DOCSLIB.ORG

The Early Modern Debate on the Problem of Matter's Divisibility: a Neo- Aristotelian Solution

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

The Early Modern Debate on the Problem of Matter's Divisibility: A Neo- Aristotelian Solution Author: Colin Edward Connors Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:103593 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2014 Copyright is held by the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0). Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Philosophy THE EARLY MODERN DEBATE ON THE PROBLEM OF MATTER’S DIVISIBILITY: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN SOLUTION A dissertation by COLIN EDWARD CONNORS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2014 © copyright by COLIN EDWARD CONNORS 2014 The Early Modern Debate on the Problem of Matter’s Divisibility: A Neo-Aristotelian Solution Colin Connors Dissertation Director: Professor Jean-Luc Solere Abstract My dissertation focuses on the problem of matter’s divisibility in the 17th-18th centuries. The problem of material divisibility is a focal point at which the metaphysical principle of simplicity and the mathematical principle of space’s infinite divisibility conflict. The principle of simplicity is the metaphysical requirement that there must be a simple or indivisible being that is the constitutive foundation of all composite things in nature. Without simple beings, there cannot be composite beings. The mathematical principle of space’s infinite divisibility is a staple of Euclidean geometry: space must be divisible into infinitely smaller parts because indivisibles or points cannot compose extension. Without reconciling these metaphysical and mathematical principles, one can call into question the integrity of mathematics and metaphysics. Metaphysical contradiction results from the application of metaphysical simplicity to the composition of material bodies that occupy infinitely divisible space. How can a simple being constitute a material object while occupying a space that lacks a smallest part? Should we assume that a composite material object (such as the paper in front of the reader) exists in an infinitely divisible space, then the simple beings must occupy a space that consists of ever smaller spaces. The simple being thereby appears to consist of parts simpler than itself—a metaphysical contradiction. Philosophers resolve this contradiction by either modifying the metaphysical principle of simplicity to allow for the occupation of infinitely divisible space, or have simply dismissed one principle for the sake of preserving the other principle. The rejection of one principle for preserving the other principle is an undesirable path. Philosophers would either forfeit any attempt to account for the composition of material reality by rejecting simplicity or deny understanding of geometry heretofore via the rejection of space’s infinite divisibility. My objective in this dissertation is two-fold: 1.) to provide an historical analysis of various philosophers’ attempts to reconcile simplicity and infinite divisibility or to argue for the exclusive nature of the said principles; 2.) to articulate a reconciliation between simplicity and infinite divisibility. Underlying both objectives is my attempt to draw a connection between the metaphysical principle of simplicity and the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason. Having shown in the historical section that each philosopher implicitly references a modified version of the principle of sufficient reason when articulating their theories of metaphysical simplicity, I will use this common principle to develop a Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem of material divisibility. This Neo-Aristotelian solution differs from other accounts in the historical section by including a potential parts theory of material divisibility while modifying the principle of simplicity: simple beings are no longer conceived as constitutive parts of a material thing, but as the sources of unity for a natural composite being. Table of Contents 1. Dissertation Introduction and Synopsis 1 2. Chapter One: The Priority of Metaphysical Principle of Simplicity 26 in Hume, Berkeley, and the Pre-Critical Kant -Chapter One Introduction 27 - Section A-John Locke and Negative Ideas 37 -Section B-Berkeley, Negative Ideas, and Perceptual Minima 51 -Section C-Hume, Negative Ideas, and Minimum Sensibles 71 -Section D-Berkeley versus Hume on the Nature of Minima 102 -Section E-Immanuel Kant and Force-Shells 130 -Chapter One Conclusion 165 3. Chapter Two: Leibniz and Phenomenal Matter and Space 167 -Chapter Two Introduction 168 -Section A-Pseudo Qualitative Intellectual Divisibility 172 -Section B-The Principle