ROMANIAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION

DUMITRU SUCIU FROM THE UNION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES TO THE CREATION OF GREATER , 1859-1918 DUMITRU SUGIU

From the Union of the Principalities to the Creation of GENTER FOR TRANSYLVANIAN STUDIES

BIBLIOTHECA RERUM TRANSSILVANIAE V

ISBN 973-9132-72-3 Copyright © 1993 by the Romanian Cultural Foundation DUMITRU SUGIU

FROM THE UNION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES TO THE CREATION OF GREATER ROMANIA

CENTER FOR TRANSYLVANIAN STUDIES THE ROMANIAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION Cluj-Napoca, 1993 THE NECESSITY AND THE PREMISES OF BRINGING THE FOREIGN HEREDITARY DYNASTY

In the XIXth century, European democratic th inkers stated that the Moldavian and Walachian , situated between Rusia, Austria and Turkey, countries which didn’t love them, but suspected and exploited them for centuries, watching them step by step, were no objectsof envy atall.as they dwelt, like Dante’sdemned sinner, in the very heart of undergrounds*. In order to put into iigh t and into practice their national programs of the state and political evolution, the Roma- niansasa whole needed the people’s support, the sacrifice and the will to fight, as well as the cool and clear spirit of their policical leaders, their diplomatic ability, the lucid understanding of the stats relations and rapports in Europe. The neigh boring great powers did not only suspect each politi­ ca 1 move made by the Romanians living in the Principalities, but took serious advantage of the patrimony of their ancient territory, includ­ ing whole territories and lands into their own borders. Starting from 1775, Austria incorporated Bucovina, Russia - - from 1812, Turkey incorporated Tumu and Giurgiu in the XVth century and Brailain 1540(regained by Wallachia inl829)andDobrudja,in 1417. The Romanians in the Principalities often used to help the Russians and the Austrians in wars against the Ottoman Empire, with a wiew to abolish the Fanariot regime and regain their previous independence. But for many centuries, the Romanian Principalities have been, in a quick and repetated ry thm, the theater of war for Austria, Russia and Turkey, sometimes for the three of them, more often for the later ones, or they were temporarily occupied by one of them, more often

1. La Reforme, 27-th of June, 1 MS spud Olimpiu Boitoș. Raporturile românilor tn Ledrn Rollhi ți radicaliifrancezi f» perioada revoluției de la 1848, București, (f.i annex XI, p.l 10

5 for the latter ones, or they were temporarily occupied by one of them, as follows: 1716-1718; 1736-1739; 1768-1774; 1787-1792; 1806-1812; Turkish intervention and occupation between 1821-1822; the Rus­ sian-Turkish war 1828-1829 and Russian occupation until 1834; Rus­ sian-Turkish intervention and occupation 1848-1851; Russian and Austrian occupation 1853-1854 and 1854-1857? Although these wars undoubtfully contributed to the serious and irreversible weakening of the Ottoman sovereignty, they terribly ravaged the Romanian territory, troubled the people’s material and spiritual life and brought about feeling of ceaseless insecurity and fear. More than this, the train or robbery and misfortunes and espe­ cially the abduction of Bucovina and Bessarabia made the Romanians in the Principalities gainfully regret the former agony of the Ottoman sovereignty, which they hoped toabolish and which was preferable to their being separated and trodden by Austrians or Russsians. The painful dilemmas - of their medieval past-uttered by old voices, who did not know whom to fear more: the cool pagans facing them or the Christian powers behind - seemed to be heard again, in the new forms, structures and mentalities of the modern epoch. Starting with the first half of the XIXlh century, the Romanian people became a modern and dynamic nation. Deep down in the Romanian society structural changes occured in the social-economic life, in institutions, in mentality and political ideas. F'irst, the unprecedent development of manufacturies, crafts, of the internal and foreign trade with cerealsand cattle brought about thedemografic explosion of the urban centers. Creative energies in universities and schools, in education and culture, burst forth and they spread in geometric progression, printings, newspapers and books, all of them

2. Considering chat 1 gold leu = 0,3225 grams, we estimated that, beginning with the XV"‘ century, until 1877, the value of the .tribute payed to the Ottomans amounted to 1,066.305.780 gold lei. Not taking into account the riches taken direcdy from Dobrudja. Tumu, Giurgiu. Brăila, this sum may be estimated at 341,021 kg of gold. The Habsburg Empire, that became Austro-Hungary later, took values representing 857,500 kg of gold while (1686-1918), Oltenia (1718- 1739), Bucovina (1775-1918) were ruled from Vienna and Budapest. Russia, only during the temporary occupations of Wallachia and Moldavia, without the income taken from Bessarabia, took hold of 64,515 kg of gold, in money and goods, during 1796-1854. See Mircea Musat. Ion Ardeleanu. De la statulg/M-dac la starul rămân unitar. București, 1983, p.200

6 contributing to the creation of the modern national conssciusness ant ideology3. The modem nation registered a solidarisation for all its mem bers which included and surpassed the confesssional, irrespective of the cultural level and differences in wealth and in affiliation to one party o another. It was the Romanians’desire for independence and the achievmen of national unity which linked them all - along the XIX1*1 century and unti 1916-1919. The ramification and generalisation of the railways, the agro-indus trial development and the development of crafts, all of these doubled ant tripled by the progress registered by the Romanian Academy in by theChurches and the partiesof theRomanians from everyehere, by the Romanian universities ofJaszy and Bucharest or by Astra and other cu ltura societies of the oppressed Romanians had made some national leader: express - since the last century - their conviction that by the XXth century - the Romanian people would have its sute unity accomplished. In ; Europe marked by the industrial revolution, by elections and parliamen tary systems, the realistic leaders made it clear that besides the peasants the priests ans teachers the Romanian society had to have all the socia classes and categories which made up Europe’s modern nations, that i intellectuals, workers, merchants, bankers, liberal proffesionists, a moden bank-financial system, together with its industry and agriculture, both ir free Romania and in the oppressed Transylvania and Bucovina. The effort for the modernizing of the Romanian society were made not only sepa rately,. but also in common4, to prove democratic Euope that the Romani ans could and had to achieve their unitary state. The mental and cultural beginning was achieved at the end of th XVIIIth century, under the positive impact of the linguistic and historic; works printed in , the former small Rome of the Enlightenment of a Romanians, and under the influence of the precios political thinking of th patriotic boyars in the Principalities, when national ideology thought th

3. The phenomenon is throughly presented in the collective volume Națiunea română. Geneză. Afirmare. Orizont contemporan, București, 1984 4. Aspects of the problem in George Barițfi contemporanii săi, vol.HI, București. 1979, p.22O and D. Suciu. “Date privind situația politică și confesional școlară a românilor1 prima decadă a duzlismulux", bt Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj-Napoca, XXX, 1990- 1991,p.98-99 omanians not to think in an Transylvanian, Wallachian or Moldavian way ly longer, but in a Romanian one, to feel and transm it from one Carpathian de toother or from one bank of the river Prut to the other * their pain and offering and seldom their happines and hopes. Modern Romanians, Ithought living under the threat of Damocle's sword, due to their gco- olitica 1 position, have never been fatalists, they have always had a fighting pirit and mentality, just because they have been fully aware of the real size nd dimension of the evil and they keenly felt the injustice of being the aves of the Turks in Dobrudja, of the Russian in Bessarabia, of the .ustrians in Bucovina, of the Hungaryans in Transylvania, Banat, Crișana nd Maramureș right in the middle of the XIXIh century, when the national »rinciple was strongly imposing itself in Europe. Everybody’s hope was directed towards the Romanian Principali- ies, where the state political being was preserved and practised, where iere have been princes, ministers, community. Meetings, offifcers, and Mdiers, Romanian diolomacy. The Romanian political elite made the itional thinking part of theEuropean thinking, expressed its determined esire for social and economic renewal, for social democracy throught land form, for constitutional govering on the basis of the principle of separa- on of powers in state, for the affirmation of the concept of a protecting otherland - for all classes and categories of society. They fought for the ■netration of foreign capital, for the application of Western patterns in licy and in the organisation of industry and trade in acordance with the •ncrcte Romanian conditions. The same elite generalized and crystal- ed the concept of Daco-Romanianism, proposing and promoting the re- iting of Mihai Viteazu’s work of uification in the contextof totally new editions and structures. This elite came sprang from the boyars, it med the liberal national and anti-Russian party, its members were ucatcd men who studied in the West, who were not only politicians, but o also wrote or taught history, philosophy, literature in the mean time, o encouraged arts and the theatre, who proposed the application of ;stern patterns in politics in work in the harmonious defences of the free izen and owner and of the new and democratic state. They rejected the ucture of the absolutisms of any kind, the Oriental, fatalistic tradition and customs, dawdling and evil as they were, in their passivity and stagnation? The lucid, enterprising political minds, eager to obtain the concrete application - that is not only theoretically - of their ideas and principles, of the fundamental wishws expressed in the program of the fight for national freedom and unity or of the general internal renewal of the Romanian society - realized that the nation needed in both directions the support and external foreign contact with the Central and Western Europe. The main leaders of the national party were fully aware that the Romanians in the Principalities whose destiny to determine the fate of the others ones too, were too few in numbers, that too, weak physically to resist all by themselves each of the three great empires Russia, Austria, Turkey, naturally all the three greedy, agressive great pow'ers. In fact, feld marshal Ludovic Wohlgemuth, the governor of Transylvania told Ioan Maiorescu, Leader or the Romanian national struggle between 1848-1849, ironically and also on a threatening tone, that the Romanians had to give up the idea of Dacia-Romania65 , if they wanted Vienna to solve their requests, but that he, as a soldier would great them with honours if, on the battle­ field, they managed to defeat Austria, Turkey and Russia and take Transylvania, Bucovina, Dobrudja and Bessarabia back. But what the Austrian military manof the caesarregal habsburgic army knew was well- known to the Romanian political thinkers as well, who, starting from the years betwen 1802-1830 had been thinking of the necessity to bring into the country a strong dynasty, with a view to constitute a shield for the defence ofthe weak internal autonomy of the Principalities but on conditions that this prince should belong neither to the Romanovs, nor to the Habsburgs and should not be under the Sultan’s influence. Beginning with the year

5. About the modern evolution of the idea of the Union of the Principalities and of the Romanian thought in consensus with the general progress in Western Europe. Sec Vlad Georgescu, Istoria românilor de la origini ptnà fu zilele noastre, Los Angeles. California, pp.140-145; 169-170. General aspects in W.T. Riker. The Mating of Romania. A Study of au International Problem.1856-1866, Oxford University Press, London. Humphrey. Milford, 1931. 6. George Barițți contemporanii säi, voll, București, 1975, voll,pp.326-329. The Governor advised the Romanians to seek for their rights in the forums and structures of the Monarchy. 9 1834 and afterwards, the Frenchconsuls in Bucharest and Iași, Huber, but also Cochelet, Duclos, Lagan and others were aware and heard from the realistic and lucrative Romanian elite too, that unless the Principalities should ged unified into a modern state led by a heredi­ tary foreign prince descendent of a Great european dynasty in the West or theCentral partof theContinent, the Romanian nation would be endangered by the external pressure of the Russians first, and then of the Austria and Turkey. In fact, both France and England were interested in weakening Russia’s position on the lower Danube and consequently, its protec­ torate in the Romanian Principalities. This explains why the general consul Colguhon was in touch with the actions of the national party led by the patriot boyar Ion Câmpineanu, or, why, Palmerston himselm knew that Bucharest had been threatened by Russia for having fought against its pressure which meant that the barrier represented by the Romanians against the extension of the Tsar’s influence South of the Danube had to be supported by Europe’s great powers, sooner or later. Otherwise, they could themselves come to fear ’s Tsars or their fleets passing through! the straits at any time, or sail all over the Mediteranean Sea and endangering the positions held by London and Paris, there if they managed to ttransform the Black Sea into a Russian lake. In fact, Prince Mihail Sturdza himself stated that, without the protection and the guarantee of the great Western forces, the Princi­ palities could not escape from the pressure of the abusive and danger­ ous protectorate of Petersbourg. The monopoly of Russia’s political influence in the Principalities seriosly upset the German pressas well, the Berlin Cabinet in order to mend the things appointed a general consul in the Principalities,askinghimtoact together with diplomatic agents to preserve European interests in this area. In this context, the position of the politicians who proposed the unification of the Princi­ palities into a Kingdom ruled by Mihail Sturdza were seriosly weak­ ened and those which prevailed were the realistic proposals of those ones who pleaded for the placing of the modern state under the scepter of the foreign prince. The prince could put into practice the materialization of the foreign suport and protection in Central or

10 Western Europe against Russian interference. Foreign observers noticed with wonder that the idea wasgladly accepted not by the great boyars, many of them being still close to Russia but by the little boyars and by the inhabitants of villages Meanwhile, foreign dimplomats openly wrote that the Principalities unified whith Transylvania, the Banat, Bessarabia and Bucovina into a Kingdom ruled by a foreign monarch could evantually be very useful to the preservation of the equilibrum, of peace and progress in Europe. Sturdza himself thought of creating a dynasty kindred to the German sovereigns - to rule the romanian reunited Principalities - for the time being7. In general, people eventualy hoped that after the achievment of this cause, the Romanian state, ruled by the hereditary foreign dynasty would find strong external allies to help them abolish consequtively and in the neighbouring danger take back the provinces inhabited mostly by Romanians, by means of international treaties well-thought and achieved-until they would finally carry out the political unity of all the Romanians. The concrete political events confirmed the realistic assump­ tions concerning the force rapport betwen the Romanians and the adjacent foreign powers inl821, when Turkey defeated the eterists and Tudor’s action. But this, having taken place in the antifanariotic way just by the time when the Greeks where at odds whith the Ottomans, brought about the benefic consequence of the crowning of Romanian rulers in both principalities. The blows given to the Otto­ man Empire by Russia lighted the Principalities’situation regarding Turkey, but worsened it in what concerned the protecting power on the Neva, until they isued the undesirable Additional Act to the Organic Regulations which seriously affected their autonomy, any internal reforms initiated by the princes and comunity. Meetings in Bucharest and Iași being forbidden, whithout the previous consent of Petersburg and Istambul (this latter one being rather formal). Betwen 1837-1856, the eforts of the whole national internal and external movement of the most representative members of the Romanian emigrations in.the West were directed towards the abolition of the

7. Unirea Principatelor Române și Puterile europene. București,1984, p. 10-19

11 abusive and exclusivist Russian protectorate, whith the help of the great Western Powers, towards the enforcement of the internal state autonomy, the weakening of the Ottoman sovereignity up to a nomi­ nal or symbolical status and then, towards a further achievment of independence. But in 1848, although! the Provisional Government in Bucharest had twice defeted the plots of the internal oppositin, the revolution was defeted by the intervention of the Turkysh-Russian army, im­ posed especialy by Russia. The Russian diplomats and politicians openly stated that Russia would declare war against the Sublime Porte or any other force which would agree whith the behaviour of the Wallachian gouverment, while Nesselrode,' the Russian chancelor - added that, if the gouverment in Bucharest - which openly rose against the Russian protectorate would sourvive the Romanians in Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Transylvania would unite whith it, in order to form the Daco-Romania - after which other nations at the Danube would like to have independent states, on the ruins of the great empires. The Chancellor was of the opinion that the application of the principle of nationalities was equal to “the denial of history” - as if only the great empires and kingdoms owned a history or a right to history - disregard­ ing the small or middle nations, oppressed and robbed as they were. Turkey feared both the presence of the Russian army at the Danube and the bad example of the - so, its attidude was contradictory. At the beginning, the Ottomans agreed to listen to the diplomats in Bucharest and, under the influence of the French and English consuls in Bucharest, of some embassies of the great Western powers of Constantinopole approved to acknoledge, by the Ottoman Comissary, Soliman, the Royal Lieutenancy and the new gouverment appointed by it. The tactics of the national party, thought and put into practice by Ion Cîmpineanu first, in order to abolish the Russian protectorate, with the help of the European powers envious of Rus­ sia’s ascent towards the Straits and the get the collective garrantee against the great powers, seemed to be about to succeed, thanks to the diplomatic activity of the Provisional Government, in 1848. But Russia, being aware that France and England could not act concretely at the Black Sea or at the Danube, in 1848, took a quite

12 determined position, threatened Turkey, which re-called Soliman and appointed Fuad as Commisary, asking him to work hand whith Russia for the abolition of the gouvernaient in Bucharest, Turkey had no interest to defend the Romanians against the Russians, which was impossible to achieve whitout the help of the Western powers any­ way; on the contrary, Turkey took benefit of Russia’s help to defel a possible revolution, dangerous for it, as well. However, whitout Rus­ sia, the Ottoman Empire, would not have dared to interfere by itself. After 20.000 Turks and 20.000 Russians entered the Principality of Wallachia, the French and English Consu Is advised Genera 1 Magheru not to bring a small country to state of painfully and impossibly fighting against two great states, to disarm the troops, and dimobilize, promising that the great Western Powers would eventually intervene diplomatically for the retreat of the Russian and Turkish troops, and re-accept the autonomy and the garantee of the Principalities’ rights? In 1848-1849, the Romanians living in Transylvania, in their terrible fight against the Hungarian state-centralism, proved that they had a dynamic, keen, national conscience, spirit of sacrifice and a huge capacity of political and military’ resistence. 40.000 of them died: 10.000 killed in combat, 30.000 executed or killed by the Hungarian cruel law-courts and hunting teams, so that remaing ones should not be any-longer mere or aditions to the Hungarian political nation and the best Transylvania should be nielted into the Hungarian naiion unitary state as a part of it? In this perspective the message for posterity was also clarified having in view that the Romanians in Transylvania themselves, whising to be given collective national rights to constitute their own political nationality and that the au-

8. About the revolution in 1848, in , Istoria românilor, vol.IX. București, 1939, p.l 17-185; An»/1848 în Principatele Române. Acte și documente, vol.I- IV, București, 1902-1910; C. Bodea, 18481a români, vol.I-Il, București, 1982; N.Adăniloaiei, D. Bcrindei, Revoluția de la 1848 in Țările Române, București, 1974; Dumitru Suciu. “Ecouri ale situației politice românești în presa franceză (1848)’’ in An. Instit. de 1st. ți Arh. din Cluj, XIII, 1970, p.145-159, Gheorghe Platon, Geneza revoluției romine de la 1848, Iași, 1982 9. D. Suciu, “Acțiuni politice românești împotriva suprimării autonomiei Transilvaniei între 1848-și 1868” în Românii din Transilvania împotriva dualismului austro-ungar (1865-1900), Cluj-Napoca, 1978, pp.84-104; Idem, “Aspecte ale politicii de asuprire națională și maghiarizare forțată a românilor din Transilvania în timpul dualismului”, in An. Inst. de 1st. ți Arh. Cluj Napoca, XXVIII, 1987/1988, p.296-297.

13 tonomy of ehe Great Principality should not be abolished, so that its teritory become part of the Hungarian state; they all acted whith a view to prepare the condions and mentalities for being embodied in the harmonious way - both the land and the people - into a Romanian unitary and independent political nation. If in 1849, the common Turkish-Russian intervention, stirred especially by Russia’s diplo­ macy against the liberal gouvernent in Bucharest, had momentary’ negative effect on the Romanian interessts, in 1849, the invasion of the Russian troops and their having crashed the Hungarian army indirectly about brought favourable counsequence: the execution and banishments of the ethnic majority of the Transylvanian came to an end. After the revolution, the Romanians who emigrated to the West kept hoping for the achievment of the natinal unity in stages, starting with the unification of the Principalities and the creation of the Modern Small Romania, the basis of the future edifice, meant to became Greater Romania, the state of all Romanians. For the time being, during those years, the Romanian leaders had in view the protection of the Western Europen Great Powers against the Russian protectorate, insisting on the unification of the Principalities and on a foreign dynasty - as an internal and international guarantee for the autonomy of the future Romanian modern state. The international situation grew favourable in a few years. Although the Russians and The Turks had left the Principalities in 1851, the former invaded them again in 1853, when Tsar Nicholas wanted established a protec­ torate over them and Serbia and to extend his influence and power over all the orthodox believers submitted to the Ottomans in the Baicans, so that Russia should come as close to the straits as possible and turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake. These ambitions strongly affected England’s and France’s interests in the preservation of the equilibrum of forces in these parts of Europe and this in why these forces, toghether with Turkey and, rather symbolically helped by Piemont defeated Russia in the Crimean War. The first great power that supported the application of the principle of the nationalities in the change and democratization of the European political geography was Napoleon the III,d’s imperial France.

14 In 1856, at the Paris Congress Count Walewski, in agreement with the leaders of the , proposed the unifation of the Principalities into a single modern Romanian state, with internal autonomy, collectively guaranteed, excluding any practical possibility of invasion by the three neighbouring empires, with a hereditary prince from a Europen dynasty who should link the Roma­ nian’s interests to those of the whole Europe in these sensitiv and feverish zones where frequent local wars took place and social and political convulsions broke out. The boycott of Austria and Turkey blocked up the proposal made by Walewski, the minister of foreign affairs of France, at the congres that the decisions should be put into practice immediately. But they resorted to consulting the Romanians will concerning their future statal organization - with the restriction that the votes of the leaders of the Romanian nation should be only consultative and those of the guarantor powers, deliberative. Anyhow, inderectly at least, at the Paris Congress of Peace, in 1856, the principle of nationalities was alredy put into practice as a standard for the regiementation of some acute problems in certain parts of Europe - meant by the Great Powers to keep a certain equilibrum and to prevent local wars which could have turned into sparks general ones. Among the guarantor forces, the defeated Russia turned to join the forces supporting the unification of the Principalities - no later than 1863, keeping close to France in these matter. Prussia and Piemont supported the unification without any rezervation, as they were interested in the existence of precedents in the aplica tion of the principle of nationalities in Europe, Berlin and Torino being in fact leaders of the process of creation of the German and Italian national unitary states. In 1856, England supported France and Romanian national party - but , until 1857-1858, it joined the Austrian and Turkish interests, directed against the unification. But Europe and the Romanians had more common gains in 1856, achieved by the removal of Russia from the Danube mouths, after the Principality of Moldavia had been given Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail, by the neutrali­ zation of the Black Sea, the blocking of the military fleet, the destruc­ tion of the Russiannavalarsenaland through the EuropeanCommision of the Danube.

15 The Romanians in the Principalities broken free from the singural and abusive Russian protectorate came under the collective guarantee of France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, England and Piemont, optaining this way their international shield for the protection of internal autonomy of the state against the frequent attaks and robber­ ies of the neighbors. The sovereignity of the Ottomans was maintainned, under a formal title. But anyhow, the Romanians whose leaders and national rulers were in the heat of things and knew both the subtrefuges of diplomacy of the European Cabinets, the attitude of the international public opinion, realized and hoped that, once the internal autonomy of the state was consolidated, they could pass on to the safe and unrisky achievement (i. e. without the intervention of foreign arm ies ) of the reformes of the year 1848and to the preparation of the condition required by the declaration of state independence. In addition to this ,the Romanian unionist leaders tackled in a very realistic spirit the relations existing the Great Powers. They noticed they had friends as well as enemies and turned to the achievement of their national aspirations of that epoch by a policy of achieved facts, of laying hands on one’s own national fate. The romanian political leaders were aware and convinced of the fact that the blows cooked up by the Great Powers would be blocked and waisted, with the help of friends who would encourage them directly and discretely, according to circumstances, on the way chosen by the nation. Indeed, in 1857, all the hateful machineries taken up by Austria, Turkey, England in order to maintain the falsified and separatist ad-hoc Divan of lași were blocked by the break of the diplomatic relations with the Ottomans, decided by forces favorable to the unification, i. e. France, Russia, Prussia, Piemont. After that, there followed correct elections and the meeting of the unionist and national ad-hoc Divan in Moldavia too, this latter one adjusting and joining its actions and efforts to the similar organism in Wallachia.10

10. About the Union of the Principalities also see Iorga N.; op.rit.. vol.IX. pp. 197-234: Riker, op.rit.;, Berindei, PUniott des Principautés Roumaines. Bucharest 1967; Suciu D., 'Ecouri ale situafiei politice românești tn publicistica francezi (1856- 1859)* in ', VII, 1970, pp.621-632, on attempt to integrate the phenomenon into the similar processes on the continent; Idem, la “Contribupa elitelor politice românești la democratizarea și armonizarea geografiei politice europene; 1848-1918" (1), An. last, de 1st. Cluj Napoca, XXXII, 1993, p. 149-167. 16 In 1857, Mihail Kogälniceanu motivated the claim oFa foreign prince also by the necessity of havinga steady and strong government, respected both inside and outside the country and by the abolishment of the Romanian former elective and deposable princes, who encour­ aged da ngerousandrepeatedanarchy,weakness and corruption caused by abuses and despotisme. The stability of the state was to be also ensured by the principle of dinastic heredity but the great Romanian politician left out of his motivation the appointment of the hereditary prince from the dynasties of the great adjacent states - which meant that he also looked for the support of the west against the Romanovs, the Habsburgs and the OttomansJon Brätianu stated that for centu­ ries on end, the thrones kept being apples of internal discord, which brought about bloody and long lasting fights wich weakened the resistance to the greedy neighbours.11 He stressed that he preferred a foreign prince from a Western dynasty, meant to be a guide for the Romanian state which was going to prove Europe its determination to exist in perfect order on its way to progress and civilization. Brätianu was hoping that the solidarity still existing among the reigning families would make them respect or interfere more deeply in the national existence of the Romanians, while the guarrantees put down, in treaties would find additional support in the interests of a strong dynasty - including its allies. To these arguments, the ad-hoc Divan in Bucharest added the hope that the foreign prince would prevent the jealousies and rivalries have an impartial attitude towards the internal political parties and personali­ ties and finally, would make a more efficient contribution to the introduction of Romania in the great family of the European states and to obtain their help. Besides, the hereditary foreign prince, the Divan also required the unification of the principalities into one state named Romania, neutrality, the guarantee of classical internal autonomy and a repre­ sentative legislative forum. But neither the Great Powers favouring

11 .D.A.Strudza, Charles I-er. Rai dr Roumanie. Chronique. Actes. Documents, tome 1-er, Bucharest, 1899, p.VI-VIII; Probleme internaționale la N. Iorga, Correspondance diplomatiques roumaine sous le Roi Charles I-er, Deuxieme edition, Bucharest, 1938.

17 the unification, nor Russia accepted the idea of a foreign prince in Bucharest, from a Western great dynasty, as the neighbours were aware that this innovation would create serious international difficul­ ties to some possible direct or diplomatic interventions meant to conduct their interests in Romania and in that region. A Romanian prince in Bucarest could be more easily intimidated or even removed than a prince supported by the Great Powers, Central or West Euro­ pean, who would implicitely defend the specific interests of the Romanian state, internal or foreign, which would be subject to contro­ versies or serious contradictions. In what concerned the unification, after the secret agreement between England and France signed at Osborne, in 1857, made public by the Convention, in August 1858, the guarantor forces made a compromise in the sense that they did not oppose it entirely, but tried’ to postpone it by some restrictive stipulations. The new state was to be called the Uniated Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, that is a sort of union, with a unique army, legislation and justice, with an autonomy effectively and collectively guaranteed by Europe, since it was specified that a direct intervention could not be carried outwithoutthe unanimousand previous approval of all the guarantor forces, a practically impossible thing. ~ The specification in the Convention of the restrictions regard­ ing the election of two princes, the functioning two governments and parliaments was in vain, because in a rapid rythm and in only 3 years, the Romanians, naturally displeased by such restrictions, feeling the help and protection of friends, overpassed them. With their help and approval, they elected a single prince, a single government and parliament in Bucarest. These realities had to be accepted by their enemies too, not being able to act concretely against these successes registered, through Romanians, by the evolution of the strong princi­ ple of the nationalities in Europe. In fact the Romanians, applying the policy of the achieved facts, reasoned correctly and concretely in the true and real sense of the principle of nationalities,interpreted di­ rectly and boldly. According to this principle, the Romanians were right in claiming their inalienable right to shape their own statal and political destiny - respecting their interests and will, not outside Europe, but together with Europe - with whatever best it had, its

18 newest and its more open values regarding the needs of the people - on the agenda referring to the democratization of its political geogra­ phy. The Romanian nation considered all the decisions legally adopted by the ad-hoc Divans in 1857 to be compulsory both for themselves and for other European forces or political organizations, democratic or not. They acted directly or indirectly in the spirit of those demands, denying the internal or external competence directed against them and acting in order to delay or preventing their achievment, to the very end insisting on the fact that only those elected in a democratic way in 1857 and their decisions express the real needs and desires of the Romanian people. In 1859, they spoke out loudly in a full Elective Assembly, so that everybody in and outside the country should hear that, in spite of the obstacles set by some guarantor forces, the unification under a hereditary foreign prince of a great dynasty reigning in Western Europe had been and would always be the most vivid, ardent and general vote of the Romanian nation.12 Consequently, in 1859, Cuza himself knew that both himself, invested with a provisional mandate, and the national party that had elected him were meant to thwart all the obstacles still at work against the achievement of the legal programs of 1857 and to bring in a foreign prince.13 The allied Great Powers helped the Romnaians to recognize the double election, which was not strange to the imperial French diplomacy, silently supporting the actions of the Romanian National Party. In fact, in Paris, the act was interpreted as a diplomatic victory of France over Austria, since the Emperor, Napoleon the IIIrd, through his representatives had supported in an organizeid and open way in international Conferences the union of the Principalites,in 1854-55. The double election was recognized, without any delay by Prussia, Russia, Piemont, England. After Viena was defeated by France and Piemont at Magenta and Solferino in 1859, and the double election was also recognized by Austria, followed by a completely isolated Turkey. The process continued in a natural way with the abolition of

12. D.A. Sturdza op.eit., p.XI-XII. 13. Unirea Prinăpatelor..., București, 1984,pp.114-115.

19 the abnormal functioning of two governments and parliaments and of Cuza’smovingfrom București to Iași and viceversa between the years 1859-1861 and with the meeting of the unique government and parliament in January, 1862. But, after the intervention of Austria and Turkey, which pain­ fully regreted all the previous unionistic achievements, a restriction was introduced mentioning that the governmental and legislative unification was valid only during Cuza’s life time. But the Romanian nation, in agreement with the principle of nationalities and democ­ ratization on this basis of the European political geography and with the cooperation of the friendly powers, created its modern state, that is the Small Romania, then called the Uniated Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia. At that time it dit not need only an ephemeral political nucleus, Hiving only for a life-time, however valuable it might have been. Romania needed a vivid and valid structure, in agreement with the system of the European statal tests, and able to stand on its own feet, to make a choice and have some time to discern from among enemies and friends, to be able - at the right time - to sign efficient diplomatic and military treaties, well-conceived and well- chosen, with a view to further create the Greater Romania. Because of some objective necessities concerning the recon­ struction of the entire Romanian society, part of the social and juridical demands which could not be achieved in 1848, because of the external military intervention such as point 13 in Izlaz Proclama­ tion, the secularization of the properties of monasteries,etc. were further achieved by the worthy Prince of the union, by prime­ minister Kogălniceanu and by all those who supported him, even if a coup d’etat and a strong hand were needed at the beginning. The merits of the Prince of the union have been huge.14 But the radical liberals and others were right to find his limits, to reproach him the persistence in his tendencies of personal government in a Napoleon the IIIrd manner or, together with the conservatives, to vehemently criticize him for the chaotic state of the finances, for loans, for his

14.About Cuza's reign, see, AD.Xenopol, Domnia Ini Cuza Vodă, Iași, 1905; Iorga, N.,a/>.r/7.,vol.IX,pp.344-397; Constantin C. Giurescu, Viața ți Optra lui Cuza Vodă, București, 1970. 20 having failed co pay salaries to the civil servants to the teaching staff or for his having a group of inhabitants of Bucarest shot, in 1865. Many difficulties of this kind were probably unavoidable for any beginning or for any start towards progress and modernization. Great dangers seemed co threaten the frontiers as well for the unfriendly neighbours were brandishing their arms and were hatch­ ing dangerous plots against the Romanian state. Beginning with 1863, Russia suddenly changend its attitude towards the union, identifing its position with Austria’s and Turkey’s. Pretending that the Tsar Alexander the IInd had been ofended by the Government in Bucharest that “ frustrated” its protégés, the monks of Athos of the income from considerable agricultural areas, the Russian government issued a project of a three- partite Russian-Austrian-Turkish military inter­ vention in the Uniated Principalities.'5 But Napoleon the III“* inter­ fered on a determined dilomatic tone, reminding them of the Treaty of 1856, which forbode a power or a group of powers to send troops on to the Romanian territory. The Emperor made it clear that the intrusion of foreign troops meant a “ cassus belli”, a fact that made the neigh bours, for the moment, at least, to forget their intentions behind or even deny that they had ever thbught of such a thing. In fact Russia trained a unit of separatist agent, including the prince of Iași, that was going to be “greateful” to the former protector on the Neva, giving him back the South ofBessarabia (Cahul,Bolgrad, Ismail), if they succeeded in breaking Moldavia from Bucharest. In fact,both the angerend and the hurt since 1863. The Great Power in the East was deeply outraged because in 1856 it had been removed from the Danubian mouths and haf ceased to be a riverain country and was trying to make preparations in order to regain its position by the abolishement of the provision of the Treaty of Paris. The Russian troops were gathered in Northern Bessarabia, on the Prut, while the Turkish divisions were concentrated on the Danube. 100,000 Rus­ sians and Turks were ready to tear into two pieces the gentle body of the modern state, a child who, though no older than 7 years, was extremely dangerous for the great empires, because it meant the 15

15. C. Constantin Giurescu, o/>.«7.,p.205. 21 change of the Romanians’ history into the history of Romania, in a political-statal sense and this history of Small Romania was the toll of a bell, the echo of which was heard by all the Romanians, from the East to the West, in their hopes of becoming free citizens of Greater Romania. But in a Europe in which the unitary national state of the Italians and of the Germans were already created or were about to be created, such a thing was extremely dangerous for the three empires, still owness of Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, the Banat, Maramureș and Crișana. The statesmen of these states looked at the geographical and geo-political configuration of the zone and noticing that the Small Romania, placed right in the middle of their Romanian subjects, in the East, and, in the West, thought of breaking it into two parts, in order to return to the old situation of stifling the ambition of Bucharest and intruding despair and hopelessness into every Romanian soul, awaken by the dignity of its national coscience. In case they wanted another “ guarantor” power i.e. Austria might have been invited to simbolically interfere with troops. The external danger, the plots and concentrations of troops, the open and vehe­ ment diplomatic foreign attacks against the Union and the state, in addition to the internal troubles and uncertainties put the state in a difficult situation. To all these, we should eventually add the public separatist manifestations in Iași with the participation not only of the Jews and Lipovens paid by the Russians but also of the Moldavians inspired by Nicolae Istrati’s writings and led by the metropolitan as an extreme symbol of the misunderstanding of the time, of obtuseness and obscurity. But the Wallachian troup successfully stifled such dangerous manifestations. On the whole a general state of anxiety and fear of a possible re-iteration of the dramatical events of a not very’ remote past, when the foreigners would periodically invade the Romanian land, xcharacterized the period. Under the circumstances, the political diplomatic and military Romanian élite concentrated round the liberals, Brätianu, Rosetti, Prince Ghica and supported by superior officers, starting from the then situation and considering the existing international rapport of forces, came to the simple and useful conclusion, that the country

22 needed a foreign prince from a strong dynasty. He was the only one who could efficiently protect them when the wolves would threaten the house. All by themselves, they were too weak to resist them. That is a foreign prince had to be brought on the throne. Those who acted in this sense had the political, moral and democratic approval, legally formulated by the leaders of the nation in thead-hoc Divans, in 1857. In 1866 they clearly stated that all the decisions of 1857 should be generally applied, in the interest of preserving the statal being, in direct relation to the fulfillment of the fundamental wishes of the whole nation. In this context, one of the major patriotic merits, of Cuza’s, as precious as all the other ones,was that of having understood the essence of things, irrespective of the form used for the salvation of the state and of his having hastened them, under external pressure. In fact, a few moths before, he had made it clear that he was ready to give up the throne, not to be an obstacle against the application of the decisions made in 1857. For this reason, when he was seen off to the frontier, he wished Romania better off that when she was under his rule. His loyal and galant behaviour with his country in the following years proved that Alexandru Ion Cuza was great in his exile just like he had been during the years of the union and of the reforms. Overcoming personal ambitions and feelings, Cuza- although he was called by some electors to come home, as a deputy,- thought only of the stability and consolidation of the state which had to be able to fulfill its historical destiny and which he strongly helped to find its natural way to unity and progress.

