Assessing Democracy Assistance:
Pakistan
Barah Mikail Senior Researcher, FRIDE1
This report was commissioned by the Foundation for the Future. It forms part of a broader project on ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance’ that aims to gather views on how democracy support can be improved and its impact enhanced. Other case studies and a synthesis report can be found at www.fride.org.
Pakistan receives significant amounts of international funding aimed at strengthening the country’s democratic institutions. Donors’ presence and activities have grown in visibility and size since the 9/11 attacks. The salience of the counter-radicalisation agenda renders Pakistan a particularly thorny case study for democracy support. Within the context of Pakistan’s patently fragile and increasingly politicised domestic situation, this report offers one very specific contribution to current debates: it focuses on international assistance to democracy as viewed by those on the receiving end of such programmes. The interviews carried out by FRIDE in Pakistan show that it is difficult to talk about a single vision of the effectiveness of donors’ strategy. On the donors’ side, the general sense is that progress has taken place and that Pakistan is evolving in a positive direction despite some faltering steps. On the recipients’ side, cautious acknowledgment of improvements is outweighed by a reluctance to talk of outright successes. Local stakeholders’ main gripe concerns the level of involvement of Pakistanis in defining democracy aid programmes.
Donors insist on the importance of international assistance for the future of the country, whereas local actors question its role. For the latter, the main overarching strategic issue is Pakistan’s relationship with the United States; this is perceived locally as a factor which weakens the government’s autonomy and legitimacy, and risks undermining the value of democracy aid. Despite the 2008 departure of General Musharraf and the organisation of free and fair general elections in that same year, local interlocutors still doubt the international community’s overall commitment to deepening democratisation. Donors have undoubtedly brought a lot to Pakistan. But fundamental changes are required to bring donor visions and local recipient expectations into line.
1 The author would like to thank all interviewees for their time and opinions shared during fieldwork. The research methodology for this report is explained in an appendix at the end of the main text. Responsibility for this report and the views expressed are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the positions of either FRIDE nor the funders.
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Democracy: the state of play
After independence Pakistan shifted between periods of autocratic and more competitive forms of governance. Then, in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup took the country decisively away from democracy. Under his rule, the military largely governed the country. Musharraf’s rule coincided with Pakistan’s strategic re-emergence, largely due to events in neighbouring Afghanistan in a post-September 11 context. Policy making was mostly driven by Musharraf’s personal whims. On most indicators political rights narrowed after 2000.
Musharraf said that he wanted his country to move towards decentralisation. He therefore introduced a series of governance reforms that started with the ‘New Devolution of Power Plan’ (2001). Musharraf’s reforms aimed at a reduction in the size of the government, more efficiency for the public services, an elevation of the general level of education and a better representation of workers, women and minorities at all levels of the country. The latter consisted in establishing three tiers of local government: at the district, the sub- district (Tehsil) and the union council levels. These steps had very limited results; they did not enable the empowerment of the elected representatives at a lower level, partly because Musharraf did not really want it to work, but also because he personally rejected the idea of allowing nascent figures to emerge. For example, the women that were elected on reserved seats were all, except for those elected on the MQM ticket (Muttahida Qaumi Movement, the third largest political party), relatives of incumbent MPs who either could not stand for re-election because they did not fulfil the necessary requirements and wanted to keep the seat in the family or just saw an opportunity to get more influence through reserved seats. This was true even for the religious parties. This led to complaints from important socio-professional categories. Landowners and bureaucrats alike resented their loss of privileges as a result of Musharraf’s decisions. Therefore, even though these new rules artificially seemed to allow nascent figures to emerge, the subsequent criticism soon led to a suspension of the electoral process.
In the last two years Pakistan has returned formally to a democratic path. Progress has undoubtedly been made. However, despite elections giving the country a breath of political freedom, the process does not yet guarantee Pakistan’s ability to consolidate democracy. The media constantly criticise the ineffective role of the Parliament. Private electronic media that were only grudgingly allowed during Musharraf’s times have operated more freely and have now become extremely powerful, even though they often face repression by the regime. A vibrant civil society exists; elections have been organised in a genuinely competitive fashion; intense political debates are regularly held; and a multiparty system prevails. But a lot of Pakistan’s underlying institutional pathologies remain beneath such reforms. A long period may be needed before anyone succeeds in transforming a country that is still ruled by the motley of feudal lords and generals2 which have perpetuated corruption and bad governance as part of their game plan.
2008 proved to be a watershed. The decision (in March of the preceding year) to remove the Pakistani Chief of Justice, Iftikhar M. Chaudhry, from his position was the beginning of the end for Musharraf’s era. Later that same year, when the Supreme Court overruled Musharraf’s decision to suspend the top judge, his legitimacy was fatally undercut. The period that followed was the beginning of a cautious democratic process in Pakistan. Elections led to the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), followed in second place by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). A new President, Asif Ali Zardari, was designated, and a new Prime Minister was nominated, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani. Similarly, between 2008 and 2011, signs of change were discernable in the freer rein given to the media, the decreased role for the military, and the government’s eschewal of interference in public debates.
2 Feudal, industrial and military sectors have dominated during different phases of Pakistan’s history, depending on the respective rulers. For instance, while Muhammad Ayyub Khan (1958-1969) and General Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971) were the first to strengthen the military, they also defended the interests of the feudals, thereby contributing significantly to Pakistan’s development. The golden age of industry came un- der Zulfikar Ali Buttho´s rule, even though M.A. Khan had also been very keen to allow this category to earn more advantages. Buttho considered that both agricultural and industrial sectors were key to enhancing Pakistan’s development. But his policies, based partly on the nationalisation of industries, also led to capital flight from the country, dependence on foreign aid, erosion of business confidence, rising unemployment and the alienation of small entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, taken as a whole in Pakistan’s history, the more they grew, the more these socio-professional categories began to dominate the political sphere, and to affect the activities of several of the country’s political parties.
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But if the Pakistani population expected deeper-reaching reforms, they were to be disappointed. Complaints soon arose about the new government’s weakness over economic policy, in recovering sovereignty in the tribal areas and in the nature of its relations with the United States. The government is caught up in scandals and corruption cases. The state of political freedom, good governance and human rights in Pakistan has seen some moderate improvements over the last few years. A sober analysis, however, suggests that much room for improvement remains.