of Simplicity and the Principle of Material 176 Sufficient Reason -Section C-Leibniz’s Theory of the Divisibility of Matter and Space and his 186 Affirmation of SIMT -Chapter Two Conclusion 192 4. Chapter Three: Kant and the Antinomy of Matter’s Divisibility 194 -Chapter Three Introduction 195 -Section A- The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: 197 The Plenum Principle and Matter’s Infinite Divisibility -Section B- The Second Antinomy and the Principle of Simplicity 218 -Chapter Three Conclusion 234 5. Chapter Four: A Defense of Neo-Aristotelian Potential Parts Doctrine 236 -Chapter Four Introduction 237 -Section A- The Problem of Divisibility in the Actual and 240 Potential Parts Doctrines: The Arguments from Divisibility -Section B- Argument against the Actual Parts Theory 253 -Section C- Substantial Form and Neo-Aristotelian Potential Parts 259 -Section D- Aristotelian Substantial Form and PPT: 263 The Reconciliation between Simplicity and Infinite Divisibility -Chapter Four Conclusion 266 6. Appendix: Interpretations of Leibnizian Space and Matter 268 References 295 1 Dissertation Introduction and Synopsis 2 During the 17th and 18th centuries, philosophers witness a conflict between proponents of the truths of mathematics and proponents of the truths of metaphysics. This conflict is not only metaphysical in nature, but also epistemic in character. In this debate, one must either deem that the conflict leaves either set of principles irreconcilable, eschewing a truth of metaphysics in order to preserve a truth of mathematics or vice-versa; or one must find some way to reconcile the seemingly conflicting principles; or one might believe that the conflict is unsolvable, casting both sets of principles into the region of knowledge that is unattainable by feeble human reason. The clash centers on the question of whether material bodies that occupy infinitely divisible space must be infinitely divisible. The principles at stake in this dispute are the metaphysical truth of simplicity and the mathematical truth of space’s infinite divisibility. The metaphysical truth of simplicity states that all beings must either be simple beings or be composed of simple beings. It is a principle traceable to the Neo-Platonic philosopher named Proclus. Proclus argues in the Elements of Theology that there must be what he calls “The One” or pure unity. Without something that is one or is considered one being, no composition or multitude could exist. Proclus writes: “For if it in no respects participates of The One, neither will the whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from each of these, and this will be the case to infinity.”1 Unity or simplicity enables the something to be called a thing; otherwise, nothing at all would exist. The principle of simplicity thereby is a fundamental principle of metaphysics that must be true in order for there to exist anything at all since composition presupposes simplicity. 1 Proclus. Proclus: Elements of Theology. Thomas Taylor, ed. Frome, Somerset, UK: The Prometheus Trust, 1998. Proposition I. 3 The mathematical truth of space’s infinite divisibility states that space can be divided without limit since there is no smallest and indivisible part of space. It is a truth propounded in Euclid’s Elements from Euclid’s notion of a line as “…a breadthless length.”2 Since Euclid conceives a point as “…that which has no part”, it could not possibly be the sole constituent of a line or any geometrical objects because partless things cannot be aligned next to one another as we will explore later in this dissertation.3 It would be absurd to consider the Euclidean principle of the infinite divisibility false since a number of mathematical theorems are based on such a principle, including the Pythagorean theorem. Without infinitely divisible space, it would be very difficult for a mathematician to prove the Pythagorean theorem because no irrational numbers would be possible. Thus, a rejection of space’s infinite divisibility would result in a repudiation of commonly accepted mathematical theorems. The affirmation of both of these principles is integral to the preservation of the coherence of human knowledge and the value placed on the disciplines of metaphysics and mathematics. Should one deny one principle in favor of the other principle, then the result is an exclusive field of human knowledge: metaphysical knowledge and mathematical knowledge collide. The affirmation of both principles is thereby necessary for the preservation of the human intellect. Without compatibility of knowledge systems, human knowledge rests in subjectivity rather than objectivity. Knowledge is not about the
Recommended publications
  • Achievements and Fallacies in Hume's Account of Infinite

