Airpower Journal: Fall 1993, Volume VII, No. 3

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila Widnall

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air Education and Trainlng Command Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr.

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Gol Robert M. Johnston

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin VV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con- strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Air Education and Training Command, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line.

JOURNAL Fali 1993, Vol. VII, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

Editorial 2

The Limits of Deep Attack Maj Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR 4

A New Defense Industrial Strategy 16

The Leadership Imperative in a Transforming Air Force Lt Col R. Joe Baldwin, USAF 35

Military Support for “Peace Efforts” Col Edward Mann, USAF 51

The United States Needs to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired 62

Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Reborn? Maj P. Mason Carpenter, USAF Maj George T. McClain, USAF 7 2

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 85 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL

Mental Preparation for War

HE MOST important element in Real professional military education is a 1 war is, as it has always been, the career-long effort. It is a responsibility competing minds of the antagonists” shared by the institution and the individ- (AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 25). As dichotomous as ual. Currently the institution is doing lit- it may seem, war is more a mental affair tle to discharge this responsibility. A few than a physical one. While this idea has who have either exceptional vision or sim- been understood through the centuries, ply an interest in military thinking take it technological advancements have made it upon themselves to continually study their even more apparent. After the Gulf War, profession—but not many. Gen Norman Schwarzkopf indicated that We might look appreciatively at the US had we had the Iraqis’ equipment and Marine Corps professional reading pro- they ours, we still would have defeated gram. Each rank (officer and enlisted) has them because our thinking was superior. a specific list of books to study. They If it is the mind’s ability to think, antici- know that it is as much their professional pate, prepare, and execute that produces responsibility to read and understand the victory over a foe with the same ability, books on their list as it is to keep their how do we prepare the minds of our peo- hair cut and their boots shined. A former ple to ensure future operational success? commandant, Gen A. M. Gray, Jr., made Military people need a working knowledge this abundantly clear by conducting dis- of military ideas, theories, histories, and cussions with the troops in the field about current thinking. No one is clever enough the ideas in the books on their lists. to conduct successful warfare without It’s intriguing to consider how our cur- having devoted significant time to study- rent PME schools would change if stu- ing what others have discovered. As dents carne to them with a vast back- Archduke Charles of Áustria said, “A great ground in m ilitary thinking gained captain can be formed only by long experi- through a continuai program of reading ence and intense study; neither is his own and discussing the ideas available in print. experience enough—for whose life is . . . They could then spend more of their time sufficiently fruitful of events to render his in active learning experiences that hone knowledge universal?” (Charles M. war-fighting skills like problem solving, Westenhoff, M ilitary Air Power: The criticai thinking, and effective team build- CADRE Digest o f Air Power Opinions and ing. They could devote their efforts to Thoughts [Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air developing the sharpness and quickness of University Press, October 1990], 145). their most important weapon system— Where does one obtain such insight? their minds. Some may say that our professional mili- When you think about it, it seems odd tary education (PME) courses provide this that we move people (and their families) learning. To an extent, they are right. to a school for 10 months and then devote However, mining the mother Iode of mili- a significant part of their time to reading tary thinking available for those who background material they could have stud- would be “Great Captains” cannot be ied and digested during the years before accomplished in a few relatively brief they carne. It seems especially wasteful courses at our formal PME schools. when we consider that the schools’ facul- 2 ties and facilities could be arranged to A career-long professional reading pro- help students reach significantly higher gram with effective incentives could leveis of preparation if only the back- make a significant difference in our future ground material has been mastered before- preparation to defeat the "competing hand. minds of the antagonists.” RBC

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- So far, our agenda has included discussions spondence should he addressed to the Editor, on the utility of strategic air power, the uses for Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, air power in the Yugoslavian war, noncombat Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the uses for air power, air power in the Iran-Iraq right to edit the material for overall length. War, and a criticai review of the Gulf War Airpower Survey. It seems to me that high-tech weaponry and VULITARY STUDY SOCIETIES motivated people who are schooled in the his- torv and application of aerospace power will I read with interest Lt Col Kimble D. Stohry’s help keep the Air Force on the cutting edge of article entitled "The Douhet Society: A Recipe military power far into the future. The for Your Professional Development Program?" Pentagon’s Mitchell Society joins with the (Spring 1993). About nine months ago, several Douhet Society and groups like it to make this graduates from the first class of the School of dream a reality. Advanced Airpower Studies started a similar group in the Pentagon. Although we had heard Maj Jason B. Barlow, USAF of the Douhet idea in school. the real impetus Bowie, Maryland came from Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, who encouraged us to “keep up our thinking and study of air power." We soon discovered (as swamped action officers) that achieving the OTHERFACTORS generaPs challenge would not be as easy as we As a regular reader of your journal, I have con- thought—unless we put aside some time for sistently found many of its articles both just that purpose. General Glosson gave his enlightening and immensely useful to my grad- wholehearted support to the concept. uate work on national security and defense pol- The Mitchell Society, as we call it, meets icy; however, lst Lt Matthew M. Hurley’s once a month to review and discuss an air “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just power topic of mutual interest. From the out- Having an Air Force Isn’t Enough” (Winter set. the Mitchell Society was envisioned as a 1992) was of special interest to me. Having fórum to express high-quality ideas. The been involved in ongoing research on the uses ground rules are simple: (1) anyone with an of air power in the third world, with a particu- interest in Exploring Aerospace Power (our lar focus on the development and operational motto) can come, (2) the members pick the top- histories of the Iraqi and Iranian air forces, I ics and lead the meetings. (3) topics should be found Lieutenant Hurley’s article an important associated with written material (i.e.. a book, step forward in understanding just what an article. or a manual that can be distributed accounts for the magnitude of the defeat of the the month before. giving members the chance Iraqi air force (IQAF) at the hands of the coali- to read the topic and compose their thoughts tion. and arguments), and (4) there are no more rules. continued on page 84

3 INCE THE EARLY 1980s, the US military has emphasized concepts of operational art1 that called for deep operations reaching 100 or Smore kilometers into enemy-controlled territory. Originally devised to counter THE the threat of a deeply echeloned Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, this approach was central to the follow-on LIMITS forces attack (FOFA) concept adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1984, to the AirLand Battle (ALB) concepts of the US Army, and to the OF DEEP air and ground campaigns that defeated Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations in 1991. Key to all of these, as well ATTACK as to plans to deter future threats from regional enemies, was and is the need for effective and precise conventional long- range firepower, delivered primarily but M aj Thomas R. M c C abe, USAFR not exclusively by air attack, against enemy forces not yet in contact with friendly units. This article will term this concept deep attack.2 As will be detailed shortly, deep attack is an extremely ambitious goal. Aside from a thicket of questions over doctrine and roles that we will not address here,3 LIMITS OF DEEP ATTACK 5 effective deep attack requires a variety of It requires effective deep reconnaissance capabilities that the US military either to detect and identify targets, especially partiallv possesses or does not yet actually mobile targets.5 Deep reconnaissance is have, despite the perceived and actual also required after an attack for bomb successes of deep attack in the war with damage assessment (BDA) to evaluate the Iraq. A frequently unacknowledged key to results of the attack.6 Finally, deep recon- the success of deep attack—and the pur- naissance must be at least reasonably sur- pose of this article—is to understand how vivable on a modern battlefield. an enemy might react to counter the threat It requires the ability to prioritize of deep attack. detected targets in keeping with the guid- The purpose of this article is threefold: ance of higher command for the conduct to examine the potential limits and weak- of the air campaign, to determine the most nesses of deep attack, to briefly evaluate effective method of dealing with those tar- how a potential enemy might go about gets, to allocate strikes against them, to exploiting these weaknesses, and to exam- elim inate the overlap between such ine the implication of those limits and attacks (“deconflict”) so that firepower is weaknesses. The article is also an indica- not wasted by unnecessary attacks, and to tion of the perishability of the military evaluate the results. This is an enor- advantage demonstrated in Operation mously complicated and, in terms of the Desert Storm. The US has established a modern battlefield, time-consuming new standard for warfare,4 one that is now process.7 known worldwide. As was the case with It requires the ability to attack targets the standard set by the German blitzkrieg effectively and without prohibitive losses, in 1940, we should expect that everyone using either air- or ground-launched preci- who can will try to match or exceed the sion guided munitions (PGM) or aircraft standard; anyone who cannot match it capable of bombing with great accuracy. will try to devise ways to defeat it. Deep attack also requires the ability to do one or more of the following: • To complete the entire “targeting The Limits of cycle” process in a short time. Deep Attack • To respond rapidly to modify pre- planned targeting of mobile targets. As we examine deep attack, it becomes • To call in attacks either in real time or clear that such an effort is an enormously on very short notice.8 ambitious and complex undertaking. For If these requirements can be met, deep maximum effect, it requires integrated attack will be an incredibly effective war- operations using diverse capabilities. If fighting mechanism. The capabilities any part of the integration does not work, demonstrated in Desert Storm, though the concepfs effectiveness rapidly devastating, were actually, in many ways, degrades and may collapse entirely. This a rather rudimentary example of such a being the case, let us examine, in general mechanism. However, as is generally the terms, what is required. case with integrated efforts, the entire Sys- Deep attack requires the ability to tem may be subject to rapid degradation detect, identify, and attack a huge number and possibly to massive failure if any key of targets such as enemy command, con- subsystem fails. Much of the technology trol, Communications, and intelligence necessary to make such a concept fully (C3I) nodes; radars; supply centers; trans- effective is, at best, only partially in exis- portation bottlenecks; and troop concen- tence today, and it may be several (or trations. many) years before such technology fully 6 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

emerges.9 When evaluating Desert Storm, an integrated program of camouflage, con- we should recognize that US effectiveness cealment, and deception. Such an effort against Iraq was enhanced by Iraq’s could be done in either peacetime or attempt to wage a defensive positional war wartime, although the techniques used of attrition rather than a war of maneuver. will vary accordingly and can be under- It remains to be seen if the speed and taken at any or all of the three leveis of robustness of the deep-attack process can warfare (strategic, operational, and tacti- be increased to handle a war where both cal). We should expect these efforts to be sides are attempting to wage a war of integrated with and supplemented by a maneuver and where our own command, centrally controlled program of electronic Communications, and air power are cen- warfare. The former Soviets called this tral targets of enemy efforts. Since deep radio-electronic combat (REC), and we will attack is only partially mature, potential use that term in this article.11 Finally, enemies can be expected to exhaustively even before the conflict begins, we should study the concept and its relevant parts expect efforts, probably by terrorist groups, and, at the very least, to seek to devise to physically attack surveillance systems. workable countermeasures. Likely coun- With the start (or, as in Kuwait, the termeasures can be found in four major renewal) of hostilities, enemy efforts will areas, each of which is examined in this likely concentrate on operational and tac- article: disrupting the ability to see deep, tical maskirovka. In addition (and in disrupting the ability to wage an inte- keeping with the traditional Soviet REC grated deep battle, reducing the vulnera- concept), we should expect a massive bility of forces, and exploiting the opera- effort to destroy friendly intelligence sys- tional limits of modern systems. tems and platforms (especially airborne surveillance platforms such as JSTARS), using an integrated effort of air, missile, Disrupting the Ability to See Deep rocket, ground, and special operations Central to deep attack is the need to see forces attacks that will undoubtedly seek deep. Before any targets can be struck, to take advantage of particular enemy they must be identified as targets, pre- strengths.12 We should expect this even if cisely located, and, more than inciden- the enemy is on the strategic defensive.13 tally, their defenses accurately assessed so An additional future aspect we must antic- that they can be hit without prohibitive ipate is an attempt to neutralize low-orbit- losses. Our intention is to do this by inte- ing reconnaissance satellites with some grating information from a complex vari- kind of rudimentary antisatellite capabil- ety of sources and sensors—above all, ity, most likely a high-powered energy advanced battlefield airborne surveillance w e a p o n . 14 F i n a l l y , we mu s t ex p e c t radars such as the joint surveillance target attempts to degrade what surveillance attack radar system (JSTARS).10 This capability survives through a campaign of being the case, an obvious countermeasure jamming and other electronic countermea- is to blind or at least degrade friendly sures (ECM) such as chaff corridors reconnaissance. There are any number of against reconnaissance systems and the ways to do this, ranging from passive data links from the reconnaissance sys- denial (camouflage) through active denial tems to ground sites. (electronic and electro-optical countermeasures) to offensive denial (physically attacking the surveillance systems). Disrupting the Ability to Wage an The most subtle way to disrupt the abil- Integrated Deep Battle ity to see deep is to combine all of these in There are two major approaches to derail- a program of maskirovka, a Soviet term for ing the execution of deep attack. The first L1MITS OF DEEP ATTACK 7

is to disrupt the C3I necessary to effec- The performance of stealthy aircraft. such as the F-117, and precision guided munitions (PGM) in Operation tively organize and control it. The second Desert Storm established a new standard for warfare. is to neutralize the weapon systems neces- Because that standard is now known worldwide, we can sary for deep attack. expect other nations to match it or devise ways to Disrupting C3I obviously overlaps con- defeat it. siderably with neutralizing the ability to see deep. In fact. in Western military thinking, the two are often combined in a artillery, rocket, and tactical surface-to- category known as C3I countermeasures surface missile units. Four major methods (C3ICM). An obvious approach is to target are available to target these units, and an the command nodes that integrate the data enemy must be expected to use all of and run the war. The success of deep them. These approaches are attack will be critically dependent on a rather limited number of key command • A c t i v e d e f e n s e s nodes, especially the corps headquarters • Targeting deep-attack forces and the tactical air control centers (TACC) • Operational techniques that are intended to direct the offensive air • T a c t i c s war. Disrupting or destroying these will Active defenses can be used as part of have an immediate impact. This can be either an offensive or defensive posture. accomplished through physical destruc- The character of such defenses can be tion using the most expedient means expected to vary according to the sophisti- available or through disrupting C3 links. cation of the enemy and, equally impor- Neutralizing deep-attack forces is the tant, the financial resources available to other approach to disrupting the ability to them. Late-generation aircraft, strategic wage deep attacks. At present, deep- surface-to-air missiles (SAM), radars, and attack forces are primarily air units, espe- the C3 systems needed to tie them together cially fighter-bomber and dual-role units, into an effective integrated air defense Sys- although they increasingly include long- tem (IADS) are extremely expensive. range attack helicopters15 and long-range Unfortunately, it appears that some of the 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Central to deep attack is the need to see deep. Criticai ments) are only partially available and to our ability to see deep is the joint surveillance target may be most vulnerable.18 attack radar system (JSTARS). Attempts to degrade Operational strategies that seek to pit an our reconnaissance include camouflage, electronic and electro-optical countermeasures, and direct attack on enemy’s strengths against our weaknesses the aircraft carrying systems like JSTARS. can be effective in neutralizing deep- attack forces. Their aim would be to seize the initiative and force us to fight at their former Soviet republics may be prepared initiative and on their terms. Obvious to sell massive quantities of their latest possibilities are the launching of an offen- equipment to virtually anybody with hard sive, using surprise, or both. Attacking currency.16 For those who cannot afford with such ferocity and tempo that we are SU-27s and SA-lOs, antiaircraft artillery kept in a defensive crouch would effec- (AAA), and shoulder-fired SAMs such as tively prevent us from mounting deep the Stinger are simple to use, compara- attacks. tively cheap, and potentially very deadly. Tactics might also be used to neutralize Further, when netted with sensors and deep-attack forces. The Soviets and command and control systems, such NATO expected any conventional war in weapons can. provide considerably more Europe to be fought under at least the than a point-defense capability.17 threat of nuclear attack and escalation. Targeting deep-attack forces, an enemy The tactics that the Soviets in particular can be expected to expend massive efforts evolved to minimize the potential effec- to neutralize the bases and units that pro- tiveness of any nuclear attack are also vide deep-attack firepower, using a locally potentially effective against conventional tailored mixture of air attacks, missiles, weapons, including the PGMs whose use special operations forces (SOF), and possi- is central to the effectiveness of deep bly Chemical weapons. These attacks are attack. Such tactics include dispersion, especially likely to be effective against mobility (rapidly moving forces are harder nonhardened assets in the early stages of to find and attack and are therefore less an allied buildup, when friendly forces vulnerable), and timing (attacking at the (and, most especially, American reinforce- time and under circumstances that reduce

10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

pounded by the steadily increasing ranges of both air-to-surface and ground weapons. Environmental factors. Many of the sensors on which PGMs and their controlling platforms depend are subject to degradation by a variety of environmental factors, including bad or cloudy weather, smoke, and the inability to penetrate foliage or structures. W eapon limitatiorxs. Many existing PGMs—especially laser-guided ones such as the Hellfire antitank missile—require control all the way to impact. This requires the airborne or ground-based laser designator to stay within the line of sight to the target until impact, which Precision guided munitions, often viewed as miracle increases the risk of the controlling air- weapons, and their launch and control platforms are craft being detected and shot down and actually subject to a wide variety of limits. the ground designator being suppressed before the weapon hits. In addition, laser- guided weapons in particular have a vari- The target-acquisition problem. Unlike ety of other significant limitations. close-air-support missions, in which targets are generally acquired by a ground or airborne forward air controller (FAC) who Conclusions then directs the attack against them, deep- attack missions will probably have to It is clear that there is a diverse assort- acquire their own targets. This is likely to ment of countermeasures available to be a tall order, especially in a single-seat degrade or defeat the various components aircraft, and strongly implies a need for a of deep attack. These countermeasures are last-minute intelligence/situation update frequently straightforward and cover a capability such as a deep-attack or inter- broad variety of methods, including tech- diction FAC. nology, tactics, organizational changes, The target identification/identification and mass. Further, these countermeasures friend or foe (1FF) problem. The lack of an are, generally speaking, not mutually IFF capability—being unable to tell friend- exclusive, and an enemy must be expected lies from hostiles—can be expected to to use them all. There is, in fact, little if compound the target acquisition problem. anything new in these approaches and tac- During the war with Iraq, the coalition tics. They are fundamentally the same used a variety of measures, including pre- methods the Soviets devised to reduce the cision navigation equipment, infrared bea- vulnerability of their forces to nuclear cons, and thermal tape. Generally such attack in a possible European campaign equipment was adequate. In a future war against NATO.21 Many of them, especially of maneuver in which hostile and friendly tactical and operational maskirovka, pre- forces are intermixed, moving rapidly, and date the nuclear era. Actually, they date perhaps operating the same types of back to the experiences and practices of equipment, it will likely not be adequate, World War II forces that had to contend especially at night or in bad weather. with superior hostile air power. Further, this problem is being com- Considering the respect that our enemies UM1TS OF DEEP A TTA CK 11 have generally had for American air that can be expected to survive long power, the emerging US focus on deep enough to be useful once shooting starts. attack has merely given potential enemies We should remember that many of the even more reason to do what they were programs originally planned to support likely to do anyway. conventional deep attack have died—some quietly, others noisily—and if other programs run behind schedule or over budget, Implications they may become mortally vulnerable in today’s fiscal circumstances. The United States has embraced deep The operational consequences of the attack, primarily based on air power, as a new focus on deep attack are, as yet, lim- central focus of our military strategy to ited. The US has proclaimed its success, defeat any future regional enemies. From and it will clearly provide the framework a doctrinal point of view, this makes great for emerging technology and tactics. sense. It minimizes reliance on forward- Therein lies the ultimate potential danger. based American forces and emphasizes If we embrace a doctrine, strategy, and our historie role as a strategic reserve operational art based on technologies and force. Further, it exploits the traditional tactics that will not work when we need strengths of the American military, espe- them, we risk surprise and defeat when cially our ability to employ sophisticated we apply them. And while the outeome of technology and the quality and initiative such a regional defeat would have far of our troops. What remains very much fewer massive implications than it would open to question is whether such a strat- have had 10 years ago, when such a defeat egy will continue to work as well as it did might have meant the Soviet army over- against Iraq. We must assume that the running Western Europe, we should not Saddam Husseins and Kim Il-Sungs (and underestimate the potential cost, espe- perhaps the Leon Trotskys) of the next century will be a great deal more sophisti- Many existing PGMs, especially laser-guided ones such cated and even more dangerous than the as the Hellfire antitank missile being fired here, require Saddam Hussein of 1991. That being the control all the way to impact. case, the US embrace of deep attack car- ries substantial or major risks, which are summarized below. There is the risk that the tightly integrated airland technologies of war will not always work as planned, reinforced by the risk of dangerously underestimating the ability of a suitably inclined enemy to put sand in the gears (to create and exploit friction, as Clausewitz might say). There is the risk that deep attack may be dangerously premature in regard to major aspects of technology. In particular, the advanced surveillance technology necessary to make it work only partially exists, at best, as does the technology necessary to rapidly process and distribute information. With the approaching budget crunch, such technology may never fully exist or, equally important, exist in a form 12 AIfíPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1993

cially in terms of the blood of the people the circumstances and situation in Kuwait who do the fighting. Korea in 1950 is the were unusually favorable. In particular, obvious example. Having failed in an there was a highly developed air infra- attempted quick and cheap win, we would structure in Saudi Arabia and the neigh- presumably have to try it again, this time boring Gulf kingdoms available for use, the hard way. So what should we do? I and our key regional allies, especially the suggest two general approaches. Saudis, were generally equipped with air First, we cannot overemphasize to all and support equipment that was at least concerned, especially to Congress and the interoperable with our own. Further, local public but also to ourselves in the mili- air forces had largely been trained by tary, that we cannot expect cheap victo- American and British instructors, and ries, however much we might like them. English was the functional international We cannot expect future enemies to coop- language. Finally, we had several months erate, as Saddam Hussein did, by provid- to prepare. Compare this with a hypothet- ing a favorable target-rich environment. ical situation in Eastern Europe some time We should remember that George Custer in the future, where the local air forces had a target-rich environment at the Little will be, at best, only partially organized Big Horn, and it was the richness of targets and trained along Western lines, where that killed him. We should remember that equipment and support infrastructure will generally not be interoperable with ours, In Desert Storm, conditions were favorable for our where readiness will be extremely low, interaction with regional allies. Their equipment was interoperable with our own, English was the functional where English will not be the interna- International language, and local air forces had been tional language, and where we will likely trained by American and British instructors. We should have to fight in a short-notice, come-as- not expect all situations and conflicts to wori< out so you-are war. well. Coalition aircraft flying in formation during Operation Desert Shield include two Oatari aircraft (a Second, in regard to weapons and sur- Mirage and an Alpha Jet). a French F-1C, an American veillance technology, we should take care F-16, and a Canadian CF-18. to see that our reach does not exceed our LIMITS OF DEEP A TTACK 13 g r a s p . VVe m a y s i m p l y b e e x p e c t i n g m o r e port to include joint attack against follow- °han present or foreseeable technology can on forces at interdiction ranges, since, as deliver. Therefore, before buying a tech- previously noted, Apache attack heii- nology in large amounts at high cost and copters can reach targets at ranges that tra- makiiig it central to our operational strat- ditionally have been associated with inter- egy, vve should demand that it prove itself. diction missions. It should face the most rigorous opera- • The use of fighter aircraft as forward tional testing, under geographic and cli- air controllers for interdiction or deep- matic conditions closely simulating those attack missions, an approach pioneered in of likely real-world operating areas and the war with Iraq.22 against targets permitted the vvidest possi- These three methods are straightfor- ble independence in devising defenses ward, although not necessarily easy. and countermeasures. If a new technology Since they seek to exploit existing assets, works in a fair test, then we should buy it, they are not likely to cost a great deal of but only then. money. They may require some adjust- Finaíív, until such technology matures ment of missions and roles,23 and for max- and, for that matter, even if it does, vve imum effectiveness they will require should seek methods of improving our improved capabilities for Communications deep-attack targeting capability that better and data transmission between the rele- exploit existing or potential assets. There vant aircraft, ground units, and command are three obvious possibilities: systems.24 Exploiting these capabilities • Increased use of existing ground assets would go a long way toward consolidating (special operations forces, reconnaissance and rapidly expanding the unprecedented units, scouts, armored cavalry) to detect qualitative military advantage Desert mobile deep-attack targets and act as Storm demonstrated in what is turning out ground forward air controllers. to be, despite the end of the cold war, an • The expansion of joint antiarmor tac- increasingly noisy and nasty world envi- tics from a primary focus on close air sup- ronment. □

