups of about 1800 men each were at time limits in Lebanon s request for military normal duty stations in Germany but prepared aid. Britain and France were asked to bring in to move out on short notice to designated de- forces within 24 hours; the United States within parture airfields. Sufficient air transportation 48 hours. These time limits represented Cha­ was earmarked to lift one of these battle moun s estimate, based on his own intelligence groups, but the aircraft were widely dispersed, sources, of the soonest that the different na- comprising not only usafe transports at vari- tional forces could arrive."' Believing that most ous European bases but also ma t s C-124s in of the U.S. Si.xth Fleet units were deployed off the United States. During the May alert, the the coast of Spain, he estimated that it would Army and Air Force had demonstrated an take them 48 hours to reach the Levant. This ability to assemble these troops and planes LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATEGY 35 rapidlv. Nevertheless many hours would be appears that substantial numbers of aircraft needed to load the force in Germany, flv 2000 should have been able to reach Adana from miles, stage at Adana, and deliver a well-exe- European bases in less than 48 hours, since cuted air assault in the vicinity of Beirut. theirs was a shorter flight over familiar routes. Combat air power to support the entry of Two attack carriers represented a third ground forces, whether by amphibious or air- source of air support. Essex, in port at Athens,7 bome assault, was available from three sources. and Saratoga, at Cannes, were many hours According to planned schedules, tac’s casf away. Either carrier, after clearing port, could could be expected to close at Adana within 48 send its air group on ahead to operate tem- hours after an alert. usafe estimates were less porarily from Adana. In this way air power specific on projected deployment times, but it probably could be brought to bear in the short-

Figure 1. Dispositirm of U.S. forces for the Lebanon operation. They included TAC CASF Bravo from the U.S. or equivalent combat forces from USAFE, two U.S. Army airbome battle groups in West Germany, USAFE transports at various bases in Europe, and MATS augmentation airlift from the U.S. Transports and forces assembled at Furstenfeldbruck and Erding Air Bases, fiew to the staging base at Adana, thence to Lebanon s capital, Beirut. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW est possible time. However, there had been no eyewitness news correspondent, “This must prior arrangements for this particular course of have been one of the most easygoing and re- action. laxed landings in the long history of the Corps. Decisions reached during the evening of . . . Within the first hour after the troops went 14 July were to send in the Marines embarked ashore, a picnic atmosphere developed along on transphibron-6 and, insofar as possible, to the beach. . . . Mothers brought their children limit knowledge of U.S. intentions to those down to have a look, and you could see little units which would conduct and support the girls in pink dresses and little boys in short initial amphibious landing. The landing was pants scampering around among the troops.”8 scheduled for 0900 edt the next morning to But appearances were deceiving. Lieuten- coincide with official U.S. announcement to the ant Colonel Harry A. Hadd, usmc, command- Congress, the United Nations, and the public. ing bl t 2/2, was ordered to use only the In general, the major commands participating minimum force needed but to accomplish his in Operation Blue Bat were to be informed but mission whatever might develop. He and his cautioned not to take any action prior to the superiors were acutely aware of the limitations landing that might suggest or reveal U.S. in­ of their own small forces ashore, knowing that tentions to intervene in the Middle East. powerful armored units equipped with modem Russian tanks were less than three hours from Beirut.9 the amphibious landing In facing this formidable threat the land­ The first wave of Marines from bl t 2/2 ing force was deficient not only in tanks and crossed the line of departure and headed for artillery but also in air support.10 When the Red Beach south of Beirut at 1500 ( 0900 edt ) Marines first hit the beach, the only airplanes on 15 July. (See Figure 2.) They encountered in the vicinity were those of the Lebanese Air no opposition and occupied their first objective, Force. Fortunately they offered no opposition. the airport, within an hour. According to an About 15 or 20 minutes after H-hour, seven

Figure 2. The amphibious landing. a. 15 July — BLT 2/2 occupies Beirut airport. TRANS- PHIBRON-2 with BLT 3/fí is dtie at 0730 next day. Essex en route from Athens is due next morning. b. 16 July — BLT 2/2 enters Beirut. BLT 3/6 occupies Beirut airport. Essex provides air support. Headquarters SPECOMME is established offshore aboard USS Taconic.

16 July

a b LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATEGY 37

AD-6 propeller-driven attack planes and four at an air base in France, Colonel Clyde Box, FJ-3 jet fighters appeared on the scene. These usaf, Commander, 322d Air Division ( Combat aireraft from the carrier Esse.r had staged Cargo), was making preparations for rapid as- through a British airfield on Cyprus. They sembly of the large transport fleet that would represented a welcome addition to the battle be required for airlift of Task Force Alpha. force though hardlv adequate to ensure air Shortly before the Marines landed in Lebanon, superiority over the beach, much less to fly both commanders received the order to execute armed reconnaissance on the borders of Leba- their respective plans for the Blue Bat deploy- non. ment. The second Marine battalion, bl t 3/6, be- Having had a recent rehearsal during the gan landing at 0730 the next morning with air May crisis, these Army and Air Force task or- cover from the Esse.x, which had reached the ganizations were in a position to carry out their area during the night. The same morning Ad­ plans rapidlv and efficiently. By that evening, mirai James L. Holloway, Jr., cincspecomme, 1800 men of Task Force Alpha and 59 transport arrived by air from London and in due course planes of the airlift force had assembled at the established his headquarters aboard the com- two departure airfíelds, Furstenfeldbruck and mand ship Taconic stationed some distance Erding, near Munich. Troops and equipment, offshore. His arrival was timely because a seri- loaded during the night, began departing early ous crisis was impending. the next morning, and on 17 July, in little more According to plan, bl t 2/2 had started than 24 hours, they closed at Adana after flying toward Beirut to secure the beaches and harbor 2100 nautical miles largely over water and area. As the Marines reached the outskirts of mountainous terrain.11 the citv, thev encountered Lebanese armv The enroute movement was hampered by forces, including tanks and artillerv, drawn up overflight and staging problems. Blue Bat in blocking positions. This dangerous con- planners had assumed that neeessary landing frontation was resolved by an on-the-spot and overflight clearances would be fortheom- conference, Admirai Holloway and U.S. Am- ing, but in the actual deployment two friendly bassador Robert McClintock meeting with governments felt obliged to restrict flights over General Fuad Chehab, commander of the Leb­ their countries because of unanticipated polit- anese Army.n The latter agreed to rescind his ical complications. This meant that transports orders, whereupon the three high-level con- had to be rerouted by more circuitous flight ferees led the Marine column past the road- paths. Some aireraft had to reduce cabin loads block and into the city. Lebanons internai and take on additional fuel in order to bypass crisis was far from settled, but the Marines had one of the planned refueling stops. landed and the immediate situation seemed to When Task Force Alpha arrived at Adana, be in hand. Meanwhile reinforcements were on it was held there on alert for two days by direc- the way. tion of Admirai Holloway, presumably to give him an air assault capability in ready reserve the airlift should the need for it arise. In the meantime another airbome force, not originally a part of At dawn on the lõth, Brigadier General the Blue Bat operation, was en route from the David W. Cray, usa, Airbome Brigade Com­ United States.14 This was Marine Corps Bat­ mander of the 24th Division, held a muster of talion 2/8, airlifted from Cherry Point, North the lst Airbome Battle Group, 187th Infantry, Carolina, in 36 Marine transport aireraft. The at its barracks in Germany. Designated as Task battalion commenced landing at Beirut airport Force Alpha, this unit was the initial airbome on 18 July and moved directly aboard ships to assault element in support of Operation Blue assist in the general unloading.1' The following Bat. Orders were to place the outfit in readiness day Admirai Holloway brought in Task Force for an airdrop, or parachute assault, at some Alpha from Adana. undisclosed time and place.'2 In the meantime A second Army airborne battle group, 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the builclup of air power Task Force Bravo, was originally scheduled to follow Alpha, but as the threat of serious trou- Near midnight on 14 July, tac received ble in Lebanon receded, Admirai Holloway word that casf Bravo would deploy to Adana asked uscinceur to hold Bravo in Germany on in lieu of usafe forces. However, the accom- 24-hour alert and send instead the support ele- panving instructions, to hold this information rnent organized as Task Force Charlie. Airlift “closest" until after the Marine landing, upset of this force, comprising some 1700 men and the planned sequence of operations and led to large quantities of cargo, commenced on 18 no little confusion and delay. At Cannon afb, July and was completed in seven days. Other New México, home of the Bravo F-100 squad- ground force units continued to arrive by sea rons, the runways were partially obstructed by and air, ultimately building up to a peak construction activity so that full-load night strength of about 15,000, of vvhich approxi- take-offs had been prohibited except in emer- mately 8000 were Army troops and 6000 were gency. Yet the F-100's would have to leave Marines."1 before daylight for their overseas staging base

F-100 Super Sabres of the 352d Tactical Fighter Squadron, Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina, line up to take off on operational deployment to Lebanon. Shortages also developed alsoin maps,Shortages radio developed facil- five incomplete. were received days earlier, kits, Flyaway refueling. inaerial qualifled ment experience. Aircrews were only partially only were partially Aircrews experience. ment deploy- no previous had They mission. this for staging base show the buildup of air power. air of buildup the show base staging The substituted squadrons were ill prepared prepared ill were squadrons substituted The later. hours nine 12 fighters of flight another ordersto launch aflight of12 F-100’s nonstop Figure 3. Cumulative Cumulative 3.aircraft arrivalsFigure Adana the at to Adana within seven hours and to follow with with follow to and hours seven Adana within to Gabreski, Commander of the 354th. received tac South Carolina. South declaration of emergency. Be that as it mav, it as that Be emergency. of declaration alert the or Cannon at else believing situation Tactical Fighter Wing at Mvrtle Beach at Mvrtle Beach Wing Fighter Tactical instructions from Washington precluded a precluded Washington frominstructions echelon when when echelon were already en route to pick up their ground up their to pick route en already were from the from the 48 hours air-refueled flighttoAdana. transports C-130 tor the inschedules toorder programed meet July Basic Chronology

19 15 20 16 18 17 At approximately 0900, Colonel S. Francis substituted two substituted squadrons of the 354th casf comes problem ToskForce Alphaheld at Adana, in Lebanon. land Marines - 1300 PMcompleteCASF - ot Adana hr ifed congestionbe- where airfield begins clearingAdana. M-Ts Force TaskAlpha AM - , either misunderstanding the real the misunderstanding either tac

deleted these squadrons afb LEBANON: A STUDYIN AIRSTRATECY ,

rT.O. _ 17 _ 23 _ 15 _ 26 - 4 Tac Ftrs Trouble deployment proved overlyTrouble optimistic. far far behind scheduled arrival times. and route, en landed seven was rescued), and shortlvby 43 C-130’scarrving essential support reach Adana until dawn of the17th.ls As Figure Adana, but in three flights instead of two and two of instead flights inthree but Adana, (as flight second the of 12 fighters time.17The out pilot bailed (the in NovaScotia crashed davon15 in July atransport C-130 but didnot was airborne within 30 minutes of the ap- the of minutes 30 within airborne was equipment and personnel. The The andpersonnel. equipment small staff, departed Foster Foster small staff, departed 3 indicates, the 48-hour estimate for the Double the for Double estimate the 48-hour 3 indicates, well as eventually three reached spares) in way the it all made four one launched, 12 the aircraft time.Of pointed naissance aircraft also left on the 15th, followed followed 15th, onthe left also aircraft naissance ity charts, exposure suits, and other important important suits, exposure andother ity charts, element. Major General Henrv Viccellio with a with Viccellio Henrv General Major element. items. Most of the tactical bomber and recon-Most bomber of the tactical Despite these difficulties, the first flight the difficulties, these Despite (fr Eur) Ftr- Ftr- Intcps l pT.O. y Element Comd CASF rT.O. [—T.O. - Land -10 -12 Bmrs Tac afb 12'A , casf Acft r T.O. Recon -17 -6 -15 Texas, at mid- hours’ flying

command Acft Transp Tac r- T.O. -43 -23 -31 -38 39 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Actually five days were to elapse before the en- tion for Lebanons internai problem. As the tire casf reached its destination. Weather, situation continued to improve, Admirai Hollo- mechanical trouble, training deficiencies, and a way received orders early in August to begin variety of other factors contributed to slippage planning an orderlv withdrawal of his forces. in the deployment schedule. One major cause The main phase of the withdrawal began of delay vvas early saturation of the base at on 15 September and continued during most of Adana. Bv 17 July almost every foot of usable October. The. last remaining casf units de- spac-e was taken up by the 147 planes already parted on 19 October, and usafes fighter-inter- on the field. Yet many of the casf Bravo combat ceptor unit returned to Germany on the 21st. aircraft and half their supporting transports On 24 October the ground, naval, and air head- were still en route. There was no alternative quarters were inactivated, and on the following but to restrict the flow of inbound aircraft even day Operation Blue Bat carne to an end. though th is meant a delay in the buildup of combat air power. The greatest source of congestion, of TTie Lessons course, was Task Force Alpha with its 50-odd transports waiting at Adana in an alert status. On the political front the Blue Bat forces When this force began leaving early on the were successful in helping to maintain stabilitv. 19th, the situation eased. Not only was more On the militarv front thev were never engaged, parking space available but taxiways were so we can only sunnise what might have hap- cleared so that incoming transports could go pened. Ultimatelv thev would have won be- directly to their unloading areas for quick turn- cause any likely combination against them around. Traffic began to move again so that by would have lacked sustained combat power. the night of 20 July the full complement of 63 However, thev would have gone into battle combat aircraft was on hand, including an ele- with three major handicaps: first, their forces ment of nine usafe F-86D fighter-interceptors were committed piecemeal and out of order; Hown in from Germany on the 17th to provide second, their organizational structure did not an all-weather air defense capabilitv. ensure coordinated employment of forces; and third, they were not fully prepared to wage conventional war. the denouement There was no actual combat in Lebanon, penalties of quick reaction although a few aircraft sustained minor dam- age from small-arms fíre. Air Force and Navv President Chamoun asked for American planes remained on alert throughout the peri- militarv aid within 48 hours. To U.S. officials od. flying routine air defense and precautionary the problem presented itself as a Communist- air cover missions. Also there were shows of supported effort to threaten with force the force and leaflet drops, but the principal opcra- legallv established government, which needed tional requirement was to provide reconnais- immediate and tangible support. The pressure sance information requested by the ground was on the armed forces to get there as soon as force.™ possible. In doing so, they íncurred penalties. American forces went into Lebanon to Basically the militarv high command had assist the legal government in maintaining two alternative courses of action: (1) to start stabilitv at a time when there was upheaval in all task units moving toward the objective area that countrv as well as in other parts of the and commit them piecemeal in whatever order Middle Eastern area. The fear that Lebanon they happened to arrive or (2) to assemble a would be engulfed in a violent revolution with balanced militarv force capable of meeting and Communist participation did not materialize. overcoming whatever opposition might rea- The arrival of U.S. forces did, however, help sonably be expected. The former combined encourage all sides to seek a compromise solu- speed with poor tactics; the latter, delay with LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATECY 41

sound tactics. The former would put ashore Recalling the original concept of an Army within 24 hours one battalion, deficient in airborne assault supported by land-based air tanks, artillerv, and air cover, its sênior com- forces, one would have expected, on the basis manders and reinforcements far avvav—a land- of tactical doctrine, to see the combatant types ing force sure to be roughly handled if opposed. of aircraft at the scene of action well in advance The latter, within 48 hours for example, would of the airborne assault elements. Yet the hasty permit a two-battalion assault with increased deployment led to a curious inversion which in fire support, adequate air cover, sênior com- effect placed unarmed transport planes in the manders on the scene, and powerful reinforce- van of the battle fleet. Specifieally, on 17 July ments one full dav nearer—a much stronger all of the airborne assault force was at Adana force probably able to hold a beachhead whereas only 70 per cent of the fighters and against whatever threats might develop. bombers and 50 per cent of their support equip­ As we have seen, the former course was ment had arrived. None of the reconnaissance followed. No opposition appeared, so who can aircraft were on hand, yet reconnaissance in­ say it was wrong? Politically it served the pur- formation was then the most urgent require- pose. Müitarily it was something of a gamble. rnent for the airborne assault force. Essentiallv the intended course of action was to Presumably the planners had intended send an initial force, consisting of one Marine that the arrivals of various elements and es- battalion. on ahead into potentially hostile ter- pecially the unloading and departure of trans­ ritory and hold other units in place far to the port aircraft would be regulated in such a way rear, starting them forward only after the ad- as to avoid the saturation of Adana and at the vance party had made contact. Wide variations same time ensure that aircraft needed first occurred in execution. W;hereas the Army and would arrive First. In the actual deployment, Air Force generally deferred force movements however, the airfield seemingly was just al- until after the initial landing, the Navy im- lowed to fill with whatever planes happened to mediately alerted Sixth Fleet combatant ships enter the traffic pattern, all units having been in Mediterranean ports and set them steaming directed to get there as soon as possible. This at best speed toward Lebanon. W’hether or not brings us to the problem of control and coordi- this action compromised U.S. intentions in any nation. way, the fact is that the government of Lebanon was helped to maintain itself. And had the coordination of forces Marines met opposition, the head start of these naval vessels would have been a great help. Consider the situation with the Air Force W'hen the Marines reported no opposition, Composite Air Strike Force and Navy carrier here seemingly was important information, not force both on hand, each under its own air com- previously available, that might affect deplov- mander, preparing to fly hundreds of missions ment plans. However, there is no evidence that into the small airspace above Lebanon. There it did so, even though most ground and air units was not then, nor is there today, any definitive had not yet departed from their home stations. body of joint doctrine to govern such opera- One Marine battalion, not even a task unit, tions. Difficulties in coordination, stemming showed up at Beirut after a breathless flight primarily from differences in procedure, were from the United States, tacs F-100 squadrons compounded by other factors such as lack of hurried off on flights made hazardous bv inade- common radio frequencies and incompatibilitv quate preparation. None of the cask Bravo of equipment. After about two weeks Admirai units brought their complete equipment. One Holloways staff managed to work out com- hastify assembled flvaway kit was later de- promise Solutions to the most urgent problems. scribed as “nothing more than 50(X) pounds of Under the pressures of actual combat, air op- random items.” The arrivals of units at Adana erations doubtless would have gone ahead on a were no more orderly than their departures had patchwork basis with the overwhelming su- been from home stations. periority of American air power permitting a 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