    Achievements and Fallacies in Hume's Account of Infinite

    -1- ACHIEVEMENTS AND FALLACIES IN HUME’S ACCOUNT OF INFINITE DIVISIBILITY James Franklin Hume Studies 20 (1994): 85-101 Throughout history,almost all mathematicians, physicists and philosophers have been of the opinion that space and time are infinitely divisible. That is, it is usually believedthat space and time do not consist of atoms, but that anypiece of space and time of non-zero size, howeversmall, can itself be divided into still smaller parts. This assumption is included in geometry,asinEuclid, and also in the Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometries used in modern physics. Of the fewwho have denied that space and time are infinitely divisible, the most notable are the ancient atomists, and Berkeleyand Hume. All of these assert not only that space and time might be atomic, but that theymust be. Infinite divisibility is, theysay, impossible on purely conceptual grounds. In the hundred years or so before Hume’s Tr eatise, there were occasional treatments of the matter,in places such as the Port Royal Logic, and Isaac Barrow’smathematical lectures of the 1660’s, 1 Theydonot add anything substantial to medievaltreatments of the same topic. 2 Mathematicians certainly did not take seriously the possibility that space and time might be atomic; Pascal, for example, instances the Chevalier de Me´re´’s belief in atomic space as proof of his total incompetence in mathematics. 3 The problem acquired amore philosophical cast when Bayle, in his Dictionary, tried to showthat both the assertion and the denial of the infinite divisibility of space led to contradictions; the problem thus appears as a general challenge to "Reason".
  • Continuity Properties and Infinite Divisibility of Stationary Distributions

    Continuity Properties and Infinite Divisibility of Stationary Distributions

    The Annals of Probability 2009, Vol. 37, No. 1, 250–274 DOI: 10.1214/08-AOP402 c Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2009 CONTINUITY PROPERTIES AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF STATIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOME GENERALIZED ORNSTEIN–UHLENBECK PROCESSES By Alexander Lindner and Ken-iti Sato Technische Universit¨at of Braunschweig and Hachiman-yama, Nagoya ∞ −Nt− Properties of the law µ of the integral R0 c dYt are studied, where c> 1 and {(Nt,Yt),t ≥ 0} is a bivariate L´evy process such that {Nt} and {Yt} are Poisson processes with parameters a and b, respectively. This is the stationary distribution of some generalized Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. The law µ is parametrized by c, q and r, where p = 1 − q − r, q, and r are the normalized L´evy measure of {(Nt,Yt)} at the points (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1), respectively. It is shown that, under the condition that p> 0 and q > 0, µc,q,r is infinitely divisible if and only if r ≤ pq. The infinite divisibility of the symmetrization of µ is also characterized. The law µ is either continuous-singular or absolutely continuous, unless r = 1. It is shown that if c is in the set of Pisot–Vijayaraghavan numbers, which includes all integers bigger than 1, then µ is continuous-singular under the condition q> 0. On the other hand, for Lebesgue almost every c> 1, there are positive constants C1 and C2 such that µ is absolutely continuous whenever q ≥ C1p ≥ C2r. For any c> 1 there is a positive constant C3 such that µ is continuous-singular whenever q> 0 and max{q,r}≤ C3p.
  • Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences

    Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences

    Philosophy Study, July 2016, Vol. 6, No. 7, 377-416 doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2016.07.001 D DAVID PUBLISHING New Perspective for the Philosophy of Science: Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences Refet Ramiz Near East University In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation between new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science.
  • Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism

    Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism

    Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. MA by Research in Theology and Religion David Horner September 2018 Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. Submitted by David Horner to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of MA by Research in Theology and Religion in September 2018 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Jonathan Hill and Dr Joel Krueger for their support and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation and for their patience in trying to keep me on the straight and narrow. I want to acknowledge the many conversations, on this and other topics, I have had with my friend and philosopher, Dr Chris Boyne, who sadly died in June of this year. I thank all my other chums at The Bull, Ditchling, for listening to my metaphysical ramblings. And finally, I thank my wife, Linda, for once more putting up with this kind of thing. 2 Abstract This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013).
  • A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth Edition

    A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth Edition

    A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth edition John Losee OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science This page intentionally left blank A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Fourth edition John Losee 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © John Losee , The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– Typeset in Adobe Minion by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Preface This book is a historical sketch of the development of views about scientific method.
  • On Theodorus' Lesson in the Theaetetus 147D-E by S

    On Theodorus' Lesson in the Theaetetus 147D-E by S

    On Theodorus’ lesson in the Theaetetus 147d-e by S. Negrepontis and G. Tassopoulos In the celebrated Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage Theodorus is giving a lesson to Theaetetus and his companion, proving certain quadratic incommensurabilities. The dominant view on this passage, expressed independently by H. Cherniss and M. Burnyeat, is that Plato has no interest to, and does not, inform the reader about Theodorus’ method of incommensurability proofs employed in his lesson, and that, therefore, there is no way to decide from the Platonic text, our sole information on the lesson, whether the method is anthyphairetic as Zeuthen, Becker, van der Waerden suggest, or not anthyphairetic as Hardy-Wright, Knorr maintain. Knorr even claims that it would be impossible for Theodorus to possess a rigorous proof of Proposition X.2 of the Elements, necessary for an anthyphairetic method, because of the reliance of the proof of this Proposition, in the Elements, on Eudoxus principle. But it is not difficult to see that Knorr’s claim is undermined by the fact that an elementary proof of Proposition X.2, in no way involving Eudoxus principle, is readily obtained either from the proof of Proposition X.3 of the Elements itself (which is contrapositive and thus logically equivalent to X.2), or from an ancient argument going back to the originator of the theory of proportion reported by Aristotle in the Topics 158a-159b passage. The main part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the evidence for a distributive rendering of the plural ‘hai dunameis’ in the crucial statement, ’because the powers (‘hai dunameis’) were shown to be infinite in multitude’ in 147d7-8 (contrary to the Burnyeat collective, set-theoretic rendering), necessarily resulting in an anthyphairetic method for Theodorus’ proofs of incommensurability (contrary to the Cherniss-Burnyeat neutrality thesis).
  • Early Greeks and Aristotle

    Early Greeks and Aristotle

    Topics Moore Chaps 1 & 2: Early Greeks & Aristotle I. Early Greeks II. The Method of Exhaustion I. Early Greeks III.Aristotle 1. Anaximander (b. 610 B.C.) “to apeiron” - “the unlimited”, “unbounded” Solution to the Problem of the One and the Many: Observable objects = composites of the four elements: - fundamental substance of reality earth, air, fire, water. - underlying substratum for change Question: How do such opposing elements combine to form objects? - neutral substratum in which Answer: Through the mediation of to apeiron opposites/strife are reconciled 2. The Pythagoreans (Pythagoras b. 570 B.C.) the physical world = product of the imposition of “peras” (limits) on “a peiron” result = order/harmony basis for this order = natural numbers 3. The Eleatics Parmenides of Elea (515 B.C.) Claim: It is meaningless to speak of what is not. Everything is. “The One” - the metaphysically infinite - indivisible, homogeneous, eternal Further claim: Change is an illusion. (Change is a transition from what is, to what is not. This is impossible, since talk of what is not is incoherent.) Zeno (490 B.C.) Paradoxes of motion: intended to demonstrate that motion is not real - Achilles and the Tortoise - Paradox of the runner: ABE D C Claim: Achilles will never reach the finish-line at B. Proof: (1) To reach B, must reach C = AB/2. (2) To reach C, must reach D = AC/2, etc... (3) Thus there are an infinite number of finite line segments between A and B. (4) So Achilles would need an infinite amount of time to traverse them all! Assumptions: (a) AB is infinitely divisible.
  • Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum

    Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum

    LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM By PATRICK RIESTERER, B.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements For the Degree Master ofArts McMaster University © Copyright by Patrick Riesterer, August 2006 MASTER OF ARTS (2006) McMaster University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum AUTHOR: Patrick Riesterer, B.A. (Trinity Western University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Richard Arthur NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 110 ii Abstract In this thesis, I address the extent ofSpinoza's influence on the development of Leibniz's response to the continuum problem, with particular emphasis on his relational philosophy oftime and space. I expend the first chapter carefully reconstructing Spinoza's position on infinity and time. We see that Spinoza developed a threefold definition ofinfinity to explain the difference between active substance and its passive modes. Spinoza advances a syncategorematic interpretation ofinfinity, and founds a causal theory oftime directly on this conception ofinfinity. In the second chapter, I examine the changes Leibniz's understanding ofthe continuum problem underwent during 1676 and immediately thereafter. During this period, Leibniz's interacted extensively with Spinoza's ideas. We see that several fundamental features ofLeibniz's philosophy oftime take shape at this time. Leibniz adopts a Spinozistic definition ofdivine eternity and immensity, he reevaluates several analogies in an attempt to understand how the attributes ofa substance interrelate, and he develops the notion ofthe law of the series that will become an essential feature ofmonadic appetition. Leibniz synthesizes several ofthese discoveries into a first philosophy ofmotion.
  • Copyright © 2008 by Lydia R

    Copyright © 2008 by Lydia R

    ABSTRACT Analogy, Causation, and Beauty in the Works of Lucy Hutchinson Evan Jay Getz, Ph.D. Dissertation Chairperson: Phillip J. Donnelly, Ph.D. Lucy Hutchinson's translation of the ancient epic De Rerum Natura is remarkable in light of her firm commitments to Calvinist theology and the doctrine of Providence. David Norbrook and Jonathan Goldberg offer strikingly different explanations for the translation exercise. For instance, Norbrook argues that Hutchinson translates Lucretius in order that she might learn from the false images in Lucretius and make better ones in such works as Order and Disorder (Norbrook, “Margaret” 191). In contrast, Goldberg argues for compatibility between Lucretian atomism and Hutchinson‟s Christianity, seeing no contradiction or tension (Goldberg 286). I argue that neither critic accounts for the aesthetics of beauty in Hutchinson's poetry; both critics instead attribute an aesthetics of the sublime to Hutchinson. In making this argument, I show that Hutchinson's theory of causation has much in common with Reformed Scholasticism, whereby she is able to restore a metaphysics of formal and final cause. Hutchinson also revives the doctrine of the analogy of being, or analogia entis, in order to show that the formal cause of creation is visible as God's glory. After a discussion of her metaphysics and ontology, I then show that Hutchinson's poetry reflects a theological aesthetics of beauty and not the aesthetics of the sublime. In the fourth chapter, I compare the typological accounts of Abraham found in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and Hutchinson's Order and Disorder with a view to virtue as the proper basis of authority.
  • The Generative Dimension, in the Light of Aristotle's Substance