Notes 1. Operational art is "the employment of militarv forces ily from lan Lesser, Interdiction and Conventional Strategy: to attain strategic or operational objectives in a theater of war Prevailing Perceptions, Rand Report N-3097-AF (Santa or a theater of operations through the design, organization. Monica, Calíf.: Rand Corp., June 1990). and conduct of campaigns and major operations. 3. Major emerging (or reemerging) doctrinal issues Operational art translates theater strategy into operational include the role and interface of naval attack aviation in an and. ultiroately. tactical action." Joint Test Publication (Pubj air campaign, whether air power should complement ground 3-03. Doctrine fo r l/nified and Joint Operations, 11 December power or vice versa, and whether and under what circum- 1990. xii. stances air power can be decisive by itself in war. 2. As a more precise definition. this article defines deep 4. See Frank Kendall, “Exploiting the Military attack as the use of conventional firepower. primarily but not Technological Revolution: A Concept for Joint Warfare." necessarily air power. to influence the ground battle at the Strategic Review 20 (Spring 1992): 23-30. operational levei of war by doing some or all of the follow- 5. Detection and identification are not necessarily the ing: isolating and shaping the ground battlefield. weakening same thing. Detection is the ability to note that something is the combat power of enemy ground forces not yet in contact there. while identification is the ability to determine just with friendlv forces, weakening enemy offensive air and what that something is and whether it is worth further atten- operational-level surface-to-surface missile capability. and tion. Identification requires much better image quality than interfering with the enemy scheme of maneuver, Whether detection. deep attack is undertaken to support the scheme of maneu- 6. Some sources report that bomb damage assessment was ver of friendly ground forces or whether the ground cam- one of the key bottlenecks during the Gulf War. See. for paign will be a supplement to the air campaign will need to instance. "War Problems Prompt 'Baseline Review' of be determined by the circumstances and characteristics of lntelligence Imagery," Aerospace Daily 160 (2 December the theater in question. This definition blends a variety of 1991): 341-42. missions. including the concepts of tactical interdiction. 7. Maj Mike Sweeney and Capt Don Spence. "TACAIR offensive counterair. the emerging concept that. for lack of a Targeting." handout, USAF Air-Ground Operations School. better term. can be referred to as offensive countermissile Hurlburt Field, Florida. 1988. and the follow-on forces attack. This definition draws heav- 8. Various efforts are under way to speed up the targeting 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 cycle, primarily by automating various parts of the process. 17. The potential threat from such weapons was revealed Some sources claim that the aim is to reduce it to three during the bombing of North Vietnam, and the danger they hours. See Comdr R. T. Williams. "The Challenge of present continues even if you have achieved air superiority Integrating Naval Air Power into a Land Campaign under or supremacy. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, US aircraft JFACC." thesis, Naval War College, 1991, 24. generally bombed from médium altitude (10,000 feet or 9. Many programs relevant to deep attack have been higher) to minimize the risk from light antiaircraft artillery delayed or canceled over the years. These include (AAA) and SAMs. The potential danger from netting such weapons with sensors and C3 is discussed in Mark Hewish, • Aquila, a sophisticated Army unmanned air vehicle; "New Sensors and Processing Boost Short-Range Air • Advanced Synthetic Aperature Radar System Defense,” International Defense Review 19, no. 2 (1986): (ASARS), an advanced radar system that was to be 167-76. put on the TR-1, a version of the U-2; 18. One of the pictures on the wall at the US Air Force • Precision Location Strike System (PLSS). an airborne Gulf War Air Power Survey during 1992 was a picture of an system that was to detect and locate hostile radar trans- airfield full of unrevetted F-15s that were unsheltered and mitters and direct weapons against them with en route parked nearly wingtip to wingtip. Undoubtedly intended as updates; and an illustration of the global reach—global power concept, it • All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), an Army also struck this student of World War II as a picture of data-fusion system. Hickam Field, Hawaii, on 6 December 1941. For more Financial constraints are likely to delay the introduction of detailed and not necessarily dated information on the vul- other equipment. nerability of air bases to attack, see "In 1991, Air Force Will 10. For an overview of the role of JSTARS in Desert Learn Whether It Has a Home," Washington Times, 12 Storm, see Peter Grier, "Joint STARS Does Its Stuff,” Air January 1989, 1. and “Getting the Jump on Base Damage," Force Magazine 74 (June 1991): 38—42. Insight 5 (6 February 1989): 34-36. 11. The Soviet term was actually closer to “radio-elec- 19. For one of the worst examples, see Frank Barnaby, tronic struggle.” See David G. Chizum, Soviet The Automated Battlefield (New York: Free Press, 1986). Dr Radioelectronic Combat (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. Barnaby embraces precision guided munitions with the 1985). 3. enthusiasm of a contractor trying to make a sale. 12. North Korea, for example, could be expected to Unfortunately, he compares the PGMs of the year 2000 with emphasize the use of its large and well-trained commando the targets of 1960, thereby grossly underestimating both the force in this role. survivability of modern weapons and the potential of coun- 13. A central reason for the adoption of AirLand Battle by termeasures. For a more detailed critique, see Thomas R. the US Army was that previous tactics ("Active Defense”) McCabe, "The Myth of the Bulls-Eye War,” unpublished arti- ceded the initiative to the enemy. The dangers of fighting a cle, summer 1988. war in a reactive mode were made obvious by the 1991 20. For a detailed study, see US General Accounting Persian Gulf War. Office, Antitank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities: 14. This author is inclined to expect such an antisatellite Report to the Honorable Charles E. Bennett, House of (ASAT) system to be a ground-based laser, since such a sys- Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing tem would be easier to hide and harden than a missile- Office. 1987). launched ASAT system. and would be more tactically flexi- 21. The Soviets also planned to apply such tactics in a ble and responsive. In any case, such a capability is not conventional European conflict. For an excellent study. see likely to be easy to build. For a useful study of the require- C. J. Dick, “Soviet Responses to Emerging Technology ments for such a system, see Federation of American Weapons and New Defense Concepts," Soviet Studies Scientists. Laser ASAT Test Restriction (Washington, D.C.: Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, (Sandhurst, U.K.: Federation of American Scientists, 1991). November 1986). 15. AH-64 Apache attack helicopters can hit targets at 22. Maj James S. Robertson, "FastFACS in the KTO: The ranges traditionally associated with interdiction missions, as First Combat Test of the F/A-18D," Marine Corps Gazette 76, noted in Lt Col Thomas Runge, Firepower and Follow-On no. 5 (May 1992): 86-94. Another alternative worth explor- Forces Attack: Making Every Round Count (Maxwell AFB. ing is the use of attack helicopters as airborne FACs. Ala.: Air University Press, March 1991), xii. 23. Currently, the primary emphasis of most of the ground 16. It is all too easy to imagine an economically desperate units of the types specifically mentioned is to find the Rússia selling advanced interceptors (Su-27s, MiG-25s, and enemy. Using them as ground forward air controllers to con- MiG-31s) and advanced air defense missiles (SA-5s, -lOs, trol air strikes would probably be more a shift of emphasis and -12s) to any government with hard currency. See “Cash- rather than an entirely new role. Starved Rússia Sees Arms Sales as Quick Way to Generate 24. Prototypes of such technology already exist, such as Income.” Washington Post, 23 February 1992, Al. Also see the Automated Target Handoff System. See Jay C. Lowndes, "Rússia to Fight Weapon Sales Curbs," Defense News 7 "Cooperative Attack," A ir Force Magazine 74. no. 11 (18-24 May 1992): 1. (November 1991): 60-64. Summer 1993 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

1 st Lt Gary A. Vincent, USAF

for his article A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design

Congratulations to lst Lt Gary A. Vincent on If you would like to compete for the Ira C. his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner Eaker Award, submit an article of feature for the best eligible article from the Summer length to the Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault 1993 issue of the Airpower Journal. Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. The Lieutenant Vincent receives a $500 cash award is for the best eligible article in each award for his contribution to the Air Force’s issue and is open to all US military personnel professional dialogue. The award honors Gen below the rank of colonel or equivalent and all Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the US government civilian employees below GS- support of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf 15 or equivalent. Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

15 A NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

HE CURRENT US force structure, procurement process, and military industrial base were established in World War II and sustained by the Tcold war. Characteristics of this system include substantial production capability, large depot capacity, threat-driven modernization, and swift acquisition and retirement of weapon systems. Such a Sys- tem, however, is no longer viable and must be changed. The new security environment calls for a new defense industrial strategy that features slower-paced acquisition of weapon systems, modern approaches to manufacturing, programmed infusion of technology, and rationalized depot/industry sustainment structure, all at a reduced cost. At the same time, the NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRA TEGY 17

US military must be able to respond quickly when our country’s interests are unexpectedly challenged. Further, the militarv must continue to provide for the security of the US from externai threats, including nuclear proliferation. That is, even as the military downsizes its forces, it must be able to maintain, surge, deploy, and sustain those forces and—if conflict arises—decisively win the fight. In order 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 to preserve these capabilities, we must link FISCAL YEAR military requirements to our supporting industry in a coherent and cooperative Figure 1. DOD Budget Authority Trends way. This article explores the feasibility of (From Office of Management and Budget, attaining such a goal by examining where “Presidenfs Economic Program" [press we are now, what we need, and how we release], 17 February 1993; National Defense can do it. Budget Estimates, FY 93, March 1992, 61; and Air Force Force and Financial Plan) Where We Are Now The budget of the US Department of Defense (DOD) has been declining since the mid-1980s and shows no signs of lev- eling off. Although our interests have not changed, our financial resources have diminished. The FY 1994 president’s budget (PB—of President Bush) and the FY 1994 amended presidenfs budget (APB—of President Clinton) call for even deeper cuts (fig. 1). These budget reduc- FISCAL YEAR tions, in turn, translate into cuts in our force structure (fig. 2). For example, the Figure 2. USAF Force Structure (From Air Air Force has already reduced its fighter Force Force and Financial Plan) force by 40 percent and its bomber fleet by we continue to cut defense according to over 50 percent (fig. 3). Even though these this pattern, we must dip even deeper into cuts are deep, we are still not finished. our force structure, despite the fact that it In the spring 1993 reworking of the bud- already has been halved in less than a get for FY 1994, the Air Force lost two decade. more wings, yet DOD still has a poten- During this period of budget cuts, our tially large bilí to pay over FY 1995-98. If purchases of new technology have also 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR

Figure 3. USAF Force Structure Reductions (From Air Force Force and Financial Plan)

FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR

Figure 4. Profiles of Fighter Buys (From Air Force Force and Financial Plan)

been sharply curtailed. For example, our procurement of F-16 aircraft has been reduced to 24 per year and will be termi- nated in fiscal year 1995; our F-15C/D production line closed in 1985; and our purchases of B-2s will be limited to only 20 aircraft (figs. 4 and 5). Additionally, our fighting force continues to age, despite the fact that we are retiring older systems first (fig. 6). The same is true of support aircraft (fig. 7). FISCAL YEAR These trends bode poorly for the future unless we change our ways. Furthermore, uncertainty about some weapon systems Figure 5. Profiles of Bomber Buys (From Air calls our future capability into question. Force Force and Financial Plan) NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 19

FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAF)

Figure 6. Average Age of Fighting Force (From USAF Statistical Digest, FY 92-93, E22-E25; and Air Force Program Data System)

FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR

Figure 7. Average Age of Support Force (From USAF Statistical Digest, FY 92-93, E22-E25; and Air Force Program Data System)

For example, the AX and multirole fighter Such pressures on force structure also are still in the design stage; the B-2 pro- tend to exert pressure on industry. During duction line has already begun to close; the past 50 years, the US built a robust the C-17 is fighting for its life; the last T- industrial base that produced the technol- 37 trainer was deiivered to the Air Force ogy and weapons that helped bring the in January 1970; and Joint Primary cold war to a close. But subsequent bud- Aircraft Training System (JPATS) candi- get cuts are forcing reductions in DOD’s dates are competing with each other to total obligation authority. Just as the mili- replace the T-37, but the Air Force has not tary draws down and reshapes itself, so yet selected the winner. must our vast industrial arsenal adapt | F-15 F-15 | 5 F-16 C-5B C-130 C-17 B-1B B-2A F-4 F-5 F-22 AIRCRAFT neither sensible nor affordable. nor sensible neither buys “fits such ahead, and starts” in the acquisition and production of and of production weaponsacquisition are smaller With Texas. Worth, at Fort tion is fighting hard to maintain F-16 produc- F-16 hard to maintain fighting is Moreover, Lockheed Douglas.McDonnell and istrue of same at Lockheed the C-5B may well be true of the F-15E at beof F-15E true the may well The there was contract. nofollow-on Towit, half of the B-mously inefficient. inthe Union of ahead former Soviet the to stay able wewere Thus 9). (fig. contract is enormously productive, it is also enor- enor- isalso it productive, is enormously Although this system “technology race.” of inaproduction anticipation follow-on best unit cost and then sharply terminate weaponin systems high at volume the systems in production (fig. 8). shrunk, but so has the number of different of has the volume our only requirements 1B buy was purchased in one year, but but year, one in purchased was buy 1B atyecesorpoetdnes Notvastly our exceeds projected needs. because our current production capacity becausecapacity ourproduction current 20 Our practice has been to produce tohas produce been Our practice AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 FALL AIRPOWER JOURNAL 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 9187 85 79 83 77 81 75 73 71 i I * i I 1 I i I i I i i I I FISCAL YEAR i I i I i I FISCAL YEAR FISCAL i I i I i I i I I Figure 8. Production in the 1950s and 1960s and Production1950s in the Figure 8. 93 95 97 97 9993 95 I territory and attacking our and attacking troops and territory vital weapon superiority air premier The egy. enemy aircraft from friendly aircraft enemy penetrating systemin the world,the prevents F-15 the current system. The F-15’s perfor- F-15’s The system. the current for is lim- growth potential its aging and ain compiling combat, 95:0 unequaled It is and Japan. Arabia, Saudi Israel, completed, the line evaporates asline the quickly completed, Once productionis volume production. over- substantial largerequires capacity, by limited also are efficiency and mance intoincorporated becannot economically is technology its but for a time, long well andpilots.Israeli, Saudiby record kill US, it, asflies US does The infrastructure. tern. Because of the reduced threat to threat the of reduced the Because tern. pat- longer afford this no to pursue we can (fig.10). in as it started foreign unless customers step for high- work tool-and-die extensive and head, a work expanding force,rapidly in future con- air superiority maintain to as fighter that ensure F-22 such we the we an improved need Hence, design. its ited. Stealth technology, for example, US,now is the time to take risks,shift to old strategy, the is linked which profile buy However,F-22 the current flicts. ■ I l~ iI I The F-15 program F-15 The typifies the old strat- The F-15’sdesign1960s has served us For the reasons previously mentioned, mentioned, previously reasons the For Aircraft Cost Sys- Estimating Cost Aircraft tion, 1987]; and October Research Corporation,Research 1988]) Monica, Calif.: Corpora- Rand tem, custo ietns A Acquisition Milestones: cial Plan; M. B. M. Rothman, cial Plan; AirForce ForceFinan- and versus Productionversus in the N-2599-ACQ [Santa Aerospace Weapon Weapon Systems Aerospace Data Base 90 hog 90 (From 1990s through 1970s vl 1, vol. , Rand Report Aircraft [Delta

buys buys iue9 UA u rfls (From BuyAir Profiles USAF ForceForce Figure and Financial Plan) 9. duction overhead, smaller buys, and a and buys, smaller overhead, duction andpro- capacity industrialreductions in of adoption strategyinthis would result inpros For the aerospaceindustry, tion periods. affordable sustainability over long produc- long over sustainability affordable inputs, enhanced responsiveness, and inputs, responsiveness, enhanced resource reduced sharply responsibility, increased productivity, decentralized decentralized productivity, increased egy of “leanproduction,” strat- whichentails industrial defense the new menting waste our depot capacity. ourdepot waste ture, idle our industrial capability, and capability, industrial our idle ture, Further anewstrategy. by establishing delay serves only to age our force struc- struc- to age our force only serves delay for gears, future the and ourselves posture We should seriouslv consider imple- imple- consider We seriouslv should 78 79 80 81 828384 92 85868788899091 What We NeedWhat We FISCAL YEAR ICLYA FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR NEW DEFENSEINDUSTRIAL STRATEGY > < 3 CD r ) ogy edge to a of systems produce existing ronment integration segment, etc.) with with etc.) segment, integration ronment tem, airborne early envi- warning/ground Sys- radar attack target surveillance joint low as one system per lowyear; and as one system tocued unit cost; rate per year ornumber tain aproduction 200 long-term, levei production—perhaps as production—perhaps levei long-term, system, and control warning (e.g., airborne of a cer- instead years) x every flight ship a per year, a brigade per year, squadron technologies as a matter of department as of adepartment matter technologies strategy incorporates upgradesand new support systems in “capability” lots (e.g., lots a in “capability” systems support 150 policy, the latter involving latter the policy, the sector, Inmilitary the ing to change. of adapt- capable line production "living” 100 • meshing the life cycle and technol- and technol- cycle the life meshing • • modernization of special systems • modernization of combat/combat 7879 8081 82 92 838485868788899091 FISCAL YEAR 21 22 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1993

smooth transition to tomorrow’s modern- Alter Production Rates ization. Instead of building major weapons in quantities driven by unit costs, the new strategy focuses on modernization by com- How We Can Do It bat units. In the case of the Air Force, this would entail the modernization of one This new strategy is in line with the cur- squadron equivalent of capability per year. rent administratiorTs industrial and We would acquire the most capable plat- defense policies. President Clinton has forms—ones that have room to incorporate called for a revitalized industrial base, and new technologies—and “lock in” one air- Secretary of Defense Aspin echoed this frame per mission area after the engineer- call in his confirmation testimony, which ing and manufacturing development emphasized the need for new thinking on (EMD) phase. This would have the effect force modernization that would reduce of reducing procurement risk and flatten- procurement funds but streamline indus- ing the pace of system retirement. trial capacity. Further, Aspin has called Further, this approach would for a process that would maintain our superior technological advantage and a • put modernization on a predictable viable industrial base by relying on vari- track, ous modernization strategies, some of • allow future systems to retire more which are outlined below. gracefully over longer periods of time,

F-15 REACHES END OF SERVICE LIFE F-22 REACHES END

Figure 10. Life Cycles of the F-15 and F-22 (From Air Force Force and Financial Plan; and Air Force Program Data System) NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 23

• allow industry to optimize planning, life extension programs (SLEP) of weapon • allow government to insist on limit- Systems, as necessary (fig. 12). ing burden and overhead to only that We should implement this approach to which is required for long-term produc- maintaining air superiority now—when tion, and threats to our security are minimal. Full • create a viable long-term production EMD funding for the F-22 is our best base and preserve industrial capability. hedge against uncertainty. Delaying F-22 production would begin to create a bow In the case of our F-15/F-22 example, wave that will overlap what we can fix the new strategy would require the Air with an F-15 SLEP. Force to alter its approach to procurement now—well before establishing the production line. The revised F-22 procurement Establish Programmed Infusion profile would be much flatter and extend over decades (fig. 11). A potential glitch of Technology in this system, however, is that it might Along with moving toward long produc- create a gap in our war-fighting capability tion runs, we must remain technologically as the F-15 reaches the end of its pro- innovative and be able to incorporate such grammed Service life before the flattened innovations in our weapon Systems. This F-22 production is complete. This could would be possible through a DOD-directed be corrected by endorsing selective Service policy of programmed technological infu-

COLD WAR F-22 PROCUREMENT TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES )ATTF

PROJECTED F-15 INVENTORY

FY 94 APB F-22 PROJECTED PROCUREMENT F-22 INVENTORY

Figure 11. Proposed Capability Increment Buy (From Air Force Force and Financial Plan; and Air Force Program Data System) 24 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1993

COLD WAR F-22 PROCUREMENT TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES ATTF

PROJECTED F-15 INVENTORY PROJECTED F-22 INVENTORY

Figure 12. Proposed Capability Increment Buy and SLEP (From Air Force Force and Financial Plan; and Air Force Program Data System)

sion for all major weapon procurement 6.3A technologies, the F-22C with “emerg- programs. We should develop, test, and ing” 6.2 technologies, and the F-22D—two “roll over” technologies for upgrades and decades away—with “visionary” 6.1 tech- modifications in a systematic way. nologies (fig. 13). Note that from our cur- The Office of the Secretary of Defense rent perspective, the 6.1 technologies are has structured its Science and technology generally those that are 10-20 years away programs in a very sensible and coherent from being applied to war-fighting hard- manner, grouping efforts according to ware, as is the purchase of the fourth wing their availability for force application. of F-22s. This existing structure provides a direct This block approach integrates and link to our new DOD procurement policy. directly links the proposed DOD industrial Again. using the F-22 as an example, pro- production policy to a departmental pol- curement would be structured into capa- icy of technology infusion. Industry meets bility blocks—wings in this case—with a a requirement and minimizes costs, while Science and technology (S&T) category procurement is phased and predictable. linked to each block. Such a system Moreover, in addition to meeting our own incorporates the time-phased availability needs, we supply arms to nations around of our S&T technology development the world. efforts (advanced technology development [budget element 6.3A], exploratory development [budget element 6.2], and basic Make Revisions in research [budget element 6.1]). Foreign Military Sales Accordingly, the F-22A would link with Deciding whether or not to sell US EMD, the F-22B with “ready” program weaponry to foreign buyers is always a NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 25

major policy issue, usually dependent in unit quantities for FMS over an upon the availability to US forces of the extended period (fig. 14). This not only superior version of the weapon—the next makes for a much better scheme, but also upgrade as a minimum. A structured pro- gives us the opportunity to work “influ- curement approach with programmed ence and assess” programs with potential technology infusion would make products recipients over a longer period of time. available sooner and at a known risk. Moreover, foreign countries are more will- A revised approach to foreign military ing to accept a used weapon system for sales (FMS) would offer a current capabií- FMS if there is a long-term commitment to ity for sale once the next levei of techno- operate it in US inventories. logical infusion is available to US forces. Applying this approach to the F-15 By procuring new systems in unit-sized example also makes sense for marketing packages and removing older systems in its replacement—the F-22—as long as the similar numbers, we can release weapons policy of technological infusion is operat-

700

600 Q LU > 500 _i LU O £ 400 £ o cr 2 300 > i- 3 | 200 3 O 100

FISCAL YEAR

WEAPON F-22A F-22B F-22C F-22D SYSTEM TYPE OF ENHANCEMENT EMD+MODIFICATION UPGRADE MODERNIZE ■NEW TECHNOLOGY' TECHNOLOGY SOURCE MODERNIZATION $ 6.3A $ 6.2$ 6.1 $

Figure 13. New DOD Procurement Strategy 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR FMS

COLD WAR F-22 PROCUREMENT TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES FMS SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM (SLEP). THEN FMS/RETIRE

PROJECTED F-15 INVENTORY PROJECTED F-22 INVENTORY

Figure 14. Proposed Capability Increment Buy, SLEP, and FMS (From Air Force Program Data System) ing. Once the F-22A production run to spares repair capacity that vastly exceeds equip the first wing is complete and once the expected demand (fig. 16). Correcting F-22B production commences with 6.3A this problem will be difficult for both the technologies, we should offer follow-on F- private and public sectors. However, 22A production to qualified FMS buyers. altered congressional guidance, linkage to Similarly, we should sell “B” when “C” is the proposed industrial strategy, and uti- in production, and so forth (fig. 15). This lization of the competition mechanisms to pattern creates additional business for the rationalize resources should allow us to industrial base. as well as additional derive the best value at minimum expense options for defense, State, and National to taxpayers. Downsizing in both the pri- Security Council policy planners. vate and public sectors would be evolutionary and more manageable than is currently possible. Assure Sustainment and Readiness Sustainment. The need for repairs has A sound approach to sustainment and been declining for several years, due in readiness must also be a part of our new part to modernization of weapon systems strategy. When we modernize by combat but principally to overall downsizing of unit and flatten production, we generate a military forces. Consequently, all Services requirement to extend the life and capabil- have much more depot/yard capacity than ity—and combat effectiveness—of existing they need. For example, there are 12 Systems in all Services. major air-related depots alone across the Our approach to this part of the new four Services. strategy can have a significant effect on A new approach to modernization will costs. At the moment, both industry and require that we extend the life of most—if the military Services have a modification/ not all—of our current major weapon sys- NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 27

WEAPON F-22A F-22B F-22C F-22D SYSTEM TYPEOF EMD+MODIFICATION UPGRADE MODERNIZE “NEW TECHNOLOGY' ENHANCEMENT

Figure 15. Notiona) FMS

tems. The F-15, for example, would undergo modification as necessary, consistent with a notional schedule (fig. 17). We should package this work to optimize opportunity for broad bidding across industry and air depots. We should also structure such a long-term effort into multiple work packages to expand the bidding pool and preserve the sustainment base. Further, if we remove congressional restrictions that direct at least 60 percent of the work load to depots (fig. 18), we would create strong incentives for implementing efficiencies in the depot system. This action would also expand opportunities for industries hit hard by force cuts and would create a healthy climate for Figure 16. Notional Depot Work Load competition. 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

DEPOT AND INDUSTRY SLEP WORK «v■ .v.u.VilW»V.V«VV»V.V«Y/.V.V.V.Vmí TWO MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

CURRENTSYSTEM DEGRADATION LINE

NEW STRATEGY OLD STRATEGY PRODUCTION SCHEME PRODUCTION SCHEM

Figure 17. Notional SLEP Requirement

84 87 88 89 FISCAL YEAR •PREUMINARY OATA

Figure 18. Historical Air Force Depot Work Load Share (From Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command [AFLC], AFLC FY 91 Depot-Maintenance Annual Fteport, AFLCP/AFMCP 66-65, 1 May 1992,27; idem, AFLC FY 89 Depot Maintenance Annual Fteport, AFLCP 66-65,15 January 1990,63; and idem, AFLC F Y 88 Depot Maintenance Annual Fteport, AFLCP 66-65, 16 January 1989, 56) NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 29