23 CAROL I, THE PRINCIPALITY AND THE KINGDOM OF ROMANIA

The secret arrival of Prince Carol on the throne in Bucharest was a peaceful revolution and it meant the application of the long- practiced policy of the fulfilld act which kept saving,once more, the situation of the hard- tried Romanian nation and its young national modern state. Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and of Iosefina de Bade was supported by Prussia and France, two great powers in the Europe of those years. The Prince’s grandmoteron maternal line was French by origin, Stefania de Bade, by mariage, and Napoleon the IK’s adoptive daughter. In the very year of 1866, Prussia and Italy were ready to fight against Austria, to remove it from the German Confed­ eration, so that Berlin could carry out north of the Main the first state of the national unity of the German state, and the italian sute should incorporate Venice. Prince Carol crossed the territory of the Habsburg Empire incognito, because having in view the nervous and extremely tensioned relations betwen Prussia and Austria concerning the out­ break of the war, he might have risked to be executed, in case he had been discovered and arrested. The successful crowning of the Prince in Bucharest, a Prince coming from a dynasty which was much older and stronger than that ofthe Romanovs and much more powerful than that of the Habsburgs, astonished and upset Russia, surprised and irriuted Austria and Turkey, causing them specific fears and concerns. But, in spite of the vehement threats and diplomatic protests, of arms brandishing, of psychological presures, the three great powers were perfectly aware that they had failed to intervene, that they had to accept the accomplished fact, and that these was nothing left for them to do. France and Prussia were still on good terms, Paris, hoping in vain that it would be given compensation accepted to approve of the union of the German state and guaranted Berlin its neutrality in the conflict

24 with Vienna - fact which was accepted by Russia, too. This latter one postponed its desire to regain Southern Bessarabia, as it could not risk a conflict with the French fleet which would have come back to the Black Sea after only 10 years and excluded any possibility of conflict with the Prussian troops. So, Turkey, left alone and isolated again, was helpless and bound to accept the new realities in Bucharest.'6 But the succes of 1866 meant more than the settlement of the contradictory interests in equilibrum of the great powers. It also marked in this East European space - the victory of the principle of nationalities and proved that the achievements already there were irreversible and so, the neighbouring or remote great povers, enem ies or friends had to accept the idea, while some were glad that Small Romania existed, that she lived more than a man‘s life, that she was not perishable or an accidental creation , but one with solid internal structures, well fused together and she entered the geo-political, territoria+rdiplomatic and military reality of the European states for good. From then on, Romania, once saved could sign treaties with other countries even better than before, could choose its partners in order to act in a diplomatic and military way for the fulfillment of its historical destiny. In the same w'ay, the other smaller or greater states were going to discuss with the state governed by a Prince from one of the oldest and strongest European dynasties.The political generation of 1866, which saved its own work, that of the union of the Principali­ ties in 1859, proved to be very scrupulous and minute when correctly applying the procedures and demands of European democracy.Allhough the Romanian leaders,indeed great and realis­ tic, people of conception and action had the undoubtful endorsement

16. About the events in 1866 and the salvation of the Romanian state, see, Paul Henry L 'abdication da prince Casa et l'avènement de la dynastic de Hokenzollern an trine de Ronmattie, Paris, 1930; Iorga ,N.^n/>.oz..vol.X, București 1939, pp.7-36. N. Corivan, Relații diplomatice ale României de la 1859 la 7tf 77,București 1984, p.l 72-207; loan Scurur, Monarhia fn România, 1866-1947, București, 1991, pp.12-15; Carol attended the cadet school in Munster, the anilery and engineer corps school in Berlin attended the courses in French literature at the University of Bonn; Gh.Platon, “1866. începutul révolu (iei pmtni independentă. Ecouri fn presa europeană", in A», last. de 1st. Xenopol, lași, 1984,pp.439-452

25 of the votes and decisions of the deputies legally elected by the nation in 1857 in the political forumus of the ad-hoc Divans, they considered and reflected that almost 10 years had passed since then, reign of the native Prince functioned for a while , with great national and social merits, but also with financial shrotcomings and tendencies of per­ sonal unconstitutional government and here and there anarhical semi- European habits of some Romanian politicians of that time, who had nothing to do with real democracy. After this reasoning, they thought it was necessary to consult once again the nation the crowning of a foreign prince of a great European dynasty .For a second time the action already earned out in the old legal spirit of 1857was approved by Romania’s Parliament and by a Referendum in 1866. The best proof that the Romanian nation did not give up any of the demands formulated in 1857 was that in 1866, by Plebiscit, 685,969 Romanians voted the election of Carol as Romania’s Prince and only 224 were against. Among the 116 deputies of the Parliament, 109 voted for Carol and only 6 abstained.Some of these latter group, wanted a Romanian Prince while others wanted a prince of Latinorigin.1’ Right when the beingand the integrity ofSmall Romania were saved, in the internal and external conditions mentioned above, the Austrians and the Hungarians, worried by the successes registered so far in the application of the principle of nationalities in Europe, forgot the older or more recent conflicts, that had seldom brought them face to face, shook hands, made peace and founded the dualist regime, changing the Habsburg monarchy into Austro-Hungary. The Aus­ trian leaders, who hadalready lost Lombardia, Venice and every place or influence in the German Confederation, and, the Hungarian lead­ ers realized that, in case they did not solve their problem and fought again, the Romanians in the Banat,Crișana, Maramureș,Transylvania and Bucovina would profit of their loss on the battlefields and get unified with those over the Carpathians, in order to made up the Dacian- Romanian Kingdom, which troubled and obsessed them all. Similar phenomena could have happened to the other non

17. DASturdza, Domuia Regelui Carol I. Fapte. Cuvlntări. Documente, tomul I, 1866-1877, București, 1906, p.98, p.214-219.

26 German and non-Hungarian nationalities too, Austro-Hungary was meant to stop the progress of the principle of nationalities, in a large central - Eastern European zone. This could not be achieved without the preservation of the two historical states the frontiers of which were established in the Middle Age by invasions, conquests or dynas­ tic alliances. Andrassy Iulian told Francise Joseph I that, if he wanted to enforce the monarhic principle of the Sf.Stephen’s Crown and give a determined reply to the progress achieved though the principle of nationalities by the union of the Principalities, he had to sanction the union of Transylvania and Hungary. The latter one already legalized by the Hungarian unionistic laws in 1848, had the approving signa­ tures of his predecessor,, Ferdinand, appointed constitutional King of the Hungarians at that time. The crowning of Francis Joseph I, on the 8th of june 1867, as a constitutional Kingof Hungary meant the sanctioning of the centralism of the Hungarian state, national freedom for the Hungarians, submis­ sion and political integration of the non-Hungarians living in Hun­ gary, who had been the majority of the inhabitants. On 2O-th of june they abolised the laws of 1863/1864 wich acknowledged the political nationality and the official language of the Transylvanian Romanians. The Romanians together with their brothers in the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, became mere non-citizens of the Hungarian political nation in their quality of citizens or people of this nation, according to the 1868 law of nationalities, while Transylvania was changed into a land belonging the unitary Hungarian state.1* The Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was very displeased with the crowing of Carol I in Bucha­ rest, first, they suspected the existence of a secret Dacian-Romanian commitee wich was sending its agents to Transylvania in order to prepare an insurrection against Hungary, together with the Romani-

18. About the genesis of the Austro-Hungarian Dualism, in Suciu D.; Antecedentele dualismuluiși rolul lui Ilie Măcelaru ftt mișcarea națională a românilor dm Transilvania (1848-1861) in mss. Idem, “Considerations sur les structures de l’autorité d'Etat pendanta 1848-1867 dans la Monarchie des Habsbourg et la situation politique des nations non Hongroises e non allemandes”, in Nouvelles Eludes d’Histoires, VIII, Publiées a l'occasion du XVII-e Congres International des Sciences Historiques, Madrid, 1990, București, 1990, pp.173-194.

27 ans chère.1’ One of the would-be agents of this commitee, Alexandru Candiano Popescu, officer in the Romanian army, was arrested in Aiud and expelled.2019 Evan the Romanian Academy, wich functioned in Bucharest under the name of Academic Literary Society was suspected of being more concerned with the idea of the creation of Daco-Romania than with literature.21 Andrassy Iuliu had an interest­ ing political career wich wholly approved of the saying: “the masters quarrel, the masters shake hands”. Although he had been sentenced to death in his absence, in 1849, he became minister-president of Hungary, first citizen, loyal servant of his Majesty Cezar Royal Apostolic, in 1867. Then, he threatened the governement in Bucha­ rest and Brätianu, saying that, if Romania continued to support the separatist and “irredentist” manifestations in Transylvania, Austro- Hungary would immediatly carry out the unification of all the Roma­ nians, meaning that Austro-Hungary would attack and incorporate the small Romanian state, extending its borders up to the river Prut, the inferior Danube and the Black Sea. This way, the Romanians over the Carpathians would be together with their Transylvanian brothers in one and the same Hungarian state.22 Other Hungarian politicans did not lose their temper and stated that they were afraid neither of Romania, nor of the Transylvanian Romanian insurrections in Transylvania or of anaction undertaken by both of these forces, as they could easily defeat them. The only thing they were worried about and officia lly confessed it was the possibility that Romania and the Transylvanian Romania ns should benefit of these Daco-Romanian tendencies within the context of a European war, in wh ich Bucharest should be supported by some great powers, enemies of Austro-Hungary's.23

19. Magyar Orszages Levéltar, (M.O.L.), Budapest, Belugyminy szter, K- 150-1867-R-16-2023, f. 13-14X22-25. 20. Ibidem. 21.Idem, loc.cit,K-150-1867-4-2725, f.12. 22. The Central State Library special collections (B.C.S.). Bucharest, Brätianu Fund, L XIII,1 .Ludovic Steege's latter to sent from Vienna on the 12-th February, 1869. 23. M.O.L.;K-150-1867-R-16-2023-f.96-97.

28 Some of them were afraid Bucharest would take advantage of Carol's presence, in order to obtain Berlin's help against Austro- Hungary, in a period when its relations with Vienna were tense and determined by the resentments of 1866. Turkey was alarmed that Prince Carol had hidden Prussian troops in order to attack Austro- Hungary,withaviewtoenlargingRomania'sterritory,addingBucovina and Transylvania. After that, Romania might enter an alliance with Russia and broke any relations with Turkey, starting warof independ­ ence. For the Ottoman Empire it was clear that this Prince coming from a great Christian European dynasty wouldn't agree with being a vassal of the Sultan fora long time. The T urkish diplomats, suspicious and distrustful, supPosed that the total number of Prussian soldiers Carol was going to brink to Romania was about 30.000, some of them having already arrived, disguised in railwaymen. Informed by the Romanian diplomatic agents, D. Sturdza reccomended that Turkey's suspicious should be calmed down, by the concviction that the extension of Romania's territory' to Austro- Hungary's detriment would have been an adventage, if a Turkish - Romanian alliance against Russia had been made. In conclusion, Sturdza tried to illustrate the idea that a strong and greater Romania did not have to be Russia's ally against Turkey. He meant to dissipate the Otoman suspicious and fears.24 It is know that the diplomatic pressures of the Great Powers contributed to the dismissal of the radical-liberal governments in Bucharest, suspected of their intention to spread dissensions in this zone, in order to create Daco-Romania. These pressures contributed to the ascent of some conservative or liberal-moderate governments, wich seemingly presented more guar­ antees concerning the preservation of peace in the area. But they never ceased to silently and discretely act, to help the churches and shcools, the oppressed Romanians living at its Western or Eastern frontières. Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1839-1914) had a good and precious political, cultural and military education, he travelled abroad and studies in France, Spain, Italy, Algeria. He deepened his

24.B.C.S. Biitianu Fund, P.D.1/1

29 military knowledge by practice, during the strategic manouevres undertaken with Prussia's heiring prince, thefuture Emperor Frederik the III-nd and Feldmareshal Moltke as well as during the military campaign in 1864, against Danemark for the liberation of Schleswig and Holstein. In spite of the financial difficulties, Carol constantly took care of the army, of its modern European instruction, equipping it with Krupp cannons and Peabody infantry guns. Together with a valuable group of Romanian officiers and generals, Prince Carol was invested for his competence and skill supreme Commander of the Russian-Romanian army at Plevna. He was the first who broke the OttomandefenceatPlevna.intuitingpromtly and irreversibly Osman's plan to escape from being surrounded and turning Sophia into a second Plevna. The foreign war correspondents admired, while Tsar Alexander the lind,decorated Carol with “TheCrossofSaint Andrew”. The same year Prince Carol was exthroned, the Constitution was voted; it was made up according to the Belgian pattern, a consti­ tutional monarhic regime was established. Only when this constitu­ tion came to be put into practice, could the Romanians understand real democracy and European parliamentarism; they overcame their anarchic and personal tendencies, adjusting to the law, to the Consti­ tution, to the elective principle of government rotation, to the will of the nation. Many leaders were right to say that one statesman or a group of statesmen alway, failed to have a more healthy political instinct than that of the people and that was why the nation had always to be asked for the vote or opinion. The Constitution maintained a healthy and vigurous equilibrum between the Prince, the executive and the legislativ bodies, it also ensured real democratic liberties, the right to asylum, liberty of the press, Courts with jurymen. Even the free manifestation of the few, brawling and not serious Republicans of the time, without any echo in the then Roumanian society was proof to the tolerance and the realy democratic character of the monarhic parliamentary regime in Romania. Carol's reign proved to be essentially an epoch of continuous progress for the contry, in spite of the hardships and hesitations of the beginning. “The marriage” between the Monarch and the nation had also moments of eclipse and tension, well known and understandable

30 until 1871. But the tensions calmed down order and discipline were re-established, because Small Romania needed the cooperation of all the forces in the country, dynasty, army, diplomacy and goverment in order to prepare for the battle for independence. Patience and ability were often needed. The neo-Latin sanguine temperament of the Romanian political leaders to match of the Prince, a sobre, practical and pragmatic Prussian, in order to overcome the disputes about the difficult problems of modernization of the Romania society. Small Romania made small but sure steps forward on the way of reforms in spite of the internal and international economic hardship and disputes; the Romanian Railway were built; roads and bridge were made; taxatin was improved, a good comunal and departamental administration was ensured. The Rural and Urban Landed Credit Bank and the National Bank were fonded. All this achievement were the product of the comon work of the Prince, who become King in 1881, of the governement and of the liberal and the conservative parliaments, of some inventive rich citizen with capital, or, that the cooperation with the foreign capital. The postal services were taken from the Russian, the Austrians and the Greeks and were well man­ aged by the Romanian state. The decimal sistem for currency and weights was enforced and the situasion of the civil servants was essentially improved by a corect system of retribution and retirement. Indirectly, or, rather, corectly, this achievement contributed very much to the rise of the prestige of the state among its own citizen, irrespective of their status, wealth or cu lture. A very hard and extremly difficult field was that of the finances. After Cuza had not managed to coin the national money, Carol disregarded Turkey's claim that the sign of its sovereignity on the Romanian coin should be printed and skilfuly overcame Austro-Hungary's suspicious about the formula “Prince of the Romanians’’, wich seemed “irredentist” toit. In 1867, he issued a bronze coin, and, starting from 1870, a si lver and a gold one, with the moderate formula “Prince of Romania”.2S In this difficult financial situation and the direct comparison to it, one should remember that the Romanian army, supposed to be

25. Georgescu, Vlad, op.cir. București, 1992, pp.138,139.

31 represented at its best by the Palace guard, failed to have prescribed footwear and the buttons; this was a sad, but relevant reality. Noticing the precarious situation of the finances, Carol donated 600,000 franks in 1866, and 133,000, in 1867, from the Civil List. The shortcoming and uncertainties made their way on during Lascar Catargiu's Con­ servative government (1871-1876). By that time, the loans were estimate at 122,000,000 lei, when, every year - out of a budget of 81 million lei - the deficit was 18 millions. But these difficulties were eventuality overcome, when the state budget progressively came to en equilibrum until 1888, although state taxes were reduced by 100 milions for 10 years. All this time, the state borrowed no more than 19 millions. In 1887-1888, the budget was more than 142 millions. The unfavourable trade treaties were changed and other favourable ones were concluded with Russia, England, Switzerland and Germany. At Carol's request, certain international regulations favoring Austro- Hungary were not applied on the Romanian Danube. (1883). The King donated 300,000 franks yearly to cultural institutions, led and helped the Romanian Academy with money from the Civil List and the Crown Estates, created in 1886. He also financed the Geography Society, the restauration of some cathedrals and the publishing of etymological dictionaries of the Romanian language. In the political life, the Monarch became an arbiter between the Liberals and the Conservaties, and, concerning the agricultural relations, until the end of the century, the peasants were given the insufficient i.e. 250,000 ha.26 Not solving the problem of the land reform, the uprising of 1907 was a deficiency not only of the throne, but especially of the partiesand the governments of the time. The landowners were much against their being expropriated; the liberals kept talkingabaout land reform without putting it into practice and while the big Romanian landowners abandoned their lands, renting them to big bussinesmen, who brought the peasant to dispair and povertry. The repression of

26. The general data about Carol I in dr. Andre Bataillard, La Grande Enciclopedii T.X.,Paris,:f.s./,pp.746-747. About the republican opposition in Scurtu, op.cil., p.23-27,37-40,44-45; esențial data in Memoriile Regelui Carol I al României (de nn martor ocular), vol.I-XVII.Bucurețti / f-s /

32 1907 was painful even if the member of the dead was artifcia I ly raised more than 5 times in the last 50 years. During the uprising in 1907, danger of an intervention of the great Powers in order to re-establish peace was almost imminent. Order was re-established by the Liberal Government - together with some Conservatives and the King. The King, as a men of order, didn't allow in the following years that the ministers or officers who proved to be excessively zealous in the repression of the uprising in certain counties to be sued. 27 The Parliament and the Gouvernment issued anti-renting laws for the regiementation of the agricultural problems too late, trying to im­ prove things. But those who largely and concretely learnt something from the bitter lesson of 1907 were the Prince heir Ferdinand, Brätianu-junior and the liberals, as well as some conservatives such as Take lonescu and Nicolae Filipescu. They decided to further act in a determined way, to pass from words to facts and turn not only to the expropriation of the big estates, to serious land reforms for the peasants, but also to implement universal vote. The system of the European collective guarantee, established in the year 1856-1858 was favorable by abolish ing the abusive Russian protectorate and by strengthening the internal autonomy of the state. But, after the year 1870, it hindered the free movement of Small Romania on its way to independence. In spite of the diplomatic efforts made by the Prince and by the Romanian ministers of foreign affairs, they couldn't do away with the sovereignty of the Ottomans, in a peaceful way, and have the independence of the state acknowledged. That was why the alliance with Russia was unavoidable, the way way the ministersof foreign affaires Nicolae lonescu and Dimitrie Brätianu saw it. In fact, for the Prince and the Govenment, Ion Brätianu - Mihail Kogălniceanu, the only way to independence remaned the diplomatic and millitary alliance with Russia against the Porte, due to the resistance of the latter and of some Western Powers wich postponed the apprval of the diplomatic independence. In fact, the Liberalas'fate was strangeand contradictory, some­

27 Sciirtu I.,o/>.oZ,p.44;ihe beneficial role of the Monarhy in Scurcu, Ion Bulei Democrația la rowrfwr. 1866-1938, București.1990,pp.152-185.

33 how. In 1848, they had been removed from power especially by the Russians, but in 1877, they had been bound to become Russia's friends because they had no other choice. Some politicians were displeased with this alliance. They put the blame on Carol, Brătianu and Kogălniceanu, saying that becouse of them and their behaviour, Southern Bessarabia had been lost. But the statesmen in Bucharest, having sensed that Russia and Austro-Hungary had secretely signed a treaty for the recovery of Bessarabia by Petersburg, in exchange for Vienna‘s neutrality, for the transfer of Bosnia and Hertzegovina in the sphere of influence of the dualist monarchy. They insisted very much on the stipulation of the recognition of Romania's state integrity by the Eastern Power, in the treaty signed in 1877. In other words, they did their best in order to avoid the removal of Bessarabia so that Russia should be kept far from the Danubian mouths, to the benefit of Romania and the whole of Europe. Gorceakov, Russia's Chancellor, tried to avoid signing the treaty in order not to frustrate Russia's robbing intention, and not to make any promise to Romania. When the Chancellor met the Roma­ nian Prime-Minister in Crimeea, he contemptously told him that Russia had been fighting against the Ottomans for 100 years on the land of the Principialities wich had always been easily wandered throught, beyond southern Danube, withaut having ever asked the Romanians for their agreement without signing any treaties. Brătianu replied that times had changed, that the Principialities had become a national state having a constitution and a monarhic parliamentary regime, with a Prince from a great European dynasty. The very reason of the existence of the sute and of the Romanian nation could not allow their land to be wandered throught by foreign armies, without the Romanian consent and against their interest. These armies could enter the territory of the Romanian sute only by a treaty signed with its representatives and competent officials. The foreign states had to pledge themselve to respect Romania's integrity and being, with whom they could fruitfully cooperate on these conditions for ceruin mutual objectives. Gorceakov got furious and stated that the Russian would enter Romania by any means, without a treaty and the Romanian's would be

34 crushed if they opposed them. Brätianu answered that, in that case, the Romanians would have to shoot, but Russia would have to give explanation and answer to Europe why it had massacred the first Christians it had met North of the Danube, while it had previously announced all the Continent that it was going to save the Christians South of the river from the Ottoman slaughter. The Russian Chancel­ lor came to the conclusion that he failed to intimidate and was aware that in Bucharest there was a Prince ofHohenzollern and Russia could not ofend Germany by extreme gestures. Russia needed Berlin's neutrality and realized that the Great Empire was bound to make diplomatic treaties with Small Romania. Emissaries were changed between Bucharest and Petersburg and in 1877, the Romanian- Russian Treaty was sealed and signed, one of its essential provisions having been the very7 observation of the integrity of the Romanian state. In conclusion, we cannot state that the Prince, the Prime- MinistecDi the Minister of Foreign Affaire were to blame for the loss of Southern Bessarabia. They could not knew or guess that Russia would change its mind, would deny its own signature, invoking various pretexts, in 1878. Russian diplomacy acted wisely and inven­ tively, in 1877, saying thaï it would respect Romania's integrity against a possible third force, not against itself. The great ally ac­ cepted the Romanian delegates neither at the concluding of the arnmisticc nor at the Peace Treaty of San Stephano. It arrogated the right to represent Romania at San Stephano, were from it telegraphed its Jitie ally the terms of the Treaty. Russia took Dobrudja, the Danube Delta, The Serpents'Islc for itself, offering them to Roma­ nia, in exchange for Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail. It was easy for the Great Eastern Power to make trade with Romanian territories and souls, but this was not the case with the Prince, the government and the parliament in Bucharest. They claimed that Dobrudja, ancient territory where the Romanian language and people had been formed should be given right to Romania. Their reasons w7as not only the historical fact, but also the true and fresh reality of the human and material sacrifices made by the country in order to get a victory7 over the Ottoman Empire.

35 The responsable factors in Bucharest, the Throne, the Government, the Parliament protested energically and officially against Russia's pretence over Southern Bessarabia and against Petersbur's having infringed the Romanian-Russian Treaty of 1877. A vehement political and diplomatic dispute was raised between Bucharest and Peterburg. The Tsar felt obliged, from a “moral” point of view to give Cahul, Ismail and Bolgrad back to Russia and its army, becouse Suvorov had won the brilliant victories over the Ottomans, there, in the XVIH,h century. But the Romanians logically retorted that the Russians had defeated Napoleon I as well and had entered Paris in 1814-1815, but these victories gave them no right to annex the whole of Europe or the territories crossed by their army. The Russian made the Romanian ungrateful, remaindes them that they had fre­ quently defeated the T urks and without them, they would have never come to be independent and regain Dobrudja. But also this time Bucharest replied that in every anti-Ottoman war so manytimes before, the Romanians had formed troops of volunteers, had fought and died together with the Russian, had contributed with work and food to the upkeep of the material needs of theirarmies. That was why did not have to be separated into two parts once again by the great Eastern ally. The Russian armies did not w'ant to withdraw from the Roma­ nian territory, in order to keep in touch with the Bulgarian armies, so, for all these reasons, the Romanian-Russian relations deteriorated. Alexander the IInd threatened that if Bucharest did not quiet down the Romanian army would be disarmed. The Romanian diplomacy an­ swered to this threat reminding him of Carol's competence and of tlte boldness proved by the Romanian army at Plevna. It warned the Tsar that such an army could be defeated in an unequal war, but not desarmed. In spite of the efforts made by competent officials in Bucharest, Russia did not give up the idea of becoming a riverain country at the Danube, and once again. That was why it intended neither to respect its Treaty with Romania in 1877, nor the one with Austro-Hungary whom it tried to cheat and deprive of Bosnia and Hertzegovina. Such a situation drew Romania closer to Austro-Hun­ gary on the external level, in spite of the difference between the two

36 of them, because of the difficult political situation of the Romanians in Transylvania and Bucovina. In this case, Romania's geopolitical situation made it try to crush and somehow remove the iminent and imediate danger in the East, by drawing closer to the great power in the West. Germany had no interest to spoil its relations with Russia and keep it away from the Danube, because of Carol and Romania, neither could it accept to see it occupied by Alexander the II-nd‘s troops. Berlin needed its neutrality, in case of a possible new war with France. But Berlin, quickly forgetting the conflict with Vienna, that became its ally, secretly supported Austro-Hungary's interests in the Balkans, i.e. export capital itself and impose its economic interests and political influence in the area. On the other hand, England threatened with war, in case the supremacy of the Russians had been maintained in the Balkans. Consequently, under the diplomatic pressure of the Great Powers, the Treaty of San Stephano, was revised in Berlin. Romania had obtained from Europe the withdrawal of the Russian armies from its territories and the avoidance of an unequal milli tary conflict. But in Berlin the great lions took,each of them, their share: Austro-Hungary, Bosnia and Hertzegovina; England, Ciprus, and Russia, Southern Bessarabia. So, Bucharest lost its cause, in this matter. Brătianu's and Kogălniceanu's speeches about morals, about honesty in interpreting the letter of the treaties, about the gratutide they owed the Romanians who had died to defend the Christian interests and civilisation were in wain. The messengers from Bucha­ rest, even if they were not thrown out the Western capitals, Bismarch extended his hand and wanted to prove a certain concern and consid­ eration for the Prime-Minister and h is minister of foreign affaires. But Carol's envoys were cynically advised togetcured of their longing for Southern Bessarabia, to accept the real situasion and to be sure that great political was never made with ingredients such as morals and feeling, but, according to interests. Brătianu curtly replied that, in that case nations would lose their faith in the dipiomancy of the Great Powersand would look for other methods to defend orwin their rights. In fact, the dignified attitude proved by Carol, by his Government and Parliament on the internal and international levels in the course of the

37 year 1878 demonstrated that Romania was bound to give up Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail not deliberately, but humiliated, frieghtened and forced by the others.28 But even in this situation, the little Romania state did not close the matter. On the contrary, it let the future decide the mending of tjie injustice made in Berlin. That is way should consider superficial and even crasy and blame invented by dreaming and nostalgic politiciansabout Romania'sgreat men in the years 1877- 1878. The result was,, is and will be the objective measure that certifies the opportunity and justice of any political, diplomatic, military action. Summa summarum, Romania gained more than it lost: it obtained its state independence ,Dobrudja, the Delta, acces to the Blach See, the “lungs” thorugh with it further opened towards the world. After Romania had carried out the internal and international obligations mentioned in the Treatry of Berlin, in 1878 Austro- Hungary, Turkey, Russia, in 1879, Italy, in 1880, France, England, Germany recognized it as a free and independent state. This allowed Romania to become a Kingdom, and Carol the I-st was proclamied King, in 1881. Volunteers from Transylvania and Bucovina came to fight in teh war for independence and Romanian ladies thorroughly helped Romania’s orphans and the wounded. Many telegrams of the Transylvanian national leaders ended with such good wishes as: “All the best from God to us those at Plevna” or, “God with us and with those at Plevna”. The Romanian ladies in Transylvanian proudly and ostentiouslv wore the Elisabeth Crosses offered by the Prince Carol and the Princess, while their portraits were preseni in many Romanian houses in Transylvania. The oppressed Romanian living there strength­ ened their conviction that in the future, after the Turkish Plevna, the Hungarian and the Austrian Plevnas would follow. Even the old peasants in Transylvania said that they were waiting for the little

28. Subs tan lia I da ta about 1877-1878, ini. I.C.Brătianu, Războiul neatimăn,1877- 1878 București,1927,pp.7.3-112; George I. Brätianu Le problème des frontières russo- roumaines pendant la guerre de 1877-1878 et au Congres de Berlin, București, 1928; Iorga. op.»/.,vol X, pp.177-230; Idem, Războiul pentru Independența României, București, 1927; D. Berindei, Cucerirea Independenței României, București, 1967,about the foreign policy, see N. Iorga, Politica externa a regelui Carol I, București. 1923. 38 Prince from the East, an obvious hint at Carol. The independence war strenghtened the solidarity of the oppressed Romanians with the small Romanian state, independent from then on, stimulated their hopes for a better future for political state unity.29 A Romanian lawyer from Cluj wrote an extremely interesting political correspondence in 1878. He stated that the responsability of the statemen in Bucharest was huge, because both the fate of the Romanian modern state and that of all Romanians depended on their decisions. Their fundamental task was to preserve the being of Small Romania, to protect it from Russia’s furious blows. This fact could have fatally wounded the whole nation for without Small Romaina there could have never been Greater Romania. The jurist, Ladislau Vaida, recommended the Prince, the ministers, and the members of the Parliament to stifle their feelings and pains, and make the painful concession required by the Russian, for the moment, in order to preserve the being and security of the state for the future, requiring appropiate com presationinexchange for Southern Bessarabia.30Other Transylvania Romanian comentators, noticing the dignified behav­ iour of the Romanian statesmenand compaing it to the dishonesty and greed of some great limitrophe powers, stated that, from a moral point of view, the tear 1878 strengthened the small, humiliated, weak ones and humiliated the powerful and greedy ones, continually longing for annexation of territories. The statesmen inBucharest, suchastheBratianu,TakeIonescu, D.A.Sturdza, Nicolae Filipescu, etc., either liberal or conservative, were aware that the security and the integrity r C J.c small Romanian state was their fundamental task. They were convinced that without it the national destiny of their brothers in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania could not be saved. In order to preserve the being and the liberty of the state, King Carol and Ion Brătianu signed thesecred

29. About the relation between the oppressed Romanians and the independent ones in these yars see L.Maior Transylvania y războiul de independență 1811-1818, Cluj- Napoca,1977; Nicolae Iorga, op.cit.189-192; George Barițiu fi contemporanii săi, vol.V. București, 1981 ,p.248-258,Stefan Pascu, Făurirea statuluinaționalromân unitar, București, 1983 pp.186-205. 30. The library of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romanian Manu­ scripts (mss.rom.) 1007, f.188-198.

39 defensive alliance with Austro-Hungary and Germany against Russia, in 1883. Althrough the Treaty was secret, there were accuisations that the leaders in Bucharest fo betrayed the interests of the Romanians in Trasylvania and Bucovina. But, in this case, there was no “treason”, this was only an additional safety margin for the state, against the Russian danger. In 1883, senator Petre Grădișteanu stated, in his famous speech delivered in Iași, that, at the crowning ceremony of Carol I-st as his crown some pearls missed to be present: Transylvania, Bucovina and Bessarabia - and he explained that the future task of the Dynasty, of the King, of his offspring, of the whole nation was that of including them into the Kingdom. His political speech expressed the golden dream ofall Romanians. But his hope mede public by an official person, terribly infuriated Austro- Hungary and Russia, which concentrated troops at the borders in order to invade Romania and put an end to its “irredentism” as they called it. Under the circumstances, Carol and Brătianu, who officialy denied that the Government and the Romanian army had meant to attack the state integrity of the two lim itrophe grea t powers, negotiated with Berlin and Vienna in order to protect itself from Russia. In exchange for the protection offered by Germany and Austro-Hungary the Hungarian statesmen asked Romania to abstain from getting involved in the internal affairsof the Hungarian state, a fact which had been avoided with much ability by the responsabile factors in Bucha­ rest. By the treaty, Carol and Brătianu suddenly separated Austro- Hungary from Russia, in 1883, and, their intention to enter Romania with their armies, also putting them in opposition with each other in this matter. They eventually considered that the improvement of the political situation of the Romanians in Transylvania in Bucovina was even more necessary than ever, having in view Romania’s friendship with two great powers. Carol I and Brătianu frequently intervened with the German and Austrian Governments in Berlin and Vienna asking them to put pressure on the Hungarian Government to give larger political rights to its “Hungarian citizens with Wallachian lips” i.e. to the Transylvanian Romanians and in order to make it give up their plans Magyarize or persecuted them. The Hungarian ministers

40 did not only refuse mediations, but also got angry; they objected to their Austrian and German partners that they were cheated and had offered a sort of “carte blanche” to Bucharest in order to interfere insistently and obstinately in Austro-Hungary’s internal affairs.31 32 In conclusion, Romania abandoned neither its Western conationals, not its Eastern ones. It offered them a hospitable asylum and gave citizenship to those persecuted by the Hungarians or by the Russians. The Liberal or Conservative gov ernments, the Parliament, the Romanian Academy sent considerable help in money and books to Astra both before and after 1883, to the united and orthodox elementary confessional shcools and highschools not forgetting the valuable school centre in Brașov. They had very close relations with it since sometimes students from Romania happened to learn there, in the trade and crafts schools.32 The Office of the State Printing House in Bucharest sent book for the schools in Brasov, Blaj, Näsäud,

31. The explanation of the Grădiștianu “Incident" but especially of the comentând essence of Romanians foreign policy in 1883. in Nicolae Iorga op.cil., vol.X, p.235-237; Gheorghe 1. Brătianu. Origines el formation de l'unitf roumaine, Bucharest, 1943,pp.256-257 32. Beginning with 1868, the Conseil of the Romanian Schools was given subsidies be the liberals and the conservatives in the governements in Bucharest including 2000 gold coins every year, in order to pay the teachers in the comercial school. The Consil cunted rather on the Romanian state since the support of the Hungarian Government by the Ministry of Education and Cult in Budapest was little and the Romanians jn Transylvania had already spent 1.500.000 florins, building more than 800 schools, re-building the churches that had been destroyded or plundered by the Hungarians, in 1848-1849, or creating literary associations etc. In addition to this, in Brașov, where 700 schoolboys front Transylvania and some from Romania; the real and commercial schools, had to subsidized to produce a middle class of specialists traders, handicrafts and for the whole Romanian society, according to the needs of the time, see Mss.rom., nr.975, f. 349-354. As a whole, not only for arts and trades. Brașov was given 36,400 lei by the Romanian state in 1868,4,000 florins each year by the Hungarian sute, 635 and 400 florins by the Jugaian Foundation and the Union of the Romanian Women 1100 by the Municipal Funds House of the town, and 1200 florins by the Funds of the rich students see Mss. rom.,nr.987.f.33.. The sums from Bucharest, 23,500 lei then increassed were voted by the Parliament, were promulgated by the Royal Decree nr. 1083 on the 2-nd of July counter-signed by V. A. Urechia, the Head of the School Division of the Teaching Office see MDB rom.;nr.987, f.30. Accordin to Gheorghe Sion, the Romanian Academy sent sums approvred of by the Parliament to the school in Transylvania see Mss.rom.,nr.l 006X163. In 1885 from Craiova, money was send for the romanian school in the Cluj area “for buc. and clothes for the poor children, in order to take them out of the schools of the Hungarian state" see Barili contemporanii saivoX.lN p.fsl. 41 Brad 33 etc. In Romania, national societies such as the “Carpathians” celebrated in 1884 together with the brothers in Transylvania the 100th anniversary of the Uprising of Horia, Cloșca and Crișan. But sometimes the Government in Bucharest, under external pressures was bound to expel certain noisy, restless and impatient Transylvanian Romanians, who printed and delivered “Dacian-Romanian” mani­ festos, who organized nationalistic street demonstrations, under the nose of foreign diplomats, agents and spies.34 The Romanian Government had no choice, it was bound to give in under the Austrian-Hungarian threats and pressures. This was also atribute payed to our friends abroad beingas coutious as possible, in order to ensure the state against the nervous, huge waves stirred by the Great Powers which could easily crush Romania. The Romanian opposition did certainly take advantage of these circumstances in order to expose and strike the “traitors”. But, it rather tried towin as many votes as possible and to sooner or later come to power. But there was a great difference between the ruling statesman, who had an extremely difficult position, he was responsible for both internal and *

33. In 1869, there were sent 1056 copies, 15 of each boock of Aritmctics, History.Geografy the Bibliografy of the Romanian Books (Iarcu); A.B.C. books, the Constitution and the elecioral laws of Romania etc. Delivery of the books was confirmed by the general Vicar Ioan Anderen w ho distributed them between Gherla and Năsâud.by 1. V.Russu in , where 68 books in 408 copies arrived, by the priest Nicolae Raicu and by the headmaster of the Council of the United School in Ohaba Făgărașului of who recived 26 books. Other 37 were confirmed by I. Germani, Codru Dragușeanu, Teofil Frîncu on behalf of the Library of the District Library; the Orthodox school in the same town received Z1 books. The priest Ioan Comsa, non united, in Zarneyti. received juridical and didactic books on from the printing House of the Romanian Pricipalities, sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, see Mss.rom.,;nr.987,f.69-96. But the Hungarian authorities supposed that from Romanian, they did not send only officially allowed books, and that across the Carpathians hidden paths weapons were also sent for the Romanians in Transylvania. So in 1881, “A Romanian in Covasna", informed Barifiu that the Hungarian soldiers broke and desecrated the Romanian churches in the region inhabited by the Szecklers, serching for the weapons sent from Romania and hidden there. The correspondent asked Baripu to fight such parctices in press. He also urged hint to publicy stigmaitze the Romanian priest Niagovici Alesa, who donated 15 florin for Gabor Aron’s grave, the murderred of the Romanians in 1848, but would give nothing for Mureșanu's monument. The correspondent appologizcd for not having given his name, since, if the Szecklers had found out chat he offerend such information to the Romanian press, he would have been punished - like others who had done the same in Covasna. see Mss.rom.nr.1009, f532-533. 34. St. Pascu., op o/.,pp.210-216, Barițți contemporanii săi, vol.VI, p.62-67.

