The Metaphysics of Improvisation
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2012 The Metaphysics of Improvisation Tobyn C. DeMarco Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1679 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE METAPHYSICS OF IMPROVISATION by TOBYN C. DEMARCO A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2012 ii © 2012 TOBYN C. DEMARCO All Rights Reserved iii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Barbara Gail Montero __________________________________________ _______________ __________________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee John Greenwood __________________________________________ _______________ __________________________________________ Date Executive Officer Nickolas Pappas __________________________________________ Steven Ross __________________________________________ Noël Carroll __________________________________________ Supervisory Committee The City University of New York iv Abstract THE METAPHYSICS OF IMPROVISATION by Tobyn C. DeMarco Adviser: Professor Nickolas Pappas In “The Metaphysics of Improvisation,” I criticize wrongheaded metaphysical views of, and theories about, improvisation, and put forward a cogent metaphysical theory of improvisation, which includes action theory, an analysis of the relevant genetic and aesthetic properties, and ontology (work-hood). The dissertation has two Parts. Part I is a survey of the history of many improvisational practices, and of the concept of improvisation. Here I delineate, sketch, and sort out the often vague boundaries between improvising and non-improvising within many art forms and genres, including music, dance, theatre, motion pictures, painting, and literature. In addition, I discuss the concept of non-artistic improvisation in various contexts. I attempt to portray an accurate picture of how improvisation functions, or does not function, in various art forms and genres. Part II addresses metaphysical issues in, and problems and questions of, improvisation in the arts. I argue that that continuum and genus-species models are the most cogent ways to understand the action-types of improvising and composing and their relations. I demonstrate that these models are substantiated by an informed investigation and phenomenology of improvisational practice, action theory conceptual analysis, cognitive neuroscience studies and experiments, cognitive psychology studies and models, and some theories of creativity. In addition, I provide a constraint based taxonomy for classifying improvisations that is compatible v with, and supports, the continuum model. Next, I address epistemological and ontological issues involving the genetic properties of improvisations, and the properties “improvisatory,” and “as if improvised.” Finally, I show that arguments against treating, or classifying, improvisations as works are weak or erroneous, and by focusing on music, I provide a correct ontological theory of work-hood for artistic improvisations. vi DEDICATION To my parents, Arlene and Louis, for all their generosity and kindness and patience; And in loving memory of my grandparents, Helen and Joseph Kollar, and Velia and Luigi DeMarco; And to Stacey, pulchra omnifariam atque sine qua non. vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am a fortunate person. Lucky for the quantity and quality of friends and colleagues who have taught me much, endured my questions and impositions, supported my work, and tolerated my failures. Many people have helped me. Douglas Sobers “piqued” my interest in the topic, and he and I first worked on some ideas about the aesthetics of improvisation while I was an undergraduate. I was very fortunate to have Peter Kivy, Laurent Stern, and Stephen Davies as my first professors in aesthetics, whose words, lectures, thoughts, and conversations continue to resonate in my thinking. I fondly recognize Kivy’s kindness, friendship, support, and encouragement. Aaron Meskin, Rupert Read, Terence Ferraro, Amy Coplan, Jami Weinstein, Sheila Lintott, Sherry Irvin, and Steven Ross have provided me with excellent intellectual and moral support. Ronald Arimenta has been a good friend, musical and philosophical comrade, and fellow seeker. Julien Valenstein, my musical comrade for many years, taught me so much about music, improvisation, and life. The people who first taught me intellectual rigor, about the examined life, about pedagogy, and introduced me to philosophical thinking: Magister Joseph Chukinas, Kenneth Kutchak, Robert Peterson, Dick Fiori. The wisdom, intellect, rigor, and character of my Latin and Greek teacher, Magister Chukinas, have influenced every domain of my life, every day. I was lucky, and I am intensely grateful, to have studied under his tutelage. At the Graduate Center, I have been inspired by the teaching of David Rosenthal and Steven Ross: both have made me a better teacher and scholar. Steve Ross has caused me to change my mind many times about many issues. Our gallery crawls and long conversations have had and will have an enormous impact on my thinking about philosophy, aesthetics, art, literature, academia, and life. viii I thank the following friends whose support and friendship have been very important to me: John Fabbo, Pankaj Sharma, John Fussa, Mark Coakes, Steven Weinstein, Louis Glinn, Dan Samaritano, Eric Brummer, Robert Higgins, Anthony Salvemini, Michael Minaides, Jennifer Spagnoli, Douglas Sobers, Aaron Meskin, Amy Coplan, Ryan Nichols, Steven Ross, Jami Weinstein, Jonathan Weingard, Sarah Markgraf, Gregg Biermann, Robert Couto, and Richard Riederer. I am blessed to have a family whose love and support are infinite: my parents, Arlene and Louis; my sister, Kyra Lang; my niece and nephew Ainsley and Haydn; my aunt Sr. Arlene Maryann Kollar; my uncle, Joseph Kollar. The late Marx Wartofsky was my initial dissertation advisor. The scope of his erudition, his intelligence, his wittiness and cleverness, and humor are legendary. The influence of his work and him are pervasive in my work and thinking. I miss him. I thank my dissertation supervisory committee and defense examination committee for their suggestions, time, patience, and efforts: Steven Ross, Noël Carroll, Christa Acampora, and Barbara Gail Montero. Finally, I thank my dissertation advisor Nickolas Pappas for his patience, excellent criticism, piercing intelligence, encouragement, erudition, disparate interests, never lacking something interesting to say, and knowing just what to say at the right time. Truly, he is a Mensch. My partner in life, Stacey Balkan, provided and provides everything one could need and want. Her support, encouragement, and love sustained me, and helped me to finish this project. Truly, I am lucky. There are, probably, others I should thank, but, alas, the limits of memory and time impinge; it is no reflection on them. My apologies to the unmentioned. As is customary, and ix justified, I say (with confidence) that all remaining deficiencies of and in the dissertation are mine alone. x PREFACE I must admit that I have an attraction to heresies, and that my sympathies naturally tend to be with the cranks and doubters and against well-established doctrines. But this is not because I enjoy controversy. Rather, it is because, like Dewey, I believe that the search for knowledge is as often impeded by faulty assumptions and by a limited creative vision for alternatives as by a lack of necessary tools for critical evidence. So I will have achieved my intent if, in the process of recounting my thoughts on this mystery, I leave a few unquestioned assumptions more questionable, make some counter-intuitive alternatives more plausible, and provide a new vantage point from which to reflect upon human uniqueness. —Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), 15. Just ten years ago, one would have had to provide a lengthy preface to justify a philosophical study of improvisation. A justification is no longer needed. Now the interdisciplinary study of improvisation is plentiful and of mostly high quality. In this dissertation, I provide a cogent metaphysical theory of artistic improvisation. I argue for a continuum model for understanding the distinction between improvising and composing (action theory), and attach a taxonomic system for classifying improvisations. Next, I criticize arguments that conclude that improvisations are not works of art. Lastly, I argue that improvisations are works of art, and provide a proper ontological theory of the work for artistic improvisations. xi EPIGRAPH Now I shall spy on beauty as none has Spied on it yet. Now I shall cry out as None has cried out. Now I shall try what none Has tried. Now I shall do what none has done. And speaking of this wonderful machine: I’m puzzled by the difference between Two methods of composing: A, the kind Which goes on solely in the poet’s mind, A testing of performing words, while he Is soaping a third time one