When it comes to evaluating general trends in their country’s process of political reform, Pakistani civil society does not seem to accord priority importance to institutional aspects. The impact of geopolitics and international relations on their government features far more prominently. Debates on state television and in the printed media reflect this trend. This partly explains why the paucity of further institutional reforms is not raised as a major complaint. The fact that certain bodies have experienced greater independence since the 2008 elections seems to have quelled some voices of dissent. Institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Higher Education Commission (HEC) have been able to operate without strong government interference. This said, however, the latter is currently being dissolved following its challenging of the authenticity of the degrees of some members of the Pakistani Parliament.3 Nevertheless, regardless of nominal institutional improvements, the government is far from winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Pakistani people. This requires far deeper reform to the still prevalent self-serving corruption of local governments. Recent political murders reflect the scale of the challenges ahead.
Turnout rates for elections have been consistently low. People vote only marginally for a party and rather for a person who is well-connected regardless of his/her political affiliation. Landlords have a stable votebank whether they run for elections as independent candidates or for PPP or PML, and they can change their affiliation without any consequence. This is why people tend to vote more in the rural areas.
Therefore, better efforts to increase Pakistanis’ political consciousness remain necessary. In a young country where 80 per cent of the poor live in rural areas, the links between poverty, illiteracy and lack of interest in civic rights seem obvious. Observation missions on the ground report that voter turnout is greater among men than women. This tendency can be attributed to cultural and social norms (perceived male superiority, especially in rural and conservative regions, means that voting is a matter for the chief of the family rather than his wife). But broadly speaking, general disaffection vis-à-vis elections inevitably leads to a low turnout in which Pakistani women do not perceive any advantage in their going to the polls and voting for people defending programmes of which they have little knowledge.
Donor activities
The United States is Pakistan’s largest source of bilateral aid. Its economic assistance has grown considerably since 2001. In 2010, Washington dedicated USD 1.2 billion to Pakistan’s economic needs, and it promised a further USD 300 million. This considerable base of USD 1.5 billion/year reflects the United States’ aim to seek Pakistan’s stability partly through strengthening its economy. But this shift has only been made possible recently, with the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill (also known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009). This bill was adopted by Congress in 2009, authorising a tripling over five years of the sums dedicated to Pakistan’s development.
USAID oversees US involvement in Pakistan. Since 2002, it has given USD 5.1 billion in support for economic growth, education, energy, health, good governance, as well as exceptional major issues linked to earthquake reconstruction, flood relief and recovery. Aid is organised through separate programmes as shown in the following table:
3 In official discourse this step is presented as a necessary move towards the reinforcement of provinces.
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Programme Purpose Allocated amount Flood Assistance Provide shelter, food, water, health USD 550,000,000 services and essential supplies to communities affected by the 2010 floods Investing in People: Improve the health and well-being of USD 165,312,000 (FY 2010) Health the Pakistani people - Maternal and Child Health: 74,735,000 (45%) - Family Planning & Reproductive Health: 44,000,000 (27%) - Water Supply and Sanitation: 17,507,000 (11%) - Tuberculosis: 10,000,000 (6%) - Other Public Health Threats: 10,470,000 (6%) - HIV/AIDS: 6,000,000 (4%) - Nutrition: 2,600,000 (1%) Creating Opportunities: Support the economy by nurturing USD 151,790,000 (FY 2010) Economic Growth more effective government policies, - Private Sector Competitiveness: 90,634,229, more competitive enterprises, and (60%) more efficient market environments - Financial Sector: 28,859,883 (19%) - Economic Opportunity: 15,796,650 (10%) - Trade and Investment: 9,000,000 (6%) - Foundation for Growth: 6,000,000 (4%) - Transport services: 1,500,000 (1%) Governing justly and Strengthen local governments and USD 104,509,000 (FY 2010) democratically legislative institutions, empower - Civil Society: 42,653,710 (41%) civil society, develop a credible and - Good Governance: 37,332,129 (36%) transparent electoral system - Political Competition and Consensus Building: 16,563,000 (16%) - Rule of Law and Human Rights: 7,960,000 (7%) Investing in People: Help educate teachers, renovate USD 125,108,213 (FY 2009) Education schools, manage educational - Basic Education: 87,574,644 (70%) systems, improve teaching outcomes, - Higher Education: 37,533,569 (30%) expand basic literacy skills Creating Opportunities: Reinforce Pakistan’s efforts to USD 95,000,000 Agriculture establish a modern, market-driven agricultural sector able to meet domestic food needs, generate export revenues, and spur broad-based economic growth Creating Opportunities: Increase energy supplies through USD 69,000,000 (FY 2010) Energy improved metering, operations, and - Modern Energy Services, 69,000,000 (100%) water distribution Investing in People: Increasing women’s participation USD 12,500,0004 (FY 2010) Gender Equity in the labour force, expanding girls’ access to quality basic education, improving maternal and child health, and promoting women’s rights in political, economic and social realms
4 It is worth mentioning that in July 2010, the US Department of State announced a new five-year, USD 40 million Gender Equity Programme to be funded by USAID aimed at advancing women’s rights and empowerment in Pakistan. Programmes include: expanding women’s access to justice; helping women exercise their rights in the workplace, community and home; combating gender-based violence; and strengthening the capacity of Pakistani organisations that advocate for gender equality, women’s empowerment and the elimination of gender-based violence. For more information see the official communiqué at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/July/20100719170336su0.2060358.html
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The United Kingdom is one of the biggest bilateral donors to Pakistan. Acting through its Department for International Development (DFID), the UK allocated GBP 140.4 million to Pakistan in 2009-2010. The greatest part of these funds were dedicated to humanitarian assistance (33 per cent), followed by governance (20 per cent), education (18 per cent), growth (15 per cent), health (8 per cent), other social services (5 per cent) and ‘other purposes’ (1 per cent).
The relationship between the UK and Pakistan means that the latter is ranked amongst London’s top priorities. The UK is planning to more than double its bilateral aid between now and 2015 (GBP 446 million/year is the sum DFID envisages by this date). Moreover, DFID does not shy away from large commitments in the fields of governance and democracy issues. This orientation takes the form of various programmes, including fighting corruption, increasing transparency, strengthening government institutions and empowering women.