satisfactory outcome despite the inefficiencies tional bombs. The B-57 crews were not much of divided command. However, in a fight better qualified. They also were regarded as against odds, the handicap of having tvvo in- incapable of performing efficient conventional dependent and uncoordinated air forces wonld weapon deliverv. On the other hand all casf cost ns dearly. units were fully qualified in the delivery of nu­ The need for a system of eentralized con- clear weapons. The reasons are not hard to trol of air operations appeared in World War fathom. II, again in the Korean War, and subsequentlv Looking back at the origin of the casf, it in crisis situations like that in Lebanon. Yet no will be recalled that the germinal conception such system exists, and field commanders must was that oi small mobile strike forces. “With still resort to ad hoc arrangements worked out nuclear weapons,” said General Weyland in on the spot as each new situation arises. The 1956, "these forces can be compact and yet be problem, commonly attributed to interservice so effective as to provide the decisive balance rivalry, really stems from a basic conflict in of power.”-" During the mid-Fifties this was traditional principies governing air and naval whollv consistent with Air Force views. Public warfare. statements of various officials emphasized the It has long been a basic tenet of Air Force advantages of nuclear weapons in limited war. doctrine that air power is an entity. Applied to Given the prevailing climate of opinion, it was a situation like Lebanon, this means simply that no wonder that tnt bombs and rockets got lit- all partieipating air forces, whether land- or tle play in tactical exercises. sea-based, must come under eentralized con- Paradoxically, these usaf forces, trained trol for coordinated employment in combat. On almost exclusively for nuclear war, assumed a the other hand, sea power is also an entity in posture totally ünsuited for such a war. Indeed the view of naval strategists. Bv way of illustra- they scarcely could have contrived a more in- tion, each carrier, destroyer, submarine, mine viting target for enemy nuclear attack than bv sweeper, oiler, and other combatant ship or concentrating all air power resources on the auxiliary in the Mediterranean is an inseparable exposed forward base at Adana. The contra- part of a single instrument of military power dictions inherent in this nuclear strike force called the Sixth Fleet. Accordingly, every ele- disposed for conventional conflict well illus- ment of this force must remain at all times re- trate the ambivalence of strategic planning at sponsive to naval command. Land-based air that time: On the one hand, preoccupation force direction of carrier strike operations with the damage our nuclear strikes could in- seems as objectionable to the Navv as does flict on the enemy, and on the other, unwilling- ground force control of tactical air operations ness to consider what his strikes might do to us; to the Air Force—and for much the same rea- recognition that our nuclear weapons might sons. Thus the problem boils down to two con- not always be usable, but disinterest in the cepts of entity, both apparently legitimate yet improvement of conventional weapons and diametricallv opposed to each other. The solu- tactics; reduetion of conventional weapon tion, which perhaps awaits the formulation of training, coupled with buildup of conventional some entirely new principie, poses an impor- weapon stockpiles at forward bases; deployed tant challenge to students of strategy and doc­ aircraft neither dispersed for nuclear war nor trine. revetted for conventional war. In the final analysis, it seems an inescapable conclusion that usaf forces carne unprepared for either the miclear-conventional dilemma tvpe of war. “There is considerable doubt,” reported a The crises in Lebanon and in the Taiwan tac staff officer after visiting Adana, “as to the Strait during the summer and early fali of 1958 conventional combat capability of the F-100 marked a turning point in relying on nuclear units. Only a few of the F-100 pilots had strafed; weapons for limited wars. Thereafter planners none had shot rockets or delivered conven­ were more inclined to accept the premise that LEBANON: A STUDY IN AIR STRATEGY 43

such crises—if thev turned into wars—would be they need to grow much bigger to fight and conventional, at least at the outset. However, win with iron bom bs. the re-emphasis on conventional capabilities simply deepened the clilemma of how to meet H avinc sin c l ed out various problems and im- the dívergent demands for these two types of perfections for purposes of discussion, let us conflict: the one requiring large numbers of now reaffirm that on the whole the Lebanon de- airplanes, high sortie rates, enormous stoclc- ployment was remarkably successful both po- piles, and a continuing flow of replacements to litically and militarily. Beyond the immediate sustain a long-drawn-out battle of attrition; the effect of helping to ease Lebanon’s internai other requiring almost the antithesis in everv crisis, this intervention had other far-reaching respect. consequences. In the eyes of Middle East na- Ten years ago the original authors of the tions, it effectively destroyed the myth of Soviet casf concept visualized small mobile strike power that grew out of the Suez crisis, and it forces of tactical aircraft made formidable by marred the image of Communism as an irre- their nuclear firepower. Since then the picture sistible wave of the future. In a purely military has changed. The fighter plane meant to carry sense, the deployment reflected a high order of kilotons of tnt equivalent now may be limited professional skill in marshaling widely dis- to tons. Here surely is a vast difference, one persed elements of land, sea, and air power and that seems on its face to eall into question the welding them into a powerful fighting force in pre-Lebanon strategic concepts of omnipotent a very short time. However, justifiable pride in nuclear strike forces roaming around the world a job well done should not obscure the im- and keeping the peace. Today small mobile portant lessons that may be leamed from the forces will still suffice to “show the flag,” but study of this complex operation. Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes 10. Peter Braestrup, "Limited Wars and the Lessons of 1. U.S., Congress, The Middle East Resolution, Public Lebanon," The Repórter, Vol. 20, No. 9 (30 April 1959), Law 7, 85th Congress ( House Joint Resolution 117, as Amended, pp. 25-26. Adopted by the Senate, March 5, 1957, and by the House of 11. McClintock, p. 71; J. L. Holloway, Jr., Adm., USN Representatives, March 7, 1957), Approved bv the President, (Ret), "Comment on ‘The American Landing in Lebanon' and 9 March 1957. ‘Orders Firm But Flexible,'" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 2. Robert McClintock, “The American Landing in Leba- Vol. 89, No. 9 (September 1963), pp. 96-97. non,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88, No. 10 ( Octo- 12. Guy S. Meloy III, Captain, USA, “A Look Back at ber 1962). p. 66. Lebanon,” Infantry, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 1960), pp. 21-22. 3. McClintock, p. 67. 13. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 4. Harry A. Hadd, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, "\Vho’s a 14. Braestrup, p. 25. Rebel? The Lesson Lebanon Taught," Marine Corps Gazette, 15. Wade. p. 18. Vol. 46. No. 3 (March 1962), p. 52. 16. McClintock, p. 73. 5. McClintock, p. 69. 17. James P. Ó'Donnell, "Operation Double Trouble," 6. S. S. Wade, Brigadier General, USMC, "Operation The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 231, No. 12 (20 September Bluebat,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 43, No. 7 (July 1959), 1958), pp. 129-30. pp. 16-Í7. IS. Ibid., p. 129. 7. E. L. Baldridge, Captain, USN, “Lebanon and Quemoy 19. Henry Viccellio, Major General, USAF, “The Com- —The Navy’s Role," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 87, posite Air Strike Force 1958,” Air Univcrsity Quarterly Review, No. 2 (February 1961), p. 95. XI, 2 (Summer 1959), 9. 8. John Law, "With the Marines in Beirut,’’ U.S. News 20. O. P. Weyland, General, USAF, “The Role of Tactical and World Report. Vol. 45, No. 4 (25 July 1958), p. 37. Air in the ‘Long Pull,’ ” Air Force, Vol. 39, No. 5 (May 1956), 9. Wade. p. 17. p. 69. AIRCRAFT COMMITMENTS TO RÚSSIA The Moscow Conference, September-October 1941

D r . R ic h a r d C. L ukas

HE MOSCOW Conference which con- that the London talks begin about 15 Septem­ vened at the end of September 1941 ber in order that the conference in Moscow Tvvas a significant milestone in Russo- could convene somewhat earlier than 1 Octo- American relations. It terminated the proces- ber, the date originallv scheduled.1 The Presi­ sion of events that had propelled American dent s desire to get the Anglo-American mission policy since June 1941 toward a program of to Moscow sooner than planned was spurred long-range aid to the Soviet Union and made by Prime Minister Churchill’s recent revelation the United States and Rússia quasi allies before of an almost desperate message from Stalin Pearl Harbor. Through the protocol which it which had been delivered in menacing tones by adopted, the United States and Creat Britain the Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maiskv. agreed to provide large quantities of war ma- This was Stalin’s second message to teriel to the Soviet Union. This study deals with Churchill since the outbreak of Russo-German the problems that confronted the United States hostilities. Stalin painted a gloomv picture of in providing the Soviet Union with military the Soviet position and again pressed the Prime aircraft, the most criticai item in demand bv Minister for a British front “somewhere in the the Russians during the earlier part of World Balkans or in France.” He also requested de- War II. liveries of aluminum and “a minimum monthlv The preliminaries of the conference took aid of 400 aeroplanes and 500 tanks.’ Without place in an atmosphere of great concern for the the second front and the supplies, he warned survival of the Soviet Union. The President had that “the Soviet Union will be either defeated proposed that American and British ofBcials or weakened to the extent that it will lose for a meet first in London, where a definite decision long time the ability to help its Allies by active regarding Anglo-American aid to the Soviet operations at the front against Hitlerism. Union could be reached. This, of course, would Ambassador Maisky brought the message in enable the Anglo-American mission destined person on the evening of 4 September. He com- for Moscow to carrv definite estimates of aid plained “in bitter terms how for the last eleven which Britain and the United States planned to weeks Rússia had been bearing the brunt of the furnish to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt urged German onslaught virtuallv alone. ' Churchill, AIRCRAFT COMMITMENTS TO RÚSSIA 45

by his own account, retorted that Maisky ule of deliveries through June 1942 but adding should not reproach Britain, which had fought that this date was only for planning purposes— Hitler for a longer period of time than Rússia. “Naturally we shall go on with you till vic- “We never thought,” he added, “our survival tory.”n was dependent on your action either way. 1 The basic question concerning aircraft Nevertheless the interview raised fears which confronted American and British repre- that the Soviet Union might negotiate a sepa- sentatives at the London talks involved the rate peace. Commenting on his exchange with number and type of planes to be allocated to Maisky, Churchill told Roosevelt that “al- the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet though nothing in his language warranted the Union from American production through June assumption, we could not exclude the impres- 1942. As for the British commitment of planes sion that they might be thinking of separate to Rússia, this had already been set forth in terms.’”' This fear prompted the British Cabinet Churchill s earlier message to Stalin. to approve a friendly reply in which Churchill Before the London talks began, Roosevelt patiently explained to Stalin the reasons why a directed the War Department to prepare a second front was not yet possible. The reply study of suggested distributions of aircraft up also committed Britain to supply one half the to June 1942 between the United States, Great monthly amount of planes and tanks that Stalin Britain, and the Soviet Union. The President requested. Churchill also suggested to Stalin informed the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stim- the possibilitv that the United States might son: inform him before the Moscow Conference of I deem it to be of paramount importance for the amount of supplies it would send.° Church­ the safety and security of America that all ill hoped Roosevelt did not object to refer- reasonable munitions help be provided for ences to aid from the United States, but, the Rússia, not only immediately but as long as Prime Minister explained, “the moment may she continues to fight the Axis Powers effec- be decisive.”7 tively. I am convineed that substantial and Stalin’s reply to Churchill indicated that he comprehensive commitments of such character was appropriately grateful for the British com- must be made to Rússia by Great Britain and mitment of supplies. But Stalin still held hopes the United States at the proposed [Moscow] for direct military assistance also. He suggested conference.12 that Britain send 25 to 30 divisions to Archangel In response to this directive, the Air War or to southem Rússia in order that “there could Plans Division prepared a study, known as be established military collaboration between AWPD/2, which revealed the problems in­ the Soviet and British troops on the territory of volved in arriving at an equitable allocation of the U.S.S.R."' Stalins appeal for direct military aircraft from American production without in- cooperation was taken under study,and some- juring the basic defense requirements of the what later Lord Beaverbrook. Minister of United States. AWPD/2 recommended that Supply, conveyed to the Soviet chieftain the out of an estimated production of 14,802 tacti- suggestion that the British might soon be able cal aircraft, the aaf receive 5094. The remain- to provide direct military assistance: "If we can ing 9708 aircraft, the study advised, should be clear our own western flank in Libya of the assigned to the anti-Axis pool. This meant that enemy we shall have considerable forces, both the anti-Axis pool would receive all aircraft air and army, to cooperate upon the Southern produced under Defense Aid, all British and flank of the Russian front.”10 But. meanwhile, other contract production, and 15 per cent of Churchill was anxious to assure Stalin of the combat types produced for the aaf . The study reality of assistance in the form of materiel. On suggested a distribution of aircraft in the anti- 17 September he sketched out for the Soviet Axis pool along these lines: 7534 to Britain, leader the progress of the Anglo-American 1163 to the Soviet Union, and the remainder to conversations on aid, informing him that the other nations.,:i British and Americans were setting up a sched- After the talks in London began, Major General James E. Chaney, the ranking aaf at home and ranked first among the offensive member of the American delegation in London, instruments available to this country.”1" It was presented figures which indicated a slight re- natural that when British aircraft production vision in Britains favor and a reduction for the failed to keep pace with planning, a greater aaf. But this revision was not large, and British premium was placed upon American deliveries. allocations were considerably less than ex- The British pressed the Americans to re- pected. The British representatives were consider their position, particularly to increase frankly shocked. They had expected that Brit- the British share of heavy bombers. They ain vvould receive all the planes produced stoutly opposed giving heavies to Rússia, 30 of under the Defense Aid program and a large which were allocated under AWPD/2. The allocation of those from aaf orders.14 The es- British maintained that heavies could be used timates now presented meant that Britain more effectively against German strategic tar- would receive approximately 1800 fewer air- gets from British bases than from Russian craft than it had expected, 600 of which were bases. The Russians, they pointed out, could in the heavy and médium bomber category. only undertake strategic bombardment of the The latter was particularly alarming. In the Romanian oil fields, which, at the rate of the words of the British official history of the event, German advance, would probably soon be out "The loss of the heavy and médium bombers of range.1!’ On the other hand, the British pro- was regarded as likely to have a grave effect on posed that the number of American aircraft the British air offensive against Germany.”1'' allocated to Rússia be increased from 1163 to

Lord Beaverbrook remarked dolefullvJ that the 1800. The distribution of planes by type under American production figures were “much lower AWPD/2 and the British proposal was as than anvthing we have had before and manv follows: of our minimum requirements cannot be met. AWPD/2 British It is imperative,” he added, “that the Americans proposal should organise immediately a rapid increase Heavy bombers 30 None of their production.”1,: Médium bombers 45 180 And, indeed, the British had real cause for Light bombers 356 450 concern. Their own production of bombers, Pursuits 620 900 particularly heavies, was lagging behind sched- Observation 112 270 ule, a natural consequence of the emphasis on fighters to defend the Isles during the Battle of Total 1163-'° 1800-1 Britain.17 The British were relying upon the The American mission accepted the in­ United States for help in building a strong force creased allocation of planes to Rússia, which of bombers, which they regarded as a logical represented a matching with British commit- counterweight to Nazi land power. As one Brit­ ments. But there was a difference of opinion on ish historian put it, “The bomber was still the the advisability of giving heavy bombers to only means of getting to grips with the enemy Rússia. Although Averell Harriman, head of AIRCRAFT COMMITMENTS TO RÚSSIA 47

the American mission, favorecí the British view, use of the heavies. He told Stimson that it was the ranking military members of the American far better, for example, to have heavies operat- delegation favored the idea of giving heavy ing from Britain than Newfoundland. Stimson, bombers to Rússia. Generais James E. Chaney, on the other hand, continued to press the need James H. Bums, and Stanley D. Embick felt to build the aaf. “It is better,” lie stated, “for that the deliverv of heavies would have a sig- her [Britain] to have in the world a potent, nificant effect in bolstering Russian morale. well-armed, friendly American air force than a General Embick, an experienced Armv strate- few additional planes.” He added: “The mo- gist, suggested that the heavies would have a ment lias now come when we should give our deterrent effect upon Japanese designs on Si­ primary attention to the ‘prompt’ development béria.2- Chaney, therefore, drafted a suggested of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well- breakdown of deliveries, which continued to trained American air force.”27 These words, of include a token number of heavy bombers. course, applied quite as cogently to aid to the These figures, which Harriman forwarded to Soviet Union as to Great Britain. Washington, contemplated the following de­ In the case of Rússia, the White House in- liveries to Rússia through June 1942: clined to favor at least token deliveries of heavy Heavy bombers 27 bombers, a view which the President advaneed Médium bombers 45 as early as August.2V Presidential advisers con­ Light bombers 828 tinued to regard Armv opposition to all-out aid Pursuits 900 coldlv. During a conference with a War De­ Total 1800 partment representative, Lieutenant Colonel Harriman also noted in his message to Wash­ K. N. Walker, Presidential adviser Harrv Hop- ington that the American mission would offer kins said that he could not understand the 203 observation planes in the place of an equiv- opposition of the Secretary of War for Air, alent number of light bombers or pursuits if Robert A. Lovett, and the ehief of the aaf, the Russians could use them effectively.2* General Henrv H. Arnold, to the allocation of Roosevelt’s reply to Harriman indicated heavies to Rússia. Hopkins noted that Generais that the problems disturbing the negotiations Chaney, Embick, and Burns approved such in London were also a matter of concem in allocations, especially from the standpoint of Washington. He indicated that the United salubrious effects on Soviet morale. Walker, ex- States would make every effort to go beyond pressing the War Department position, agreed scheduled production but that no decision had in principie, but he pointed out that as soon as been reached vet in Washington concerning the Soviet Union discovered the small number heavy bombers.2' The question of heavies for of heavies scheduled for deliverv the effects Rússia formed a part of the continuing problem might be the opposite of tliose desired. He went of the relationships of aircraft exports to the on to explain that the character of Soviet air needs of the aaf. The military advisers of the operations did not lend itself to the effective President continued to press the case of the use of heavy bombers, which were sorely American air force establishment as against needed elsewhere.2”' foreign aid. The President followed up his mes­ Finally, on 25 September, Lovett offered a sage to Harriman with one to the Secretary of compromise solution to the problem of alloca­ War. The President informed Stimson that ex­ tions to Rússia. His proposal increased the ports of aircraft, including heavies, should fol- number of médium bombers to be delivered by low a “rule of thumb” of 50 per cent.2' Stimson the number of heavies in Chaney’s suggested replied that American exports of various types distribution. By taking away the allotmcnt of of aircraft, excluding heavies, would exceed heavy bombers from Rússia, his proposal would that figure. However, Stimson said that in view pacify to some extent the British, who would of aaf shortages the 50 per cent figure could receive the heavies scheduled for the Russians. not be applied to heavies.2'’ The President did Lovetts formula for delivery under the Mos- not feel that this was making the most effective cow Protocol was 72 B-25’s, 828 A-20’s, and 900 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

