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An Introduction to the Modern Chinese Science of Military Supraplanning

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An Introduction to the Modern Chinese Science of Military Supraplanning An Introduction to the Modern Chinese Science of Military Supraplanning Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. vorgelegt von Christopher Detweiler aus den USA SS 2009 Originaltitel: An Introduction to the Modern Chinese Science of Military Stratagem Erstgutachter: Herr Prof. Dr. Dr. Harro von Senger Zweitgutachterin: Frau PD Dr. Ylva Monschein Vorsitzende des Promotionsausschusses der Gemeinsamen Kommission der Philologischen, Philosophischen und Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät: Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Cheauré Datum der Fachprüfung im Promotionsfach: 20.11.2009 Table of Contents I. Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 5 A. Technicalities .................................................................................................................................... 5 B. Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................... 8 C. Introductory Remarks ..................................................................................................................... 10 1. Western Translations of “Moulüe” .............................................................................................. 10 2. LI Bingyan and his Definitions of “Moulüe” .............................................................................. 16 3. My Translation of “Moulüe” ....................................................................................................... 23 4. The Objective of this Study ........................................................................................................ 29 D. Terminology ................................................................................................................................... 30 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 30 2. English Terms.............................................................................................................................. 31 3. Chinese Terms ............................................................................................................................. 36 II. Translation with Annotations.............................................................................................................. 54 A. Publisher’s Explanation ................................................................................................................. 54 B. Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 56 C. Attacking with Supraplanning ........................................................................................................ 64 1. First [Part of] Fragmentary Notes on Military Supraplanning Research .................................... 64 2. The Superior [Method of Using the] Army is to Attack [the Enemy’s] Supraplanning .............. 68 3. Devise Thorough Plans and Make Long-term Calculations ....................................................... 72 4. Use an Adaptive Stratagem According to the Situation .............................................................. 77 5. Gain Victory in the Imperceptible ............................................................................................... 81 6. Take the Circuitous [Route] as the Direct [Route] ...................................................................... 86 7. Take a Disaster and Turn it into an Advantage ........................................................................... 91 8. [One] Can Capture the Morale of the [Enemy’s] Army .............................................................. 97 9. [One] Can Capture the Resolve of the [Enemy] General .......................................................... 101 D. Making Estimations and Plans in the Temple .............................................................................. 106 1. Second [Part of] Fragmentary Notes on Military Supraplanning Research.............................. 106 2. Regard Calculations as Being the Most Important .................................................................... 110 3. Rely on [Obtaining] Provisions from the Enemy ....................................................................... 112 4. When Weak Defend, When Strong Attack ................................................................................. 114 5. Cautiously Defend, Bravely Wage War ..................................................................................... 117 6. When Using Few [Troops], [One] Must [Use a] Narrow [Valley]............................................ 120 7. When Using Many [Troops], [One] Must [Use] Flat [Terrain] ................................................. 122 8. Concentrate [Military Strength] on [One Point of] the Enemy in One Direction ..................... 124 9. If [the Commander] Loves War, [the State] Will Certainly Be Destroyed ............................... 126 10. If [the Commander] Forgets War, [the State] Will Certainly Be in Peril ................................ 129 E. Encouraging the Troops ................................................................................................................ 132 1. Third [Part of] Fragmentary Notes on Military Supraplanning Research................................. 132 2. To Kill the Enemy Use Anger ................................................................................................... 135 3. Select People and [Have Them] Take Posts [Suitable] for the Disposition [of Power] ............ 137 4. When Giving Rewards, [One] Must Not Allow the [Excessive] Passing of Time ................... 140 5. When Punishing, [One] Must Not [Allow any] Movement of the Formation .......................... 144 6. [When] Victory Has Already Been Obtained, [Act] As Though It Has Not Been .................... 146 7. [When] Accepting Surrendering [Troops], [Accept them] As Enemies ................................... 149 F. The Art of Trickery ........................................................................................................................ 151 1. Fourth [Part of] Fragmentary Notes on Military Supraplanning Research ............................... 151 1 2. Use [the Army] but Show the Enemy [that We Are] Not Using [the Army] ............................ 155 3. [When] Capable [of Attacking] Show the Enemy [that We Are] Incapable ............................. 157 4. [Intend to Attack] Far Away But Show the Enemy [We Intend to Attack] Nearby .................. 160 5. [Intend to Attack] Nearby But Show the Enemy [We Intend to Attack] Far Away .................. 163 6. If [We Have] Emptiness [on Our Side], Then Show the Enemy Fullness ................................ 167 7. If [We Have] Fullness [on Our Side], Then Show the Enemy Emptiness ................................ 170 8. If [We Have] Emptiness [on Our Side], Then Show the Enemy Emptiness ............................. 173 9. If [We Have] Fullness [on Our Side], Then Show the Enemy Fullness ................................... 176 10. If [the Enemy Is] at Ease, [One] Can Tire Him Out ............................................................... 180 11. If [the Enemy’s Provisions Are] Abundant, [One] Can Starve Him ....................................... 182 12. If [the Enemy Has] Settled [Down], [One] Can Move Him ................................................... 185 13. If [the Enemy Is Greedy for] Advantage, [Use a Small Advantage to] Lure Him .................. 188 14. If [the Enemy Is] Chaotic, [Take Advantage of It to Attack and] Capture Him ..................... 191 15. If [the Enemy’s Strength Is] Full, Take Precautions Against Him .......................................... 194 16. If [the Enemy’s Army Is] Strong, [Temporarily] Avoid Him .................................................. 198 17. [By Making One’s Words] Lowly, Cause Him To Become Arrogant ..................................... 200 18. If [the Enemy Can Be Made] Furious, Disturb Him ............................................................... 203 19. If [the Enemy’s Internal Relations Are] Close, Sow Discord amongst Them ........................ 206 20. Launch an Attack on a Place Unguarded by the Enemy ......................................................... 210 21. Carry Out [an Operation] When the Enemy Does Not Expect It ............................................ 213 G. Using the Unorthodox .................................................................................................................. 216 1. Fifth [Part of] Fragmentary Notes on Military Supraplanning Research .................................. 216 2. With the Orthodox Engage [in Battle], With the Unorthodox Gain Victory ............................. 218 3. The Unorthodox and the Orthodox Produce Each Other .......................................................... 221 4. Launch [an Attack] First in Order to Control the Enemy ......................................................... 224 5. Launch [an Attack] Later in Order to Control the Enemy ........................................................ 227 6. In War Value Amazing Speed .................................................................................................... 230 7. Delay
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