If this approach makes sense, we have rationalize the total sustainment capacity an opportunity to downsize the depots in to meet both defense and industry needs a more evolutionary manner. After func- during peacetime. tionalizing the depot system, appointing By following the above principies, both executive agents to direct the functional the military and industry would achieve integration of like work of the various Ser- major savings yet preserve the nation’s vices (i.e., putting the Army in charge of ability to defend itself. Functionalizing all ground systems, etc.), and removing the military depot system is essential; oth- restrictions on competition (the 60/40 erwise, efficiencies, economies of scale, rule), we should seek the exemption of and baselining competition will not be depots from the base realignment and clo- effective. Considerable consolidation of sure (BRAC) process. Such an exemption the Air Force’s repair facilities for all DOD would have important economic and fixed-wing aircraft would occur over time. political implications: That service’s five large depots and one • competition is leveled and opened by small depot would be combined with the standardizing the accounting rules for mil- Navy’s six naval aviation depots, and then itary depots and civilian industries (the would be rationalized and downsized to a American Institute of Certified Public levei of efficiency that would be both sus- Accountants could chair this effort), tainable and competitive. Finally, the • the depot work force assumes control new principies of competition would link over its future (i.e., it must compete suc- the concepts of production (industrial cessfully or die), base) and repair (sustainment base). • employment leveis are tied to suc- Readiness. Our recent experience in cess in bid competition, Operations Desert Shield and Desert • adjustments in the depots’ labor force Storm suggest that the new strategy can are directly related to trends in winning meet wartime surge requirements. Once open bidding competitions, and Desert Shield began, substantial forces • consolidations/closures are directly deployed for operations in just a matter of linked to efficiency and work load. weeks. All Services immediately acceler- ated work schedules at logistics/commer- Gradually opening all work packages to cial locations. Specifically, the Air Force competitive bids still means that the sharply ramped up its depot activity, depots and industry will share the work, pulling C-141 and C-5 aircraft out of but not according to some predetermined depots an average of two weeks ahead of ratio. All work packages would also meet schedule for potential theater employ- commercial specifications unless more ment. stringent specifications were justified. Since both the military depots and civilian industries will respond to competitive Conclusions pressure, it is unlikely that either will gain a monopoly. Other factors working Regardless of the final industry/depot against monopolization include the cost of work ratio, the new strategy offers many fixed equipment, test gear, and unique advantages. If DOD chooses to modernize processes; the nature of the work; the our land, sea, and air forces in capability environmental risk; and the age of the increments per year (i.e., land required process. manufacturing tech- brigade/naval groupings/air squadrons), it nique, or technology. In short, the assures an affordable modernization strengths of military depots and civilian scheme during a period of reduced budget industries will determine how the work is authority and much reduced risk. divided between them. The process will Moreover, today’s shallower acquisition 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

gradient sets up a much more affordable production of technology systems; tech- modernization cycle later in the twenty- nology is integrated into production; and first century, regardless of risk (fig. 19). In industry can handle limited production the case of the Air Force, realigning pro- surges. This approach links the national jected procurements in the near term military strategy and a superior, respon- could affect all major force-employment sive force with systems. • the presidenfs commitment to revi- Should a major threat emerge, we would talize the domestic sector, be in the most efficient posture for recon- • the Congress’s commitment to sup- stitution. Warm production lines would porting defense conversion, be turning out almost all of our criticai • the secretary of defense’s commit- weapon systems, and existing design ment to reposture acquisition strategy and teams would be infusing new technology nurture new technologies, into production. In short, the nation • the military’s need for readiness and would have a ready fighting force in con- sustainability, stant modernization, with readiness and • the need to maintain an affordable sustainment determined by market forces. base in industry to supply technological In sum, we must maintain a technologi- weaponry, and cally superior military force, armed with • long-term stability in the industrial all-purpose, high-tech conventional work force—both military and civilian. weapons that are credible and easily deployed. Further, such a force must be Any policy that bonds this new DOD able to prosecute US and allied interests approach to our industrial partners must with a minimum expenditure of money be developed in concert with key industry and lives. In order to do this, we must leaders and must entail rules of competi- reshape the distribution of work between tion agreed to under third party oversight. military depots and civilian industries so All this would come from a draft DOD that the forces of competition drive an directive that appropriate conversion to civilian produc- • establishes lean production as the tion; industries are downsized for smooth DOD approach,

C-17: 8/year. JPATS: 20/year; F-22: 24/year

Figure 19. Cumulative Production (Reduced Production Rates) NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 31

• requires systematic technological Our current force structure, procurement process, and military industrial base—characterized by large-volume infusion, production, threat-driven modemization, and swift • spreads capability buys over decades, acquisition—date back to World War II. For example, in • requires SLEPs to maintain the effec- response to the threat in the Pacific theater, workers in tiveness of weapon systems, the Boeing Company (USA) produced nearly 4,000 • aligns depot responsibility by func- B-29s in three years. tion, with an appropriate executive agent tect the industrial base and criticai tech- in charge, nologies for national security needs and • uses the market mechanism to strike commercial exploitation. It will link tech- the appropriate long-term balance between nology, modemization, force structure, military/civilian sustainment structure, and the industrial base into a cohesive and mechanism and offer industry predictable • sets deadlines for implementation. and substantial primary production and This new defense industrial strategy secondary repair work that will assure will deliver a modem military and mod- broad partnership over the long run. ern industrial sector, maintain the most Further, this strategy will sharply reduce capable force for the lowest cost, and pro- up-front acquisition, divert savings to sus- 32 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

In spite of rts 95:0 kill record. the F-15 (top) is restricted by limited growth potential and aging technology. We need its successor, the F-22 (bottom), to ensure that we can attain air superiority in future conflicts. NEW DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 33 taining force structure and funding base for reconstitution should a major domestic needs, use competition to size threat to US interests emerge. Thus, sustainment work, and keep lean pro- military requirements are linked to sup- duction lines active. In turn, active porting industry in the context of a new lines will protect logistic surges and sus- security environment. We need a tainment needs, while providing a solid change. Now is the time to act.

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34 THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE IN A TRANSFORMING AIR FORCE

Lt Col R. ]oe Bal dw in, USAF

HE LAST DECADE of the twentieth of the Air Force got out in front of events century promises to be one of the and promulgated a strategic planning most eventful in modern history. framework for the post-cold war era.1 TThese truly revolutionary times mark Subsequent efforts to realize the promise of a defining moment for the United States global reach—global power and to imple- Air Force. Sweeping change in the interna- ment organizational realignments have put tional arena, coupled with irresistible the Air Force in a good position to meet the domestic pressures to cut the defense bud- demands of a regionally focused military get, has produced a dramatic shift in strategy while building down to lower America’s national security strategy. force leveis.2 However, merely restructur- Fortuitously, in 1990 the sênior leadership ing the Air Force in accordance with an 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

overarching strategic framework is insuffi- and at all leveis.3 Officers and noncom- cient to ensure the vitality of our Service missioned officers alike must exhibit into the next century. tremendous leadership as they implement fundamental change throughout the Air Force and seek to take care of our most Meeting the Challenge cherished asset—quality people. As we charge ahead in restructuring our Service, of Transformation undertaking “Quality Air Force” initia- The key to transforming our Air Force tives, creating composite wings, imple- into a leaner, meaner Service that retains menting two-level maintenance, revamp- its reputation as “the worlcTs most ing training and education programs, and respected air and space force" lies in the assessing equipping requirements, we hands of blue-suit leaders across the ranks must never forget the criticai importance of the human factor to organizational success.4 An Air Force leader must adhere to high moral and Far-reaching change inevitably creates ethical principies and live a life of personal integrity. enormous anxiety and tension among the Though women have served in the Air Force for a number of years, recent scandals such as “Tailhook" people who make up an organization. have highlighted the leaders role in maintaining high This natural development is further aggra- morale while fostering a climate of “zero tolerance." vated in today’s Air Force by the uncer- LEA DERSHIP IMPERA TI VE 37

tainty and turmoil associated with defense Selfless airmen served in the front lines budget cuts. force drawdowns, base clo- during the cold war, providing awesome sures, selective early retirement boards nuclear and conventional capabilities that (SERB), and reductions in force (RIF). deterred Soviet aggression, defended Leaders across the Air Force must care- Western democracies, and assured the fully manage the transformation of our Ser- ultimate victory of Western liberal values vice with due concern for people as well over a bankrupt communist ideology. as for the mission. Otherwise, we run the Clearly, the realization of a Europe whole serious risk of producing a well-armed, yet and free in the early nineties was due in hollow, force lacking in morale, esprit, no small measure to more than 45 years of and cohesion. The current situation sacrifice and commitment on the part of places a prernium on involved leaders United States airmen. who set the example, insist on quality per- More recently, the adroit application of formance, maintain a consistent focus on aerospace power assured the triumph of the mission, and, above all else, take care coalition efforts to tum back blatant Iraqi of their people. aggression against Kuwait in the Persian Involved leadership is all the more criti- Gulf region. It is indisputable that the cai given the likelihood that the Air Force fierce 1,000-hour air campaign against Iraq will be the force of choice when the nation and its forces in the Kuwaiti theater of responds to fast-rising regional crises. No operations made possible the brief 100- other Service can go directly from the hour ground war that culminated in a United States to the fight in a matter of decisive victory for the coalition. This hours and apply overwhelming firepower impressive feat resulted from the extraor- with the precision and lethality that we dinary leadership and devotion to duty of can. Regrettably, we still live in a trou- blue suiters at all echelons—from the Air bled world racked by age-old animosities, Staff and major commands to US Air proliferating arms, and unyielding insta- Forces, Central Command (CENTAF) bility.5 All these pose a potential threat to Forward all the way down to the units. US security interests around the globe. These remarkable military professionals Thus, the Air Force must be prepared to projected enormous combat power halfway safeguard those interests through the around the world to halt further aggression, assured capability to project highly agile, created an expeditionary air force in the extremely flexible, and decidedly lethal sands of the Arabian Peninsula, developed aerospace power to any hot spot in the a comprehensive war plan orchestrating world. But there can be no global reach or hundreds of air assets, and launched a mas- global power without involved leadership sive air campaign that demolished Iraq’s and quality people. war-fighting capability. Their extraordi- Fortunately, we have a tremendous her- nary performance provided compelling evi- itage to draw upon as we take on this chal- dence of Giulio Douhet’s assertion that lenge. The brief history of the Air Force is “aerial warfare will be the most important replete with visionary leaders—Benjamin element in future wars.”6 D. Foulois, William (“Billy”) Mitchell, We must now capitalize on the same Frank M. Andrews, Henry H. (“Hap") energy, skill, enthusiasm, and dedication Arnold, Claire L. Chennault, Carl A. that produced a decisive victory in the (“Tooey") Spaatz, Ira C. Eaker, Hoyt S. Gulf War to successfully transform our Vandenberg, Elwood R. (“Pete”) Quesada, Service into the premier air and space Curtis E. LeMay—who shepherded the air force of the twenty-first century. That arm through good times and bad, then endeavor will require a personal commit- wielded this most flexible of military ment on the part of officers and noncom- instruments to win our nation’s conflicts. missioned officers (NCO) throughout the 38 AIfíPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1993

Top Priority: Integrity The most important characteristic that an Air Force leader must possess is personal integrity. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines integrity as an “uncompromising adherence to moral and ethical principies.” It is that and much more in a professional military organization such as ours. Integrity con- stitutes the essential ingredient for sound, effective leadership. An officer or NCO who lacks integrity is worthless to the Ser- vice and highly destructive of its ethical standing with the public. Such an individual neither earns nor deserves the trust of superiors or subordinates. And no one can lead effectively without such trust. If you expect your people to give 110 percent day in and day out and to will- ingly undergo the rigors of combat, then you must exhibit unquestioned honesty, be forthright in what you expect of your troops, and behave in an ethical manner in all that you do. If you would have others “fíegardless of what appears to be some superficial follow you, then cultivate a well-deserved ideas of present day conduct . . . the man who is reputation as a solid military professional genuinely respected is the man who keeps his moral who possesses the highest personal stan- integrity. ...” Gen H. H. Arnold demonstrated the conviction behind his words when he fought for the dards and demonstrates unerring ethical predominance of air power and supported its advocates behavior. Take responsibility for your in spite of strong resistance to his views. actions and those of your people. Never try to avoid blame by pointing the finger at Air Force to get involved with their peo- someone else. Rather than wasting time in ple, to address subordinate concerns over an unethical effort to shift the blame, organizational change and personnel tur- strive to identify the cause of the problem moil. and to instill a keen sense of pride in and take immediate action to resolve it. being part of a unique military organiza- Superiors do not expect you and your peo- tion that takes care of its own. ple to be perfect, but they do expect you to This kind of involved leadership is recognize genuine mistakes and to correct essential if we are to provide the compre- them. hensive air and space power necessary to Moreover, the leader with true integrity defend our nation and its global interests has the courage of his or her convictions against a vast array of threats in the aus- and the will to take action on those con- tere fiscal times that lie ahead.7 While victions. That characteristic is crucial in a there is no textbook answer on how best to self-monitoring profession such as ours provide the requisite leadership during wherein we must make tough ethical calls this challenging period, the following dis- as to the propriety of individual actions. cussion highlights some important consid- A few years ago, a wing commander fur- erations for those who would lead the way nished his office and quarters in an extrav- in our transforming Air Force. agant fashion that was blatantly wasteful LEADEfíSHIP IMPER ATIVE 39

of Air Force resources. He had behaved to get ahead through ingratiating behavior. similarly as a vice-commander of another Once your boss has made a decision, how- wing, but no one had called him on it ever, loyalty requires your unflinching there. No one had the guts to do the right support for that decision, especially in thing and report him to his superiors or go front of the troops. It matters little through inspector general channels. whether you personally agree or disagree Consequently, he continued his profligate with the decision or how you expect your ways when he became a wing commander subordinates to respond to it. You must until a junior member in his unit had the give it your wholehearted support as long courage to file a fraud, waste, and abuse as it is not immoral, illegal, or contrary to complaint against him. Unfortunately, his regulations. Never attempt to pacify your eventual removal from command threw an people by joining them in criticizing your entire wing into turmoil and tarnished the superiors. image of the Air Force due to the commander’s lack of integrity and the failure of Gen B erija min O. Davis, Jr.. fought bigotry and official other Air Force people to do the right discriminatory policies throughout his career. His efiorts thing earlier. helped pave the way for an integrated Air Force. A leader's personal life must always be above reproach. Set the example of self- discipline and moral rectitude for your people to foliow. Take prompt corrective action in the event of sexual harassment or other inappropriate behavior. Realize that the American public closely scrutinizes your behavior and that of your subordinates as a direct reflection of the United States Air Force. We cannot afford nor can we tolerate any “Tailhook” affairs in our Service. Perhaps General Arnold said it best: Personal integrity also means moral integrity. Regardless of what appear to be some superficial ideas of present day conduct, fundamentally—today as always—the man who is genuinely respected is the man who keeps his moral integrity sound, who is trustworthy in every respect.8

Loyalty Cuts Both Ways Loyalty is an essential ingredient of involved leadership. Loyalty up the chain entails not only the staunch support of one’s superior but also the courage to disagree with him or her and the will to provide honest feedback on issues within your purview—all in private. Few sênior officers like yes-men (or yes-women) who do not think for themselves but instead try 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

can be no more dispiriting, morale-busting development than to have a superior not support you in the face of adversity. However, the involved leader who has the courage to take up for subordinates in both good times and bad will be repaid many- fold by troops who deeply appreciate such unselfish loyalty. In 1943, then-Colonel LeMay carne to the aid of an Eighth Air Force pilot during a mission critique when it became apparent that he was being made the scapegoat for a bomb run to Bremen that had gone bad. Although most of the other officers conducting the critique were his sênior, LeMay stood up, stopped the inquisition, and made it clear that his superiors had completely lost their perspective in seeking to pin the blame on someone for what in essence had been an honest mistake. Interestingly enough, LeMay had gone to bat for a pilot who was not even in his bomb group because he was so incensed at the injustice being done to a brave airman who was doing his best in the war-torn skies over Europe.10

Strength of Character Will Carry the Day In an era of growing regional threats to US interests, we should all take our cue from Gen George Kenney. a It won’t always be easy to do what is master of developing innovative ways to generate the right in the confusing and uncertain days most combat capability possible from limited air assets that lie ahead for our Air Force. But it in World War II. will be absolutely essential for the future of our Service and the nation that we stick by our principies, defend our people. and Loyalty alao entails taking care of the stand our ethical ground on the difficult needs of your people and supporting them issues that confront us. Strength of char- in the face of adversity. Gen George S. acter will be pivotal in this regard. We Patton once observed, “There is a great can learn much from our Air Force fore- deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom bears who have risked it all for what they to the top. Loyalty from the top down is believed in. even more necessary and much less preva- General Arnold exhibited tremendous lent.”9 Thus, put the health and welfare of character in promoting air power and the your troops first. See that their needs are widely shared vision of an air service that adequately taken care of. Then be pre- would be independent of the US Army pared to stand behind your subordinates during the interwar years. As an air when they are in the right and beside power advocate, then-Lieutenant Colonel them when they are in the wrong. There Arnold testified in favor of Col Billy LEADEfíSHIP IMPEfíATIVE 41

Mitchell at his court-martial in 1925, stood for exceptional professionalism, despite strong warnings from sênior offi- rigid discipline, and equal opportunity for cers that such action would endanger his black aviators to tly and fight. He attacked career. Arnold steadfastly supported racial segregation ruthlessly in 1945 in tes- Mitchell and continued to fight for a sepa- timony before a general officer panei eval- rate air Service because of his firm convic- uating how best to employ blacks in the tion that it was the right thing to do for the military. Thereafter, he spoke out against defense of the nation. As a result, he was segregation to military and civilian audi- publicly admonished by the chief of the ences as well as the press. All that took Air Service and exiled to Fort Riley, tremendous courage since segregation was Kansas. Not one to be dissuaded by a lit- War Department policy at the time. tle adversity, Arnold persevered in his Ultimately, this activism, combined with beliefs, excelled in his career, and eventu- the impressive performance of Davis and ally became chief of the Army Air Forces. the Tuskegee airmen he led, provided From that position, he directed the devel- compelling evidence of the propriety of opment of and influenced the employment integrated air units. In light of all that, of the massive air armada that pummeled General Vandenberg, chief of staff of the the Axis powers during World War II. Air Force, approved the order to integrate Moreover, he laid the foundation for the the Air Force. Throughout a long and dis- creation of an independent United States tinguished career, General Davis contin- Air Force in 1947.11 In a similar manner, Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., demonstrated extraordinary character in fighting the destructive big- Although Gen Curtis LeMay was tough and demanding, otry that pervaded the air service. In his emphasis on training and preparation during World World War II, he led the all-black 99th War II paid ofi with his bomber groups achieving an impressive record of putting bombs squarely on target Pursuit Squadron and 332d Fighter Group and retuming to base with minimal losses. Here LeMay to great honor and distinction in the (on right) stands with another Air Force visionary. Brig Mediterranean theater of operations. He Gen Haywood Hansell.

rjjj:

■ r A 1 Á V 42 AIRPOWEFt JOURNAL FALL 1993

have been so impressed that they are now professionalizing their military based on the American model, often with American assistance. While the current drawdown in forces is regrettable in many respects, in the end it will produce a core of experienced aerospace professionals who possess the expertise, the energy, and the commitment to keep our Air Force number one in the world. As we implement extensive changes and fundamental restructuring in a fiscally austere environment, Air Force leaders must capitalize on the talent and skill of these top-notch people. Continue to push authority and responsibility down to the lowest leveis possible. Implement quality initiatives that are tailored to the unique requirements of your organization, then strive for constant improvement of the process. Nurture and cultivate the creativity and ingenuity of your troops. Strive to Creating a quality work environment means taking care empower those people working on the cut- of your people by seeking ways to recognize ting edge who best know how to get the exceptional performers. job done efficiently and effectively. Ensure that the right procedures are in place to make it tough to say no to good ideas and encourage anyone with a good ued to set the professional standard in a idea to surface it via those procedures. variety of sênior command and staff billets While Eighth Air Force commander in while combating racism wherever it raised the late eighties, Gen James P. McCarthy its ugly head.12 capitalized on the bright, young officers and NCOs in his command by having them participate on numbered air force (NAF) working groups that addressed the “ People Are the Essence of hot issues of the day. In this manner, he Our Business”13 focused the creativity and ingenuity of his young leaders on such initiatives as Our greatest strength as a Service lies in enhancing unit conventional capabilities, our high-quality people. We are extremely improving pilot retention, increasing fortunate to have the best people we’ve bombing accuracy, and streamlining alert ever put in uniform as we draw down the changeover procedures. The NAF work- Air Force. They are well educated, highly ing groups developed comprehensive pro- trained. and committed to excellence— lit- posals for action that were reviewed and erally the best and brightest our nation has approved by the commander, then submit- to offer. Their exceptional quality is rec- ted to the commander in chief, Strategic ognized worldwide. Former Warsaw Pact Air Command (CINCSAC). Ultimately, military leaders have been astonished at many elements of these proposals were the authority and responsibility we entrust approved by CINCSAC for implementation to our young officers and NCOs. Many throughout the command. In a similar LEADERSHIPIMPERAT1VE 43 vein, General McCarthy unleashed an air Do the “Impossible” refueling vving to rewrite the book on daily tanker operations. Unencurabered by reg- Too often in the past, we have allowed ulations or headquarters oversight in vir- bureaucratic inertia or conventional wis- tually every area except safety, the wing dom to stymie good ideas and novel deveíoped a number of innovative proce- approaches to doing our business better. dures that were eventually adopted We can no longer afford this tyranny of throughout the command to optimize the status quo. Today Air Force leaders tanker operations.14 must create an atmosphere that encour- In this era of growing regional threats to ages people to take on the daunting chal- US interests, we must concentrate on lenges that confront us with innovative squeezing the raost combat power possible Solutions, then support those Solutions up out of shrinking aerospace assets. Urge the chain despite the odds against them. your troops to apply their brain power and Inspire your people to do great things by their ingenuitv to the vital task of exploiting convincing them that they can truly do the enormous combat potential of Air Force what others write off as impossible. Don’t weapon systems. Gen George Kenney was a allow innovation to be blocked by a nega- master at developing innovative ways to tive, excuse-seeking mentality that blames generate the most combat capability possi- the system. Instead, embolden your ble from rather limited air assets under his troops by implementing their good ideas command in the Southwest Pacific during when possible and staunchly supporting World War II. As Gen Douglas MacArthur’s others by recasting and resubmitting those air component commander, he (1) that must be approved by higher authority. employed bombers as airborne artillery in Never accept as a final answer the oft- support of struggling ground forces, (2) repeated lines “It’s never been done that delivered troops and equipment by air into way before” or “The boss will never the heat of battle, (3) devastated enemy approve that.” Continually buck the con- shipping and closed down sea lanes by ventional wisdom and strive to convince employing “skip-bombing” techniques, (4) your people that they can indeed “make it converted bombers into heavily armed happen.” Build their confidence, reward interdiction platforms, (5) deceived the their initiatives, and support their good Japanese into making futile air strikes on ideas. In turn, the results of their efforts mock airfields and established expedi- will greatly impress your superiors. tionary airfields nearby, (6) launched mass When he took over as Eighth Air Force surprise attacks against major Japanese air- commander in 1987, General McCarthy fields to gut the combat effectiveness of immediately sought to develop realistic their air forces, and (7) dropped parachute conventional deployment exercises for his fragmentation bombs (his own invention) to bombardment wings. However, he encoun- demolish enemy aerodromes.15 tered stiff resistance from Headquarters General Kenney was a true master at SAC, the NAF staff, and his wing comman- ingeniously exploiting the vast potential ders. Nevertheless, he persevered in devel- of air assets to seize control of the air, dev- oping an exercise that would have bomb astate enemy forces, and provide tremen- wings deploy seven-bomber packages to dous support for ground and naval opera- relatively austere airfields to fly two weeks tions in the Southwest Pacific. We would of conventional training sorties in Red Flag do well to follow his lead in the lean years or similar exercises. This would be a tall ahead when we inevitably will be called order for bomb wings that had gotten used upon to use limited aerospace assets in to operating almost solely from home sta- innovative ways to deal with regional tion. Through force of personality, General crises that erupt. McCarthy convinced his staff and wing 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

commanders it could be done, then over- the significance of what we are about in came the objections of higher headquarters the Air Force and the vital importance of to deploy the first unit (the 97th their contribution to this mission. Inform Bombardment Wing) to Clinton-Sherman them about the vital role that aerospace Industrial Air Park, Oklahoma, in less than power plays in implementing a regionally three months’ time. The resulting Mighty focused defense strategy that relies largely Force exercise program saw Eighth Air Force bomb wings deploy to a variety of upon global reach and power to safeguard continental US (CONUS) and overseas America’s vital interests. Educate them on locations, set up tent cities, feed the troops Air Force doctrine and the evolution of from mobile kitchens, conduct bladder our Service during this century. refueling, use mobile Communications Sys- Emphasize our great leaders and impres- tems, respond to mission-type orders, and sive accomplishments in two world wars, keep aircraft flying for two weeks of Korea, Vietnam, the cold war, the Gulf intense conventional operations.16 War, and innumerable crises. Stress their Subsequently, under the direction of Lt place in the continuous and proud line of Gen E. G. Shuler, Jr., Eighth Air Force dedicated American airmen who have bomb wings performed evermore demand- given their all to fight and win their ing and realistic deployments that pushed nation’s wars. Remind them of Gen units further up the conventional learning curve. He too fought an uphill battle Douglas MacArthur’s admonition: “Yours against nonbelievers to conduct two is the profession of arms. ... You stand as highly successful NAF-wide exercises the nation’s war guardian, as its lifeguard (Mighty Warrior 88 and 89) that entailed from the raging tides of international con- deploying all Eighth Air Force bomber and flict, as its gladiator in the arena of tanker wings as well as some command battle.”19 elements to austere operating locations in Seek to build a cohesive team of com- the CONUS and Europe. These deployed mitted aerospace professionals who are units conducted a combined command capable of generating the maximum com- post and field training exercise that bat power possible from shrinking spanned a two-week period of rigorous resources. Concentrate on those funda- flying operations at wartime sortie rates.17 mental activities that underwrite unit The dedicated efforts of all those who readiness to perform our mission and that strived to bring off these realistic conven- give us an unquestioned capability to tional exercises, despite the naysayers, deploy and fight. Meanwhile, avoid the paid off in the unprecedented capability of diversion of time, energy, and resources to SAC bomb wings to deploy and fight dur- less significant activities that contribute to ing the Persian Gulf War. neither. Work the substance hard and the image will take care of itself. Lead the way for your troops by giving Maintain an Unwavering 110 percent in dedicated duty performance on a daily basis. Set the professional stan- Focus on the Mission dard for them to emulate. Inculcate an unrelenting drive for excellence. In these increasingly austere and uncer- Moreover, utilize an enlightened leader- tain times, it is vitally important that we ship approach that insists on quality per- keep our mission of defending the United formance but does not shoot them in the States through control and exploitation of face every time your people make a mis- air and space in the forefront of the minds take. Be firm but fair. Never accept of our people.18 Convince your troops of mediocre performance. When people don’t LEADERSH1PIMPERATIVE 45

