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Honoré Fabri and the Concept of Impetus: a Bridge Between Conceptual Frameworks Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Honoré Fabri and the Concept of Impetus: a Bridge Between Conceptual Frameworks Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science HONORÉ FABRI AND THE CONCEPT OF IMPETUS: A BRIDGE BETWEEN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editors ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University JÜRGEN RENN, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science KOSTAS GAVROGLU, University of Athens Managing Editor LINDY DIVARCI, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Editorial Board THEODORE ARABATZIS, University of Athens ALISA BOKULICH, Boston University HEATHER E. DOUGLAS, University of Pittsburgh JEAN GAYON, Université Paris 1 THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University HUBERT GOENNER, University of Goettingen JOHN HEILBRON, University of California, Berkeley DIANA KORMOS-BUCHWALD, California Institute of Technology CHRISTOPH LEHNER, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science PETER MCLAUGHLIN, Universität Heidelberg AGUSTÍ NIETO-GALAN, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona NUCCIO ORDINE, Universitá della Calabria ANA SIMÕES, Universidade de Lisboa JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Harvard University BAICHUN ZHANG, Chinese Academy of Science VOLUME 288 For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/5710 HONORÉ FABRI AND THE CONCEPT OF IMPETUS: A BRIDGE BETWEEN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS by MICHAEL ELAZAR Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, Germany 123 Michael Elazar Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Boltzmannstrasse 22 14195 Berlin Germany [email protected] ISSN 0068-0346 ISBN 978-94-007-1604-9 e-ISBN 978-94-007-1605-6 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1605-6 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011928368 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Honoré Fabri: A Short Biography The Jesuit Honoré Fabri was born on 8 April 1608 at Le Grand Abergement, Ain, a small town in eastern France, about eighty kilometers north-east of Lyon.1 Fabri entered the Jesuit novitiate in Avignon in October 1626 and completed in 1630 his course on Scholastic philosophy (under Claude Boniel) in the Collège de la Trinité at Lyon (Fellmann 1971, p. 505). He spent the next two years teaching grammar at the Jesuit College at Roanne. In 1632 he was sent to Rome, to start his course in the- ology at the Collegio Romano, but after one year he was summoned back to Lyon, where he completed (in 1636) his theological training. Meanwhile, in 1635, he was ordained as a priest. Afterwards he was sent to the newly opened Jesuit college at Arles, where he taught logic (1636–1637) and natural philosophy (1637–1638). In Arles he lectured on the circulation of the blood, boasting thirty years later, in his Tractatus de homine (1666), that he had publicly taught it before the appearance of Harvey’s book (Lukens 1979, pp. 7–8). This vague declaration has been inter- preted – by contemporaries and historians alike – as a claim to priority over Harvey, though Fabri himself subsequently argued (as late as 1687) that “at no time did I ever say that the circulation of the blood had been first discovered by me”.2 In 1638–1639 Fabri served as a prefect at the Jesuit College in Aix-en-Provence. In 1640 Fabri was recalled to the Collège de la Trinité at Lyon, where he was promoted to professor of logic and mathematics, as well as to the office of dean. Until 1646 Fabri, “the first of many famous professors produced by the Collège de la Trinité” (Vregille 1906, p. 7), taught there logic, metaphysics, astronomy, math- ematics, and natural philosophy. In Fellmann’s words, “this period was the most brilliant and fruitful of his life; several books that he published later3 were developed from lectures delivered during this time” (Fellmann 1971, p. 505). It is there that 1Lukens 1979, p. 6. Lukens relies on documents contained in the Archivium Romanum Societatis Iesu (reproduced as plates I–III, immediately after page 5). Lukens acknowledges that other sources convey different dates or places for Fabri’s birth (for example, 1607 or Virieu-le-Grand, Dauphiné), but claims that he “cannot explain these discrepancies” (Lukens 1979, p. 6, n. 1). 2Lukens 1979, p. 9. Lukens suggests that Fabri “may have taken the 1639 Lyon edition of De motu cordis – or even the 1649 (first) edition of De circulatione sanguinis – as the first publication of Harvey’s idea” (Lukens 1979, p. 9). 