Canada is also a donor that has committed to Pakistan’s development. It intervenes through its Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), a body dedicated to development and poverty reduction. CIDA’s programming in Pakistan corresponds with the country’s 2008 and 2009 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as endorsed by the World Bank.5 In 2009, Canada also decided to rank Pakistan as a focus country for its own aid effectiveness agenda.6 Given the PRSP priorities, CIDA has decided to focus on the following issues in Pakistan: children and youth (improving the quality of teachers, the quality of education, etc.) and sustainable economic growth (improving employment opportunities, encouraging women-led enterprises, etc). CIDA disbursements for the 2009-2010 period reached a total of USD 86 million.
Germany’s relations with Pakistan have increased decade by decade since the 1960s. As a result, Germans are considered among the most skilled actors on the ground. Their total budget (USD 47 million for FY 2010, including USD 15 million for humanitarian and flood purposes) focuses on health, education, energy and governance. The latter is a recent orientation. The Federal Foreign Office (FFO) and some 30 other German NGOs are active throughout the Pakistani territories, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where there is a lower international presence.
Norway is increasingly cited as a very important and efficient donor in Pakistan. There seem to be two main reasons for this (aside from the fact that the presence of 40,000 Pakistanis in Norway, their strong media presence, and their involvement in politics including the Parliament, may also play a role): Norway’s flexible procedures when it comes to granting funds for projects; and the high visibility it is trying to achieve on the ground. For instance, to build on cooperation dating back to the 1980s, Norway and Pakistan signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Norway-Pakistan Partnership Initiative’ (NPPI) in January 2009. This covers a five-year period until 2013, for which its allocated budget is USD 44 million. It is committed to improving maternal health and child mortality, two of the Millennium Development Goals. The NPPI is far from Norway’s sole engagement in Pakistan. With the 2010 floods, Norway decided to increase its assistance to the victims by dedicating USD 66 million through the United Nations. Bilateral cooperation also focuses on good governance (i.e. democratisation and human rights), education and support of children’s rights. Norway works closely with multilateral as well as local partners (UNDP, UNESCO, International Labour Organisation, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Working Women Organisation of Lahore, etc.) in Pakistan.
Until recently, the European Commission has not featured prominently amongst the major donors to Pakistan. In the period 1976-2009, it dedicated a mere EUR 500 million to aid projects (including EUR 125 million for the period 2002-2006). Most of these funds were dedicated to infrastructure and development projects (roads, electricity infrastructures, education, etc.) as well as human development and environmental management. But there has been a shift in the last few years. Since the establishment of a joint Cooperation agreement in 2004, the EU and Pakistan’s relations have shown a stronger commitment to promoting development in Pakistan. As a result, the EU’s commitment is now based on a 2007-2013 strategy, which
5 The PRSP priorities are: macroeconomic stability, protecting the poor and the vulnerable, agricultural productivity, integrated energy develop- ment, industrial competitiveness, human development, infrastructure, finance for development, and governance. 6 Canada’s aid effectiveness agenda allows the country to allocate 80 percent of its bilateral resources to 20 focus countries. These are selected according to three main criteria: their real needs; their capacity to benefit from aid; and their alignment with Canadian foreign policy priorities.
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states that both partners should strengthen their strategic dialogue, as well as focus on the following issues: security (counterterrorism); trade and investment; energy; development; humanitarian assistance; regional issues; democracy, governance and promotion of human rights; and climate change. Other issues include the promotion of investments and a comprehensive plan on stabilisation and reconstruction in the affected areas.
In June 2010, the EU and Pakistan reassessed their state of relations. The EU reiterated its commitment to support Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, as well as its economic and social development. Moreover, the Development Cooperation Instrument, which was planned for the period 2011-2013, stated a 50 per cent increase in its average budget, taking it to EUR 75 million per year. From the EU’s point of view, this engagement would then be in line with the EU Action Plan for Pakistan, which sets out priorities such as capacity support to the rule of law sector, support of the Malakand Development Strategy and support to Pakistan’s energy sector. Finally, it should also be mentioned that the European Commission dedicated significant funds to help Pakistan deal with the consequences of the 2010 floods. The European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department’s (ECHO) funds were increased to a total of EUR 150 million (70 million in cash contributions and 80 million in commitments). This amount comes alongside contributions from EU member states, which amount to EUR 170 million.7
Multilateral organisations are huge aid donors to Pakistan. Their significant funds, technical skills and development of relations with most of the actors working in the aid field in Pakistan make them an invaluable asset in the development of the country.
The World Bank (WB) is one of these key funders. Through its Pakistan Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), covering the period 2010-2013, it provides assistance in fields ranging from development to governance and humanitarian issues. The WB cooperates with various local actors including communities, civil society, the government and donor agencies. Its actions aim to support the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, focusing on three main fields: strengthening economic stability and government effectiveness; strengthening the investment climate; and supporting pro-poor and pro-gender equity policies. But the CPS also brought new objectives (in line with a redefinition of priorities by the WB based on its previous engagement in Pakistan): improving economic governance; improving human development and social protection; improving infrastructure to support growth; improving security and reducing the risk of conflict.
Whereas most donors operate in Pakistan on the basis of aid packages, the WB provides loans with repayment requirements. Some consider that this situation creates an additional burden on Pakistan; but most acknowledge that it is a fair way to prevent wastage of the huge sums lent to the country. The government remains aware that these funds are essential to its development. The WB has allocated just under USD 1 billion for Pakistan in 2011. Reform and governance (included below within the ‘public administration law’ sector) rank among WB priorities for Pakistan. According to WB forecasts, allocations for FY 2011 are as follows:
Public Administration Law: USD 373 million Transportation: USD 216 million Health Social Services: USD 197 million Agriculture: USD 104 million Water, Sanitation, Flood Protection: USD 39 million Education: USD 35 million Finance: USD 490,000
The United Nations acts in Pakistan through its ‘One Programme’. UN funds, agencies and programmes working in the country have been undertaking a comprehensive review of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Accordingly, five major areas of UN support to the developmental process
7 It is noteworthy that the Pakistani population was very generous itself in giving money when this catastrophe occurred. Religious and cultural reasons, combined with emotion and a sense of solidarity, are the main reasons for this. Nevertheless, local initiatives could have been channelled in a much more efficient way.