measure up, insist on taking the necessary Air Force units honed to a razor-sharp corrective action whether that consists of edge. Achieving that goal requires that we remedial training, removal from flying sta- engage our troops in the most demanding, tus, reassignment, administrative counsel- realistic training possible in peacetime. It Lng, nonjudicial punishment, or even court- also necessitates taking the initiative to martial. We cannot afford incompetence, evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures disregard for standards, or dereliction of to stay abreast of the diverse threats and duty in any unit, most especially in those situations we may encounter around the where lives may be on the line. globe. Seek to capitalize on the enormous A few years ago, a KC-135 tanker mishap talent and brain power of your people to occurred in which several aircrew mem- further your unit’s war-fighting capabili- bers died. The aircraft commander made ties. Moreover, seek to exploit the inher- too steep a descent in attempting to land ent capabilities of assigned weapon Sys- the aircraft, bounced it off the runway, tems to contribute to the fight. Don’t allow attempted to go around, but failed and your people to become complacent or your drove the doomed tanker into the ground unit to stagnate. next to the runway. The aircraft broke up While he commanded 3d Bombardment and the crew compartment became Division in England during World War II, engulfed in flames. It turned out that this General LeMay insisted on just this kind aircraft commander had a track record of of rigorous training and mental ingenuity serious problems in landing the airplane— to prepare his crews for combat and to problems that had never been adequately continually refine their war-fighting skills. addressed through retraining or adminis- LeMay evolved various formations to con- trative action. He was a dedicated officer centrate the defensive firepower of his who was well liked by his peers and his bombers and enhance their survivability. superiors and appeared to be headed for a He developed new procedures to enable successful Air Force career. Thus, no one aircrews to take off in foul weather and wanted to hurt his prospects by taking the improved procedures to form up hundreds tough remedial action dictated by his poor of bombers over Britain for massive landing skills. Consequently, the unit mis- attacks on the continent. When his people sion and safety considerations were com- weren’t flying missions, they were attend- promised by an overweening concern for ing ground school, firing live rounds at the an individuaTs career. The result was a target range, performing intensive target tragic mishap that quite possibly could study, learning foul weather takeoff proce- have been avoided. Obviously, much dures, honing formation flying skills, or worse things can happen to an aviator than refining bombing techniques. Aircrews busting a check ride, going through addi- were not overly enamored with their com- tional training, or even coming off of flying manderis demanding approach to business status. Air Force leaders must have the and soon began referring to him as “Old courage, the strength of character, and the Iron Ass.” But General LeMay took their wisdom to make the tough decisions when criticism in stride and said, “I don’t mind the circumstances warrant. being called tough, since I find in this racket it’s the tough guys who lead the survivors.”20 Ultimately, LeMay’s emphasis on training and preparation paid off Realistic Training is when his bomber groups achieved an de Rigueur impressive record of putting bombs squarely on target and returning to base The post-cold war era of come-as-you- with minimal losses. are crises makes it imperative that we keep In a similar manner, Eighth Air Force 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 began training selected bomb wings to per- valuable resource—Air Force people. We form long-range strikes from the CONUS must not be a cold, uncaring institution in 1987 in anticipation of future crises that but a professional outfit that takes care of might necessitate such missions. Under its own by assisting those transitioning to General McCarthy’s direction, the NAF civilian life while continuing to provide a staff worked out the details of these decent quality of life for those who remain round-robin sorties with affected bomb with us. Our dedicated airmen are the wings, Headquarters SAC, and other agen- backbone of the Air Force’s combat effec- cies. It then tasked wings to fly Mighty tiveness. We must continue to do right by Strike exercise sorties into the them (and their families) if we are to Mediterranean and other regions of the maintain the enthusiasm, esprit, and com- world to prove the concept and refine mis- mitment that binds our people into a sion procedures. Continuation of this coherent war-fighting team. realistic exercise program under General Therefore, place a high priority on the Shuler had Eighth Air Force primed and quality of life for your troops and their ready to launch long-range B-52 strikes families. Ensure they have a decent envi- from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, against ronment in which to live and work. vital power and Communications facilities Demonstrate an evident concern for the within Iraq at the initiation of the Desert welfare of your troops. Be Creative and Storm air war. Seven bomber crews flew persistent in addressing their needs. After halfway around the world, dispatched taking charge of SAC, General LeMay their deadly ordnance of conventional sought innovative ways to take care of his cruise missiles from outside Iraq’s borders, people. He utilized spot promotions to then returned home after a record-setting reward standout performers. He prevailed 35-hour combat mission.21 That operation upon the Army Corps of Engineers to put potential aggressors on notice that the replace open-bay barracks with semipri- United States can reach out and touch vate dorms for enlisted troops. He worked them unexpectedly with devastating with Sen Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska strikes flown from the CONUS. (R-Nebr.) to secure funding to build new If we are to remain the world’s most married quarters at SAC installations. He respected air and space force, we must even went so far as to establish hobby have the vision to anticipate future crises shops at all his bases to provide his troops and develop the appropriate aerospace an enjoyable outlet for their mechanical capabilities to handle them through realis- talents. General LeMay firmly believed tic training and rigorous exercises. that he could demand the utmost in per- However, no amount of preparation can formance and commitment from his peo- prevent our units from becoming hollow ple if he took good care of them, and they due to uncertainty and fear over the proved him right.22 future. Only involved leadership that Similarly, you should strive to provide a keeps the mission in the forefront while quality work environment for your people. providing a stable, secure, and reassuring Use self-help where feasible to upgrade environment can do that. work areas. Involve your people in planning and effecting upgrades, then take part in the work yourself. Your people will work hard to fix up their own work areas, Take Care of Your People take pride in the results, and welcome your participation as an indication of your During these trying times of force draw- concern. Even modest improvements can downs, base closures, SERBs, and RIFs, it help inspire troops because they know the is imperative that we take care of our most boss cares. LEADERSHIPIMPERATIVE 47

Structure your outfit to encourage inno- their concerns on frequent visits to the vation and reward performance. Look out flight line, maintenance shops, launch for the best interests of your people. Seek control facilities, guard posts, or wher- any and all opportunities to recognize ever your people work—day and night, your exceptional performers. Capitalize in good weather and bad. Hold periodic on the awards and decorations program, commander’s calls or similar gatherings specialty awards, and awards whenever to keep your people informed and to possible at the NAF, major command enable them to express their concerns (MAJCOM), and Air Force leveis. Create directly to you. your own unit awards and spread the When he was commander of Twelfth wealth to deserving people. Be sure to Air Force in North África during World recognize your top people in public War II, Gen James H. Doolittle saw it as his forums such as commander’s calls or job to visit every unit under his command, award ceremonies. Written and verbal engage his troops, discover any problems, pats-on-the-back are always in order. and begin to work the Solutions. To facili- Take a sincere interest in furthering the tate this process, he often arrived at a unit careers of your troops. Put in the time and and announced that he was going to fly a effort to do performance reports, promo- combat mission with them aboard one of tion recommendations, and decoration their aircraft (B-17, B-25, or B-26) as an nominations right. Encourage your people observer or copilot. He “was convinced to improve themselves through profes- that nothing gives your men the confi- sional military education, specialty dence in you and in themselves that hav- courses, and college or advance-degree ing you go with them does.” He tried to programs. Support the efforts of individu- pick the tough missions so he could get a ais to get good follow-on assignments. A good understanding of the challenges that well-placed phone call or endorsement confronted his bomber crews in combat. letter can greatly enhance prospects for Moreover, he wanted everyone in his com- individuais to land a desired job. Never mand to know that the “old man” would hesitate to go to bat for a deserving subor- fly the dangerous sorties and that he was dinate. In the end, your people will knowledgeable about bombing tactics, for- respond to your concem for their welfare mation flying, and the methods to evade with dedicated Service above and beyond flak and fighters.23 Doolittle’s actions the call. reflected a common approach to combat leadership in World War II that saw group, wing, division, and NAF commanders risking their lives to gather firsthand Maintain a Visible knowledge about the progress of the air Presence war and to bolster the confidence of their troops. Effective Air Force leaders must get As a military leader, you must be pre- out of their offices and become sent and visible when the criticai is hap- immersed in all aspects of their unit’s pening in your unit. Never hesitate to take operations. Maintain a visible presence charge during an emergency or crisis. throughout your outfit—observing, Your troops will want to see you in the directing, encouraging, critiquing, or thick of things, and that is where you need praising as appropriate. Get out and put to be if you are to lead effectively. Your your footprints on the organization. presence will bolster the confidence of Infuse the unit with your spirit, enthusi- your people and allay their fears. By all asm. commitment, and high standards. means, let the experts do their jobs, but be Energize your people to excel. Solicit present and on the scene to provide over- 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 arching guidance and continuity. Then, taking the initiative in fear of jeopardiz- take responsibility for the outcome. ing their career. In most instances, Air In 1987, one of the best examples of on- Force superiors expect subordinate lead- the-scene leadership in peacetime ers to decide upon all matters within occurred at Barksdale when a KC-10 their purview as long as they keep the exploded on the ramp shortly after Gen boss informed. Superiors have enough to John T. Chain, Jr., CINCSAC, arrived on do without having to make a subordi- station to speak at an NCO Academy grad- nate’s decisions for him or her. Thus, uation. Despite the stress of this ill-timed they prefer to make only those extraordi- and deadly mishap, the wing commander nary decisions that lie beyond the remained calm, cool, collected, and in authority of their subordinate leaders. charge. His professional demeanor was Moreover, they readily expect those lead- contagious. His people performed ers to be self-starters who can get a good superbly under dangerous conditions in read on the boss’s agenda, then under- response to his crisp directions. They take initiatives to further that agenda.25 quickly moved to control the mishap area, The key to this approach lies in fully taxied endangered airframes out of harm’s understanding the goals and operating way, extinguished the fuel-fed inferno, philosophy of your superior, as well as his attempted to rescue a maintenance person or her expectations for you and your unit. from the airframe, and minimized injuries Armed with this knowledge, you can incurred. That evening, the commander move out smartly to exploit your authority appeared on local newscasts to calm the in performing the unit mission and imple- fears of the local civilian and military menting appropriate initiatives, all the communities and to lay to rest rumors while keeping your boss informed. If you about a terrorist incident at the base. His operate in this manner, you will gain confident performance was especially greater latitude from your superior, greater reassuring to those living on or near a SAC satisfaction in your job, and greater suc- installation that kept bombers on alert. cess in your career. As a boss yourself, Undoubtedly, the superb performance of you must be willing to allow your subordi- then-Col Brett M. Dula during this pres- nates to behave in a similar manner. sure-filled emergency contributed to his Groom them for positions of increased subsequent selection to become a general responsibility by encouraging them to officer.24 exercise the full measure of their authority while always keeping their superior in the loop. For your part, strive to get involved only in those decisions that cannot be Exploit the Full handled at a lower levei and that require Measure of Your your action or that of your superior.26 Authority If you do so, then you will be traveling in good company. During World War II, While deputy commander in chief of General Spaatz was especially adept at US European Command, General assigning responsibilities to subordinate McCarthy stressed the need for leaders to air commanders, empowering them with use the full measure of the authority the necessary authority to carrv out those entrusted to them by their superiors. Too responsibilities, then getting out of the often, individuais are reluctant to do so way while they discharged them. His because they incorrectly believe that willingness to repose confidence in his their boss wants to be in on every deci- commanders inspired them to great sion. So they buck all substantive deci- heights in accomplishing the mission for sions up the chain and shy away from “Tooey.”27 Tear Oul and Remove □ □ Detach one of these cards, fill it out, and mail it mail al it fill and out, cards, of these one Detach Order ProcessingOrder Code Enclosed is my check for $13.00 for each subscription ordered ($16.25 for international mail). international for ($16.25 ordered subscription for each $13.00 for is check my Enclosed •5151 Ilike would subscription to a one-year purchase to the Enclosed is Enclosed for check formy $ international for subscription mail).13.00 each ($16.25 ordered I wouldlike to subscription purchase a one-year to the Order Processing Code *5151 GIFTFOR: GIFTFOR: Make che Make Mail to: New Orders, Superintendent of Documents,P.O. Box 371954, PLEASE PRINT PLEASE Mail to: Orders,New Superintendent of Documents,P.O. cheBoxMake 371954, PLEASE PRINT □ □ VISA Rank/Tide First Lasl Name InrtiaJ Name VISA City State Zip First ank/Title R Last Code e Nam Initial Country e am N (if Reqd) Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Rank/Tide Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 City ank/Title R Make allMake che Want aSubscription to the cks payable to:cks payable ofSuperintendent Documents cks payable to: Superintendent ofDocuments to: Superintendent payable cks tetAdes iy tt/onr Zip Code Stato/Country City Street Address Street Address Street Address Street Address ..Bx 371954 Box P.O. itbrh A 15250-7954 PA Pittsburgh, New Orders,Superintendent ofDocuments Airpower Journal? □ □ cks pavable to Superintendent of to Superintendent Documents pavable cks MSECR l MASTERCARD MASTERCARD Visa, or MasterCard number to: First Name State First Name Card No adN Expiration Date Card No City Initial Zip Code Initial rm l l l Il JOURNAL JOURNAL T T I IT I I IT IT l I I M I 1 AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER

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New orders, Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954

New orders, Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954 LEADERSHIPIMPERATIVE 49

Involved Leadership— Gen George C. MarshalTs advice to his commanders in World War II applies The Ultimate Key equally well to those who would lead in to Success today’s Air Force: As vve transition to a new, streamlined The truly great leader overcomes all difficul- Air Force that focuses on power projec- ties. . . . The lack of equipment, the lack of food. the lack of this or that are only excuses; tion and employs the latest in manage- the real leader displays his quality in his tri- ment techniques, we must continue to umphs over adversity, however great it may provide the involved leadership that is be.28 essential to the successful transformation of our service. Ours is a particu- If the United States Air Force is to remain larly human endeavor. We ask our dedi- the world’s premier air and space force, cated people to undergo risks, to with- we must triumph over the adversity that stand hardships, and to make sacrifices confronts us as we transform our Service in defending the United States and its into a leaner, meaner combat organization global security interests. We owe them capable of meeting the challenges of the the very best we can provide in the way future. We dare do no less if we are to of quality leadership at all times, but meet the security needs of our great nation most especially during this era of enor- and keep faith with our illustrious Air mous change and uncertainty. Force forebears. □

Notes 1. See details of this framework in Donald B. Rice, Global 8. Gen H. H. Arnold to Lt Col Leroy L. Stefen. letter, 5 Reach—Global Power The A ir Force and U.S. National November 1946, 7 January 1947, 2. Security. white paper (Washington. D.C.: Department of the 9. Gen George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Air Force. June 1990): and idem. "Reshaping for the Future.” Bantam Books, Inc., 1981), 346. Also see page 390 for guid- testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. 20 ance on proper care of troops. February 1992. in Vital Speeches 58, no. 12 (1 April 1992): 10. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr.. Stars in Flight: A Study in A ir 354-61.' Force Character and Leadership (Novato, Calif.: Presidio 2. See organizational initiatives in A ir Force Restructure, Press, 1981), 232-33. white paper (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force. 11. Ibid., 17-19; and H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New September 1991); and Gen Merrill A. McPeak, "Restructuring York: Harper & Row, 1949), 120-22. the Air Force: Organize, Train, and Equip," address to the 12. John L. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the United States A ir Air Force Association Convention. 18 September 1991, in Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), Vital Speeches 58, no. 3 (15 November 1991): 69-74. 229-55. For a firsthand account of the challenges General 3. From the USAF Vision statement in “State of the Air Davis confronted, see Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Benjamin O. Force,” Airman. December 1992, A3. Davis. Jr.. American: An Autobiography (Washington, D.C.: 4. See full panoply of endeavors identified in "Reshaping Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991). the Force" section in ibid.. A4-18. 13. Favored expression of Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF, 5. See National Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Joint Retired, when discussing the importance of people to the Air Staff. January 1992) for discussion of regionally focused Force mission. Used at USAFE colonel's orientation. 2 defense strategy (page 1), the strategic landscape, US inter- December 1991, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. ests and threats to same (pages 1-4), the need for an unques- 14. Gen James P. McCarthy. "SAC; The Command for the tioned capacity to respond to regional crises (pages 7 and Future," Combat Crew 38, no. 3 (March 1988): 3-4. 11-12). and the strategic principies of readiness, aerospace 15. For details, see George C. Kenney. General Kenney superiority. strategic agility. power projection, decisive Reports (1949; reprint, Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force force, and technological superiority (pages 9-10). The attrib- History. 1987); and Frisbee, 127-50. utes of aerospace power make the Air Force particularly well 16. Gen James P. McCarthy, "The Conventional suited to implement the defense strategy articulated herein. Challenge," Combat Crew 37. no. 9 (September 1987): 2; and 6. Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air (1942; reprint, Jeffrey P. Rhodes, "SAC Extends Its Wings." Air Force Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983). 91. Magazine 71, no. 8 (August 1988): 44-50. 7. For an intriguing discussion of the unique nature of our 17. Lt Gen E. G. Shuler. Jr., “Mighty Warrior 88: Training "comprehensive" Air Force that seeks to provide the full as We Intend to Fight,” Combat Crew 38, no. 10 (October range of air and space capabilities. see Gen Merrill A. 1988): 3, 6-7; and "Mighty Warrior 89," Combat Crew 39, McPeak. "Does the Air Force Have a Mission?" address at no. 11 (November 1989): 3. 9. Maxwell AFB. Ala. Text of the address is in "McPeak: No 18. McPeak. "Does the Air Force Have a Mission?" 5. Clear Mission Statement Until Now." A ir Force Times. no. 52 19. Gen Douglas MacArthur, "Duty, Honor. Country," (3 August 1992): 4-5. American Legion Magazine, November 1986, 50. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

20. Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of 24. Maj Gen Brett M. Dula is currently commander. General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., Second Air Force, Beale AFB, Califórnia. 1986), 56-59. 25. Gen James P. McCarthy, “Commanding Joint and 21. James P. Coyne. Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, Va.: Coalition Operations,” Naval War College Review 46, no. 1 Air Force Association Aerospace Education Foundation, (Winter 1993): 11. 1992), 4. 26. Ibid., 12. 22. Coffey, 294-98. 27. Puryear, 89-91. 23. Gen James H. Doolittle and Carroll V. Glines, I Could 28. Quoted in Lt Col Charles M. VVestenhoff, Military Air Never Be So Lucky Again: The Memoirs of General }ames H. Power: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and “limmy" Doolittle (New York: Bantam Books. 1992), 306. Thoughts (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1990), 149.

I Can Write Better than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Journal focuses on the operational levei of war—that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational levei, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, APJ strives to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. ODAY’S WORLD is very different from what it was just a few short MILITARY years ago. While some of this new world seems headed for greater Tregional and international unity (as in SUPPORT “Europe 1992”?), much of the rest of it seems to be disintegrating into racial, religious, ethnic, and tribal warfare with all FOR “PEACE the normally associated disregard for humanitarian concerns. The collapse of EFFORTS” the Soviet Union and the condominium of superpowers that restrained client States C ol Edwar d M ann, USAF and the potential unrest within them has

51 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Proposed Joint Definitions (Even if these definitions are finalized, they will apply only to the Department of Defense. We will eventually have to agree on something with the State Department and other agencies.)

[Primarily military operations:] “Peacekeeping: Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the re- quest of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties. “Peace-enforcement: Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat.

[Primarily diplomatic efforts:] “Preventive diplomacy: Diplomatic actions, taken inadvanceof a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. [We take exception to the word predictable. Potential would seem to be more appropriate.] “Peacemaking: Diplomatic process of ar- rangirtg an end to disputes and solving their Under Reagan and Gorbachev, the role of each underlying causes. superpowers military forces was well defined. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has blurred those roles, causing the international security environment to [Diplomatic and military:] become unsettled. “Peace-building: Post-conflict diplom atic and military action to identify and support produced an unsettled international secu- structures which will tend to strengthen and rity environment not unlike the one that solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict [emphasesadded]." existed just prior to World War I. Today, however, the United States is more Source: Joint Pub 3 07.3, "JTTP Uoint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures] for Peacekeeping inclined to be involved in diplomatic, Operations" (draft), 7 December 1992. socioeconomic, and—especially—military efforts to ameliorate conflict and suffering “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: As- in the rest of the world—much more so sistance provided in conjunction with military than it was during the early years of this operations, specifically authorized by Title century. 10, US Code, Section 401. Such assistance Humanitarian operations and efforts to is limited to (1) medicai, dental, and veteri- attain and maintain peace (wherever it nary care provided in rural areas of a country; might be threatened) are rapidly becoming (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and a major focus of US, as well as United construction of basic sanitation facilities: and Nations, security policy. The US military (4) rudimentary construction and repair of establishment does not appear well pre- public facilities." pared for this shift in emphasis. In fact, it Source: Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign has not even agreed upon definitions for Internai Defense" (final draft), 17September 1991 these types of operations. Peacekeeping, MILITAR Y SUPPORT FOR "PEACE EFFORTS 53 peace enforcing, peace building, and simi- nity has considerable experience with lar missions are likely to be predominant peacekeeping operations and conducts concerns of the US and the community of them according to widely accepted rules nations in the near-to-intermediate future. of engagement. However, the military’s It is imperative that the military Services understanding of peace enforcement or begin preparing concepts, strategies, and some of the other operations it may be doctrines to deal with these kinds of oper- asked to conduct or support is not nearly ations. so well developed. The purpose of this article is to address Using the proposed definitions as a some of the key issues raised bv the chal- starting point, one may offer some general lenge of international “peace efforts” with thoughts on issues that will likely prove the hope of at least beginning to ask some criticai in the military’s approach to these of the right questions, rather than having activities. These thoughts are not neces- to learn everything from devastating expe- sarily new, nor do they apply solely to riences like the bombing of the Marine peace efforts. Mostly, they are problems barracks in Lebanon. Since a common the military struggles with in all types of understanding of terms is essential for operations, but they seem to have particu- Communications, we should examine lar significance for the kinds of operations some recently proposed definitions for activities relevant to peace efforts (see The US military has often contributed to humanitarian sidebar on page 52). efforts. For example, during Operation Babylift in 1975, Most people are, of course, familiar with volunteers helped transport Vietnamese orphans in peacekeeping. The international commu- C-141 airlifters. 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

How do you define real peace? Some efforts appear to be nothing more than political or diplomatic gestures. as suggested by the prominent display of the emblem of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on th is C-130 during Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia (top). But other efforts. such as the delivery of basic foodstuffs to Somalia (left) and the prevention of hostilities between competing armies (below) in that country, can mean the difference between life and death. MIUTARY SUPPORT FOR "PEACE EFFORTS" 55 contemplated here. Further, they are mat- peace and may adamantly reject it. In this ters that are most likely to be overlooked case, the rules of engagement must be very in the rush to embark upon interventions different—an important point, because evoked by humanitarian concerns, despite peace enforcement may become a much the fact that such omissions would bear more common endeavor in the future. the gravest potential consequences. A careful review of the proposed defini- Because of the complexity of peace efforts, tions (sidebar) suggests two major this article is not intended to be definitive. thoughts. First, this set of definitions may Rather, it is an "initial engagement,” sub- not be sufficiently comprehensive or com- ject to considerable revision. plete. Considering that this breakout of The relationship of political/military peace efforts is new (at least to the mili- objectives to military operations is of para- tary), one can expect to discover addi- mount importance if one is to avoid tional categories and to spend some time unpleasant surprises that can lead to psy- determining how these efforts relate to one chological exhaustion and defeat, as another. Second, assuming an extensive occurred in the Vietnam VVar. Certainly, interrelationship among all these types of this concern applies to all types of mili- peace efforts, the military must ask the tary operations, but—since peace efforts of question, Military intervention in conjunc- all types are likely to be long-running tion with what? Otherwise, its commit- affairs, lacking clear “turning-points”— it ments are likely to become infinitely is criticai to keep this relationship clearly open-ended, especially in the case of in focus. Sun Tzu’s admonition to know peace-enforcing operations. one’s adversary and oneself (to whom we Protecting people who want peace from add actual and potential allies) is central people who don’t (and sometimes separat- to this relationship and applies equally to ing people who don’t from others who capabilities, will, and culture. don’t) does little to solve long-term, fundamental problems. Therefore, peacemaking and peace building will ultimately be nec- Types of Peace Efforts essary before we can extricate our military forces involved in peacekeeping and peace As mentioned previously, past military enforcing. Failure in the diplomatic mis- operations in support of peace efforts have sion will sooner or later force the with- been primarily of the peacekeeping vari- drawal of the military mission, which will ety, although in 1982-83 the Marines may have achieved little but wasted much— have made a serious mistake in Lebanon specifically, the national treasure and the by conducting peace enforcement as if it blood of our young men and women. were peacekeeping. Peacekeepers, by definition, have a primary responsibility to avoid any clash of arms, since they are inserted between opposing factions who Importance of Objectives want to avoid conflict but require assis- and End States tance to do so. Although peacekeepers may have to defend themselves, they don’t Avoiding such consequences calls for really expect to and even carry unloaded the clear articulation of national objectives arms to avoid accidental altercations. as well as supporting diplomatic, socio- Eschewing loaded weapons would be a economic, and military objectives. mistake for peace enforcers since, by defi- Sometimes it may be possible (though nition, they will face at least one hostile never advisable) to muddle through a full- adversary—someone who doesn’t want scale war with objectives such as “making 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

the world safe for democracy,” but to do Unhappily for military planners, national so in the murky waters of humanitarian objectives and strategies may not always be interventions will almost certainly be di- clearly articulated. They may have to sastrous. We must remember Clausewitz’s develop their own objectives and strategies counsel that we always exercise military and seek formal recognition for them later, force for political objectives. as was the case during Operations Desert Military objectives, then, must proceed Shield/Storm. That is, the air campaign from national strategy derived from planners for Desert Storm initially wrote national (political) objectives. National their own objectives, using extracts from strategy should involve diplomatic, speeches by President Bush, and refined socioeconomic, and military efforts in an them as they proceeded. They included appropriate mix, depending on the situa- these objectives in their briefing on the tion. Before undertaking peace efforts, the concept of operations to Gen Norman military must understand the diplomatic Schwarzkopf and Gen Colin Powell, among and socioeconomic objectives and strate- others, and—encountering no opposition— gies and coordinate with them when it for- assumed the objectives were acceptable. mulates its own strategy. Otherwise, mili- Had the planners waited for someone to tary efforts will be isolated, ineffective, bring objectives to them, they might never or—even worse—counterproductive to have started planning—or they might have efforts designed to solve the fundamental planned for the wrong war. problems. Defining and/or understanding the national objectives and strategy is step one in determining what the right “tools” are and how one should use them. A lack of clearly understood national objectives can lead to one’s assuming an invalid military objective (usually in terms of destroying something—e.g., “Service the [expletive deleted] targets, and be done with it”). We must be wary of military objectives such as “reduce the flow of [som ething),” “destroy the army,” “demonstrate resolve,” “protect someone or something,” and “restore the balance.” They may relate to a real national objective, but they represent potential quagmires and should normally be avoided. Military objectives outline efforts that are “in support of” or “in conjunction with” something likely to achieve the national objectives. When defining objectives and strategies at all leveis, one should have in mind a