    The Generative Dimension, in the Light of Aristotle's Substance

    90 THE GENERATIVE DIMENSION, IN THE LIGHT OF ARISTOTLE’S SUBSTANCE (HYPOKEIMENON) THEORY Xiaoyu XU1 and Xinlei LIU1 ABSTRACT: The paper is dedicated to the analysis of Aristotle’s substance theory within the overall Organicist perception of the universe as a living organism. The suggested analytical pathway begins with the generative substance (in Stagirite’s original term – generative hypokeimenon) and leads to the primary causes, prompted by the constant movement of the “thing”. We argue that Aristotle’s analysis of “matter and form” (in his original texts: “ὕλη – hyle” and “μορφή – morphe”)2 leads to the generative function, reaffirming its dynamism and process expression. KEYWORDS: Aristotle, hypokeimenon, hyle, morphe, potential, reality, dynamism, universe, organism, process, generative function Contents Introduction 1. From the studying of Aristotle’s theory of substance (hypokeimenon) – to realizing the generative dimension 2. From Aristotle’s analysis of “hyle” and “morphe” – to examining the generative potentials that are their natural essences Conclusion 1 Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, CHINA. 2 Following the approach of the BCnA-journal, we consider it essential to apply the genuine terms and notions, used by the Stagirite in his original works, in expressing the authentic (and our own – neo-Aristotelian) conceptual constructions. Thus, we use (adding Italics); hyle – instead of “matter”; morphe – instead of “form”; hypokeimenon – instead of “substance”, etc. Vol. 8, No. 1, BIOCOSMOLOGY – NEO-ARISTOTELISM Winter 2018 91 ГЕНЕРАТИВНОЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ, В СВЕТЕ АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ СУБСТАНЦИИ (ГИПОКЕЙМЕНОНА) Чиаю ЗЮЕ и Шинлей ЛЬЮ АБСТРАКТ: Статья посвящена анализу теории субстанции (гипокейменона) Аристотеля в общем восприятии органической вселенной как живого организма. Предлагаемый аналитический путь начинается с порождающего вещества (в первоначальном выражении Стагирита – порождающего гипокейменона) и приводит к основным причинам, побуждающим постоянное движением «вещи».
  • Leibniz's Ontology of Individual Substance

    Leibniz's Ontology of Individual Substance

    THE SCIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL: LEIBNIZ’S ONTOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE TOPOI LIBRARY VOLUME 6 Managing Editor: Ermanno Bencivenga, University of California, Irvine, U.S.A. Editorial Board: Daniel Berthold-Bond, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, U.S.A. William James Earle, Baruch College, City University of New York,NewYork, U.S.A. Ann Ferguson, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, U.S.A. David Lloyd, Scripps College, Claremont, U.S.A. Topoi Library is sponsoredbythe Department of Philosophy and theSchool of Humanities at the University of California, Irvine Scope: Likethe journal TOPOII, the TOPOI Library is based on the assumption that philosophy isa lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, inalternative possibleworlds. Whatever its ideology,whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of shooting our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettlinggeneration ofdoubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a dialogue, that philosophy is first andforemost philosophicaldiscussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one’s approach,tomake itricher, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play.Andit follows that thespiritwhich one bringstothis activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one’s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible)judgment on what isthere but also without failing to show interest and respect.
  • Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives Edited by Mary Helen Mcmurran and Alison Conway MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER

    Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives Edited by Mary Helen Mcmurran and Alison Conway MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER

    Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives edited by Mary Helen McMurran and Alison Conway MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives EDITED BY MARY HELEN MCMURRAN AND ALISON CONWAY UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London © University of Toronto Press 2016 Toronto Buffalo London www.utppublishing.com Printed in the U.S.A. ISBN 978-1-4426-5011-4 (cloth) Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetable-based inks. ___________________________________________________________________ Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Mind, body, motion, matter : eighteenth-century British and French literary perspectives / edited by Mary Helen McMurran and Alison Conway. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4426-5011-4 (cloth) 1. English literature – 18th century – History and criticism. 2. French literature – 18th century – History and criticism. 3. Philosophy in literature. 4. Materialism in literature. 5. Vitalism in literature. 6. Aesthetics in literature. I. Conway, Alison Margaret, editor II. McMurran, Mary Helen, 1962–, author, editor PR448.P5M55 2016 820.9'384 C2015-908168-8 ___________________________________________________________________ CC-BY-NC-ND This work is published subject to a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivative License. For permission to publish commercial versions please