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Interagency Intelligence During the Malayan Emergency

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Interagency Intelligence During the Malayan Emergency ‘Our Achilles’ Heel’ – Interagency Intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Roger Christopher Arditti Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies September 2015 1 ‘Our Achilles’ Heel’ – Interagency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency.1 Abstract The Malayan Emergency is often considered the defining paradigm for a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The effective collection and management of intelligence by Special Branch dominates this paradigm. However, the intelligence architecture during Emergency was much more complicated than the simple Special Branch-Army nexus upon which existing studies focus. Other components of the intelligence included the Malayan Security Service (MSS), Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), the Joint Intelligence Committee / Far East (JIC/FE), the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Army, and the mainstream police. Each component adapted to the challenge of insurgency in different ways – the civilian elements faring far worse than the military. Britain struggled to adapt to the post-war intelligence challenges in the Far East. Key intelligence components and capabilities were constituted in haste with overlapping and ambiguous remits. Consequently, there was bitter infighting at a number of levels, particularly between the various civilian intelligence agencies. In contrast, the Army and RAF demonstrated an instinctive ability to work in a ‘joint’ environment from the very beginning of the Emergency. In particular, the RAF took a leading role in creating a joint theatre-level intelligence apparatus which included establishment of a Joint Operations Room in Kuala Lumpur and the Joint Intelligence Photographic Intelligence Committee / Far East. However, the military were unable to provide the comprehensive human intelligence or strategic leadership necessary to make the broader apparatus effective. This could only come once the apparatus led by the civil agencies – chiefly the uniformed police as well as Special Branch – had learnt to adapt to the demands of waging a counter-insurgency campaign. Given that the British intelligence organisations had learnt to function in a joint manner during the Second World War, it is remarkable how much had apparently been forgotten in the three years preceding the outbreak of the Communist 1 AIR 20/7777, Report on the Emergency in Malaya, from April 1950 to November 1951, by Sir Harold Briggs. insurgency in Malaya and how long it took to create an effective method of coordinating intelligence during subsequent Emergency. 3 Contents Abstract p. 2 Abbreviations P. 5 Dramatis Personae p. 9 Timeline p. 16 Chapter 1 – Introduction p. 19 Chapter 2 - Status Quo Ante: Defence and Security Intelligence in the Empire p. 57 c.1945-47 Chapter 3 - The Failure of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) p. 89 Chapter 4 - The Failure of the Security Service p. 117 Chapter 5 – The Demise of the Malayan Security Service p. 147 Chapter 6 – The Development of a Local Intelligence Apparatus p. 179 Chapter 7 – Networking Intelligence – Creating a Theatre-Level Intelligence p. 210 Apparatus Chapter 8 – The Reconstruction of the Civilian Intelligence Apparatus p. 235 Chapter 9 – Conclusion: Evolution of the Intelligence Apparatus during the p. 261 Malayan Emergency Bibliography p. 300 Abbreviations. ACFE Air Command Far East ACP Assistant Commissioner of Police AHQ Air Headquarters ALFSEA Allied Land Forces South East Asia AOC Air Officer Commanding APS Axis Planning Staff APIU Air Photographic Interpretation Unit ASP Assistant Superintendent of Police BDCC (FE) British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East) BMA British Military Administration CCP Chinese Communist Party CEP Captured Enemy Personnel CICB Counter-Intelligence Combined Board CICI Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq CIS Central Intelligence Staff CLC Civil Liaison Corps CoS Chiefs of Staff CID Committee of Imperial Defence CID Criminal Investigation Department CIGS Chief of the British Imperial General Staff CIU Central Interpretation Unit CO Commanding Officer CP Commissioner of Police CPA Chief Political Advisor CPM Communist Party of Malaya CPO Chief Police Office CSDIC Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre CT Communist Terrorist 5 DALCO Dalley’s Company DCM District Committee Member CPM DMI Director of Military Intelligence DMO&I Director of Military Operations and Intelligence DoI Director of Intelligence DSO Defence Security Officer DWEC District War Executive Committee EIS Economic Intelligence Section EIS Emergency Information Service FARELF Far East Land Forces FEAF Far East Air Forces FECB Far East Combined Intelligence Bureau FELF Far East Land Forces FIC Federal Intelligence Committee FMS