42 external problems and the politician in the opposition, whose position was an easier one, who could freely, speak out his views in open and radical terms. In fact, the Romania state and nation on the whole, including the people in the Principalities and later on in the Kingdom of Romania, those in the oppresed territories had much to win. In reality these contradictory positions happily mixed the caution neces­ sary to preserve the state and the conscience to fight for the future more favourable moments and conditions in order to later aclieve the complete political unity. The almost tragic or at least dramatic dilemma the political personalities in the government and in the opposition had passed through or had been put through was best expressed by the almost classical example of D.A. Sturdza. Nobody had ever expressed more clearly the unity of fate of the oppressed Romanians and of the free Romanian in the small Romanian Kingdom than this liberal leader. Being in the opposition, he openly stated that, if death came for the three milion Romanians in Austro-Hungary, the same would happen to the ones in Romania, a feeling shared by all the citizens in the free state, in fact. D.A.Sturdza immediately stressed that the Romanians in Austro-Hungary were also convinced that the suppression of the Kingdom also meant their disappearance. But the Hungarian whom the bishop Alexandru Sterca Suluçiu had characterized as having “a better memory than the German” - had neither forgotten nor forgiven anything. When Sturdza became prime-minister, they neither threat­ ened and forced him to make mea culpa, to declare that Romania would not support the national cause in Transylvania and'would not get involved in Austro-Hungary’s internal affairs. Besides, the Gov­ ernment in Budapest, according to the law of 1875, which forbade the churches, the confessional schools, the cultural corporations and associations in Hungary to accept any assistance from foreign mon­ archs and states, not to spoil the prestige of the Hungarian state iS, forced Sturdza to turn down the funds for the Romanian school ip Brașov?6 3536

35. The State Archives Alba-Iulia, Fund of the Greek Catholic Superior Gymnasium in Blaj, file 122/1874-1875,f.l.see, Ibidem, file 136/1874-1875,f.l. 36. About this incident as well as about its being settled by the conservative Take Ionescu who secretely met Ion Mețianu at Zărnești, in 1900, and eventually 43 Although on good terms with Austro-Hungary and Germany concerning the anti-Russian foreign policy, Carol was sincerely and deeply hurt by the attitude of the government in Budapest, concern­ ing the fate fo the Romanians in Transylvania. He was of the opinion that consistently brought about natural pain and indignation to the citizens of the Kingdom, irrespective of their political colour. That was why the King was no friend of the Hungarian Government and of the Apostolic King of Hungary - who legally were Saint Stephen’s Crown, from a dynastic and historic point of view, as well as according to the Hungarian construction. Carol stated that he was friendly only with the Austrian Emperor. Asked by Slavici if he would go to Hungary to greet its Habsburg King, Carol replied that he did not know or acknowlege any King of Hungary, but he would visit the Austrian Emperor at Vienna, Graz or Prague, any time. In fact, the King had a keen sense of justice. He was sure that Transylvania will finaly be united to Romania, since justice had to prevail until the end, no matter how many obstacles would the enemies place on its way to freedom. The King was very understand­ ing and considerate with the Romania leaders in Transylvania; he listened for instance to Theodor Mihali and confered with him 22 times in 15 years. The regal jubilee in 1906 was a wonderful opportu­ nity to celebrate, in Bucharest, the desire of all the Romanians to get united into a single state. This desire was artistically invoked by the choirs of the Banal, Transylvania, Bucovina and magnificently sug­ gested by the great historian Nicolae Iorga as “floating in the air and calling the future to carry it out”.37 But the Romania’sgeo-political situation, theequilibrum forces on the international level required the necessary caution for the preservation of the state in this troubled East European so space, managed to getSzel’s consentfor the Romanian state to depositstate money for 99 years in a bank in Budapest, for the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan Church in Sibiu for its schools in Brașov, see I. Russu Abrudeanu, Român iași Războiul Mondial, București 1921 pp.65-69. Later even if it was for the aliance with the Central Powers against Russia, in case of war, the conservative , minister of Internal Affairs, gave Theodor Mihaili 200,000 lei in 1913 in order to support the interess of the Romanias in Transylvania , see Anastase Iordache, Viața Politică în România. 1910-1914 București, 1972, p.301. 37.1. Scurtu, op.cit., pp.47-49

44 These realities forced Carol to deal with the Great Powers trying get closer to some of them, in order to maintain the equilibrum of the Kingdom, keeping the paradigm of a certain necessary behaviour in the diplomatic and political problems and the supreme hope in the hypothetical moment of the mavoidable victory’ of justice. In spite of the Treaty of 1883, the King avoided to enter directly and for good one block or another. He was not only fieldmarshal in the German army, but he also accepted to be a marshal in the Russian one, in order to maintain and equidistant position and upset nobody. The old King, irrespective of his personal feelings towards Budapest’s atttitude, was bound to decorate some Hungarian magistrates in order to obtain amnesty for the Romanian leaders in Transylvania and promises for some change in the treatment of the Romanians there. Carol I often tried to prove Vienna and Berlin, that if he was courteous with Budapest, the later was also morally bound to be understanding with Romania or with the Romanians within the Hungarian state. Carol pressed Berlin and Berlin pressed Budapest to start négociations with the Hungarian government and with certain Roma­ nian leaders in Transylvania, in order to revise harmful laws to their national being, such as the famous Apponyi electoral laws etc. But because of the important position held by the chauvinist Hungarian parties in Hungary’s political life, the négociations ended with no result. Cautiously, the King often stated that he and the governments in Bucharest were not irredentist. Sometimes, however, because of the very fact that all his efforts to obtain the relief of the political status of the Romanians in the Western ethnical space failed, Carol lost his temper of a disciplined, orderly German, faithful to treaties. He committed certain indiscretions, for instance when he nervously stated inTake Ionescu’s presence thatAustro-Hungary hadno reason to think of itself as external and to shout that the people in Bucharest would never see i it torn into pieces. Take Ionescu, the leader of the democratic-conservatives and a great patriot also proved to be undisciplined and indiscrete. De­ lighted by the king’s words Take Ionescu repeated them in the foreign diplomatic groups in Bucharest. His words spread quickly and created diplomatic difficulties. After futher pressures, Carol was

45 forced to better watch his words and to specify in front of foreign friends, that things were not imminent, but was enough time for them to work that way. The King repeated for the enemies the stereotype sentences about the lack of irredentism in Romania. Even if he met Francise Joseph I, at Ischl, King Carol repeated in other political and diplomatic contexts, that the Romanian Kingdom could not tolerate Hungary’s forceful general of the Romanians living on its territory, after it had managed to declare its absolute independence and get only in a personal union with Austria. These fluctuations, easy to explain only by the paramétrés of Romania’s hard geo-political situation, proved that the responsible factors, first and foremost the King, were most of the times bound to be contious. Other times however, they went beyond expectations and proved spirit of justice and faith in the victory of their cause. In fact, the realistic German and Austro-Hungarian diplomats sensed that in case a German-French war was to break out the Romanians would join Paris, and that starting with the King. They all longed for the territories in Austro-Hungary with Romanian ethnic majority.38 But the public opinion in Romania either did not know the essence of the complicated international situation or did not want to know it. It was impatient and nervous and did not accept the political games of their leaders, however understanding and wise they were, or seemed to be. Public opinion did not forgive them and did not forget the Prime-Minister D.A.Sturdza for that “mea culpa” in public, in front of Austro-Hungary, at Iași, in 1895. In the same hall, some years before Petre Grădișteanu’s dignified words and calls could be heard. But the Senator, although he had also been threatened, had not withdrawn any stated word. On the contrary, Grădișteanu went on saying that Transylvania would get united with Romania by any means, that this only daughter would marry the future Romanian perfect of . This statement created further diplomatic difficulties, especially because Grădișteanu became the President of the Cultural League. King Carol often excused him in front of the Austro-Hungarian diplomats, saying that Grădișteanu used to talk

38. Nicolae Iorga, Subi trei Regi, București. 1932,pp.54-64 46 that way t after some glasses of wine. Under the steady pressure of the public opinion, in 1899, A.D.Sturdza was forced to withdraw and make room for the Conservative George Gr. Cantacuzino. Under his patronage, négociations were started with the Hungarian Cabinet for the assistance of the Transylvanian Romanians. The Szel Cabinet reluctantly accepted that the Romanian Government deposit a Ro­ manian state rent for 99 years, in a bank in Budapest. The Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan Chruch in Sibiu was going to withdraw the money necessary to support the school complex in Brașov. The evolution of the négociations was facilitated by the secret meetings in Zărnești between the Orthodox Metropolitan Ioan Mețianu and the great statesman, Take Ionescu, who came from Romania. The solu­ tion found by the two of them was reluctantly accepted by Szel, as a result of their determined insistance and under the pressure of Ioan Meçianu’s dignified and determined attitude.39 However justified and useful, in its defferent stages, the for­ eign policy inaugurated in 1883 was, after only 4 years, a Romanian discrete and modest political thinker, supposed to be Scarlat Rosetti, openly stated that Romania would inevitably have to fight against Austro-Hungary and its allies. Only after the fallow this empire could there be some hope for the union of the territories inhabited by Romanian ethnic majorities, and that was not possible without on alliance with Russia and other great powers. The author hoped that a friendly Russia would change its attitude towards Bucharest, would ment the past injustice and would offer the whole of Bessarabia to its natural owner, to Romania. So Rosetti foresaw the possibility of the union of all the Romanians in one and the same national state, which, according to the then statistics, was to include more than 10 milion citizens. This interesting and realistic visionary man, foresaw in 1887, that the time would come to chalenge the offensive coalition made by Germany and Austro-Hungary which kept trying to ceaselessly spoil the peace and equilibrum of the European continent - and not before long - for all the neo-Latin and Slavic states, as well as for the oppressed co­

39.See note 36

47 nationals outside their borders and they will find their real and useful place in a general anti-German-Austrian-Hungarian alliance. This alliance was going to save their existence and interests, and, at the same time, European civilizatrion and democracy40. In fact, Rosetti expressed and sinthesized the paradigm of the process of formation of the national unitary’ Romanian state. The small Kingdom of Romania, geographically situated at cross roads was the hope, the nucleus and the centre of the oppresed inhabitants in Bucovina and Bessarabia - who were in danger to be Germanized and Russianized and in the West, while in Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana they were threatened to be Magyarized. In this context, the critical situations in the oppressed prov­ inces, chenched in foreign states hostile to the Romania element constituted micro-climates for the Romanians who were gravitating round the free state, that had a Dynasty, a government, an army and diplomacy and could really act in order to save them all. These forums and levers that were well-shaped, officially, implemented in the international political life, helped from aove the action of resistance of the Orthodox Romanians in Bessarabia, oppressed by the Orthodox but intolerant and chauvinistic Russian church, of the Orthodox Romanians in Bucovina, banished by the German Catholicism and of the Orthodox and Greek - Catolic inhabitants in Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana and Maramureș, troubled and unsafe, afraid of the Catholic, Reformed and Unitarian Hungarianism. In the XIXthcen­ tury until 1918, nationalism incorporated the confessional and the most resistent, strong and ultimate piece of resistance of the national element was made up of the synthesis represented by the Dynasty, the Army, the Government and diplomacy of Small Romanian King­ dom. It became obvious and more than certain that the Orthodox and Uniated Romanians in Transylvania had no chances to get free - from a national point of view - without Romania. Practically, for instance, Iuliu Maniu, Iuliu Hossu, Vasile Lucaciu and all their generation of wonderful Greek-Catholic and Romanians, the former, a layman, the latter prelates, came to beaware that they couldnotgetridof Hungary

40. Rusu-Abrudeanu, op.cit., pp.55-56. The booklet although of 28 pages only, included the essential. 48 and the Hungarians without the help of “the Romanians over the Charpatians” This wasclearly expressed by Vasile Lucaciu, a Uniated Protopope, called the “lion of Sinești”, before the Hungarian magis­ trates - whom he had assured, in 1891, that he would still become a Senator in Bucharest, in spite of the sentenced pronounced against him. This meant that he strongly believed in Transylvania’s union with the Romanian Kingdom. In the XVIIIth century and in the first half of the XIXth century, Blaj certainly had an important cultural and ideological role in the formation of the militant and deep Romanian national modern con­ science and in the political opposition against the Hungarian domina­ tion. Nobody has ever expressed this reality more profoundly than the Orthodox Eminescu, who called Blaj, the centre of the Romanian Greek-Catholicism, the little Rome of all the Romanians. In this historical period, the Metropolitan Church and, starting from 1853, the Uniated Romanian Metropolitan church of Alba-Iulia, the Metro­ politan church of Oradea, the most recent ones in Gherla and Lugoj, the richest and with Western traditions and disciplinen in work, had a staff of superior and inferior prelates, extremely cultivated and valuable, educatedat the theological University in Blaj. Knowallover Europe, the best of them having pursued their studies in Vienna and Rome as well the Romanian Greek-Catholic gymnasium in Blaj, and later those of Beiuș, Năsăud, the Uniated Preparanda supplied the Romanian nation with valuable young men, every year. Some of them had attented higher education in Hungarian and Germany Law schools, and became competent national leaders of the Romanian political movement; from the church have been recruited bishop to fight on national ground. Such lis Inochentie Micu Klein, Ignatie Darabant, Alexandru StercaȘuluțiu and other clergymentand especially the glorious pleiade of the Transylvanian School, the creator of the Enlightenment national ideology of all the Romanians. In this historical epoch, the in Transylvania used to be poor, oppresed, hunted down, left without bishops for decades on end, hardly managed to survive until the end of the XVIIIth century. It was often helped to resist the Catholic

49 prozelitism by the powerful and influent Serbian Patriarchy in Novisad. These realities explain why the Orthodox clergyman was more mod­ est and less cultivated than the united one or why Orthodox Church, ina certain historical period could not educate and endow the national movement with as many and as valuable people as the other churches. Still, it also had great and precious gifted men, such as Radu Tempea, Dimitrie Eustatievici, Damaschin Bojinca and even Eftimie Murgu, in the first period of his activity. But, no mather how valuable were the diet or petitionary struggle of the Uniated bishop Micu, the first modern militant for the rights of his nation, or, the fight about the Supplex, in 1791, they failed to be more than more political opposition movement, without carry­ ing out their program to destroy the monopoly of the privileged. These ones were recruited from the ethnical minorities of the Great Principality of Transylvania, they did not obtain the legal proclama­ tion of the Romanian nation as the fourth political nation, proportion­ ally represented in the Diet, in the Government, in the Chancery in the districts, in official positions etc. This failure drew the Uniated Romanian even closer to the Orthodox one, because, irrespective of the nature of their religion they had all been terribly oppresed and depsed, turned into a political paria by the system 3+4 of the political “nations” - the Hungarians, the Saxons, the Seckiers and of the Roman-Catholic, Calvinist, Unitarian, Lutheran religious. In 1791 the Orthodox bishop were offered positions in the Diet, the same vay the Greek-Catholic noblemen were permitted to become deputies in 1744. But the sad result of the years 1791-1792 only reiterrated another great disatisfaction and blow the Romanians were given, namely the fact the Diploma of 1701 was not put into practice, an act which legally offered the Uniated Romanian clergy and laymen the same civil rights as those of their counterparts in social position in the system 3+4. The adoptation and application of the Diploma by the Great Principality of Transylvania would have meant the creation of the first breach in the monopoly of the local state power, structured on the basis of the system 3 + 4. At the end of the century, during the Enlightenment and the enlighted despotism, tolerant with all the

50 churches, this breach would have had a benefic impacton theOrtodox brothers, Eț.ut the Hungarian barons, counts and other Hungarian noblemen in the XVIIId> century had enough power and influence in the Habsburg monarchy, exactly like the Hungarian national parties - led by their descendants in the first hall of the XIXlh century- to avoid the crush of their local political monopoly.In both periods the failure of the just process to turn Transylvania into a democratic romaniancountry altohugh the Romanian leaders badly wanteditand meant to respect the intersts and rights of the national minorities. The noblemen manged to maintain the Great Principality of Transylvania as a Hungarian nobiliary- state, annihilating every Romanian political progress. The Habsburgs, who were also Kings of Hungary and great princes of Transylvania, had sometimes conflicts with the Hungarian noblemen during the periods of tension and struggles, but finally came to reconcilialed, making compromises. In other words, the masters quarelled, but finally came to terms and mutually defended their weakness, their interests, keeping in their hands the levers of the centralized and local state power. That is, the throne was interested in preserving the nobiliary Hungarian states, Hungary and Transylvania, linked in a personal union under its sceptre. The very feudal Hungarianconstitutions, starting with the vote of the nobiliar,’ Diet of Pojon, in 1526, up to the Lepoldin Diploma, in 1691, the Pragmatic Sanctions of 1722 and 1723, the laws of 1741, 1744,1-791, were the “legal” historical feudal basis of the continuity of the principle of the monarchic legitimity of Sf.Stephen’s Crown. This was worn by the Habsburgs and ensured both the interests of the throne and those of the nobility and aristocracy , which maintained and preserved their power and competence in the Diets, in the chancery, in the Supreme Court of justice, in the legal Tables etc. Practically speaking, in spite of the differences between them, both the Habsburg Dinasty and the Hungarian nobility solved their conflicts and problems by arrguments made in such a way that they shou Id never come to fight and endanger their rule over the territories and the people in Hungary7 and the autonomous territory of the Crown

51 which was the Great Principality of Transylvania.Even in this field, the throne and the nobility acted in the spirit of the monarchical legitimity of the St.Stephen’sCrownand stipulated that the Habsburgs owned Transylvania and were “legally ”Great PrincesofTransylvania, in their quality of legitimate Kings of Hungary7, which meant they were given the crown and made an oath on the inaugural diploma, on the constitution and its laws.4' That was why,the breaking of the political monopoly of the system 3 + 4 and the proclamation of the romanian nation as at least the fourth political nation, were not possible, in the XVIIIth century and in the first half of the XIXth century, either in spite of the efforts of the worthy struggles in which the layman or eclesiastic leaders educated in the spirit of Blaj had, an important contribution. Facts proved concretely that, however valuable they were culturally and politically, few, but good, in other words, they had no future perspective regarding this national prob­ lems without the cooperaton of their Ortodox brothers not only in Transylvania but also in the Principalities that eventually became modern Romania. In the XIXth century, the principle of nationalities essentially changed the problem, bat for the Hungarians and for the Romanians. The Hungarian national leaders threw away the historical autonomy of the Croatia and of the Transylvania, in order to create, by excesive statal centralism, the so-called unitary7 Hungarian national state - where,alongside 5 Hungarians there lived 11 non Hungarians. From a political point of view, these ones were sentenced to become citizens of the political Hungarian nation, as unitary and indivisible as its state, formally called a national one, but polyglod and multina­ tional in its real ethnic structures. The Hungarian leaders, as well as the Austrian ones, were definitely against the transplant of the ethnic problem in the statal-political structures, an operation required by the spirit of the principle of nationalities, which was vehicled and defended in Central and Eastern Europe.

41.Aspects concerning the Habsburg-nobilliary dual mastery and its evolution to dualism in D. Suciu, Antecedentele dualismului...

52 Vienna and Budapest strongly rejected the plans of federaliza­ tion of the Monarchy on ethnic basis that later on became Austro- Hungary no matter if these came from the Croat Ogarev-Ostrojinski, the Czechs Palacky, Rieger, the Romanians Maiorescu, A. C. Popovici or from other non - Hungarian and non-German political leaders, in the Empire , who contributed to the political movements of their peoples, tțt that time. No wonder that in this context, all the efforts of the Romanians to built round the Great Principality of Transylvania an autonomous country, a great Dukedom, including the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, Bucovina on why the Croats efforts to create the Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, totally failed. The same chances or lack of chances had the lucid voices, such as that of the Austrian professor of worlds history in Vienna, Anton Springer, who specified that the Austrians and the Hungarians, who were in minority in the monarchy had no right to command, and, consequently, the only solution was its ethnic federalization. The same results had the interventions made by Lucger, major of Vienna, who frequently tried to temper Budapest’s Magyarizing zeal. The rejection of Austro - Hungary’s program of ethnic federalization strenghtened the non­ Hungarians and the non- Germans beliefes that they could save their nationality, language and culture only by breaking the Monarchy.42 This was the case of the Romnaians too; the arithmetic rejection of these programs and of other demands, by Vienna and Budapest spread in a geomtrical progression the centifugal tenden­ cies of the inhabitants in Bucovina and Transylvania. They anchored their hopes of political evolution in the centre created and offered by the Small Romanian Kingdom, free and independente. In the XIXth century the political paradigm was changed in the sense of the gathering of all the oppressed micro-Romanian space round Bucharest: some structural changes also took place in culture in general. First of all, the benefic activity of the Orthodox Bishop,

42.D. Suciu, “Aspecte ale politicii...” in kn.Inst de 1st., XXVIII; 1987- 1988,pp. 289-310; Idem, “Considerații peivind statutul general al Transilvaniei și situația politică specifică a românilor din Monarhie la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea”, in mss.la hn.lnst de 1st. Xenopol, Iași

53 Andrei Șaguna, described by Eminescu as belonging to the immortal world, the cultural difference between the Orthodox and the Unia ted Christians in Transylvania became less and less evident. Șaguna managed to get the emancipation of the Romanian Orthodox Metro­ politan Church in Sibiu from the Serbian patriarchy and estabilished the afferent bishoprics in Arad and Caransebeș; he founded the confessional high-school in Brașov and Brad, and they produced a valuable body of clergymen and teachers; he issued a model of an Organic Statute, a modern “constitution” in the organization of churches, with great echoes and prestige. He maintained an efficient and valuable conffesional teaching system in Transylvanian villages and communes. From then on such names of Orthodox clergymen as the bishop Ioan Popasu, Nicolae Popea, Ioan Mețianu, NicolaeCristea, RomanCiorogariu, Ilie Miron Cristea and others were equally famous both in the cultural and in the political life as those of the Canonical- teachers or of the Uniated Prelates in Blaj, Șuluțiu, a bishop, the Canons Simion Crainic, I. Micu Moldovan, Baziliu Raçiu, Timotei Cipariu, Iuliu Hossu, the bishop, etc.; known all over the country. They all were memorable fighters for the Romanian context, which was deeply democratic, open to universal contribution and to exter­ nal values of Christianity . Due them , the generations that joined their efforts for liberty and national unity could sincerely say: “ the right way , we fallowed the right fight we fought”. The novelty brought about by the modern epoch was the fact that after the fundation of the Universities in Iași and Bucharest, in 1860-1864, of the Romanian Academy in 1866-1867, first under the name of the name of the Literary Academic Sociely, together with benefic and competent detectors of real values that had been the Junimea Society and the literary review “ Convorbiri literare “43, the nationalcentre of phylosophy, of culture and ideology gathered round the centralizing political nucleus over the Carphatians and moved into the Small Kingdom of Romania. It was the only forum

43. About Convorbiri literare, see Dicționarul Literaturii Române de la origini pfnà la 1900, București, 1979, pp.211-214. About the Academy, St. Pascu., Istoricul Academiei Române, 125 de ani de la înființare 1866-1991, București, 1991

54 which.could look after these institutions and faomus superior schools of Agriculture, Polytehnics, Medicine, Societies of Geography and other Natural Sciences. Many Romanians coming from the foreign limitrophe states studied there. This fundamental truth was still valid ,evenif,atthe beginning, some Transylvanian scholars-persecuted or not-had also contributed to the emancipation of the Romanians, and they were right in doing so, since literature and national culture were united before the state. They have contributed to the develop­ ment of the archivisticandacademicinstituionsovertheCharpatians. This was the case of Aaron Florian, August Treboniu Laurian, ,SimionBărnuțiu,allofthem united,except loan Maiorescu, or other famous sholars, who took refuge in Romania, for good. The opening of the Universities and of the Romanian Acad­ emy towards the West was great. The reception of European culture of the new Eropean streams and system of ideas, the contribution of the men and culture to the national system was made in a quick rytm, with results unknown before. We don’t mean to diminish the wonder­ ful cultural role of the Romanian Students’Circle at the Germanand Hungarian Universities in Vienna, Cernăuți, Budapest, Cluj, or the militant activity of the Societies “ Iulia”, “Petru Maior”, “Romania Jună”, in Cluj, Budapest or Vienna. Astra’s cultural activities of its scientific departaments, of the schools of Etnologv and Folklore in Transylvania and Bucovina or of the magazines printed there wasalso remarkable. But being realistic, we cannot help noticing that they made lesser contribution than their brothers over the Carpathians. The students’ groups, the Romanian intellectuals in Austro-Hungary although valuable and highly qualified were not only few and most often poor, but also politically persecuted, despised and obscured by the cultural institutions of prestige of the two dominat nations, the Hungarians and the Ausrians, whom only the counterpart institutions in the Romanian Kingdom could equal, on an equal footing That was why, by a certain time, both the Romanians hopes for political progress for the salvation and preservation of national culture in the oppressed provinces, threatened by the Hungarians, by the Germans and by the Russian Panslavism, focused their hopes on

55 Bucharest and the cultural institutions in the free and independent Kingdom. Lookingatthe general evolution of the Romanian society, it is clear that Small Romania became not only the political center, but also the center of the national modern culture of the whole Romanian people. This fact is illustrated by the fundation in Bucharest of the League of the Cultural (and then political) Unity of all the Romanians - and, also, by the generous asylum men of letters, historians Romanian teachers from the foreign states to the West or to the East of the Kingdom, could find in Romania. Bat lately, one can notice a strange way of forgetting the essential parameters of this istorical phenomenon. There are tenden­ cies to comment or praize certain local aspects, insignificant excep­ tions - which do only confirm the general rule. Thus statements according to wich in Transylvania, the Greek-Catholic priests were more cultivated than the Orthodox ones, has exaggerated the role of Blaj in the national movement and in the second half of the XIXth century while the contribution of Sibiu, the Orthodox center is often forgotten. The cultural and naiional role played by Blaj was certain magnificent, as well as its achievements in concrete political terms, represented by the two superb Great National Meetings of 40.000, and, respectively, 60.000 people, that involved every Romanian be­ ing, Orthodox or a Uniated in the fight against the fire that used to destroy Romanian hearts, language and culture, represented by the Hungarian state centralism. After several decades, the achievements of Blaj became “ Swan songs”, since Blaj lost its leading role in favor of Bucharest. During the latter half of the XIXth century and especially after B laj had anchored itself in passivity and in the old and dusty Staatsrecht of the Leopoldine Diploma of 1691, and of the Pragmatic Sanctions of 1722., etc. it failed to catch up with the quick evolution of the general political situation. It got stuck in a past that could not be revitalized any longer; if offerd partial and inappropriate solution, which could become dangerous obstacles in the modernization and fortification of the national movement of the Romanians in Transylvania. Passivity was the product of Blaj, but those who pronunced themselves for this tactics and anchored the program of

56 the movement in ancient, old-fashioned acts and diplomas lost their contact with the then present, their access to the future and the chances of finding the new and modern solutions and objectives. The supporters of the absolute passivism created a Transylvanian separatism, stated that only the Transylvanian Roma­ nians understood the specific Transylvanian cause and many of them refused to meet the Romanian leaders in the Banat, Crișana and Maramureș. They used to say that the latter ones might become a burden and they would have less chances to re-activate the autonomy of the Great Principality ofTransylvania and the parliamentary rights of the Schmerling regime on the basis of the Leopoldine Diploma of 1691 the Diploma of October, 1860, the Patenta of february 1861, the laws of 1863-1864. It is a Iso true that the Romanians in the Banat, Crișana , Maramureș, could not appeal to Diplomas and the old regulations, had no autonomy and no positive laws such as those of 1863-1864,and the unfortunately validonly for a short time and only for their Transylvanian brothers) to acknowledge their Romanian language and nationality. But this was no reason for then not to involve themselves in the national struggle. In fact, they were all Romanians, oppressed by the Hungarian state but situated not far from their brothers in Romania who helped them substantially in their efforts to preserve their national culture and existence. The separatist attitude ofthe Transylvanian elite was strongly criticized and blamed; its supporters were drastically qualified as “political idiots”, an epi­ thet used by the realistic national thinkhers, suppoters of both the relative and the absolute active and passive tactics i.e., of the . par­ liamentary’ boycott or, on the contrary, of the parliamentary actions. Romanian’s war for independence concentrated the material and moral help,every body’sattention and so, the internal struggles ceased, for the moment, and the Romanian leaders in Hungary founded the Romanian National Party, in Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, in 1881. The party’s unique principle of organization was initiated, cultivated- enforced so as to resist the internal struggles and covulsions of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania. But the sup­ porters of the absolute passivism included some old fashioned

57 solutions in the Program: two obstacles in the way towards the modernization and quicker fortification of the national movement and the achievement of its internal cohesion trough an efficient solution to the alternative of the common antidualist tactics, sup­ ported by everybody.The first point of the Program stated the necessity of reactivating the autonomy of the Great Principality of Tranylvania, which would have meant the reactivation of the laws benefic to nationality and the romanian language and could have led to the creation of an autonomus Romanian country on the basis of a territorial and politcal autonomy, according to the model which was to be much enlarged during the years 1863-1865. But starting with point II in the Program, another sort of autonomy was stipulated, namely only a political one since, according to the old way of thinking, the teritorial one . failed to have sufficiently clear legal “ historical” basis for the Romanians in the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș.Further on their better representation was demanded in districtis, towns, in communes, at the central admnistrative and legislative levels of the state, as well as the use of the Romanian language at these levels. They hoped that in conflicts broke out again betwen Budapestand Vienna, Dualism, which had to be renewed every 10 years , would jold and, through the breaches between the two metropolies. Dualism would return to the situation in 1861-1865. The naives, who looked the past .noticingonly the moments when the masters often guarreled, ignored those times when they came to terms, oppressing their ancestors; they were warmed by the realists that times had changed, the principle of nationalities made a great progress, breaches had to be avoided. They were aware that, if they stated to fight again, would never reconcile without losing the non-German and non-Hungarian territories and nations in Austro- Hungary. But, even if these breaches had oppened and the autonomy of the Great Principality of Transylvania and the legislation of Sibiu, in 1863-1864, had been rivived, there was the great impediment that the Transylvanian Romanians, had to go the Parliament in Sibiu or another Transylvanian town, and , those in the Banat, Crișana,

58 Maramureș to the Parliament in Budapest. This impediment was a fundamental shortcoming in the political thinking of the supporters of the absolute passivism which preserved in other forms, the danger ofthe revitalization of separatism and preserved some old mistakes, in the mentality and the Program of the Party, some ambiguities, in the unitary approach of the Romanian political being in Hungary. But it was clear that the settling of this essential principle in program, concerning its structure, was left for the future. The future was going to elucidate and solve it after other hard, but benefic confruntation of ideas, between the new andoldinthe thiniking ofthe Transylvanian Romanian national movement. In the Program of the Romanian Naționali Party of 1881, the tactical alternative was divided into two: it chose the way of the old tradionof 1869, meaning that because of the great and old personali­ ties more eager than necessary' to hold the leadership in their tired, trembling hands, adopted the passivist attitude, while the leadership in their tired, prem bling hands the passivist attitude, while the others, the active one. During the National Conference of 1881 some subtle coriimentators and observers vainly suggested that there was also need for unity, proposing that all the Romanians within the Hungarian state should vote einther for the application of passivity or for an active attitude. But the keen minded ones realized that the Europe of their epoch was deeply affected by the electoral and parliamentary fights, thatthe Irishmen, for instance fought for Irleand’s autonomy in the Parliament in London, with an international echo, in time and in the world. They were of the opinion that obstinate passivism would put the national movement out of time, out of the modern political thinikingand would block up its access to the newest methods of approach and action, to the concrete political opposition on the continent, digging its political grave. These leaders had proposed an active attitude and parliamentarism in 1881 too, as before. But at the Conference of the Party, the most part of the sheep faithful to the great leaders of the absolute passivist attitude, who didn’t approach the situation ofthe movement starting from realities and their own reasoning, accepting,the views of their few main leaders, automatically voted for their solutions, rejecting the benefic, realistic and inovating options of the minority. 59 But this was the very reason why these people and these minorities were great and famous. They distinguished themselves from the flock or unspeaking faithuful sheep, who baaed in the Conferences, extolled according to the system of the Greek choir and imposed the solutions of the great ancient personalities.The realists in the national movement were characterized by an independent, individual thinking and conduct. They approached the general problem of the given political situation by means of reasoning of an individual logic which slowly led them to an earlier discovery of the structural changes that had occurred. They tried to find a new and solutions, to the rapid rythm of change in the society in general and in the Romanian one, in particular. Of course, the actions of antidualist opposition that came from passivist sources, were praized and benefic, such as, for instance Memorandum of 1866, the Pronuncement in 1868, the Memorandum of 1882, addressed to European public opinion, the Memorandum of 1892 and others. The pasivist newspapers read to the peasants by the priests, their being “ enlightened” by the intellectuals in the villages in connection with the general problems of the national movement were certainly fruithfulfor the political education of the people, for their devotion to the leaders and the Program of the Party. But the realists openruly stated that the tactics of petitioneering of begging was no longer actual. It used to be a sort of humiliating “kriherei” (crawling) in front of the throne,while the modern nations did not have to beg, any longer, they openly fought in an organized way in front of the world and the direct, not of the indirect enemies, for their rights, using the most modern means and tactics. The realists appreciated the wonderful political content of the Memorandum of 1892, but definitely stressed that the tactics of petitioneering took the national movement out of normal, new and modern circuit of the general European political spectrum and pushed it backwards to ancient and barbarian times, when the use of such a method had been not only understandable, but the only, possibileone.Infactagreat national personality of the time, Alexandru Mocioni, who used to offer scholarships to tensof Romanian students and apprentices, for faculties and schools in Hungary, every year,

