BRITISH NAVAL POLICY IN TI{E 1920s. by Gillan R. Topþ Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy In the Deparfrnent ofHistory Adelaide Universtty ""'"':'dvOctober 2000 i ) : -f I I TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE.. TABLE OF CONTENTS. .. ABSTRACT..... .111 DECLARATON... v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... ... ...v1 INTRODUCTION.. .......1 CHAPTER 1... ... .. ... ...5 CHAPTER 2......,..... .' '',,43 .. ....69 .. ... .98 .... t14 .. .. 148 .....t70 .....19r .....225 .....273 ,276 .277 .279 ..287 .283 .285 .286 Itt Adelaide Universig, Absfact RRITISH NAVAL POLICY TN the 1920" by Gillan R. Tople.y A thesis presented on British Naval Policy in the 1920s, conceming the economic, political and cliplomatic proble.ms e.ncounte.red by Government ancl by the Admiraþ Board in formulating a standard of strength for the Fleet, post W. orld War I (W\m). The thesis covers the closing months of WWI, the Versailles Feace Conference, the l92l Imperial Conference, the Washington Naval Conference, the Admiralty/Treasury departmental struggle for control o'¡er project funding, British foreign policy in relation to collective security and disarmament under the League of Nations Convention and its effect on Admiralty policy in the period 1924 -30. LTnpublished primary source material for the thesis was collected from the University of Adelaide, Barr Smith Library - Microfiche Documents and, during a two-month stay in London in 1997, frorn the Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, London (Papers of the Cabinet, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office) and from the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London (the Chatfield Papers). Other source material includes published primary and secondary sources and Joumal articles. 1\/ The thesis concludes that Govemment Naval Policy decisions in the 1920s had a direct bearing on the selection of appeasement as a diplomatic tool by British decision makers in the 1930s. v DE,CLARATION This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or lr':füary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or uriffen by another person, except rrytrere due reference has been made in the text I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan or photocopying. SIGNED: DArE: Q ltnl lqv\ vl ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For the completion of this thesis I arn grateful to: Professor Trevor Wilson for his meticulous and sympathetic supervision of its progress Rosemary and Robert Black for their generous hospitality during my stay in London My Parents for their unflagging encorragonrcnt and practical support- Introduction In 1938 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain wrote, 'Over and over again Canning lays it dowl that you should never menace nnlçss you are rn a position to ca.r,ry out your threats'.1 It was a hard-headed affinnation of pragmatism in a long tradition of the pragmatism of British statesmen in diplomacy. It contained no refutation of menaçe per se. But for British statesmen of the 1930s, decisions in the previous decade had all but climinated menaçe as a diplomatic optron. Credibilify and responsibility for naJional interest prolúbited its use. Chamberlain's statement w.as uttered at a time when the e.mploymørt of appeasement had become a vital instrument in British diplomacy for almost a decade. For by the end of the 1920s naval power, Britain's most important military arm, was rnsufficient to mççt even thç absolutc ninrmum Admiralty requrrement for national and imperial defence. The purpose of this thesis is to examine British Naval Policy in the 1920s, and the resultant drastic reduction in thç strenglh of the Flect and ìts eapaeiff to operate rn national and rn imperial waters. Chapter t considers Royal Naval StaffproposaLs for Bntain's post WWI Fleet requirements against the backgrorurd of tensions between the lJnited States (US) and Britain over Naval Power and over the agenda of the two Powers for the peace settlement. The Chapter concludes with the failure of the two Powers to accornplish definitive closure of their dif-ferences concerning Naval Power. 1 Quoted in Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, Macmillan & Co , London, 1947, p.380. 2 Against the backgrorurd of Treasury resistance to Admirah-v spending demands, Chapler 2 considers the hiaflis in policy decisions in Britain created by the failure of the US Adrninistration to respond to British attempts to resnrne the dialogr-re begrrn in thc Versailles Peace Conference. The Chapter concludes with the decision of Prirne Ml,nister David Lloyd George to affirm the restrmption of British Capital Ship constmction ìn January I 921. Chapter 3 discusses the erposure of the vulne.rability of Britain's Eastern Ernpire caused by the shift rn the balance in sea-power. It concerns the I.loyd George Governmerrt's desire to assure the Dorninions of Britain's commitment to their securiff, and the decision to do so by means of rene-wal of the AnglolJapanese Allianee, and by rnodern eapital