Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila Widnall Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air Education and Trainlng Command Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr. Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Gol Robert M. Johnston Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark Associate Editor Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin VV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova- tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tac- tics, force structure, readiness, and other mat- ters of national defense. The views and opin- ions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con- strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Air Education and Training Command, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Fali 1993, Vol. VII, No. 3 AFRP 10-1 Editorial 2 The Limits of Deep Attack Maj Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR 4 A New Defense Industrial Strategy 16 The Leadership Imperative in a Transforming Air Force Lt Col R. Joe Baldwin, USAF 35 Military Support for “Peace Efforts” Col Edward Mann, USAF 51 The United States Needs to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired 62 Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Reborn? Maj P. Mason Carpenter, USAF Maj George T. McClain, USAF 7 2 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 85 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL Mental Preparation for War HE MOST important element in Real professional military education is a 1 war is, as it has always been, the career-long effort. It is a responsibility competing minds of the antagonists” shared by the institution and the individ- (AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 25). As dichotomous as ual. Currently the institution is doing lit- it may seem, war is more a mental affair tle to discharge this responsibility. A few than a physical one. While this idea has who have either exceptional vision or sim- been understood through the centuries, ply an interest in military thinking take it technological advancements have made it upon themselves to continually study their even more apparent. After the Gulf War, profession—but not many. Gen Norman Schwarzkopf indicated that We might look appreciatively at the US had we had the Iraqis’ equipment and Marine Corps professional reading pro- they ours, we still would have defeated gram. Each rank (officer and enlisted) has them because our thinking was superior. a specific list of books to study. They If it is the mind’s ability to think, antici- know that it is as much their professional pate, prepare, and execute that produces responsibility to read and understand the victory over a foe with the same ability, books on their list as it is to keep their how do we prepare the minds of our peo- hair cut and their boots shined. A former ple to ensure future operational success? commandant, Gen A. M. Gray, Jr., made Military people need a working knowledge this abundantly clear by conducting dis- of military ideas, theories, histories, and cussions with the troops in the field about current thinking. No one is clever enough the ideas in the books on their lists. to conduct successful warfare without It’s intriguing to consider how our cur- having devoted significant time to study- rent PME schools would change if stu- ing what others have discovered. As dents carne to them with a vast back- Archduke Charles of Áustria said, “A great ground in m ilitary thinking gained captain can be formed only by long experi- through a continuai program of reading ence and intense study; neither is his own and discussing the ideas available in print. experience enough—for whose life is . They could then spend more of their time sufficiently fruitful of events to render his in active learning experiences that hone knowledge universal?” (Charles M. war-fighting skills like problem solving, Westenhoff, M ilitary Air Power: The criticai thinking, and effective team build- CADRE Digest o f Air Power Opinions and ing. They could devote their efforts to Thoughts [Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air developing the sharpness and quickness of University Press, October 1990], 145). their most important weapon system— Where does one obtain such insight? their minds. Some may say that our professional mili- When you think about it, it seems odd tary education (PME) courses provide this that we move people (and their families) learning. To an extent, they are right. to a school for 10 months and then devote However, mining the mother Iode of mili- a significant part of their time to reading tary thinking available for those who background material they could have stud- would be “Great Captains” cannot be ied and digested during the years before accomplished in a few relatively brief they carne. It seems especially wasteful courses at our formal PME schools. when we consider that the schools’ facul- 2 ties and facilities could be arranged to A career-long professional reading pro- help students reach significantly higher gram with effective incentives could leveis of preparation if only the back- make a significant difference in our future ground material has been mastered before- preparation to defeat the "competing hand. minds of the antagonists.” RBC Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- So far, our agenda has included discussions spondence should he addressed to the Editor, on the utility of strategic air power, the uses for Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, air power in the Yugoslavian war, noncombat Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the uses for air power, air power in the Iran-Iraq right to edit the material for overall length. War, and a criticai review of the Gulf War Airpower Survey. It seems to me that high-tech weaponry and VULITARY STUDY SOCIETIES motivated people who are schooled in the his- torv and application of aerospace power will I read with interest Lt Col Kimble D. Stohry’s help keep the Air Force on the cutting edge of article entitled "The Douhet Society: A Recipe military power far into the future. The for Your Professional Development Program?" Pentagon’s Mitchell Society joins with the (Spring 1993). About nine months ago, several Douhet Society and groups like it to make this graduates from the first class of the School of dream a reality. Advanced Airpower Studies started a similar group in the Pentagon. Although we had heard Maj Jason B. Barlow, USAF of the Douhet idea in school. the real impetus Bowie, Maryland came from Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, who encouraged us to “keep up our thinking and study of air power." We soon discovered (as swamped action officers) that achieving the OTHERFACTORS generaPs challenge would not be as easy as we As a regular reader of your journal, I have con- thought—unless we put aside some time for sistently found many of its articles both just that purpose. General Glosson gave his enlightening and immensely useful to my grad- wholehearted support to the concept. uate work on national security and defense pol- The Mitchell Society, as we call it, meets icy; however, lst Lt Matthew M. Hurley’s once a month to review and discuss an air “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power: Just power topic of mutual interest. From the out- Having an Air Force Isn’t Enough” (Winter set. the Mitchell Society was envisioned as a 1992) was of special interest to me. Having fórum to express high-quality ideas. The been involved in ongoing research on the uses ground rules are simple: (1) anyone with an of air power in the third world, with a particu- interest in Exploring Aerospace Power (our lar focus on the development and operational motto) can come, (2) the members pick the top- histories of the Iraqi and Iranian air forces, I ics and lead the meetings. (3) topics should be found Lieutenant Hurley’s article an important associated with written material (i.e.. a book, step forward in understanding just what an article. or a manual that can be distributed accounts for the magnitude of the defeat of the the month before. giving members the chance Iraqi air force (IQAF) at the hands of the coali- to read the topic and compose their thoughts tion. and arguments), and (4) there are no more rules. continued on page 84 3 INCE THE EARLY 1980s, the US military has emphasized concepts of operational art1 that called for deep operations reaching 100 or Smore kilometers into enemy-controlled territory. Originally devised to counter THE the threat of a deeply echeloned Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, this approach was central to the follow-on LIMITS forces attack (FOFA) concept adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1984, to the AirLand Battle (ALB) concepts of the US Army, and to the OF DEEP air and ground campaigns that defeated Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of oper- ations in 1991. Key to all of these, as well ATTACK as to plans to deter future threats from regional enemies, was and is the need for effective and precise conventional long- range firepower, delivered primarily but M aj Thomas R.