P-40's.'° Arnold agreed in part vvith the pro- better image of the Soviet Union and did ex- posal but ofFered a different breakdown of pect this bill to pass. However, there would be planes to Rússia. In view of the difficulty in opposition, and efforts to create large-seale fi­ fínding the number of A-20’s for the Russians in nancial support specifically assigned to the Lovett’s proposal, Arnold recommended that Soviet Union might well have foundered. As a the United States allocate to Rússia through consequence, the bill which would provide June 1942: 72 B-25’s, 584 A-20’s, 144 A-29’s, 100 support for the initial phases of the Soviet aid 0-52’s, and 900 P-40’s. Arnolds recommenda- program was being debated in Congress as tions were forvvarded to Harriman and formed Harriman reached Moscow. Thus, Harriman the basis of American diseussions with the Rus­ found himself in the curious position of leading sians in Moscow.:,t a mission to commit the United States to a sub- With this action the allocation of planes to stantial program of aid without definite as- the Soviet Union had been increased offieially surances of how it was to be financed. from 1163 to 1800. This left unsolved, however, After the London meetings the Anglo- the basic question: Where were the additional Americ-an mission, composed of civilian and planes to be obtained? The British, in offering military officials, prepared for the trek to Mos­ their proposal, had suggested that they come cow. Part of the Anglo-American delegation, from aaf allocations rather than from British including Harriman and Beaverbrook, pro- Lend-Lease, to which the American mission ceeded to Rússia aboard HMS London, the vvith one exception. General Embick, agreed. remainder went in two B-24’s. The flight of the Harriman urged Washington for approval of B-24’s was a particularly dangerous one, since this decision. However, he also wanted a deci- there was the possibility of attack not only by sion on a second vital issue—namely, how were the enemy but also by the Russians themselves. the war munitions to be provided the Russians For some reason the Russians failed to acknowl- to be financed? He was, he told the President, edge the proper radio signals of the American “most anxious for clarification” in this regard planes, causing many anxious moments for prior to his arrival in Moscow.3- those involved. The group which arrived by Hopkins, speaking for the President, could ship at Archangel was transferred to a Soviet do little to ease Harriman’s apprehensions. plane which took it on to Moscow. This group Public opinion was improving in the United also received a strange but a more dramatic States with respect to Rússia, he said, but he welcome—Russian batteries accidentally fired implied that no decision could be made as vet on the Soviet plane.34 to include the Soviet Union under Lend- Harriman and Beaverbrook met Stalin Lease.™ The White House was waiting for upon their arrival on 28 September. 1 The other Congressional action on the Second Supple- members of the American and British mission mental National Defense Appropriations Bill. began their meetings on the following day. some of the funds of which the President in- Thev served on one of several committees es- tended to use for aid to Rússia. The President tablished to deal with specific areas of im- had been zealously fostering the creation of a portanee, one of which was the Air Supply Committee under the chairmanship of General Chaney. The other ranking members of this 0-52 committee were the Undersecretary of State for Air, H. H. Balfour, for Britain, and Com- missar for Aircraft Industries, Shakurin, for the Soviet Union.30 In his meetings with Harriman and Bea­ verbrook, Stalin stressed his need for aircraft, which constituted a “first priority" in Russian munitions requests.'' During the meetings of the Air Supply Committee, which dealt with the details of these requests, the Soviet request for bombers posed the most difficult problem. Shakurin asked for a monthly total of 300 bombers and 100 fighters from the United States and Britain, a reversa] of the ratio which li-25 Britain and the United States had previously agreed upon in London. The Russian represent- ative stated that the Soviet Union was pro- particular preference for the B-25, of which ducing 70 planes per dav, including 40 fighters, they had been so criticai less than a month 20 bombers, and 10 Stormovik bombers. “This before.43 They urged that the United States was not enough for the Soviet Air Force,” Sha­ send as many of them as possible. When kurin said, “whose needs were particularly Chaney stated that these were still in the early great in the case of bombers.” He emphasized stages of production and hence limited in avail- that “the front was active and the need was im- ability, Shakurin indicated a choice for Boston mediate.”38 The Soviets estimated that 1000- 3’s [A-20’s]. For technical and military reasons, 1200 bombers were produced monthly in the Shakurin argued that the planes should be of United States, and thev felt that this would one type. The British and American representa­ allow the deliverv to them of the 300 they tives agreed that this was desirable. However, requested. Shakurin pressed for a médium due to existing production and the needs of bomber similar to the Soviet PE-2 with a range others, it was doubtful, said Chaney, if more of 15,000 km, a bomb load of one ton, and a than 600 A-20’s could be sent during the pro­ maximum speed of 540 km. tocol period. Therefore the remainder might Chaney promptlv tried to correet errors in have to be made up with Lockheed Hudsons Soviet estimates of American bomber produc- [A-29’s] or some smaller plane. Once again tion. He said that total United States aircraft the Russians requested the allocation of heavv production for July and August 1941 was 1500 bombers, but Chaney answered that American and 1800 respectively, a large percentage of production of these was negligible and that the which were trainers. Chaney explained that Soviet request would have to be held in abey- American light and médium bomber produc­ ance for a year. tion was small, approximatelv 300 planes a As to fighter tvpes, the Russians preferred month.Chaneys estimates of American air­ Spitfires and Kittyhawks. The British pointed craft production were basically correet. During out that production limitations made it impos­ the third quarter of 1941 factory deliveries of sible to meet their commitment of 200 fighters all types of aircraft reached 5156, or an average with Spitfires. Balfour added that Britain would monthly rate of 1719. During the same period try to send 100 of them a month toward the end deliveries of light and médium bombers totaled of the protocol period; however, the bulk of 1029, or an average monthly deliverv rate of the planes would have to be Hurricanes.44 343.*" Shakurin responded that if 300 bombers Deliverv problems also loomed large in could not be delivered, the Soviet Union the conversations. The Russians preferred that wanted at least 200 a month. The American and the planes be shipped to Archangel. They ex- British representatives adhered to the “100 cluded deliverv to Vladivostok as impractical'5 monthly" figure and suggested that the Soviet and opposed flight deliverv via Alaska and Air Force adapt Kittyhawk and Hurricane Sibéria—the so-called “Alsib” route—which fighters for elose-support bombardment work." Harriman had proposed in one of his conver- Chaney held out the possibility that a readjust- sations with Stalin. When Harriman suggested ment of the ratio of 300 fighters and 100 bomb­ that the planes be Hight-delivered by aaf pi- ers per month from the United States and Brit­ lots over Alaska and Sibéria, Stalin labeled the ain could be considered in the next protocol route “too dangerous.”40 period.4- However, Stalin had agreed to provide the Strangely, the Soviets now expressed a Americans with information about Siberian 50 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW airports.'7 This soon proved to be an unfulfilled left Moscow with such insignificant informa­ promise. General Chaney had been led to be- tion as the Soviets chose to provide. Soviet his- lieve that the infonnation about Siberian air- torians have erroneously suggested that Harri- dromes would come from a certain General man and Beaverbrook made Anglo-American Golitov. However, Chaney s contacts with him aid contingent upon the receipt of this infor­ were unproductive. Chaney explained that af- mation but when met by Soviet refusals they ter several meetings, Golitov “indicated each gave up their attempts. Soviet historians de- time that the data was not ready and that I scribe the information requested as allegedly would hear from him before my departure.” "secret.”’’1 But the full extent of British-Amer- Before he left Moscow, Chaney received a map ican inquiries concerned a weapon which had almost completely devoid of value for plan- been publicly tested and observed by Russia’s ning ferrying operations from Nome to Sibéria. allies, a plane long in operation on the Soviet No descriptive information was provided about front which would have been little in exchange airdromes on the portion of the route from for the various British and American types Nome to Vladivostok. The Russians assured then in operation in Rússia, and a knowledge Chaney that ample facilities existed from of Siberian airdromes in order to initiate plans Vladivostok to Moscow, which the aaf already to ferry aircraft more speedily to the Soviet knew. Chaney was told that the route from front. It is an ironic commentary upon the Nome across Sibéria was inadvisable and extent of mutual trust involved that American would be especially difficult during the win- military planners knew more at this time about ter. As a result of the Soviet attitude, Chaney the Cerman Luftwaffe than they did about the had no alternative but to recommend that if Soviet Air Force.52 planes were to be ferried to Rússia the aaf On 1 October 1941 Harriman, Beaver­ would have to use the South Atlantic route brook, and Molotov signed the Moscow Pro- to the Middle East.4S tocol. The United States agreed to provide a The British did not fare any better than monthly total of 100 fíghters and 100 bombers. the Americans in prying information from their Britain agreed to provide 200 fighters per hosts. Beaverbrook sought in vain for data con- month. The combined commitment for a nine- cerning a Soviet weapon tested before a group month period totaled 3600 planes. No state- of British and American observers some time ment of specific types and series of aircraft earlier. Likewise unavailing was his request was included other than “fighters” and “bomb­ ers,” since too many uncertainties existed to warrant such precision. The text of the agree- ment stated that the supplies . . . will be made available at British and U.S.A. centres of production, for the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States of America within the period beginning from October 1941, till the end of June 1942.

It went on to say that Great Britain and the United States “will give aid to the transpor- that the Russians send to Britain for examina- tation of these materiais to the Soviet Union tion one of the Stormoviks, which had proved and will help with the delivery. so effective on the Russo-German front.40 The results of the conference appeared to Either to prevent injury to Soviet sensibilities be as satisfactory to the Russians as to the or to avoid arousing Soviet suspicions, these Anglo-American mission. Harriman wrote to requests were not pressed in Moscow/’0 In Roosevelt: “We have closed the conference other words, the principie of quid pro quo was today in an atmosphere of great enthusiasm not applied, and the Anglo-American mission by all who participated." He added, Stalin A1RCRAFT COMMITMENTS TO RÚSSIA 51

personallv is much gratified and sends you his soundness of Soviet principies of airplane and personal thanks.”54 A few days later Harriman engine design and the efficiency of factory \vrote that the results of the conferences “have administration, production methods, and proc­ been accepted with undisguised enthusiasm by esses of inspection—all of which followed Stalin and all others connected with the dis- Western patterns. The report eommented upon cussions ”5i Before the departure of the Anglo- the skill of the workers who labored on pro­ American mission, a State dinner was held at duction machinery and noted that although the Kremlin. Thirty toasts were proposed, sev- women and young boys worked in factories eral of them by Stalin himself, who particularly only men occupied key positions.01 praised American industrv. Ambassador Laur- The favorable commentary of General ence A. Steinhardt, who was present at the Chaney was reinforced by the reports of the occasion, reported Stalins observation that two aaf officers at Archangel, Lieutenant John “the United States is giving more assistance R. Alison, who had remained in Rússia after as a non-belligerent than some countries in the earlier mission to Moscow of Harry Hop­ history had given as allies.” He added the hope, kins, and Lieutenant Hubert Zemke, who had soon to be realized, that the United States, arrived in September. They remarked upon the Great Britain, and the Soviet Union “would be skill and ingenuity of Soviet mechanics and fighting side by side.”3G technicians who worked “without shelter in Harriman was most anxious that the sleet, rain, and wind on an average of 14 hours United States initiate deliveries under the pro- a day.” These officers also eommented on the tocol without delay. On 3 October in a com- ability of the Russian pilots—120 of whom munication to Roosevelt, Harriman urged: “It qualified in non-Soviet tvpes in the period is of the utmost importance that prompt action 10-29 September, with the loss of only one confirm the confidence the Russians now have plane. The mission was provided an example in the sincerity of our aid.”57 In a message to of the ability of Soviet workers to execute Hopkins on the next day, Harriman declared decisions by constructing an airdrome at Arch­ that “in order to translate the spirit of our angel for the reception of American and British conference into actuality [it is] urgently de- planes. Construction began on 3 September, sirable that a maximum amount [of] criticallv and within a month it was completed. Dur- needed material be dispatched earliest pos- ing that time 47 planes were assembled and sible. First priority is tanks and aircraft... .”5S tested.0- In a message to Stalin, Roosevelt expressed his Such observations naturally inspired the “confidence that your armies will ultimately committee to recommend sending only the prevail over Hitler” and assured him “of our best planes and equipment to the Russians, great determination to be of every possible who, the committee stated, could use them material assistance.”'3 Less than two weeks effectively. As a result of the meetings with after the conference, Roosevelt announced the Russians, the committee concluded that that “everything possible is being done to 0-52’s were not suitable for Soviet needs and send material to Rússia to help the brave de- A-29’s were of doubtful value, these types hav- fense which continues to be made.”'i0 ing been considered for delivery to the Rus­ After the departure of the American mis­ sians during the discussions in Moscow.fit The sion from Moscow, General Chaney submit- committees final recommendations to Harri­ ted a report to Harriman containing the obser- man, who communicated them to Roosevelt vations and recommendations of the members on 9 October, stated that the 1800 planes pro­ of the Air Supply Committee. In addition to vided by the United States through June 1942 the formal conferences with the Russians, should include 900 P-40’s, 828 A-20’s, and 72 members of the mission had had an oppor- B-25 .S.'11 In other words, the Air Supply Com­ tunity to observe the work at Russian aircraft mittee recommended the distribution of air­ factories and to talk informally with other ob- craft proposed earlier by Secretary Lovett. servers in Rússia. Chaney s report noted the In view of commitments to the Soviet transferred from Defense Aid contracts and the remainder from planes in or scheduled for the aaf. Médium bombers and observation planes were to come entirely from those sched­ A-29 uled for the aaf.':s Aircraft occupied a criticai position in Soviet requests for aid from the West. This was l'nion and recent production estimates, particularly underscored by the priority po­ AWPD/2's recommended allocations were sition which aircraft held in the protocol signed substantially revised. On 29 October 1941 Ar- in Moscow. As has been seen, it was not an nold announced a nevv schedule of allocations easy matter to arrive at decisions concerning among the claimants on American aircraft pro­ the number and type of aircraft which the duction through June 1942:,i'1 United States approved for Rússia, since this U.S.A. Great Britain U.S.S.R. China Others involved a reduction of the share which the 4189 6634 1835 407 109 aaf and Britain received from limited Ameri­ The breakdovvn of planes approved for the can production. The existence of another Soviet Union included 77 B-25’s, 828 A-20’s, claimant upon American aircraft production 900 P-40 s, and 30 0 -5 2 ’s.''1' The 35 planes above had added pressing dimensions to the problem protocol commitments included 5 B-25’s, ap­ of allocation. proved before the Moscow Conference began, The aircraft as well as other supplies and 30 0-52 s which were already in the proc- which the United States and Britain agreed ess of shipment.',; To provide the increased to provide Rússia during the protocol period number of planes above the original AYVPD/2 might not have loomed large when measured allocation was not a simple matter of rearrang- in terms of total production. However, when ing figures. Any change inevitably affected viewed in eonnection with the effects of these other claimants upon American aircraft pro­ commitments on American and British require- duction. The problem was temporarily re- ments, the sacrifice was substantial. Churchill solved when the British agreed to defer 300 aptlv summed this up to Hopkins when he A-20’s, originally scheduled for them under said: “There is no disguising the fact however Lend-Lease and British contracts. This en- that they make grievous inroads into what is abled the United States, by drawing 515 planes required by you for expanding your forces from Defense Aid contracts and 13 from aaf and by us for intensifying our war effort. contracts, to meet its deliveries of light bomb- Although the Moscow Protocol expired in ers to the Soviet Union within the protocol June 1942, the rationale behind it was applied period. But the British action was a deferment, to succeeding protocols concluded with the not a cancellation, which meant that the Soviet Union. And the air force aspects of these United States was obliged to make up the later protocols continued to play a prominent amount later. In order to meet the commit- role in America’s wartime relations with the ment for the delivery of fighters, 343 were Kremlin. Cookeville, Tennessee

Notes 1. Msg., Hopkins to Winant, 9 Septemher 1941, in U.S. s 4 Septemher 1941. Such variations in diplomatic correspond- Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, nce often exist. They can be explained largely in terms of the Diplomatic Papers: 1941, Vol. I: General, The Soviet Union me difference from initial dispatch to ultimate receipt. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), 3. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 457. pp. 829-30. Hereinafter cited as F.R.U.S., 1941, I. 2. Msg., Stalin to Churchill, 3 Septemher 1941, Ministry íl Msg.', Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 Septemher 1941, The of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., StaliiTs Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945 ( 2 vols. ™"6 .^ M^g^ChurchiÍ1 to Stalin. 4 Septemher 1941. The Grand in 1, London: Lawrenee and Wishart, 1958), 1, 20-21. Also in Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton ,í,n7^'M sg.f5Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 Septemher 1941, The Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 455-57. There is a slight difference in the date of the message in ChurchilPs book where it is listed ™" 8 .A Msg^f S talírfto Churchill, 13 Septemher 1941, Ministry AIRCRAFT COMM1TMENTS TO RÚSSIA 53

of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.. Stalins Correspondente . . ., 41 "The Chaney Report," Inclosure 3. I, 24. 42. Ibid., Tab G. 9. Msg., Churchill to Stalin, 17 September 1941, The 43. Richard C. Lukas, "Air Force Aspects of American Grand Alliance, pp. 463-64. Aid to lhe Soviet Union: The Crucial Years, 1941-1942” (un- 10. Ltr., Churchill to Stalin, 21 September 1941, The published Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Florida Grand Alliance, pp. 465-67. State University, 1963). pp. 71-76. 11. Msg., Churchill to Stalin, 17 September 1941, The 44. "The Chaney Report,” Inclosure 3. Grand Alliance, pp. 463-64. 45. Ibid. 12. Mcmo, Roosevelt for Stimson, 30 August 1941, 46. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An F.R.U.S., 1941. I, 826. Intimate History (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1948), 13. AWPD/2, file 145.82-2 in United States Air Force p. 388; William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admirai Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Alabama (hereinafter cited Ambassador to Rússia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), as USAF HA ). p. 66. 14. "Report of Special Mission to U.S.S.R. on Allocation 47. Ibid. of Aircraft from U.K. and U.S. Production, September 16 to 48. Memo, Chaney for Harriman, 11 October 1941 (file October 10, 1941.” Tab A and B. This report, drafted by Maj. 091 Rússia, ASWA, in NMW/NA). Gen. James E. Chaney, wül be cited hereinafter as “The Chaney 49. Msg., Chaney to AG, 6 December 1941 (file 400.3295, Report.” (File 178.104 in USAF HA) AG, in NMW/NA). 15. H. Duncan Hall, Sorth American Supply (London: 50. Memo, Col. C. W. Bundy for Marshall, 24 October Her Ma)esty's Stationerv Office, 1955), pp. 332-33. 1941, reveals Harriman's instruetion to the American members 16. Ibid., p. 333. of the mission not to press the Russians for military Information 17. For a brief summary on the lag in British production (file 4557 to 49 Rússia, WPD, WDGS. in NMW/NA). This is of heavy bombers, see M. M. Postan, British War Production confirmed in a note in reference to msg. frorn Maj. Yeaton (London: Her Majesty’s Stationerv Office, 1952), pp. 124-26, 6 October 1941 (file 913410, C-2, in NMW/NA). 174. 51. V. L. Israelian, Diplomatischeskaia Istoriia Velikoi 18. Ibid., p. 303. Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1911-1945 (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Insti­ 19. An excellent summary of British objections to pro- tuía Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959), p. 34; C. A. Deborin, posed American aircraft allocations can be found in “United Vtoraia Mirovaia Voina (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatelstvo Minis- States Proposals for Allocation of American Production.” n. d., terstva Oborony SSSR, 1958), p. 148. file 4557. WPD. WDGS, in World War 11 Records Óivisíon, 52. See the instruetive remarks in tnemo with report, National Archives (hereinafter cited as NMW/NA). Col. R. C. Jacobs Jr. for Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, 7 May 20. AWPD 2. Tab 1. Also in AWPD/1 Scrap Book, Tab 1943 (file ABC 452.1, WPD, WDGS, in NMW/NA). 79, file 145.82-1, pt. 3, in USAF/HA. The latter source, how- 53. U.S., Department of State, Soviet Supply Protocols ever, omits the observatíon planes included in the original (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, n.d.), AWPD 2 allocation. p. 3. 21. "The Chaney Report," Tab C. 54. Msg., Harriman to Roosevelt, 1 October 1941, 22. Msg.. Harriman to Roosevelt and Hopkins, 18 Sep­ F.R.U.S., 1941, I, 839-40. tember 1941 (file Russian Cables, ID, ASF, in NMW/NA). 55. Msg., Harriman to Roosevelt, 3 October 1941, 23. Msg-, Harriman to Hopkins, 18 September 1941 F.R.U.S., 1941, I. 841-42. [supplement to message cited above] (file 091 Rússia, ASWA, 56. Msg., Steinhardt to Hull, 3 October 1941, F.R.U.S., in NMW/NA). 1941, I, 840-41. 24. Msg., Roosevelt to Harriman, 18 September 1941 57. Msg., Harriman to Roosevelt, 3 October 1941, (file 091. Rússia, ASWA, in NMW/NA). F.R.U.S.. 1941, 1, 841-42. 25. Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18 September 1941 (file 58. Msg., Harriman to Hopkins, 4 October 1941, F.R.U.S., 452.1 in NMW/NA). 1941. I, 842. 26. Ltr., Stimson to Roosevelt, 22 September 1941 (file 59. U.S., Department of State, The Department of State 452.1 in NN1W NA). Bulletin, 11 October 1941, p. 276. 27. Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 14 October 1941; ltr., Stimson to Roosevelt, 21 October 1941 (file 452.1 in NMW/NA). 60. Ibid., 18 October 1941, p. 296. 28. “Notes on Remarks of the President at Conference 61. “The Chaney Report,” Tab H. held on August 1, 1941, signed Marshall.” The conference was 62. Ibid. between Roosevelt and Col. Philip Favmonville, foriner Military 63. Ibid.; also see p. 4 of the text of the report. The A-29, Attaché to Rússia. (File 19776 to 20150. OCS, in NMW/NA) popularlv known as the "Hudson,” was an observatíon and 29. AWPD 1 Scrap Book, Tab 76. patrol bomber. The 0-52, also known as the "Owl,” was an 30. Ltr., Lovett to Hopkins, with suggested message for observatíon plane. Neither of these met Soviet requirements Hamman, 25 September 1941 (file 091 Rússia, ASWA, in with respect to speed and annament. NMW/NA). 64. Ibid.. pp. 4-5 of text. An official copy of the message 31. Memo, Amold for Lovett, 26 September 1941; msg., can be found in file 091 Rússia, ASWA, in NMW/NA. Hopkins to Harriman, 26 September 1941 (file 091 Rússia, 65. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army ASWA. in NMW NA). Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I: Plans and Earhj Operations 32. Msg., Harriman to Roosevelt, 19 September 1941 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 134; (file 167.6-39, Rússia, in USAF/HA). memo, Amold for distribntion, with Inclosure 1, 29 October 33. Msg., Hopkins to Harriman, 20 September 1941 (file 1941, in AWPD/2, gives different figures for the American and Russian Cables, ID, ASF. in NMW/NA). British share, listing 4205 and 6590 aircraft respectively. 34. Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command, "History of the Air Transport Command: Ferrving Command Operations, 66. Memo, Amold for distribution, with Inclosure 1, May 29-December 7, 1941,” I. 63-64 (file 300.01 in USAF/ 29 October 1941. HA >, Hastings L. Ismay, The \1emoirs of General Lord Ismay 67. The extra 5 B-25's constituted part of America’s first (New^York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 230. allocation of aircraft to Rússia during the summer. Since they 35. Nlsg.. Steinhardt to Roosevelt and Hull, 29 Septem­ were available, 30 O-52's were scheduled for shipment to ber 1941, [No. 1726], F.R.U.S.. 1941. I, 836. Rússia in October. See msg., Hopkins to Harriman, 3 October 36. “The Chaney Report," Inclosure 3. A brief summary 1941; msg., Faymonville to Brig. Gen. S. P. Spalding, 13 Octo­ of the committees and the members who composed them can ber 1941; ltr., Hopkins to Hull, with message to Harriman, be found in msg., Steinhardt to Roosevelt and Hull, 29 Sep­ 13 October 1941 (file Russian Cables, ID, ASF, in NMW/NA). tember 1941. [No. 1732J, F.R.V.S., 1941, I, 837-38. 68. "Minutes of Conferences, 21-22 October 1941, held 37. Msg., Harhman to Hopkins, 4 October 1941, F.R.U.S., by the Chief of the Army Air Forces with following British 1941. I. 842. Representatives: Captain Balfour, Sir Henry Self, Air Marshal 38. "The Chaney Report,” Inclosure 3. A. T. Harris, Air Commodore E. B. C. Batts, Mr. C. R. Fairey, 39. Ibid, and Mr. T. D. Weldon” (file 452.1, Deliveries of planes to 40. L .S. Air Force, United States Air Force Statistical Rússia. ID, ASF, in NMW/NA). Digerí; 1947, p. 121. 69. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 469. THE NEGLECTED TASKS OF OFFICER EDUCATION