Federated Malay States FOES Future Operations Enemy Section FSS Field Security Service / Section FWEC Federal War Executive Committee GLU General Labour Union GOC General Officer Commanding GOS II (Int) General Staff Officer II (Intelligence) HD(S)E Home Defence (Security) Executive HUMINT Human Intelligence INA Indian National Army ISLD Inter-Service Liaison Department ISIC Interservice Intelligence Committee ISTD Interservice Topographical Department JAPIB Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board JAPIC Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre JIB Joint Intelligence Bureau JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JID Joint Intelligence Division 6 JIO Joint Intelligence Organisation JIS Joint Intelligence Staff JOC Joint Operations Room JPS Joint Planning Staff KMT Kuomintang LDC Local Defence Committee LIC Local Intelligence Committee LSO Local Security Officer MCA Malayan Chinese Affairs MCP Malayan Communist Party MEF Middle East Force MEIC Middle East Intelligence Centre MELF Middle East Land Forces MI5 Security Service MI6 Security Intelligence Service (SIS) MIO Military Intelligence Officer MDU Malayan Democratic Union MNLA Malayan National Liberation Army MNP Malay Nationalist Party MPABA Malayan People’s Anti-British Army MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army MSS Malayan Security Service NDYL New Democratic Youth League OC Overseas Control OCPD Officer-in-Charge Police District OPSUM Operational Summary OSPC Officer Superintending Police Circle OSS Office of Strategic Services OWI Office of War Information Photinit Photographic Intelligence PIAW Political Intelligence Arab World 7 PIJ Political Intelligence Journal PMFTU Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions PRC People’s Republic of China PRO Public Records Office PWE Political Warfare Executive PWS Psychological Warfare Section RAF Royal Air Force RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RN Royal Navy SAS Special Air Service SB Special Branch SAC Supreme Allied Commander SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia SC Special Constable SEAC Southeast Asia Command SEIO State Emergency Information Officer SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel SFTU Singapore Federation of Trade Unions SIFE Security Intelligence Far East SIME Security Intelligence Middle East SIS Security Intelligence Service SLO Security Liaison Officer SOE Special Operations Executive SOVF Special Operations Volunteer Force SRC Situation Report Centre SWEC State / Settlement War Executive Committee 8 Dramatis Personae Boucher, General Sir Charles (1898-1951) Born in 1898 and educated at Wellington College. He was appointed to the India Army in 1916, attached to the 2nd King Edwards VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles, and served in Palestine and the North West Frontier. During the Second World War, Boucher commanded the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade in North Africa and the 17th Indian Infantry Brigade in Italy. He was appointed General Officer Commanding Malaya District. In 1948 He retired in 1951, dying shortly after. Bourne, General Geoffrey (1902-1982) Commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1923. Bourne served as a member of the Joint Planning Staff between 1939-41. He was posted to the Joint Staff Mission in Washington in 1942. He then commanded the 152nd Field Regiment in Italy and was a member of the General Staff Airborne Corps fighting in Belgium. After a number of staff appointments, Bourne was appointed General Officer Commanding Malaya between 1954-56. He retired from the Army in 1960. Bower, General Sir Roger (1903-1990) Educated at Sandhurst, Bower was commissioned into the Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in 1923. He served in India and Hong Kong in the inter-war years. During the Second World War Bower took part in Operation Market Garden. After the war, he served in Palestine and Germany. Bower served as General Officer Commanding and Director of Operations for Malaya between 1956-58. He retired from the Army in 1960. Briggs, General Sir Harold Rawdon (1894-1952) Born in Pipestone, Minnesota, USA in 1894. Briggs attended Sunburst and was subsequently attached to the 4th Bn Kings Regiment, fighting in France in 1915. In the following year he transferred to the 31st Punjab Regiment of the Indian Army, seeing action in Mesopotamia and Palestine. In the inter-war period he saw action on the North-West Frontier. During the Second World War, Briggs saw action in Eritrea, North Africa and Burma, including the battle for Kohima. In April 1946 he was appointed General Officer Commanding, Burma before retiring from the Army when Burma obtained independence in 1948. He subsequently served in a civilian capacity as Director of Operations in Malaya between 1950-52. He died in Limassol on 27 October 1952. Chin Peng (1924-2013) Born in Sitiawan, Perak, Malaya. In 1937 he joined the Chinese Anti Enemy
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