Assessing Democracy Assistance: Pakistan

Assessing Democracy Assistance: Pakistan Barah Mikail Senior Researcher, FRIDE1 This report was commissioned by the Foundation for the Future. It forms part of a broader project on ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance’ that aims to gather views on how democracy support can be improved and its impact enhanced. Other case studies and a synthesis report can be found at www.fride.org. Pakistan receives significant amounts of international funding aimed at strengthening the country’s democratic institutions. Donors’ presence and activities have grown in visibility and size since the 9/11 attacks. The salience of the counter-radicalisation agenda renders Pakistan a particularly thorny case study for democracy support. Within the context of Pakistan’s patently fragile and increasingly politicised domestic situation, this report offers one very specific contribution to current debates: it focuses on international assistance to democracy as viewed by those on the receiving end of such programmes. The interviews carried out by FRIDE in Pakistan show that it is difficult to talk about a single vision of the effectiveness of donors’ strategy. On the donors’ side, the general sense is that progress has taken place and that Pakistan is evolving in a positive direction despite some faltering steps. On the recipients’ side, cautious acknowledgment of improvements is outweighed by a reluctance to talk of outright successes. Local stakeholders’ main gripe concerns the level of involvement of Pakistanis in defining democracy aid programmes. Donors insist on the importance of international assistance for the future of the country, whereas local actors question its role. For the latter, the main overarching strategic issue is Pakistan’s relationship with the United States; this is perceived locally as a factor which weakens the government’s autonomy and legitimacy, and risks undermining the value of democracy aid. Despite the 2008 departure of General Musharraf and the organisation of free and fair general elections in that same year, local interlocutors still doubt the international community’s overall commitment to deepening democratisation. Donors have undoubtedly brought a lot to Pakistan. But fundamental changes are required to bring donor visions and local recipient expectations into line. 1 The author would like to thank all interviewees for their time and opinions shared during fieldwork. The research methodology for this report is explained in an appendix at the end of the main text. Responsibility for this report and the views expressed are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the positions of either FRIDE nor the funders. Project Report: Assessing Democracy Assistance May 2011 2 Democracy: the state of play After independence Pakistan shifted between periods of autocratic and more competitive forms of governance. Then, in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup took the country decisively away from democracy. Under his rule, the military largely governed the country. Musharraf’s rule coincided with Pakistan’s strategic re-emergence, largely due to events in neighbouring Afghanistan in a post-September 11 context. Policy making was mostly driven by Musharraf’s personal whims. On most indicators political rights narrowed after 2000. Musharraf said that he wanted his country to move towards decentralisation. He therefore introduced a series of governance reforms that started with the ‘New Devolution of Power Plan’ (2001). Musharraf’s reforms aimed at a reduction in the size of the government, more efficiency for the public services, an elevation of the general level of education and a better representation of workers, women and minorities at all levels of the country. The latter consisted in establishing three tiers of local government: at the district, the sub- district (Tehsil) and the union council levels. These steps had very limited results; they did not enable the empowerment of the elected representatives at a lower level, partly because Musharraf did not really want it to work, but also because he personally rejected the idea of allowing nascent figures to emerge. For example, the women that were elected on reserved seats were all, except for those elected on the MQM ticket (Muttahida Qaumi Movement, the third largest political party), relatives of incumbent MPs who either could not stand for re-election because they did not fulfil the necessary requirements and wanted to keep the seat in the family or just saw an opportunity to get more influence through reserved seats. This was true even for the religious parties. This led to complaints from important socio-professional categories. Landowners and bureaucrats alike resented their loss of privileges as a result of Musharraf’s decisions. Therefore, even though these new rules artificially seemed to allow nascent figures to emerge, the subsequent criticism soon led to a suspension of the electoral process. In the last two years Pakistan has returned formally to a democratic path. Progress has undoubtedly been made. However, despite elections giving the country a breath of political freedom, the process does not yet guarantee Pakistan’s ability to consolidate democracy. The media constantly criticise the ineffective role of the Parliament. Private electronic media that were only grudgingly allowed during Musharraf’s times have operated more freely and have now become extremely powerful, even though they often face repression by the regime. A vibrant civil society exists; elections have been organised in a genuinely competitive fashion; intense political debates are regularly held; and a multiparty system prevails. But a lot of Pakistan’s underlying institutional pathologies remain beneath such reforms. A long period may be needed before anyone succeeds in transforming a country that is still ruled by the motley of feudal lords and generals2 which have perpetuated corruption and bad governance as part of their game plan. 2008 proved to be a watershed. The decision (in March of the preceding year) to remove the Pakistani Chief of Justice, Iftikhar M. Chaudhry, from his position was the beginning of the end for Musharraf’s era. Later that same year, when the Supreme Court overruled Musharraf’s decision to suspend the top judge, his legitimacy was fatally undercut. The period that followed was the beginning of a cautious democratic process in Pakistan. Elections led to the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), followed in second place by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). A new President, Asif Ali Zardari, was designated, and a new Prime Minister was nominated, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani. Similarly, between 2008 and 2011, signs of change were discernable in the freer rein given to the media, the decreased role for the military, and the government’s eschewal of interference in public debates. 2 Feudal, industrial and military sectors have dominated during different phases of Pakistan’s history, depending on the respective rulers. For instance, while Muhammad Ayyub Khan (1958-1969) and General Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971) were the first to strengthen the military, they also defended the interests of the feudals, thereby contributing significantly to Pakistan’s development. The golden age of industry came under Zulfikar Ali Buttho´s rule, even though M.A. Khan had also been very keen to allow this category to earn more advantages. Buttho considered that both agricultural and industrial sectors were key to enhancing Pakistan’s development. But his policies, based partly on the nationalisation of industries, also led to capital flight from the country, dependence on foreign aid, erosion of business confidence, rising unemployment and the alienation of small entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, taken as a whole in Pakistan’s history, the more they grew, the more these socio-professional categories began to dominate the political sphere, and to affect the activities of several of the country’s political parties. Pakistan Barah Mikail 3 But if the Pakistani population expected deeper-reaching reforms, they were to be disappointed. Complaints soon arose about the new government’s weakness over economic policy, in recovering sovereignty in the tribal areas and in the nature of its relations with the United States. The government is caught up in scandals and corruption cases. The state of political freedom, good governance and human rights in Pakistan has seen some moderate improvements over the last few years. A sober analysis, however, suggests that much room for improvement remains. When it comes to evaluating general trends in their country’s process of political reform, Pakistani civil society does not seem to accord priority importance to institutional aspects. The impact of geopolitics and international relations on their government features far more prominently. Debates on state television and in the printed media reflect this trend. This partly explains why the paucity of further institutional reforms is not raised as a major complaint. The fact that certain bodies have experienced greater independence since the 2008 elections seems to have quelled some voices of dissent. Institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Higher Education Commission (HEC) have been able to operate without strong government interference. This said, however, the latter is currently being dissolved following its challenging of the authenticity of the degrees of some members of the Pakistani Parliament.3 Nevertheless, regardless of nominal institutional improvements, the

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