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Ralph L. G id d in c s, J r ., USA

PERCEPTIVE and provocative article the meaning of education by Col. John P. .Lisack on the impor- Before this question can be explored, we A - tance of officer education appeared in must agree on what is meant by “education,” the Air University Revietv recently.1 Colonel as without this agreement there is no standard Lisack referred to a basic eonflict between two by which accomplishment can be judged. The major categories of officer education, which he first essential for any successful education pro- identified as specialized education and profes- gram is that the community as a whole ( in this sional military education, and he disjcussed the case the armed forces) must have an idea of correlation between formal education achieve- the true purpose and value of education. In ment and promotion to high rank. The article The La ws, Plato defined true education as: was addressed specifically to the U.S. Air Force, and the charts and statistics reflected Air Force T h at. . . which makes a man eagerly pursue the experience. However, increasing emphasis on ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him formal education is also apparent in the other how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is Services, and the importance of a college degree the only training which, upon our view, would or degrees in achieving high rank generally ap- be characterized by education; that other sort of training, which aims at acquisition of wealth plies to them as well. or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart While I am in complete agreement with from intelligence and justice, is mean and Colonel Lisack in his emphasis on the im­ illiberal, and is not worthy to be called educa­ portance of officer education (I apply this to tion at all.2 officers in all our armed forces), I \frould like to approach his two major categories from a In evaluating the sênior military colleges, slightly different direction and point out what i.e., the National War College, the Service war seems to me to be a serious failure in our Sys­ colleges, and the Industrial College of the tem of officer schooling. The two major cate­ Armed Forces, John W. Masland and Laurence gories I vvill examine are education

with facts on a fevv problems. It is to shovv the of Air University, speaking in a parallel vein officer the realities of the policy-making process, said: to give him an awareness of all relevant factors, a concem for their implications, and an appre- We know certain characteristics which the ciation of the responsibilities of other indi­ responsible air officer of the future must have. viduais and agencies. . . . When [the student His thinking must be clear, vigorous, objective, officer] comes to one of the sênior schooJs he is independent, and on a global seale. He must be being prepared for a different set of require- flexible in his approaeh to problems and in his ments. Directives tend to become vague. Ob- reaction to unusual and unforeseen situations. jectives are sometimes blurred. And there is no He must have the courage and intellectual curi- immediate and tangible measure of success.3 osity to try new things and new methods. He must guard vigorously against believing that he Army Regulation 350-5 sets forth the ob- has leamed all the answers to future war, jectives of the Army school system: against building up resistance to ehange, against taking the easv course of accepting The primary mission of the Army School Sys­ answers from the past instead of the infinitely tem is to prepare selected individuais of all more difficult course of digging them out of components of the Army to perform those the future.0 duties which they mav be called upon to carry out in war or in peace. The emphasis is on the The similarity of the thought expressed in art of leadership. Its goal is to develop officers these five quotations is striking. Note the re- and enlisted personnel who will be able to ap- current emphasis on leadership, imagination, ply a sure knowledge of fundamentais to the fiexibility, understanding of fundamentais, complex situations of the future and who will creativity, and original thinking in complex demonstrate intelligence, versatility, imagina- situations. If we are to achieve these objeetives, tion, and initiative in their applicationd should advanced officer schooling stress educa­ These objeetives were supported by the tion or training? Naval War College, which expressed its philos- Training takes a short view and has limited ophy of education in these words: objeetives. It concentrates on the skill or knowl­ The art and Science of modem warfare is an edge necessary to carry on a particular task or extremely complex web of political, economic, activity. A soldier0 is trained to fire a gun, fly social, and military factors. . . . The Naval War an airplane, or sail a ship. Training has specific, College seeks to further an understanding of limited objeetives; is concerned with tech- the fundamentais involved and develop broad niques; can be accomplished relatively rapidly; vision so that the individual may be better pre­ and is comparatively easy to evaluate. Educa­ pared to make proper decisions in similar situa­ tion, on the other hand, takes a longer view. tions. . . . The primary functions of a high It is of Iess immediate utility but of much more commander are to make sound military deci­ endufing and vital signifícance. Its objeetives sions and to provide the benefits of military are broad and unlimited. It is concerned with education and experience to the formulation of military and national strategy. His basic re- intangibles such as abstract principies, insights, quirement in performing these functions is good mental discipline, and the grasp of complex re- judgement—the ability to analyze a complex lationships. True education is a continuing military situation, to weigh factors, and to process and is difficult to evaluate. Perhaps the choose soundly. Education is the cultivation of difference can be stated cryptically by saying good judgement; it is preparation for dealing that training prepares a soldier for his next job with novel situations in which no precedent while education prepares him for a lifetime of exists. . . . It is the educational policy of the dedicated Service. Naval War College to devote principal empha­ It is of course true that education and sis to the promotion of reasoning powers, good training are not entirely separate. They repre- judgement and intellectual leadership expected of a naval officer in high command.5 •Throughout this article the word “soldier" is used to mean General MuirS. Fairchild, first commander anyone engaged in military Service. 56 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW sent opposite polarities of a single whole rather exclusive concern in the military that schooling than two completely dissimilar entities. There must be immediately relevant to vocation. To is no training that does not contain some ele- be sure, background subjects must be kept ment of education, nor is there any education within proper bounds, but the real danger is that does not contain an element of training. As not in tuming officers into dilettantes; it is in Herbert Spencer said, “Civing the best knowl- accepting a superficial definition of the prac- edge is also the best mental training.” However, tical. the difference is significant, and thus we can The ability to grasp large and complex eontrast them and ask. “Which is, and which situations. In the words of ar 350-5 quoted should be, the main emphasis in advanced offi- above, officers must “be able to apply a sure cer schooling: education or training?” knowledge of fundamentais to the complex situations of the future.” Anyone who has at- the seven tasks of officer education tended Congressional hearings when military officers testified may well have been amazed It is possible to classify the purposes of ad­ at the breadth of subjects upon which con- vanced officer schooling under seven different gressmen have sought the opinion of these of­ goals. While this classification mav not be ex- ficers. In addition to purely professional mili­ haustive and mutually exclusive in detail, it is tary matters, these subjects have included instructive, and it is complete enough for most economics, diplomacy, statesmanship, scientific purposes. research and development, administration, and Professional competence. The officer must even morais as these things relate to military first of all be an expert in the military field nar- affairs. The ability to recognize the relevant rowly defined. Any professional man must factors in a large and complex situation and to know the secrets of his trade, and the soldier grasp their significant relationship is colloquial- is no exception. This expertise is his first re- ly referred to as “getting the big picture.” It is quirement. Because of it the soldier is often an asset highly regarded in the military Service called upon to act or to assist in the broader and one which is essential for success in high field of military and national policy. It is true command or staff duty. that much purely military competence is the The capacity for analytical and Creative result of training rather than education, but, as thinking in a changing environment. As the pointed out above, these two are not entirely passage from the Naval War College catalogue separate. expressed it, “Education... is preparation for Understanding the total environment. In dealing with novel situations in which no the complex web of modem warfare, the mili­ precedent exists.” To be successful either on tary leader must have an understanding of all the battlefield or in the conference room, an significant elements of the environment in officer s thinking must be, as General Fairchild which he operates. He must be aware of mili­ reminds us, “clear, vigorous, objective, inde- tary. political, economic, sociological, psycho- pendent, and on a global scale.” And this re- logieal, scientific, and moral factors. His educa­ quires intellectual curiosity and open-minded- tion must make him aware of theSe factors, alive ness. Officers must not hold with the past mere- to their significance, and able to apply their les- ly because it is the accepted way; yet they must sons. Here the distinction between “need to not assume that the new is better simply be­ know" and “nice to know” breaks down. While cause it is new. They must adapt to the chang­ this distinction may be perfectly sound in train­ ing environment, but they must adapt creative- ing, it loses its validity in education. Over the ly and with judgment. In the words of Under long run it is impossible to separate them, and Secretary of State George W. Bali: what seemed to be only “nice to know” may, We shall not find the answer to [todays prob- in the end, turn out to be of vital significance. lems] by nostalgic references to an earlier era. Unfortunately there is an instinctive, almost These questions can be answered only in terms NEGLECTED TASKS OF OFFICER EDUCATION 57

of the eonditions and requirements of todavs that identification becomes so strong and so un- worl d. For whatever one may thi ri k or say, one critical that any semblance of objectivity be­ fact is clear above all—the world today is comes impossible. Parochialism means unduly wholly different from what it was before the narrow loyalties. In the military it is usually Second World W7ar, and Américas role in the thought of in connection with interservice con- world is wholly different. Anyone who fails to troversies. However, it is possible to be paro- realize these facts will be befuddled by the ehial about ones branch, bureau, or command. problems we are encountering—and he will reach, not for the complex answer that has a Even the Nation can be made the object of chance to be right, but for the simple answer parochialism (chauvinism and jingoism). Sin- that is very likelv to be wrong.7 cere and patriotic men can have honest differ- ences as to what is the best national policy. No With this task we have arrived at the crux one should expect all Joint Chiefs of Staff deci- of education versus training. How do you sions to be unanimous any more than he expects train an officer to be Creative? And vet the culti- all Congressional actions or all Supreme Court vation of creativity is the ultimate purpose of decisions to be unanimous. Nevertheless the any educational process. depth and bitterness of some Service disagree- The ability to communicate. As military ments raise the question of parochialism. A life itself becomes more formal and complex, broad education rather than narrow specialized the ability to communicate effectively, both training is the best way to overcome this. within the military and with civilians, becomes Skill in group dynamics. This is a generic increasingly important. A forceful briefing or term that includes, but is not limited to, old- an effective, soundlv reasoned staff paper are fashioned military leadership. It is closely re- the usual vehicles whereby nascent ideas gain lated to the ability to communicate but is im­ acceptance. Often the first one to get to the portant enough to merit separate mention. Plato “old man” with a well-written paper carries the gives knowledge of "how rightly to rule and dav. In The Uncertain Trumpet General Max­ how to obey” as a true end of education. Today well Taylor said: we call “how to rule” leadership, and "how to obev” discipline, but the meaning is still very Each Chief receives a briefing from the mem- bers of his staff on items on the [jcs] agenda a much the same. We expect military officers to few hours before the actual meeting. Called the be skilled in leadership and to accept discipline, Indians in contrast to the Chiefs, these Service but this is not enough. The soldier on horse- briefers exercise a considerable influence on the baek with "headquarters in the saddle” is no ultimate position taken by their superiors. more. Today the successful officer has to ac- Every Chief has to be alert to the danger of complish uniservice staff planning with his becoming a prisoner of his Indians, who are seniors, peers, and juniors. He has to meet his generallv able and enthusiastic young officers opposites from the sister Services at the joint trained to defend their views fearlessly before conference table. He must function effectively their superiors.8 with allied officers on combined stafls. He must Many would be surprised at the inHuence a cooperate harmoniously with civilians both in major or lieutenant colonel Indian can exert if and out of the Government, and he must work he is skilled in communication. willingly and understandingly under the civil- Military officers are also called upon to ian control prescribed by the American Con- appear before Congressional committees, meet stitution. In all these areas the officer must be with the press, make appearances on radio and able to meet, favorably influence, and effective­ tv, and act as unofficial ambassadors of the ly cooperate with others. This ability is the United States in half a hundred nations. In all most nebulous and yet the most important of these the ability to communicate effectively objective of the officer education process. is required. failures of officer education Freedom from parochialism. Parochialism means identification with a cause or idea vvhen When measured against these seven goals. 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW how successful has our officer schooling pro- a very special sense we are the fathers of mili­ gram been? \\rhile the formally stated objec- tary aviation. Not only did the Wright brothers tives of this program clearly recognize all seven invent the airplane, but another favorite Ameri­ of these tasks, actual practice has been less can child, the gasoline engine, has made pos- satisfactory. There is, in actual practice, a per- sible the development of the airplane from a vasive concern that officer schooling must be primitive thing to the powerful four-motored bomber. But we have not produced a Clause- directly relevant to vocation. The emphasis is witz or a Vauban. Mahan is our only military on “practical utility in the narrowest sense. theorist of comparable reputation. This concern reflects an admirable appreciation of the importance of the fírst of the seven tasks “This,” Earle remarks, “is a small representa- of officer education and has resulted in the de- tion for a people which has been preoccupied velopment of the American militarv officer as a with war, to a greater or lesser degree, since tactician and staff officer par excellence. He the first colonists landed on our shores.”10 probably has no superior anywhere in the world Why are there no Clausewitzes or Mahans in these areas. However, the insistence that or Douhets in our armed forces today? Why officer schooling must be job-oriented has be- has “no book on strategy produced by an come an obsession—almost a fetish. And therein American military officer reached the sophisti­ lies the danger. We have emphasized training cated levei of analysis of the best books on at the expense of education, and this has re­ strategy written by American civilians”? The sulted in our failure to recognize fully the reasons for this failure in military theory are importance of the other six tasks. We have thus no doubt complex, but surely among them must íailed to capitalize fully on our investment. be some failure of our officer education system. That this failure is de facto rather than de jure The second illustration may be somewhat only makes it the more dangerous. I will sup- more elusive, but it is probably even more sig- port this contention by offering only two spe- nificant. It involves the slowness of the pro- cific examples, although almost any thoughtful fessional military establishment, especially in officer should be able to provide additional the intermediate echelons, to read the hand- instances. writing on the wall relative to the McNamara First, we have failed to develop any first- defense strategy. The broad outlines of this rate military theorists. In his article, “Recent strategy have long been freely available—in Writings in Military Politics,” Samuel P. Hunt- books, articles, speeches, and Congressional ington said: testimony. While the basic thrust of this new policy has been clearly evident for some time, After World War II no book on strategy pro- we have been slow to understand its rationale, duced by an American military officer reached adapt to its methods, and communicate effec- the sophisticated levei of analysis of the tively with its advocates. This does not mean best books on strategy written by American that we must necessarily agree with the new civilians.1* policy in all respects; but we should under- He need not have restricted this eriticism to stancl it and, if we believe eriticism is neces- the post-World War II era. In 1948 Edward sary, express that eriticism in terms that are Mead Earle, in the Introduction to Makers of responsive to the significant aspects of the Modern Strategy, had written: policy and relevant to its underlying assump- tions. Too many military objections have failed In the field of military technologv, we [Ameri- simply because they did not address themselves cans] introduced to the world the rifle with inter- to the essential elements of this strategy. Once changeable parts, the machine gun, the balloon, again our edueational program must bear co- the tractor for tanks, the parachute, the dive ordinate if not sole responsibility. bomber, the submarine, and the airplane. Be- ing mechanically minded and possessed of I do not advocate scrapping vocational almost religious faith in the machine, we were training for officers. But I do believe that we first to adapt mass production to war. And in must look beyond the narrow limits of job spe- NECLECTED TASKS OF OFFICER EDUCATION 59 cialization in evaluating our school system. military and national strategies to deal with Specialized professional competence is essen- them, we will need officers who have a broad tial, yes, but it is not enough. The complex educational background—one that includes all problems of the future lie ahead. To develop seven ends of officer education. Hq North American Air Defense Command

Notes Catalog, 15th Edition, Academic Year 1960-61, Air University, 1. John P. Lisack, “Air Force Officer Education,” Air Uni- Maxwell AFB, Alabama, p. ii. cenity Review, XVI, I (November-December 1964), 84-91. 7. George W. Bali in an address to the Chicago Council on 2. Plato, The Laws. Book I, Part 1. Foreign Relations, 18 September 1964. Printed in For Com- 3. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and manders, IV, 9 (1 November 1964), 1. Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: 8. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: The Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 377. Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 89-90. 4. Army Regulation 350-5, Education and Training: Mili- 9. Samuel P. Huntington, “Recent Writings in Military tary Education and Service Schools, 21 November 1963, para- Politics,’’ Changing Pattems of Military Politics, ed. Samuel P. graph 6. Huntington (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 239. 5. Catalog of Courses, 1960-1962 (Newport, Rhode Island: 10. Edward Mead Earle, “Introduction,” Makers of Modem United States Naval War College), pp. 6-7. Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton Uni­ 6. Quoted in War College Orientation and Curriculum versity Press, 1948), p. ix. Military

JAPAN’S AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCE

M ajor Gil be r t M. Billings, J r .