60 skilfully described the situation that was created round the problem of the Memorandum. He expressed it magnificently, stating that the Romanians could never fail to do a “ foolishness”, as for instance to take a petition to Vienna in order to tell on the King to the Emperor while, the Hungarian after 2 years, would do an ever greater one, namely, to sue him and put him to jail for such a thing. In fact, the absolute passivists, showed off, pretending to be pure and saying that there was no King, that there was only the Emperor, Francise Joseph I, an expression that was a rather rhetorical, anti- dualist formula; but the King really existed as a constitutional monarch of the Hungarians, who swore by their laws, who was defending them and who was a friend and their close protector. On the other hand, as a constiutional Monarch, Francise Joseph I, was reigning, but not governing Hungary that according to its constitu­ tion, was governed by the government appointed by the party which won majority in the Parliament in Budapest. It is obvious that, if we interpreton the situation within framework and that is the way the realist (or the activists) did it, the passivists did often lead and indirect struggle,even ifitwasfutile, asa means ofmoral anti-dualist resistence. They addressed themselves to a symbolic and formal monarhic power and not to the political forums in Budapest that were the ones that oppressed the non-magyar nations to restrict their rights as individu­ als and as citizens, to disregard their collective national right, to continously decrease the number of confessional schools, the ones that had to be fought for face to face, directly and not from the distance, in indirect ways. The “purists” recruited from among the supporters of the “passive attitude” and of the absolute parliamentary boycott, forget­ ting that, in realiity and life, thinghs were not simply black or white, but more often grey, implemented further shortcomings on the national movement. They “offered” it certain ambiguities, contro­ versies or even situation when the theoretical-ideatic sketches were contrary to the concrete reality, to every day life. Thus, in 1881, they did not pronunce themeselves about Law XII of 1867, and launched the idea that Dualism,one way or another, did no exist. But it was more than obvious that it did exist,that the passivists, as well as other

61 oppressend co-nationals of their payed taxes had soldiers in Hunga­ ry’s territorial army as in Austro-Hungarian one and they were all put into Hungarian jails if they broke Hungarian laws. Other inadvertencies had affected he Party since 1869, as well, because, some years after this date, the passivists obstinately pre­ tended that their leading forum, the Central Committee and together with it, the Party still existed,although, it never held any meeting and it never chose its local committees in districts, its activity having been forbidden by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Budapest. The passiv­ ists, experts in petitions and memoranda promised to send a petition to the Hungarian Government althrough, on the other hand, they pretended that this did not exist “legally” and, they did not acknowl­ edge it in principle, to obtain the permission to re-activate the Central Committee,but words never turned into facts. In other words, they produced a sort of philosophy, sayng that the Party existed, but only in their theory, and not in the daily life of the national movement. Here, ata certain time, the antidualist actions were supported not by something that did not exist, but by the deputies in the Romanian clubs in the state local administrative assemblies, as well as by the passivists gathered round the editorial staff of the “Transylvanian Gazette” and by the activists gathered at “The Romanian Telegraph”.About this newspaper issued in Sibiu,Eminescu was sayng that it waas the most modern and realistic Romanian newspapeer in Austro - Hungary. The great pasivist leaders, George Barițiu, Ioan Rațiu, Ilie Măcelariu - this latter one with great reserves, presided by the Uniated Metropolitan Ioan Vancea carried on négociations for a Romanian Hungarian reconcili­ ation with the President - Minister of Hungary, Melchior Lonyay, in 1872, although the regime of his royal Majesty did not “exist” or was not “ legal “. In spite of the great leaders good intentions to improve the political situation of the Romanians in the great Principality of Transylvania, after the model existing between 1863 -1865, as it had been seen after two years, when their Memorandum of B la j was finally published; the young people and the realists were definitely against the idea that two or three personalities - no matter how great they were

62 - should secrete ly negotiate the fate of more than one million people locked up, in an office. They insisted that all the problems concerning the national movement,including the hypothetica 1 reconciliation with the Hungarian regime,should be discussed in a Congress of up to 1000 leaders and not in small conclaves, more or less secret and mysterious. Such a change in the political thinking of the Romanians in Hungary had a remarkable success in the intimate and real content of the European democratic mentalities, which gave priority to not only consulting public opinion and, especially to respecting it in political practice, either by governments or opposition. Beyond the Carpathians, Brătianu and other politicians defi­ nitely affirmed that taking counsel with the nations and using their vote, since they had more instincfthan their great personalities, was the only way to practically reach the exact intuition of the people’s will, the grasp of the real and primary necessities, the promoting and acordingly using the most modern and efficient methods in the national movement. In fact, in 1872, the Frenchman Emil Picot, as well as Roma­ nian and foreign observers noticed that the president - Minister of Hungary led a fraudulent policy concerning the non-Hungarian na­ tions, cheating them with vain promises. He cunningly supported the dissensions among their political leaders, deliberately guided the old ones on ways with no return and no end. He used to urge them to send pettions, with a viev to prevent the realist leaders from having initiatives instead ones, and reinforce the whole national movement and bring it to the same level as the similar political movements in Europe.The President-Minister of Hungary, pushing things towards insincere négociations for Romanian-Hungarian reconcilliation, did never answer the Memorandum 1872, but indirectly suggested that he acknowledged only the great passivist chiefs, convened by him at Blaj, as leaders of the movement. Although the realist Șaguna was also invited to the négociations, Șaguna sensed the trap and refused to participate. By this way, the Government managed to block up the Congress wanted by everybody and also to stop the progress made by the activist and parliamentary current, after the conference in May, 1872.

63 The members of the Hungarian Government,although ini­ tially hindered by passivism, did soon realize that a dumb and remote resistence fit them better than a direct, close one .The entrence of the Romanian Transylvanian deputies in the Parliament, together with those from the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș and Partium, allied and concentrated in the club of nationalities with the Slav leaders or even the Hungarian independent deputies, would have brought about infinitely greater difficulties to the Government in Budapest, than those of the passive attitude.The passivist leaders except Mäcelariu, who was not listend to, refused the Congress, in 1872, sayng they were still waiting for an answer from Budapest,and more that at the very beginning of the elections, most of them did not manage to adopt relative passivity at least, that is to let the Romanians elect and not send the elected deputies to the Parliament. This would have had a double advantage: it would have en­ sured an element of unity by participation to the elections of all the Romanians in Hungary, while in Transylvania - Picot said - the deputies elected according to the Hungarian Constitution, however exclusivist and restrictive it was, could have done more harm to the Government than the passivists had done. The deputies would have contributed due to their parliamentary mandates a greater weight to the Romanian antidualist actions, from this level, once every four years, that is in each parliamentary cycle.The reactivating of absolute passivism and its prolongation more that it was necessary, favoured the election once in four years, in the districts boycotted by the Romanians, of some Hungarian and Saxon governmental deputies, who strengthened even more the position of the regim in the legisla­ tive forum. Paradoxicaly, the pasivists,, who morally seemed to be the most determined enemies of the dualist regime, did it favours unwares offering them places in the Parliament periodicaly, or nour­ ishing the inner feuds in the movement. But, as “les extremes se touchent”,the Hungarian government, by the replisals in 1894, made the passivists the authors of the Memorandum of 1892, martyrs and turned the Memorandist action into a symbolic resistence of great moral depth with a resounding internal and international echo. But the great shortcoming of the absolute passivism was that it

64 did not keep a rytmic and rapid contact with the people once in every four years, they did not mobilize them for the direct, face to face-fights with the hungarian members of the Government, their national enemies. In certain places this helped foreign propaganda or “ tools “ in the Government win over certain Romanians. The Romanian nation had no powerful nobility or bourgeoisie, like the Hungarians or the Czechs had the former ones, before dualism, the latter ones until 1884, practicing absolute and relative passivism in order to get re­ markable results by these methods and tactics of boycot.That was why the people’s moral resistence its determination to fight for national liberty and unity had to be reinforced. All the disputes concerning the différend ideas about programmatic foundation and solutions to the tactic alternatives of the national movement of the Romanians in Transylvania were overcome and buried for ever, soon after the death of the great passivist personalities.In 1905, the elec­ toral and parliamentary activism was adopted, the Transylvanian separatism was abolished for ever by the plain and clear affirmation of the unity and indivisibility of the Romanian nation in Hungary, according to the Program of the Party. The victory of the constitutional and parliamentary mentali­ ties and methods of the Romanians in Austro-Hungary refreshed and modernized the national movement and, from this point of view, it got clloser to the evolution of the political life in the Romanian Kingdom where, since the Constitution in 1866, they had cultivated a parliamentarism of hight quality, in spite of the inherent feuds and fights for power, understandable in a parliamentary monarchic re­ gime.44 In fact,it was necessary that, a society marked by the industrial revolution, which was essentially changing it from a social-economic, institutional and mental point of view should be dominated by

44. The soludon of the tactical alternative, of the structure of the party and the programma de evoludon of the national movementof the Romanians in T ransylvania, in D.Suciu, Mișcarea antidualistă a românilor dm Transilvanul ți Hie Măcelarii (1867-1891) in mss and at Idem, “Aspecte ale politicii...” in An. Inst, deist. Cluj.$M\ÏY, 1987-1988, p.289-310. About the moment 1892 in Liviu Maior, Memorandul:filosofiapolitico-istorică a petiționismului românesc, Cluj, 1992, the collective volume Memorandul 1892-1894: ideologie fi acțiune politică românească, București, 1992. 65 discussions about the electoral system and elections, by parliamen­ tary disputes reflecting the collision of national interests as of those of other kinds. The number of the poor and middle Romanian land­ owner was greater than that of the non Romanians in Transylvania, but they were a Iso 20,3 % of the number of the owners of 50-500 ha and even 5,7 % of those owning more that 500 ha.The Romanian industrial and comercial investement was insignificant, only 2,3 %, but the financial one reached 25 %, the Romanian banks, cartels, supported Romanian property in agriculture. Simultaneously, the member of the Romanian workers grew and they founded a section of the Social- Democratic Party in Hungary. Together with the leaders of the National Party45 they started the fight for the universal vote. The Hungarian leaders who knev the proverb “he who the land owns the country too” vainly planned, at the beginning of the XX1*1 century, to found an “altruistic” bank for the Hungarian small and middle landowners should buy land, or so that only the Hungar­ ians could in Transylvania. Meanwhile, they ultymately tried to modify the ethnic structures in Transylvania. According to their views, all the Romanian confessional schols at the frontiers had to be Maghyarized and turned into state schools, the Romanian Uniated and Orthodox theological istitutes had to be swallowed by the Hun­ garian state Universities or had to have deans appointed by the Government had to control them severely. The teachers, the school­ masters and the whole activity in the Romanian high-schools, el­ ementary schools and Preparande had to be equally well-controlled. The Romanian small and middle land-properties at the border were to be changed with Hungarian ones and “pushed “more inside the country. All the Transylvanian fruitful valleys were going to be colonized with Hungarians living in Moldavia and Hungarian small and middle owners, in the country or in exile, were to be helped with money to buy land in order to create an ethnic and linguistic continu­ ity from inside Hungary’ up the region inhabited by Seckiers.

45.Thc figures in Pascu, St, Făurirea..., vol. I, p.293. The general social- economic development of the Romanian society in Transylvania at the begining of the XX-th century, well-drawn up by Kheit Hitchins, Die Rumänien A. Siebenbürgen in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Band III, pp.603-615 66 Drastic laws were prepared in order to condemn the people who were against the idea of a Hunagarian political nation and of a national unitary Hungarian state, including expropriation their land being given to Hungarians. A future Ministry of Reconstruction was meant to carry out these plans, in cooperation with the Ministries in Budapest, to ensure a hungarian ethnic majority and to impose a Romanian minority in Transylvania since that was the only way in which the Principality could belong to Hungary and its union with the Kingdom could be avoided.46 But the Hungarians were left neither time, nor money in order to put into practice these far-reaching measures,since modern Europe announced the beginning of some esențial changes in the structural system of the state built by con­ quests and systematic plunders of foreign territories during the bar­ baric times of the Middle-Age. The victory’ of the new ideas in the national movement of the Romanians in Transylvania was supported and morally encouraged by the great thinkers in the Romanian Kingdom, Nicolae Iorga, a learned historian and politician , who greeted the active fight of the youth, in opposition with the passive protests of the old generation. Activist leaders went to villages, and spoke to them about the national being, its past, its goals and its future. Even if they could not change the hostile dualist legislation,they fought a brave, face to face fight confroting the enemy each and every’ moment, in order to hit him, for the victory’ of the most human, just and holly right, namely that every’ nation should live on its own land, with its own language, law and customs. Iorga said that the Hungarians made it clear that the land conqered and defended by theirs forerunners could never belogn but to them and it was but natural - from their point of view - for them to be themselves, to defend their interests to the end. But before the Hungarians came, this land had been defended only by the Romanians and afterwards, by both of them. But if its defence throughout history’,had been important to make it bear had been fruits even more important. The Romanians would work until

46. Silviu Dragomir, La Hongrie et la probleme de Transylvanie, in Revue de Transylvanie, L 1., 1934, nr.1-4, pp.334-335 67 sunset for it to bear fruits, and not for themselves but for the masters imposed on them by a dramatic destiny. This was the greatest sacrifice a human being could make. Consequently, the Hungarians could say what they always used to say and will always say, and the Romanians had right to defend their position and interests, to the end. The activist fight, interpreted according to this principle, was no transaction or négociation dreamt of by the “kind” old men of Blaj, who were not meant and will never be destined to ever advise or rule nations; it was the qallitative fundamental step forward made toward the greatest awakening of the consecince of the Romanian peasant in Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana,Maramureș, the basis of the West­ ern brach of the nation.47 Nicolae Iorga inferred that, in the first stage of the antidualist movement, that is about the year 1870, when the people acted for the nation rather according to its instincts, local différenciés were noticed which were too much enlarged by the passivism that encouraged them and made them publycly known.According to the great Roma­ nian historian,the reason and the program of passivism was not a largely Romanian one, but a particular and teritorial one, something that was proved by the first conferences after 1867, and specially at Miercurea,in 1869.Afterwards, the fight of the Transylvanians was supported only by political forces of poor or inferior values and experience, while in the Parliament, where the Romanians from the Banat, Crișana and Maramureș continued to act courageously for a while. Such courageus and accusing voices against the regime such as that of Hie Măcelariu’s had never been heard afterwards. Iorga proposed and preffered the activist attitude since it helped the people overcome the old states in though and behaviour to become more efficient, more enlighted,rich and universal.The Ro­ manian could not fight on more three fronts,from the beginning, namely the economic,cultural and political ones, having been often bound to lay stress on the former ones, in order to prepare more

47.N. \otgp,N-,CevadespreArdealulRotnânescșivia(aromâneascădeastăzi. Două conferințe cu privire la românii din Ardealți Ungaria, București, 1907, pp.32-35, where the author had resumed his ideas concerning the support of the active attitude of the Romanians in Transylvania, expressed 10 years before.

68 favorably the future conditions for the latter.The Romanians in Transylvania went through a different situation from those in the Romanian Kingdom-since they were bound to carry on a polycy for themselves and among”the others”, among the non-Romanians and against them, against their enemies. In the Kingdom, the Romanians could promote a policy for themselves,actig in freedom.48 Pasivism could not survive, Iorga noticed, because, as political fight, it failed to reach its well-determined goal. Passivism was neither a political work, nor a constructive action, it was rather a sentimental problem, and a matter of dignity. If somebody took away one’s rights and one wasn’t able to defend them he had to wait for the moment when he could reconcquer them by force, but the passivists had not enough force to act a way and went on groping, in a situation they themselves did not admitJn a great battle the great commanders had to concentrate ail the forces round them, to count them, place them on a more favourable battlefield and, using new methods, to start the attak.The great passivist personalities were just “in the sulks” in 1869 and after, although they had to step out of their hiding places to get involved in the fight, more than ever, in order to educate them directly and intensely. After 1867 -1869,the Metropolitans, such great men of culture as Baritiu and Cipariu were also displeased. People loved them, greeted them, sent them letters of congratulation, for their position.,But these personalities kept being isolated in their hiding - places, editorial, effices, and Metropolitan churches. They started to look like a shop-window, but their position was no place of honour, since great sentries ha ve to stand like statues inorder to be admired,they had to fight for the nation. On the other hand,on a local level and in certain fields, passivism did not produce - as it had promised - that modest daily modest result of wich the great historical events that change the life of nations were supposed to spring, at certain mo­ ments. It failed to offer to the nation the continuous and intense basic activity in Hungary. This strictly necessary’ fight never took place, side the great passivists have been thinking of extremely high things, always out-of-reach.

48. Idem, Istoria românilor din Ardela și Ungaria, Ediție de Georgeta Penelea, București, 1989, pp. 486-487 69 Inferring the danger of the Tansylvanian passivist separatism, spiritualy supported by Blaj, before 1881, and in 1881,by the Point 1 in the Party’s Program, Iorga noticed the antinomy between this position and the gains already existing in terms of the Orthodox church unity. Starting from 1864, the latter having become a Metro­ politan church located in Sibiu (Transylvania) and thus it became responsible for the Romnian Bishoprics of the western parts, that is Arad and Caransebeș.4’ This was the very reason why Andrei Saguna disapproved of passivism and in general he considered that in the Parliament in Budapest, the Romanians would learn more about policy in a week than at B laj and Turda in a year. Thus, the Metropoli­ tan, magnificently understood that the national movement of the Romanians in Hungary had to be included in the European thinking and political movement, a thing confirmed and achieved by the great ideological and programatic revolution of 19O5.so Then, un certain­ ties, hesitation, controversies in thought and action were put away ; it became obvious that dualism existed and oppressed them and that people had to directly fight against it. The direct electoral and parliamentary fight made one become more realistic,made him approach thinghs as they were, support people by a concentrated, continuous work, organized on new bases. Thus people came to be quickly and efficiently act in the great historical moments to follow. In fact, the ideological and program­ matic revolution of 1905 prepared the Romanianus’conseciousness and abillities for the future and enabled them to apply the most modern procedures and tactics of the European and extra-European democracy. In 1918, the Romanianselected their deputies at Chișinău, Cernăuți, Alba-Iulia by the imposing national self determinatio, substantially helped by the climate created by the War of National Union fought by the Romanian Kingdom. They managed to destroy Austro-Hungary and the Russian foreign domination. Iorga was of the opinion that passivism lasted longer than it should have because it failed to be understood, the way it had to be

49. Ibidem.,48 7-489 50. D. Suciu, Mișcarea atitidualistà..., and Idem, Aspcaealepoliticii..., pp.297-298

70 understood, asa momentary solution, whose provisional character had to be shortened, that people did not realize that it was meant to be a mere tactics.51 The documents of the epoch did really prove that passivism, as a tactics, substituted the very principle, at times, a thing that brought about arguments, splits - as well as elucidation, and, the time wasted by the “kind” tactics suggested by Blaj was often rewarded by an extremely intense and vivid cultural propaganda.52 Indeed, Astra, with its centre in Sibiu, Transylvania, brached out its departamentsand cultural communal sectionsupto the Banat,Crișana, Maramureș; if the Orthodox had bishoprics at Arad and Caransebeș, the Uniated churches of Blaj had bishopricsat Gherla, as well as in the Western parts, in Oradea or Lugoj; it was clear that the creation of the programmatic unity of the Party and of tactics of all the Romanians in Hungary was more than necessary. Anyhow, Iorga, who had perfectly inferred how the tactics alternative had to be solved, without having known about the political corespondence of the Romanian leaders in Hungary, wrote that the whole national movement there was continuosly strenghened by the ceaseless evolution of the Romanian Principalityand Kingdom. Itwas encouraged and given moral force in Cuza’s epoch by Kogălniceanu’s reforms, as well as in the year when in Bucharest a Prince from a great European dynasty was brought. The Romanians in Transylvania and Bucovina were delighted by the achievements that did away with the plans of the great neighbours to destroy the modern Romanian that slowly repressed the separatis actions in Iași, inspired by unispired people, such as Prince Constantin Moruzzi, Nicolae Rosetti Roznoveanu and Calinic Miclescu. If these achievements encour­ aged the theartsand the hopes of the Romanians inTransylvania, they exasperated the political thinkers of the Hungarian unitary state. They were afraid that Bucharest would be given external support by Prussia or other great powers, against Austro-Hungary. Certain Hungarian considered Carol to be the Prince of a “savage

51.1orga N.,op.«Z, p. 489 52.In this action, Astta distinguished itself, see Curticareanu V. Le mouvementculturelpour leparachement de I’etat national roumain (1918), Bucharest, 1973

71 people of swine herds”, good to be imprisoned in Muncaci. About the boyars, they used to say that they had “come out of pigsties” and long after the Union, Romania kept being treated as Wallachia and Moldavia.53 In fact, even the matters of tactics of the national movement of the Romanians in Transylvania, problems that depended on certain alliances that had to be made for the democratization of the electoral system in Hungary, were discussed and set out after consultation between the political leaders from Transylvania and statesmen in the Kingdom of Romania. E. Brote, a Transylvanian, who had taken refuge to Romania, R. Ciorogariu, V. Mangra, the Transylvanian leaders, together with I. Slavici, another Romanian refuge, a writer and national fighter, signed in 1907, the Agreement of Gaincea, a village on D.A.Sturdza’s estate, the prime-minister in Bucharest: By this agreement, the participants bound themselves to support the Romanian deputies in the Parliament of Budapest and to co-operate especially with Vaida and Maniu. They esteblished to also get into touch with P.S.D. in Hungary, in order to act together in several problems (especially the universal sufrage) and to support the Croats in their national antidualist fight. The participants pledged them­ selves to beware of any conflict with the Greek-Catolic brothers to firmly remove any attempt to get involved in confessional conflicts. They would interpret religious and agricultural problems, that impetously required a land reform not as party matters, but a matter of preservation of the whole nation. Through, the agency of I. Kalinderu, the manager of the Domains of the Crown, and in an absolute discretion, King Carol I was to be informed of all the actions and manifestation of the Romanians in Transylvania. They also got into touch with D.A. Sturdza, who had just come back to power. Without having openly asked for help, the Transylvanian leaders accepted the support of the Regal Government in Bucharest, for the newspaper “Tribuna”, but were also painstakingly after some mate­ rial help for the national and religious preservation of the Romanians in the diocese of Oradea Mare, consideret to be the most exposed to

53. Iorga, N., op.cit., p. 491 72 the danger of Magyarization.54 In the Parliament in Bucharest, great political personalities such as I.I.C. Brătianu, D.A. Sturdza, I.G. Duca and others militated for malleability in the choice of options concerning the foreign policy.55 They strongly emphasized that it had to change according to the general modifications occurred on thé international level. The foreign policy had to be able to reflect and defend as completely and firmily as possible the internal fundamental necessities and interests of the whole Romanian nation. Russia’s weakness did really become obvious after 1904-1905, when its maritime and infantry armies were beaten by the Japanese, so, the danger in the East started to diminish, slowly and surely. On the other hand, during the Balkan Wars, King Carol had new diplomatic conflicts with Austro-Hungary which, unlike himself, acted for a great and powerful Bulgaria, and Serbia’s continous weakening and destruction. King Carol did not admit the change of ballance of forces in the Balkan-Danubian region, to Bulgaria’s advantage, and accepted neither then, nor in 1914, the idea of Serbia’s destruction. King Carol and Maiorescu’s conservative Government, after vain diplomatic negotiations with Bulgaria - direct of through foreign media tion to correct certain frontiers in order to preserve the equ ilibrum of forces, joined the anti-Bulgarian coalition in 1913, and Romania was given Dîrstor (Silistra) promised in 1878 Balcic and Caliacra regions where many Romanians lived, Dîrstor belonged to the old Feudal state of Wallachia that united with Moldavia and became modern Romania in 1859. By the same time, the Romanians’ history registered a qualitative evolution through the structural mutuation of the Union based on the principle of nationalities, the creation of the modern state that wanted to get back the lost territories. In the second Balkan War, Russia was more understanding with Romania than

54. Miron Constantinescu.f/» document inconu (5-9 août 1901) concernât la lutte nationale deliberation des Roumains de Transylvanie (ai Revue Roumaine d'Histoire,IV, 1965, nr.3, p. 571-576 55. Anastase aiordache, Viața politică în România.l 910-1914,, București, 1972, pp.106-108,162, 304-312. They required the conclusion of an alliance with the great power against Austro-Hungary; Aurelia Bunea, Parlamentul României pentru o politică externăfavorabilă unirii Transilvaniei cu România (1892-1899), in Acta Musei Napocensis, VII, 1970, pp.329-352 73 Austro-Hungary was, through Berlin kept warning Vienna several times that by its obstructive position, it would estrange Bucharest from the Central Powers. The signs of Russia’s getting closer to Romania became obvious in 1914, after Nicolae the IInd’s visits, after the discussions between Brătianu, brought into the Government and Sazonov, who “accidenta’lly” crossed the border into Transylvania. This incident, as insignificant as it was, caused the Hungarians’ worry and indignation.56 After the war broke out, Wilhelm the IInd Francise Joseph I asked King Carol to join the Central Powers, their diplomacy eventu­ ally suggested Bucharest that it would be given Bessarabia from the Russians and Bucovina, from the Austrians. Berlin even promised Romania apossibleautonomyof Transylvania an idea thatwas firmly rejected by Budapest. But King Carol I played an extremely subtle and shrewid part. He managed to act in both directions, with the country’s allies, ratherformer allies, and the country'itself, as a man of honour and of duty. In fact, the old Monarch cultivated both with an almost religious scrupulosity and consciousness. He convened the Counlcil of the Crown, in order to give Germany an answer since he did not feel obliged to Austro-Hungary any longer, either morally, or in any other way. N. Iorga and Gheorghe Brătianu said the King pronounced himself in a formal way for the alliance with the Central Powers, without being legally bound; he correctly left the decision to the majority of the votes given by the members of the Crown Council. Iorga understood the profound meaning of the King’s formal speech delivered on the 3rd of August 1914. He clearly emphasized that his speech could not have been different, especially because the conflicts between Carol I and Austro-Hungary had previously marked the unavoidable break with Vienna and Budapest. And a few weeks after the Council and the old Monarch, approved of Romania’s new direction in foreign policy, agreed on in the secret Treaty of affable neutrality with Russia. In this Treaty, Russia recognized Romania’s

56.N., Iorga , Supt trei Regi,p. 144-179, Idem Istoria Românilor, vol. X, pp.321- 330 74 rights over Transylvania, the Banat and Bucovina in exchange for neutrality. Some territorial limitations to Serbia’s and Russia’s advan­ tage had however been suggested, in the Southern Banat and in the Northern territories inhabited by Ruthenians. Having understood the profound meaning of the Treaty, Carol approved of its content, and, feeling his end was drawing near, wished Fredinand and the ministers good luck on the new way chosen by Romania for the accomplishement of its political destiny in the decisive historical events which were talking place in Europe and in the world, at that time.57 In the Treaty, they stipulated that Romania was free to chose the moment when it would send its divisions to exercise its rights recognized as legitimate over these territories. On the other hand, his personal vote saved his honor in the House of Hohenzollern but more important for himself and for the country was that, in his capacity of a Constitutional King himself, obeying then more that anything else, acting in the spirit of the oath taken by the Monarch. Th us, unti 1 the end of his life, Carol kept being the first faithful servant of the Romanian law and state, disciplined, correct, a man of duty and of honor. In fact, the Union of the Pricipalities,w'ithallits benefic consequences, achieved by Cuza, was saved and consolidated during Carol’s reign, who led the country on the way to Independence, gaining Dobrudja and the Danube Delta, for the general economic, cultural and institutional progress, in ac­ cordance with the evolution of European civilization. Ina way, Cuza’s policy was inexorably followed by Carol and his generations and the old Hohenzollern was naturally right wanting the state to be enlarged. The independence, as well as Dobrudja’s union with the country was substantially supporte by him and won the sympathy of the Romani­ ans in Austro-Hungary. It is true that the royal vote on the 3rd of August 1914, supported only by P.P.Carp, against overwhelming majority who pronounced itself for neutrality, as a first step for breaking apart from the Central Powers in secret, cautiously and getting closer to the Entante, could

57.N.,Iorga, Istoria românilor... ,pp. 343-347; Idem, Supt trei Regi,pp. 180-184, Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Origines etformation de l’unité roumaine, Bucharest, 1943, pp. 270- 273 75 be interpreted by Berlin and Vienna as policy similar to chat of Pontius Pilate. By his behaviour, the King got all the rights to tell them: you see, I voted for you, but as a Constitutional King, I was morally bound to submit to the will of the majority and follow my country, even if facts were slightly different, from a legal point of view. This was inferred especially by the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy that had already suspected Carol of not being and bier that other Romanian politician and that,in fact, he was also longing for Transylvania and Bucovina.58 That was why, they suggested the Central Powers and Bulgaria should preventively occupy Romania and annihilate any schemes and actions dangerous for Austro-Hungary, but such propos­ als were tempered by Berlin. Practically speaking, King Carol was out obliged, from the Romanian constitutional point of view, to accept neutrality de facto, since the royal prerogatives in the constitution didn’t compel him to mind the decisions of the Council of the Crown - an optional instance - as Iorga said, without a legal compulsory character. The monarch could have immediately replaced Brătianu with the despotic and fanatic anti-Russian and anti-Slavic in general, P.P. Carp, if he had u'anted to Carp, inclined towards drastic and autocratic internal measures, would have overwhelmed his enemies and would have pushed the country into fight against Kiev and Russia joining the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. The real problem was that King Carol did not really want this, since his conscience saw clearly that, above his, more than doubtful obligations in the old treaties, that involved his personal honor too, was the superior duty - concerning the future of his people oppresed by the Hungarians in the Western ethnic space whose national - political and statal unity he had himself proclaimed several times and on several occasions, in spite of the frontiers existing during his life - time. In conclusion, de facto, Carol was on the side of the Romanian majority in the Council of the Crown, that gave priority to the liberation of the richest and most advanced regions of Transylvania

58. Furstemgerg, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Bucharest was convinced of this see Iorga, Supt trei Regi, p.64 76 and Bucovina. This was the essence of the problem and Iorga pitied those Romanian and foreign commentators who said that the King was “striken” by the vote of the Council, that he was left alone, upset and isolated after the 3td of August, 1914, considering their words groundless, result of their ignorance.59

59. Idem, op. cit., pp.185-186 FERDINAND I, MARIA AND THE CREATION OF GREATER ROMANIA

Ferdinand, Brätianu and the vote for neutrality had in view the time necessary to conclude the treaty with Entante. The treaties, once signed and stampen, seem always simple, but the work for their preparation and conclusion was extremely hard, minute and long- lasting. Considering the war, much responsability, absolute discre­ tion, ability and consciusness was required from those in power. Bucharest’s real attitude, which was oficially neuter, irrespective of suppositions, had to be well-hidden since, if it had been disccovered by the Central Powers in time they might have really occupied Romania preventively, in order to block its plans to create a single state for all the Romanians. The negotiations with the diplomats of Entante, in Bucharest were very secretly; meanwhile discussions were initiated - rather fake discussions, “pour paries" - with the Central Powers, but transactions were signed, the Central Powers being provided with cereals, cattle, and other raw materials. It was clear that a small slate had to be cautions, since at its borders powerful armies had fought. Still, facilitating clandestine transport on the Romanian territory' of weapons into Serbia, until 1915 was one of the signs of the real direction of Bucharest’s policy during the years of neutrality in the spirit of the previous Treaty with Russia, in 1914. In 1914, Ferdinand I folowed on Romania’s throne. He was the son of Leopold of Hohenzollern Siegmaringen and the Princess Dona Antonia of Portugal, of the House of Braganza, founder of the King­ dom. Even if he had been unknown and unnoticed by many people60, while he had been Prince heir since 1889, during the years, every body had the opportunity to make sure that Ferdinand had a basic contribu­ tor to the achievment of the Romanian’s dream. He was at certainty

60. Idem, Istoria românillor, vol. X, p. 352

78 during hard, troubles times, that finally led to the creation of the unitary state. Seemingly, delicate and shy, King Ferdinand was in fact a determined man, who would take up decisions once taken to the very end and who knew how to resist influences and pressures contrary to their achievment. A graduate of the University of Bonn, the King was very knowledgeable in natural science and the classical ancient history. He also spoke English and French very well, with elegance and distinction. He was passionate reader, but he also was a lover of nature and Botanies. Even before th e first war, Ferdinand contributed to the consolidation of the army, to its organization on modern bases. Early in his youth; but especially in October 1914, when he became King, Ferdinand kept being convinced that Romania, without taking part in the War, could not achieve its national destiny, a conviction that he spoke out only at the right time, when, together with Queen Maria, the Romanian Goverment, the army and Romanian diplomats, they involved themselves and made the decision to fight.61 King Ferdinand inherited from his uncle, the former King, as well as by education, the understanding, the respect for notion of “man of duty”, with any sacrifice and any cost. Ferdinand of Romania identified himself so much with the man of duty, that he stood for the hope and guiding lighthouse, for consolation in difficult moments, even to those who were doubtful and fearful concerning the way that had to be followed, proving to be both outside and inside a good Romanian. In his family, Ferdinand was educated by professor Grobles and, morally and religiously, he was under the benefic influence of his mother, an extremely kind, religous woman, endowed with subtle and delicate artistic tastes - all of them handed over to the little Prince. Ferdinand gratuated from the high-school in Dusseldorf, attended the military school in Cassel and starting from 1885, he was an officer in the Prussian army and guard. As a student of Universities of Tübingen and Lipsea, he had as professors, among others, Wundt, the philosopher, Kupier, the historian of the crusades, Friedeberg, the expert in the canonic law, etc.

61. Encyclopedia Britanica, 9, Chicago,London-Toronto, 1860,p.l68

79 In 1881 and 1886, together with his father, he payed visit, to his uncle, King Carol of Romania, who urged him to become the heir to the Kingdom. The young Prince had promised, and, the future and his deeds perfectly confirmed that his acts would be animated by a sincere and deep love of the country which he was going to serve with all his powers, following the examples of the Kings and Princes who had been worthy of its history. In 1890, he was elected, member of honor of the Romanian Academy. Then he took the opportunity to delight the public with a scholarlydissertation, presented in an ex­ tremely beautiful and elegant form, about Romanian culture and literature. In 1892, Ferdinand married Mary of Great Britain and Ireland, a woman chosen by destiny to fit him, both of them eventually contributing of the happiness and the political unity of the state of the Romanian nation. But first of all, Ferdinand went throught a hard military career, under the strict discipline imposed by the King on himself and on his heir, the heir of the country being promoted to the rank of Army corps general and inspector of the army. He travelled all over Romania and got accustomed with his people and riches, studied its past, made a summary of its present and correctly sketched the future of the Romanian state and people. Ferdinand himself was a brave soldier who lay stress on the army, on its power, being convinced that its would help the people achieve national unity and liberty. In 1913, Ferdinand was the supreme commander of the Romanian army in Bulgaria. Although he was concerned with the preparations of the negotiations with the Entante, in 1914-1916, he donated one million lei to the girl-orphanage in Iași and 200 thousand lei to the war invalids; and, in 1916, he offered 1.250.000 lei to the poor, living in the Kingdom. Ashe never lost hope and faith in the justice of forging Greater Romania, riot even in the hardest and darkest moments, during the years 1916-1918. Fate offered him,asa symbol of theaccomplishement of the Romanians’ golden dream, the great satisfaction of travelling across Transylvania, Bucovina, Bessarabia and the Banat, after the 2 years of vagrancy in Iași, which however, became a fortress of the Romanians’ last resistance, during the war years between 1916-1918.