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in Pakistan have been defined: education; environment; disaster risk management; health and population; and agriculture, rural development and poverty reduction. In parallel, four cross-cutting themes are integrated: gender; refugees; human rights; and civil society. To achieve these objectives, the UN works with the Pakistani government, civil society and development partners. Its expenditure on Pakistan remains more constant than that of the WB. Its overall assistance to Pakistan was USD 900 million in 2009.
Even though it represents only one aspect of UN strategy and actions in Pakistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) remains an important actor in the country, spending USD 60 million in 2010. Crisis prevention and recovery tops the list of the UNDP priorities in Pakistan, accounting for more than USD 35 million of total expenditures. Democracy and governance accounts for less than USD 10 million; poverty reduction less than USD 8 million; and environment and climate change less than USD 6 million.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is also a very important multilateral donor. It works together with the government and the private sector to improve the country’s infrastructure, energy security and basic public services. Since Pakistan joined the ADB in 1966, it has received more than USD 20 billion in loans, with USD 15.7 billion disbursed. ADB also completed, together with the World Bank, a Damage and Needs Assessment after the 2010 floods. Globally speaking, the work of the ADB mainly focuses on supporting initiatives in fields such as energy, social development, governance and transport. In 2010, ADB’s involvement consisted of a disbursement of USD 800 million and USD 700 million in newly provided assistance. But taken as a whole, ADB’s portfolio in Pakistan contains 30 active loans amounting to USD 3.3 billion, 27 ongoing loans of USD 3.1 billion, and 3 grants totalling USD 180 million.
Also noteworthy is that the ADB is committed to a Country Partnership Strategy for Pakistan (CPS) for the 2009-2013 period. The CPS planned assistance consists of USD 4.4 billion throughout 2011, and annual leverage lending of almost USD 1.5 billion. It prioritises to the four following areas: reforms and investments in key infrastructure sectors; support for a new generation of economic reforms; development of urban services; and effective implementation of projects and programmes and capacity building.8
Finally, the Asia Foundation, which has been working in Pakistan since 1954, also ranks among the key actors on the multilateral donor scene. As opposed to the development focus of the WB and UNDP, the Asia Foundation prioritises governance and institutionalisation. Indeed, its main areas of focus are: democratic reform, democratic participation, human rights and civil liberties, and women’s civic participation. According to its mandate, the Foundation aims at ‘working with civil society and government in Pakistan to promote democratic governance that focuses on citizens’ needs’. To achieve these objectives, it is active in the entire country. Meetings with religious leaders and local representatives are at the heart of its strategy, as the Asia Foundation remains committed to better understanding peoples’ needs and local points of view before proceeding to recommendations.
Local views
The most striking observation made constantly by all our Pakistani interviewees was that democratic governance programmes are still elaborated in an extremely top-down fashion. The World Bank and the IMF would be hard pressed to develop their huge aid programmes from a bottom-up approach, simply because their overarching objectives have to take into account the interests and investment of several countries. The considerable financial strength of these large multilaterals is therefore also a limiting factor in that local issues are often left untouched. This perspective was echoed by the majority of local actors interviewed for this study: multilateral and multinational donors play a very important role in Pakistan, although they are sometimes limited in terms of strategy by their very size. On the positive side, their significant logistical and financial resources, their appointment of highly skilled programme managers with background experience, and their previous dealings with institutional reform and governance issues make them indispensable actors in the field of international democracy assistance to Pakistan.
8 For further details on these issues, see http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/PAK.pdf
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These positive elements are countered by a tendency to deal with local issues from a single standardised approach. Such an approach is rarely able to anticipate particularities. For example, calling for a better coordination of efforts between local Pakistani representatives, without paying attention to local power structures (feudalism, religious representatives, tribal chiefs, etc.) sometimes leads to counterproductive results. In a similar vein, local interlocutors criticised ‘foreign bureaucrats’ for their attempts to ‘analyse Pakistani general perspectives as if the country were a reflection of Islamabad’. It seems to be that representatives from multilateral organisations almost fear the reality of an on-the-ground analysis for security reasons. The result is that they stick to general considerations that are never enough to fulfil the people’s and the country’s needs.
Several interviewees pointed out that even when the WB or the IMF send their personnel to villages and towns, this does not necessarily result in a positive impact on their country strategy. As their programmes are defined from a top-down perspective, and the means of implementation developed thereafter, the possibility for local observations to generate a positive impact and provoke direct re-evaluations of ongoing democracy programmes is inexistent. Bureaucratic tendencies and institutionalised mechanisms of organisation are the main culprits of such bad habits, coupled with a reliance on ‘non-Pakistani judgments and points of view’.
Things seem to work differently and more positively when it comes to small, bilateral donors as they are generally more discrete and more prepared to rely on their local networks (even though there are exceptions in this case too). Smaller donors are much more open to a revision of their initial objectives based on specific local particularities, which in turn allows their objectives and democracy programmes to be more locally- orientated. Spain and Norway are highlighted by interviewees as two bilateral donors whose assessments generally take into consideration the needs and demands of the local population. ‘People look much more positively at the role of organisations which ask them relevant questions, which take time to inquire after their genuine needs, and which develop subsequent programmes adapted to such needs.’ Of course, taking this point into consideration does not mean that adopting a solely micro-level approach would guarantee better strategies and better results; virtually all the interviewees agreed on the necessity for a multi-level approach. But considering Pakistan’s particular stakes, programmes defined according to only general perspectives do not bode well for strengthening the country’s democracy.
Interviewees also called for more attention to regional governance structures. The current government is engaged in a similar policy of decentralisation as that initiated under Musharraf, under the pretext that in a country in which people acknowledge the severe weaknesses of their political leaders, an insistence on decentralisation seems unavoidable. Pakistani political actors, who are an important interface between central institutions and citizens, are also key to donors pursuing projects at a meso level. Furthermore, governors and members of local ‘majlisses’, despite not always seeing eye to eye with the central government over policies, enjoy greater access and legitimacy in the eyes of local citizens. They take the risk of acting independently and dealing with local issues without responding to the demands of the ‘legitimate executives of powers’. Analysed from this perspective, acting at a meso level makes sense; by giving importance to intermediary representatives and by dedicating funds and programmes to them, donors allow them to remain ‘part of the game’. Such a situation brings two main advantages: on the one hand, it allows reforms to take place at every level of power in Pakistan; on the other hand, it allows the central government to be able to rely on them as official interlocutors. Whilst the status quo does not protect Pakistan from possible tensions between the executive main power and each of these intermediary levels, it nevertheless allows for a safer sphere of operation than one in which players act separately.