Y L A T E summer of 1945 a shattered, di s- as a military power had solidified in Japan and Billusioned Japan had surrendered uncon- in the United States. But in 1950 the North ditionallv. Deeply resentful of the military leaders Koreans swarmed over the 38th parallel, and the who had l ed them into war and defeat, the Japa- illusion of a neutral Japan—unarmed, assailable, nese people renounced nationalism, their flag, their wasted—demanded new attention. national anthem, and their armed forces. Their The United States could not defend Japan postwar constitution, inspired by General Mac- indefinitely, and circumstances could strip the Arthur and accepted by the National Diet in the home islands of the protection of U.S. might. At fali of 1946, aspired to an “intemational peace the urging of MacArthur, but in the face of much based on justice and order and forever withheld opposition, the Diet approved in 1950 a 75,000- 'war as a sovereign right of the nation and the man quasi-militarv National Police Reserve, pro- threat or use of force as means of settling Inter- viding legislative basis for security and law en- national disputes.” forcement by the Japanese for the first time since As the world calmlv relaxed in the postwar the national police were abolished in 1945. aura of worldwide harmony, Japan’s new consti- In September 1951 the peace treatv was tution was applauded with unbounded enthusiasm signed. With the termination of Allied occupation —both by the Free World and by the Communist in April 1952, firm steps had to be taken by the bloc. By the time the initial tides of the “cold Japanese people—with strong encouragement from war had flowed i nto the more vulnerable areas, the United States—to provide for their own even- Japan s neutralism was well established. tual autonomous defense capability. Within a matter of months both legal and The first of these steps was taken in August psychological barriers to the re-creation of Japan 1952 when the National Police Reserve was reor- MIL1TARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 61

ganized as a National Safety Force (ground) and Staff,” consisting of an independent air force. But a Coastal Safety Force (sea). The naval branch violent opposition from leftist and Communist had at its disposal some 200,000 tons of combat groups, which charged that even nsa itself was a shipping, primarily patrol craft. The land branch constitutional violation, dictated a governmental was composed of 135,000 troops and included “go slow” policy. tanks, artillery, and light aircraft. It had taken two years to rally apathetic sup- The attitude at that time, both on the part porters behind the 1952 nsa law, and, very deli- of the United States and the U.S. Army (then the cately. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida began prime U.S. policy-making Service in Japan), was working on a reali stic defense force with ade- that any program to expand the Japanese forces quately balanced air, ground, and sea forces. The vvould overtax the fragile economy, so no indige- powerful leftist opposition was vocal at every op- nous air force was provided for. Far East Air portunity: the Japanese people oppose rearma- Forces ( fea f) was then char ged wi t h the aer i al ment—the Japanese feel that they will become a defense of Japan, a responsibility delegated to the tool of U.S. policy—the national economy is wholly usaf Japan Air Defense Force.0 strained, and the government is weak and in- feaf fought for its belief that the most imme- secure. diate threat to the safety of the islands was from Political opposition in the Diet and in the Communi st ai r power, not ground or sea forces. prefectures was too great for Yoshida to bid for Worl d War I I , j ust seven years i n the past, had an amendment to the 1947 constitution, so he provided a classic example of strategic vulner- asked the Diet to enact legislation designed to ability. During less than four months of intense provide Japan with means of self-defense—on the air attack, between April and August 1945, Japan ground, in its Coastal waters, and in the air. had been defeated without invasion. Yoshida faced his opposition with a firm de- Under the 1947 constitution ° ° and the ensu- termination that the constitution did not intend to ing interpretations of its renouncement of war, leave the islands vulnerable to aggression. One of threat, or use of force, the Japanese would accept his most convincing points was that American onl y the mi ni mum forces necessary to provi de a forces could be withdrawn when Japanese defense defensive capability against aggression. And mod- was strong enough. After lengthy debate, this self- ern aerial weapons—long-range strategic bombers, defense doctrine became law with passage of the nuclear weapons, intercontinental and intermedi- Self Defense Law on 2 June 1954. ate-range ballistic missiles—had relegated land fea f had already begun planning for the forces to a third priority in the defense of the embryonie air force. An Air Advisory Group was islands, less than an hour bv jet from the main- established in fea fs Tokvo headquarters in July land of Asia. 1953 to initiate general policy and procedures If the United States was to have Japan as a planning. In addition the Japanese ereated an Air partner in a bilateral treaty of mutual security to Planning Group composed of former Japanese defend democracy in the Pacific, air power had to Army and Navy officers to work with feaf. be provided. fea fs plan for the establishment of an autonomous Japanese air force, no longer tied to the army or navy as it had been up to 1945, O n 1 Jul y 1954 the Japan Air Self included concepts for a radar network and a Sys- Defense Force—even today burdened with its cum- tem of air bases, in addition to a minimum number bersome title by the constitutional interpretation of fighter-interceptors. of its primary mission—was est abl i shed. 0 The earli- Already the National Safety Ageney had been est firm planning foresaw the new ja sd f as a pro- worki ng on pl ans for the ereati on of a “Thi r d jected force of 36 tactical squadrons equipped with 783 aircraft. The force was to have included “Fifth Air Force headquarters retumed to Nagoya, Japan, from Korea on 1 September 1954 and simultaneously assumed the responsibihties of the JADF, which was then deactivated. •"The postwar constitution, which was accepted in 1946 °Thc Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, was also and went into effect in 1947. is referred to as the 1947 consti­ established on this date under the jurisdiction of the U.S. tution. Ambassador. 62 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

9 fighter, 6 fighter-bomber, 6 fighter-interceptor, Phase Three ( fy 1962 on) period of 3 tactical-reconnaissance, 6 medium-transport, and modemi za- 6 light-bomber squadrons. tion of air Even with many months of quiet lead-time defense planning, the handicaps to be overcome were for- power mi dabl e. Japan had been compl etel y wi thout con- Initial planning also depended on World War tinuity in air operations between the end of the II-trained pilots, ground crewmen, and support war and 1950. Allied occupation forces had banned personnel. Originally, basic manning was to come both military and civil aviation. The only qualified from this reserve. Subsequent personnel were to be Japanese military pilots then available were those obtained from pipelines to civilian pools established trained by the U.S. Army to fly the L-21 in sup- to bring the force up to full strength. port of the National Safety Agency mission. Five training concepts were adopted: During this time every aspect of aviation (1) Refresher flying training would give World technology and engineering had undergone rapid War II pilots reorientation in the T-6 for eventual and radical development. While Japan was pre- conversion to jet, transport, or pilot instructor. occupied with sweeping internai problems and sur- (2) usaf Air Training Command schools in the vival, the Science of aeronautics had moved ahead United States would train ja sd f personnel in the at supersoni c speeds. Even modem concepts of f l y - more complex skills, including flying training. ing proficiencv and instrument techniques made (3) usaf training of ja sd f personnel in Japan Japans pre-1945 approaches antiquated. would make use of technical schools within feaf Director General Tokutaro Kimura, civilian and Far East Command for certain general areas, head of the Japan Defense Agency created under such as sheet metal repairman, machinist, and the newly enacted law, immediately made it clear supply. that the Air Self Defense Force would be the prin- (4) On-the-job training would give the Japa- cipal weapon for the defense of Japan in the new nese craftsman or tradesman appropriate initial or defense alignment. refresher training to modify his civilian skill for The ja sd f stafiF was composed of men who military application. had had professional military experience with the (5) Formal ja sd f schools would be established, Imperial Japanese armed forces, and most of them staffed by Japanese personnel, with advice, guid- had also served with jd a s predecessors. The staff ance, and material assistance from the United included a general, a lieutenant general, and nine States. major generais (among them the colorful, stoic ja sd f ’s first base was Matsushima, at the time Mi noru Genda, a Worl d War I I fi ghter ace con- a satellite of Misawa Air Base (now Fifth Air sidered one of the most brilliant naval strategists Force’s northernmost base in Japan), to be used Japan ever produced, who later beeame Chief of for initial single-engine refresher flying training. Staff and is now a member of the House of Coun- The first cadets reporting in to Matsushima cillors). were al l veteran fl yers who had had combat ex- The ja sd f Air Staff Office foresaw the devel- perience during World War II. Most of them had opment of the air defense System in three phases: been lieutenant or captain equivalents in the Im- perial Army or Navy Air Forces. Their program Phase One ( fy 1954—57) period of was to i ncl ude fi ve months of classroom work and construc- 150 hours of flying time in the T-6 trainer.0 tion of a To take a sorely defeated nation and build a training technologically modern air force was no small foundation undertaking. Problems, some unforeseen and some Phase Two ( fy 1958-61) period of predicted, arose at once. The language barrier augmenta- stood in the way of every movement; recruiters tion of operational °Tbe last T-6 group was deactivated on 31 May 1964. The Fuji T-1A, a tandem two-seat jet trainer, replaced the reciprocal- units engine trainer in the JASDF inventory. M1LITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 63

lacked incentives to offer those qualified; new in- later) became an Operational Training Unit. dustry competed for trained personnel, regardless By January 1956—just six months after its es- of the levei of their sldll; facilities vvere limited, in- tablishment—the Japan Air Self Defense Force adequate, and crowded; equipment had to be was equipped with 319 aircraft, 40 per cent of brought in as soon as a legal basis was established. them T-6’s, 30 per cent T-34’s, 20 per cent T-33’s, The legal structure upon which the Self De- and the remainder C-46’s and F-86’s. The fírst of fense Forces vvere built did not evolve ovemight. them arrived in December 1955. All the original Defeat had stripped Japan of the right to exercise aircraft were provided by the U.S. her soverei gn povvrers, and compl ex nati onal and By mid-1955 plans had to be made to recruit intemational negotiation was required to restore flying training cadets who had no previous flying them. The U.S. and 48 other non-Communist na- experience. College graduates with a knowledge of tions signed a peace treaty with Japan, which was spoken English were selected, and the fírst class of ratified by the U.S. Senate in March 1952. 24 entered Phase I the following October. Recruit- At the same time a bilateral mutual defense ing, however, was no easy task. Prestige, pay, and treaty was signed by Japan and the United States. incentives vvere low. .An act passed by the Diet in 1953 restored to Japa- Earlier, in January 1955, the fírst five re- nese industry the right to make munitions. Japan fresher-trained Japanese pilots began T-33 jet was elected the 80th member of the United Nations transition training at Tsuiki. The Japanese press in 1956. A revised “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation hailed the event as a milestone, and in May the fírst and Security” was signed by Japan and the U.S. in class graduated. It was a significant day for Japan 1960. All these measures established the legal and —for the fírst time, Japan had jet-qualified pilots. ethical foundation for Japanese defensive forces, In August the fírst 5 of 22 pilots who vvere to which the 1947 constitution—according to some in- receive F-86 training departed for the United terpretations—had forbidden. States. Four months later the fírst F-86’s for ja sd f At the same time that cadets vvere reporting arrived. in to Matsushima for T-6 training, a usaf training Meantime transport flying training in the C-46 group was activated at Nagoya, under fea fs started at Tachikawa. The basic program called for Japan Air Defense Force, culminating months of 120 hours in this two-engine aircraft, still the basic planning and coordination by usaf, feaf, the Air troop carrier in ja sd f , but experience proved that Training Command, and the Japanese. Also orga- while the 120-hour course was sufficient to train nized were a usaf technical training squadron at crew members it did not qualify the pilots as air- Hamamatsu i n central Honshu and usaf flying craft commanders. This problem was solved by training squadrons at Tsuiki ab in northem Kvushu giving the pilots 300 additional hours in the aircraft and (under 315th Air Division) at Tachikavva ab under usAF-supervised ojt. usaf instrument certifi- near Tokyo. This latter squadron was moved sev- cates vvere issued until ja sd f could produce its eral weeks later to Miho ab on the western coast own. when it was found that Tachikawa was too crowded. Technical training began at the same time The flying training program was originally built flying training was initiated. Every skill needed to around four bases. Former Japanese pilots were to man the new air force had to be recruited, and the receive 30 hours in light planes (T-34’s) at Hama- people had to be trained—for Communications, matsu and 130 hours in the T-6 at Matsushima. maintenance, supply, personnel, radio, radar, They then were to go to C-46 transport conversion weather, hydraulies, airframe, food Service, pho- training at Tachikawa (later Miho) or to T-33 jet tography, medicai. conversion training at Tsuiki or back to Hama- Weather trai ni ng began at Yokota ab in 1954 matsu or Matsushima for T-34 or T-6 pilot instruc- with officer refresher and airman observer courses. tor training. Eighteen officers and 82 airmen were sent to Scott Later the T-34 base became the Phase I Pri- and Keesler Air Force Bases for aircraft control and mary School, the T-6 base became the Phase II waming schools. Control tower and ground-con- Primary School, the T-33 base the Basic Jet Pilot trolled approach operators were trained in lan- Training School, and the C-46 (and the F-86 much guage as well as technique, for they had to know Japan Air Self Defense Force pilots, look- ing toward the daij when their first F-104J squadron becomes operational, put in Link trainer time at a Japanese training base.

' 1 1 !• M1LITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 05

enough English to pass the U.S. Caa exarninations. ojt in supply and formal training and op' in feaf Consolidated technical schools were initiated. In April 1958 the force at Hokkaido, the Northern Air Defense Force of today, scrambled the first aircraft to intercept a suspected violation of territorial air. In 1959 Central Air Defense Force aircraft went on alert, and the following year air- craft of the Western Air Defense Force took their place in the air defense system. In 1957 fea f had been redesignated Pacific Air Forces and moved to Hawaii as the air com- ponent of the unified Pacific Command. Fifth Air Force was then charged with responsibility for the air defense of Japan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and sur- rounding seas. Gradually ja sd f began to fit into the A Japan-built F-104], dive brahes still ex- tended, taxis off the runway after a train- Fifth Air Force air defense pattern. ing flight. JASDF now has more than During mid-1960 the radar installations of 100 pilots qualified in its new aircraft. the ac&w network were taken over by ja sd f . Today the ja sd f Ai rways Ai r Communi cations & Weather Service Wing still provides this criticai element of the air defense system to both Fifth Air Force and ja sd f fighters and fighter-interceptors. By this time a firm mission statement had evolved. Article 3 of the 1954 Self Defense Law stated: “The mission of the Japan Air Self Defense Force is to conduct itself chiefly in the air.” ja sd f s peacetime mission is to —prepare for defensive and guard operations —employ measures to prevent violation of ter- ritorial air —conduct disaster rescue measures —maintain air traffic control —conduct weather observation and forecast —cooperate with and support the United States Air Force.

D urinc its decade of development the Japan Air Self Defense Force grew rapidly in size, stature, and prestige. In 1954 its 6738 men included 1383 officers, 4904 airmen, and 451 ci- vilians. By 1958 its size had multiplied six times and its officer corps of 3400 included 207 jet- qualified F-86D and F-86F fighter-interceptor and fighter pilots. By 1965 the force stood just short of 40,000 men (compared to 20,000 U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in Japan), with 700 pilots qual- ified in the F-86F and 155 in the F-86D. ja sd f is now equipped with over 1100 air-

M1LITARY AFFA1RS ARROAD 67

craft of various types. The backbone of its present fighter strength is a force of nearly 450 F-86’s. However, Japan faces an obsolescence problem common to many nations. The D-model of the F-86 was first flown 16 years ago, and the F-model (later versions of which were mannfactured in Japan by Mitsubishi) is only three years younger. Reconnaissance is flown with the RF-86F, while troop-carrier capability is still built around the 25- year- ol d C- 46 Commando, best known for i ts Ai r Transport Command “Hump” operations in the China-Burma-India Theater during World War II. The C-46 range of 1400 miles is suitable for transport and airborne operations within the home islands of Japan under the purely defensive con- cept, but its speed detracts froin its usefulness in modern f ast - r eact i on war f ar e. However, Japans air defense is not yet totally charged to ja sd f alone—nor will it be until at least five years from now, when the Mutual Seeurity Treaty is first subject to review. Fifth Air Force maintains two tactical bases in Japan. Three squad- rons of its new all-weather F-105D fighters are stationed at Yokota ab near Tokyo in central Hon- shu. Additional fighters, two Tacti cal Ai r Com- mand F-100 rotational squadrons, are stationed at Misawa ab in northern Honshu, with recon- naissance aircraft at both Misawa and Yokota. At Tachikawa ab near Tokyo, pa c a f s 315th Air Di- vision (Combat Cargo) has a C-130 troop-transport High-speed photography shows a Japanese pilot ttndergoing centrifuge training, his face revealing squadron, while ma ts has a C-124 squadron. the pressures building up. In the ten years from The usaf 39th Air Division and ja sd f s North- the end of World War II to the birth of JASDF, in- ern Air Defense Force cover northern Honshu and ternational aviation pushed far ahead while Japans Japans northernmost island, Hokkaido. ja sd f s remained at a standstill. Prior to 1945 Japan had Central Air Defense Force covers central Honshu, had no need for equipment such as the centrifuge. while the Western Air Defense Force covers the ex- treme Southern tip of Honshu, Kyushu, and Shi- koku. The 41st Air Division provides coverage for all of central and Southern Japan. In addition, three squadrons of the F-105, augmented with recon- naissance, fighter-interceptors, and combat cargo airlift, are located in the Ryukyu Islands, 250 miles south of Kyushu. In November 1959 the National Defense Council (advisory body to the Cabinet, equivalent to the U.S. National Seeurity Council) made the formal decision to adopt the F-104J to replace the F-86. Two hundred F-104’s are now in the ja sd f inventor)', and a projected force of seven F-104 squadrons has been approved. Japanese second lieutenant puts on his oxygen mask the back seat of a T-33. JASDF has used U.S.- mated T-33's in pilot training since January 1955. Mainstay of Japans present-day fighter strength is thc queen of the Korean War, the F-86. In various configurations, it is used as a fighter, as a fighter-interceptor, and as a reconnaissance aircraft.

The control tower of a modem JASDF tactical air base overlooks a flight line filled ivith F-86's, some of which were built by Mitsubishi, maker of the famous World War II aircraft, the Zero. MILITARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 69

Another National Defense Council move that will influenee Japanese military thinldng in the fu- ture is the 1963 clecision to place the Nike-Ajax air defense missile systems under the control of ja sd f . After construction of missile sites and a ground environment installation, the Nike-Ajax battalions will provide Japan with a surfaee-to-air missile. For the next few years Japan is ensured a strong air defense potential, with a balanced mix of weapon systems. Defense is never a static situation, and undoubtedly decisions will be made to inodify present forces assigned, but aircraft available as of the tenth anniversary of ja sd f include: JASDF USAF Fighters F-86F F-100 F-105 Fighter-in terceptors F-86D F-104J Reconnaissance RF-86F RF-101 C-130 Airlift C-46 C-130 Missiles Nike-Ajax Helicopters H-19. H-21 H-19 S-62 HH-43B Present operational aircraft available in the air defense system number more than 1000, 500 of them belonging to Fifth Air Force squadrons in Japan and Okinawa. The eífectiveness of the ja sd f squadrons is reflected in their 1964 aircraft major accident rate (for jets) of 5.8 and in their detec- tion and neutralization rate in country-wide air defense exercises that matches U.S. Air Force standards. At the usaf worldwide fighter-interceptor vveapons meet at Tyndall afb. Florida, “William Tell 1963,” the Fifth Air Force team representing Pacific Air Forces was composed of F-102 pilots from Fifth Air Forces 4th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Misawa ab,° support personnel from the 39th Air Divísion, and a weapons controller team from the Japan Air Self Defense Force. Com- peting against usaf weapons contr ol l er teams from the Philippines and Okinaw'a and against other Japanese teams from the 24 radar sites in Japan, the 42d Aircraft Control and Warning Group per- sonnel took top honors in the pre-William Tell exercise “Small Change.”

