Britain's Psychological Warfare in the Middle

1 ‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945-60 Huw Bennett Cardiff University Abstract Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda's ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military’s involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on. Introduction In 1947 the British Army’s future leaders in training at the Staff College learned ‘The propaganda battle has come to stay.’ 1 For a generation exposed to total war, concluding hostilities by persuasion was an attractive proposition, with the promise of bloodless victories. 2 Amidst relative international decline the potential for propaganda to compensate for waning diplomatic and military power could not easily be ignored.3 Psychological warfare (or psywar), like aerial bombing and special forces, offered cheaper strategic effects for statesmen struggling to hold their country’s ambitious place in the world order.4 The technique was understood as ‘psychological measures, including information, propaganda and others, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly groups in support of current policy in time of war or emergency.’5 Yet psywar did not undergo a radical enlargement in the early Cold War. This article asks how psychological warfare’s modest expansion can be accounted for in British strategy in the Middle East. 2 Since the end of the First World War the Middle East was a central locus for British power, and the government consistently aimed to preserve its interests in the region.6 Between 1946 and 1955 oil consumption in the U.K. doubled; most came from the Middle East.7 Cold War theatre defence was allocated to Britain at American-British- Canadian talks in October 1947. Consequently military planning was conducted on a national, rather than allied, basis.8 Little is known about psywar in the area; most secret intelligence papers have been closed until recently.9 Newly released records belonging to the unit responsible for psychological warfare are examined here for the first time. Created in 1951 to control strategic deception, from 1952 the Directorate of Forward Plans became involved in psywar planning. After the Suez crisis the Directorate assumed overall responsibility for psychological warfare.10 Existing work on early Cold War propaganda treats the military as largely irrelevant in a field dominated by the Foreign Office, and especially its Information Research Department (IRD), created in January 1948. Much debate has centred upon the IRD’s position within overall Cold War strategy, whether the output it generated achieved anything, and whether the organisation should be understood primarily in Cold War or decolonisation terms. 11 Important questions have also been raised about the wisdom and ethics of directing propaganda at the British domestic audience.12 The Department is regarded as a ‘significant instrument of national and foreign policy.’13 The leading book on propaganda in the decolonisation conflicts concentrates on how government shaped public opinion at home, rather than to support military operations.14 In single-country studies, the emphasis is upon colonial information services who often, as in Kenya, ran the show.15 3 Psychological warfare has been interpreted according to three organising ideas, relating to effectiveness, civil-military relations, and the conviction of its practitioners. This article reinterprets these ideas to show how psychological warfare became gradually more important in regional defence in the Middle East. Cyprus is included in the analysis as defence policy considered the island to be a major base for securing British interests in the region. Cold War defence planning and colonial security are tackled together. While political concessions, social reforms and propaganda are now thought to have mattered less in British counter-insurgency than violence, studies on counter-insurgency miss the long-term reasons why propaganda occupied a marginal position.16 These were to do with defence policy rather than colonial security. This article thus makes a contribution to existing knowledge in three ways. Turning to effectiveness first, judging whether propaganda has an impact on the intended audience is a perennial difficulty.17 Research on the IRD often echoes the organisation’s own anxieties about their influence.18 James Vaughan persuasively argues propaganda aiming to generate popular enthusiasm for Britain’s Middle East presence was doomed in the decolonisation era.19 Yet for the military, swaying public opinion on a mass scale was not necessarily essential, nor even their prerogative. Targeting friendly elites, small numbers of rebels, or one’s own soldiers could be more appropriate. The armed forces were less bothered about proving effectiveness conclusively because, unlike their diplomatic counterparts, they employed propaganda alongside other tactics.20 For the armed forces, the moment when an opponent began to counter propaganda directed at them indicated some effect was being felt.21 In Southeast Asia officials counted the publications distributed, the 4 column inches in newspapers based on their information, and how many insurgents surrendered.22 Doubts around effectiveness never decisively halted psywar’s cautious expansion in the Middle East in the early Cold War. Military commanders never expected any tactic to be valuable in every given instance; this general rule applied to psywar too. A second tendency in the literature portrays psychological warfare as highly divisive, rousing a deep-seated animosity between civilians and soldiers over foreign and defence policy. Discord has distracted from the prevalent compromise across the civil-military divide during the twentieth century, mundane as agreement might be when set aside sensational disputation.23 Writing on Cold War covert action, and propaganda in Northern Ireland, Rory Cormac has a keen eye for disagreement between military and civilians.24 On Britain’s turbulent experience in Egypt prior to the Suez crisis, Michael Thornhill perceives civil-military friction to be the norm.25 These examples partly derive from over-specialisation in intelligence studies, military history and diplomatic history. Strong demarcations are striking when the object of study is a single organisation, whether MI6, the British Army or the IRD. Disputes about psywar happened within the armed forces, within and between Whitehall departments, and between officials in the Middle East and those in London. Support for, and opposition to, psychological warfare transcended simple civil-military boundaries because these organisations permitted their staff to think for themselves. A third notion accuses those concerned with psychological warfare of zealotry. Richard Aldrich charges the Directorate of Forward Plans with exploiting the Malaya emergency to expand from deception work into territory rightly belonging to MI6 and 5 the IRD.26 Field Marshal Gerald Templer, High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952 to 1954 and then Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from 1955 to 1958, is identified as the mastermind behind the Directorate’s expansionism. Templer's role in Malaya is claimed by Erik Linstrum to have ‘secured the status of psychological warfare in the British military for years to come.’27 He is chastised by Anthony Gorst and Keith Kyle for forcing psywar into the disastrous 1956 Suez invasion plans.28 Behind these views lie misgivings about psychological warfare’s propensity to dangerously politicise the armed forces.29 If soldiers dispense propaganda, they might develop political ideas that cannot easily be controlled. In the British military in the early Cold War Middle East the evidence points to ambivalence about psywar, not devotion, reflecting a long-running nervousness about propaganda in Britain’s political culture. 30 Major Ashworth, a leading expert, described psywar as ‘the weapon of the Cold War’, though admitting an ‘ugly and evil connotation’, reminiscent of Joseph Goebbels.31 Even the supposedly zealous psy-warriors were in two minds about the business. The article argues psychological warfare expanded gradually in British military plans and operations because the attractions of a cheap victory were counter-balanced by reservations about whether the method worked, and risked politicising the armed forces. The argument is structured in the following sections. The first section analyses how planning developed. The Chiefs of Staff abstained from inserting propaganda into their war plans until April 1952, only doing so systematically from February 1957 because changes required civil-military consensus. The Korean War and, above all the Suez crisis, hastened an extension in psychological warfare planning, capabilities and deployment. Augmentation came due to shifts in the 6 strategic environment (such as Egyptian and Soviet propaganda) and in defence policy. The article thus contributes to the critique of

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