Whether US forces are involved in warfare or peace efforts, the press is there to cover everything—mistakes and all. Here, eager Somali children greet our humanitarian efforts under the watchful eye of the media. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR "PEACE EFFORTS" 57 reference point or “desired end state”* particularly criticai when a country con- that denotes success. Otherwise, failure is templates intervening in ethnic, racial, a non sequitur, and one can use the term or religious disputes. There are many success for almost any favorable change in dimensions to this issue, some of which status. This situation also implies that a we understand well and some of which little more effort will result in the achieve- totally mystify us. For instance, the US ment of objectives. However, a desired military isn’t too bad at monitoring mili- end state that is clearly understood allows tary capability through surveillance and one to measure progress in real terms. For reconnaissance but isn’t too good at dis- instance, contrast "restoring and maintain- cerning an adversary’s intentions. ing a balance in Vietnam” with “immedi- Traditionally, it is miserable at under- ate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi standing the history and culture of forces from Kuwait.” Each military nations and peoples in conflict. employment should be measured against its expected contribution to the desired end state. For example, even if it were possible to Know Our Adversaries destroy every military weapon in a state such as Bosnia, there is nothing to stop Our military spends considerable time people who have been waiting 800 years designing and buying intelligence systems to kill each other from sharpening table to identify and monitor foreign military knives and going after each other as soon capabilities, and it does these jobs rather as the peacekeeping force has left. If the well in most cases. The military also desired end state is to make the killing assumes that any given contingency will be more difficult, this approach may be suit- preceded by a warning time, which it can able. But if the goal is to establish real use for analysis and action. That is. we peace in the area, this outcome will leave expect to be able to anticipate an enemy’s much to be desired. The problem is how attack because of our ability to detect and to define “real peace.” Certainly, the monitor his preparations for the attack. desired end state in such a case will Complicating this expectation, however, is include some goals that are political/ the fact that military preparations are made diplomatic (e.g., reasonable government for all kinds of reasons, including exercises control), socioeconomic (e.g., at least a and diplomatic signaling. survival standard of living), and military When Saddam Hussein began his (e.g., control of competing armies). If any buildup for the attack on Kuwait in late of these goals are omitted—or even ill ]uly 1990, nearly everyone read his action defined—long-term success is highly as a signal to Kuwait and other Middle improbable. East oil producers to pay more attention to Given a well-defined set of objectives his demands. Initially, that may even and a desired end state, the next consid- have been his intention. When Saddam eration is to kncw as much as possible decided to invade is still not clear. During about our adversary, our allies, and our- the last few days of July, some mavericks selves. Again, this consideration is true began warning of an attack. but most intel- for any military operation but seems ligence agencies were not confident enough to affirm this assessment. As long 'As used here. end state does not imply finality. As Clausewitz pointed out, the result of war is never final as the indicators were considered ambigu- because the losers always hope to reverse the result at a later ous, any allied counterpreparation could time. In the context of this articte. the term refers Io some have been escalatory. This quandary is far reference point by which one can gauge the success of current operations. Thus, end state is a defining status. not the from being unusual; indeed, it is closer to "end of history.” being the norm. 58 AIfíPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Most situations that our military is likely to face will entail indicators that are even more ambiguous than the ones prior to the Gulf War. For example, we will often be dealing with substate actors and/or peoples who recognize each other quite readily but who seem almost indistinguishable to us (e.g., Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia; the Middle Eastern States; and Somalia). Their killing systems will be simple and small and won’t require large logistic efforts. If we don’t learn their history and understand their culture, we will make horrible mistakes and fail to achieve our objectives, no matter how well con- Simuttaneous participation in a number of peace efforts ceived and clear they are. could put a strain on our logistics structure. If a major In situations involving multiple factions contingency emerges while severa! peace efforts—such as the ones in Bosnia (top) and Somalia (above)— are in conflict, each with its own objectives in progress, we might not be able to respond effectively. and strategies, we must understand each set of adversary objectives and strategies if we are to prevail. Because very few, if any, foes will be able to stand toe-to-toe with us on a battlefield, they are likely to M1L1TARY SUPPOfíT FOR “PEACE EFFORTS" 59 choose strategies for indirect engage- remains tipped in our favor. That is, ments—terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and when the adversary’s commitment is other “wear-them-down’’ approaches. greater than our own, we must be sure that Unless we are prepared to annihilate our capability makes up the difference—or entire peoples, we will have to defeat such we should stay home. We will never be strategies through indirect means. able to measure these factors in finite Similarly, if our adversaries are willing to terms, but we must try to understand the die for their cause, our adoption of a head- relative balance. If we don’t, we will pay on strategv will produce a number of mar- enormous costs and fail to achieve our tyrs. Americans aren’t likely to accept objectives. such situations for long and are even less likelv to recognize our actions as peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. Know Our Allies Thus, we must know not only the enemy’s strategies but also his alternative strate- We should know the same kinds of gies, because a thinking opponent is likely things about our allies and not assume to make a change if his current strategv is that their objectives and strategies are the failing. same as ours. Incompatibility between Further, we must be able to search out their objectives and strategies and ours enemv centers of gravity in order to attack could produce real trouble. Mutual will- them. Destroying them may not be neces- ingness to beat up on the same adversary sary; sometimes merely capturing or neu- may be enough—at least temporarily—but tralizing them will be sufficient. At any we should try to understand the potential rate, we should identify enemy strengths consequences. For example, the Soviet and weaknesses and attack centers of grav- Union was very helpful in defeating ity where the enemy is most vulnerable Hitler’s Germany, but—aside from sur- (not just his weakest point, which may or vival—the Soviets’ objectives were quite may not be important). Once again, this different from ours. Failure to accept and procedure applies in all cases of military understand the potential consequences of action, but centers of gravity associated that fact contributed to 45 years of cold with peace efforts (i.e., those of a religious war and Soviet domination of Central and or ethnic group in a third world State) may Eastern Europe. be significantlv different from the ones we Sometimes allies, who always have their are accustomed to. Therefore, finding real own centers of gravity to protect, represent centers of gravity in such a case will a center of gravity for us. Had Saddam require an understanding of cultures, cus- been able to cause dissension among the toms, and ways of thinking that probably Arab members of the coalition, for will be totally different from our own. We instance, the United States would proba- must not assume that our adversary will bly have been unable to engage—let alone react to situations in the same way that we defeat—Iraq’s army. Thus, his strategy would. That is likely to be a terrible mis- was to attack centers of gravity within take. allied camps (both coalition members Perhaps most important, we must know such as Saudi Arabia and our long-stand- the strength of our adversary’s commit- i n g M i d d l e E a s t e r n a 11 y I s r a e l ) . S c u d ment to his objectives. Since some people attacks on Israeli and Saudi cities caused are willing to die for things that may seem less physical damage than a Los Angeles unimportant to us, we tend to underesti- freeway accident, but the ensuing Scud mate their commitment—a criticai error. hunt occupied most of the available F-15E At the least, we should assure that the bal- sorties for weeks. The strange politics of ance between commitment and capability the Middle East made both protecting 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Israel and persuading it not to retaliate gies (especially if they’re not working), but against Iraq extremely sensitive issues. such changes should be deliberate and We must try to be aware of the potential considered—not the result of “policy for such problems and help allies protect drift.” In any case, if the political objec- their vital centers of gravity. If peace- tives change, so must military activity. enforcement missions drag on for years, as Results of actions (strikes, engagements, they well might, this task will be challeng- battles, etc.) must be measured not only ing, especially considering that in many against planned achievements (leveis of cases our allies will have special reasons to destruction, etc.), but against their contri- be sensitive. Supporting Iraqi Kurds from bution to political and military objectives. Turkey, for instance, runs the risk of incit- This process must be continuous and iter- ing further conflict between Turkey’s gov- ative throughout the operation. ernment and its own Kurdish minority. In those conflicts in which the US has The intermingling of cultures, religions, the luxury of being in complete control, and ethnicities throughout Europe, Asia, we are typically sensitive to casualties— África, and other areas of concern makes on both sides—even though there is proba- this complication nearly ubiquitous. bly no logical place in war for such a The US also needs to know, monitor, sense of fair play. But in limited opera- and reinforce its allies’ commitment to the tions like peace efforts, we must be atten- mission’s objectives, because the levei of tive to this issue. For example, Desert commitment affects one’s political— Storm probably ended prematurely hence, military—latitude in many ways. because of the televised coverage of the In World War II. commitment of all Allies “highway of death.” However, we to the unconditional surrender of the Axis shouldn’t expect the adversary to share powers was crucial. During Desert Storm, our concern about casualties, a fact that the fact that the objectives of our Arab has sobering implications for any of our allies were somewhat narrower than our people who are captured. Since adver- own necessitated operational plans saries in peace-enforcing operations may designed to keep Arab forces out of Iraq. not be States—or may not consider them- Even with all of its careful planning, the selves at war—the Geneva conventions US had to be constantly concerned about might not apply to the treatment of prison- allies who might have wanted to “cut a ers of war. deal” with Saddam, since deal making is We must examine all potential end an important part of the Arab way of life. States (both intended and unintended) and strive to know the cost of victory as well as the cost of defeat, because both are Know Ourselves important. Sometimes the price is just too high—no matter the outcome. This Finally, we must know ourselves. What knowledge, of course, relates to our objec- strengths and weaknesses do we bring to tives and our commitment to those objec- the situation, and how do they relate to tives. Military leaders must be impartial those of our adversaries and allies? The and truthful in communicating the poten- fact that the US is the strongest nation in tial costs to the national command author- the world does not automatically assure ities. On the one hand, if we promise too an easy victory, even in relatively minor much, the cost is measured in national spats halfway across the world. After we treasure, diplomatic leverage, and—worst have established our objectives and strate- of all—human life. On the other hand. if gies, we must monitor them carefully we are overly cautious, our leaders are throughout. Sometimes there are valid cheated out of a key element of national reasons for changing objectives and strate- power, and US interests are left wanting. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ‘PEACE EFFORTS" 61

Regardless of how well we prepare our- Similarly, C3 and logistics structures selves for peace operations, we are likely will feel much the same pressure. If a to wind up in bogs that will tie up our major contingency emerges while several troops and resources (however limited) for peace efforts are in progress, we could be extended periods of time. Young, front- in real trouble—especially if anticipated line troops are likely to find these experi- force structure cuts are implemented. If ences frustrating, especially when friend our support proves inadequate, American and foe are nearly indistinguishable. We forces could be stranded all over the will make mistakes, and the press will be world. there to ensure that the public hears about Other efforts, such as psychological them on the six o’clock news (and sees operations (PSYOPS), will also gain signif- them on film at 11 o’clock). We will lose icance. Despite the number of arms in and take life in seemingly senseless alter- Somalia, for example, there was relatively cations, and that will also be recorded for little gunplay there because we had the quick dissemination—as well as for pos- opposition psyched. Future scenarios terity. Each of the endless candidates for may require PSYOPS to keep adversaries intervention by the “world’s police force” respectful of our might as well as to gain will carry its own “opportunity cost.” the confidence of the people we are pro- Although the commitment of our tecting. Considering that the ultimate resources to individual interventions will solution to centuries-long hatred is proba- usually be small (compared to our overall bly education, PSYOPS are a necessary force structure), the sum of those commit- adjunct to military—not to mention ments could eventually occupy a signifi- socioeconomic or diplomatic—operations. cant percentage of the force. Further, this If we continue on our present course, our situation will prove much more demand- new world order will undoubtedly make ing of support structures (e.g., command, such considerations increasingly impor- control, and Communications [C3]; logis- tant. tics; intelligence; and automated data Pro- So simple a thing as one loaded gun in a cessing) than would a force of the same guard shack could save hundreds of lives size in a single location, even allowing for (it might have in Beirut, for example). In the fact that some support demands will turn, deciding whether or not to load the be reduced by lower tempos of operations. gun may depend on as simple a thing as Intelligence operations, already slow in calling the operation peacekeeping or providing planners and war fighters with peace enforcement. In other cases, it will what they need to know, will be especially depend on how well we understand the strained in peace efforts. Such missions complex nuances of diplomatic objectives will require reams of very precise informa- and maneuverings and how well we adapt tion, much of which can be collected only our military operations in response to through human intelligence because photo those efforts. Our wake-up call carne in reconnaissance exposes only what is visi- 1983 with the bombing of the Marine bar- ble and readily distinguishable. Thus, racks in Lebanon. Unfortunately, we are enemy weapons that are easily conceal- just now stumbling to the coffeepot. □ able or that blend into the environs may go undetected and prove lethal. HE CLINTON administration has THE UNITED begun making decisions of pro- found importance to the national security of the United States. In STATES NEEDS Tresponse to economic realities, it has decided to make significant cuts in the defense budget and now must decide TO EXPLOIT where to cut, recognizing that the collapse of the Soviet Union has not eliminated the need for a strong conventional military ITS AIR capability. Before proceeding, the administration should be extremely cautious about POWER accepting advice from anyone who pro- poses roughly equal reductions in our air, ADVANTAGE land, and naval capabilities. Such a rec- ommendation would be convincing evidence of a failure to recognize that devel- Lt Col Price T. B in g h a m, USAF, Ret ir ed opments in technology have enabled air power (the ability to project military force by or from an aircraft) to revolutionize the conduct of conventional warfare. More importantly, the fact that the recommen- dation would be based on an obsolete theory of war could make equal reductions dangerous for this country. THE US NEEDS TO EXPLOITITS AIR POWER ADVANTAGE 63

Fortunately, the US can dramatically craft played an important supporting reduce its defense spending and still role—we continued to depend on power- maintain a conventional military capabil- ful land forces to defeat the enemy’s land ity of great power. The solution is to forces. Comparing the difficulty of finding exploit the immense advantage in air and destroying targets on land to that of power that we realized from the revolu- finding and destroying targets at sea tion in warfare. To identify the actions accounts for this difference. that the Clinton administration should Finding suitable targets on land and at take to exploit this advantage most effec- sea was dependent upon the characteris- tively, we raust first examine how devel- tics of the respective operating mediums. opments in technology have revolution- The sea’s (often) levei, unobstructed sur- ized the conduct of conventional warfare. face made visual searches for targets relatively easy and enhanced the effectiveness of the primitive radar available in World Air Power and Technology War II. Complex terrain, however, pre- through World War II vented airmen from using that same radar to find enemy land forces (and even Although technological developments enemy cities—not to mention factories). have always changed the conduct of war- Thus, pilots depended solely on their fare, only with the invention of the aircraft unaided vision to find enemy troops, did the effects of these developments tanks, trucks, and artillery. This restric- become more revolutionary than evolution not only confined searches to day- tionary. Even with advances such as gun- light hours with good visibility, but made powder, armies and navies were still the thorough searches time-consuming and primary instruments for fighting wars— dependent on many sorties. armies being the key to defeating armies, Further, the enemy could take advan- and navies the key to defeating navies. tage of our airmen’s dependence on visual Despite the predictions of several early searches to disperse, conceal, and camou- air power theorists, even the aircraft did flage his land forces much more effec- not seem able to revolutionize the conduct tively than he could hide his sea forces. of warfare. These theorists based their To compensate, our airmen had to search predictions on the belief that air attacks at lower altitudes and airspeeds, which against an enemy’s population and indus- made them more vulnerable to enemy air try would be sufficient to win wars, obvi- defenses. When Allied pilots did find ating the need to fight and defeat his army land targets such as tanks, they often had or navy.1 Actual combat, however, consis- difficulty determining whether they were tently demonstrated that technical limita- already disabled or decoys. If enemy tions prevented air attacks from making forces moved at night or during poor visi- armies and navies obsolete. The most sig- bility, airmen could find no targets at all. nificant limitations were the ones that Even when airmen found enemy forces, affected the ability of airmen to find and they still had to hit them. This problem hit a target with a suitable munition. proved less daunting at sea because ships These limitations also explain why air were large and relatively few in number. power revolutionized the conduct of war- Although hitting a ship with a bomb or fare at sea but not on land during World torpedo posed a major challenge—espe- War II. Indeed, many naval warfare cially if it was maneuvering at high experts were surprised by the fact that air- speed—usually only a few hits would put craft rather than battleships were the pri- a large ship out of action. For that reason, mary means we used for defeating Japan’s we were willing to risk the loss of several navy.2 However—despite the fact that air- aircraft in exchange for the destruction of 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

a major enemy warship. Thus, air power was able to revolutionize the conduct of war at sea during World War II—as we discovered at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and Budget cuts for our air forces should not be as deep as those for land and sea forces because developments in Midway. technology have enabled air power to revolutionize In contrast, if airmen were to have a conventional warfare. similar effect on an enemy army, they had to hit many more targets, each of which was much smaller than any oceangoing ship. One can appreciate the magnitude of the challenge by considering the difficulty of hitting a tank with a rocket. During training, when accuracy was not degraded by enemy fighters or antiaircraft fire, the average pilot of the Allies’ best tank-killing aircraft—the Royal Air Force Typhoon—hit a tank-sized target with a salvo of eight rockets only 4 percent of the time; accuracy with bombs was even worse. Moreover, to attain even this degree of accuracy, a pilot had to fire from no more than 1,000 to 2,000 yards slant THE US NEEDS TO EXPLOITITS AIR POWER ADVANTAGE 65

range, which put him well within reach of impact of these technical developments. German antiaircraft guns.3 These were the For example, the prototype E-8A joint sur- kinds of problems that prevented air veillance target attack radar system power from revolutionizing land warfare (JSTARS) aircraft for the first time in the as it did sea warfare during World War II. entire history of warfare allowed com- Although the conditions described manders to see enemy forces over a wide above often kept aircraft from destroying area—even in darkness. This “real-time, much of an enemy army, air power still god's-eye view” gave our commanders an made an extremely important contribution immense advantage in situation aware- to the conduct of land warfare. For ness. instance, soldiers—especially inexperi- In turn, this advantage allowed them to enced ones—had an irrational fear of air direct devastatingly effective air attacks attacks and were known to abandon their against the enemy’s land forces.6 The suc- tanks when they were attacked. Further, cess of these attacks was also due to although aircraft machine guns and can- another technological innovation, the non were not very effective against a F-15E’s low-altitude navigation and target- tank’s heavy armor, they easily destroyed ing infrared for night (LANTIRN) pods, softer targets such as fuel trucks, infantry, which allowed acquisition of targets as and artillery.4 small as tanks. Other developments made Since armored forces depended heavily possible the delivery of weapons with on these three elements, air power could such accuracy that a single sortie could thus prevent an enemy army from moving destroy numerous targets.7 rapidly, a handicap that severely con- Interestingly, JSTARS provides another strained its chances for success in conven- advantage that was not exploited in Desert tional warfare. Hence, the support of air Storm. Because JSTARS can detect the power was often the key to the victories movement of land vehicles over a wide achieved by Allied armies in World War area, a commander would be able to keep II. Indeed, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel friendly land forces outside the range of observed that the enemy army’s weapons. A commander could thereby maneuver land a balance of power in the air would have made the old rules of warfare [emphasis forces—much as a boxer uses footwork— added] valid again. . . . Anyone who has to to dance beyond the reach of the oppo- fight, even with the most modern weapons, nent’s punches but still use air power to against an enemy in complete command of deliver a devastating series of blows. It the air, fights like a savage against modern thus becomes a simple matter to maneuver European troops, under the same handicaps land forces to make the enemy concentrate and with the same chances of success.5 his forces in the open where they would be more vulnerable to air attacks. This use of JSTARS, then, enhances the effective- Air Power and Technology ness of our air power, reduces the risk in Operation Desert Storm of casualties from enemy weapons, and lessens the chance of fratricide from Today, RommeFs observation is even surface-to-surface and air-to-surface more appropriate than it was in World weapons. War II because technological develop- Such advantages demonstrate that in ments have dramatically reduced the diffi- many circumstances air power should be culty of finding and hitting targets such as the primary tool for destroying an enemy trucks, tanks, and artillery. The perfor- army. Land forces would still be neces- mance of air power in Operation Desert sary but normally in a supporting role. Storm bears witness to the revolutionary The need for formalizing this relationship 66 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1993 becomes apparent when we realize that it diers welcomed it as a chance to surrender was more by accident than design that air and escape death from the air.10 power was able to demonstrate its ability to defeat an enemy army in Desert Storm. Because heavy land forces were slow to arrive in the Middle East and because our political and military leaders feared that An Obsolete Theory land combat would claim many casualties, of Warfare air power began the attack on Iraq while coalition land forces remained on the Our victory in the Gulf War, great defensive.8 Yet, this defensive posture— though it was, could have been achieved in and of itself—provided valuable sup- with significantly fewer land forces and port to air power by “fixing” Iraqi land even fewer casualties if we had had the forces in exposed forward defensive posi- proper military leadership and doctrine. tions, allowing coalition aircraft to inflict Unfortunately, the latter two elements terrible punishment. For example, the failed to recognize that air power had rev- precision guided munitions used by the olutionized the conduct of conventional coalition in tank-plinking missions were warfare on land. As a result, Operation so effective that Iraqi soldiers feared to Desert Storm saw the application of the sleep in their tanks.9 Air power also now obsolete theory of warfare found in demoralized the Iraqis by denying them the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine, the supplies, intelligence, and Communi- which points to land forces as the primary cations they needed to conduct an effec- means for defeating the enemy army.11 tive defense—let alone attack—as soon Applying this theory, leaders of Army and became evident at the Battle of Al-Khafji. Marine units requested far more air power Adding to the demoralization of Iraqi than was necessary to attack Iraqi units soldiers was their inability to fight back fixed in exposed forward positions so as effectively against coalition air power. to “prepare” the battlefield for the coali- Employing stealth and other sophisticated tion’s land offensive. Honoring these technologies, our air forces quickly requests left too little air power to destroy achieved air superiority by defeating the Iraq’s Republican Guard units, which Iraqis’ air force and suppressing their were dispersed and dug in well to the radar-guided, surface-to-air missile (SAM) rear.12 defenses. Additionally, technologies gave Instead of trying to defeat the Iraqi army us the crucial advantage of delivering according to the “old” way—by having weapons accurately from slant ranges and our land forces close with the enemy’s altitudes that rendered the enemy’s short- land forces—our military leaders could range antiaircraft guns and shoulder-fired have exploited their superior situation SAMs ineffective. awareness by designing coalition land Despite air power’s efficient destruction maneuvers to make Iraqi units even more of Iraqi land forces, many US Army and vulnerable to air attack. At Al-Khaf]i, for Marine officers and civilian experts were example, JSTARS's near-real-time, wide- still surprised when the coalition’s land area radar surveillance would have made offensive met with virtually no coherent it easy for our leaders to simulate a pan- resistance. Unlike Iraqi soldiers, these icked retreat—a tactic often employed by people evidently were not aware that air history’s Great Captains to draw an attack- power could now destroy the fighting abil- ing force into a position from which ity of armies—not merely delay their escape is impossible. In this case, air movement. In fact, instead of fearing the power could have totally annihilated the coalition’s land offensive, many Iraqi sol- Iraqis; as it was, air power allowed only THE US NEEDS TO EXPLOITITS AIR POWER ADVANTAGE 67