80 In 1919, the King entered Hungary’s capital, being the only one among the Allied leaders who entered the capital of a defeated country. Ferdinand took personally part in the commemorations of Stephen the Great, Andrei Șaguna, , in the meetings of the Romanian Academy, in the inauguration of the Universities of Cluj, Cernăuți, of the Polytechnics in Timișoara. The King consid­ ered the land reform and the universal vote to be two of the happiest achievments of his reign. In 1924, together, with Queen Mary, during a diplomatic journey of 2 months, he thanked France, England, Belgium for the help given for the creation of Greater Romania, and, in his will, he offered 50 millions lei to différend cultural and charity institutions in the country. Feeling his end was drawing near, the King ended his will with the following words: “Until the ends of my days, I do dearly pray God to bless the fate of the Romanian people, and give the future King of United Romania - two years before he died, he disinheritedhiselder son,having considered him unworthy-all God’s help so that he, should in his turn strenghten and enrich the national inheritance by closely joining the powers and qualities of the Roma­ nians of all social strata”. His death, which occurred on the 20-th’of July, 1927, brought about the sincere and profound mourning of all Romanians for the first King of Greier Romania, finding his place in eternity, next to the first King of Small Romania, in the Cathedral of Curtea de Argeș (see, Minerva, Enciclopedia Română, Cluj, 1929, p. 441-442). Ferdinand has a very endawed wife, chosen by Carol who firmly put an end to the short idyll between Prince heir and Elena Văcărescu, Mary, half English, half Russian was the second daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh - the son of Queen Victoria of Great Britain - married to a great Russian Duchess, daugh ter of Alexander the 11 Ird ’s wife.62 Thus Mary was the niece of Great Britain’s Queen and of Russia’s Tsarina, and, on her grandparents’ side, cousin to Tsar Nicolae the IInd of Russia and to, the King George the Vth of England. Her education was and kept being very7 English, Mary ’s anti-German- Austrian spirit grew even stronger and more mature after her marriage

62.N.Iorga., Istoria românilor, p.363

81 to Ferdinand, whcm she was only 17 years old. Even when, for reason of etiquette and courtesy, she was asked to help the members of Legations of Austro-Hungary' in Bucharest to be well received in society, the young wife of the Prince-heir did not hesitate to give Carol a reply, well-known for its humor and much disscused at that time, namely, that it used to be “extremely difficult to make an Austrian popular”. Czernin soon discovered his enemy who would not know or would not like to hide her feelings and, like anybody who feared something, or, rather, a certain thing, he concluded in an exagerated and wrong way, that, after the expected death of the old King in the near future, Romania’s policy would be made only by the future queen, Mary, who, being initiated in the politics by her very uncle Would take Ecaterina the IInd and Maria Tereza as models for her political ambitions.“ Still, Czernin obviously lost both the sense of proportions and the comparative one, as the Queen’s policy had nothing in common with the policy of the quoted Queens; on the contrary, the opposition betwen them was obvious. The Princess and later, Queen Mary, although she came from the great dynasties of the world, adjusted herself to her adoptive country and loved it so dearly that she came to be a firm supported of the applications of the principle of the nationalities in Eastern Europe, that meant to bring about the destruction of the great Kingdoms and Empires, built in the past by the sword of the powerful and greedy conquerors. Diplomatic parties were organized in Bucharest by the friends of the Central Powers, in order to try a reconciliation with Princess Mary. She kept being deaf to such challeges and, more than that she helped the initiators notice and make sure, by direct experience, willingly or not, of the validity of the F rench saying: “il n’y a pas le pire sourd que celui qui ne veut pas entendre”. After she had publicly declared, in loud voice, that she better liked Nicolas the IInd (her relatives) then Wilhelm the IInd (her husband’s relative), she kept repeating it at such parties, with prearranged effect, that, honesty and sincerity being the best thing in the world, she had been, was and

63. Idem Supt trei Regi, pp. 199-200

82 would always be “the friend of her friends”. The furios and disap­ pointed Czernin, noted with grudge, and, from his point of view, the conclusion couldnot have been different, that “the wickedness of this high lady”, but he could not help admiring and honoring her skill and remarkable idealism, which would push her towards a basic role in Romania. Czernin did also try his luck with the Prince, asking him about his plans concerning Romania’s direction. The answer was unexpect­ edly firm and sincere. Ferdinand said that his feelings and thoughts would follow the spirit and will of the nation. Romania did not want war with Russia, by any means. This being the decissive factor, the Prince also said that the principle was unbeatable, and therefore, such a war, desired by Czernin, could not take place. The Austro-Hungar­ ian diplomat, an influential man, with a solid position in politics did not expect such an answer, but he did not lose his temperând retorted, with a view to defeat him morally, bring him to order an teach him a lesson once and for ever. He said plainly an severely that Ferdinand’s duty of honor, that of the country as well, was to join the Central Powers (the war had already begun); any other attitude or orientation being would have meant a simple and miserable treason. However, Ferdinand was undisturbed and curtly replied that Romania knew its duty of honour, but in the real sense of the notion. The country- needed no stormy influences from outside in order to understand and correctly choose the way of its duty of honor.64 The enemies of the Romanians started to understand, with displeasure and irritation, the real dimensions of the great personali­ ties, Ferdinand and Mary. But, soon after this, their Romanian sub­ jects, of which some used to look at them with distrust, gossiping or making fun of them, had to realize that the shy and hesitanting Ferdinand was faithful to his country and nation and was a more reliable, a better and a more devoted Romanian than many Romani­ ans. He proved to be a firm sovereign, determined to achieve his options once expressed and stamped in treaties, even with the price of certain great and painful personal or public sacrificies. Of course,

64. Ibidem pp.200-201

83 the diplomats of Central Powers still tried to make King Ferdinand abandon neutrality and join them, but his answer kept being as dignified and correct as previously. Such a decision could only be made by.the Romanian nation, by its legislative bodies and, until it was changed-one way or another, as the King spoke in principle and formally, without getting engaged or promising anything on behalf of the country - the neutrality was to be strictly preserved.65 This answer was a way of delicately avoiding pressures and of preserving the Throne’s and the govermcnt’s the liberty of action. Mary wrote many letters to her imperial cousins, described them the regionsand areas inhabited by Romanians in Austro-Hungary, sketched and drew maps, in order to help them understand the real ethnic situation in the great Western empire. She wanted to draw especially King George’s attention where these regions were situated, knowing that he wasn’t goodatgeography,eversincehischildhood, as they had used to study geography with the same teacher. In her correspond­ ence, Mary insisted that the powerful should help the weak,-the oppressed, the miserable ones, liberating them from foreign slavery, so that they should also enjoy the light of freedom and of national unity. Through Queen Mary, Romania had wide access to certain powerful friends of the principle of nationalities, of national autodétermination, startingfrom 1918.She,themotherof the wounded and of the poor, kept being a strong enemy of the Central Powers, a faithful friend of the Entante, for the creation, with its support, of the state of all Romanians66,yet, there were little souls,that looked only at

65. Ibidem, p.205-206 66. Mary, who was an intelligent natural and honest woman, did not hesitate in politics, since by her birth, education and adoption, after her marriage to Ferdinand of Romania, since an intimate.ftndamentaland indis tructible communion between herself and the country was estamblished. The Queen was honestly involved in politics, since she was part of her country and she also spoke out her convicyions, orally and in wirting, as she was both sincere and optimistic, Mary never needed an answer concerning Romanian’s option in the war, as the ansver was deep in her mind and heart; here is the confession she made: “ 1 kept believing in my star all over my life and now, in the most difficult moments, the Heavenly Providence, in her compassions has decided that Romania and myself should shave the same thought”, see Maria, Regina României, Povestea vie{iinuleycA. II, București, 1991, p.391. The Queen noted that, as far back as in January, 1915, her husband warned the Kaiser that, irrespective ofhis power, he would be one with the Romanian people, for the Romanian’s emancipation from the Hungarian domination. As King of Romania, he was bound by the oath he had taken, to serve the 84 the unessential, judging only the woman and forgetting the great Queen on purpose, criticizing her and trying to cast shade on her merits. The same little souls, some of them friends of the Central Powers, would not forgive Ferdinand, either, for his options, in the orientation of the Romanian foreign policy. But both the Kingand the Queen, after the country had overcome terrible hardships, humility and suffering, acted like great and real soverigns, forgiving them all. In the years of the neutrality, as it often happened in the past, public opinion in Romania, proved to be nervous, impatient and failed to understand or did not want to that discretion was much needed. The press, the Parliament as well as the man in the street were for Romania’s immediate declaration of war, against the Central Powers. Voices were heard criticizing, this time, from different positions, the King and Brätianu, for hesitation, appeasement or, even worse, they were suspected andaccused of “treason”. Brätianu, “The Sphynx” of Bucharest, was a mistery both for the Central Powers and their few Romanian friends, and for the Entante and its numerous Romanian supporters. In fact, Brätianu was so shrewd and keen-minded in keeping the secret and in hiding the real face of official politics, that nobody could understand his attitude and orientation, no matter how, much they wanted to. Of course, the diplomats of the Central Powers tried their luck in winning Brätianu over to their side, promising him Bessarabia, Bucovina from the Austrians, or Transylvania’s autonomy from Hungary, Berlin having nothing against the possible further people. If Italy broke its neutrality with Germany.Romania would steop on this way. The Kaiser did not take Ferdinand seriously and adopted a sort of " conceited indifference" towards the Royal family in Bucharest. Mary senta letter to kind George by General Arthur Paget, esuring him that Romanian's feelings were against Austro- Hunagry and germany, and that the country counted on “it" for strong support in the fulfimet of “its national dreamiTransylvania". In May 1915, she wrote the secont letter to England’s King, at Bratianu’s request who wasconvincend who was convinced that" it would be received with more attention than a nythingelse”. In the Irtter, Mary told him about Arad, as the centre ofthe Romanian political interest in Hungary, a Kingof leding forum of the movement, about the fact that in Transylvania and the Banat were mainly inhabited by Romanians more numerous titan the Hungarians, the Germans, the Serbians, etc.Thereforme, there was nothing “abnormal” in Romanian’s claims, that were justified by life and by the ethnic reality. Mary warned George that Bucovina had been kikdnapped from the Romanians in 1775, and, certain regions of it should not be given to Russia, that had also taken Bassarabia away from the Romanians. If Austro- Hungary broke up, Bucovina and not to Russia, with its 200,000 Ruthenians, as against the 1,500,000 Romanians, see Idem,op.cit.,vol III. pp. 35-41 85 step, that is a future union with Romania. But this alternative was firmly rejected by Budapest. The result was the same as that obtained from the King, since the two major factors of power acted and responded to pressures the same way. Germany’s attack on Belgium, the terrible bombarding of Liège, Namur, of the university city of Louvain and of its library, the shooting of civilian Frenchmen and the destruction of the cathedral in Reims revolted the Romanians who started considering Wilhelm the IInd a second Attila67. But public opinion in Romania was worried and desperate especially because of the massive mobilization of the Romanians in Austro-Hungary, by their being sent on the front,on the first line, in order to die for causes that were alien and hostile to their people. The same devilish system was used by Tisza with the South­ ern slavs in Hungary, sending them to die fighting against Serbia and Russia; this could have brought h im a double advantage, reducing the number of his external and internal enemies through themselves. According to incomplete satistics 449,769 Trasylvanian Romanians, out of 500,000 mobilized in the Austro-Hungarian armies, fought on the first line. Out of them 41,737 died on the front then while in hospitals, inprisonmentor jailother 11,275 died. In the Banat, 115,000 Romanian young men fought on the front other 90,000 were the sedentary part; of these 10,000 died in combat, 3,100 in hospitals and prisons, 6,300 were left invalid and 6000 disappeared.68 From the very beginning, Iorga maintained compassionately, that the memory of those who had died under foreign flag and command, would be rewared by another flag, that as going tobe raised higher and higher, namely that of the national achievement and evolution of all Romanians, and their offsprings. Some Romanian young men menaged to flee to Romania, during 1914-1916, about 26,000 of them; and Vasile Lucaciu did the same thing, at the beginning of the war, in order to make ready in liberty and spirit for the union of Transylvania and Bucovina with the Kingdom of Romania. The League for the Political Unity of all the Romanians, the National Action, the Unionist Federation and others, organized

67. N Iorga, Supt frei Regi, P.190 68. Șt. Pascu op. cit.,p. 359 86 by the brothers over the Carpathians, acted in the same way. A strong and concentrated external campaign was started in order to attract friends, with a view to faster the process of dividing up Austro- Hungary, strongly supported by France, Italy, England, USA. Meanwhile, Brătianu, a cunning man, as well as cold-blooded and calm, advised the leadership of the Romanian National Party to adopt a cautious and moderate attitude, not be fatally hit by the heavy’ hand of the Government in Budapest and in order to ensure its existence for the events that were to come. Nicolae Filipescu wished the new King Ferdinand, in public and in loud voice, to triumfantly enter Alba Iulia with his armies or to heroically die on Turda Plain, that was more than a hint at the necessity of putting into practice of some firm and immediate decisions for the achievement of the fundamental claims of the people. Later on, Filipescu undertook a documentary journey to Russia, acting for Romania’s joining the Entante in the war that was also wanted by the crowds of people, demonstrating in the streets of Bucharest, for their crossing the Carpathians. In the Parliament N.Titulescu declared that under those circumstances, Romania had to do everything to save its unity and integrity, but that could never be so without Transylvania and without sacrifices. Transylvania was the cradle and the school that protected Romanian’schildhood and created the nation, that was why there was no Romanian life that was not ready to die for it and nobody would spare any effort for its achievement.69 In August 1916, after long, secret and minute négociations, the dice were cast by the conclusion of the political and military Treaty with England, France, Italy and Russia, regarding Romania’s joining the war - for the liberation of Transylvania and Bucovina, a moment that marked the beginning of the War for National Union of the Romanians. King Ferdinand and Brătianu let the Council of the Crown know the text, the content and the terms of the Treaty that

69. General data about the internal events, including the Council of the Crown in 1916, in N. Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. X,pp. 333-337-360; Bratianu, op.ciL, pp.283- 286; Șt. Pascu, op. dr., pp. 373-381. For the years 1897-1915 and following, up to 1924, concret and interesting data in Alexandru, Marghiloman, Note politice,vol.I-V, București, 1917;olderdata in Ti tu Mi'mtcscu, Istoria contemporanăaRomâniei(l6f>6-1900), București, 1925 87 brought about enthusiasm and received the moral approval of the majority of the participants. But they also brought about sever criti­ cism and reserves of the minority represented by conservative politi­ cians, such as P.P.Carp, Alexandru Marghiloman, Titu Maiorescu, Theodor Rosetti. Carp, asked by the King to help and support his decisions and those of the government, put off his speech, motivating that the ministers and the leaders of the parties had to speak first, as the responsability was theirs, especially because they adopted “la politique du fait accompli”. When he came to speak, Carp started from the premise thaL Russia and not Germany was the great danger for the Romanian state and accused the King, and the Government, as well as the timeliness of the Treaty with the Entante, in an open, rough and vehement way, as he had always done in his parliamentary or political past. Ferdinand further replied that he also acknowledged the Russian danger, but, if the war with Austro-Hungary and Germany was won and T ransylvania and Bucovina were freed, a state of almost 14 milion citizens could defend itself against it better that one of 7 milion. Carp, an obstinate politician, faithful only to his beliefs, reminded the King that Ger­ many and the Hohenzollerns, unbeaten ever since Napoleon, were unbeatable and he even hinted that, by his “adventurous” policy, the King was after destroying the Romanian state and army, exposing them to such a great power. Ferdinand assured him that, with the support of the great allies, the German army could be defeated and later on, giving other replies to the supporters of the Central Powers or encouraging their enemies, he also denied that the Germans and the Hohenzollerns were unbeatable, using his example, who over­ came his German heart and got engaged in the fight against his native country. The philo-German party was afraid that, once Russia would win, supported by its great allies, and by Romania, it would lay hands on Bosporus and Dardanelles ajid fataly hit the little and middle states in the Carpathian - Balkan region, locked in a stifling cage. The King replied that he was not that much afraid of Russia, but he emphasized that if Russia got to the straits, it was better for Romania as its ally, and not its enemy. Brătianu replied that Romania’s ideal was the national

88 unity of all the Romanians and that was why it could not go on being externally neutral in the war at its borders, without suffering a con­ temptuous moral death, since Romania could not be sure that those circumstances would ever occur again. In order to calm down those who stated the invincibility of Germany and therefore of its allies too, Brätianu used Italy as an example which abandoned neutrality, in 1915. Just some decades earlier, although Italy had gone through victories, as well as defeats, in 1848and 1866 (Custozza, Novara, Lissa), in itsown wars for national unity, it still managed to reach its goal in 1859 and 1866 thanks to its well-known and great allies, at that time (France and Prusia). Take lonescu declared that he understood the suffering the King had been through, but the way he chose would be the one to bring h im a brilliant compensation, the love of the Romanian people. He said that the Romanians in Transylvania and Bucovina were waiting for the King’s intervension, that of the Government and of the Romanian army, the way one would wait for Messiah. He added that those present had to be neither Russophyles, nor Germanophyles, but just Romanians. Titu Maiorescu, whom the King had vainly tried to attract on to his side, one day before the Council met, was wrong when affirming that the Romanians in Transylvania did not want the union with the Romanian Kingdom. Indignant, Take lonescu and Ionel Brätianu specified that the leaders of the Romanians in Transylvania did not express their own desire to get united with Romania in front of him, as they knew his views and options favorable to the Central Powers. But several times, even before the war, they expressed their desire thaL the Kingdom should break them free from Austro-Hungarian oppresion, as soon as possible, because if the process of Magyarization and Germaniza tion continued, discouragement wouId be generalized and if th ings were pu t off for too long, they would be likely to flee from their ancient country. The Prime-minister lay stress, with great satisfaction on the great success achieved by the cause of the Romanians, since its fundamental interests had been recognized by the four great powers for the first time in its recent history. The national unity was also a matter of fundamental moral option, and those who were against the

89 war against the Central Powers were disconsidering both the success and the necessity to save the Romanians in Transy lvania and Bucovina. Both him and Take Ionescu affirmed that Michael the Brave was great for the Romanians consciousness for the very reason that he entered Transylvania and so would be King Ferdinand who, after having crosses the Carpathians, would be regarded as the best Roma­ nian by the whole nation,and the dynasty would be rather a Romanian than a foreign one. Indeed, the Sovereign himself told Carp that the Romanians had not invited his uncle to create a German dynasty in Romania, but a Romanian one, in its content and feelings. Carp replied that the royal philoantantist and anti-German policy would also endanger the inter­ ests of the German dynasty in Bucharest, that would be removed from the throne by the victorious and revengeful Berlin. Old Carp did not offer any personal support to the foreign policy adopted by the Throne and by the Government and stated that the Royal Romanian Army should rather be defeated than contribute to Russia’s victory. But the King answered that such words were said just out of anger and irritation and they were not sincere. Then, P.P.Carp offered his sons without giving up his views of which, one would die in the war for the Union, but Brătianu, more nervous and indignant, turned down his offer on moral grounds. Finally, the King urged all the present statesmen and politicians to follow his example, to surpass them­ selves, give up their contradictory convictions and sincerely and loyally support the Romanian Government and army in these decisive moments.70 The break of the War for national union was well prepared both from the outside and from inside. The responsible factors in Bucha­ rest drew up a concrete plan of internal re-organization of the whole Romanian society, protecting the interests of all the social classes and categories that made up the Romanian nation as a whole. In one word, they thought of creating a country’ that was meant to be real mother to

70. Iorga N, op. at., pp. 360-364. Mary confessed that Ferdinand had to face the phy - locentrals in the Council; he considered that it was his duty to join Bratianu and the others. The Queen wanted “ Nando” ‘s supreme sacrifice for the country to be biassed in romanian’s interest, see Idem, Povestea..., vol.III, p. 68; Marghiloman, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 148-157,380-381 ’90 all her sons and daughters. King Ferdinand and Brătianu, the leader of the liberals and of the Government had decided already in 1914 tha t Romania would carry out all the European fundamental democratic reforms. In 1915, the “Conservative” Nicu Filipescu told Take Ionescu, the leader of the Conservative-Democratic Party that, since between them there was a perfect agreement concerning the foreign policy as to quickening Romania’s entering the war against the Central Powers, he and the supporters of his ideas and of his party would act in a determined way for the expropriation of the big land owners and for the land reform as well as for the universal suffrage. The King’s option for reforms did away even with the last reservations in this matter, so for instance, there was an extremely great difference, between the boyars in 1907, and the “boyars” in 1914-1918. In the context of the hots events to come, an extraordinary solidarity was acheived the members of the same nation, especially because in the fight for Transylvania and Bucovina, and later for Bessarabia too, the rich and the poor died together. That also holds good for the generals, the highly-educa ted officers, the uneducated or almost uneducated soldiers the conservatives, the liberals, the social­ democrats, with or without a party, the Christians, as well as the atheists. Soon, the dramatic but heroic cry of death for the cause of the nation produced and strengthened a solidarity, unknown before, between the King and the soldier, the poor and the bishop, between the leaders, and the rank and file. Consequently, the great agricultural and electoral reforms, as well as others, concerning Christian tolarance, open to universality for those who were weak and made the word join the deed and life, in the epoch of Ferdinand and Mary. In the middle of August 1916, King Ferdinand ordered the Romanian Royal Army tocross the Mountains in order to achieve once and for all what Michael the Brave had achieved for only one moment. The insults of the German and Austro-Hungarian public opinion addresed to Hohenzollern the “traitor”, to Brătianu the “sly” or, to the “vallachian”, Queen Mary, greedy for Hungarian blood, who went out in the streets of Bucharest in order to stir the crowds against Budapest, in order to steal the “pearl” from St. Stephen’s crown, that is Transylvania, had but confirmed the major role of these personali­ ties in the War for National Union, as well as the fact that they 91 identified themselves with the deepest and most legitimate aspira­ tions of all Romanians. Apocalyptic punishments were reserved for the Queen, whose mouth was to be filled with earth by the brave and rightly-revengeful Hungarian army and for all the “liars” and “trai­ tors” in Romania.7' In Berlin, the chief of the Hohenzollern family, Kaiser Wilhelm the Il-nd, excluded Ferdinand I from the family. But the King, in the hard moments fate did not spare him in the following years, kept stating that, if he met the Emperor, he would not be the one to blush,* 72 since it was in Germany that he learnt that, before life and origin, the most precious thing in the world was the profound sense of duty and of eternal respect for the oath taken. Thus, the King, who had taken an oath on the Constitution of the Kingdom, when he was crowned, though that his only real and legal obligation was that of being the first servant of the Romanian state and nation. Ferdinand was determined to be a man of duty and of honor, in the real sens of the word, up to the end. He had nothing to reproach himself and he had no reasons to blush. King Ferdinand, Queen Mary, Prime-minister Brătianu, other Romanian politicians and their policy was vehemently criticized and condemned by Andrassy Gyula - junior,73 as well as by many other Hungarian politicians and journalists in the Parliament of Budapest, in the press. Such attacks were being pronounced in speeches and in prose, as well as in the article A roman betöres74 and even in Portik Andor’s poem Mefimozdult ujra Bukarest.75 Of course, during the War of Union, there were both heroic moments and discouraging ones, both victories and defeats, benefic strategic solutions and, on the contrary, inactivity and malign atti­ tudes, bearers of misfortunes, caused by internal or external condi­ tions and weakeness. The unispired appointement of certain generals of no-value or perspective, such as Iliescu, Petala, Grăiniceanu, Popovici or Socec were accompanied by the affirmation in the Army Headquarters of great values and military talent. Such generals of

~l\.E.llenzek, XXXVII, nr. 196-29-th of August, 1916, p. 1-2 72. N Iorga., Supt trei Regi, p.255 HEllenzek, XXXVII,nr. 197-30-th of August, 1916, p. 1 74. Idem, nr. 201-the 4-th of September 1916, p.2 75. Idem, nr 199-the 1-st of September, 1916, pp. 2-3 92 European value as Äverescu, Prezan, Grigorescu, Cristescu, Mardarescu had fought heroically. These were joined by the authors of terrible and firm blows, given to the enemy: Moșoiu, Razoviceanu, Broșteanu. At top of the military pyramid stored those who highly sacrificed themselves during 1916-1919-generalsofa happy memory such as Praporgescu, Dragalina, Poetaș. They died to defend their foreruners’ land, together with their officers and soldiers. In 1916, the Romanian soldiers boldly fought in the regions of Sibiu, Brașov in the regions inhabited by Seckiers; where general Prezan, self-confi- dently, led his army, ready to go Westwards, but in the first part of the war no defendance fortifications had been built in the Carpathians. The German-Austrian-Hungarian counter offensive led by Falkenhayn, drove the troops of the Romanian Royal Army away from Transylvania and they made their way back to the Kingdom, after the soldiers of the Central Powers, armed with appropiate and superior war technique, crushed the heroic Romanian resistence in the Carpathians and wrent Southward. But at Oituz, their access to the East was stopped by Eremia Grigorescu’s troops, that defeated the troops of the Central Powers, sternly telling them there was “No très passing”. The defeat atTurtucaia brought about the lossofDobrudja. Thecrossingof the DanubeatZimniceaby the impetuous Mackensen was due to some mistakes and weakness as well as to some external shortcomings. These were caused by the fact that the Russian soldiers failed to get simultanously engaged in Dobrudja, in the Nothern Carpathians and that the attack at Salonic was not backed up by the passive and meditative General Sarrail. In the terrible fight for the defence of Bucharest, the Romanian Royal Army put the enemy troops in great difficulty, being vers- close to victory’, once, but the grave bad luck of the fall of the officers and of the secret military plans in the attackers’ hand, as well as the same techincal superiority, were finally decissive and on the 6-th of December, the German, Austro- Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish troops entered the capital of the Kingdom. In the dramatic moments of the retreat from Bucharest, King Ferdinand eagerly looked for Henri Mathias Berthelot, but, not finding him, he told a French officer to let the general and France

93 know that he did not regret anything, that if he had to start all over again, he would act just like he did in August 1916. The Sovereigns, the Government, the army withdrew to Moldavia and thousands of Romanians accompanied the political authorities and the national army in their retreat. The refugges suffered of cold, of hunger and diseases, many of them never returned home. Those who stayed on in the occupied territory had to suffer the humiliation and outrage of the proud, self-confident winners. Uncon­ scious Romanian voices were heard, multiplied in geometrical pro­ gression, in 1918, who pronounced the King, Brătianu and their Government “quilty”, for the disaster of the country, or, even “trai­ tors”. But the conscience of those blamed was clear and responsible since, for any clear mind, the great deeds could certainly be achieved only by equally great and hard human and material sacrifice. In 1917, the Central Powers hoped to crush the Romanians, chase the King, the Queen, the ministers, the generals and their soldiers into the Russian huge steppes, where they would disappear for good, so that Hungary and Austria could own Transylvania and Bucovina for good. But the Romanian Army destroyed their plans, pushed back the enemy’s from and with anemic help from the Russians, inclined towards pacifism, crushed the impetuous and scientifically prepared attacks of the same “front-crusher”, Mackensen. Meanwhile, the national troops had been endowed with modern equipment and weapons sent from the West, through Russia, through Arhanghelsk and Murmansk and trained by the military mission of the great allies."’ Mărășcști, Mărăști and Oituz gladly proved the friends and the enemies frightening them, that Small Romania existed, it did not run away to foreign lands, that on the little territory preserved by its brave army the Romanian flag was raised. National dignity, as well as the hope in the creation of Greater Romania were flourishing in the

76. About the War of National Union, in Constantin Kirițescu, Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României, vol. 1-11, București, Idem, Ion I. C. Brătianu în pregătirea războiului de întregire, București, 1936; Iorga,N., Războiul nostru în note zilnice. București, 1920; Idem, Supt trei Regi, pp.210-259, with many accents and criticalno les; Idem, Istoria românilor, vol. X. pp.343-415; Ion Bulei, Arcul așteptării, București, 1918; Ioan Cupșa, Annota română în campaniile din anii 1916-1911, București, 1967 94 famous battles of 1917. The soldiers from Kingdom were helped by Romanian volunteers from Transylvania and Bucovina, former sol­ diers of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial army, prisoners of war in Russia who had been freed to their request, in order to fight against the Central Powers. In the MeetingofDarniça, eventually named the first or the little Alba Iulia, they swore to fight and sacrifice their lives to crush ofAustro-Hungary.forthe union ofTransylvaniaand Bucovina with Romania. King Ferdinand thanked the Romanian soldiers, gave them land; the Parliament in Iași turned to facts voting the law of agricultural reform. The Sovereign assured his soldiers that the war was not started by the Throne and the Government out of vain or ambitions reasons, since life, their only fortune, was too precious to them to be vainly exposed to death. The dead and the survivers of the hard fights of the War for National Union were called by history to achieve the liberty and unity of the whole nation and that was why the Sovereign said that the gratitude of all the living Romanians and of the following generations, would accompany their memory across times. Gradually, first in the small and old Kingdom and later, in the greater one, until 1921,1,393,353 heds of families, either Romanian or not, but citizens of Greater Romania were given 5,811,827 ha of land, six to each in Bessarabia, five in former Romania, four in Transylvania, 2,5 in Bucovina.77 The structure of property was fundamentally changed, the absentee lease holdersand land-owners disappeared all together with the past; estates between 100-500 ha were very few, that small and middle properties being the ones that prevailed. Even if in the first years they met with many difficulties, the peasants managed pay- their taxes with time, adjusting themselves; after a period of eclipse, the export of cereals progressed immediately after the change in the aricultural financial policy and after the year 1933, Romanian agriculture got settled and organized, developing alongside with the othere fields of the national economy. But during those years of Union, the Romanian peasant and soldier, who were most burdened felt both the bitterness and the sweatness of their accomplished dreams; they sincerely loved their

77. V. Georgescu, op. cit.. 212-213 95 Sovereign, with the natural, elementary and deep devotion and love of the man troubled by poverty and needs, considering h im a good and just leader, who stretched his protecting hand, unhesitatingly too. The soldiers of the Romanian Army told everybody they met until 1919, from the East to the West, that they were proud to have fought and to fight for Greater Romania as the soldiers of King Ferdinand. This loyal monarch, Sovereign of the country and of the nation, was, in fact, their first servant too, the man who urged the whole society to respect the law, by the personal example doing his duty, until the Constitution was thoroughy by put into the practice. In fact, on the lists of the expropriated ones, the Romanian Crown was registered with 46,422 ha, the Bishopric of Saint Spiridon in Iași, with 38,669, the Hungarian Countess Christina Wenkheim in Arad, with 31,866 ha, the former conservative Prime-Minister Al. Maghiloman with 3,668 ha.78 79 King Ferdinand, a sensitive and extremely faithful man,much more religious than Carol, grew up in the Bismarkian atmosphere, more reserved as far as church and faith were concerned, but felt the love of the soldier and of the ordinary man for him. The King understood why the Queen had spent great sums of money in order to help the wounded, thepoor Moldavians and, in his turn, loved his soldiers, until the end of his life. In the following years, he would often mention them in his official speeches, at different receptions, would bless their memory on different occasions that often had nothing to do with peasants or agriculture. The Sovereing kept believing in the justice *of reforms, in the democratic evolution of the Romanian society. In the most dramatic moments of the war when others thought that everything was lost, Ferdinand, with deep belief in his eyes and mind, did firmly say that the goals of terrible fight would be finally reached, that the time when Transylvania and Bucovina would be united with the Kingdom” would soon come. Surprised by the statements of the “shy one”, some tried to explain the King’s “fa­ natic” attitude by his “mistic” conscience, by a faith that came from his profoundly religious spirit.