When it comes to the Pakistani central government, things appear to be less problematic than is commonly held. From an external point of view, Pakistan is frequently cited as a country in which corruption dominates. By extension, this would mean that actors involved in projects would have to bribe key personalities to allow projects to develop in a smooth way on the ground. Nevertheless, none of those interviewed for this study confirmed this issue. On the contrary, all insisted on the facilitating role of the Pakistani government in allowing foreign donors to move freely in the country, putting them in contact with key local actors, according them all the necessary authorisations to act quickly and efficiently, etc. As one of the interviewees pointed out, there is a very tight and controlled procedure that makes it hard, if not impossible, for most structures to
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go off the rails. Those specificities are mainly due to the way foreign institutions have elaborated their own chart and principles, so that every rupee ends up well spent. This vision may sound over optimistic, as some bodies, including the FATA Secretariat, are not exactly perceived as incorrupt; but none of the interviewees expressed real problems of corruption in democracy aid.
That said, even though they categorically denied the existence of any form of corruption, some actors acknowledged a tendency to cash in on favours. A common instance concerns Pakistani interlocutors asking for invitations outside of their country, or even demanding invitations for some of their relatives. Even though this type of demand remains a form of corruption, most donors seem easily to grant such requests, considering that they are part of the game, and that giving Pakistani players the opportunity to visit foreign countries can be an interesting opportunity for them to meet their external counterparts and to promote better bilateral relations in the future.
Other local actors interviewed claimed that whilst they could not attest directly to cases of corruption, Pakistan was not necessarily a virtuous country. Bribes are apparently more common when it comes to smaller structures and institutions which have fewer resources and act solely on a bilateral basis. Two main reasons could explain such a situation: the fact that these structures are not submitted to a ‘chart of integrity’ as is the case for the big donors; and the complicated situation that often prevails on the ground, making it difficult for a new and/or small donor to achieve his objectives without relying on local knowledge. For their part, as Pakistani interlocutors do not fear scandals when it comes to the case of little known organisations, it becomes easier for them to demand direct ‘trade-offs’ for their advice and efforts.
Finally, when it comes to democracy and its definition, it seems that consensus is far from evident in Pakistan. Political actors, donors, NGO representatives and locals each have their own interpretation of democracy as a concept. Even though all interviewees agreed that it would be exaggerated to talk of the existence of a real democracy in Pakistan, they differed widely on how to define it. Some considered that democracy is a system in which people go to the polls and designate their political representatives, and concluded therefore that the post-Musharraf period has already sown the seeds of democracy in the country. Others distanced themselves from such a vision, and insisted on the fact that the minimum requirements for democracy – elites representing the people’s vote, a smooth political process and a stable sovereign government – were absent in Pakistan. Between these two views lies an alternative, more pragmatic vision: democracy is a process that is based on constant evolution and reforms and as such it cannot be defined in a single manner. That is why democracy – even though imperfect – exists to a certain degree in Pakistan, and the situation has evolved considerably during recent years.
Opinions also differed on whether the coming months and years could allow Pakistan to achieve wider reforms or not. The general appreciation is optimistic, as most interviewees consider that there will be no step back by the government, and that all the reforms that have occurred these last years will be followed up. This vision is mainly held by local NGO representatives, who are regularly in touch with realities on the ground, and who feel that even the population considers that reforms have contributed to the country’s general welfare. But there are also detractors who say that regardless of superficial achievements, the core problems of Pakistan remain embedded, namely a ruling military elite, corruption, a weak political class and deep frustration among public opinion.
This same public opinion seems to be concerned primarily with the improvement of basic economic conditions over and above mentions of reform and governance. When it comes to evaluating the government’s actions, few if any of the people we met considered that the modest achievements to date could be seen as a precursor for rapid and certain reform in the coming years. Moreover, when pressed on Pakistan’s political considerations they invariably referred to their country’s relations with the United States. According to local actors, the current government – as well as most of those that came before – failed in consolidating the idea of a strong country that would act according to its own independent vision. Indeed, decisions on the Pakistani side are often interpreted as if they were due to pressures from the American side. As scepticism against Americans remains high in Pakistan, it may not be exaggerated to claim that governance and reform, even if fundamental, do not seem to be sufficient to get Pakistanis to believe in a better future and more stability for their country.
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Factors weakening the impact of democracy aid
NGO representatives, politicians and members of civil society in general all stated that the presence of donors in the country was legitimate and important for the future of the country, and brought obvious results on the ground. Challenges in the form of Pakistan’s need for serious reforms, the acknowledgment by key political representatives of this need and the country’s reliance on international donor funding to bring about such reforms are all elements which constitute a safeguard for most of the donors operating in Pakistan.
The aid allocated and invested by donors in Pakistan contributes to the good image most local stakeholders hold of them. Indeed, when asked whether the sums that are being invested in their country were substantial enough to move forward, none complained about the amount of money currently benefiting Pakistan. On the contrary, all concurred that every recipient of foreign funding found it largely sufficient to develop their projects. Some NGOs even claimed that they could probably obtain more funds to develop more projects if they wanted, but that they deliberately chose to limit their own activities. Unsurprisingly, some have been creating their own structures in an attempt to profit from the huge amounts of money that are dedicated to reform in Pakistan.
Local views are nevertheless more reserved when it comes to the appropriateness of donors’ strategies given the issues at stake in various areas of Pakistan. They sometimes blame the methods promoted by some agencies for being disconnected from local realities. USAID’s strategy is often the first target for such critics. For instance, it is often unclear whether all of the employees’ wages and different logistical expenses are deducted from the undoubtedly large quantities allocated for reform purposes in Pakistan. This situation causes some frustration, as people expect all the dedicated funds to benefit their country. USAID is also criticised for not taking into consideration the long-term impact and the sustainability of its democracy programmes, as well as for its strong attachment to statistics and reliance on general objectives. According to local views, an understanding of the specificities of Pakistani culture and way of living is more important than mere facts and figures.