20 percent of the attacking Iraqi division Guard was now an extremely lucrative tar- to escape.13 get for air attack, we did not use our sur- Once the coalition’s land offensive veillance capability to keep coalition land began, our military leaders could have forces at a safe distance and use air power continued to use their superior situation to destroy the enemy. avvareness to control friendlv land maneu- Instead, our leaders fought according to ver in a vvay that enhanced the ability of the old theory and ordered coalition land our air power to defeat the Iraqi army. For forces to close with the Republican Guard example. the threat posed by the maneu- units, thereby increasing the risk of ver of our land forces caused Republican friendly casualties. More importantly, Guard units to concentrate in the open because air power had already taken most because they could not hope to stop our of the fight out of the Iraqi forces, such advance if they remained dispersed and close combat operations unnecessarily protected. Although the Republican increased the danger of fratricide from air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons.14 Further, as was the case in the initial phase of Desert Storm, it was more DespUe the terrible destruction that Allied air power was by accident than design that air power— capable of in World War II, early theorists were wrong in not land forces—became the primary their belief that air power alone could win wars. Because of problems with the accuracy of bombing, we instrument for pursuing and destroying still needed ground forces to complete the enemy s retreating Iraqi units on the road to Al- defeat. Basrah. 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Exploiting Our Moreover, because of air power’s immense Air Power Advantage advantage, in many cases simply combin- ing it with allied land forces would be suf- Desert Storm should have persuaded all ficient to achieve victory, even if those but the most stubborn people that air land forces were significantly inferior in power now has the ability in many situa- quality and quantity to the enemy’s.15 tions to defeat an enemy’s conventional By exploiting its air power advantage, army as well as his air force and navy. If the US could play a balancing role in the Clinton administration decides to world affairs similar to the one that Great exploit our air power advantage, we will Britain once played by exploiting its navy. be able to field a much smaller army but However, unlike the British navy, whose still play a key role in helping preserve influence extended no further than areas world stability. In fact, in a crisis in near an ocean, the US Air Force can cover which an aggressor threatens a vital the entire globe and is thus a far more use- region, air power’s ability to respond ful tool for maintaining world stability. quickly and effectively could be the key to Decreasing our dependence on using deterring the outbreak of conventional land forces to defeat enemy land forces conflict. has still other important benefits, such as Even if the presence of our air power reducing the size of the defense budget isn’t enough to deter an aggressor, it can and lowering the risk of losing large num- ensure his rapid defeat without the high bers of American and allied lives if com- number of friendly casualties normally bat proved necessary. Further, it elimi- associated with intense land combat. nates the economic stress and cultural tension that arises from intermingling a Although Japanese aircraft demonstrated their deadly large US land force with the host nation’s effectiveness against battleships in Pearl Harbor, population. By way of contrast, we could experts in naval warfare were surprised that aircraft were our primary means of defeating the Japanese base our air forces outside the host navy in World War II. Here, flames engutf the battleship nation’s territory or in an area of that terri- Arizona as it sinks in the harbor. tory that is sparsely populated. THE US NEEDS TO EXPLOITITS AIR POWER ADVANTAGE 69

^ ^ : . i*

The best Allied aircraft of World War II could hit Conclusions tank-sized targets only 4 percent of the time, but F-15Es equipped with LANTIRN enjoyed near-perfect accuracy Sadly, President Clinton is likely to find during Desert Storm. that the US military itself is the greatest obstacle to realizing this goal. Too many Finally, by devoting scarce defense dol- of our current military leaders still fail to lars to air power, we will help maintain recognize that air power has revolution- our position as the world’s leader in aero- ized conventional land warfare. Evidence space technologies.16 This status, in turn, of this failure includes Gen Colin PowelPs will help ensure both a strong national report on the roles, missions, and func- defense and a more competitive economy. tions of the military Services, as well as Clearly, these are powerful reasons for his proposed base force. This report by exploiting the advantage that air power the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives us. In view of the limited resources does not identify technological develop- available for defense, the president must ments as a key factor in providing “the make truly dramatic reductions in the size opportunity, the necessity, and authority of our active duty land forces if we are to to address the ways in which all four have air forces in sufficient numbers and Services are structured, trained, and with superior technical attributes—not an employed in combat.”17 It is no surprise, easy task. then, that his base force proposal recom- 70 AÍRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 mends reducing our air, land, and sea expected to make a determined effort to capabilities by roughly equal amounts.18 preserve the status quo. To overcome Further evidence is provided by the such resistance, the president may have to Department of Defense’s (DOD) Conduct of conduct a reform of the American military the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to even more far-reaching than that insti- Congress, which never admits that air tuted in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD power’s effectiveness allowed the United Reorganization Act of 1986. If this refor- States to employ many more soldiers and mation proves necessary, he must begin— marines than were actually needed. This as Sen Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) has recom- omission is surprising in light of Gen mended—by addressing the roles, mis- Norman Schwarzkopfs admission that he sions, and functions of America’s military gave President Bush “terrible advice,” ask- Services and not allowing these three ele- ing for “five times more force than I ended ments to create artificial barriers that up getting, and [thinking] that it would handicap our use of air power.20 Ideally, probably take about seven or eight months he should direct the Army and Air Force longer than it actually took to do the to share the role of defeating enemy land job.”i9 forces, emphasizing that—conditions per- As has frequently been the case in the mitting—air power is our nation’s pre- past, sênior officers who continue to cling ferred instrument for that role.21 □ to an obsolete theory of warfare can be

Notes 1. Edward Warner. "Douhet, M itchell, Seversky: and conventional munitions than were necessary in World Theories of Air Warfare," in Makers of Modem Strategy: War II. The ability to quickly hit a great many targets denies M ilitary Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward an enemy the opportunity to take measures, previously Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, explained, that will reduce the effectiveness of the attacks. 1943), 485-503: and David Maclsaac, "Voices from the Moreover, the suddenness with which great damage can be Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Makers of inflicted can have a shock effect on the enemy. This shock is Modem Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. further magnified because the destruction of a relatively Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, small number of Communications and electrical power nodes 1986), 624-47. has the potential to cause chãos in a modem society and gov- 2. Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forgirtg of ernment. At the same time. this damage can be achieved an A ir Navy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.. 1968), with only a minute amount of collateral damage, a term 20- 21. often derided as a synonym for innocent civilians—if there 3. Ian Gooderson, “Allied Fighter-Bomber versus German are any left. Although strategic attacks conducted in isola- Armour in North-West Europe, 1944-1945: Myths and tion may not be sufficient to achieve desired objectives, Realities," The Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1991, World War II and Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that 212-13. thev create a powerful synergy when combined with efforts 4. Ibid., 215-17, 220, 223, 226. to defeat enemy military forces directly. 5. Erwin Rommel. The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell 8. For a discussion of the amount of time required for air Hart, trans. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and and land forces to deploy, see James Blackwell, Thunder in Co.. 1953), 285. the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War 6. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 93-102. See also Conduct Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, of the Persian G ulf War: Final Report to Congress 1992), 234-35. The prototype JSTARS aircraft used during (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. April 1992), Desert Storm did not have all of its sensor modes in place. 43-51, 103-4; and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, Since then. all modes have been incorporated and fully The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the tested, giving the current system even greater capability. New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University David Hughes, "DAB Review to Determine Future of Joint- Press, 1993), 283-90. STARS," Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 29 March 9. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 186. 1993, 53. 10. Hallion. 232. 7. Hallion. 234-35, 290-92. It is important to realize that 11. According to Army doctrine, “The primary strike these same improvements in target acquisition and delivery assets for deep attack are aerial. artillerv, and missile accuracy. combined with the development of low-observable weapons.” The doctrine then States that "only in rare cases or "stealth” technologies, have also made conventional will commanders be able to destroy enemy forces in depth." strategic air attacks a far more feasible option. Now it is pos- Consequently. it asserts that close operations. which "at the sible to destroy a large number of targets deep in enemy ter- operational levei, comprise the efforts of large tactical forma- ritory in a short period of time, while using far fewer aircraft tions—corps and divisions—to win current battles, (will) THE US NEEDS TO EXPLOITITS AIR POWER ADVANTAGE 71

bear lhe ultimate burden of victory or defeat. The measure 19. Dean Fischer, "Sayings of Stormin' Norman," Time, of success of deep and rear operations is their eventual 11 March 1991, 27. impact on close operations." Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 20. One of the primary functions of the Department of the Operations. 5 May 1986. 19, 38—39. Army is to organize, train, and equip forces "to defeat enemy 12. Only 5,600 of 35,000 coalition sorties attacking land land forces." In contrast, the primary functions of the Air forces in Kuwait targeted the Republican Guard. Hallion. Force include organizing, equipping. and providing forces 206-9. for “close air support and air logistics support to the Army." 13. Gen H. Norman Schw arzkopf with Peter Petre, DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Defense and Its Major Components, 25 September 1987, 13, Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books. 1992), 383. 19. 14. Ibid.. 467-68. See also Conduct of the Persian Gulf 21. Recognition that such a change might be appropriate War. appendix M. can be found in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff s 15. VVorth remembering is the fact that over two decades doctrinal guidance for joint war fighting, which supplements ago, US air power combined with South Vietnamese land the concepts provided in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US forces to defeat a powerful North Vietnamese land offensive. Armed Forces. 11 November 1991. The chairman‘s guidance Aithough it might be a surprise to critics of air power's cur- recognizes that rent capabilities. the technologies we possessed even in Joint Force Commanders may choose to eraploy interdiction as a 1972 were sufficient for our airmen to find and destroy well- principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other com- concealed North Vietnamese 122-mm artillery pieces. ponents supporting the component leading the interdiction effort). . . . 16. In 1993 US aerospace sales totaled about $100 billion, tndeed, Joint Force Commanders may employ a scheme of maneuver just over two-thirds of the world market. Anthony L. that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, Velocci. Jr., "Fewer Players to See Late-Decade Upturn,” actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by Aviation Week &■ Space Technology. attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide 15 March 1993, 38. excellent and vulnerabte targets for interdiction. Moreover, all com- 17. According to the report. the four key factors were "the manders should consider how their capabilities and operations can end of the Cold War, budgetary constraints, the Goldwater- complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives. These Nichols Act, and the press of new regional crises." Colin L. operations may include actions such as deception operations. with- Powell, Chairman of the foint Chiefs of Staff Report on the drawals, lateral repositioning, and Banking movements that are Roles. Missions. and Functions of the Armed Forces of the likely to cause the enemy to maneuver large surface forces in such a United States (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, manner as to make them better targets for interdiction. February 1993), v-vi. Colin L. Powell, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint 18. Larry Grossman. "Base Force,” Government Executive. Operational Concepts (Washington. D.C.: Department of May 1992, 10. Defense, 23 November 1992), 15-16.

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THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL REBORN?

M aj P. M aso n Car pent er , USAF, and M aj Geor ge T. M c C lain, USAF

N MARCH 1991, the US military and the ground forces were fully prepared for coalition forces ended the most suc- offensive operations.1 Gen Norman cessful war in recent history. For 42 Schwarzkopf possessed a ready air ele- days, air power proved deadly and ment and had the foresight to employ it effective. Air Marshal Giulio Douhefs while his ground forces were preparing ideas of air power application came true, for battle. The capability was made possi- and for the first time in warfare, air power ble by the US military industrial complex was equal with the land and sea elements. and the military-technical revolution.2 Three circumstances allowed this revolu- For the first time in history, air power had tion in warfare—opportunity, capability, the tools to effectively attack large num- and foresight. bers of significant targets in a relatively The opportunity occurred when the short period of time. However, the key to national command authorities (NCA) pres- successful air power employment in Oper- sured for military action six weeks before ation Desert Storm was foresight—the air ACSC Alli CAMPAIGN COIJRSE 73

The first US attempt at developing air power strategists and planners was the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) of the 1930s. Two of those eariy visionary instructors were Haywood Hansell (above) and Kenneth Walker (left).

campaign plan. This plan, Instant Thun- der, was the product of a group of thinkers that included Brig Gen Buster Glosson, Col John Warden, the “Black Hole” Group, (a group of air campaign planners at Headquarters CENTAF in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), and Checkmate (a group of air strategy planners at Headquarters USAF). They proved the value of operational air power planning and employment. The real origins of Instant Thunder came from the experience of a group of air power advocates who, when opportunity came, stepped forward and, with recent air power technological advancements in mind, produced a superior operational air campaign. Although this worked for Operation Desert Storm, there 4 • to the to the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) compares these ideas to ideas past efforts such these compares of be atmust heart the that ideas goals or of set a offers basic article This have? for a course design to If were we chief. in commanders toadvisors war-fighting power who air as act can officers effective becould created to of produce 1930s, the eetycmltd Air Commandand completed recently as the Air Corps Tactical School and a program, education any new power air it would attributes what purpose, this for operational the air campaigns effective develop and commanders advise can who levei of warfare. A formal method, similar similar A method, formal of levei warfare. power planners to replace the old ad ad old the process of developinghoc/on-the-job cam- replace to planners power Perhaps a smooth as it might have been. was not as planning and difficulties were paign planners. for is needed air system formal education 74 The Air Force needs to‘ needs Air Force The officers educate AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 FALL AIRPOWER JOURNAL possible." In World War II. that idea manifested itself in itself manifested idea that II. War World In possible." bombing with suitable weapons was both practical was both weapons and practical suitable with bombing monuments while reducing the surrounding areato surrounding the while reducing monuments were to able religiousairmen spare and cultural where Germany, one this at Cologne. as such scenes One tenet of was“precision air that early of One tenet strategy rvbble. Course,3 anddiscusses the1993-94ACSC tise. To properly build this academic curriculum in light of requirements. these curriculum Staff College (ACSC) Air Campaign problems from the top down, and (4) andan down, top the from problems to intractability, (2) a cepts, Creative, not open mind given of con- air power understanding broad (1) who have a officers develop must ners threats that d exper- we must the base visionary’s which upon foundation is the solid education not air will develop power visionaries, ayaito itr. A thorough exami- history. tary/aviation and USpossible courses of action. organized methodology of thoughtful fora air power plan- course foundation, analyses interspersed with problems/ problem andcase studies theoretical purpose are this technical Goodfor tools somevaluable vicarious experience. designedcan curriculum a ence, properly While operations. of tion large joint and execu- planning the with deal to able and theorists, thinkers, strategists of the of the key feelings and thoughts the to with gain empathy individual the allow mustcers be provided to theopportunity introspection. rvd tdnsteopruiyt gain the opportunity toprovide students experi- real-world replace can nothing ideas. past. This understanding will stimulate that will perspective provide a historical past will of military/aviation the nation of mili- knowledge an in-depth develop Next, on the practical levei, these these offi- Next,levei, on the practical pursuits academic While by themselves Future air power strategists must be air strategists power Future The Course Ideal eal with actual world events actual eal with (3) an ability to look at look to ability (3) an

ACSC AIR CAMPAIGN COURSE 75

Air power planners must have an almost employment. The ACTS faculty believed instinctual levei of knowledge on the role the real objective and fundamental pur- of the US Air Force. They must also be pose of war was to overcome the will of able to understand jointness in the truest the enemy. They believed air power could sense of the word. The planner/advisor break the enemy’s will by attacking its must also understand the roles the other industrial grid, thereby avoiding an Services perform, their capabilities, and exhaustive war of attrition. The visionar- their limitations. Finally, the air power ies of the Air Corps Tactical School planner must be able to effectively meld summed up the potential of air strategy in the different elements of US military three basic tenets: might in truly effective. multiservice, a. Modern States are dependent upon an multinational operations. interwoven industrial base to produce war and their standard of living. b. Precision bombing with suitable weapons is practical and possible. The Air Corps c. Strategic Air Forces could use speed, ini- Tactical School tiative, deception, altitude, defensive formations and gunfire to penetrate defenses and The first US attempt at developing air bomb interior targets with minimal losses.7 power strategists/planners was the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1930s. ACTS The “Bomber Mafia” of the Air Corps was strategic in scope. A small group of Tactical School faculty believed that the visionary instructors—Harold George, objectives of war were political, strategic, Haywood Hansell, Kenneth Walker, and tactical. Strikes against the political Donald Wilson, Laurence Kuter, Muir objectives were generally considered Fairchild, and others—sought to formalize unacceptable because bombing popula- the application of military might to the tion-type targets was considered air.4 They saw air power as more than a “immoral.” Attacking the enemy air force support weapon for the land and sea (tactical) to gain control of the air was dis- forces; it had its own technology, doc- missed because the group believed enemy trine, and médium to operate in. Accord- air forces could not successfully defend ing to Douhet, William (“Billy”) Mitchell, their nation against high-altitude bombers. and Hugh M. Trenchard, it was strategic They therefore considered strategic target in nature. Some on the ACTS faculty categories. These target categories were as sought to make air power an exact Science follows: with studies, tests, and data analyzed at a. Armed forces Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where its cadre b. War production industry was based.5 Theories of attack, force size, c. State infrastructure and weapons to use were developed based d. Cities and worker dwellings8 on belief in the invincibility of high- From the Air Corps Tactical School, altitude, long-range, precision daylight George, Hansell, Walker, Wilson, Kuter, bombing. The appearance of the B-17 and and Fairchild brought a new perspective the Norden bombsight in the early 1930s that pushed past traditional aviation roles gave substance to their theories.6 by emphasizing the need for a bigger, bet- The Air Corps Tactical School tackled ter, and independent air Service. Their the relevant philosophical issues as direction laid the foundation for the Air well—the nature of war, the object of war, War Plans Division-Plan 1 (AWPD-1) in the characteristics of modern military the summer of 1941 and for the great air forces and their relationship to national armadas of World War II. Although not objectives, and the nature of military their intent, they ignored some advantages 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

of joint warfare and in their zeal created a mechanics and the ideas of air campaign- dogma of the air.9 ing, unlike ACTS, which considered only How does ACTS measure up against our the ideas for study. The ACTS emphasis theoretical ideal air campaign course? on strategy also affected the final area of There appear to be several shortfalls: (1) difference—the sensitivity of air cam- the issues of jointness and joint operations paigning to flexibility versus standardiza- with the other Services, (2) the depth and tion.12 breadth of campaign planning, and (3) the ACTS was rigid in its doctrine. The sensitivity to flexibility versus standard- result was that ACTS confused centers of ization in solving problems.10 gravity (COG) with targeting. They The issue of jointness is a significant believed a COG was synonymous with a area of difference. ACTS focused on target, and the way to victory was to work strategic air power exclusively. The unof- through the target set. This assumption ficial objective of ACTS was to establish was central to the bombing plans of World Air Corps roles and missions, to include War II, AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and the supplanting the Navy in the role of Coastal Combined Bomber Offensive. The ideal defense and dominating the Navy and air campaign course would recognize the Army in the role of hemispheric defense awaiting pitfalls of rigidity and standard- of the United States. ACTS had a grudg- ization. It would emphasize the criticai ing respect for jointness but did not have importance of strategic intelligence and its heart set on pursuing it.11 The ideal air recognize the part creativity has to play in campaign course would possess an identifying what is or is not a suitable tar- enthusiasm for jointness and emphasize get. Such an approach would force a the synergy possible among all the Ser- reexamination and comparison of results vices. The course policy would be one of with desired effects during an air cam- inclusion, not exclusion. paign. A center of gravity may not neces- The scope or depth and breadth of the sarily be a legitimate target because strik- study of the air campaign is another sub- ing it may not yield the desired effect. stantial area of difference between ACTS and the ideal air campaign course. ACTS focused exclusively on a narrow band of campaigning (strategy), while the ideal The Air Campaign Course course would be three-dimensional in its emphasis. This emphasis should start Recently, the Air Command and Staff with grand strategy. progress through College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, strategy and campaign operations, and embarked on a path to recapture the then finish with tactical operations. enthusiasm and concept-building atmos- ACTS focused on strategy and assumed phere embodied in the Air Corps Tactical technical capabilities as a given. These School prior to World War II while avoid- assumed capabilities included the ability ing its failings. The pilot project for this to deliver weapons and to destroy targets, new endeavor was called the “Air Cam- but ACTS did not analyze these areas paign Course.” Like its predecessor, the well enough to identify potential shortfalls Air Corps Tactical School, the Air Cam- in realizing desired strategic effects. The paign Course was strategic in scope; it ideal air campaign course would evaluate studied all aspects of air and space power the availability of suitable systems, employment that might be applied in sup- weapons effects, navigational ability, and port of the theater commander’s cam- accuracy of delivery before analyzing the paign. Its creator was Col John A. War- strategic effect. Therefore, the ideal air den III, the ACSC commandant. Imple- campaign course is a marriage of the menting Colonel Warden’s ideas were several ACSC academic instructors vvho, Two categories of early strategic targets were enemy armed forces and the enemy war production industry. along with o ver 100 motivated volunteers This emphasis shaped our efforts in Worid War II, as from the 1993 ACSC class, attempted to demonstrated by these impotent German flak guns make history in the tradition of the Air (above) on a train going nowhere, and this flattened Corps Tactical School.13 This initiative German oil plant, (below) which is out of operation. appears successful and with potential benefit to the military. Aerospace capability and power projection are going to play an increasingíy dominant role in safe- guarding our vital interests. Our nation will need the best educated and most forward-thinking air planners we can provide. The primary objective of this course was to educate and develop officers who will represent air power as advisors to a war-fighting commander in chief and who one day will lead, maintain, and continue to provide our nation with the most effective air force on the globe. To accomplish this end, the Air Campaign Course sought to educate future air campaign planners and promote freethinking and vision in the field of air and space power employment. Another objective of the Air Cam- paign Course was to serve as the forerunner of the 1993-94 ACSC curriculum. Additionally, the ACSC faculty critically

77 Today, cohesive joint-service and often multinational evaluated the Air Campaign Course and operations are important to conflict resolution. At top, a was especially receptive to student feed- US Apache helicopter, parí of our joint-service effort in Desert Storm, surveys an abandoned Iraqi tank. United back. Course instructor and student Nations troops (below) in Bosnia inspect paperwork and insights are affecting the development of pallet contents brought by USAF C-130s from the 1993-94 ACSC course structure and Rhein-Main AB, Germany. The Air Campaign Course educational methods. can help develop officers who are competent to work in these environments. A rigorous regimen of reading and lectures was essential to accomplishing the primary course objective. The air cam- paigners tackled a challenging academic load of nightly reading, advanced content lectures, and daily discussions. The course had four phases—the air campaign process, contextual issues, operational art, and a series of practical case studies. Stu- dents also completed research projects that ranged from the development of an operational levei Computer war game to the study of chãos theory. The readings included classic studies by Douhet, Mitchell, and Thucydides, and contemporary works by Schwarzkopf, Mark Clod- felter, and Richard Hallion. Guest lectur- ers not only offered their views but also created a fórum in which to challenge the old axioms of military thought. Past mili-

78 ACSC AIR CAMPAIGN COURSE 79 tarv conflicts were used as case studies to space power to support national policy. anályze strategy, doctrine, leadership, Air campaign planners must also be able technology, politico-military relation- to assist the political leadership in the ships, air power and joint concepts, and development of clearly defined and attain- their impact on modem warfare. Through able military objectives that support these case studies, students learned and national policy through the proper identi- developed new thought processes by ana- fication of the vulnerable and accessible lyzing problems, asking probing ques- enemy centers of gravity. tions, and generating Solutions. The Air Campaign Course encouraged Like the Air Corps Tactical School, the the development of a new breed of aero- Air Campaign Course was an intense space visionaries and thinkers. The mili- effort to develop strategic and operational tary professional must be a “free thinker” air power thinking. In their bid for an who can conceive new ideas to improve independent air force, the leaders of the air power applications. The Air Cam- Air Corps Tactical School, in the spirit of paign Course pursued this goal through Douhet and Mitchell, advocated strategic the study of the military-technical revolu- bombing as the “end-all” of military con- tion and its relationship to the realities of flict. The Air Campaign Course empha- ethnic/religious nationalism, the secular sized air and space power but recognized nation-state, and conflicting ideologies. that air and space power is not an end in The professional officer must also be on itself. Depending on the nature of the guard against the tendency to allow doc- conflict, air power may be the decisive trine to stagnate in the light of broadly military element or provide a supporting defined threats and changing world reali- role to land or sea forces. It also might ties so that the air campaigner, in the final support a psychological or economic strat- analysis, will be able to correctly identify egy. Today, cohesive, joint Service opera- appropriate centers of gravity and strike tions are important to successful conflict the targets that affect them with the resolution. Under certain circumstances, proper mix of force and intensity. however, air and space power of all Ser- "The first and most important point I vices can be decisive in itself, and we emphasized to our Air Campaign class must be able to employ joint aerospace was to avoid ‘dogma’ at all costs,” States forces in a manner that will bring the Lt Col Larrv Weaver, the course director. enemy to our terms quickly, with few “I did not want a ‘school’ answet to a casualties and with minimal collateral given problem. We designed the course to damage. Additionally, in other circum- go beyond comprehension of traditional stances, air and space power planners doctrine. Our goal was to inspire Creative must orchestrate air campaigns to best ideas for aerospace employment.” To support surface operations. Air campaign help accomplish this, the Air Campaign planning knowledge is the new course’s Course workload was raised well above foundation, but developing vision is its that of past ACSC classes. More responsi- comerstone. bility was placed on the students to read, To develop vision, Air Force officers study, and discuss essential aerospace need to understand the capabilities and thought, doctrine, and writings. In addi- the limitations of air and space power in tion to developing freethinking, the Air military operations. Only with this Campaign Course emphasized the impor- knowledge can the military professional tance of understanding the political gain the expertise and wisdom necessary dimension of air and space power. to properly employ aerospace forces and Realizing that the Air Campaign Course correctly advise political and military was to serve as the centerpiece for the leaders of the need for investment in aero- new ACSC curriculum, the faculty and 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

students were attuned to learning impor- Professional Skills tant lessons during the 1992-93 session. War, Conflict, and Military Missions Most difficulties experienced in the Air Military Theory Campaign Course were related to the Strategic Structure course’s rapid development. Administra- Operational Structure tive difficulties included textbook acqui- Campaign Concepts sition, problems with scheduling speak- Air Campaign ers, the limited number of qualified Campaign Termination instructors, and delays in organizing Campaign 2000+ course materiais. Regarding these prob- Terminal Exercise lems, instructors responded to student See the sidebar (page 81) for a brief needs. description of these curriculum areas. Student feedback for nonadministrative Like an inverted pyramid, this new cur- course improvement was concentrated in riculum will begin with large conceptual four areas: (1) lack of instruction in Air issues of politico-military operations and Force basics concerning air power end in practical case studies. In these employment (tactical levei knowledge), case studies, students will apply their (2) lack of scheduled seminar discussion knowledge and practice application of air periods, (3) too little time spent incorpo- power to carefully selected case studies at rating other branches of the military into the operational levei. the teaching of aerospace power employ- A significant effort is being made for ment (jointness), and (4) poor representa- officers to study original military and aviation of different disciplines within semi- tion literary readings. More than 90 nars. The first three criticisms were a books will be issued to each student. direct product of placing a tremendous Central to this new curriculum is the amount of study material and lectures into understanding that campaigning in gen- a two-month period. The fourth problem eral, and air campaigning in particular, is was the result of this being an elective not the sole province of the flyer. A suc- course and the type of individuais who cessful campaign requires full participa- volunteered to take it.14 Special attention tion from virtually every fiel d in the was placed on these structural problems, USAF, from public affairs to the logisti- which are planned to be resolved as the cian. campaign course is incorporated into the The new curriculum has been con- overall 10-month ACSC curriculum for ceived as a whole. Care has been taken to 1993-94. integrate the instructional blocks. As the curriculum progresses, the students should experience an intellectual flow of ideas and at any point be able to relate The 1993-94 their current studies to any other concept ACSC Curriculum previously covered in the course. The past division of the curriculum into dis- Based on the experience gained through crete segments of study with arbitrarv presenting the Air Campaign Course, boundaries will be removed in favor of a Colonel Warden and the ACSC staff have yearlong continuum. Instructors will developed a curriculum to begin in the assist the students by performing multiple summer of 1993 that will teach officers to functions throughout the course in accor- deal with conceptual and practical issues dance with their expertise.15 involved in mastering the art of air war- There are advantages to this new cur- fare. This new curriculum focuses on 10 riculum. With a single focal point. all areas: instructors can work through issues of ACSC AIR CAMPAIGN COURSE 81