78. Ibidem., p. 213 79. N. Iorga., Supt trei Regi, p. 262 96 Romania’s political and military situation suddenly worsened in the autumn and winter of 1917. If Russia of the Romanov and of Kerenski’s was the friend of Romania’s cause, Lenin’s came to be its determined enemies. The German secret services gave Lenin armored trains, gold, printing houses, other material support in order to overh t on Kerenski, by a coûp d’état, in order to get Russia out of the war, anda separate peace should be concluded with the Central Powers.80 Once spread on the Eastern front, the German troops could turn to the Western one, in order to attack decisively. F rom their point of view, the fulfilment of their plan was imperiously necessary be­ cause this way they could anihilate the consequences of 1 million American soldiers’ joining the Entante in the war, in 1917. Especially after the coup d’etat on the 7-th of November, but also before, the Russian Bolshevik soldiers left the front lines in Moldavia, that had to be cnvered by the rest of 1,083,000 Romanian soldiers81,engaged in the war for National Union. That they made several attempts to undermine Romania, trying to arrest the Sovereignsand the Govern­ ment of the country by plunderingand killing the civilian population. The situation of Small and Free Romania became extremely critical, was being “negotiated” in Moldavia, while occupied Roma­ nia was plundered by the Central Powers and their small allies. The natural resources were exhausted by the two huge armies friends for a while and by the many civilian refugees. The continuous plundering of the territory by the Russian Bolsheviks would have brought the country to disaster.Therefore in spite of the unmotivated reserves of some Romanian politicians, as to the eventual fight with their former friends, who had meanwhile become powerful enemies, Prezan and Razoviceanu imposed their firm decision and turn to repress evil by the evil, then more than necessary and benefic, by a quick military intervention. The anarchist Bolsheviks in Iași were repressed, their leaders and instigators, who wanted to arrest the Royal family, were killed. At Galați, Pașcani and other places, the Romanians had to fight against the red Russians in order to draw them out of Moldavia.82

80. Ibidem p. 257 81. The figure in M. Mușat, Ardeleanu, op. tit., p. 504 82. N. Iorga, Istoria Românilor, vol. X,

97 Meanwhile, Lenin deprived the Romanian state of its treasure, for ever, consisting in 315,580,456 gold lei, taken to in December, 1916, in order to save it form theCentral Powers.83 8485 In these dramatic conditions, the Romanian Army, threatened by Bolsheviks from behind, left alone to face its old enemies, the Romanian Government, equally threatened, were forced to sign the Armistice of Focșani, in December 1917,after which Averescu negociated and Marghiloman signed the Peace Treaty of Buftea- Bucharest. Its singing was also forced,after Lenin and Troțki had signed the peace at Brest Litovsk,in order to start the terrible inner slaughter at home. The German troops entered Ucraina and sur­ rounded Small Romania whose situation was “rediscussed” in Moldavia. According to the Peace Treaty signed on the 7-th of May 1918, Romania lost in the East Dobrudja to the Central Powersand in the West, a stretch from the Carpathians, with 170 villages, taken by Austro-Hungary ,M The plansof the German secret services, of aiming their blows westwards seemed to be successful after they had man­ aged to put Russia and Romania on bad terms with each other out of the war. On the other hand, the Central Powers diplomatically sup­ ported the vote expressed on the 28th of March - 9th of April, 1918, at Chișinau, for the Union of Bessarabia with Romania, following the traditional line of pushing Romania Eastward, and struggling against in theWest. Furthermore, Romania’seconomy was supposed to come under German control, which was going to “look after” itsindustry, finances and trade. According to the plans of the German diplomat Ktihlmann, the whole country was supposed to became a kind of “back garden” of Imperial Germany,85 the way it used to be for the Ottoman Empire, a sort of storehouse for cereals and oil, exported through Giurgiu, that was also confiscated for a long while. During the negotiations for the conclusion of the peace with the Centrals, the latter, together with some anti-Entante Romanian

83. M. Mușat, I. Ardeleanu, op.cit., p. 504 84. V. Georgescu, op.cit., p. 183 85. N. Iorga, Supt mi Regi, p. 271 98 politicians, Stere and Carp, proposed that Hohenzollern the “traitor” should be dethroned.86 Stere motivated that by the chosen foreign policy, the very7 principle of dynasty and the dynasty itself be “confis­ cated” by one party, namely Brätianu’s party. That was why he suggested that Ferdinand should be replaced by Josef of Habsburg, i.e. by a“powerful” dynasty, above parties. Besides the fact that such a monarch would have perfectly suited Carp’s and Stere’soptions, we wonder, from a purely theoretical point of view,expecting an answer with a mere rethorical value, hadFerdinand chosen their foreign alternative, i.e. the fight against the Entante, would he still have been labelled as a weak and helpless King, serving any party? General Averescu insisted on King Ferdinand’s keeping the throne and he was supported by the very Feldmarshal Mackensen, who understood that his enemy had done his duty, that could not be desired,even if he had been defeated. Averescu was ready to speak with Kaiser Wilhelm the IInd personally, so that the King and the Queen should not be de­ throned. Inorder to save the legal and constitutional dynasty, thePrime- Minister, Alexandru Marghiloman,although he wasagainst the Entante himself, and, the Emperor King Carol of Austro-Hungary out of reasons of dynastic solidarity, agreed to give up their plans to dethrone Ferdinand. At the meeting at Răcăciuni, between Czernin andKing Ferdinand the Austro-Hungarian politician was extremely rude with Romania’s Sovereign. He insulted him, took revenge and humiliated Ferdinand when he told him that he has allowed to keep the throne only out of “mercy” and with the express condition that the would accept and immediately put into practice the conditions of the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers.8’Marghiloman’sgovernmentorgan- ized elections all over Romania including the territories still occu­ pied, in Moldavia as well that though not occupied, for the Parliament that was going to approve of the Peace at Buftea. During the elections, the German and Austro-Hungarian se- *87

86 Ibidem p.255. Other attacks against the King and Br2tianu, against the liberal Parliament preferred by the worcher’s party, N. Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. X., p.391 87. Idem Supt trei Regi, p.273

99 creț service, aș well as the Bulgarian and Turkish ones, deliberately tried to stress the inter-Romanian social conflicts, to stir the spirits against King Ferdinand and Queen Mary, against the politicians who led Romania to“disaster”, in 1916.M The German secret services seemed to continue Russia’s policy in Romania too, on a smaller scale, meaning that they used to support and incite certain unconscious Romanian socialists and anarchist, to destroy it and pull down what had been left, by internal disorders and further on, by a possible civil war. In the Parliament of “shame” in Iași, where the supporters of the Central Powers had obtained overwhelm ing majorities. The King and the Queen, Brätianu and his supporters were often vulgarly attacked, and certain politicians were saying that the former liberal prime-minister had to be tried as a “traitor”. King Ferdinand, who did not lose hope in the future victory of the Romanian cause and in the union of Transylvania and Bucovina with the Kingdom, even in these tragic and painful moments, avoided to ratify the Buftea-Bucharest Treaty. Queen Mary, who was firmly against its conclusions, kept alive the flame of the spirit of 1916,speaKing to be heard both by friends and by enemies, that the future of a nation could be killed by nobody and in no circumstance, however dramatic it mightbe.’9 In fact, everybody kept very close to the Entante. What Ferdinand was really convinced ever since his youth, that the army hadagreatrole, in a future war with Austro-Hungary and itsallies,and that the great military and political talents of the Kingdom, who thought like their King and closely cooperated with him, were con­ cerned with the preservation of the Romanian army and of the state, no matter the sacrifice,the territorial price or humiliation. They had 8889

88. Iorga, N., op. cit., p. 280-282 89. Even Marygot scared of herself when, in spite of the disaster that was obvious to many people, in spite of Romanian's being abandoned and threatened, she did not agree with separate peace. After a discussion with Prezan and after she had decorated colonel Anderson and his subordinates with the Cross of Queen Mary’s order, a very touching ceremony, the Queen stated: “ It is frightening that nothing can make me give up or let nyself be persuaded", see mary, Povestea..., vol. Ill, p. 379. About the wole period December 1917-May 1918, as well as about the attempts of Carp, Beldiman, Lupu Costachi, Virgil Arion, C.Stere, Nenițescu, in order to dethrone the Royal Dynasty, see Idem, op. cit., pp. 349-416 100 in view chat Small Romania, as striken and humiliated as it was at that time, once saved and existing, did never give up the hope of Greater Romania. The preservation of the state and of the army was meant to preserve the concrete and real instruments of getting back into action under more favourable circumstances in the near future. Consequently, all Romanian politicians and military person­ alities, did their best in order to maintain the Dinasty, that was not only legal, but also deeply, involved in the creation of national unity and preservation of the Romanian Army. In the winter 1917/1918and in the spring of 1918, their merits were even greater, in more than dramatic conditions and under the arrogant pressure of the powerful and revengeful foreigners. Some of them would have liked to have them both destroyed, but their plan was baffled by those who, saving the Dinasty and the Army, implicitly achieved national salvation. In this sense, the great military talent, Averescu, had real merits both in the War for Union and in his unhappy position of Prime-Minister of a defeated state, that started the negotiations with the Central Power. He saved the Dinasty and preserved part of the Romanian Army under the national flag. In this respect, even his successor, Marghiloman, also had certain merits; in spite of some hesitations at the beginning, he continued to defend the Dinasty and the Army and directly contributed to the fulfilment of the first stage in the creation of national unity: the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. He even tried to save Dobrudja, but he did not succeed. Some political personalities in Romania or in the Entante eventually looked at Averescu reprovingly, because he started the negotiations with the Central Powers. But they were nor right, as both his general and his Sovereign had had no choice; they were threatened and had to cross the lake of defeat, and humiliation one way or another. It is true that the conclusion of the separate peace with the Centrals brought about the cancellation of the Treaty of 1916, but everyday life and reality richer in content than any paper written and stamped at a certain time, corrected things. Even if the Treaty of 1916, that could contain errors and exaggerations, was never enforced completely, it was applied in its just spirit, that is in the fundamental stipulation of the justice and

101 rightfulness of this nation, with a dramatic history whose territories and materia] resources have been plundered to fulfil its national destiny by creating a unitary state.In fact, the feelings of the King, of the Queen, of the officersand most politicians concerning the Entante kept being the same even in the hard days of 1918. The emotional departure of the Entante diplomats and mili­ tary attaches, at the railway station in Iași, under the terrible pressure of the Central Powers is proof to that.90 On the other hand, the diplomats and officers, of the Entante knew Romania’s dramatic situation much better that their superiors in Italy, France, Great Britain or the U.S.A. That is why they eventu­ ally tried to explain or apologize and openly pleaded for the Treaty of 1916 to be preserved, in spite of the shortcoming in May, 1918. But such voices were repressed by the severe Clemenceau, who would draw Saint-Aulaire’s or Berthelot’s attention that they were not in Romania’s service and neither were they its representatives, but France’s. Nowever, the politicians of the Entante understood Roma­ nia’s tragic geo-political and military situation, the reasons that had forced Romania to sign the separate peace treaty, but they a Iso wanted to “sin” all by herself, without their “blessing” orapproval, forgiving her later. Meanwhile, the former broke up, according to the principle of national self-determination, mathematically and correctly defined, belonging to the majority of the inhabitants of a territory, the only ones who had the right to decide itsfate oraffiliation to a state.After this the rights of the national minorities were to be ensured. Based on self-determination, in different stages from au­ tonomy to independence, Bessarabia voted to unite with Romania.

90. Idem, op. cit., p. 376-386, in ehe decisive moment of the Allie’s mission's departure, May wrote to her coustin, George of England again: “Your Englishmen will tell you how we fought up to the end, even when all the others had surrendered and how I tried to forgive what cannon be forgiven and how I have never lost hope and how I Was ready to get any sacrifice and face any danger: but everything was in vain. We have had no luck and no chance in those circumstances, the story is too long to be written, there will be others to tell it to you and then where yuo are, on victory’s side you will be able to take action for us; as we have tried to fight for you. You wil fight and win and, on victory day, do notforget... I should have rather died with all oursoldiers than say that I had been defeated; for the blood in my viewis still English”, see Idem, op. cil., vol. III. pp. 387-388

102 But the Bolsheviks of Lenin, Troțki, etc., great masters in dissimula­ tion, forgers of nations and principles, falsified the real sense of the self-determination in two ways.They “slightly” transferred it from majority to ethnic minorities or, had previously established the statal background, where self-determination was to be put in practice. Lenin, while in the opposition fighting against the Tsar, wrote that self-determination meant the destruction of the great empires so, implicitly, that Transylvania and Bessarabia belonged to Romania.91 But after he removed Kerenski and became a statesman, Lenin “reoriented” self-determination and stated that Bessarabia had to “self-determinate” itself with in Russia’s bordersand the application of this principle was valid for the ethnic minorities in Bessarabia too. This meant drawing it closer to Russia. In other words, red Russia did not have to lag behind white Russia, concerning their domination over non-Russian territories and peoples. To this end socialism and com­ munism that were going to be exported to these regions were meant to help the Bolsheviks regain their lost positions. In Finland, the Russian Bolsheviks supported the Finnish Bolsheviks, not only in order to bring the country' to communism in the name of the proletarian internationalism, but also in order to convince it to seek its “self-determination” in red Russia or in a federation led by it. The same thing happened in Lithuania, Latvia, ^pstonia, that were given to Germany at Brest-Litovsk. After its surrender, they tried loregain them attacking them in 1918-1920. Meanwhile, these small countries wanted by the greai ones, were invaded by the German troops of the Republic of Weitmar, that wanted them for itself. The Finnish and Baltic national forces, acting for real independence and self-determination, organized free

91. M Mușat, I Ardeleanu, op.cit., p.311,345,503. he wrote not only about the objective character of the disape rance of Austro-Hungary and ofTsarist Russia, butalso about the democratic character of the wars of national liberation of the small states on the Danube an in the Balkans. Sodid Marx and Engels, both of them greatanti-Russians, foreseing that the Principalities together wich , Dubrudja, Transylvania and Bucovina would from a “ Moldo-Vallachian unitary state in the future. In 1889, Engels wrote that, if tomorow the Russian despotism were down, the day after tomorrow there would be no Austro-Hungary in Europe, see K. Marx, F. Engels, Opere, translated into Romanian, vol, IX., Bucharest, 1959, pp. 9-10; Contemporanul, VII, nr. 11, Jan 1891, p.476

103 and armed governments, that fought hard and firmly on several fronts.They were also helped by English and French little flotillas, by Entante’s diplomatic mediation and pressure or, in some cases, by Pilsudski’s Polish troops. Only this way, in 1921,did Russia finally agree to give up “for good” its “rights”over the Baltic countries and to recognize Finland’s independence and integrity.’2 But this “for good” did not last too long; during the period between the two world wars, in spite of some exceptions of better relations with the democratic Western powers, that only confirmed the rule, red Moscow’s foreign policy starting with the German- Russian treaty at Rapallo, in 1922, advanced later on to that of Ribbentrop-Molotov, in 1939. The U.S.S.R. and fascist Germany, both of them revisionist powers, started the second World War and destroyed Poland together. Between 1919-1921, Russia attacked Poland in order to bring it back under its authority and in order to advance towards Germany where it was going to support the socialists and carry on the flag of the international communism. Of course, the Russian Army was joined by the similar governments of Dzerjinski, Marchlewsky and Ron set up by their protectors at Bialystok. Be­ tween 1919-1920 Lenin boasted that,attacKingand destroying “white” Poland, he would give a final blow to the policy ofthe Entante in Eastern Europe and he would melt the whole system of Peace of Versailles that according to him, had laundered the former Austroț. Hungary in an imperialist way. Another great Bolshevik leader, Trotski, assured his ideological comrades in France that, after he finished with Denikin, he would destroy Poland too. But in spite of the Bolsheviks’ initial success, Pilsudski managed to crush them, drive them away from Poland and forced them to sign the peace of Riga, in 1921.” But what the Russian Bolsheviks did not manage to do in those years was carried out later, in 1939, together whit Nazi-Germany, when they divided Poland, attacked Finland all by themselves and deprived it form its Southern territories between 1939-1940, and,also,

92. D.Suciu, Contribuția elitdorpolitice... 93. Michel Heller, Aleksandr Nekrich, L’Utopie au pouvoir Histoire de l’URSS de 1917a nos jours, 1985, p. 78-81 ; D. Suciu, op. cil..Encyclopedia Britanică, vol. 18, Chicago, London, Toronto, 1960,pp.139-147 104 in 1940, with diplomatic support, and a treaty with Berlin, they occupied Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Bessarabia. By tricks and new combinations, they also obtained Northern Bucovina, this being not mentioned in the treaty. Only Berlin’s attack against Moscow, in 1941, brought red Russia closer to some of the great allies of “white” Russia in the first war, i.e., Great Britain, the U.S.A., France (under de Gaulle). But these allies recognized most of Stalin’s and Molotov’s territorial acquisitions, forgetting the correct position of their coun­ tries that made up the Entante of the years 1914-1921, “the god­ mother” of Versailles. The Romanians in Bessarabia had to face two dangers during their fight for theirunion whit Romania, namely the Ucrainianand the Russian ones. The Parliament ofUcrain firmly expressed its claims to Bessarabia, but the Romanians answer were equally firm. They were expressed in the meetings of the delegates the political, professional and administrative organizations in Chișinau, joined by the open protests of the Romanian soldiers and officers in , which thwarted Kiev’s greed. In October, 1917,900 delegates of the Roma­ nian soldiers and officers, organized in “Moldavian” army units, pronounced the autonomy of Bessarabia and decided to elect and immediately convene the Country’s Council to justly and properly express the people’s desirc.The meeting of the Romanian soldiers from Bessarabia in the armies of the Tsar and of Kerenski’s with the troops in the Romanian army, whom they fought together with in 1916-1917,their exchange of ideas with the Romanian volunteers from Transylvania and Bucovina,with a modern, advanced and pro­ found national conscience, strengthened their Romanian feelings. Actually, the whole political activity was correctly and system­ atically guided by the Moldavian National Party, set up in 1917 and let by the famous Vasile Stroiescu. Before the war, he sent great sums of money to the Romanian confessional Greek-Catholic and Ortho­ dox schools in Transylvania, in order to save them from being turned into Magyarized government schools. Between 1917-1918, the mili­ tant activity of the Party was supported by the famous Transylvanian professor , who joined Stroiescu, to pay him back his previous generosity concerning the survival of the Western-Roma-

105 nian ethnic element. They also wanted to continue the struggle for national unity, in spite of the then defeat and humility. When the Romanian volunteers from Transylvania and Bucovina, who left Darniça in order to join the Royal Romanian Army, fighting in Moldavia against the army of the Central Powers, crossed Chișinau, the Romanian soldiers and officers there gave them a Bible and a Romanian flag, wishing them good luck in defeating the enemy and bringing the gifts to Alba-Iulia, under King Ferdinand’s flag. Because of the war and of the chaos it brought about - there were no direct elections in Bessarabia, since many men between 19 and 48 were on the fronts. But the military, the peasant and the workers’ communittees, the professional corporations elected del­ egates for the Legislative Assembly, that mean they turned into indirect elections. Th is fact affected by no means thé democratic and representative character of delegates and deputies, elected by the peasant forums (36), by the soldiers forumus (44) or by the district and communal commissions, by the professional corporations (58). From an ethnic point of view, 70Î of the deputies stood for the Romanian nation, while 30Î for the national minorities in Bessarabia. Ion Inculeț was elected President, representing the young democratic wing in the movement for national liberty and unity. This forum worked fast, but in several stages, towards the logical and legal moment of the union with Romania. At the beginning, in December 1917, Bessarabia proclaimed itself a Moldavian Democratic Republic, and the administrative functions were transferred from the Russians to the Romanian district commissioners, who acted under the supervision of the Directors’ Council, the executive forum of the young sute. But as if wanting to prove that the bitter saying that history’ has also known peoples that died holding justice in their hands, the Russian Bolscheviks, meaning to destabilize the Moldavian Republic surted to rob beat and murder the Romanians in villages and towns; among their victims there were national leaders, such as lawyer Murafa and engineer Hodorogea. Romanian soldiersand officers from Transylvania and Bucovina helped the anti-Bolshevik resistance of the Romanians in Bessarabia. But the Russians managed to enter Chișinau and chase some of the

106 Directors and deputies. Those who did not leave, met secretly, asking King Ferdinand and the Romanian Government in Iași for immediate help. They also understood that the Bolsheviks’ forcefu 1 actions could never be put down by offering them flowers or moralizing stories about law and national justice, but by bullets for bullets. The conclusion was just, since it was in the spirit of the wars for national liberation, this time Eastward, and in order to save the existence and interests of the majority of the inhabitants of the province between the Prut and the Nistru. Under the circumstances, the King and Brătianu sent General Broșteanu’s Division XI to Besserabia who. brought the situation under control in January, 1918. On the 22nd of January, 1918, the Country’s Council proclaimed the independence of the Moldavian Republic. Buton the 27th of March, 1918, the Country’s Council voted the union of Bessarabia with Romania by 86 votes for, 3, against,and, 36 abstentions. The parliamentary decision was signed by President Ion Inculeț and secretary Ion Buzdugan. Romania’s Prime-Minister, Alexandru Marghiloman, was immediately announced about the result and he agreed with it, in the name of the Romanian people and King Ferdinand I. The Sovereign,who was at Iași, congratulated the deputies in a'letter of consent, sent to Inculet. The King expressed the satisfaction that the Romanian lan­ guage and nation survived a century of oppression and inspite of all the pressures for and called the union a remarkable national achievement, in moments of confusion for the Romanian state and army for the entire nation. The valuable, objective and realistic Romanians in Bessarabia would not stumble over details and trifles, they did not mind the form, meaning that for a wh i le, their state was proclaimed a Republic according to foreign patterns. They had in mind the content, namely a state of all Romanians. In fact, they realized that the Dinasty and the Royal Army had saved them from the Russian danger. Generally, we can say that events in Bessarabia in the winter and spring of 1918, did already prove the efficiency of the preservation of the two fundamental institutional levers that gave them possibility of concrete and organ­ ized action in saveguarding of the interests of the entire Romanian nation. 107 The U nion on the 27th of March (the 9th of April 1918) was voted on certain conditions, in the sense that the Country’s Council kept on existing in order to vote the land reform that was to be accepted by the Romanian Government. In the future, the province was going to have its local autonomy, with a Diet elected by universal vote and an administration of its own.The Diet (The Country’s Council) would vote the local budget,control the local councils and the towns, would appoint the clerks of the local administration, the superior ones being eventually confirmed by the Government in Bucharest. The recruit­ ing of the national army was to be done according to local criteria and the Bessarabian laws and forums could be modified by the Parliament in Bucharest, only after it would be joined by the Bessarabian depu­ ties. Some regulations regarding the rights of the national minorities between the Prut and the Nistru were also voted. Bessarabia was going to have two representatives in the Council of Ministers in Bucharest, initially appointed by the Moldavian Council and then, recruited from among the Bessarabian members of the Parliament in the capital. The population would elect its deputies for Bucharest and the local bodies by universal, equal, secret and direct ballot, while the liberties of faith, printing and of speech were to be guaranteed by the national constitution.After 7 months, the Moldavian Council, notic­ ing the deeply democratic character of the social, legislative, govern­ mental and civic structures, the application of the land and electoral reforms in Romania, voted the removal of the amendments made in spring, and proclaimed the union with Romania without any reserva­ tion, explaining its attitude by way the monarchic parliamentary regime of the Kingdom of all the Romanians functioned. In 1919, the Bessarabian Romanians elected for the National assembly 90 depu­ ties and 35 senators. This represented the vote of the 395,159 electors (105,716 non-Romanians abstained from polling) and, on the 30* of December 1919, the legislative forum of all the Romanians voted the law project for the ratification of Bessarabia’s union with Romania, read by Vasile Stoicescu.94 In fact, between the years 1917-1919,

94. The whole problem of the Union of Basarabia with Romania in Ion 1. Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, Cernăuți, 1923, p. 2S2-436.Other data in Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. X. p. 392-395; Onosifor Ghibu, De la Basarabia rusească la Basarabia romanească, București, 1926, F. Ciurea, Din trecutul fi prezentul Basarabiei, București, 1928. 108 concrete actions were undertaken, with the more than authorized and necessary assistance of the Romanian Army and of the King Ferdinand I, its supreme Commander, who annihilated the Bolshevik hostility. Thus the real self-determination wascarried out by the imprescriptible right of the 1,810,000 Romanians to get united with Romania. The civic interests of the 330,000 Russians, 210,000 Bulgarians and Gagauzi, 75,000 Germans and 270,000 Jews, in Bessarabia, were also guaranteed by the newly formed state.95 In fact, the King, the Queen, Brätianu and his dismissed governmental team, Take Ionescu, other politicians, Romanian gen­ erals continued to hope in the victory of the Entante over the Central Powers, even if the latter ones disentangled in the East, were still capturing tens of thousands of enemy prisoners in the West, in the summer of the year 1918.Theautumnof 1918marked the destruction of the Central Powers, both in Western and in the Eastern Europe. Take Ionescu had left for Paris, taking over the leadership of the National Council of Romanian Unity, the forum that obtained the diplomatic recognition of the imprescriptible rights of all the Roma­ nians in Austro-Hungary to get united within the frontiers of one and the same national slate, in October 1918. After the surrender of Turkey and Bulgaria, the Balkan front was broken through by the allied troops commended by Franchet d’ Esperay, that reached and crossed the Danube, determining Austro-Hungary’s capitulation; consequently, after several days, the Romanian state and army joined the war against Germany, in November 1918.96 The Powers of the Entante, although they would not recognize 95. Nistor. op. cit., p.305. 96. A corect interpretation of romania's international situation during 1918- 1919, ita status of as member and allied state, with the specification of the differences resulting from the Treatv of 1916, a followup of the Armistice in Belgrade, in Gh. Iancu, G. Cipăianu, La consolidation de L'Union de la Transylvanie et la Roumanie (1918-1919). Témoignages français, Bucharest, 1990, with the due internal and foreign bibligraphy;Gh. Vilain, Les Quatre armistice de 1918, Paris, 1968; România in primul război mondial, Bucurejti. 1979; România fi conferința de pace de la Paris (1918-1919) Cluj-Napoca. 1983; glenn E. Torrey. General Buthelot and romania. Memories et corespondance 1916-1919, New-York. 1987 (A. Macartney. A. W. Palmer. Independent Eastern Europe, London. 1962, etc. The juridical essenpal interpretați in N. Dașcovici, Interesele ți drepturile României în texte de drept internațional public, Iași, 1936, 1918 la români. Desăvîrțirea unității naționale statale a poporului român, Documente externe, vol. I-VI, București, 1983; Another interpretation Ormos Maria, From Paduato Trianon 1918-1920, Budapest, 1990, the objectives in vo. J. Lederer, Yougoslavia at the Peace Conference, heven and london, 1963, etc. 109 the validity of the secret treaties concluded in the last years, any longer maybe under American influence, decided together with their new great ally to support the application of the principle of national self-determination, that is the right of the people to decide their fate and that of their territories, stipulated in President Wilson’s Princi­ ples. In what concerned the Romanian, as well other less numerous nations that had the misfortune to have been conquered by foreigners in Eastern Europe, this did not mean an essential or structural contra­ diction with the treaties that had started the wars for national libera­ tion in the first World War. The self-determination of Bucovina and Transylvania, in 1918, had but revitalized the spirit of the Treaty of 1916 that manifestly stipulated Romania’s rights over those territories with Romanian ethnic majorities or over those which Moldavia had been deprived of in the XVI IIth century. At a certain time, a confused historiography tried to lay stress only on self-determination and to neglect the first stipulation or consider it of second importance. This exaggeration has to be clearly now, since both the War for National Liberationand the Romanian’s votes in 1918,be longed tooneandthe same process in the political thinking of the Romanian nation. But at least in our modest opinion, during the resistance in the dangerous key moments, the stress was mainly laid on the royal and militarypower, the hopes of salvation of all the oppressed brothers in the East and the West of the Kingdom.This was the very natural prolongation of the phenomena that had happened in the XIX,h century, until 1914-1916. Beginning with October, there were certain signs suggesting that the Kingdom’s alliance with the Entante could be restored. Among them, general Henri Mathias Berthelot, King Ferdinand’s and Queen Mary’s great and good friend, felt the need to cooperate with the Romanian Army again. Victor Antonescu, the former ambas­ sador of Romania in Paris, was sentby a French plane, that took off from Salonic and flew over the Balkans and the territory occupied by the Central Powers in order to take a personalmessageofClémenceau’s to Brätianu: “be ready, Berthelot is to arrive”. The same messenger took back with him the emotion and the joy of the responsable ones in Iași. After this Berthelot, through Robert de Fiers, a convinced

110 philo-Romanian, sent to Iași by plane, asked Romania to mobilize its divisions and equip them with artillery. This way the Romanian Army was meant to cooperate with the Entante again, the junction being about to be made not far from Ploiești. The military plans of mobili­ zation and cooperation with the Entante were drawn up by general Prezan although, just like Brătianu, he did not have any official authority in the Marghiloman Government. Actually, the process was one of breaking the shameful stamps on the Treaty of Buftea-Bucharest, thwarting the peace imposed by temporary conquerors. And the Romanian soldier once again was ready to fight his former battle brothers in 1916-1917 (except the Russians). As if sensing the atmosphere in thé air, a poster on walls in Iași, was showing a French soldier embracing a Romanian soldier, seem ingly trying explain the shortcom ings of 1918, carried the follow­ ing text: “Wake up Romania, you are not alone, any more. Remember Mărășești”. Prime-Minister Alexandru Marghiloman tried to impose himself to the country and on the Romanian nation, in the last moment, in order to keep his power, but his stratagem followed the same trodden path, old-fashioned then i.e. negotiations with the Central Powers. Marghiloman, sincerely believed that Germany, though defeated, would remain a great power, “equal” to the Entante in the future peace negotiations. Therefore he negotiated with Mackensen in order to get the Peace Treaty concerning Dobrudja revised. At Dembling, the negotiated with Austro-Hungary’sattaché in Bucharest, trying to obtain the approval for Romania’s military occu­ pation of Transylvania and Bucovina. Practically speaking, Marghiloman tried to create Greater Romania under the aegis of the Central Powers, especially that of Germany,as Austro-Hungary was about to be breaken up. These powers, defeated, could give up anything, as they had nothing, any more. The agreement, once concluded, would have been “defended” at the next peace negotia­ tions even by Germany, which would have “supported” it in from of the victorious Entante. In fact the latter “knew” about a previous similar plan, but through its own channels and by another Romanian government. Of course, there was hope that, if such a plan

111 hadsucceeded, Marghiloman would have deserved the nation’s and the Dinasty’s gratitude and so, he could have kept on his position as prime-minister, especially because under his Government, the first stage of the creation of the unitary state had been achieved: the union of Bessarabia with Romania. But defeated Germany was never equal to the victorious powers of the Congress of Peace, and, Marghiloman’s policy was as illogical as dangerous. It was neither moral, nor logical, to carry out the Romanian national desiderata with the agreement of a state that once powerful, had categorically objected to their fulfilment. Such a con­ duct would have displeased the Entante, the only real supporter of world peace in politics. Its representatives objected to the entrance of troops of the Royal Army into Bucovina, not because they were against this fact in itself, but because it might have been the result of the agreement between Marghiloman and the Austrians. It was more than obvious that Marghiloman’s role who concluded the peace in May, 1918, all by himself, assuming all its consequences, came to an end when the Central Powers were defeated. Thus, the “Moor did hid duty, now the Moor has to leave”.97 Anyhow, we have to clearly emphasize the fact that for the Romanians in Bucovina, whose lives and fortune were threatened by the Ucraineans, the arrival of the Romanian armies, was benefic and saving, irrespective of wh ich Romanian Government had sent them or of the tribulations or “angers” of the great leaders, even if they were of the Entante. Broșteanu’s arrival in Bessarabia, that had been ravaged by the Bolsheviks, during a period when the Entante troops were exhausted in the East, having been defeated and forced to take refuge in Western Europe fora while, was equally saving. One way or the other, the Romanian ethnic element in Bessarabia and Bucovina, supported in different ways before the war by Small Romania, had to be saved under any circumstances, in the final and decisive moments, by the Romanian state. The oppressed brothers could not express their options regarding their belonging to a state on the basis of national self-determination without their protection. And this hap­

97. Kirifcscu, op. eit., vol. Ill, p, 316-318

112 pened indeed, first, because of the enemies, i.e. the Russians, and the Ucraineans had never managed to reach the performance of the civilized Swedes who let the Norwegians choose their destiny all by themselves, in 1905. King Ferdinand required Marghiloman’s resignation on the6lh of November; after that general Coandă’s Cabinet was formed. Marghiloman’s Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as well as all the laws issued by him were abrogated. The Romanian soldier had once again the opportunity to put submissiveness out of his country and hope for the fulfilment of the nation’s hopes. The King’s order for the mobilization of the army was signed by the new War Minister, Eremia Grigorescu, a name which signified Oituz and Mărășești and was meant to bring back hope and trust to those who were called again to fight for the same high moral commandments expressed by the voices of 1916. King Ferdinand called his soldiers to join their allies, chase the enemy out of the country and bring peace to the oppressed Romani­ ans. “Your King - said the Appeal - calls you again to fight, to carry out our old dream: the Union of all the Romanians, for which you fought so bravely in 1916-1917. May the souls of those who died in honour in combat bless you for this last effort. Our faithful allies are looking up toourcountry and its sons with love. Trust you camrades in the valiant French and English armies, who come to support you. They knew the courage you proved at Oituz, Mărăști and Mărășești. Show them that time could not weaken the Romanian soldier’s arm. Our brothers in Bucovina and Transylvania call you to fight one more fight and bring them salvation from foreign oppression. The victory is yours and the future is going to ensure a peaceful and happy life for the whole Romanian people: “Forw ard then, with our ancestors’ bravery’! God is with us.’”8 After Mackensen received Coandă’s ultimatum, he ordered the evacuation of his troops on the very evening of the 10-th of November, cautiously protecting his retreat by destroying bridges and telegraphic communications. Berthelot’s Frenchmen were re-

98. Idem, op. cit., p.318-319.

113 ceived wich enthusiasm by the liberated Romanians, whom the General called again to fight under King Ferdinand, who sacrificed everything in order to make Greater Romania and, on the 16-th of November the French and the English troops started toenter Bucha­ rest. On the 1-th of December, the Germans already crossed the Carpathians, their soldiers became Bolsheviks, and ill-treated their officers, sold the materials captured in Romania to civilians. Mean­ while Count Kărolyi, a philo-Antantist, put Mackensen in hospital near Budapest, then in Neusatz and afterwards in Salonic, being hardly freed in November 1919. On his arrival in Bucharest, King Ferdinand on the I51 of December 1918, could state that he had kept his promise to be good Romanian, that difficulties had been overcome and the reward would be great and that was why his conscience was clear in front of God and of the Romanian people." In Austrian Bucovina, Romanian conscience was always vivid and the contacts with the Kingdom kept it alive and strongly rein­ forced during the Pan-Romanian celebrations at Putna, in 1904 or at the Exhibition in Bucharest, in 1906. The whole national movement there was supported by Nicolae Iorga and the magazine Semănătorul. During the War, the Romanians, as well as the Ruthenians, fell under colonel Fischer’s terror, nicknamed “father of gallaws”. In 1917- 1918, he took terrible revenge on the Romanians and the Ruthenians who“betrayed” every time Russians and Romanian troops entered Bucovina, during the previous military operations. Fisher and Gen­ eral Koewess also ordered brief executions, because the judiciary actions took too long and failed to produce the expected results, a thing that made Count Meran, Governor of Bucovina order his mili­ tary commanders to shoot even those who only seemed suspect, on the spot. Great complications between the Northern Ruthenians and the Southern Romanians occurred in Bucovina, in 1918. Although at Brest-Litovsk, Austro-Hungary wanted to turn Eastern Galicia and Bucovina into a sort of Habsburg “Crownland”, Vienna was still inclined to give it to Ucraine in exchange for substantial supplies of

99. Idem, op.cit, p. 325. 114 cereals. Yet, the Wilsonian self-determination concept destroyed the treaties and the secret agreements. The Ruthenians gave up some of their claims and managed to save some territory and only the North­ ern region was taken by Ucraine. But Ucraine, abandoned by the defeated Austrian and German troops, fell under the Russian Bolshe­ viks, too. Galicia was united with Poland, and Romanians in Bucovina struggled for union of the whole province with the Romanian King­ dom, meaning to repair the injustice of 1775. Little by little, but safely, the Romanian deputies in the Diet of Bucovina and in the Parliament in Vienna, the newspaper Bucovina’s Voice, the mayors and the intellectuals, as well as the ordinary people acted for the union with Romania. The Constituent Assembly in Cernăuți, on the 27th of October, 1918, was the first to take action in this respect. It elected a National Council of 50 leaders, who were meant to carry out the desires of the Romanians in Bucovina in co­ operation with the Romanians in Transylvania, observing the exist­ ence and the interests of the non-Romanians. This council elected an Executive Committeeled by Iancu Flondor, that was goingact as local government. But count Etzdorf did not give up Bucovina’s administration from the very beginning. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik or anarchist soldiers, as well as the nation­ alist Ucraineans, turned to plunder and destruction, ultimately com­ bined with antisemitic outbursts, in villages. Etzdorf warned the Romanians that Northern Bucovina was claimed by the Ucraineans, while they were given the South, up to the Șiret. The region between the Șiret and the Prut was meant to be a sort of condominium until the problem was finally solved. This position was also supported by the Romanian traitors Aurel Onciul, one of the supporters of the propaganda of the Central Powers that used to insult the Kingdom, its policy and their leaders. Flondor refused the division of Bucovina and let the Count know that he had asked Romania for military help against the Romanian’s enemies. The Ucraineans occupied Cernăuți, joined by Aurel Onciul, the“representative” of the Romanians and all state official to swear allegiance to them. But this action was boycotted by the Romanian employers. Aurel Onciul left for Iași in order to protest against the

115 Romanian troops being sent to Bucovina,but he found no audience and the students based him. The real winners were the good, patriotic Romanians, such as Flondor and Bodnărescu, who renewed their appeals to the King and the Government, asking them to send the troops. The 8th infantry division, led by general Zadik was ordered to enter Bucovina on the 8th of November, 1918. Facing the General’s attack, the brave ucrainean legionaries, masters of Cernăuți for some days, mounted their horses and ran where they came from. On the llll> of November, Zadik embraced Flondor each other that meant a rediscovery embracement that of mother Romania and her daughter Bucovina, kidnapped by foreign­ ers. The Bucovinean intellectuals in Romania and Bessarabia, led by Stefanelli and Nistor, arrived at Cernăuți, too. The Bessarabians sent a delegation to congratulate and cheer those who were for uniting the second Romanian province with the Romanian Kingdom. The Na­ tional Council, completed with new-comers also invited the repre­ sentatives of the national minorities in Bucovina to the Congress scheduled for the 15/28 of November. • The Romanians in Bucovina adopted the formula of uncondi­ tional union, being advised by Halippa to do so, who told that the Bessarabians did not establish any conditions for the union to be guaranteed by Romania. They were however against Marghiloman’s policy, manipulated by the Germans. But after the Centra] Powers had been defeated, after the King himself, had ordered the land reform their reservations ceased to be justified, both in Bucovina and in Bessarabia and the reservations were going to be withdrawn soon, otherwise, they might be a sign of internal weakness. On the 15/28 of November, the Congress in Cernăuți voted Bucovina’s union with Romania, the motion being supported by the Pole Stanislav Kwia towski and by the German Alois Lebouton who, at the end of their speech, cheered for Greater Romania and King Ferdinand I. The motion for the Union was carried unanimously.100 The Parliament of Greater

100. Idem, op. cit., p. 344-358; About the Union of Bucovina with Romania, Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. X, p. 412-413, the episode about the traitor Aurei Onciu who was not receined by the King, who decided to support the Romanians in Bucovina with troops; other data in T. Bălan, Bucovina in războiul mondial, Cernăuți 1929; Șt. Pascu op. cit.,vol II, pp. 164-170 116 Romania, that became a Constituent Assembly ratified it on the 30lh of December, 1919. In the autumn of 1918, the Romanians in Transylvania joined the general stream of democratization and harmonization of the European political geography in Eastern Europe. They proceeded to correctly put into practice the principle of national self-determination and of the union with Romania on this basis. Actually, the union was also mentioned in theTreaty of 1916, concluded by the Romanian Kingdom with the Entame, so, both East and the West acted in the same direction, that accepting the creation of the state of all Romani­ ans. At Oradea, on the 12lh of October, 1918, the Romanian National Party adopted the text of the Declaration of the self-determination of Romanians in Transylvania; it was read in the Parliament of Budapest by Alexandru Vaida Voievod 6 days later. The text was drawn up by Vasile Goldiș. Thus, Vaida Voievod and other party comrades of his rehabilitated themselves for having signed the declaration of loyalty to the-Hungarian state, under the terror imposed by the Govern­ ment.101 In the Declaration of self-determination, the Romanian Na­ tional party drew the attention of the Hungarian nation that it had also agreed to the principle of self-determination by having approved of the proposals for armistice with the Entante that bound Hungary to accept them. On behalf of the Romanians in Transylvania, the Party proclaimed its right to make its own choice among the free nations, from then on, to establish its relations and links with what ever nation.