Unfortunately, some donors, including USAID, are seen by local groups as reluctant to take on board cultural nuances. Their broader orientation and duty to achieve objectives that have been defined by their distant hierarchies seem to lead to a particular state of mind in which overarching objectives trump local pragmatism. As a result, even though nobody went as far as to explicitly charge a counterproductive attitude, some accused USAID of seeking to reinforce its image at the expense of focusing on local aspects. More often than not, in the context of anti-Americanism (which remains very high in Pakistan), USAID will attempt to convince Pakistanis that they are not interested solely in security matters. The other negative side to the high visibility of USAID on the ground and local awareness of USAID involvement at a project level is that the image of Western donors in general is sometimes harmed. This stems in part from a tendency to group together all donors under one label. Most of the interviewees seemed nevertheless to regret the current situation, as they all acknowledged that USAID has ideas, funds, resources and objectives that can be of key importance for the future of Pakistan.
It is important to stress that these critics did not point the finger of blame at USAID only. All foreign and more precisely Western donors have been the object of such accusations. The general sense is that even though very qualified, most foreign actors in Pakistan look at Pakistan’s problems and issues through an Islamabad- focused lens. Several factors could explain this situation, but the most important one is probably the reluctance by internationals to tour Pakistan due to the risks they may encounter. Islamabad – an administrative city that is disconnected from certain realities of Pakistan – therefore remains their principle destination, base and implementation area. Other cities including Lahore and Karachi are frequented often enough but mainly for leisure purposes and weekend visits. On the professional side, few experts appear ready to ‘risk their lives’ and take the time to visit Pakistan’s more remote areas. As a result, some local issues and particularities are overlooked by those very people who claim to facilitate the country’s progress.
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According to one of the interviewees, ‘they [experts acting on behalf of donors] live in a hub. They feel they wouldn’t be secure if they went on the ground. Incidentally, they may be right. But in that case, why don’t they ask themselves: why were we able to go on the ground ten years ago and why aren’t we able to go anymore now?’ This call for a self-critical attitude is expressed by most of those who want to see better perspectives for Pakistan’s future. Few feel that donors’ attitudes reflect a form of neo-colonialism; nevertheless, they remain outraged by the fact that beneath a façade of nominal inclusion, donors’ arrogance prevents them from relying on and working with local actors to a greater extent. Such an accusation is not directed at all foreign actors, as some of them are also seen as pragmatic and are considered to be dealing positively with issues on the ground (Spain and Norway’s work have often been cited as examples of good in-country practice). But the situation could nevertheless be improved in terms of efficiency and accountability, as more often than not the quantities of money available for projects do not find their way to those who would most benefit from such funds.
That said, the criticism of USAID in particular and American donors in general does not lead Pakistanis to reject their funding or projects. Whether Western or non-Western partners provide the money and the ideas makes no difference to them. This acceptance of funds regardless of its origins seems to extend even to the tribal areas, where anti-American sentiment is arguably stronger than in the main cities according to most of the interviewees.9 The general perception of animosity towards Western representatives loses its ferocity when it comes to money, improvement of the economic situation and infrastructure construction. The danger that travelling in these regions poses to Westerners should not be overlooked, however, as even Pakistani official representatives often fail to find a means of interaction in the tribal areas.
The difficulties sometimes experienced by foreigners in working in more remote areas can be lessened by a greater reliance on local Pakistani interlocutors and local NGO outreach workers. The tense relations which often mar interactions between representatives of Pakistan’s official bodies and inhabitants of tribal areas do not impede regular citizens from being able act as go-betweens. It is partly the involvement of non-affiliated mediators which has gradually facilitated the presence of some foreign structures in these areas. Discretion enables foreign donors to find a way to accomplish their mission (or at least some of their objectives) without their overt presence deliberately provoking animosity. And even if most interviewees acknowledged that this approach does not guarantee full success for governance and reform programmes in such areas, they nevertheless expressed satisfaction. ‘Doing few but good things is much better than not acting at all’, one person involved in the tribal areas affirmed.
But there is still a lot that has to be done in terms of democracy aid as well as reforms, projects and enhancement in general. The situation has evolved considerably in the last years, and none of the experts, observers and actors we interviewed talked about any kind of regression on the ground. On the contrary, both the important programmes and funds available for Pakistan’s institutional and structural development, and the country’s moves since the 2008 elections, are presented as examples of the promising path the country seems to be following.
Despite positive overtones, however, mistrust and suspicion remain heavily present in Pakistani society with regard to their view of international donor involvement. No one can guarantee the willingness of Pakistanis to appear open to every single actor that arrives with programmes ‘a la carte’. Indeed, this broader sentiment of caution is reflected in the local media which do not hesitate to indulge in what appears to be Pakistan’s ‘favourite national sport’: anti-Western feeling in general and anti-Americanism in particular. During our stay in Pakistan, while the rest of the world’s media seemed to be following the revolts across the Middle East and Northern Africa, Pakistani local media chose to barely cite them. Instead, entire debates and columns were dedicated to the state of US-Pakistani relations, the Raymond Davis case,10 and the way this calls
9 In reality, this could be partly a myth, as anti-American sentiment also seems very strong in the cities, including among the Westernised, educated upper middle-class. 10 Raymond Davis is a US consular employee who shot dead two Pakistanis in the city of Lahore in January 2011. Since then, anti-American resentment has increased in Pakistan, to the extent of impacting on US-Pakistani relations. Both Washington and Islamabad are committed to maintaining good bilateral relations; but these have been strained following Pakistan’s insistence on trying the American citizen in its courts, whilst the United States argues that such an issue is impossible because of Davis’s diplomatic immunity.
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into question Pakistan’s overly strong dependence on the United States. What are said to be the ‘positive achievements of the last years’ seem to weigh nothing compared to Pakistanis’ main demands: stronger political independence for their country, less corruption in everyday life, better engagement with strategic environmental issues, the progressive separation of the political and the religious spheres, as well as better defence of the country’s territorial integrity.
In conclusion, to date no significant threats have arisen to donors’ presence and projects in the country. But some of the obstacles to their presence on the ground, if they gain footing, are more likely to come through social resentment and frustration, and to negatively impact American as well as Western donors in general.
Views on diplomatic back-up to aid programmes
A frequent local complaint is that training programmes implemented by NGOs often remain out of reach of those they would most benefit. Some blamed a lack of interest on the side of the trainers; but critics also address a lack of awareness or consciousness on the Pakistani side. Whereas Westerners working in Pakistan are conscious of the need to achieve certain objectives, their local counterparts sometimes display a more passive attitude. In other words, they execute orders without exerting their critical sense. Needless to say, this critical brush cannot be used to tar all local interlocutors; for their part, Pakistani employers and directors of NGOs are said to be very motivated and innovative. The interviews we conducted with national representatives confirmed this impression.