The 1993-94 Air Command and Staff Curriculum

The 1993-94 Air Command and Staff curriculum will teaches coalition theory and introduces the instru- focus on 10 block areas: ments of power projection. It reviews the process of making security assessments, analyzes hostile and friendly centers of gravity, and explores the role of • Professional Skills intelligence in the national security process. This • War, Conflict, and Military Missions block allows the student the opportunity to look at the • Military Theory basic power relationships of the civiVmilitary leader- • Strategic Structure ship in both State and nonstate entities Students are • Operational Structure introduced to illustrative case studies which serve as • Campaign Concepts examples of center of gravity analysis. The Opera- • Air Campaign tional Structure block snifts the focus of study to an adversarys operational centers of gravity and the • Campaign Termination process of identifying and targeting them as part of • Campaign 2000+ a cohesive campaign plan. This block continues the • Terminal Exercise threat analysis and role of intelligence capabilities. It also introduces basic challenges of logislics and The Professional Skills block of instruction is resources The Campaign Concepts block intro- specifically designed to teach essential skills in joint duces basic service and joint doctrine as well as operations, qualíty concepts, and leadership. Staff fundamental US military capability and force struc- officer communication training will continue through ture This block introduces the student to campaign the academic year. Special emphasis, however, is options selection. It also provides the opportunity to placed on joint operations education. It is difficult to begin developing courses of action. imagine any future conflict that will not involve all The Air Campaian block initially explores the branches of the Service. Learnina to integrate the military technological revolution critically examining aerospace power of Air Force, Army, Navy, and the concept, the technological and operational reality Marine Corps components is essential. Next, stu- behind it, and rts effects on warfare. It develops an dents will attend seminars and lectures on the basic appreciation of the synergistic contributions of air terms and procedures necessary to understand and >ower to the combat commanders campaign plan. apply the "quality" ideas of organization that are key ft sets the foundation for mastering operational art in to agility in a rapidly changing world. The thrust is to the aerospace domain and for the exploitation of air introduce students to the resources available to the power in support of US national objectives. Its goal commander and to procedures and concepts unique is to produce students who can plan and execute an to command. This block also provides material and air campaign. They need to understand and in- knowledge necessary for officers to continue tegrate tne diverse parts of the modern air campaign. developing as leaders. The War. Conflict, and These parts incluae political objectives, air opera- Military Missions block explores the meaning of war tional art. deception, logistics, public affairs, and tne motives that lead to armed conflict It psychological operations, morality, technology, and focuses on translating political objectives of war into numanitarian operations. Students will be able to military operations by means of a military mission. develop the master attack plan and be familiar with Here the student is introduced to the leveis of conflict, the air tasking order process. The Campaign Ter- the actors in conflict, and the means to classify mination block of instruction explores the concepts contemporary wars The Military Theory block looks of ending conflicts. This block of instruction will brina at warfare in a systematic fashion Modem warfare air power study beyond the moment marking the ena is an inteliectual as well as a technological of nostilities. Campaign termination is a phase of jhenomenon, and military theorists ha ve long at- military operations that must be planned in full coor- Sempted to impose order and rationality on what is dination with diplomatic, political. and war-fighting considered by many to be an irrational enterprise. functions As confrontation diminishes, diplomacy The reformation of military theory, and the creation takes on an added dimension The students will of new paradigms, is the first criticai step in integrat- understand the role of US military forces in the tran- ing new technology into war fighting A discussion of sition to peace. The students will analyze case the strengths, weaknesses, uses, and relevance of studies to highlight the importance of matching ter- such attempts. from Cart von Clausewitz to the most mination objectives to the military means used in the recent aerospace thinkers, will provide the students campaian Campaign 2000+ focuses on Depart- with the analytical tools for developing military theory ment of Defense long-term resource allocation, as that will be relevant for the twenty-first century well as acquisition and logistical issues. The block Buildina on this base of knowledge, the Strategic applies analysis of the lessons of history to our need Structure block teaches students about centers of to stay a "technological revolution" ahead of the rest gravity and organization at the strategic levei It of the world Finally, the Terminal Exercise provides applies strategic organization theory to States, sub- a chance to achieve higher leveis of learning through state. and criminal entities and shows the exploitable simulations, case studies, and Computer war games similarities among all of them. This block also inserted throughout the curriculum. 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993 academic preparation and execution. The today’s threats to our nation are minimal corporate nature of this new relationship and not well defined, others argue differ- will replace the former compartmentaliza- ently. Today’s threats are still significant, tion of tasks within divisions and improve and although broader in scope, are well faculty communication. This new per- defined. What is harder to define is how spective on education at the Air Command to effectively counter these evolving new and Staff College is, of course, still in its world problems. But, we must be pre- infancy. As of this writing, lesson plans pared. are being reviewed and course organiza- One of many problems facing today’s tion refined. Nevertheless, the college and tomorrow’s military professional is staff approaches its task with the confi- the effective interaction between them- dence that, by implementing this new selves and political leaders. Military pro- vision with all judicious speed, there will fessionals cannot afford to be thought of be an improvement in the study of aero- as “technotwits” driven by the desire for space power. By learning from shortfalls better toys. They must be able to con- in the Air Corps Tactical School and the vince political leaders of the necessary initial Air Campaign Course, planners will force leveis, training, and hardware make a concerted effort to keep the new required to support national interests with ACSC curriculum from being trapped in air power. Today’s officers must be able narrowly focused thought. The new cur- to understand political leaders’ intent at riculum will review a broad spectrum of all leveis in order to help develop cogent military conflict, studying in depth the objectives. To do so, political and mili- role air and space power will play in uni- tary leaders must also establish criteria lateral and joint/combined/coalition war- for terminating each conflict or contin- fare. gency we enter. Educating our future air campaign planners to deal with all aspects of aerospace employment is Conclusion criticai to future success. Next year’s ACSC core curriculum will emphasize this The Soviet threat may have diminished, aspect of aerospace power planning and but it has been replaced by other threats execution. that may appear smaller but in reality are The new ACSC curriculum will extend no less lethal. Today the world is air power thought past the Air Corps Tac- involved in more armed conflicts than any tical School, dealing with a broader spec- other period in modem history. The dis- trum of military conflict in which air and appearance of the single, well-defined space power can either be the key power- threat of the former Soviet Union compli- projection tool; play a supporting role; cates the pfoblem. There are those in and execute independent, parallel, and political leadership positions who clamor supporting operations simultaneously. for a much-reduced emphasis on military The new curriculum will teach profes- forces. Many perceive a safer world envi- sional officers of all Services to think both ronment. In reality it is not clear that the inside and outside of the traditional world is a safer place. The breakup of the Douhet/Mitchell air power employment Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, ethnic/reli- concepts. gious nationalism—which transcends tra- A nation that wins a conflict is often set ditional Westphalian boundaries—and a up to lose the next one. If it is satisfied growing number of third world powers with the status quo of its forces and doc- with weapons of mass destruction have trine, it is apt to fight future wars in a resulted in a very unstable international predictable manner. Conversely, losing community. While many argue that nations often become innovative, rebuild- ACSC AIR CAMPAIGN COURSE 83

ing and rethinking warfare to ensure vic- these officers will be provided the oppor- tory in the next conflict. To avoid the trap tunity to develop an in-depth knowledge of living in the past, the US Air Force of military/aviation history and empathy needs officers who not only can create with the thoughts and feelings of the key successful air campaigns but who are also thinkers, theorists, and strategists of the visionaries who can look past the most past. Ideas will be stimulated by this recent conflict and into the next one. understanding. Case studies, some real The ACSC staff has set ambitious goals world, will help to develop air campaign for the 1993-94 curriculum. We endorse planners who can advise and orchestrate these goals and their efforts to educate operational-level air operations. Finally, freethinking professionals. ACSC is seek- efforts are being made to instruct officers ing to institutionalize excellence in the on effectively melding the different ele- officer corps so as to create a living, con- ments of US military might in truly effec- stantly renewing group that is sensitive to tive, joint operations. So, in design and the lessons of history but not impeded by plan, the new ACSC curriculum meets the the dogma of past victories. It is impera- standards of the “ideal course.” We await tive that we continue to advance the study its implementation. of military aerospace applications and The United States won its last conflict, modera force projection. but we must keep looking ahead and not Does this new curriculum meet the attempt to fight our next conflict as if it goals of our theoretical “ideal course”? were a pure replica of Operation Desert This new course has been designed to Storm. Enhancing the United States mili- instill in the air planner (1) a broad tary’s execution of operational campaigns understanding of air power concepts, (2) a through successful air and space opera- Creative, open mind not given to tions in future conflict should be the ulti- intractability, (3) an ability to look at mate goal of any air power education pro- problems from the top down, and (4) an gram. The new ACSC curriculum is a step organized methodology of thoughtful in the right direction. □ introspection. On the practical levei,

Notes 1. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn t Take A Hero (New 8. Ibid., 47-48. York: Bantam Books. 1992). 393. 9. Ibid., 1-57. 2. Andrew F. Krepenvich, Jr.. “Military-Technical Revo- 10. Maj Peter R. Faber, School of Advanced Airpower lution: A Preliminary Assessment." Office of the Secretary Studies. Maxwell AFB. Ala., interview with author, 1993. of Defense, 1992 (unclassified version); and Maj Gaylord 11. Ibid. Liby, briefing. Air Command and Staff College. Maxwell 12. Ibid. AFB. Ala., subject: The Military-Technical Revolution, 5 13. Instructors Lt Col Albert Mitchum. Lt Col Larry January 1993. Weaver. Dr Earl Tilford, and Dr Richard Muller designed the 3. In the fali of 1992 at Maxwell AFB. Alabama, the Air Air Campaign Course. The initial instructor cadre includes Command and Staff College effected such a concept with Lt Col Tom Falconer and the following majors: (ohn Pardo, the creation of the Air Campaign Course. This course was of Sy Caudill. Rick Cosby, Gaylord Liby. Gary Burg, Doug limited scale (100 volunteers) and was the forerunner to the Goebei, and Larry Key. 1993-94 ACSC core curriculum. 14. The Air Campaign Course was made up of approxi- 4. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. The A ir Plan That Defeated mately 60 percent aircrew members, and many key disci- Hitler (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, plines were underrepresented on the seminar levei. 1975). 12-24. 15. Lt Col Albert Mitchum and Dr Lewis B. Ware, 5. Ibid.. 6. "The New ACSC Curriculum" (unpublished paper, Air 6. Ibid.. 24. Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, 7. Ibid., 40. Ala., 1993). 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Ricochets because it took quite some time for logistics to continued from page 3 bring the force up to an operational levei at Nevertheless, Hurley’s article touches on which a massive sortie surge was possible. only one cause of the IQAF’s failure (i.e., Since this represented quite an effort, the air Saddam Hussein’s efforts to politicize the Iraqi war was fought in fits and starts: a series of military) and neglects two others that have large-scale attacks was followed by a bombing equal explanatory value: (1) the operational lull and a period of rebuilding. constraints placed upon the IQAF’s develop- These systemic or “rational” factors that ment by the exigencies of the Iran-Iraq War and explain Iraq’s defeat are compounded by more (2) the impact of social, political, and economic general problems related to political, eco- modernization upon third world armed forces. nomic, and social modernization found Both of these factors were as important to throughout third world military establish- ensuring the IQAF’s defeat as Hussein's med- ments. While more abstract, such arguments dling with the professionalization of the officer are essential for understanding the magnitude corps and his capricious exercise of power over of Iraq’s defeat and expand greatly upon work the IQAF’s employment in battle. In combina- done by Maj Ronald E. Bergquist (USAF), as tion with the political interference succinctly outlined in his book The Role of Airpower in described by Lieutenant Hurley, they provide a the Iran-Iraq War (Air University Press, 1988). more complete explanation for the disaster that They generally revolve around the nature of befell the IQAF in early 1991. “nonmodern” or traditional societies, the One cannot underestimate the impact that things upon which value is placed in such the Iran-Iraq War had upon the growth and societies, and the dynamics of political and development of the IQAF. During this eight- social action within them. In essence, the way year conflict, battlefield conditions forced in which the leadership and the populace view Iraq’s leaders to make crucial (and generally military power in such societies explains a rational) operational and purchasing decisions great deal about the state of the IQAF at the which, in other circumstances, might have time of the Gulf War. been reconsidered. In other words, the IQAF Traditional societies frequently attempt to that emerged from the Iran-Iraq War was, in appear modern by possessing the outward certain respects, designed to fight that war. signs of modernity without actually under- Since, in most every respect, Operation Desert standing the process of becoming modern. As Storm was fax different from the first Gulf War, Major Bergquisfs writings have hinted, Iraq one could expect that the IQAF was unsuited saw the IQAF’s fleet of combat aircraft as repre- to deal with the new conditions thrust upon it sentative of a modern nation: the fleet’s most in so short a time. important function was to act as a Symbol of Due to its uncertain relations with the vari- modernity. But as Max Weber and other schol- ous superpowers, Iraq was forced to diversify ars have pointed out, modernity is a mental its sources of aircraft supply to ensure that a process—not a terminal goal. A significant part cutoff of any one source need not cripple the of being modern is the realization of the need entire air force. It also tended to keep large for constant improvement, driven by rational numbers of older designs on hand as an opera- thought. This perception was lost on the tional reserve in case such a cutoff should Iraqis, who attempted to purchase modernity occur. Thus, by 1991 the IQAF operated five without internalizing its structures and norms. types of fighters (MiG-21/23/25/29 and J-7), at This may seem like an abstract—or merely aca- least eight attack and bomber types (MiG-23, demic—argument until one realizes that many Su-7/20/24/25, J-6, Tu-16, Tu-22), and the mul- arms purchases by third world States (the trans- tirole Mirage Fl-EQ. With relatively small fer of Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi numbers of each type on hand, supplying this Arabia, for example) have been interpreted by force must have been a logistics nightmare. many serious defense analysts (such as Hence, inoperability rates were extremely high, Anthony Cordesman) as primarily symbolic in reducing the numbers of possible combat sor- nature. ties during wartime, while simultaneously The symbolic nature of such military power depressing the number of training flight hours leads to some strange results. Since the posses- possible during peacetime. In fact, during that sion of the military asset is perceived as more war, massed air power was used sporadically important than its combat effectiveness, a NET ASSESSMENT 85

"preservation ethic" often emerges. In this dernise. With the potential for US involvement case, the preservation of the IQAF became far in third world military conflicts on the rise, it more important than any actual successes it is extremely important to understand how such scored in combat. The tremendous—and factors contribute to the development of third sometimes puzzling—efforts to preserve the world air forces, what the US can do to exploit force (e.g., dispersing, hiding in aircraft shel- such weaknesses during wartime, and how the ters, fleeing combat, flying to Iran, etc.) demon- US can overcome such hurdles in building the strate the truth of this interpretation. air forces of its third world allies (such as Of course, political interference in military Saudi Arabia and Egypt). operations is nothing new. Any cursory analy- Thomas W. Zarzecki sis of Operation Rolling Thunder would show University Park, Pennsylvania that the Iraqis have no monopoly on misguided executive intervention in military affairs. Undoubtedly, Saddam's extreme methods and pervasive influence served to substantially KUDOS TO THE AUTHORS weaken the Iraqi military, but this alone cannot Capt James H. Patton’s article on “Stealth, Sea explain its catastrophic defeat at the hands of Control, and Air Superiority” (Spring 1993) did the US-led coalition. The impact and intersec- an excellent job of holding my interest. Keep tion of modernization and circumstantial fac- these kinds of articles coming. tors had a great deal to do with shaping the force that confronted the allies and are just as SrA Julie A. Knapp, USAF important in explaining that force’s ultimate Battle Creek, Michigan

NET A M E N T

AUTOBIOGRAPHY, BIOGRAPHY, view of events surrounding the downing, sub- AND MEMOIRS sequent investigation, intrusive media attention, sabotage of Sharon’s van on her way to work, and the upheaval that this caused their Storm Center: The USS Vincennes and Iran family. Air Flight 655 by Will and Sharon Rogers The book begins with Persian Gulf action with Gene Gregston. Naval Institute Press, that sets an important context for the launching US Naval Institute. Preble Hall, 118 of missiles on a suspected hostile aircraft. Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland Taking fire from the enemy in combat with 21401, 1992, 288 pages, $21.95. Iranian Revolutionary Guard “Boghammer” boats, the Vincennes was keyed up and ready Storm Center is "a personal account of for an even more deadly engagement. Such a tragedy and terrorism” by Will Rogers—the raid was, of course, not coming. Since then, captain of the USS Vincennes, which brought the central question has always been, How did down an Iranian commercial airliner on 3 July one of the US Navy's newest and most techni- 1988—and his wife, Sharon, a target of a car cally advanced ships, an antiair warfare (AAW) bombing in March 1989. Unfortunately, their cruiser equipped with the world’s finest battle story does not add substantially to the resolu- management system, Aegis, and a so-called tion of nagging issues that surround the tragic supership, misidentify and press home an shootdown of the A300 Airbus. The work is attack on an airliner mistaken for an aggressor primarily autobiographical since it concen- F-14? Captain Rogers defends that action as a trates less on the causes of these incidents than necessary response to protect his ship and on the outcomes to the writers’ personal and crew. Though quick to accept responsibility professional lives. The authors do give their for their reaction, Captain Rogers places blame 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

for the tragic outcome squarely on the circum- Such seems to have been the case for the USS stances that existed that day. Vincennes on 3 July 1988. In this way, the author maintains a distance Maj John S. Chilstrom, USAF from the event and the large loss of civilian life Washington, D.C. in a situation requiring defensive action by the ship. Captain Rogers's expressed regret for the outcome—“but not the decision"—might be GULF WAR judged even more closely today by Americans who demand unprecedented precision in tar- George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military geting weapons, especially after they consider Success! Political Failure? by Roger the loss of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the Hilsman. Presidio Press, Lyford Books, 505 friendly fire mishaps in Operation Desert San Marin Drive, Suite 300B, Novato, Storm, and the proven precision of strikes and Califórnia 94945, 1992, 273 pages, $21.95. lack of collateral damage in the Gulf War. The loss of noncombatants (or friendly forces) can “Instead of heading off Hussein by midwifing no longer be excused, as it might have been not a settlement, the Bush administration indicated very long ago, under the cause of “military that the United States would not interfere if necessity.” Iraq seized the two islands and the Rumaila oil The other side of this story is told by Sharon field, and was outraged when Hussein under- Rogers. With the exception of the terrorist stood the message to be that he had permission bombing of the family’s van (of which very lit- to take all of Kuwait.” The war in the Persian tle is still known), her details of family back- Gulf was an avoidable conflict in which ground run slightly too long. That incident President George Bush failed to investigate all and other fallout from the media’s invasion of possible options thoroughly before resorting to their lives portray the Rogerses themselves as force. victims whose private and professional lives Hilsman divides his book into three sections: have been forever altered. a brief history of the Middle East, a detailed Storm Center is at its best in a few exciting, narrative of the Persian Gulf War, and an analv- well-written chapters that give the feel for sis of George Bush and Saddam Hussein. Each operations on a complex warship and of the section supports the author’s contentions that surface action preceding the downing of Iran the Persian Gulf War was avoidable and Air Flight 655. The value of this book is that President Bush was personally responsible for its message reminds modern warriors that they the “headlong rush to war.” can be suddenly put under battle stress, thrust Given Hilsman’s background (he is a West into a fast-paced, life-and-death action in Point graduate and World War II veteran), the which boundaries between peacetime and war antiwar tone in the book is somewhat unex- are anything but clear. It contributes to the lit- pected. The author skillfully narrates antiwar erature on how people react amid the fog and positions before, during, and after the Persian friction of conflict, and it adds the dimension Gulf conflict while failing to point out flaws in of terrorist retaliation to family members those themes. He also fails to present any thought safe in our homeland. points of view supporting military action. Regrettably,' the book fails to live up to its Hilsman comes just short of legitimizing Iraq’s promotion as “epic in scope” or, in Will invasion of Kuwait by pointing out Kuwaiti Rogers’s words, “a full accounting of what hap- provocations and a US “green light" for Iraqi pened.” Due to the event’s sensitivity, the military action. Hilsman also criminalizes the íikely classification of some evidence, and the US role in the conflict, pointing out that Bush uncooperative position of Iran, a full exposi- repeatedly violated international law and tion will either be a long time coming, or never manipulated the United Nations (UN). The known. book suffers from a clear lack of objectivity. In an article on “friendly fire” incidents, mil- Hilsman describes several courses of action itary historian Charles Shrader noted in the available to President Bush that could have Autumn 1992 Parameters that "in many prevented Iraqi aggression before the invasion respects modern weapons have outstripped the of Kuwait. They include placing some Kuwaiti ability of their human users to control them.” territory under UN supervision as well as iso- NET ASSESSMENT 87 lating Kuwait until it ceased drilling in Iraqi an analysis of two men and their actions. territory. However, in a prior chapter, the While factually sound, this book does little to author describes talks between Iraq and the shed light on the conflict as a whole. Hilsman Arab League during vvhich these same ideas attempts to enter the minds of Bush and were discussed and rejected. He never Hussein. The result is a convoluted descrip- explains the apparent contradiction. Hilsman tion of war, politics, and personalities. lists several other options available to lst Lt Steven D. Kiser, USAF President Bush after the Iraqi invasion that Tinker AFB, Oklahoma could have kept the United States out of the conflict. Central to these options were an Arab-led economic embargo and an Arab-led HISTORICAL military buildup. Minimal involvement by the United States was necessary. By not discussing The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive the importance of global leadership in these Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo by options, Hilsman builds little credibility in Russell E. Weigley. Indiana University Press, them. Arabs could not unite themselves in the 601 N. Morton Street, Bloomington, Indiana wake of the invasion; there was little hope they 47404, 1991, 602 pages, $35.00. could unite the whole world. A lack of definition also leaves the reader This book is exactly what its title indicates: frustrated. Hilsman never defines military suc- a survey of the major battles in military history cess or political failure. The reader has the from the early seventeenth to the early nine- notion that Hilsman is saying Bush failed polit- teenth centuries. The survey of the battles is ically because he resorted to war much too accompanied by an analysis of the place of bat- soon. This contrasts sharply with the conven- tle in the conduct of war during the same tional concept of political failure in the Persian period. The author, professor of history at Gulf. This view States that Bush did not signif- Temple University, is familiar to the readers of icantly change the unstable Arab world after Airpower Journal for at least two of his previ- the conflict was over. By not clearly defining ous works. The American Way of War (1977) such an important part of the book, Hilsman has been used in both the Squadron Officer loses much of the impact of his arguments. School and Air Command and Staff College There is, however, no lack of facts. The book curricula, and Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (1981) is an excellent narration of the Iran-Iraq and has become one of the foremost accounts of the Persian Gulf wars. Hilsman is meticulous in World War II campaigns in northwest Europe. describing the political processes during crises. Weigley thus brings to this present work a life- Details of the lives of both Bush and Hussein time of teaching and writing about military his- are interesting and occasionally revealing. The tory, mostly from the American perspective, reader is much more informed about the Arab but this is his first major attempt to interpret world in general and the war in particular the European military experience. afterward. Weigley's central argument is that from the The book ends with a psychological analysis Battle of Breitenfeld on 17 September 1631, in of Bush and Hussein. This allows Hilsman to which Gustavus Adolphus’s Swedish army define the Persian Gulf War as a clash between defeated the imperial forces of Count Tilly, personalities instead of a clash between until the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815, in national interests. By trivializing the conflict which the combined forces of Wellington’s and stating that the global impact of Iraq’s Anglo-Dutch army and Blücher’s Prussians actions was inconsequential, Hilsman's intense defeated Napoléon's Armée du Nord, com- criticisms focus on Bush’s actions instead of manders consistently sought major battles as the war. This reduction causes the Gulf War to the preferred instrument to achieve decisive become secondary to Bush the man, which results in war, and that the results consistently Hilsman describes as "driven" and determined fell short of expectations. Weigley refers to the “to prove to himself and the world that he was latter phenomenon as "the persisting, recalci- a tough guy.’* trant indecisiveness of war,” which he believes George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein is not a dis- makes most wars evidence of the “bankruptcy cussion of the Persian Gulf War. Rather, it is of policy” rather than the extension thereof. 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