101. Such gestures, like the previous ones concerning the federalization of the Monarchy and the links with Franz-Ferdinand, were firmaly criticized in Rusu-Abrudanu, Păcatele Ardealului față de sufletul vechiului Regat. Fapte. Documente, Fascimile. But the auther has not sufficiently grasped the situation of the Romanians threatened by Dualism and living under the terror of the Hungarian Government. Under the circum­ stances, they gave up under Budapest’s pressure and those who previously supported the federalization meant to escape from Dualism, that way. The internal and interna­ tional situation permitting the Romanians, now free and liberated from oppresors, got clearly oriented towards Romania. And in 1848-1849, the Romanian deputies in the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, Partium, in the Parliament, closer to the Hungarian state centralism that came from Budapest, took action under the supervision of the Govern­ ment and were forced to obey in certain respects. But after Hungary had been defeated, most of them joined the Delegation of the Transylvanian Romanians in Vienna and stated to fight for a greater Romanian Dukedon, Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, Bucovina, the next stage certainly being its Union with Romania. 117 Consequently, the Hungary’s Government had no right to represent the Romanians in Transylvania at the next Congress of Peace. They were going to be represented everywhere, only by those elected by the Romanians’ National Assembly, under any circumstances and nobody else could ever negotiate about them or on behalf of them. If that happened, Vaida would declare them ab initio null and void, not representing the Romanian nation. Vaida’s declaration was an answer to Hungary7, as well as the tardy declaration offederalization of the Empire,on the basisof “self- determination”, proclaimed by King Emperor Carol of Hasburg. In fact, according to this declaration, Hungary’s integrity was not put into question but it was rejected by the Czechs, by the Poles, by the Slovak, by the-Croats, by the Serbians and by the Slovenians. Vaida’s speech-was followed by that of the Slovak Juriga, delivered in the same spirit, then by that of Ossoimek of Fiume. Their speeches angered the Hungarian deputies and were followed by shouts and insults, as well as by Wekerle’s and Apponyi’s retorts concerning the absolute preservation of the integrity of the state.102 But the Hungarians suddenly caught the idea of “self-determi­ nation”, realized that if they applied themselves to the territories conquered by their ancestors, they might have had a further reason for the preservation of the integrity of St .Stephen’s Crown i.e. Hungary'. They changed their views quickly, murdered Tisza, who had led the country into war and also led ut to disaster. The Hungarians looked at themselves as “victims” of the Austrians and of the Germans who pushed them into the conflagration against their willand asked Count Kârolyi, an honest phylo-Entantist, to save the situation. Kărolyi declared that the Hungarians were sincere friends of the Entante and together with this supporters, he openly stated, to be heard by everybody, that they wanted to change their foreign policy, to bring home their troops, from Germany and in order to defend the integrity of the Hungarian country, and, if needed their troops would also help the Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovakia, Ruthenia, Serbia, Vojvodina too to “self-determine” within the historical bordersof the

102. About these events see N. Iorga, op. cit, pp. 413-415; Șt Pascu, op. cit., pp. 51-163; Kirifescu, op. cit.,pp. 364-366 118 same state draw up by means of swords by their Middle-Ages ances­ tors. Thus, the Hungarian propaganda tried to picture the Hungarians not guilty for the war, the responsibility being exclusively that of the Germans’ and the Austrians’, the Hungarians being completely inno­ cent, and their state would be untouched.103 But by the end of October, Slovakian separated itself from Hungary and got united with Czechia and so did the Serbians in Voivodina, the Croats and Slovenian who got united with Serbia104. Kărolyi was disappointed that the King would not accept his proposals to with -draw the Hungarian troops from the front in Germany and for him to be appointed President-iMinister. Thus he unleashed the revolution in Budapest on the31-st of October and lait hands on power. Six national leaders and six social-democratic leaders formed the Romanian Central National Council there but, soon moved to Arad and decided to take action according to the real principle of national self-idetermination. Meanwhile, Iuliu Maniu founded “The Council of the Romanian soldiers in Vienna” that united with the Romanian troops in Prague secured order in the two cities against anarchy and robbery, then Iuliu Maniu and the soldiers order left for Transylvania. Other Romanian soldiers took refuge in Italy, made an oath on the Romanian flag in the barracks in Wienernenstadt, taken up by Maniu and kept on the same way.The Romanian National Central Council, a real revolutionary Government, organized district, communal councils, military guards, taking over Transylvania’s ad­ ministration. But the action was doubled in an opposite direction and tripled by the Hungarian and Saxon Councils and guards faithful to the Government in Budapest. Kărolyi went to Belgrade to obtain from General Franchet d’Espérey special armistice conditions for Hun­ gary, based on the recognition of its integrity, minus Croația and Slovenia. He meant to convince him of the philo-Entantist feelings of

103. About the falsification of the notion of self-determination by the Hungar­ ians and the Russians, in D. Suciu, Aspecte ale criticii..., in An. Inst, de 1st. Cluj-Napoca XXVIII, 1987-1988, p. 299-300;Idem, Contribuția elitelorpolitice... 104. About the creation of Czechia see Thomas G. Massa ryk, La resurrection d'un Etat. Souvenire et refleaations, Paris, 1930; Jaroslav Prokes, Histoire Tchdtoslovaque, Prague, 1929; Opoccnsky Jeans, Le fin de l’Austriebe et la genese de l'Etat tochecosl«vaque, Prague, 1928, about the sute of the Southern Slavs, see George V. Devas, La nouvelle Serbie, Paris-Nancy, 1918 119 the Hungarian nation, that he tried to absolve the every change. The General drew his attention that he represented the Hungarian nation al one, therefore no other nation in Hungary and remained him that the Hungarians and the Austrians went together with the Germans against France, thus they would have to pay and atone for their sins together.105 That is why we are of the opinion that the Armistice in Belgrade, that established the temporary' line of demarcationbetween Hungary' and the Entante in Transylvania, was an administrative . instrument meant to solve only the ordinary problems such as supplies civil administration, military matters concerning discipline and the gradual movement of the troops in both camps, and it was not as a favour done to Kérolyi by d’Espérey. The only forum that had the right to trace up the frontiers was the Peace Conference and not the armistice or the temporary lines of demarcation established by offic­ ers. That was also known by the French General whom we not suspect of philo-Hungarian feelings or of being bought by theHungarians. In fact, by virtue of the Armistice and of the renewal of the military alliance with the Entante the Romanian Army was allowed to make its way towards the dividing line established in Belgrade, which, in spite of some he sitations and moderations _ was slowly but safety moved up to the ethnic frontier established by the Peace Conference.106 It was a completely different thing that the Hungarians, did their best beyond this dividing line to maintain their positions or, starting from these bases, they tried to regain their former ones. In November, Romania obtained the statute of Cobelligerent state and later, that of an allied state, as well107 though unequal to the

105. Gh. Iancu, Gh. Cipăianu, op.cil., pp.22-25; C. Kiritescu op.cit.,p.373 106. Clemenceau, Pichon, Lacombe, General Patey, Colonel Tilly supported the dividing line being moved westwards, limiting the territory claimed by the Great National Asembly in Alba Iuliaand emphasized that this had to be done quickly, because of the pressures of the Hungarians. The locala of special armistices, Marcel Moye said- had but a temporary character and had no political significance, seelancu, Cipăianu, op.cit., pp.26-28. The Directing Council in Sibiuled by luliu Maniu and general Henri Mathias Berthelot acted in the same directions; about red Hungary, see A. Szelpal, Les 133 jours de Bela Kun, Paris, 1959, Gyorgy Litvan, “Documents de relations franco- hongroises des ann’es 1917-1919”, Acta Historica, 1975,21, nr.1-2, pp.183-207 107. Gh. Iancu, Gh. Cipăianu, op.cit., p.19 120 great ones in the Council, as mentioned in the Treaty of 1916, which in the meanwhile had become null and void. After Kărolyi’s failure in Belgrade, the Hungarians realized better the disaster and, overcome by fury, they turned to excess and tried to save their state. Meanwhile, the Romanian Central National Council asked the Government in Budapest not to interfere with Transylvania’s administration any longer which, according to the right to self-determination, was to be governed in its 23 districts,where public order, safety and life of all the inhabitants’ fortune will be ensured. Hungary’s delegation of that included not only the demo­ crats in the Ministery of nationalities such as Iăszi Oszkâr, but alsosocial-democrats such as, Bôkany, the rector of the University of Cluj, Apathy, the Saxon Neugeboren, arrived in Arad for negotiations, trying to keep Transylvania with in a re-built Hungary similar to the cantonal Swiss system. The Minister of the nationalities in Hungary was a democrat, like Kârolyi, his superior, much more democratic than Wekerle, Bânffy, etc., but not to the extent so as of accepting to the dividing historical Hungary or of what was left of it. On the other hand, Oszkâr knew the trick about democratic nations, about “self-determina­ tion”, maintaining that if the Romanians make use of this principle, then the Hungarians and the Saxons could also use it. This was the same tactics of distorting the notion, of moving the real right of self- determination from majorities to ethnic minorities.108 In fact, during the national fight, that was a fight for territories, the conquering nations resorted to falsifying the notion of self- determination from an ethnic point of view in order to save their multinational states. The conquered nations on the other hand used it correctly, in order to dissolve them and built up real national, free and unitary states. The fundamental difference was that the laterones were majorities within the new political entities, while the former ones were ethnic minorities within the old empires conquered by the sword, in the Middle-Age. At Arad, Iâszi Oszkăr tried to scare the Romanians, claiming that the conclusion of the peace depended

108. Kirijescu, op.cit., pp.370-373; Pascu, Șt., op.cit., vol.II, p.121-125. Jaszy eventually confessed that the Romanians' refusal could be expected 121 neither on them, nor on Foch, but on the Soviet Republics of workers, in Europe. The Hungarian Minister quickly caught the idea that the policy of the socialists and of the communists who falsified real self- determination in Russia, in order to save the old states, baptized differently, could constitute a favourable precedent for Hungary too. Jâszi Oszkăr did not trust the Entante and in its capacity to conclude the peace any longer, as there had been two things, that he did not approve of, namely that the Entante supported the real version of self-determination thus, the one concerning majorities and sec­ ondly, he was disappointed that in Belgrade the French General had not accepted Kărolyi’ suggestion. This was why he tried to scare the Romanians and push them towards “self-determination within Hun­ gary’s borders. But people like Maniu, who came back home and its party fellow members were really impossible to scare. Maniu plainly told them that Transylvania, where Romanian was much more spo­ ken than Hungarian, would break loose from Hungary and get united with Romania. But, Apă thy claimed that the Hungarian people would never agree to dissolution of Greater Hungary, while Neugeboren said that the Germans wanted “self-determination “too, probably also within Hungary’s borders.109 But the Hungarians, furious that the situation came to be completely unfavourable for them, started to attack the Romanians, pretending they ensure the order against the disorder inspired by the revolution. At Giurcuta, near Huedin,a detachment led by captain Dietrich and lieuteantCserenyes shot44 Romaniansand burned their corpses while in Făget, a place intensely inhabited by Romanians, bombs were dropped from planes and more than 100 people were killed.ll0Under the circumstances, delegatesof Romanians from Arad, Cluj, Sibiu, left for Iași to meet the Sovereign and the Government and asked the Romanian Army for help, in Transylvania, to defend their lives and propreties.

109. C. Kirijescu, op.cit., pp.371-372 110. M. Lehrer, , pamînt românesc, CLUJ, 1991 ,p.331. Tisza warned the Serbians and the Croats tha t if Greater Hungary had been broken, it would still have been powerful enough to destroy them; C. Kirițescu, op.cit., pp.373-374 122 Five Transylvanian Romanians sent a letter written by Vaida Voievod to Brătianu asking for military help and assured him of the unanimous desire of the Transylvanian Romanians to get united with Romania. The Romanian Central National Council sent father N.Bălan and captain N.Precup to the Romanian Royal Government in Iași, on the 18lh of November. Afterwards, the officer, came back home then left Blaj again and returned to Iași by plane, in order to announce the convening of the Great National Assembly at Alba-Iulia, on the l“of December,!918. The Royal Government sent a mission led by pro­ fessor Halița to Transylvania; they met Mihali and Vaida in Dej and the other members of the Romanian Central National Council in Arad. The mission brought Brătianu’s message of greetings; he ad­ vised his co-nationals to make sure that the future Assembly started in its procedures and decisions from the most democratic principles in Europe, and he promised them that Romania would send its troops to the West.111 The troops of Divisions 7 and 1 of mountain corps crossed the Carpathians into Transylvania. On the 16th of November, the Hungar­ ian police soldiers vainly tried to resist in Borsec and the Romanian Royal troopswenton through Tulgheș,Toplița,Cic-Sereda -reaching Tîrgu-Mureș and Reghin,on the25lhand28l1'of November. At Brașov, on the 7Ihof December, Division 1 captured 4,000 German soldiers led by the Bavarian General Schoch and by colonel Schrandenbach, who did not withdraw in time, according to the set up plan. Many things that had been stolen from Romanian villages were retrieved and many weapons were captured.112 On the other hand, during November, 70,000 soldiers, gradually arrived in the Western regions; they were sent by Iuliu Maniu and led by general Boeriu and colonel Vlad,113 while the royal troops ones reached the Mureș line. Impressed by these the Hungarians, though furious, did not dare to attack the columns of Romanians who were making their way to Alba-Iulia, on the lsl of December, especially because Maniu warned them that he

111. Kirițescu, op.cit., pp.375-377; Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol.X., pp.313-414. The historian Silviu Dragomir participated to these action too, but Goga stated that he was not the delegate of die Council 112. C. Kiriçescu, op.cit., p.389 113. V. Georgescu, opM., p.184 123 would reply by force, if he had to. Yet, on the 1“of December, at the Great National Meeting in Alba-Iulia, Iuliu Maniu and the Romanians had afirm attitude in orderto ensure liberty of action and the expression of national self- determination, to annihilate the malignant intrigues, meant to thwart it. But they were not animated by anti-Hungarian feelings. As it is well-known, theGreat Meeting voted Transylvania’s union with Ro­ mania, land reform, the universal suffrage, rights for workers, like in the advanced states, as well as the rights and interests of the national minorities, the use of their languages in the local state administration and in the law. Iuliu Maniu himself insisted on the idea that, although there were people against the creation of the state of all the Romanians; still this was going to be created, in spite of the obstacles and thus there would be no oppressive empire left for anyone. The Romanians would never turn from an oppressed people into an oppressive one, as they were well acuinted with the proverbs “dont do to anyone whatever your personally dislike”. Their ancestors have given for centuries on end, being oppressed, despised, humiliated, and their language, ostracized in public life.114 Therefore, considering the memory of their ancestors, the Romanian promised to their own conscience and to the whole world not denationalize anybody. This attitude equalled the commitment that Apponyi would never be “Translated” into Romanian, like Alexander von Bach had once translated Kossuth into German. But such rough and unnatural actions did not succeed, since in spite of the suffering and oppression, both the Romanians and the other non­ German and non-Hungarian nations in Austro-Hungary preserved their being their national language and the culture and in 1918 they came to join world culture.115

114. Discursul lui Ma niu în Marea AdunareNafionlă întrunită la Alba lulia tn ziua de 1 Decembrie 1918. Acte fi documente.,țip. 12-13 About the meeting, see Șt. Pascu, op.cit., pp.171-231 115. D. Suciu, "Antecedentele dualismului...*; Idem "Considerations sur les structures, de l’autorité L’Etat pendant 1848-1867 dans la Monarchie des Habsbourge et la situation politique des nations non hongroises et non allemandes", in Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoire,i, Publiée à l'occasion du XVÏFCongrés Internationales des Sciences Historiques Madrid, 1990, București, 1990, pp.173-174 124 But such moral attitudes, derived from the up to then op­ pressed and hunted Romanianism who have been essentially and structurally characterized by a wide and generous opening towards universality and Christianity, were expressed both by the members of the political leading élite and by ordinary persons, contemporaries of the events in the unforgettable year 1918,Thus, a few days before the 1th of December, the teacher Remus Agliceriu from the Banat head master of the elementary schools in Rijeka, which he handed over to the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian authorities, spoke out to his people asking them to forget all their old tears and pains, prove that the 18 centuries of oppression did not change their noble nature, inherited from the Roman colonists. When the Romanians say good_bye to their Hungarians oppressors, they will be asked not to blame them, not to curse them, they should just say “so long, brothers”, and wish them all the best in the world.“6The Romanians should urge them to get used to live in their new, truly national Hungarian state, where they can go developing their culture, cultivate their national interests and being, without imposing it on others. Such attitudes of a high morality and spiritualit continued Ladislau Vaida’s old line, who, in 1878, blamed every Romanian who might have thought to disregard the national being and the language of another fellow-creature of his the way he used to respect his own or de-nationalize him after he had suffered so much himself not to become a Hungarian, a German or Russian. “Voices” coming from the past were also heard: most of all mentalities of leaders who passed away, but now they were present at Alba-Iulia through their spiritual sons, successors of theirs in what concerned the Romanian cause that remained everybody that the Romanians had asked the Hungarians for justice and equality, in 1744 through Klein,who was banished, in 1791, through Bob and Adamovici who had bearly escapedfrom being tried because they had taken the Supplex to Vienna; through the Romanian Delegation sent to the nobiliary Diet in Cluj, in 1848, but they had been all rejected by their local political leaders. Thus, the Hungarians failed to reconciliate with the Romanians three timesand

116. Gh. Iancu, ‘Toamna popoarelor’, în Vatra, XIII, nr.l53,p.l53/B 125 were found guilty for the bloody national war in 1848-1849. Still, not even after the 11 years of neo-absolutism that threat­ ened everybody with Germanization, had the Hungarians wanted to cooperate in issuing the laws at Sibiu, in 1863-1864, though this gesture would have meant the wiping of their ancestors’s sins. They did not want the reconciliation in 1865 either, as they relied on the anti-Romanian and anti-Slavic centralizing and Magyarizing 1848 lawsand considered the legislation of 1863 tobe “tabula rasa and fixio juris”. And if we add the Hungarians’ negative attitude towards the Memorandums of 1866 and 1892 as well as the proposals for ethnic federalization promoted by the Romanians and the Slavs between 1849-1910, we realize that the obtuseness of Budapest and Vienna really contributed to the undermining of the Monarchy."7 Iorga himself was respectful the interests of the Hungarian culture and school, a suggestive example being the fact that during the years 1919- 1920 he supported the idea of the existence of a Hungarian state university in Romania."8 At Alba-Iulia, they elected a Great Council, without a notable role, and a Directing Council with modest administrative attributes, concerning the local administration, both of them valid only until the complete union in the social-economic, institutional, juridical, bank­ ing life was fulfilled. Thus, irrespective of the discussions that took place in the right of the 3O'h of November, mere proposals and“pourparles”, rather theoretical attitudes concerning the form of the state of certain forms of autonomy, the Great National Assembly at Alba-Iulia voted no kind of political autonomy for Transylvania on the Is' of December, 1918. They decided on a temporary, local administration leading to the creation of the unitary state and nothing more. In 1920 the Directing Council was dissolved altogether and

117. D. Suciu, "Alexandru Stcrca Șuluțiu ți mișcarea națională românească între 1848-1867"(I), în An. Inst. deist. ți Arh. A.D.Xenopol, XXV12, 1988, pp. 76-90; în XXV/1, 1989,pp.285-301 and the next; Idem, "Considerații generale privind statutul Transilvaniei și situația politică specifică a românilor din Monarhie la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea* în mss. See Ghibu’s presentation in *Transilvania, Banatul, Crișana, Maramureșul", în voi. II, p.877; Bara bas Endre, A magyar isholaugy helyzete Rfimaniaban. 1918-1940-1941, Kecskemét, 1944, pp.30-31 118. Gh. Iancu, Contribuția Consiliului Dirigent la consolidarea statului național unitar român 707S-/0Â\Cluj-Napoca. 1985 126 legal government took over all its attribute.119 In fact, the Delegation composed of the Greek-Catholics, Vaida and Hossu,and the Orthodox, Gristea and Goldiș, went to King Ferdinand on the 12lM3d'of December and read him the documents of Union drawn up at Alba Iulia. In fact, they handed him over sovereignty mastery overTransylvania .together with the oath of faith taken by the Transylvanian Romanians. The decree, given by the King meant the application of the final Union. In Decern ber 1918, Brätianu ’s Government was supplemented with the Transylvanians, Vaida, Cicio-Pop, Goldiș, the Bucovinians, Flondor and Nistor and the Bessarabians InculețandCiugureanu, all of them leaders of the fight for national unity.On the 30th of December 1919, the Parliament of Greater Romania voted the law of Transylvania’s Union at the same time with those of Bessarabia and Bucovina. The Hungarians certainly did not understand or would not understand the message of Alba-Iulia and, according to Iorga’s sug­ gestive terms, they had their own policy in Transylvania, they re­ mained themselves. Bur the Romanians had their policy and interests too, and they imposed them with great sacrifices and with the steady help of the King and of the Romanian Royal Army, that alsojncluded Romanian, and not only Romanian soldiers and officers of the former Imperial Army. Immediately after Alba-Iulia, the president - minister of Hungary’, Count Kărolyi appointed the rector of the Hungarian state University ofCluj, Apăthy Istvan, commissary’ for Transylvania; recommending him to apply the methods used by the Romanians for the convening of a Hungarian meeting in Cluj, meant to defendBudapest’s interests. Indeed, 3 weeks after Alba-Iulia, 40,000 Hungarians gathered in Cluj, opting for the preservation of integrity of the Hungarian state.“9 Contemporary’ Hungarian historiography has been of the opin­ ion that the Romanians and their allies forgot the Latin saying “audietur et altera pars” and agreed only with Bucharest and the

119. Erdily ZorzZ»?zz harmadik hotel 1830-tdl napjainking, szerkesztette Szasz Zoltan, Budapest, 1986, pp.1719-1720

127 events in Alba-Iulia. But, according to this very formal logic, the real notion of self-determination was falsified, attempts being made to transfer it, as other conquering nations had also done, in other places, from the oppressed majority to that of the oppressive minority. In fact, national self-determination validandapplicable only to ethnic majorities, just like the inherent national sovereignty deriving from it were indivisible and conditioned the great democratization and harmonization of European political geography, by the destroy­ ing the multinational states builtupby conquest andoppression in the past and by creation of the truly national, unitary states after 1918. The transfer of the nation self-determination to minorities was just malign maneuver to keep the old states of those few,haughty and oppressive and hinder the emancipation of the majority, oppressed for centuries. Thus, nobody except the representatives at Alba-Iulia, elected by means of universal suffrage or appointed by churches, institutions, schools, representing the 2,830,040 Romanians,.could be the only ones to speak on behalf of Transylvania, on the 1-st of December, 1918. On the 22nd of December, at Cluj, the delegates of the 1,660,296 Hungarians failed to speak on behalf of Transylvania. They did not but prove that, not even after one thousand years at least, they did not understand to give up what their ancestors had con­ quered; they did not understand or did not want to understand that Transylvania, where Romanian was much more spoken that Hungar­ ian had to stop being part of Hungary and finally become part of a Romanian unitary’ state.120 In 1918, this was the very’ real and fundamental content of self- determination, meaning that, for instance, since in Pomerania and Poznania, in Warsaw and Galicia people spoke rather Polish than German or Russian, these provinces were certainly supposed to become part of the Polish rebuilt state. If in Czechia, Moravia, Silezia, Slovakia, Croația, Slovenia, Voievodina, Czech, Slovakian and Ser­ bian were more widely spoken than German and Hungarian in those parts of the world they were meant to create Czehoslovakia and the

120. D. Suciu “Aspecte ale politicii de asuprire națională ți de maghiarizare in An.Inst.deist.Arh.,Cluj-Napoca, XXVIII, 1987-1988, pp.299-300; Idem, “Contribuția eli taior politice românești la democra tizarea ți armonizarea geografiei politice europene: 1848-1918" (I) in An.lnst.de 1st. Cluj,XXXII, 1993, p. 149-167. 128 Serbian-Croacian-Slovenian Kingdom. This was the only way for the political geography in Eastern Europe, to get it in harmony with that in the West, where the French, the English, the Spanish etc. had centralized and unitary states for hundred of years or with that in the centre of the continent, where the Germans and the Italians had created their own national unitary states, in the second half of the XIXth century. The difference between these and the states created in 1918 in Eastern Europe was that in Poland and Romania, two compact nations had lived together and the structure of the state was built according to these realities, where as in the other cases we speak of several nations that opted for structures suitable to those condi­ tions, and sometimes coming into conflict with the centralizing variants of Prague and Belgrade. At the end of 1918 and the first month of 1919, the Hungarians formed and armed contingents of Szecklers, the battalions pro­ Transylvania. The Hungarian social-democrats turned to organize strikes in order to undermine the creation of the Romanian national unitary state and invited the Romanian socialist traitor, Cristian Rakowski, to Budapest,121 asally and representative of the destabilizing red Russia. But the Hungarian social-democrats did not manage to create gaps within the Romanian nation by trying to attract certain Romanian valuable social-democrats such as Jumanca, Fluieraș, Isac, Ciser, Albani, etc. who congratulated the Hungarians for their repub­ lic, but rejected their proposals of remaining in Hungary'. They went to Alba-Iulia and proved the Hungarians that they were interested in content rather than in form, that is their patriotic attitude was mainly concerned with the creation of the Romanian national unitary state that the Romanian people had never known across the history.122

121. Kiritescu, op.cit.,p.448-449, about the Russian Hungarian cooperation a ga instRoma nia. Racowski evalved in whatconcerned the self-determination and so did his superior, Lenin. After he had supported the real selfdeterminatio, he turned to falsify and sabotaje it. Inia daily, he wrote diet the Union of the fellow-country who speak the same language into a unitary sute and their emancipation from foreign zoke is a historical right and nacessity.Then, Racowski stated that Transylvania became the objectofthe greed of the Romanian imperialism, see M. Mușat, I. Ardeleanu.o/i.dz., pp.420, 469. The “evolution”, or rather the involution was more then obvious. 122. I. Cicalä, Misearea mucitorească fi socialistă din Transilvania. 1901-1921, Bucurași, 1976, pp.227-240 129 There were also certain Romanian socialists who betrayed the cause of national unity of Romania. Michael the Brave’s Union of the three countries was a brief and personal one; it failed to built a unitary and centralized state in those times, when there had been no modern national nations and national conscience. But after these realities and mentalities had appeared, his work was adjusted to the modern times and turned into a moral guide in action. Therefore, most of the social democrats were for the Union of Transylvania with Romania under the King Ferdinand the Ist, while the painful exceptions, meaning for instance Rakowski and some of his supporters did not but confirm the rule that both the workers and the socialists, equal sons of the Romanian nation, did their duty in the decisive historical moments.123 In fact, when the few Romanian socialist who betrayed their people and country and the Hungarian socialists tried to deceive the Romanian peasants and workers in Transylvania to remain in the Hungarian Republic, to not join the King and the“reactionary boyards” in Bucharest, some of the leaders of the Romanian National Party such as the Orthodox Vicar ofOradea, Romul Ciorogariu, born in Pecica, county of Arad, in 1854, old and devoted leader of the Romanians, proved them that the King was goodand correct with the nation and the people and that he fought like nobody before for nation’s happiness as well being. The Romanian Vicar urged the ordinary Romanians not to listen to their enemies and their supporters, but join their great, gentle, protective Sovereign in Bucharest.124 The Romanian Vicar was about to pay for this policy with his life, but he was saved by the Romanian army that occupied Oradea. On the other hand, the Bolshevik anarchists took revenge later. They heart him when they planted a bomb in the Parliament in Bucharest, when his colleague and friend, the united bishop Demetru Radu, was killed. Beginning with 24th of December, 1918, Cluj, the centre of the Hungarian chauvinism stopped being the place of anti-Romanian acts, since it was occupied by the Romanian Army which made its way

123. Tiron Albani, Memorii, București, 1969 124. Roman R. Ciorogariu, Zile trăite, pp.305-309,313-324 130 up to the Apuseni Mountains; the 4 divisions were under the com­ mand of General Traian Moșoiu. But the Hungarians undertook destabilizing actions in the region administered by the Directing Council led by Iuliu Maniu and protected before by Moșoiu in Sibiu. And the regions around Arad, Bihor, Sätmar, administered by the Hungarians, they initiated anti-Romanian terror raids and trained armies in order to try to get Transylvania back. In the Banat, there were Serbians who tried to annex it up to the Mureș, but these plans failed too, and with the support and consent of the Allies, the Roma­ nian administration was introduced in the province.'“ The railways workers in Transylvania, instigated by Kârolyi and Apathy went on strike in order to paralyse the movements of the Romanian troops. But Moșoiu expelled the Manager of the Railways and all the instigators, arrested more than 500 strikers and brought clerks from the Kingdom, whom he mixed with the Hungarians. Afterwards, Apathy was tried and expelled. The same treatment was applied to 800 Hungarian workers, miners from Baia Mare who attacked the Romanians with hand grenades and weapons, and who were disarmed by the Romanian troops in January, 1919. The Roma­ nian troops occupied the region Sighet-Baia Mare-Zalău, while their brothers in arms managed to repress quickly the actions of the Hungarian miners in Petroșani. In the region of Sighet, The Roma­ nian soldiers had to fight the Ucrainian guards, that they defeated and disarmed, capturing 7 officers and 337 soldiers on January 18. Zalău was occupied in spite of some Hungarian resistance that brought about certain losses in the Romanian Royal troops126125 During the first months of 1919, the Karolyi’s supporters andsocialists or magnates and formar ministers, organized and armed troops in order to save the integrity of their country. Their armoured trains on the railways Arad-Săvîrșin, Arad-Sebiș fired cannons and machine-guns on the Romanian villages in the area.Hungarian troops murdered or ill-treated Romanians in the national guards in such

125. G. Cipăianu, G. Iancu, “Nouvcles contributions concernant L’instituion de l’administration roumaine dans le Banat (1919), in An. Inst.de 1st. și Arh. Cluj-Napoca, XXV, II, 1985-1986, pp.457-474 126. C. Kirițescu,t>/>.ar., p.393-394; Gh.Iancu, Gh.Cipăianu, La consolidation... pp.180-181 131 villages asMicaIaca, Varadia de Mureș,Stejar, Julita,Birzava,Savirșin, Șiria and Batutia. Thus, many peasants took refuge in the nearly forests. Other times, groups of villagers happened to be shot at the end of the village Șiria was bombarded and attacked according to methods used in 1848-1849 Revolution. At Șiria, lawyer Hotaran was murdered together with his family and so were other 60 Romanians in the neighbouring villages. At Sohodol, the priests Leucuta and Popescu were executed and then, thrown into the river Criș. Lieutenant Tamaș was executed like in 1848-1849, being forced todig his own grave. Moreover, in those years, the Seckiers forced the “Vallachians” priests, and their peasants to sing “Wake up, Romanians’’, before execution. Statistics say that in thosemonths, 180 Romanian were killed in Caras-Severin and 300 in the country of Arad. Other Romanians were executed in the region of Bihor by armed Seckiers who were concentrated there, some villages, such as Sigh iștel having gone through 3 attacks when Romanians were burned in their own houses just like in 1848. The funerals of Gheorghe Pop of Băsești, the former President of the Great National Assembly at Alba-Iulia was not spared, either it was attacked by the Hungarians on the 26* of February, 1919. But they were soon chased by the troops of the Royal Army. One of the leaders, Ioan Ciordaș, and lawyer, Nicolae Bolcaș, were mutilated, their noses out off, their mouths and napes stabbed with the bayonet, their eyes plucked out and then, buried half-alive, in the village Lunca near Vașcău.127 In order to prevent the region administered by the Hungarians from being turned into on opperational basis in the designed offen­ sive, directed against Romania and the Allied Powers, the well-known note Vix was sent through the second mission Smuts,asking Budapest to withdraw to the ethnic dividing live, that is West of the cities Carei, Satu-Mare, Oradea, Arad, new frontier. Thus in March-April 1919, the mistake made on the 28* of February, was corrected when the dividing line was moved up to the railway route Satu Mare-Oradea- Arad. While these towns were not to be occupied, and neutre zone of 5 km, occupied by the Allies was to divide the Romanians from

127. C. Kiriçcscu, op.cit., pp.395-400; Gh.Iancu, Gh.Cipăianu, op.cit., pp.148-260

132 Hungarians. Nowcver, they always emphasized the fact that only the Peace Conference had the right to draw up the final frontiers between Romania and Hungary. Under the circumstances the power was pacefully handed over to Béla Kun who, after March 21, counted on the alliance with the Moskow, against Cekoslovakia and Romania and against all the “bourgeois” states,128 but with the obvious and imme­ diate intention to lay hands on Slovakia, Transylvania and Bessarabia again. The diplomatic services on the time realized the alliance between Lenin and Kun, concluded to that purpose. In the springand summer of 1919, the two Bolshevik powers hoped that their offensives in Hungary and on the Nistru would facilitate their meeting in the Northern Carpathians, in order to have “Greater” Romanian de­ stroyed. Between 1919-1920, Lenin, at “home” desperately strove to destroy the real state independence of Azerbaidjan, of Armenia, of Gruzia, preparing Communist pupped-governments, meant to inter­ vene at the right moment and seize the power in the Caucazian Republics, remove the “nationalists” and finally “self-determine” the states under the aegis-party and state centralism in Moskow. Also, Lenin got allied with Turkey in order to destroy Armenia ’s independ­ ent state and, as a rule, the Bolshevik’s interventions were full of blood and general terrorist actions.129Therefore, the alliance between Lenin and Kun, directed against Romania, was just a part of the general plan of destroying the new national unitary and independent states, and, in this context, both Greater Romania and Poland had an extremely important role in blocking the Bolsheviks’ intrigues and stopping their attempts to spread and support the Bolshevik system in Europe.