®The last two F-102 squadrons will be withdrawn from Japan by 1 July 1965. 70 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEXV

pa c a f had the only dual nationality team at Preston, Commander of Fifth Air Force, and Lt. Tyndall, and its efficiency was exhibited on open- Gen. Hi rokuni Muta, Commander of ja sd f ’s Air ing day when the usaf F-102 pilots were vectored Defense Command, occupy side-by-side positions into the target area by the ja sd f weapons control l er on the control dais. Representatives of both usaf and shot dovvn the first drone to be killed in the and ja sd f are on the joint Battle Staff of each of competition. the three air defense sectors. Two “perfect” missions were flown, and the To the north, west, and south are Air Direc- pa c a f -ja sd f team took third place in the F- 1 02 tion Control Centers ( adcc), located at Misawa eategory—fourth place worldwide for a 11 intercep- ab, Iruma ab (“Johnson ab” under usaf tenure tors. The team’s “splash” rate at the end of the until returned to the Japanese), and Itazuke ab competition was 50 per cent, compared to an over- (novv a usaf íorward operating base). The 24 all average of about 33 per cent. ac&w sites detect and follow more than half a The Japan Air Selí Defense Force organiza- million aircraft tracks annually, sifting “friendly” tion is patterned to a great degree after the U.S. from “unidentified” and relaying the latter infor- Air Force, just as the Japan Defense Agency par- mati on through the adccs to coc for joint evalua- allels the structure of the U.S. Department of De- tion by the usaf-ja sd f duty officers, who together fense. The Director General of pA is a civilian, must make the deci si on to “destroy” after detec- equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The tion, identification, and interception have been Japanese eounterpart of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of accomplished. StafF is the Joint StafF Council. Under the Director General is a Chief of

StafF for each of the three Services. The office of T he ten yea h s since ja sd f ’s inauguration have the ja sd f Chief of StafF includes a coordinating Air been years of struggling to provide the Japanese usaf. StafF Office similar to Headquarters The with their own defense forces. Now ja sd f is rapidlv ja sd f organizational complex includes four major maturing into a capable, ready, well-equipped commands: machine and is taking its full share of Japans air • Air Defense Command, with headquar- defense responsibilities, commensurate with its op- ters at Fuchu as, has three Air Defense Forces, erational capability. each with one to four wings, one ac& w wing, and lt has inherent problems. The Japan Defense support components. Agency is still retained in the government struc- • Flying Training Command includes one ture as an “agency,” and it is considered politically F-86F wing and five ffight training wings. inopportune at the moment to press for its eleva- tion to “Ministrv of Defense parallel with the • Air Technical Training Command has Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Labor. five technical training schools. (In addition, two Although the Director General reports directly to basic training groups, an officer candidate school, the Prime Minister and is addressed as “Minister and an air staff college are assigned to the ja sd f Junva Koizumi,” he is a “state minister without a Chief of Staff.) “ministry.” • Ai r Materi el Command coordi nates ac- Manv officers admit readilv, too, that they tivities of three air depots (land vehicles and sup- woul d l i ke to see t hei r cumbersome desi gnati on plies, aircraft, and Communications and electron- reduced to “Japan Air Defense Force. The press- ics). ing problein of the need to enhance public con- Other support components assigned directly fklence in the defense establishment and to in- to the Chief of Staff include an air transportation crease the prestige of the man in unifonn weighs wi ng, Ai rways and Ai r Communi cations Service, heavily on their minds. air rescue, air proving group, aeromedical labora- A follow-on transport to replace the C-46 has tory, air aids, intelligence, and the ja sd f hospital been under study for some time, and the Air Staff at Gifu. Office is taking a dose look at such aircraft as the On the Battle Staff in the Combat Operations General Dynamics-Grumman F-111, the McDon- Center (coc) at Fuchu as, Lt. Gen. Maurice A. nell F-4, and the Lockheed A - l l for the day when M1LITARY AFFAIRS ARROAD 71

a new air defense weapon system may be needed. craft, and antisubmarine aircraft including heli- ja sd f has had the leadership of exceptionally copters; and the Japan Air Self Defense Force. capable Chiefs of Staff, including its first, Gen. On 1 October 1964 the first F-104 fighter- Kentaro Uemura; Gen. Sadamu Sanagi, a former interceptor squadron became operational at Nyu- Imperial Navy staff officer; and Gen. Genda and tabaru Air Base on Kyushu, Japans southernmost Gen. Takeshi Matsuda. both of whom had much island. (Five of ja sd f s 20 operational squadrons to do with the adoption of the F-104, reassignment are now F-104 equipped.) By spring 1965 Japan of the Nike-Ajax to ja sd f , and selection of the Base had more than 115 pilots (only 10 of them trained Air Defense Ground Environment ( b .adce) equip- in the U.S.) qualifiedto fly the F-104J and F-104DJ. ment. With the high caliber of leadership it has had Its present chief is 55-vear-old Gen. Shigeru during its first ten years, with increased public un- Ura, a ta.ll, personable professional soldier who derstanding of the need for defense, with eulmina- speaks English fluentlv. A 1932 graduate of the tion of programing for more modem weapon Sys- Imperial Military Academy, General Ura was a tems, and with the maturity which comes only from staff officer in the Imperial Armv headquarters dur- tenure and experience, Japan will move back into ing the war and later was assigned as liaison officer a position in the world as an aerial power—firmly to the Supreme Commander, Allied Povvers (sc a p). dedicated to the objectives of the Free World in Japans 250,000-man defense forces today in- the Pacific. clude the Ground Self Defense Force of five Annies Headquarters Fifth Air Force (PACAF) with 150,000 men, most of them concentrated in the north facing U.S.S.R. and in the west facing Communi st Chi na; the Mari ti me Sel f Defense Force of 31,000 men with 211 destrovers, destroy- Acknowledgnient The Editor wishes to thank Mainichi Craphic, Tokyo, for er escorts, destroyer frigates, submarines, patrol- the photographs. Air Force Review

AIRCRAFT INTEGRATED DATA SYSTEMS

M ajor Gen er a l Earl C. H edl un d

NEW eoncept in aircraft maintenance oper- of aids are so numerous that the concept may be A ations promises to bring about sweeping considered a major breakthrough, the first since changes for the entire aviation industry. The pos- shortly before World War II, when overhaul depot sibilities of the nevv system, called Aircraft Inte- methods first carne into general acceptance. The aids grated Data Systems ( aids), may eventually pro- breakthrough was possible because of other vide Hight crevvs with continuous information about technological developments: the “health” of their aircraft, vvhile at the same • The rather reeent development of minia- time data on the cause of incipient failure vvill be turized eleetronic circuits, along with the develop- telemetered to the landing terminal during actual ment of slow-speed, high-density, magnetic-tape flight. At the terminal, automated maintenance recording techniques, has made possible a lovv- and supply procedures will take care of the re- weight, highly reliable flight data recording system. quirements—the requisition of parts, vvork orders, • The development of high-speed data resupplv, etc. The more practical short-term reduction and computing machines has made it development of the system lies in erash investiga- feasible to do something useful with the tremen- tion recording, out-of-limits operation of aircraft dous volume of data gathered by the recording recording, and performance trend analysis by system. existing computers. The name Aircraft Integrated Data Systems Aircraft flight data recording has been accom- was adopted by a subcommi ttee of the Ai rl i nes plished for many years for purposes of flight-testing Electronic Engineering Committee of the Airlines and crash analysis. Various systems are used in Communi cation Admi ni strati ve Counci l at a meet- flight-test vvork, ranging from crude mechanical- ing in Kansas City early in 1965. The possibilities Iimit recording devices through photographic re- for improvement in aircraft maintenance by use cording and, more recently, analog traces on a AIR FORCE REVIEW 73

paper scroll using transducers, electronic sigiial electronic analog-to-digital (A/D) converter; in conditioning circuits, and a rather sophisticated fact, most of the digital recorder Systems available recording machine. Crash recorders have been today do this conversion in the aircraft signal- manda tory equipment on certain types of commer- conditioning circuits before recording, since most cial aircraft for some years. To my knowledge, available sensors that are both practical and eco- these have all been of the metal-foil tape type. nomical are of the analog type. Digital sensors are (See Figure 1.) They have the advantages of a not yet competitive; ultimately, though, reliable, rather easy-to-analyze record. the tape is praetically accurate, and economical ones will be developed. fireproof. and upkeep is simple and not too expen- The analog recorder is the more economical sive. The disadvantages of the metal-foil recorder to design and install, and it is inherently more accu- are that the tape cannot be reused, the number rate because one step in signal conditioning for of parameters which can be recorded is extremely digital output is imnecessary. However, because limited. and the length of record is so short as to of the mechanical features of the analog recorder, necessitate frequent tape changes. All these earlier this accuracy advantage is subject to argument. recording Systems have been made obsolete by The analog data presentation is also easier for the nevver miniaturized electronic circuitrv, slow- maintenance personnel to inteipret. A simple line speed magnetic-tape recording, and the high-speed graph represents many numbers, which makes Computer. manual (eyebal l ) study si mpl er. With the digital recorder, pure numbers on the data record can be easily interpreted for the magnetic tape recording true value of the parameter. Often the number There are two basic types of magnetic-tape printed will be the true number of degrees, psi, etc. record output: analog data and digital data. Analog Machine analysis of the digital tape on readily data must be printed out in a graphic format. available computing machines is possible at most Digital data are printed as pure numbers. Analog major air bases. This is probably the major factor data may be converted to digital data by a suitable in deciding which basic type of system to use,

Figure 1. Metal foil tape information input

2. acceleration 3. heading 4. altitude transducer signal multiplexer output conditioner switch Changes all inputs signal time sharing Oscillator output to relative d-c funetion (CPS) is a funetion voltages. of input d-c voltage value.

1 magnetic tape

number of pulses variable with voltage

Figure 2. Frequency moclulation analog tape

because data reduction and utilization will be the needed. Figure 2 illustrates the fm format on the greatest expense as well as the key to maxi mum tape. On the actual recorder, eight tracks of im- utilization of the aids. pulses are carried on a half-ineh-wide tape, seven of them for data and one for cancellation of error caused hy variations in tape speed, line voltage, recorder tape format and temperature. The recording of as many as 315 The actual magnetization of the tape must, of bits of information every three seconds is possible. course, follow a definite format. The industry has An example of a semidigital system is the devised many designs, each of which satisfies a recording format which is called pulse duration certain purpose vvithin a system and none of which modul ati on. Thi s system uses a fi xed l ength of tape has all the desired features. for each bit recording. The quantity being recorded One recording system uses frequency modu- is a funetion of the length of magnetization and is lated ( km) analog recording technique. A basic expressed as a percentage of the maxi mum range frequency is modulated up or down as the signal of the particular parameter. Magnetization of the strength of the Circuit is varied. Each signal is full length would represent 100 per cent of the modified (conditioned) to an output between zero maxi mum val ue for the parameter. Fi gure 3 i l l us - and some upper-limit voltage, then fed to the fre- trates this format. Four tracks are recorded on half quency modidator so that only one fm Circuit is of a half-inch tape. One track is for speech and

Figure 3. Pulse duration digital tape

transducer signal multiplexer , mndulator output conditioner switch Changes all inputs signal time sharing Oscillator output to relative d-c funetion (pulse duration) is voltages. a funetion of input d-c voltage value.

í magnetic Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll reference tape start stop p.__ Number of pulses variable with time. Read as per cent total possible per time base. Choracter Representation Exomple: 1 c h o r a c t e r binary eode 0 1010 539 0101 0011 1001 1 0001 (5) (3) (9) 2 0010 One data word = three decimal 3 0011 characters 4 0100 0101 = three seis of four 5 binary bits per set ó 0110 7 0111 Four binary bits recorded in parollel 1000 8 Three characters per word recorded serially 9 1001

100's | 10's One word = 539

parity bit (1) (D (D unused unused 3's bit mylar tape 4's bit (1) (0) (0) 2's bit (0) (1) (0) l's bit (1) (1) (1)

1 1 4 4 sec write heads tape motion I- 1/48 sec

Figure 4. Binary coded decimal recording format “parallel bit'’

What can data recording do? referente (error cancellation), and three tracks are for data. There are two basic areas of use for recorded One widely used digital recording system flight data, in crash analysis and maintenance. format is referred to as the Binary Coded Decimal Crash Analysis. This area is quite obvious. Recording Format, the format which ibm machi nes Civil airlines have been required to have a limited accept. There are two common ways of doing this, flight data recorder on aJl their large aircraft for and ibm has machines in use which are suitable a number of years. Tiie recordeis they have been for either one or both. The bit parallel format is carrying are “crash-proofed” as much as possible, illustrated by Figure 4. Another way to do the but on numerous occasions the recorders have not same thing is the bit serial format illustrated by survived the crash. Also in many cases where the Figure 5. When one understands these two pos- data recorder did survive the crash the limited sible formats, he can readily see that the number of amount of data was of little use in detennining variations possible in representing numbers on the cause of the crash. The Federal Aviation Agency magnetic tape is quite large. Selection of any data- and the civil airlines are currently working to de- recording system must include careful consideration velop a better crash data recording system that of the data format and the ground equipment will record many more parameters; therefore, it necessary to reduce and analyze the data. probably will be a magnetic tape recorder. Figure 5. Birxanj coded decimal recording format “serial bit”

Character Representation -O J3 .a J3 Tape speed - 0.2“/sec x decimal binary X X X 136 bits/inch of tape character code o 100's a 10's o l's O Q_ a. a. a 1010 0 1000 110 1011100 11 1 0001 159 2 0010 1 00111 0100110001 348 3 0011 10010 1 001110 1111 237 4 0100 110 0111000 10 1011 5 0101 985 V4" 6 0110 1100011010100011 801 7 0111 10 0 10 10 1 00 110001 248 8 1000 9 1001 1 01001 0101101101 456 1 0011100101000 11 321 .030“ approx.

tape motion

Maintenance Recording. This area has been many equipment items are taken off the aircraft championed by several domestic as vvell as British for overhaul when there is much useful life left. and Dutch companies. The fundamental concept A third concept to consider is the maintenance that vvear or deterioration of equipment follows a practice in effect with some secondary equipment rather regular pattern is the basis of argument for on aircraft today. This concept includes engines on maintenance recording. The normal vvear curve of multiengine aircraft which are comfortably povv- a mechanical device might be illustrated by Figure ered, such as the C - 1 3 0 . The establ i shed maxi mum 6. During its early life there is a very slovv dete- time betvveen overhauls is such that very rarely is rioration. With age the slope of the curve becomes one pulled off at its time limit. In this case it is more pronounced until, near the failure point, the obvious that many extra parts are necessary in slope is increasing quite rapidly. The end of the overhaul, and in fact major destruction of com- curve should be rather vvell behaved. If it is pos- ponents must occur at times, adding greatly to sible to evaluate and make a record of a perform- overhaul cost. ance factor or group of factors that tells this story These three concepts, together with the need of vvear, it should be possible to predict failure for crash investigation data, lead to a firm require- vvithin some practical limits. This concept is vvell ment f or the aids. On the curve of Figure 6, for anv knovvn and has been used with the means at hand given ecjuipment, a point can be determined vvhere throughout the history of aviation (and before), the slope is at the criticai rate of vvear. This point but the tools to evaluate vvear vvere never as is determined by vvhat normal operations require. sophisticated or promising as the data recorder. If an item must operate for 20 hours to serve suc- Another concept to consider is that of the cessfully for the longest normal mission, the point number of failures of a mass-use item plotted 20 hours in advance of vvhere failure occurs is the against time in use before failure. This graph should rate-of-wear point which should govern replace- be the familiar Gaussian (hat) curve (Figure 7). ment of the equipment. By basing replacement of On criticai equipments a time betvveen overhauls equipment on this argument, which may be called is established which, based on experience, ensures “on conclition maintenance,” the “early replace- that failures vvill be very rare. This point on the ment and resultant loss of useful life illustrated by curve in Figure 7 is well to the left. Obviously Figure 7 vvill be eliminated to an appreciable de- Figure 6. Normal wear curve Figure 7. Number of failures vs. time

<------>

gree. Also failures on the aircraft of secondary etc. Also particularly troublesome equipment of equipment, vvith resultant high parts destruction, an aircraft can be fitted with the necessary sensors will be reduced. and integrated into the aids. Corrective actions will Another area vvhere maintenance recording then be based on aids information. will prove useful is in troubleshooting failures of equipment. Predicting failures will certainly not Only a few of the aids developments taking place be accomplished 100 per cent by the aids, beca use, are given here. We will always have sudden fail- even though a large number of parameters can be ures of equipment on aircraft caused by material or monitored, not everything that can fail can be manufacturing deficiencies or equipment abuse, moni tored. The aids can give a much better idea but the aids promises greater safety while reducing of the way in which failure occurred, and thus maintenance and operating costs for normal wear diagnosis of the failure may be greatly facilitated. and operation. The capability of the system to While the above benefits are being realized, make a continuous record of hundreds of param- the use of aids in the operations end of the business eters, sampled every few seconds, makes it such can result in substantial savings by providing the a powerful crash analysis tool that this alone should data necessary for more efficient operation of the make installation of the aids mandatory. aircraft (fuel and flight profile) and by detecting such things as overloads, overtemps, hard landings, Warner Robins Air Materiel Area THE AVIATION CADET PROGRAM IN RETROSPECT

C aptain Maurice G. S tack

N 3 MARCH 1965 at James Connally Air preparing to become an officer and leader in the O Force Base in the heart of Texas, the last of United States Air Force. The Air Force had to a legend passed before us when Aviation Cadet determine quickly whether he had the tools to Steven V. Harper received his commission as a become a leader. Could he accept the responsibili- second lieutenant in the United States Air Force. ties of command? Was he honorable in his actions? It is a legend created in our time, the story of the Did he have the emotional stability to withstand aviation cadet program. the pressure of command? Did he possess the hu- Started in 1917 when the United States en- maneness to help his men? Not only was the cadet tered World War I, the cadet program ended with preparing to lead, he was also studying to become the graduation of Navigator Training Class 65-15. a skilled technician, a combat flyer. It was not This small class of only 22 cadets never had the enough merely to learn the theory or discuss ob- privilege of being an “upper class.” Yet it shares jectives. The aviation cadet had to perform and a tradition with and can be equally as proud of perform well under the watchíul eye of an experi- its achievements as the largest of the classes dur- enced instructor. The cadet could not talk his way ing the great buildup of World War II—Class 44-A, through; actual performance was all that counted. which began training with 13,294 cadets. Looking back on the program a former cadet To commemorate the closing of the aviation cannot help wondering, “Why must it go?” An in- cadet program Lieutenant General William W. stitution which made men out of so many boys Momyer, Commander of the Air Training Com- must be good; and few indeed will argue over the mand, took part in this last graduation. It was only fine job that was done. Yet there is an answer to fitting that Air Force Major General Benjamin D. this question. We are now entering the space age. Foulois (Retired) was chosen to be the principal Its not enough to fly “by the seat of your pants” speaker and to present the navigator wings. An or have a burning desire to fly. True, this ambition aviation pioneer, General Foulois was one of the is still wanted; but formal education is also essen- first military pilots in the old Air Service, his flving tial. A bachelor degree is now a prerequisite to experience dating back to 1909. flving training. My purpose, however, is not to tell Being an aviation cadet was not an easy life. where we are going but to reminisce about the As a fourth classman the cadet was held in very aviation cadet program from its inception through low regard; it was a period of hitting a brace, eat- the peak years of World War II and on to its final ing square meais, reciting verbatim underclass phase-out. knowledge, rising for reveille at 0500 hours, then pursuing studies for 17 hours until the cadet could Tlie Beginning - World W ar I safely say that he had completed another day with lights out at 2200 hours. Third, second, and first The aviation cadet program started during class status was only slightly less demanding. The World War I in an effort to build up our air arm. strict discipline and pressure placed on the cadet Again in World War II, we were caught short by the was designed for a definite purpose. The cadet was events in Europe. When we entered the war on 6 AIR FORCE REVIEW 79

April 1917, we had a total of 96 rated pilots and little was done by way of bombing or air-to-ground two flying schools within our borders. At the time support. of the Armistice, 11 November 1918, over 11,000 During the 1920’s austerity hit the air arm. pilots had been trained on 41 American bases or From an appropriation of nearly $2 bilhon in 1918 by our allies in Europe and Canada. Our air objec- the annual appropriation dropped to under $13 dve called for 260 American squadrons to fight in million in 1923 and to $12,800,000 in 1925. Dur­ the Allied offensive of 1918. We did not quite ing this period there were never more than 1000 achieve this goal, but we did create an interest in officers or 9000 enlisted men on active duty; cadet aviation for future generations to develop. During strength seldom rose above 200 per year. Flying World War I only 90 hours of flying time was re- training was Consolidated at San Antonio, Texas, quired to send a cadet to the front for combat. where Kelly and Brooks Fields were used; training To qualify as a cadet the applicant had to be at Randolph Field began later. Flying training ‘‘under 25, have 2-3 years of college, be athletic, was divided into two phases: primary training, in honest, and reliable.” This was a far cry from the which the cadet leamed the rudiments of flying, extensive battery of physical, mental, and psycho- soloed, and gained his confidence as a pilot; and a logical tests required in later years. Even though second phase, advanced training, which included assignment to the air arm of the Signal Corps was basic flying skills such as instrument flying, auxili- still dangerous duty, 37,800 young Americans ary Controls, night flying, cross-country flights, pre- streamed into training, of which 22,545 actually cision and smooth aircraft operation. The cadet also qualified and entered school. From this number received specialized training in either pursuit, approximately 8700 received their wings. The ad- bombing, or reconnaissance aircraft. Class life dom- dition of those graduated by our allies brought inated the primary-basic program. The upper- the total of American pilots to over 11,000. About classmen indoctrinated the new cadets. Customs 1000 of these pilots saw action against the enemy. and discipline were rigidly enforced—life was far Of the 491 confirmed enemy aircraft shot down, from dull. No cadet can ever forget his first experi- 462 were shot down by 63 pilots, each of whom ence with “verbatims.” was designated an ace. Most of our air activity was Just as I reached my barracks and felt safe confined to artiller>' observation of air battles. Very from repeating fourth-class knowledge, an upper-