An additional argument is that military profes- ultimately able to capture Lille and give the sionalism, which Weigley traces to the reforms allies significant access to northeastern France of Gustavus Adolphus, has generally acted as a for the campaigns of 1709. And for all of restraining influence on depredations against Frederick’s willingness to seek battle during noncombatants. the early campaigns of the Seven Years’ War, The Age of Battles is characterized by three after Torgau (3 November 1760) he became great strengths. The tactical descriptions of the increasingly eager to avoid major engagements battles are concise and illuminating, bringing and gratefully accepted the salvation offered by to bear insights into the leaders’ personalities, Tsarina Elizabeth’s death in 1762. And in the analvsis of the terrain, and informed commen- War of Bavarian Succession, the effectiveness tary of combined arms tactics. The research is of Austrian artillery and the deterioration of his impeccable, reflecting VVeigley’s close attention own army convinced him that engagement to historical detail. These attributes make the would be futile. Instead, he was content to book a very useful place to start for anyone allow the depleted Austrian coffers and the needing an OverView of the major military mediations of France and Rússia to secure the actions of two centuries of European warfare. withdrawal of Áustria from Bavaria that he And, as a bonus, Weigley’s style is active and could not achieve on the battlefield. In short, engaging. making the book an easy read. there is a major period in Weigley’s analysis In my opinion, however, the main argument (roughly 1650-1790) in which battle was usu- is not proven. The book fails to convince ally not the preferred method of achieving because it ignores two major bodies of evi- political effect but frequently was a last resort. dence: first, the frequent times commanders in And it was one in which commanders and the era under consideration sought to avoid their political superiors recognized that the battle, particularly in the period 1650-1790: issue at hand would usually not be decided by and second, the less than decisive results that battle alone but by a complex amalgam of commanders expected from battle when they diplomatic maneuvering, financial bargaining, did employ it, particularly in the same period. dynastic intrigue, military action, and—to When one looks at the campaigns of the Duke quote Frederick the Great—chance. The French of Marlborough and Frederick the Great, one Revolution and Napoléon changed all that, but does find a great many battles: Blenheim, Weigley’s argument for continuity rather than Malplaquet, Rossbach, and Leuthen are exam- discontinuity in this regard is misleading. ples of these great captains using major field There is also a definitional problem with engagements to further the political purposes Weigley’s argument. What does "decisive” of their sovereign in Marlborough’s case, or of mean? Weigley implies that decisiveness must the Prussian State in Frederick’s case. Yet we entail the toppling of a regime. However. this just as often find them using other military does not seem to be a useful standard since instruments to achieve their purpose, the siege such an extreme measure was normally not the and maneuver on one's adversaries’ lines of object of the wars of this period. Rather, one Communications being the most frequent. For needs to think of strategic decisiveness as example, after his victory at Oudenuarde (11 whether or not the war settled the political July 1708), Marlborough attempted to pursue issue at stake. In this sense, it is possible to Vendôme’s defeated French forces, but was argue that the War of Spanish Succession and repulsed at Ghent. Rather than continuing this the wars of the Quadruple Alliance that fol- pursuit, Marlborough proposed invading lowed it did settle the issue: France and Spain France by way of the Channel coast and the would not be united. The War of Austrian Somme River. The Dutch, however, were Succession and the Seven Years' War decided unwilling to participate in this bold maneuver the issue that Prússia would include the and convinced Marlborough to lay siege to province of Silesia in its realm and would Lille instead. Vendôme, unwilling to risk bat- remain a major European power. The War for tle but concerned over the adverse conse- American Independence was certainly decisive quences of the fali of Lille, blockaded all the in detaching England’s most significant North crossings of the river Scheldt between Lille American colonies from the mother country. and Brussels, severing the allied Communica- And the Napoleonic Wars were decisive in tions. Marlborough countered by organizing putting a check on the extent to which French overland convoys from Ostend to Lille and was revolutionary idealism would influence the NET ASSESSMENT 89 rest of Europe and whether the Napoleonic A’man, the intelligence branch of the Israeli imperium would be allowed to continue to Defense Forces (IDF). Despite some obvious reign in France. In short, while wars in the patriotic overtones, Soldier Spies provides a period under investigation did not always comprehensive political and military history of accomplish the more extreme objectives of the Israeli military intelligence, comparing and belligerents, this does not mean that nothing contrasting A’man to the more glamorous and significant was decided by the wars. better known Mossad foreign espionage agency The other argument in the book—that mili- and the Shin Bet counterintelligence agency. tary professionalism has a restraining influence Written in Israel, Soldier Spies underwent on the impact of war upon noncombatants— scrutiny and censorship of the IDF Censor’s suffers from the fundamental deficiency that Office (itself a part of IsraeTs military intelli- throughout the period under investigation war gence). was not a profession. It was a craft, practiced Politics and intelligence can never be sepa- with more or less success depending on a wide rated, and the State of Israel—bom of war and variety of factors, only one of which was the surrounded by a ring of Arab States dedicated effectiveness of military education. Although to its destruction—epitomizes the intertwining there were attempts to study war in a system- of politics and the military. In its short history atic manner and apply the lessons of this study in the modern era, Israel has survived six to the battlefield as early as Gustavus major wars and 40 years of terrorism, due in no Adoiphus’s military reforms, it is misleading to small part to its superior intelligence opera- speak of military professionalism in European tions. Israeli leadership has always considered military institutions of the seventeenth and intelligence the first line of defense against eighteenth centuries in anything other than a established military powers such as Egypt and protean sense. Professionalism required the Syria and revolutionary/terrorist groups such development of a systematic body of knowl- as the Palestine Liberation Organization. edge and the lifetime study and application of Interestingly, many of the key figures in the that knowledge that was not evident in early davs of Israeli intelligence and the European armies until the midnineteenth cen- Haganah played significant political roles later turv. And while 1 find some comfort in the in life; they include David Ben-Gurion, notion that military professionalism acts as a Menachein Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, and Moshe brake on the effects of war spreading to non- Dayan. combatants. the experiences of World Wars I Although unapologetically pro-Israeli and II. admittedly outside Professor Weigley’s throughout, Soldier Spies documents the fail- scope of investigation. may argue to the con- ures and the dark side of military intelligence trary. operations as well. For example, the success of In short, Weigley’s informed and engaging the Six-Day War of 1967 is balanced by the fail- accounts of the major battles in European mili- ure to correctly interpret Arab intentions in tary history from Breitenfeld to Waterloo make 1973. Further, the account of the kidnapping the book well worth reading. One must, how- and murder of suspected informers by Israeli ever, accept with a great deal of caution the agents during the formative years of the coun- interpretation of those battles' place in the try indicates that the practice was tolerated if overall context of the era. not endorsed. Harold R. Winton The Israeli intelligence organization grew Maxwell AFB. Alabama out of the Jewish Brigade, which supported British operations during World War II. At the end of the war, a group known as the Avengers INTELLIGENCE sought out and executed hundreds of German SS officers without benefit of trial, although Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence by the Avengers did require proof that these Samuel M. Katz. Presidio Press. 505 San Germans were involved in war crimes. In Marin Drive, Suite 300B, Novato, Califórnia another instance, an Arab identified as the 94945-1309, 1992. 320 pages, S21.95. rapist of two young Jewish girls was summarily castrated by an elite commando force as an act Israeli military historian Samuel M. Katz has of retribution and as part of the psychological written an entertaining, documented history of warfare against the Arabs. 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

The book alludes to the relationship between But with the continuing outbreaks of ethnic Israeli and US intelligence over the years but and religious violence, the disintegration of the does not go into detail because of a lack of former Soviet Union, and the erosion of the unclassified information. For instance, with- borders of Western Europe, one can anticipate out providing detail or documentation, Katz that hostage taking will not decrease. speculates about the use of American aircraft Moreover, it could increasingly become a and aircrews to fly photoreconnaissance mis- weapon of choice by both States and nonstate sions during the 1967 war and about a relation- actors who will employ the seizure of individu- ship with the Central Intelligence Agency that ais to dramatize their causes or as a means of has grown closer over the years. Whether due very profitable extortion. Faced with this real- to a lack of documented information or severe ity, Douglas S. Derrer has written a very read- editing by Israeli censors, little is said about able book that should be must reading for the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty. In this members of the military and their families incident, forces of the IDF navy and Israeli air since their duties may place them in harnTs force followed the US ship for six hours before way. The book should also be read by those in launching an attack that killed or injured sev- the traveling public who are willing to recog- eral sailors. Considerable discussion of the nize that carrying an American passport in incident has appeared in the press for years, troubled areas could be a potential invitation but no satisfactory explanation has been forth- to disaster. coming. The author brings unique experience to his Katz also discusses some of the key study of hostage behavior and survival. As a exchanges of intelligence information with the commander in the Medicai Service Corps who United States relating to hostage taking and holds a PhD in psychology from Yale other terrorist activities. According to Katz, in University, Derrer is a pioneer in the system- exchange for invaluable human intelligence atic study of how hostages react to their seizure resources and information on terrorist organi- and captivity. Furthermore, he has been able zations in the Middle East, the US has pro- to refine and apply his research as a result of vided Israel with sophisticated technical intel- his involvement in the Navy’s very demanding ligence on its neighbors. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Soldier Spies makes for easy reading but suf- (SERE) School, where the students experience fers from a lack of original research, depending highly realistic simulations of being held pris- almost exclusively on magazine articles and oners of war. the works of other authors. Further, whether After providing a good brief overview on the due to censorship or patriotic bias, Katz goes nature of the terrorist threat, Derrer presents a out of his way to always portray the IDF in the series of chapters that cogently address how best possible light. potential hostages can avoid capture and, fail- Maj Jim Marshall, USAF ing that. adjust to their seizure and captivity. San Antonio, Texas His first chapter, “Personal Protection and Security,” provides a good discussion on the basic principies of security as well as a check- list that should be used by a family whose hus- band or wife is to be assigned to an area of LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, TOTAL potential or actual strife. While the author QUALITY, PERSONAL AFFAIRS covers familiar ground, the chapter is a well- organized guide for predeparture security We Are All the Target: A Handbook of arrangements. Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival Chapter 2, “Military Policy and Peacetime by Douglas S. Derrer. Naval Institute Press, Captivity,” should be required reading for mili- US Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland tary personnel. Derrer engages in an excellent 21402-5035, 1992, 112 pages, $12.95 (paper). discussion of how the Code of Conduct can be used as guidance by the captive in both peace With the release of the American and and war. Furthermore. he analyzes how European hostages in Lebanon in 1991, the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1300.7, plights of the captives and their families Training and Education Measures Necessary to receded from the headlines in the world press. Support the Code of Conduct. provides excel- NET ASSESSMENT 91 lent guidance for Service personnel in various Dupuy. Brassey’s (order through Macmillan types of detention ranging from seizure by hos- Publishing Company, Front and Brown tile governments to captivity by terrorists. Streets, Riverside. New Jersey 08075), 1993, In chapter 3, “Crisis Stages and Hostage 3,132 pages. $1,250.00. Survival," the author provides a tightly written Remember when you were in elementary guide to the three stages of hostage taking— school and the teacher assigned “the research “the intimidation,” “custodiai," and "resolu- report”? If the task of writing a whole page on tion” stages. your assigned topic was not scary enough, the Chapter 4, “Coping with Captivity,” makes prospect of finding information among all the telling point that “there are no superheroes those books in the school library was posi- in captivity" despite the penchant of the tively daunting. Then somehow you found out American public to often place the victims on about THE ENCYCLOPEDIA. Suddenly you a pedestal (page 57). The author presents in had all the information you could ever want chronological order the stages of adjustment to about your topic in one place. Remember the captivity and suggests a coping mechanism elation? The relief? We on the that can be readily learned and used by those Airpower staff had a similar reaction when we who might experience either short- or long- Journal unpacked the six-volume set of the term imprisonment. International Military and Defense Chapter 5, "History and Geopolitics of ), published by Terrorism," and chapter 6, “Social Issues of Encyclopedia (IMADE Brassey’s. Although we no longer consider an Terrorism,” provide good general analysis on encyclopedia the pinnacle of research, most of the evolution of the terrorists’ strategies and capabilities that have been presented in great us still find it useful as a starting point. An detail in numerous articles and books. While encyclopedia places general topics in historical of interest, one can question whether this context and interweaves related concepts familiar ground really adds to the book. throughout a variety of subjects—as does Nevertheless, in his conclusion, Derrer is to be IMADE. particularly complimented for candidly taking The dearth of a single source of information the following position. In regards to govern- on military and defense issues led to Brassey’s mental response to hostage taking, he notes the publication of IMADE, which—the publisher following: “But. if they voluntarily risk their claims—is the “first and only definitive and own lives by going into dangerous zones comprehensive English-language encyclopedia through personal choice and are taken hostage, of international military and defense informa- we should not allow our government and the tion.” Brassey’s implies that its secondary goal rest of us to be held hostage" (page 116). The is to educate the general public on defense and author has therefore effectively addressed the national security issues. Therefore, IMADE is issue of personal responsibility and account- designed for a primary audience of faculty and ability that is often lost in the understandablv students within a variety of civilian and mili- emotional debates surrounding the fate of tary educational institutions and for civilian hostages. and governmental personnel working in the US We Are All Targets is an excellent book that and abroad. should be in the library of those in or out of Focusing on American. Soviet, British, and uniform who must carry out their responsibili- French systems, the encyclopedia includes 798 ties in an increasingly dangerous international articles—all with supplemental bibliogra- environment. It is a book that can make a dif- phies—in 17 topic areas: ference—a difference between death and a life Aerospace Forces and Warfare of psychological well-being in the face of ter- Combat Theory and Operations rorism. Leadership, Command, and Management Countries. Regions, and Organizations Stephen Sloan Armed Forces and Society Norman, Oklahoma History and Biography REFERENCE Land Forces and Warfare Logistics Manpower and Personnel International Military and Defense Materiel and Weapons Encyclopedia edited by Col Trevor N. Naval Forces and Warfare 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Technology, Research, and Development 1965—the first major battle of the Vietnam War Military Theory and Operations Research between US and North Vietnamese Army Defense and International Security Policy (NVA) troops. One of the coauthors, Lt Col Military and International Security Law Harold Moore, commanded the lst Battalion, Military Intelligence General Military 7th Cavalry, which—after being dumped off by “slicks” (helicopters)—found itself immedi- IMADE does have its weaknesses, however. ately surrounded by more than 2,000 North First, the honorary advisory board and the edi- Vietnamese soldiers. The other coauthor, torial boards are composed entirely of a distin- Joseph L. Galloway—a journalist—was also at guished and credentialed group of men, the the battle. With about 250 troops at landing overwhelming majority of whom come from zone (LZ) X-Ray, Moore had thoughts about Army backgrounds. This weighting towards a Gen George Armstrong Custer at the Little Big particular military experience leads to a strong Horn some 89 years earlier. Moore was deter- Army emphasis and a perceived bias. mined that history would not repeat itself at In addition, the above list of subject areas the Ia Drang. emphasizes some issues at the expense of oth- He knew that he had one thing that Custer ers. For example, I read an article entitled didn’t—firepower—which he credits for saving “Electronic Warfare Technology Applications," the day. Artillery from nearby fire-support which devoted three of its eight pages to radar bases walked rounds down the mountainside equations. Although the subject of the article to the surrounded Americans’ established may be important, I don’t think it deserves perimeter. Army helicopters attacked with eight pages, especially when we consider that I 2.75-inch rockets while Air Force fighter- couldn’t find even one paragraph devoted to bombers dropped 250- and 500-pound bombs total quality (TQ) anywhere in IMADE, despite and let loose destructive napalm canisters. In the fact that TQ is changing the way the entire addition, Moore credits the A-l Skyraider, “the Air Force does business. As a whole, the ency- antiquated single-engine propeller plane of clopedia seems to deemphasize such areas as Korean War vintage,” with providing some of personnel and leadership—a questionable prac- the best air support during the fray. tice. Certainly if one of IMADE’s goals is to The battle was tense and bloody: educate the public, it should cover some of the issues that receive so much public attention. Never before had the Vietnamese enemy carried In the preface, however, Brassey’s does men- the fight to an American Army unit with such tion the problem of keeping the encyclopedia tenacity. None of the common wisdom born of the American experience in Vietnam to date applied to current; it’s doubtful that a satisfactory solution this enemy. We were locked into a savage battle of to this problem is possible. fire and maneuver, a battle for survival, which only Overall, IMADE is a major publication wor- one side would be permitted to win. (Page 113) thy of any public, private, or professional library. Although few of us could afford to buy During the first night, an Air Force C-123 flare IMADE for our personal libraries, we should ship dropped parachute fiares nonstop, work at procuring it for our base or unit enabling US troops to see and place small-arms libraries. fire on the enemy, thus preventing penetration Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne, USAF of the American line. The tally for the fight at Maxwell AFB. Alabama LZ X-Ray was 834 confirmed enemy dead and an estimated 1,215 killed and wounded by VIETNAM artillery, air attacks, and rocket attacks. The Americans tallied 79 battle deaths, 121 We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia wounded, and none missing. This battle marked the first time that B-52 Drang—America’s First Battle in Vietnam by Lt Gen Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. strategic bombers were used in a tactical role in support of American ground troops. Indeed, Galloway. Random House, 201 East 50th an anticipated B-52 attack on the area around Street, New York 10022, 1992, 412 pages, $25.00. LZ X-Ray prompted moving US troops from that location to be picked up at LZ Albany. This book is a superb account of the Battle of Moore questions the rationale behind the six- the Ia Drang (Valley) in October and November mile march to LZ Albany, especially for a divi- NET ASSESSMENT 93

sion that had over 400 helicopters at its com- ary in Cambodia, they could choose to fight mand. It was the misfortune of the 2d when they were ready and leave when they Battalion, 7th Cavalry, commanded by Lt Col wanted to. The NVA learned that they could Robert McDade, to run into the 550-man NVA cope with American technological superiority reserve force of the 8th Battalion, 66th no matter how serious their losses. Regiment. The latter unit had been bivouacked George M. Watson, Jr. to the northwest of the American column, Washington, D.C. which was spread out on a line 550 yards long in triple-canopy jungle. The units in the middle of the column were immediately overrun. WORLD WAR II Soon. the entire 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was reduced from a full battalion in line to a small Battle of the Bismarck Sea by Lex McAulay. perimeter defended by a few Alpha Company St. Martin’s Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New survivors, the recon platoon, a handful of strag- York 10010, 1991, 226 pages, $19.95. glers from Alpha and Delta companies, and the battalion command group at LZ Albany. The The Battle of the Bismarck Sea has been long details of this encounter are gruesome. Hand- overdue for a serious historical examination. to-hand combat was the norm at various posi- The details of this epic battle have been largely tions. The horrors and screams of wounded forgotten by everyone except the surviving par- troops being massacred by NVA patrols and ticipants and a few historians. During the first the cheers of US troops when the brutal four days of March 1943, American and napalm canisters landed directly on the enemy Australian land-based bombers and fighters bring to light the awesome, savage reality of smashed a 16-ship Japanese convoy that was war. As was the case at LZ X-Ray, the authors bringing vital reinforcements to Lae, New point to firepower as the deciding factor at LZ Guinea. Had the Japanese successfully landed Albany, particularly the old, slow A-l their troops, the course of the New Guinea Skyraiders that maneuvered magnificently campaign probably would have been very dif- around the tree lines, dropping napalm and ferent. 250-pound bombs and unleashing deadly accu- Lex McAulay, an Australian, has done an rate 20-mm cannon fire. Total US casualties at admirable job in writing Battle of the Bismarck Albany were 151 killed, 121 wounded, and Sea, perhaps the most detailed account of this four missing, while enemy estimates were 403 battle ever produced. By the time we finish killed and 150 wounded. reading it, we know everything we could con- The reader will be impressed with the fight- ceivably want to know—the meticulous Allied ing spirit of the American troops, most of preparations and plans, an almost hour-by- whom were draftees, some with only a few hour account of each unit involved in the fight- weeks left on their Army tours. Stories of their ing, and the aftermath of the battle. The heroic deeds fill the book. The will and stay- account is also remarkably balanced, including ing power of the enemy soldiers also deserve both Allied and Japanese viewpoints. admiration. Even though they didn’t have the Although McAulay is to be praised for such a firepower of the Americans, they continued to thorough piece of research, his very thorough- fight, charging US lines with ruthless determi- ness contributes to the book's only weakness. nation at a tremendous loss of life. So many Allied units were involved in the Moore was particularly perturbed that he action at any one time that McAulay’s “you- could not pursue the NVA into Cambodia, a are-there” technique sometimes makes it diffi- US policy that continued at least until the cult to figure out who did what to whom. spring of 1970. Both sides learned some Perhaps inadvertently, he has re-created the lessons, although not the correct ones. US very "fog of war” that existed during the battle leaders believed that they could beat the itself. This is best exemplified by a diagram of enemy through attrition—trading one the attack routes of Allied aircraft, which American life for 11 or 12 North Vietnamese resembles a plate of spaghetti. The movements until the enemy gave up. This thinking was of large numbers of high-speed aircraft attack- erroneous because the Vietnamese accepted ing multiple targets within a fairly small area that ratio and were willing to sacrifice more do not readily lend themselves to diagram- lives to win, Further, because they had sanctu- ming. 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1993

Having said this, I would still recommend mass, and offensive action, to name just a few. this book to serious air power scholars. The It still represents one of the greatest victories of Battle of the Bismarck Sea is one of those land-based aircraft over naval forces. Lex World War II battles that everyone has heard of McAulay is to be commended for making this but few know much about. Yet in almost text- epic struggle accessible to contemporary stu- book fashion, it illustrates the successful appli- dents of air power history. cation of some of the most important princi- Maj James C. Ruehrmund, Jr., USAFR pies of war—surprise, security, flexibility, Richmond, Virgínia

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The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 1992, 386 pages, public release.

This collection of essays includes the proceedings of a 1991 conference on “The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s” sponsored by the Air Force and Tufts University. The 20 contributors— including academics, high- level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors— comment on the pivotal role of air power in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the Air Force. These include factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of air power as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry’s views on the Air Force’s future acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century.

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Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions by Stephen J. Blank et al., 1992, 370 pages, public release.

Five specialists examine the historical relationship of culture and conflict in various regional societies. The authors use Adda B. Bozeman’s theories on conflict and culture as the basis for their analyses of the causes, nature, and conduct of war and conflict in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Asia (China, Japan, and Vietnam), Latin America, and África. Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers conclude that non-Western cultures and societies do not reject war but look at violence and conflict as a normal and legitimate aspect of sociopolitical behavior. C □ N T T □ R S

Via) T k o n u i R McCabe BA. West Col Edward Mann (BS. Pepperdine Chestef Sute Coüege MA. George- l niversity MA. University of Lt Coi R |oe Baldwin BA. Umver- U»wb Uwvertnv ViS. Deíense Intel- Southern Califórnia) is chief of the sny of Virgínia MS. Universitv of .igence Goliegej it « sentar analyst at Docttine Research Division. Southern Califórnia) is commander lhe Joént Services Survival Evssion. Airpower Research lnstitute, Center of th* +46ih Missiíe Squadron. 321st Resistente, and Estepe Ageocy. Fort for Aerospace Domine. Research, Missile Wing. Grand Forks AFB, Beivotr Virgínia He u a maior in and Education (CADRE), Maxwell Sorth Oakota Prevrously he uas lhe Air Force Reserve and ha* served AFB. Alahania. He is a c.ainiuand speciaJ as&istant to the deputy com- as s targettng inielUgence offiter pilot with 5.200 hours in the KC-135 mandar ia cbief. European Com- with lhe J66tíJ Tattical Kighter Wing mrcratt Previouslv. he was deputy mand spacial assistant to the c.um- st Mountain Home AFB Idaho. and director of the Airborne Com- msndet Etghth Air Forca, policy as an opemions tntallrgence offiter mand/Control Division, liuadquar- and strategy anaiyst. Headquarters at Osan AB Rapublic of Korea ters Stralegic Air Coinmand. Offult Stratagic Air Command (SAC); Ma|ot McCtks U • gradual* of AFB, Nebraska; USAF resoarch asso- Squadron OfTUer School clate to the International Securlty Virgínia, and SAC tnissileer. )41tl Studms Program. Fletuher School of Straiegic Missita Wing. Melou trom I..IH and Diplomai v. Tufts Univnr- AFB Muntana Colonel Baldwin is *ity. Madford, Massachusetts; and a distinguishad graduata of Squadron OfBcar Schcxil. a graduata mllítarv doctrine nnnlyst at CADKE. A pmvious contributor to Atrpowtir of Artned Fortes Stafl Gollsp. and a lourrwl Colonel Mann is a graduntv I9V I graduata of Air Wai Gol lega of Squadron Officor School. Air Command and Steff Culloga, and Air War Col lege

95 Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired (BS, USAFA; MA, Univer- sity of Alabama), was chief of the Current Doclrine Division, Airpower Maj P. Mason Carpenter (BS, Maj George T. McClain, Air Research Institute, Center for Aero- USAFA; MPA, Troy State Univer- National Guard (BS, USAFA: MBA, space Doctrine, Research, and Edu- sity) is a student at the School of Golden Gata University), is a faculty cation (CADRE), Maxwell AFB, Advanced Airpower Studies, Air member at Air Command and Staff Alabama, at the time of his retire- Command and Staff College (ACSC), College (ACSC), Maxwell AFB. ment in August 1992. During his 30 Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is a Alabama. A command pilot with years of military Service, he flew sênior pilot with over 2,000 flying 3,000 flying hours, he has flown the fighters in the United States, hours, 150 hours combat time. He F-4E, March AFB, Califórnia; the F- Europe, and Southeast Asia. He has served as F - lll instructor pilot, 4G, George AFB, Califórnia; the OV- served as a fighter and tanker duty 0-2A forward air controller opera- 10A, Osan AB, Republic of Korea; controller in the Military Assistance tions officer, assistant operations the F-4D, Kunsan AB, Republic of Command, Vietnam (MÁCV)/United officer, and flight commander. Korea, and Nellis AFB, Nevada; and States Support Activities Group Major Carpenter is a 1993 graduate the F-4C, Luke AFB, Arizona. Major (USSAG) tactical air control center of ACSC. McClain is a 1993 graduate of and as an air operations officer at ACSC. Headquarters USAF. Colonel Bing- ham is a frequent contributor to Air- power Journal and has published in numerous other professional jour- nals.

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• Strategic Paralysis • Space Power Survivability • The Art of Intelligence