128. C. Kirifescu, op.cit., p.402; Gh.Iancu, Gh. Cipäianu, op.cit., p.4 129. Michel Heller,Aleksandr NeYnch,L’Utopieaupouvir.Histoire del’URSS de 1917 duos jours, 1985, p.93-95. At the beginning. Lenin pretended to recognize the independence of Gruzia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan but, on the other hand he also appointed the future ministers in these countries, tha tmeant the recognition of their independence was a mere trick, since the Bolshevik governments and troups were prepared to attack the Caucassy. We way say indeed that the great Bolshevik leaders and ideologists were perfect masters of dissimulation and falsification of the real notcions concerning independece, self-determination, etc. Defeated in Poland and Romania, as well as in Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia Lenin, Trozki, Stalin and the others took revenge in the Caucasus or in other regions of the future URSS, destroying the real independence of many sûtes. 133 The Hungarian Bolsheviks, too confident in their lucky star, asked Smuts to force' Romania to withdeaw on the Mures, again, while they were secretely preparing for the offensive, that they considered to be victorious and decissive in solving the territorial dispute. Thus, Kun was not ready for peace as certain Allies thought but for war and realities in Hungary proved it. Here, and in western Transylvania, the military7 forces and structures were re-organized and, in spite of disorder created by the Bolsheviks, the Hungarian armies were also joined by the old military commanders, with experience in command, in their attemtps to re-build the state, mean to be as unaffected as posible, even if it had to be painted in red. The Hungarian Bolsheviks’greates hope was the decissive cooperation with the Rus­ sian Bolsheviks with whom they organized destabilizing actions in Romania and Cekoslovakia, with spies and emissaries. In order to prevent a Hungarian attack, Romania, threatened from the Tisa, the Danube and the Nistru, unleashed the offensive for the Western Mountains, all by itself, April, 16,1919. The Romanian Royal Army was morally bound to advance since, on the other side of the dividing line, Romanians and not the citizens of other states of the Entante had been murdered and terrorized and it was called to defend them in the name of the King and thwart all intrigues meàn to baffle the vote on the Is'of December, 1918. The Romanian offensive in April, 1919, was unleashed by 3 Divisions, (7,6,2) of mountain corps, followed by the infantry divi­ sions. In spite of the obstinate Hungarian resistence in the passes they occupied Ciucea, the Crișul Repede pass, Beiuș, Vașcău,Țebea, with Iancu’s tomb and Horia’s oak tree, Gurahonț. The Romanian Army continued its advance on the two rivers Crișul Alb and Negru, and at Buteni, under the command of reservist major Diamandi, a formar minister in Petrograds, another Hungarian attempt to stop the Roma­ nian offensive was defeated so, on the 18th of April, the first stage of the action was fulfilled.130 During the second statge of the action, Carei, Satu Mare, Marghita, Salonta were occupied, and on Easter Day, Oradea

130. C. Kirițescu, op.cit., pp.409-414

134 wasliberated, too. Some Hungarians, terrorized by their Bolsheviks, gave up their longing for Transylvania and received the Romanian soldiers well, among them, there was Kalman Tisza, the brother of the former President-Minister of Hungary. In this offensive, the Com­ mander of the Romanian Royal Army, in Transylvania, General Mărdărescu George, colonel Rașoviceanu, Generals Holban, Olteanu and Moșoiu distinguished themselves and the whole operation lasted only 5 days; the Hungarians withdrew from the line Nyiregyhaza, Debrecen, Bekes-Csaba. However, the Hungarians eagerly started preparing for coounteroffensive, but they had no time, since, in the third stage they were thrown out of the country over the Tisa. And on April, 29, the Seckiers Division gave itself up, including 10,000people and rich was material. Knowing the Hungarians’aggresive intentions, Brätianu refused to give up the natural defence position on the Tisa and withdraw on the dividing line established by the Allies. The Army temporarily remained on the Tisa, in front of the demarcation line recognized in 1916.13' Meanwhile, King Ferdinand and Queen Mary arrived in Transylvania, spreading a feeling of peace and certainty among the Romanians as well as among some non-Romanians. The Sovereigns visited thegoldminesandfactory atGura Barza, near Brad,acornpanied by Maniu, Cicio-Pop, Goldiș, Prezan, Colonel Antonescu and others. This event meant that from then on, the gold would belong to the Romanian state, not only to the foreign states and companies.132131 The King and the Queen, joined by two Romanian priests, held the woven bread above Iancu’s tomb, praying for his soul and thanking him.133 Once he himself had fought fot Transylvania. He had made a great contribution to his brothers’ future belonging to their own political nation, and to Greater Romania. At Alba-Iulia, the Sovereigns were received by a crowd of peasants, priests and teachers, politicians,prelates of the two Romanian churches, with the words: “God save the King for you saved us from slavery!”. Ferdinand re­ called the martyrs of the nation who had died in Alba-Iulia, Michael

131. Ibidem, pp.415-428 132. Radu Cosmin, Prin Ardeal, 1919, p.381-388 133. Ibidem, p.393 135 the Brave’s fights and rendered homage to the l“of December, 1918, that proced that the Romanian soul remainded the same.114 At Blaj, the Bishop of the Uniate Metropolitan Church told King Ferdinand that in the past, the Hungarian nobelem and princes in Transylvania had often come to hunting parties, but they would never look down on the Vallachian subjects. The town had also been parsed by the more the Great Princes ofTransylvania, The Habsburgs, had also passed through the town but they had never seen the gymnasium and theological institute where the teachers and the students were passing through many material difficulties in order to save their souls and become educated men, both for themselves and for their brothers in suffering. But Blaj had waited for its time to come Suciu said: “ The ideal King who, having left his mother country and personal matters had come here to become part of the people whose father he was. We had to wait for the worshipped Queen to come who em braces everybody, in her mother-like love, not taking into account class differences.”115 Afterwards, the Uniated bishop thanked the Sovereigns for having suffereded together with the people, for having ahared their fortune; they encouraged the weak in the difficult moments, cured the sick and the suffering and raised them all to the moral height and strength of the Throne. Bishop Suciu promised the King that Blaj will never cease fight for thena tional unity ofall the Romanians. Ferdinand praised the cultural role of the Romanian Greek-Catholicism. In Sibiu, the King was greeted in a sensitive speech delivered by Iuliu Maniu, but in the context of the general joy, the liberal Pherekyde emphasized that there were still many difficulties and dangers to overcome, that the Romanians were still surrounded by enemies and that they had to stick together in order to resist them all.116 Indeed, encouraged that Foch did not attack Bolshevik Hun­ gary with the French, Serbian, Romanian and Czech troops, Béla Kundecided to take his neighbours unawares and attack them first. Feeling the force of the Romanian army and because Yugoslavia had 134135136

134. Ibidem, pp.414-427. At Alba-Iulia King Ferdinand expressed his desire to keep being the same as it had been la telly and especially at the GreatNa tional meeting 135. Ibidem, p.483 136. Ibidem pp.445-468 136 been occupied by the French, Kun made up his mind to attack. He wanted to cut off the links between the Romanian and the Czech armies and get allied with red Russia; he also hoped to get soldiersand material from her. In order to help the Hungarians morally, in May, 1919, Russia sent an ultimatum to Romania, and Rakovki sent armed Ucraineans in order to operate in Bucovina and Galicia. The Hungar­ ian offensive managed to defeat the Czech allies, in spite of attempts made by the Romanian troops to help them. Știll, they stopped the Ucraineanattacks in Galicia and, together with Division 8 in Bucovina, the Romanians advanced up to Colomeea, destroying the Hungar­ ians’ plans to join the Ucrainean and Russian Bolsheviks there. The members of the supreme Allied Council were angry with Romania, accusing it for having irritated Hungary, for having advanced to Tisa, without their consent. But they vainly asked the limiting of the Romanian army and armament. Brătianu was asked to start négociations with Béla Kun, but he turped down both of the proposals. The RomanianPrime-Minister stated that Romania needed all its military forces in order to maintain its state integrity and that it would not negotiate with Kun since he was trying to cheat all thegovernments by such discussions, in oredr to join the anarchies in Moscow and Buda­ pest and spread Bolshevism all over Central Europe. Later, Brătianu was accused by the leaders of the Entante that he exasperated the Hungarians by his policy and pushed them to­ wards Bolshevism. Bui he replied that the Bolshevisks, before his resignation, had agreed with Karolyi to present the specter of a danger of the settingup communism in Budapest in order to extort territorial concessions form the Allies. Bratianu remined the Allies that they had also occupied the German territory up to the Rhine by means of weapons and told them that he could not withdraw from the Tisa unless he would be given guarantees by the Hungarians, to remove military conflicts with them in the future. And if he was asked to withdraw on to the frontier line between Romania and Hungary, he had the right to know it concretely and in details. Under the circum­ stances, the Allied Council let the Romanian, Serbian and Czech delegations know the frontier lines with Hungary, inviting them to stop hostilities against it. Hungary concluded an armistice with

137 Cekoslovakia and withdrew from the territory occupied by them, but only to 15 km from the dividing line, the Romanian troops left them positions in Slovakia and Pocutia, that were occupied by the armies of the respective states.157 But in spite of the Allies’pressure, Brătianu aware of imminent danger of the Hungarian offensive towards Transylvania, left his armies on the Tisa. Meanwhile, certain disputes with the Serbians were solved in the Banat, where the Romanian state administration was set up; the same happened in Arad, occupied by the French, transferred to the Romanians for good by General Franchet d’Esperay (July, 1919). Eastern Banat137 138 had the same fate. The Polish General Pilsnski was not dreated by the pacifist declarations made by Lenin, Trotki, Stalin, Tuchacevski either, and guessed red Russia’s inten­ tions concerning Poland in 1920.139 In the same way Brătianu guessed Kun’s intentions concerning Romania, in 1919. In 1919-1920 the Romanian’s and the Pole’s realism often helped the Allies to perceive the Bolsheviks’real intentions more clearly, to be more circumspect with their pacifist declarations and take more prompt and firm action in order to annihilate their plans. Although in 1919, people made ready for peace, rest and recovery, after the terrible war that had hardly finished, in Eastern Europe the Royal Romanian Army, as well as the Republican Polish, Latvian, Estonian, Lithunian, Czech ones still had to fight in order to save the existence and the integrity of their national states in the period between 1919-1920.l40InJanuary, 1919,theBolshevikscrossed the Nistru and attacked Bessarabia, being also supported by the anti­ Romanian actions of the Ukrainians in the region of Hotin. At the beginning, the Romanian Royal troops redefined their positions but afterwards, seriously organizing their defence, they stopped the of­ fensive, turned to counter-offensive and threw the Bolsheviks over the Nistru. During the fight General Poetas was killed while he was

137. C. Kirițescu, op.cit., pp.428-441 138. Ibidem, pp.440-442 139. D.Suciu, “Contribuția elitelor politice românești la democratizarea și armonizarea geografiei politice europene: 1848-1849” (I) in An.Inst.de 1st. Cluj, XXXII. 1993, p.149-167 140. Ibidem 138 inspecting his troops. Practically speaking, the Bolsheviks organized a mean attack, killing the Romanian General from beh ind, a man who was known for his bravery during the war for National Unity at Topraiser, Neajlov and Mărășești. But the Bolsheviks, who were not discouraged by the Roma­ nian counter-offensive attacked Bessarabia again and occupied Hotin. The Romanian clerks and soldiers there had a tragic fate, that could be compared but to that of Bolcaș, Ciordaș, and of other Romanians in the West of the country. The chief of the Romanian security was killed and thrown into a well; the Romanian soldiers were hanged from trees and telegraph poles, after they had their tongues cut. For a second time after violent fights, General Davidoglu managed to repulse the Bolsheviks, but he could never remove their desire of attacking Bessarabia again. They were encouraged when they heard that in Budapest, the power was taken by their friends in ideology. In fact, they were after regarding the provinces that they had lost an aim that could be served by international socialism and communism. The Russians founded a Committee for the “liberation” of Bessarabia, getting ready to destroy Greater Romania and re-born Poland and shake hands with Béla Kun. The counter-attack mounted by the French general d’Anselme, with three French divisions, two Greek ones, with the Russian, Polish, Ucrainean anti-Bolshevik vol­ unteers in Southern Russia and in Odessa, though joined by the Romanians who reached Tiraspol, was beaten off by the Bolsheviks, and the survivers withdrew into Southern Bessarabia and Cetatea Albă, terrified. Confident in their red star again, the Bolsheviks and their friend Racowski, asked Romania to evacuate Bucovina and Bessarabia; they threatened the Royal Government in Bucharest and ensured Budapest of their brotherly help. But Bucharest, that had been through the terrible fire of the War for National Union, re­ organized its defence on the Nistru and never gave up courage.' InMay, 1919,theBolshevikbombardedandoccupiedTighina, after they crossed the Nistru by boats but were repulsed by Algerian sharp shooters in the French troops who did not fraternize with the attackers, as they expected them to do, except for about 60 French­ men who let them cross the river. After wards Division 5, was went to

139 Bessarabia and took over custody of the Nistru from Tighina to the Sea, replacing the Allied troops, that not want to flight, being contamined by the Bolshevik pacifist propaganda. Thus, General Paul Anghelescu organized his territorial command and the Bolshe­ viks gave up their hard attacks upon Bessarabia. The vote on the 27th of March, the 9th of April, 1918, stayed valid, with the great sacrifice of the Romanian Royal Army, in 1919.M1 The Romanian Government promised the Supreme Allied Council that it would withdraw from the Tisa, if Hungary demobi­ lized and disarmed its army. Kun, summoned by the Allies to do so, but probably encouraged by the military success in Slovakia and by the promise that he would participate to the Peace Conference, turned down the offer and replied that he still relied on his army. The Allies understood too that Bolsheviks meant to take advantage of the demobilization and demoralization of some of the Entante’s armies and attack again, in order to re-built their states and push communism forward. Considering this Marshal Foch decided to occupy Budapest and disarm Hungary with 7 Romanian divisions (2, cavalry and 5,infantry divisions) 2 French ones, 2 Czech divisions and a Serbian one. While the Czechs thought of the plan as ill-timed and the Serbians asked for military protection against the Bulgarians, the Romanians immediately accepted the challenge. The burden of the war fell on Romania. But anyhow, history and fate called it to fight, first, to defeat those who wanted to reconquer Bessarabia and Transylvania. The soldiers of the Entante were tired of the war; they fought far away from home and falied to properly understand all the conditions and the paramétrés of complicated situation in Eastern Europe, especially because the Western Europeans had already built up their centralized states. The fundamental difference between the Romanian soldiers and those of the Entante was that the former ones had no right to get tired, become pacifist and turn back home since their own nation was in danger, and their King repeatedly asked them to create and then to preserve the political unity of the present-day and future Romania.

141. G. Kirifescu, opxit., pp.443-450, the chapter Garda Nistrului 140 Still, the presence of some troops of the Entante, in the years 1919- 1920, was precious moral help, both for the Romanians and for the Poles and Baltics, involved in decissive fights in order to consolidate their states, eventually diplomatically recognized with no reserva­ tions by the Peace Conference in Paris, and put into practice by the Supreme Allied Council.142 But Foch’s Conference in Paris had no object any longer, since Kun was the first who attacked, and not the Allies. Though Kun prepared a shrewd shield for himself stating that he had started the offensive on hehalf of hte Allies, in order to repress rebel Romania, wich had not obeyed them to withdraw from the Tisa. He actually aimed at ensuring his contact with Lenin, by defeating Romania, and carrying out their common plans. The Bolshevik dictator had much to learn from the experience in April and organized an army let by professionals, that, even if it had political commissars, had very good commanders powerful armament. He realized that there was a nota­ ble difference between the force of the Romanian Royal Army and that of the young Czech army. On the July, 17,1919, the attack on the Romanian Army was launched, the Hungarians managed to advance and started to believe in victory and in the accomplishement of their goals. But after 7 days of terrible fight, the Romanian troops crushed the enemy’s offensive and the Hungarians were thrown over the Tisa, the way their comrades in the East had chased the Russians over the Nistru. The Romanian Army, once again the main guarantor for the intagrity of Greater Romania, ensured the validity of the vote on the 1-st of December, 1918, by its great sacrificies in 1919. The Hungarians, who rushed upon Transylvania again, after a thousand years when Tuhutum the victorious had killed Gelu, started what they called “Hônfoglolâs” (the conquer of the country); they were defeated by Ferdinand’s brave soldiers now, who revenged themselves, in the name of their ancestor. But since war had its own rules and had to be continued until the enemy gave up, and was not dangerous any longer, the Romanian Royal Army started the offen­ sive against Budapest, with Mărdărescu, Holban, Moșoiu, Demetrescu, in command. After the Hungarian disaster in the steppe, some Hun- garian troops surrendered, wh ile others abandoned their weapons and 142. D. Suciu, “Contribuția elitelor politice ..” 141 took refuge in their own homes. Thus, Béla Kun’s republic came to an end, too. The leaders of the Allied Italian and English missions, Colo­ nels Rommanelli and Cunningham, quickly set up a Hungarian social-democratic-bourgeois Government in Budapest and asked the Romanian troops not to enter the town, since “not the Romanian troops had defeated Kun”. They went on saying that the negotiations initiated by the Allies’diplomats, temporarily in Vienna, had con­ vinced the dictator to surrender. Further more, the neo-Latin Rommanelli, who had not left Budapest, under Kun either, asked the Romanians to immediately withdraw from Hungary. The ridiculous sense of the two colonel’s statement, concerning Kun’s having been defeated at negotiationsand not by the Romanian armies was noticed by a French publisher of the time, who compared Rommanelli’s and Cunmungham’s judgement to a rooster’s mind, convinced that sun rise depended on its crow. But on August 3, 1919, General Rusescu entered Budapest with just some troops after which, the next day mountain corps division 1 occupied the Hungarian capital, forcing the new Hungarian Government, and the Allies who had installed it to face the accom­ plished fact. The rest of the Hungarian territory was occupied by generals Mosoiu and Davidoglu, who disarmed the last of the enemy’s troops and set up order in the defeated country. The latter was left with the South-Western unoccupied territory, governed by the Horthy Government, that was re-building its army with armament offered by the Romanian Headquarters of the Army.143 In the battle on the Tisa up to Budapest, on the Western front, the Romanian troops lost 123 officers and 6,434 soldiers, dead, wounded or missing in action.144

143. C. Kirițescu, op.cit., pp.451 -490 144. Ibidem, p.484. On the front, in hospitals and in prisons 2330 officers and 217,016 soldiers died for their people and country during 1916-1919. There were also 35,717 disabled officers, 55,906 widows and 48,445 was orphans assisted and helped by the Public Assistancem in the Old Kingdom. But on the whole territory of Greater Romania there were 300,728 orphans, as follows: Bucharest, 121,775; Iași, 60,759; Craiova, 40,039; Cluj, 40,625; Sibiu,24,404 etc. Among the civilians, due to bombard­ ments, to typhus fever and of other diseases, such as variola, a recourent fever to executions 2,438 people died in bombardaments, 1,561 were wounded, 1,446 were executed. In 1917 in Moldavia 12,845 died of diseases and in 1919, 15,950; see C. Kirițescu. op.cit., pp.538-540. Kirițescu estimates that in the Old Kingdom there were 300,000 dead and not 800,000, including those not registered 142 Brätianu, who came back from the Peace Conference went on acting as Prime-Minister until Budapest was occupied; after the event he resigned because of the disputes with the Allies. He was succeded by Vaitoianu. As a consequence of the negotiations with the Allies, between the 16lh of November, 1919, and the 28,h of February, 1920, Romania withdrew from Hungary. In 1920 at Trianon, the latter recognized that Transy lvania belonged to Romania and the new state border. The formation of the Romanian national unitary state as a process started from up and went forwards at the beginning of theWar for National Union, under the auspices of the King and the Brätianu government. It was completed from down upwards, by the correct application of the real national self-determination, ofthe electoral, parliament and plebiscit character, specific to European democracy, with the forums - that voted on the 27th of March/the 9lh of April, on the 15th/28Ih of November and on the 1" of December 1918 inChișinau, Cernăuți and Alba-Iulia operated. But since the enemies counter­ attacked, trying to prove (may be without wanting or thinking that they were the only ones who would always win) that history had seen nations dying with their rights and justice in their hands, before, in 1919. The fight was joined by superior forças i.e., the King, the Government, diplomacy, the officers and the soldiers of the Roma­ nian Royal Army. They thwarted the anti-Romanian actions, by means of weapons, and saved the country and especially the votes for the union in 1918. The power of the Throne, of the Government and of the Royal Army was the one to ensure their existence, in 1919. After everything calmed down. King Ferdinand donated 400,000 lei to an Institute145 in Cluj, that was meant to study the History of the Romanians in Transylvania and ensure with the hystoriographic al methods the preservation of the vote in Alba-Iulia on the 1st of December 1918 and of the decissions in Trianon on the 4th of June, 1920. In February 1920,durring the inauguration of the Romanian University in Cluj, named in the normal times after the King’s name in the presence of Romanian and foreign scientists

145. Serbările pentru inaugurarea Universității din Cluj 31 ianuarie-2 februarie 1920, București, 1920, p.6 143 Ferdinand honored the memory of the great men, and that of the peasants who sacrificed their lives in the War for the Union, in the following words: “The pure homage of our grateful hearts, should raise our loving and pious prayer for the heralds, forerunners and fathers of this glorious day, for the valiant and departed martyrs of the nation, for the know and for the unknow, for the great and for the ordinary, as well as for these many dead in this War. If today’s joy is only ours, the merit is theirs, of all those who are gone. From Michael the Brave, the first saviour, from the great soldiers of the Romanian thought indeed present here, tireless guards of the language and law, up to the last poor shepherd and plowman, all of them, absolutely all had their own contribution to today’s masterpiece, to the brilliant wonder of Greater Romania, within the borders of Trajan’s Dacia, which they did not live to see but which would have never been possible without their every day endeavour and sacrifice... Let us join them all in the same blessing today, together with the heroes who wrote and sealed with their generous blood, the document of our external mastery overthisglorious land, according to tradition. Blessed and glorified be their names for ever! F ruit of the same endeavor is the Romanian University we inaugurate here today”.146 The War for the of the Romanian people was as right and justas the German and Italian wars for the national unity of their state, in the second half of the XIXth century or the Greek and Slavic Wars,for inde pendence and national unity. The Poles and the Ba Iticas wors in 1918, were progressive too; all of them contributed to the democratization and harmonization of Europe’s political geogra­ phy. This phenomen was beneficial in those years, however different the local structures and conditions might have been, and no matter how things may look today, in certain singular, specific and isolated cases. And the crowning of King Ferdinand and Queen Mary, as King

146. Ibidem, pp 14-15. About the King of the Union see Ștefan Mete;, Regele Ferdinand I al României, Cluj, 1925,; Marius Verbiceanu, Viafa fi opera regelui Ferdinand I, Galati, 1928; Ioan Lupa;, Regele Ferdinand, Cluj, 1929; Cnvfntàri de Ferdinand I, Regele Æ

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150 annes 1917-1919,” Acta Historica”. 1975,21, nr.1-2. Moga,V., Stan, C.L, încoronarea Regelui Ferdinand I la Alba lulia. Jubileul de 70 de ani al Catedralei încoronării. 15 octombrie 1922-15Octombriel992,în“îndrumător Pastoral”,XV, 1992,p,1-47. Suciu D., “Aspecte ale politicii de asuprire națională și de maghiarizare forțată a românilor din Transilvania în timpul dualismului”, în Anuarul Institutului de istorie și arheologie Clui- Napoca XXVIII. 1987/1988. Idem, “ Considerations sur Ies structures de l’autorité d’Etat pendant 1848-1867 dans la Monarchie des Habsbourg et la situation politique des nations non Hongroises et non Alemandes”. Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoires. VIII, 1990. Idem, “Date privind situația politică și confesional-școlară a românilorîn prima decadă a dualismului,”în “ Anuarul Institutului de istorie din Clui-Napoca, XXX, 1990-1991. Idem, “ Ecouri ale situației politice române in presa franceză 1848, “Anuarul Inst. de 1st, și Arh, din Cluj “.XXXIII. 1970. Idem, “ Alexandru Sterca Șuluțiu și mișcarea națională românească între 1848-1867 “(I) în “Anuarul Institutului A.D.XenoDol Iași”,XXV/ 2,1988, II în XXV/1,1989. etc.

151 Names index and authors

Barabaș E., 126 Abrudeanu, R.I., 44,48, Barițiu G., 7,9,39,41,42, 117,149 62,69,146 Adamovici, Gh., 126 Bataillard, A., 32 Adăniloaiei, N., 13 Bălan, N„ 123 Agliceriu, R., 125 Bălan T., 116,147 Albani, T., 129, 130,146 Bărnuțiu, S, 55 Alexandru, II, 21,30,36, Berindei, D., 13,16,38, 37 147 Alexandru III, 81 Berthelot, H.M.,93,102, Anderco I., 42 110,113,120 Anderson 100 Bob I., 125 Andrăssy, I., 27, 28 Bodea C., 13,147 Andrăssy, I, j., 92 Bodnărescu, 116 Angelescu, P., 140 Bocriu, I., 123 Anselme, 139 Boitoș, O., 5,147 Antonescu,I., 135 Bojincă, D., 50 Antonescu, V., 110 Bokany, D., 121 Antonia, B., 78 Bolcaș, N„ 132,139 Apathy, I., 121,122,127, Brătianu,D., 33 131 Brătianu,L, 17, 22, 28, 33, Apponyi,Al., 45,118,124 34,35,37,39,40,63 Ardeleanu I., 6, 97,98, Brătianu, I.k 33,38,73,74, 103,127,147 76,85,87,88,89,90,91,92, Arion, V., 100 94, 99, 100, 110, 111, 123, Attila, 86 127,135,137,138,143,145 Averescu, Al, 93,98,99, Brătianu, Gh. I.,38,42, 74, 101,145 75, 87,147 Broșteanu, E.,93,107,112 Bach, Al, 124 Brote, E.,72 Bânffy D., 121 Bulei, I.,33,94,147,149

152 Bunea, A.,73,150 Corivan, N., 25,147 Buzdugan, I.,107 Coscachi, L., 100 Crainic, S., 54 Candiano-Popcscu, Al.,28 Crăiniceanu, G., 92 Cancacuzino, Gr. G.,47 Criscea, N., 54 Carol, I, 17,24, 25,26,27, Criscea I.M., 54,127 29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36, Criscescu, C., 93 37,38,39,40,44,45,46,71, Crișan,42 72, 74, 75, 77,82,146,147 Cserenyes, 122 Carol Ancon, Hohenzollern- Cunnigham, 142 Sigmaringen, 24 Cupșa, I., 94,148 Caro], Habsburg de, 99,118, Curcicäpeanu V., 71,147 119 Cuza, Al. I., 19, 20, 23, 25, CarpP.P., 75,76,88,90,99, 26,31,71,75,148 100 Czernin, O., 82,83,99 Catargiu L.,32 Cicală, I.,127,147 Dance, Al., 5 Cicio Pop, Sc.,127,135 Darabane, I., 49 Ciordaș, I., 132,139 Dașcovici N., 109,148 Ciorogariu, R.,54, 72, 130, Davidoglu, 139,142 146 Demescrescu, 141 Cipariu,T., 54,69 Denikin A.N., 104 Cipăianu,G., 109,120,131, Devas, G ., 119,148 132,133,147,150 Diamandi C., 134 Ciugureanu, D., 127 Diecrich, 122 Ciurea, E., 108,147 Dragalina.I., 93 Cîmpeanu, L, 10,12 Dragomir.S., 67,123,150 Clemenceau,G., 102, 110, Duca, I.G., 73 120 Duclos, 10 Cloșca, 42 Dzerjinski, F.E., 104 Coandă, C„ 113 Cochelec, B., 10 Ecacerina, II, 82 Codru-Drăgușeanu, I., 42 Edinburg, 81 Colguhon,10,13 Elisabeca, 38 Comșa, I., 42 Eminescu M., 49,54,62 Conscancinescu, M.,73 Engels F., 103,148 153 Esperay, F., 109, 119, 120, 148 121,138 Ghica I., 22 Etzdorf, 115 Ghica, D., 28 Giurescu, G.C., 20, 21,148 Falkenhayn, F., 93 Goga, O., 86,123 Ferdinand, 1,33,75,79,80, Goldiș, V., 117,127,135 81,82,83,84,85,87,88,90, Gorceakov,AJ. M., 34,35 91,92,95,96,99,100,106, Grădișteanu, P., 40,42,46 107,109,110,113,114,116, Grigorescu, E., 93,113 127,130,135,136,140,141, Gröbles, 79 143,144,145 Ferdinand II, Habsburg de, Halippa, P., 116 27 Haliça, C., 123 Filipescu, N., 33,39,87,91, Héller, M., 104,133,148 145 Henry, P., 25,148 Fischer, 114 Hitchins, K., 66,150 Fiers, R., 110 Hodorogea, 106 Flondor, L, 115,116,127 Holban, 137,141 Florian, A., 55 Horia,42,134 Flueraș, L, 129 Hotäran, 132 Foch, F., 122,136,140,141 Hossu, I., 48, 54,127 Francis Iosif, I, 27, 46, 61, Horthy M., 142 74 Huber, 10 Franz-Ferdinand, 117 Frederik, III, 30 Iancu, A., 81,134,135 Friedeberg, 79 lancu, Gh., 109, 120, 125, Frîncu, T., 42 126,131,132,133,147,148, Fuad, E., 13 150 Furstenberg, 76 Iarcu, D., 42 Iaszi, O., 121,122 Gelu, 141 Iliescu, D., 92 George,V, 81,84,102 Inculeț, I., 106,107,127 Germani, I., 42 Ionescu, N., 33 Georgescu V., 9,31,85,95, Ionescu, T., 33, 39, 43,45, 96,98,123,148 47,89,90,91,109 Ghibu, O., 105, 108, 126, Iordache, A., 44,73,148 154 Iorga, N., 13,16,17, 38, 39, Lebouton A., 116 42,44,46,67,68,69,70,71, Leopold, Hohenzollern- 72,74,75, 76, 77, 78,81,82, Siegmaringen de, 78 86,87,90,92,94,96,98, 99, Lederer J., 109,148 101,108,114,116,118,123, Lehrer, G.M., 122,149 126.127.146.148 Lenin, V.I.,97,98,103,104, Iosif, Habsburg de, 99 129,133,138,141 Iozefina, Baden de, 24 Leucuția, 132 Isac E., 129 Litvan, G., 120,141 Istrati N., 22 Lonyay M., 62,63 Lucaci V., 48,49,86 Jumanca, I., 129 Lueger K., 53 Juriga, 118 Lupaș I., 144,149

Kalinderu, I., 72 Macartney A., 109,149 Karolyi, M., 114, 118, 119, Mackensen A., 93, 94, 99, 120,122,127,131,137 111, 113,114 Kerenski, A.F., 97,103,105 Magheru G., 13 Kirițescu, C., 94, 112, 113, Maior L., 39,65,149 114,116,118,120,121,122, Maiorescu I., 9,53,55 123,129,131,131,133,134, Maiorescu T., 73,87,88,89, 135.138.140.142.148 149 Kogälniceanu,M., 17,20,33, Mangra V., 72 34,36,37, 71 Maniu I., 48, 72, 119, 120, Koewess, H., 114 122,123,124,135,136 Kon,104 Marchlewski, 104 Kossuth, L., 124 Marghiloman A., 44,87,88, Kuhlmann, 98 90, 98, 99, 101, 107, 111, Kun, B., 133,136,137,139, 112,113,116,147 140,141,142 Maria, 79,80,81,82,83,84, Kupier, 79 85,90, 91,92,96,100,102, Kwintowski, S., 116 109,110,135,136,144,145, 147 Lacombe G., 120 Marx K-, 103,148 Lagan F., 10 Massaryk T., 119,149 Laurian A. T., 55 Măcelariu L, 62,64,68 155 MărdărescuG.,93,135,141, 145 Ogarev-Ostrojinski I., 53 Meran, 114 Olteanu M., 135 Meteș Șt., 144,149 Onciu A., 115,116 Mețianu I., 43,47, 54 Opocensky I., 119,149 Miclescu C., 71 Ormoș M., 109 Micu-Klain I.,49,50,125 Osman, 30 Micu Moldovan I., 54 Ossoimek, 118 Mihai-Viteazul,90,91,130, 135 Paget A., 85 MihaliT.,44,123 Palacky F., 53 Mocioni Al., 60 Palmer A.W., 109,149 Moga V., 144,150 Palmerston H. Y. T., 10 Molotov S., 104,105 Papiu-Ilarian A., 55 Moltke H.C.B., 30 Pascu Șt., 39,42,66,86,87, Moruzi C., 71 116,118,121,124,149 MoșoiuT.,93,131,135,141, Patcy H., 120 142 Penelea G., 69 Moye M., 120 Petals, 92 Murafa, 106 Phrekyde M., 136 Mureșan A., 42 Picot E., 63 Murgu E., 50 Pichon St., 120 Mușai M., 6, 97, 98, 103, Pilsudski J., 104,138 127,147 Platon Gh., 25,149 Poetaș S., 93,138,139 Napoleon, I, 24,36,88 Pop-Băsești, G. de, 132 Napoleon,III, 14,19,20,21 Popasu I., 54 Nekrich A., 104,133,148 Popeea N., 54 Nenițescu, 100 Popescu I., 132 Nesselrode, K.R., 12 Popovici, 92 Neugeboren, 121,122 Popovici A.C., 53 Niacovici A., 42 Portik A., 92 Nicolae, 1,14 Praporgescu D., 93 Nicolae, II, 74,81,82 Precup N., 123 Nistor,I.,108,109,116,127, Prezan C.,93,97,101,111, 149 135,145

156 Prokes J., 119,149 StanC.I., 144,150 Steffanelli, 116 Radu C., 135,136,147 Steege L., 28 Radu D., 130 Stere C., 99,100 Raicu N., 42 Stroiescu V., 105,108 Rakowski C., 129,130,137, Sturdza D. A., 17,19,26,29, 139 39,43,46,47, 72,73,147 Rațiu B., 54 Sturdza M., 10 Rațiu I., 62 Suciu D-, 7, 13, 16, 27, 52, Razoviceanu A., 93,97,135 53, 65, 70, 104, 119, 124, Riebentrop J., 104 126,128,138,141,151 Rieger T.W., 53 Suciu V., 52,136 Rieker T.W., 9,16,149 Suvorov A. V., 36 Rollin L., 147 Szăsz Z., 127,147,149 Romanelli, 142 Széll K., 47 Rosetti C. A., 22 Szélpâl A ., 120,149 Rosetti S., 47,48 Rosetti T., 88 Șaguna A., 54,63, 70,81 Roznoveanu R. N., 71 Șuluțiu St. A., 43,49,54 Russescu G., 142 Russu I. V7., 42 Tămaș, 13 Tereza M., 82 Saint-Aulaire A.F.Ch., 102 Tilly B.V., 120 Sarrail M., 93 Tisza I., 86,118,122 Sazonov S. D., 74 Tisza K-, 135 Schmerling A., 57 Titulescu N-, 87 Schoch, 123 Torrey G.E., 109,150 Schrandenbach, 123 Troțki L.D., 98, 103, 104, Scurtul., 25,32,33,44,149 133,138 Sion G.,41 Tuhacevski M.N., 138 Smuts J.C., 132 Tuhutum, 141 Slavici I., 44, 55, 72 Socec, 92 Urechia, V.A.,41 Soliman, 12,13 Vaida, Al.V., 72, 117, 118, Springer A., 53 123,127 Stalin I. V-, 105,133 Vaida L., 39,125 157 Vancca I62 Vasilescu N, A., 144 Văcărescu E., 81 Väitoianu A., 143 Verbiceanu M., 144,150 Victoria, 1,81 Vilain Ch., 109 Vix, F„ 132 Vlad, 123 Vladimirescu T., 11

Walewski Al. F. J., 15 Wekerle, Ș., 118,121 Wilhehm, II, 74,82,85,86, 92,99 Willson W., 110 Wohlgemuth L., 9 Wundt W„ 79

Zadik I., 116

Xenopol A. D., 20,150

158 CONTENTS

THE NECESSITY AND THE PREMISES OF BRINGING THE FOREIGN HEREDITARY DYNASTY...... 5

CAROL I, THE PRINCIPALITY AND THE KINGDOM OF ROMANIA...... 24

FERDINAND I, MARIA AND THE CREATION OF GREATER ROMANIA...... 78

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 146

NAMES INDEX AND AUTHORS...... 152

159