Coordination is another issue raised just as often by recipients vis-à-vis donors as it is among donors themselves. A supposedly common elaboration of strategy and aims does not necessarily translate into regular and sustained coordination between actors. Indeed, NGO representatives we met insisted that the main contact they had with their donors occurred at the beginning of the process, when their candidacy for funds or projects required attention. One or several initial meetings are organised at this time, to discuss the way work will be achieved on the ground. But it depends on the donor as to whether this initial interest is followed up. Some do scrutinise implementation processes, mainly to avoid wastage of money and effort. But in half if not more cases, donors’ attention towards projects wanes until their scheduled end and the time of assessment. This situation occurs mainly at the level of large multilateral donors, as they sometimes suffer the negative impact of their own inflexible procedures and bureaucratic trends.
Some of the interviewees nevertheless regarded this situation as normal, saying that their skills and their reputation were considered sufficient to let them develop projects on their own. But some others considered that such ‘negligence’ could also turn counterproductive, especially in the case of smaller NGOs. Demands for funds usually pour in, as donors want to assist a maximum number of partners. But even though they seem concerned not to give funds and means to newcomers that might not have the necessary skills, ‘accidents’ sometimes happen, generating a waste in investments. Nevertheless, all the interviewees agreed that such situations were the exception rather than the rule.
Conditionality was seen as a potentially useful tool by those interviewed. Many Pakistani counterparts regret the fact that some donors do not insist enough on principles, rules and a certain discipline that local partners should adhere to. This leads to worries that inexperienced and ill-suited newcomers will be able to take on projects or funding without necessarily being up to the job. Those that have experience recognise that they stand a better chance of accessing donor funding, harbouring the advantage of their knowledge of the criteria and application procedures.
Aid and governance in Pakistan bring challenges just as in any other field of international assistance, leading to potential rivalries and jealousies. This seems to be the main reason why actors that have been working for a long time on the ground feel as if they have more legitimacy. By extension, that also means that they are asking for conditionality, as they know that they are capable of fully achieving the objectives that donors set out in their criteria for assessment (contrary to small or relatively young actors who will not have had time or experience to demonstrate their skills).
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Last but not least, some individuals highlighted an aspect rarely focused on in assessments of international donor assistance: local philanthropic organisations. Indeed, Pakistani funders are very active in Pakistan and are seen to be achieving positive steps in their involvement with projects. Their intimate knowledge of Pakistani society, their easy acceptance by citizens and their focus on local issues are all elements in their favour. When it comes to joint efforts for funding and project development with international donors, however, these local philanthropic organisations prove reluctant to co-operate. Donors interviewed for this study claimed to have failed in their attempts to approach such organisations. Obviously for foreign donors the benefit lies in the latter’s detailed in-country knowledge, extensive contacts and local legitimacy. For the Pakistani philanthropists, however, who are in need neither of funds nor projects, the benefits of building strategies in common with foreign organisations are not as clear-cut.11
A positive interpretation of this reluctance to coordinate strategies and resources lies in the consideration of these philanthropic organisations as examples of independent Pakistani action. Their guaranteed funding, combined with grassroots ideas, is an indication that Pakistan would be able to engage in reforms and progression by indigenous means. This, in turn, would reduce dependency on foreign aid. Another view is that two parallel worlds prevail in Pakistan with regards to aid and projects in general: one externally- funded, with average-to-good results that could nevertheless be considerably improved; and the other relying on local skills and financial means, which some fear could also promote a bigger rejection of foreign donors by Pakistan and/or Pakistanis in general. Indeed, several interviewees pointed out that most of these philanthropists were known for their conservative views and their very nationalistic trends that make it hard even for the Pakistani government to stand in their way.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s advance towards security, stability, positive development and democracy seems to be far from fully achieved. Historical processes in and on its borders have played their part in conditioning the development of democracy in the country. But some internal and structural elements have also contributed. Furthermore, Pakistan remains very sensitive to the evolution of its surrounding environment. The 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan that followed and the extension of the risks of instability in the region underlined its importance on the regional map. Before these events, Pakistan was left rather to its own devices. Thereafter, the opportunity arose for it to benefit from a lot of funds, allocated mainly to security and counterterrorism but also targeting governance, reform, development and reconstruction projects.
Even though funds, projects, partners and ideas are very much present in Pakistan, it seems that no amount of money, however great, will be enough to guarantee the conditions for long-term stability. Pakistani citizens remain extremely sensitive to political issues, especially their country’s relationship with the United States. And news and events seem to bring them constant and somehow objective reasons to fuel and justify their anti-American stance. By extension, even the Pakistani government’s loss of grip on some parts of its territory is used as evidence by some opposition elements that the government has ‘submitted to the West’s will’. Domestic and sociological reasons for such a development are largely ignored in favour of blaming the usual suspect.
Aid and donors remain nevertheless very important in guaranteeing a high level of development in Pakistan, even though the country could also rely on its own resources and efforts, without having to depend on foreign aid, if it were better organised and money and wealth better shared and distributed. Evidence suggests that were the country left to its own recourses, its situation would deteriorate. Such an extreme scenario seems unlikely in the short term, however, as most donors remain committed. A more secure environment would undoubtedly allow them to act in better conditions; but there is no denying the advances that have been made over the last few years.
11 Nevertheless, one of the main problems with these organisations is that they also create a parallel world and do not want to work with the gov- ernment. As a result, government institutions end up totally marginalised.
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Pakistan is by no means a hopeless country that will suddenly fail because of its fragile internal situation. Tensions are present, and the government often seems unable to cope with some of its citizens’ most important demands. But the fact that functioning institutions of state exist and continue to operate means that save for an unexpected coup d’état which would topple the current government, we can be cautiously optimistic about Pakistan’s trajectory in the coming months and probably years.
Nevertheless, some conditions are still necessary to help Pakistan achieve its transition towards more positive prospects, and with the aim of creating a safer Pakistan. The main recommendations to arise from our research and interviews – which are based on ideas and concerns raised directly by local stakeholders – can be summarised as follows:
• Regarding the political situation:
- The United States should allow the Pakistani government to express more independence in its actions and statements. The US’s need for conditionality when it comes to the nature of its relations with Pakistan is legitimate, but Pakistani citizens interpret this as a sign of their government’s submission to the US and ‘the West’ as a whole. Washington should therefore give the Pakistani government more room to talk about its own internal and regional issues.