shrp construction and the development of rnodern naval base facilities at Shgapore. Chapter 4 concerns the hnperial Conference of 1921 and the presentation of the London government's seeurity resolutions with regard to the Asia-Pacifie Region and of its favorrable view of Canadian proposals for a Couference of the Pacific Powe-rs. It discusses the efforts, on behalf of the hnperial Conferees, of Foreign Secreta-ry Lord Curzon to lay the grorurdwork for a convention of Powers with interests in the Far East, with the aim of settlurg politieal concems in the region. Chapter 5 discusses tåe collapse of the British concept of se.ttle.ment of political concerns in the Asia-Pacific region as a necessary prelirninary to any future regional naval lirnitation talks and its substitution try the desire of the Ll-S Admjnistration to give priority of plaee to dismname.nt at a Naval Conferenee in Washington. It diseusses Lloyd George's moves to rebuild Britain's negotiating position in the altered ûamework in order to make it plain British interest in disarmament was tied to such limitations as were consistent with the 1 securit-v of the British Empire. The Chapter concludes that the Washingfon Naval Agreernent met the Adrniralgr's f,rndamental planning objectives to seeure the region Chapter 6 concerns the inquiry of the Geddes Commrttee into Service spending under the aegis of the Treasury. It discusses the Adrniralff's objection to the Committee's findings, and the subseqnent intervention of a- Cabinet Comrnittee on Defence Estirnates, eharecl by Winston Churchill. The Chapter concludes that Governrnent support for stringent economy was bounded by its acknowledgement of the vital importance of the Navy for national and imperial securiqr. Chapte.r 7 discusses the Adrniralt¡r's encor:nters with Britain's First Labou Gove.mment and its dealings on a double front with a government not only looking for economy in Service spending but also ideologically opposed to the whole system of Capitalist Imperialisrn and to the foreign relations traditions that combhecl to pe.rpetr-rate it. It discusses the Adrniralty's struggle to preserve prografixnes in the face of Treasrlry pressure and against the foreign policy objective of Prime Ministe.r R-amsay MacDonald to promote international disarmament. The Chapter concludes that before the fall of the Labour (iovernmenf. fhe Admirahv successfirlly defended ils consfnrcfion nrogramfite but had its Singapore Sche.me ca-ncelled. However it regarded the rehrr¡ oçflre Conservatives as hopeful for the reinstatement of the Scheme. Clrapter 8 discusses Naval Policy decisions in the period Noverntre.r 1924-August79?1 during Stanley Baldwin's Second Government. It considers Catrinet scrutiny ofthe Admiraþ Construction Programme that culminated in its confirmation at a level of 'ahsollfe need' in a policv Paper in 1925 Tt rliscrrsses Treasulv attempts to slow down the Adrniralgr's planned rate of progress for completion of the policy. It conside.rs fjre 4 Government support of the Admiralty position on naval rçduçtions against the pressuro for graater reductions on the part of Leaguç Mçmbers, and again of the US in the Gencva Naval Conference of 1927 .Tlte Chapter concludes the Governrnent demonstrated tha-t while it had an interest in arms limitation, it remained committed to the maintenance of Britain's preponderance of naval power. Chapter 9 discusses the Baldwin Government's clarification and defence of its record on disarmament from the dual perspectives of economy and ofnational sectrity and its pursuit of a continuing interest in the limitation of armaments throt gh diplomatic channels as well as in the League. After the Conservative fall from government in June l929,the Chapter concerns Ramsay MacDonald's personal conduct of Anglo/American conversations having as his object settlement of a basis of agreement for naval reductions preliminary to calling a new Nava! Conference in London. The Chapter concludes that the London Naval Conference denied the tool of military prepmedness to British diplomacy for a decade. Chanter 1. 1918-1919The American challense to British Nâval supremacv. 'World Towards the end of War One, and when victory seemed assured, Royal Naval Staffbegan planning revisions of Britain's post war fleet requirements. The background to this event was as follows. In 1889 parliament passed the Naval Defence Act establishing a power standard as a basis of naval policy. The Act required the maintenance of British sea-po\Mer at a standatd equal to the combined strength of the next two largest navies in the world. At that time this 'two-power' standard referred to the navies of France and of Russia. In consequence, two successive five-year constnrction programmes provided the Royal Navy with a 'homogenous battlefleet of I high quality, backed by a large nunber of new cruisers.' Twenty-two years after the Act the rise of Gennany as a maritime power led the Admiralty to seek a revision of policy, whereby the old two-power standard was set aside in favour of a 60Yo superiority over the German Navy alone.