The famous Jenny (Curtiss JN-4). In- troduced injuly 1914, the Jenny was the airplane most used for the training of pilots in the U.S. during World War 1. Early Training after lhe Vrighl brolher» W|iin Iruniai lhe firat Vfililury A«Mlnr> «I (a lk | < Park, K * rj- lund, ín l'»IW, Clenn Curtiu «lurtrd Hrini oper- uliona frum « firld nn North l.lund in San Dirgu Bay (*in** in 1911 and r« 1917, r ig h l). Wtté fw beller year-round wMtlwr led Io lha Irunafer of lhe ir m /t uviulion I rumina uelivity lo lhe Morlh * l.lund »ite in 1912. D e .i Cn u led lh e S i« n a l ( a r p . Aviuiion Srbool in 1913 und Horkwell Kirld in 1917, ihia « o Iruiy lhe “Irudlr of Array Avia* lion,” uinre a urrai ra»nj o f ihr early rerord- aetlintf tfighla originutrd h ere.. . , The Rrowlh of aviuiion and lhe evenla in Kuropr lhal forrltdd ila role in warfare reaulled in a pro- lifrruliun of airfielda throughoul lhe rounlry. Hrook» Kirld «va» umong lhe early onea in Teaaa ( vir**» in 1918 belo** und in 1923 lovrer right). / r s

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-*L- 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

classman appeared as if from nowhere and said, Henry H. Arnold, met with civilian flying school “Mister, what is the defnition of military disci- owners Oliver L. Parks, C. C. Moseley, and The- pline?" ophilus Lee to arrange for civilian flying schools to As a fourth-classman I had the answer dotcn teach Air Corps primary flying. This allowed the cold, hut there was always the chance I might slip. Air Corps to get at the large untapped pool of I started with a burst of energij in a very military civilian pilots and facilities. Even though civilians manner: “Sir, military discipline is that mental at- were to teach primary, Air Corps officers super- titude and State of training ichich renders obe- vised the training. The Air Corps continued to dience and proper conduct under all conditions. It conduct basic and advanced training. As a result is founded on respect for and loyalty to properly of a 1938 study, 4500 pilots were to be trained constituted authority. Although it is developed pri- over a two-year period, and 666 cadets started marily by military drill, every feature of military training every six weeks. The length of training life has its effect on military discipline.” (At about was reduced from one year to three 12-week phases this point l was out of breath, getting nervous, and (primary, basic, and advanced). Total flying time confused. Only reflex action and thorough repeti- to graduate was reduced from 279 hours to 215. tion carried rne on.) Again I continucd, “It is gen- This reduction was anticipatory of the larger ex­ erally indicated in an individual or unit by smart- pansion needed in the event of total war. During ness of appcarance and action, by cleanliness and the buildup phase Congressional appropriation for neatness of dress, equipment and quarters, by re- expansion was increased to $300,000,000. The con- spect for seniors, and by prompt and cheerful exe- cept of civilian primary flying training was con- cution by subordinates of both the letter and the sidered a success, not only in the quality of training spirit of the legal orders of their lawful superiors.” but also in the percentages successfully completing I had made it, hut I was disappointed with training (40-A, 60?; 40-B, 61%; 40-C, 65%). myself. No demerits, but in the eyes of that While the Air Corps was expanding, in 1939 upperclassman I was not the sharpest cadet in the the Civil Aeronautics Administration proposed the squudron—in fact, he was probably wondering how installation of small training centers at various col- I was ever accepted. Remembering that only one leges. This program was to make the youth of in twenty do get accepted, I was thoroughly de- America more air-minded and act as an auxiliary to flated. “Vm not good enough to he here," I kept the Air Corps primary flying program. President thinking to myself. Then l was caught up in activ- Roosevelt asked Congress to traiu 20,000 young ities and didnt have time to worry about whether men; however, only a 10,000-man program was I was good enough. approved. The program proved highly successful: After 1926 the Air Corps received larger ap- of 9500 men entered, 88 per cent successfully com­ propriations and more cadets entered training; pleted training. however, washout rates, 47 per cent in primary Although the rate of 4500 pilots was not met, and 12 per cent in advanced, kept down the num- 3500 pilots were graduated. Again as in the past, ber of graduates. From 1931 to 1939, of the 4798 appropriations were cut even though the war in who entered, 2295 students completed primary Europe was going badly for the Allies. Class en- and advanced training. As the European eoun- tries proposed for Class 41-E were to be cut to 287 tries prepared for World War II, our pilot produc- and reduced to 170 in 42-B. Nazi victories against tion actually decreased from 299 in 1932 to 194 in France and Britain changed our thinking, and de- 1937. Then it slowly rose. fense of the Western Hemisphere was thought to require more qualified pilots. Plans were made for 54 combat flying groups; training had to be in­ Ttie Buildup creased to meet this need. Fortunately the System During the 1930’s the Air Corps anticipated used in 1938—39 was sound, and an increased out- the need for expansion in the event of war and put to 7000 pilots per year was authorized by the was well prepared for limited expansion. After the President. In addition navigator and bombardier German involvement in the Czechoslovakian Sude- cadets were also to be trained. Primary classes in­ ten, the Chief of the Air Corps, Major General creased in size so that by October 1940, 1234 stu- AIR FORCE REVIEW 83

dents began training every six weeks, divided American Airways school. Later classes increased among 18 civilian contract schools. The training in size to 100 students. During 1940 and early periods were further reduced to three ten-vveek 1941 this was the only school for Air Corps navi­ phases. gators. In July 1941 three navigation schools were To administer this increase the Air Corps established, one in each of the three training divi- Training Center became three divisions: the West sions (at Turner Field, Albany, Ceorgia; Kelly Coast with headquarters at Nloffett Field, Califór­ Field, Texas; and Stockton, Califórnia). Bombard- nia; the Gulf Coast with headquarters at Randolph ier training got under way at Barksdale Field, Field, Texas; and the Southeast with headquarters Louisiana, in the spring of 1941. Class duration at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Proeuring instruetors was ten weeks, a far cry from the extensive 18- offered no difficulty in 1940. Civilian instruetors month training our sa c bombardiers receive today. were available, and basic and advanced training Farsighted planning on the part of General produced good pilot instruetors from among its Davenport Johnson guaranteed not only the pro- graduates. The general inexperienee of these new' duetion of 12,000 pilots but anticipated further instruetors was a bit of a problem and pointed up buildup. He fought for and achieved a 75 per cent the military unpreparedness of this country during utilization of all civilian contract schools. This the 1930’s. Actuallv less than one fourth of the meant that if additional pilots were needed, the officers on duty in the Air Training Command by then existing schools could expand to meet the late 1940 had more than three years’ active duty. commitment. Base construction continued to be a Even with these problems the 7000 quota proved problem, but the Army Corps of Engineers worked highly successful and laid the groundwork for the with dispatch and efficiency to build the bases. tremendous expansion that was to come. Before the Costs of materiais skyrocketed. New and faster 7000 program got into full swing, the rate was in- aircraft were needed. Although the problems creased to 12,000 pilots per year. seemed insurmountable, they were overcome. Lack Due to events in Europe our training situation of training aircraft at one time did, however, force u'as under constant change, always upward. Ten reduetion in number of entering classes. It seems primary bases were added, bringing the total to 28; odd, but at the time we were striving for an Air seven basic schools were in existence; and 12 ad­ Corps of 150,000 officers and men, Germany had vanced flying schools were required to support the an air force of 1,500,000 men and Britain had 12,000-pilot commitment. At this time General Ar- 250,000. Requirements to enter pilot training still nold, recognizing the need for transport aircraft to remained high, a minimum of two years of college support our combat groups, authorized six transport being necessary. The educational levei was later groups. reduced to a high-school education. Notwithstand- Our pilot trainees increased rapidly in the ing the problems of Mareh 1941, we had 27 civilian 1939-40 period: on 1 July 1939, 643 students primary schools with 4050 students; 10 basic were in training; on 1 July 1940 — 1894; by 19 schools with 2717 students; and 11 advanced September 1940 — 1943; and on 1 January 1941 — schools with 918 single-engine students and 1633 4926. Although the 12,000-pilot plan was being multiengine students. Students in replacement met, our installations had to be modified and en- centers, forerunner of the preflight program, num- larged to meet the demand. The Air Corps also had bered 2400. to find and develop new training sites. Many prob­ In light of the world situation, the 12,000 lems arose in selecting the sites. Political pressure, figure would not do the job. A second aviation ob- climate, altitude, and proximity to other airfields jective was established: 84 combat groups. This and airways had to be considered. increase, plus allowing for attrition of wartime As our aircraft became larger and more com- operations, required a new plan for the annual plex, the need for nonpilot aircrew members be­ output of pilots. On 25 Mareh 1941 the annual came a major problem. Navígators, bombardiers, output was raised to 30,000 pilots. This required observers, aerial gunners, engineers, and radio op- 102 training bases. Plans were flexible enough to erators were needed. Fifty student navigators were allow for a progressive buildup of aircraft and sent to Coral Gables, Florida, to train at the Pan bases to get maximum efficiency of training. The 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

30,000 quota incorporated 4000 British pilot train- the existing 30,000 program. This called for an ees, a program paid for vvith Lend-Lease funds. increase in schools, equipment, and personnel. The The British troops, unlike the others, held civilian existing schools increased their student enrollment status and vvere subject to neither U.S. nor British —in some cases it vvas doubled. This put a tremen- army disciplinary codes. Later in the war we vvere dous strain on equipment, aircraft, and permanent- to train pilots from many other nations. To meet party personnel. Due to shortages of aircraft and these new loads additional bases vvere established, instructors, quotas were temporarily reduced. and each base needed barracks, mess halls, elass- Elimination rates still ran high: 37 per cent in rooms, vvarehouses, and recreational areas. primary, 6 per cent in basic, and 1 per cent in ad­ Temporary construction vvas the ansvver; it vanced. After Pearl Harbor we had but one goal in vvas economical, easily built, and vvould last sight, to defeat our enemies. We strove to produce through the emergency. Many a eadet can recall the greatest number of aircrevvs in the least amount living at these temporary bases. In a dust or sand of time. Pilot training was reduced to three nine- storm the walls acted as a sieve, and dust vvould week phases. The student pilot still received 200 accumulate in clothes, bed, even in the food. In flying hours, the minimum deemed necessary be- cold vveather the 30 x 80-foot barracks vvere heated fore exposing a man to combat. bv coal stoves that never seemed to produce enough Under the 50,000-pilot program, preflight heat. As unpleasant as they vvere, they did the job. training carne into its own. The Air Corps needed a The number one problem under the 30,000 system in which new cadets could be equipped quota vvas the laek of training aircraft. We needed and processed and be given initial military training 3340 primary trainers, 3360 basic trainers, 2305 and medicai and psychological tests. While at the advanced single-engine trainers, and 3200 ad- replacement eenter the eadet also undervvent rigor- vanced tvvin-engine trainers. As of Mareh 1941 we ous physical training to prepare him for the hard- had 951 primary trainers, 591 basic trainers, 421 ships of flying training. At Maxwell Field the daily advanced single-engine trainers, and no advanced four-mile hike became affectionately knovvn as the tvvin-engine trainers. To train these 30,000 pilots, “Burma Road,” while the exercise area and the ob- the Air Corps estimated that it needed 2000 pri­ stacle course vvere knovvn as “Hell s Half Acre" and mary and 1600 basic flying instructors. “Mayhem Meadow” respectively. World everits soou proved that the 30,000- pilot program vvas inadequate to meet our needs. I can recall my own experience with physi- Class 42-G, vvhich started training on 24 January cal training; within one week of entering flying 1942, and others through Class 43-A carne under training I was udrninistered a PFT (Physical this program. Its signifieant features vvere the be- Fitness Test), in 94-degree Texas heat. The ginning of the preHight program and our aid in PFT then consisted of five exercises, all timed: training British pilots. push-ups, sit-ups, 300-yard run, pull-ups, and squat jumps. Each exercise was designed to test different muscles. My flight was no different The Peak Programs from any other so we tried our best. . . . Over half of our flight was unable to mareh back to The 50,000-pilot program got its inception the barracks. I made it back but collapsed on vvhen the Chief of the Air Corps asked for an in- my bunk determined to get out of this chicken crease of 100 per cent in the production of combat outfit. But after a good “chew ing out by an crevvs. Plans progressed tovvard an output of upperclassman for lying on my bunk at an in- 60,000. After the attack on Pearl Harbor our think- appropriate time, 1 made it to the evening meai ing vvas changed. Novv vvith a global effort on our formation—but what luck, I thought, steak for hands, the 60,000 figure became the first step dinner and 1 couldnt eat a mouthful. tovvard eventually reaching a quota of 95,000 pilots I would be remiss if I did not mention the per year. Tentative plateaus vvere set at 50,000 by dread of every eadet, namely, the Ramp. If late 1942 and 70,000 by early 1943. It was hoped during the week a eadet accumulated six that the 50,000 program would be a follow-on to demerits for violuting eadet regulations, he AIR FORCE REVIEW 85

marched one hoiir on the Ramp. For each trate what was required under the 75,000 program, additional demerit, one more hour on the Ramp. each of the three training centers graduated the This hour or more of soul searching on the following every 4J* weeks: Ramp, of course, carne during the cadet’s 480 four-engine crews (pilot and copilot) weekend free time when other more fortunate 1000 single-engine pilots cadets were heading for the beach, out on open 1400 twin-engine pilots post, or dating. A total breakdown ran as follows: The 75,000-pilot training program was the 17,900 four-engine pilots second step toward the ultimate goal of 90,000. It 27,300 twin-engine pilots began with Class 43-J, which was to graduate from 24,800 single-engine pilots advanced training in December 1943. This quota was closely related to the 50,000 quota, but it had 13,500 navigators an innovation: the first base to train women pilots 14,000 bombardiers. was opened at Sweetwater, Texas. To better illus- The success of the German Luftwaffe against

Pilot Training The World War II influx of aviation cadets strained permanent facilities, including the mess facilities. An instructor at a contract primary flying school introduces new cadets to the PT-17’s they will fly. Cadets of the Royal Air Force—like many other Al- Rigorous physical conditioning pre- lied nationals—graduated from U.S. flying schools. pared cadets for flying training. A cadet in an AT-6 bores in on a practice pier target over the Gulf of México as part of his advanced single-engine training. A cadet flies a night solo mission in the AT-6 ad- vanccd trainer, which later became a primarij trainer.

Target range at Avon Park, Florida, provided practice bombi as final step in fusing B-17 trainees into a combat-ready cre

Polantl, France, and the Low Countries suggested cadets. However, a figure of 93,600 was main- that air povver was the most important arm of any tained. Further broken down, there were over military force. This fact, coupled vvith our unpre- 11,000 four-engine pilots, 50,000 twin-engine paredness at the time of Pearl Harbor, pointed up pilots, and approximately 32,000 single-engine the urgent need to bnild United States air power. pilots, the remainder being divided between glider All-out effort was necessary. There were many pilots and Allied students in training. limiting factors, but we had the money, manpower, Availability of training aircraft was also a natural resources, and unity of effort to give it a go. problem. Under this program the following aircraft No one knew what we conld do, though Air Corps were needed: leaders felt that a 100,000 ontpnt could be reached. Adv’d During this peak phase, ontput fluctuated between Basic Single- Twin- Four- a low of 75,000 and a high of 102,000, the 102,000 Trainers Engine Engine Engine peak beginning with Class 44-A. Maximum effort West Coast 1786 556 1312 160 was directed for all stations. Tent cities, field Gulf Coast 3226 930 2019 53 kitchens, and ditch latrines were ordered and util- Southeast 1580 817 1632 159 ized. The peak of the cadet program was reached in the fali of 1943. The 102,000 quota had to be This output was designed to produce a 273-group scrapped in late 1943, for the classification centers Air Corps. could neither house nor mess the large numbers of We were able to reduce our pilot training «-

rates by late 1943, confident of the eventual defeat With the start of the war in Korea our flying of Germany and Japan. This was due to reduced training quotas again began to rise but with a dií- combat attrition rates and the quantities being pro- ference: instead of aviation cadets, more and more duced by our training program. The downward commissioned officers entered training. Although swing started with Class 44-G (85,000 output), the flying training was similar, these men were not and by Class 44-1 output was dovvn to 60,000. cadets; they had received their Air Force commis- At the dose of hostilities, in September 1945, sions tlnough the afrotc program. Since the cadet training came to a standstill; many primary Korean War the percentage of rotc graduates en- and basic flying bases were shut down. It was not tering pilot and navigator training increased until until 1948 that aviation cadet training again began in 1961 aviation cadet pilot training was discon- in earnest but at the modest rate of 5000 pilots per tinued. Now with the graduation of unt Class 65- year. We were then in the jet age. The cadet re- 15, all aviation cadet training has ended. ceived his primary training in aircraft vvhich his older brother of World War II had used as ad- vanced trainers. He rapidly progressed into a jet W hat did it mean to be an aviation cadet? First training version of the P-80 Lockheed Shooting and foremost it was a challenge, but more than that Star if he was lucky enough to enter advanced sin- it was a way of life and a pattem to follow in later gle-engine training. Eventually all pilot training life; it developed self-confidence, a confidence was conducted in jet aircraft. which came through achievement. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Very few people ever come face to face with tightness that a quarter would bounce back if such a clear-cut challenge. For each cadet the goal dropped on it, fioors waxed until they were spot- was there, as were the obstacles. For the most part less; and in the bathroom (latrine), woe to the man it was our first time away from home. We had to who allowed a drop of water to remain in the sink rely on our own ability; there were no doting par- or shower. To this day garters are as much a part ents or influential friends to help us over the rough of my dress as socks or shoes (a carry-over from spots. Many of my classmates, myself included, had cadet days). Life was military to the extreme but, never been inside an aircraft before becoming a as many have found, an excellent foundation for cadet, but courage doesn’t come from merely en- later life. listing. As we progressed in our training, now and Cadet life bred confidence, not the cocky con- again a cadet would drop out—his records would fidence of a show-off but the self-assurance of a man read: “Fear of flying.” We all had our bad days, who knows his job, has faced and overcome dan- and the “burp bag” was never far away on those gers, and has gained the poise which comes from early flights. But being cadets and imbued with the achievement. We first started to show the con­ spirit of cadet life, we proved it took more than a fidence in our flying, but all of cadet life was de- bumpy ride to discourage us. Perhaps it was our signed to make us “tigers.” Soon this confidence youth, but now the challenges in our life are not so seeped into other areas of our life. I can recall viv- clear-cut: We may procrastinate, rationalize, and idly diving from a 30-foot-high tower into the local solve problems through “group effort.” In those swimming pool. Not being a diving enthusiast or a days we were on our own. particularly good swimmer, I felt the moment I Cadet life was strenuous, a life which few dived off that tower there was nothing I couldn’t relish as a cadet. We lived by an Honor Code, and do. We all felt we were a little better than the aver- lest anyone forget, the Code does work. The vast age man. In cadet training we started early gaining majority of the cadets who lived by the Code are confidence. “Verbatims” kept us alert. As fourth- better men as the result of withstanding the temp- classmen we had to march ourselves about the tations. I can recall early in my cadet days telling cadet area with loud, clear oral commands, and the other members of my flight exactly where many was the time a cadet marched himself into I stood: I don t intend to cheat, and I would not a blank wall by his failure to execute the proper hesitate to tum in any cadet who did cheat. Saying command. Serving as a cadet student officer further this might have set me up as an oddball in some developed our confidence. places, but not in a group where all lived by the Cadet life was certainly rewarding. I often Code and were responsible for administering it. feel I received much more from it than I gave to it. If there was one thing I could willingly forget Most graduates hate to see the aviation cadet pro- about cadet life, it would be daily inspection. Andy gram go because of the heroie position it holds in Griffith exaggerated very little when he had the American history. But go it must. As one cadet toilet seats snapping to attention in “No Time for said, “I wouldn t take anything for my cadet train­ Sergeants.’’ Few housewives could meet the rigid ing, but by the same token you could never get me standards imposed on cadets in their personal dress to go through it again.” and the neatness of their room. All buttons had to be buttoned, beds made with such precision and Hcadquarters Air University Books and Ideas