- Other actors, starting with the EU, should insist to a greater extent on their commitment to promote better stability in Pakistan. Meetings and statements set out Europe’s desire to improve in-country stability; but Europeans seem less efficient compared to their North American counterparts. The EU should translate its rhetoric into more evident actions, in order to show its capacities and prove that ‘the West’ is much more diverse than it may initially appear.
- The solution for internal instability is a matter that can only be solved by the Pakistani government and the local institutions. This is why any interference on the part of foreign actors in social aspects risks contributing to counterproductive results. The more the central government deals directly with its issues, the more legitimacy it will gain in the eyes of the Pakistani population and the more respect it will earn from the international community. Furthermore, it will gradually lessen the grip of the army on the country’s general trends.
• Regarding aid and the role of donors:
- Aid is vital for Pakistan, and there are very few signs of rejection by locals of international projects designed to benefit them and their country. Aside from continuing projects which have been successful to date (and not forgetting the importance of the Millennium Development Goals), donors should also consider allowing Pakistani citizens a greater say in the development and implementation of such projects. This would theoretically contribute to a locally-led and locally-driven series of institutional changes.
- Elections are important, and the next scheduled electoral steps should be maintained and monitored in line with international standards. It would be an error to insist on any hastening of these procedures, as one of the essential conditions for reform and democratisation is allowing sufficient time.
- Foreign donors should train more Pakistani nationals and allow them to hold key positions in their own organisations. NGOs composed almost entirely of foreigners usually generate rejection from Pakistanis, whereas visible inclusion of national counterparts creates greater confidence. The added benefit of higher Pakistani participation is that it increases their ability to build their future by themselves one day.
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- Finally, greater attention needs to be paid to Pakistani citizens’ demands. Donors usually come burdened with statistics and main objectives. Whilst this attitude is not problematic in itself, the risk is that local and popular cultural issues are neglected. This situation can be counterproductive, as people do not want to feel that programmes and objectives are imposed on them, however positive they may seem from the outside. Foreign actors in particular should therefore engage more with the population, in all areas of Pakistan, so that they can be sure that their efforts provide a direct response to genuine local needs.
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Appendix: Country Report Methodology
Scope and aims of this report This report assesses external democracy assistance in one country according to the views of local democracy stakeholders.
The report does not aspire to provide an exhaustive record of external democracy assistance to the country in question. Neither does it aspire to be a representative survey among local civil society at large. The scope of this project allows reports to provide only a rough sketch of external democracy assistance to the country assessed, and of the tendencies of local civil society activists’ views on the latter.
Sample of interviews The report’s findings are based on a set of personal interviews that were carried out by the authorsin February 2011.
For each country report, between 40 and 60 in-country interviews were carried out. The mix of interviewees aimed to include, on the one hand, the most important international donors (governmental and non- governmental, from a wide range of geographic origins), and on the other hand, a broad sample of local democracy stakeholders that included human rights defenders, democracy activists, journalists, lawyers, political party representatives, women’s rights activists, union leaders and other stakeholders substantially engaged in the promotion of democratic values and practices in their country. Wherever possible, the sample of interviewees included representatives from both urban and rural communities and a selection of stakeholders from a broad range of sectors. While governmental stakeholders were included in many of the samples, the focus was on non-governmental actors. Both actual and potential recipients of external democracy support were interviewed.
Donors The term ‘donor’ is here understood as including governmental and non-governmental external actors providing financial and/or technical assistance in the fields of democracy, human rights, governance and related fields. Among all the donors active in the country, authors approached those governmental and non- governmental donors with the strongest presence in this sector, or which were referred to by recipients as particularly relevant actors in this regard. An exhaustive audit of all the donors active in this field/country is not aspired to as this exceeds the scope of this study. While many donors were very open and collaborative in granting interviews and providing and confirming information, others did not reply to our request or were not available for an interview within the timeframe of this study. While we sought to reconfirm all major factual affirmations on donor activities with the donors in question, not all donors responded to our request.
We do not work to a narrow or rigid definition of ‘democracy support’, but rather reflect donors’, foundations’ and recipients’ own views of what counts and does not count as democracy assistance. The fact that this is contentious is part of the issues discussed in each report.
Anonymity External democracy assistance to local activists is a delicate matter in all the countries assessed under this project. It is part of the nature of external democracy assistance that local non-governmental recipients, especially when openly opposed to the ruling establishment, fear for their reputation and safety when providing information on external assistance received to any outlet that will make these remarks public. In a similar vein, many donor representatives critical of their own or other donors’ programmes will fear personal consequences when these critical attitudes are made public on a personal basis. In the interest of gathering a maximum of useful information from our interviewees and safeguarding their privacy and, indeed, security, we have ensured that all interviewees who requested to remain anonymous on a personal and/or institutional basis have done so.
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Interview methodology
In order to carry out field work, authors were provided with a detailed research template that specified 7 areas of focus:
1. A brief historical background and the state of democracy in the country; 2. A short overview of donor activities; 3. A general overview of local views on impact of democracy aid projects on the micro, meso and macro levels (including best practices and variations of the local and international understandings of the concept of ‘democracy’); 4. Local views on specific factors that have weakened the impact of democracy aid; 5. Local views on diplomatic back-up to aid programmes (including conditionality; diplomatic engagement; donor coordination; relevance, quality, quantity and implementation of programmes, etc); 6. An illustration of the above dynamics in one or two key sectors of support; 7. A conclusion outlining the main tendencies of local views on external democracy assistance.
Along these lines, semi-structured interviews were carried out by the authors in the country in January 2011.
Key sectors of support
Transitions to democracy are highly complex political, economic and social processes. No study of this scope could aspire to fully do justice to them, or to external assistance to these processes. Aware of the limitations of our approach, we have encouraged authors to let their general assessment of local views on external democracy support be followed by a closer, slightly more detailed assessment of the dynamics in one or two key sectors of support. These were chosen by the respective authors according to their estimated relevance (positively or negatively) in the current democracy assistance panorama. In none of the cases does the choice of the illustrative key sectors suggest that there may not be other sectors that are equally important.
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