3Including his important Physica (Fabri 1669–1671). v vi Honoré Fabri: A Short Biography Fabri and his students – including the future medical doctor Pierre Mousnier (who later edited Fabri’s lectures), the mathematician François de Raynaud, and the Jesuits Claude de Chales (philosopher and theologian), Jean Bertet (astronomer) and François de la Chaize (confessor to Louis XIV) – began their correspondence with figures like Pierre Gassendi, René Descartes, Huygens (Constantin and Christiaan) and Marine Mersenne. Fabri’s principal book on motion, Tractatus physicus de motu locali (Fabri 1646b), as well as his work on logic, Philosophiae tomus primus (Fabri 1646a), and his Metaphysica demonstrativa (Fabri 1648), were published in Lyon (Lukens 1979, p. 11). In 1646 Fabri was removed from his teaching office in the Collège de la Trinité, under circumstances which are not entirely clear, and sent to a bureaucratic post in Rome. In a letter dated 3 June 1647, the Minime Gabriel Thibaut informed Mersenne that Fabri was “at odds with the fathers of his order (il est traversé par les Pères de sa Compaignie), and it is believed that they did everything they could to make him leave, just as they did what they could to withhold the printing of his books”.4 Adrien Baillet, Descartes’ biographer, mentions Thibaut’s letter, and adds that Fabri’s activity in Rome, following his transfer, rehabilitated his position within his order.5 Neither Thibaut nor Baillet assert that it was specifically hold- ing Cartesian opinions which caused Fabri’s superiors to transfer him to Rome, and some historians believe that Fabri became suspected of supporting Descartes only long after the latter died.6 However, most historians tend to agree that it was “Fabri’s aggressive taste for novelties” – whether Cartesian or not – that alarmed his conservative superiors in Lyon and brought about his removal from teaching.7 In the words of Mordechai Feingold, “the removal of audacious Jesuits from teaching philosophy, as stipulated in the founding documents of the society, became a popu- lar measure against those charged with introducing novel ideas into the classroom” (Feingold 2003, p. 31). It should be emphasized that on 15 February 1643 Fabri took the fourth vow, the special vow of particular obedience to the pope, taken only by select Jesuits (in addition to the three standard vows of poverty, chastity, and obe- dience),8 and thus became practically immuned from absolute expulsion from his order. “The complicated procedures required to expel a professed father”, explains Robert Bireley, S. J., “made dismissal at the initiative of superiors extremely rare”.9 4Tannery et al. 1945–1988, vol. XV, p. 245. 5Baillet 1691, vol. 2, p. 300. 6Lukens 1979, p. 15; Sortais 1929, pp. 48–49. 7Heilbron 1979, p. 113. See also Feingold 2003, p. 31. Some historians insist that it was specifically Cartesian ideas which led to Fabri’s expulsion from Lyon (Vregille 1906, p. 8; Fellmann 1971, p. 505). 8Lukens 1979, p. 10. 9Bireley 2003, p. 257, n. 90. Honoré Fabri: A Short Biography vii Fabri arrived in Rome on 12 September 1646. He became a member of the Minor Vatican Penitentiary, a community of Jesuits responsible for hearing confessions in foreign languages, and was commissioned to hear confessions in French. In 1677 he was appointed rector of the Penitentiary, but three years later he was forced to retire after a quarrel with the Grand Penitentiary.10 While serving in the Penitentiary, Fabri continued to pursue his scientific interests. Through his acquaintance with the math- ematician Michelangelo Ricci he became (in 1660) a corresponding member of the short-lived Accademia del Cimento (1657–1667), founded by Prince Leopold de’ Medici (Fellmann 1971, p. 506). Fabri produced several important books on current mathematical topics,11 crusaded in favor of Jesuit’s bark (quinine) as a remedy for fever,12 and embarked on a bitter (and hopeless) controversy against Huygens’s dis- covery of Saturn’s rings.13 Upon his dismissal from the Penitentiary, Fabri retired to the Gesu (the Jesuit headquarters in Rome), and was appointed Latin historian of the Society. He died in Rome on 8 March 1688 (Lukens 1979, pp. 30–31). While in Rome, Fabri flourished – writing all in all more than thirty books, many of them on scientific topics – but nevertheless managed to involve himself in some unpleasant situations. In 1672 he spent almost two months in prison, following the publication of his Apologeticus doctrinae moralis eiusdem Societatis (1670), which still appears in the last edition of the Index librorum prohibitorum (published in 1948). It is not clear whether it was its vigorous attack on the Jansenists, while defending probabilism,14 which brought about Fabri’s imprisonment,15 or whether it was an issue of authority which caused this unhappy incident;16 but it should be emphasized that the reason which is given in some biographical accounts for this affair17 – namely, Fabri’s allegedly soft position towards Copernicanism – is without a doubt incorrect. Fabri claimed that if a proof were ever to be found for the motion of the earth, then the Holy Scriptures should be reinterpreted accordingly, thus only repeating Cardinal Bellarmine’s view (from 1616), “which seemed to be relatively common in Jesuit circles” (Finocchiaro 2005, p.
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