ARON ON NUCLEAR

H er ma n S. W olk

HILOSOPHER, historian, and sociologist, would also do well to become acquainted with it. PRaymond Aron has longbeen oneof Europes Lucid and cogent, The Great Debate is a major most perceptive observers of intemational affairs. contribution to the massive literature of the great But even more so, this witty and disceming French- deterrent dialogue. man has been an apt student of the human condi- There are several major theses running con- tion. Indeed it is the wide range of his intellect and currently through Aron’s book. None, however, is his gifted pen that make The Creat Debaie of more more important or timely than his admonition— than ordinarv interest.® which he expresses in one way or another through- Urdike so many recent tracts on nuclear strat- out the work—that it is high time that we carne to egy and disarmament, Aron’s book is well written grips with the nuclear era instead of running away and replete with sharp insights and the traditional from it. Nuclear weapons, he says, are still the trademark of the historian-philosopher: irony. The object of mystery and horror. Their destructive author observes that whereas once military strategy power is awesome and, indeed, unimaginable. was almost totally the province of the soldier, today Yet, barring a miraculous transformation in it is no less the forum of both physical and social world affairs, we must learn to live with them. In scientists. And, in sum (with perhaps some notable fact, according to Aron, one of the salient paradoxes exceptions), this development has been a benefi- of the age we live in is that the nonuse of therrno- cent one. The Great Debate stands as but one ex- nuclear weapons militarily is inseparable from their cellent example of the rewards that may be gained constant diplomatic use. Thus, “for a nation to be from having a philosopher-historian put his mind able to avoid using them, it must make other nations to the problems of war and peace in the thermo- believe that it will do so in certain circumstances.” nuclear age. (pp. vi-vii) While this is clearly a general book for the As a European and one who has enjoyed the layman and nonspecialist, one must hasten to add blessings of Western democracy and the free world, that those conversant with military-political affairs Aron is naturally preoccupied with the future of

°Raymond Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Translated by Ernst Pawel. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965, $4.95), 265 pp. 92 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW the Atlantic Alliance. His analysis of the vvracking deterioration of the Atlantic Alliance lie? A viable political-military problems besetting the alliance is joint strategy betvveen the U.S. and Europe, ac- distinguished by a rare objectivity. Although he cording to the author, will not evolve until two takes dead aim at the oversimplifications and con- Basic conditions are met. First, the American strate­ tradictions inherent in General Calloiss defense of gic doctrine of flexible response must be accepted the De Gaulle nuclear policy, he is quick to point by the Europeans. Second, the United States must out that De Gaulle s policy is primarily political forego its obsession with escalation and “eventually and psychological rather than overtly military. make concessions to their allies’ frame of mind” General de Gaulle has already clearly demon- while attempting to see the European point of view. strated the essential political leverage to he gained Needless to say, neither of these conditions has as from the possession of a nuclear capahilitv. Signifí- yet been met. cantly, he has shown that because of his stubborn- What of the future? Nations cannot do with- ness in driving ahead along the nuclear road France out ailiances, and neither can thev rely completely has been able to exert political pressure far out of on them. Thus, although the Atlantic community proportion to her presently small nuclear ability. cannot agree on a joint strategy, this does not Aron does not place a great deal of weight necessarily mean the dissolution of the alliance. In on the military credibilitv of the force de frappe— the absence of agreement, a less eohesive alliance either now or in the future. But he does respect its may result—indeed is now evolving—or a European psychological impact. And as far as France’s failure deterrent may eventually somehow mesh with the to sign the limited nuclear test ban treatv is con- overwhelming American nuclear power. cerned, he notes that the United States vvas not Strategy, of course, is inseparable from the overly concerned about contamination of the means available to carry it out. With the phasing atmosphere during the davs when the U.S. vvas out of the B-47, the onrushing obsolescence of the testing and developing its nuclear arsenal: B-52, and the phasing out of the first-generation Atlas and Titan I missiles, Aron concludes that the I am not in favor of the dissemination of atomic weapons as such; but I am struck by the fact U.S. will in the future count primarily on the Min- that Americans, even the least given to hypoc- uteman-Polaris combination. Thus he sees a trend risv, do not feel bothered by the interpretation away from counterforce strategy toward a doctrine to vvhich their attitude lends itself in the eves emphasizing minimum deterrence. of evervone else. (p. 237) Because the technological revolution cannot On the other hand, the author finds the so- be stopped, Aron predicts that the arms race will continue, although at a slower paee. He is not called McNamara doctrine “moderate and compre- hensive. It possesses many of the eoncepts held greatly alarmed over the so-called “Nth country’ problem except perhaps in the Middle East, where by leading American defense planners and theore- ticians including nonproliferation, graduated or Arab-Israeli enmity is a fact of life. While many nations possess the resources to develop a nuclear flexible response, and the abhorrence of escalation. capability, they must also have the will to embark As Aron puts it: “Thus far the dominant inHuence upon the very expensive Business of building some in Secretary McNamara’s circle has been exerted kind of deterrent. And this presupposes the desire by the scientists, eager above all to slovv the arms to commit a vast outlay for a strategic delivery race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. ’ force. Red China, despite her explosion of an (p, 65) atomic device, faces tremendous domestic difficul- Aron sees little to commend the multilateral ties and has a long way to go before she has a nuclear force ( mlf) either militarily or politically. credible delivery ability.0 He feels that the mixed-manned force is a military As far as the foreseeable future is concerned, monstrosity (primarily a countercity force) and at the same time does little to assuage deep political mlf «Aron comments: “. . . I am rather inclined to hetieve that problems. The fails to counter the European the countries of Latin America, África and Asia will tino it in strategic and political objections. their hearts to forgive China what they cannot forgive r rance and that Peking will he hailed for the same techmcal feat that But where, then, does the solution to the makes France a criminal/' (p. 241) BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

the United States and the Soviet Union vvill remain ignorance, disinterest, and wishful thinking liave as the two nuclear giants. And while the search never served the interests of free men. I ain sug- for newer, more improved arms will continue, arms- gesting that, even more than scientific know-how control measures will be pursued eoncomitantly. and streamlined, efficient production lines, the Too, despite the Soviet-American rapprochement, cause of democratic society will today and tomor- the aims and philosophies of the Big Two will row best be served by dedication blended with that remain divergent. Wisely, Aron declares that “the most elusive and difficult quality of perseverance. men in the Kremlin cannot forswear their faith in One does not read Aron’s book without coming world revolution without revealing themselves as away with the impression that, happily, he realizes revisionists, thus proving Mao’s point." (p. 252) that often when things seein darkest, the light is Aron’s philosophical and historical roots are just around the comer; and conversely, sometimes too deep for him to be persuaded that today’s when we are rolling blithely along, the wolves vvait détente amounts to a prelude of the millenium. in ambush. The lesson has always been clear. Con- He is well avvare that free men everywhere will fidence and a sure, steady hand at the helm remain answer grave challenges in the future. The West prime requisites if there is to be a future worth must of necessity remain technologically dynamic. waiting for. But technology and hardware will remain onlv It follows, then, that complete understanding one side of the coin. Strategic nuclear deterrence between the cold war combatants is “neither pos- is only partly a matter of weapon systems; it also sible nor, perhaps, even desirable.” Why? has its psvchological and political framework. De­ terrence, Aron reminds us, “is essentiallv a test of Because beyond a certain point the use of will power. an exchange of altemate threats and thermonuclear arms can never seem wholly rational if both sides are vulnerable, even if messages, or rather of threats bearing messages and not equally so. It is almost impossible to imag­ messages pregnant with threats.’’ (p. 223) ine what a war fought with all available weap- Obviously, Raymond Aron sees no immediate ons would be like without coming to the end to global tension. The history of the post-World conclusion that only a madman could possibly War II period remains highly relevant to the pres- unleash it. Therefore it has sometimes been ent situation. The danger is that we may be mes- considered preferable to act the madman in merized by one twist or tum of the Soviet tactics order to be taken seriously rather than pretend machine and thereby lose sight of the essential wisdom in a madmans game—a depressing continuity of Soviet ideology and objectives. thought, even if it does contain a grain of truth, Todays world forces upon us the necessity of and deadly in its implieations for mankind as a whole. The Big Two have succeeded in mini- patience—but not a self-enforced patience which mizing the dangers of the thermonuclear age will free us from our global responsibilities; not precisely because they have never abused this patience to forget our allies and friends; not the logic of insanity. (pp. 224-225) kind of creeping inaction that freezes our techno- logical and intemational pohtical arteries; not the Thus the world remains in the grip of paradox. kind of patience which will somehow not demand One inevitably finds it preferable to struggle with of us future risks; and not the sort of patience that the imperfections, complexities, and ironies of merely enables us to sit back and relax, awaiting, human affairs than to surrender to some all-inclu- as it were, the utopian paradise. sive tyranny of so-called perfection or utopia. The enemies of freedom are betting that the It would seem that today the beginning of United States—which bars their road to empire— wisdom becomes the acceptance of thermonuclear will simply lose interest in the long run. They are weapons as, regrettably, an inherent part of the counting on our being afflieted with hardening of world landseape. Perhaps the ultimate paradox is the arteries. They see us tiring of the cold war, of that the coming to grips with these weapons the “long twiüght struggle.” It may be helpful, psychologically, politically, and militarily forms an now and then, to be reminded that life does not essential precondition for successfully relegating solely revolve around cold war and ideology; but them to the graveyard of history. Omaha, Nehraska The Contributors

M aj or Gener al John C. M eyeh (B.A., Dartmouth College) is Com­ mander, Twelfth Air Force (TAC), Waco, Texas. After two years at Dartmouth he enlisted in the aviation cadet program and was commissioned in July 1940. He served as a flying instructor at Randolph and Gunter Fields and as a fighter pilot at Mitchel Field and in Iceland until January 1943. when he organized and activated the 487th Fighter Squadron at VVestover Field. Massachusetts. The following July he took his squadron to Europe as part of the 352d Fighter Group, Eighth Air Force. In Novem- her 1944 he became Deputy Commander, 352d Fighter Group, and also flew under command of the Ninth Taetical Air Force. He returned to the United States in February 1945 as the top-ranking ace of the Eighth Air Force with 37!í: enemy aircraft destroyed, including 24 air kills. From 1945 until 1948 he held varíous staff and command assignments and eompleted his degree at Dartmouth. Subsequent assignments have been in the Otfice of the Secretary of the Air Force as Liaison Officer with the U.S. House of Representatives, 1949-50; Commander, 4th Fighter VVing, Newcastle, Dela- svare, 1950, Deputy Commander, 4th Fighter Wing, Korea, 1950-51 (svhere he destroyed two more enemy aircraft); Deputy Commander, lOlst Fighter Interceptor Wing. Larson AFB, Washington, 1951-53; Direclor of Opera- tíons and Training, Headquarters Continental Air Command, Ent AFB, Colorado, to 1955; student, Air War College, 1956, then as a member of the faculty and later Director of Studies in Future Military Strategy, to 1959; Commander, 57th Air Division, Westover AFB, to 1961; Com­ mander, 45th Air Division. Loring AFB, Maine, to 1962; and Deputy Director of Plans for the Strategic Air Command and CINCSAC Repre- sentative to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, to November 1963, when he assumed his present command.

Bhicadieh General Anor ew S. Low, Jr . ( USMA; M.A., George Washing­ ton University) is Deputy Director, Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force, United States Strike Command, MacDill AFB, Florida. After graduation at West Point in 1942, he eompleted pilot and combat crew training, then was assigned to the 453d Bomb Group ( B-24) as Assistant Group Opera- tions Officer, arriving in England in January 1944. As a squadron com­ mander, then group operations officer, he flew sixteen combat missions, was shot down over Germany, and spent the remainder of the war in a hospital and prison camp. Postwar assignments have been in G-2 War Department General Staff to 1947; as Assistant Executive Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, to 1950; as student, Air Command and Staff School; as Executive Officer to the Director of Operations, Headquar­ ters Strategic Air Command. for four years; as SAC representative at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, for six months; in B-47 transition training, Schilling AFB, then as Deputy Commander, 40th Bomb Wing; Director of Operations, 802d Air Division; and Commander, 40th Bomb Wing (B -47); as student, Air War College, 1959; as Chief, Aero- nautical Systems Division, DCS/Development, then as Director of Systems Acquisition, DSC/Systems and Logistics, Hq USAF, to November 1961; and as Military Assistant to the Assistant Director (Strategic Weapons), Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, OSD, until his present assignment in July 1964.

Col onel Albert P. Sic h t s, Jr . (USMA) is as- signed to the Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University. During World War II he held command and staff positions in flying and flexi- ble gunnery training programs. Subsequent assign­ ments have heen as Inspector General, Twentieth Air Force, Guam; Chief, Personnel and Administra- tion, Wright-Patterson AFB; Commander, Patrick AFB; and as Inspector General, Nouasseur Air Depot, Morocco. A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff Col­ lege, 1950, and the Air War College, 1956, he after- ward served as International Politico-Military Affairs Officer, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Before Corn- ing to Air University in 1963, he was Director, Fac­ ulty Group C, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virgínia. Dr . R ic h a h d C. L ukas (Ph.D., Florida State Uni­ versity ) is Assistant Professor of History, Tennessee Technologicul University, Cookeville, Tennessee. He served as a research consultant in the preparation of Air Force Combat Units of World War II. in 1957-58. Since then he luis published articles on díploinatic and military history in Military Affairs, The Historian, and Tlie Airpower Historian.

Lie ut e nant Col onel Ral ph L. Giddings, J h ., USA (M.S., Utah State University; M.A., George Washington University) is a member of the J-5 staff at Headquarters North American Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado. He was com- imissioned as 2d lieutenant, Field Artillery Reserve, in 1940 and has been on active duty since Januar>r 1942. He was inte- igrated into the Regular Army in 1956. His duty assignments have included two years as Guided Missile Staff Officer, 31st Artillery Brigade, McChord AFB, Washington, and two years as Commander, lst Missile Battalion ( Nike-Hercules), 61st Artillery, Travis AFB, Califórnia. Colonel Giddings is a gradu- ate of the Army Air Defense School, Army Command and Gen­ eral Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War ÍCollege.

Maj or Gener al Ear l Clifford Hedl und ( Ph.D., University of Illinois) is Commander, Warner Robins Air Materiel Area, Air Force Logistics Command, Robins AFB, Geórgia. Commissioned from the AFROTC, lie completed pilot trainíng at Randolph and Foster Fields in 1942. From August 1942 to 1947 he served as a fighter pilot, group commander, and deputy wing commander in the Pacific and European theaters. When his P-38 was shot down over Europe in April 1945, he was captured by the Germans but later escaped and made his way back to the American lines. Postwar assignments have been with the Joint Military Transportation Commíttee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1948-51; as Chief, Air Transport Division, Directorate of Transportation, Headquarters USAF, 1952; as student. Naval War College, 1953; as Director of Transportation, Head­ quarters Far East Air Forces, to 1956; as Deputy Director of Transportation, Headquarters USAF, to 1959, then as Director until 1961; and as Deputy Commander, Ogden Air Materiel Area, AFLC, Hill AFB, Utah, from 1961 until his present assignment in August 1963.

M aj or Gil be r t M. Bil l inc s, J r . ( B.S., Wake Forest College) is Chief, Public Information Division, Office of Information, Hq Fifth Air Force, PACAF, Japan. During World War II he was a pilot with the lst Troop Carrier Command. He was assigned as Public Relations Officer, Laurinburg-Maxton AAB, North Carolina, in 1945 and served in the same capacity with USAAF- RCAF Exercise Musk-Ox in Northwest Territories and Arctic during the winter of 1946. After attending the U.S. Army Infor­ mation School, he was PRO with the Air Exhibition Team, Langley Field, 1947. He has served in information assignments with the 137th Fighter Bomber Wing, Alexandria, Louisiana; with the Northern Air Materiel Area, Burtonwood, England; with Task Group 7.1, Joint Task Force SEVEN, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New México; with nuclear tests RED- WING ’56 and HARDTACK ’58 and at the Nevada Test Site; with the 6594th Test Wing (Satellite), Sunnyvale, Califórnia; and in his present assignment since 1961. Major Billings is a 1961 graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and author of numerous articles on USAF subjects. H er ma n S. W olk (M.A., American International College) has been a historian for Headquarters Strategic Air Com- mand for the past six years. He served in the U.S. Army information and education program during the Korean War. He has been a teacher of history for two years and a lec- turer on strategic nuclear deterrence and political-military matters related to the cold war. Among his published arti- cles are “The Great Deterrent Dialogue,” Air Force and Space Digest, March 1963, and “Is History Obsolete?” Air Force and Space Digest, August 1964.

Capt ain Maur ice G. Stack ( B.S., Siena College) is Alde-de-Camp to the Com- mander, Air University. After graduation from college he entered the Air Force as an aviation cadet, graduating in 1954 as number one man in his class. He was assigned to the 45th Air Transport Squadron, Atlantic Division, Military Air Transport Service, Dover AFB, Delaware, where he flew C-124 Globemasters. In 1956 he was assigned to the 55th Air Rescue Squadron, Thule, Greenland, where in addition to flying he served as Assistant Squadron Adjutant. Other assign- ments ha ve been as Assistant Professor of Air Science, Allegheny College, 1957-60; as Military Training Officer and Operations Support Officer, James Connally AFB, Texas, to 1962; and on the faculty of the Squadron Officer School from November 1962 until his present appointment in August 1964. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Eluon W. D owns, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Mariaging Editor Major Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acqumtion Branch E dmund O. Barkeh, Financial and Administrativa Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r ., Art Director and Troduction Manager E nrique Gaston, Ph.D., Assoe iate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. Mid o si May Patterson, Assistant Editor, Portuguesa Language Edition W il l ia m J. De Paola, lllustrator

ADY1SERS

C olonel Glen W. C lark, fi

C olonel W illiam J. Mc G in t y , H c/ Air Force Systems Command

C olonel Geoh ge Schenkein, Hq Tactical Air Command

C olonel J oseph A. S tuaht, J h ., Hq Military Air Transport Service

C olonel Kenneth F. G antz, USAF ( Ret), Historical Adviser

L ieo t en a n t Colonel J ack Rose, H

L ie l t e n a n t Colonel J ames F. S undehman, Ilq Pacific Air Forces

H ahhy A. Ha ber er , U i/ Air F o rce Logistics Co m m a nd

L a Y er n e E. \ \ roons. H q Air Force Cam bridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION Air Uníversity Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning oerospace doefrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- fors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions ore welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW - — Pi 1

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1965