The Political Origins of Britain's Financial and Economic Unpreparedness for the Second World War
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"A DIFFERENT KIND OF NATION": THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BRITAIN'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC UNPREPAREDNESS FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR Christopher Price Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of York Department of History April 1998 ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the political origins of Britain's economic and financial unpreparedness for the Second World War. The thesis contends that new liberal doctrines were formulated in Government for future defence finance in the 1920s, and that these survived and lay dormant after the collapse of the gold standard in 1931. In this context, we argue that the gains made by British and dependent economies after the subsequent victory of protectionism and Imperial preference were very great and invulnerable to outside economic pressure. Consequently, the policy represented by the Ottawa system was, and was known to be, eminently suitable both for rearmament and the economic challenges of the pre-war world. We argue that an enviable situation was compromised by a liberal revival aimed at bypassing Parliament and steering policy again in the direction of free trade. This movement benefitted from, and was essential to, Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and was articulated through the Government machine. Within it, the American Government became a significant participant in British politics. This thesis contends that by March 1938 the new political alignment had combined with existing administrative structures to create a thoroughly liberal policy for Imperial defence, and that Chamberlain's Government depended upon rigid adherence to the concept that economic stability was Britain's 'fourth arm of defence'. We argue with particular reference to the drain of Britain's gold reserves that the period of undeclared war after the Anschluss demonstrated the new policy to be reckless, dangerous and harmful to the British Empire's massive war potential. This thesis concludes that Britain's economic and financial weakness when war broke out was the result of recent political activity; was remarkable rather than inevitable, and in no way reflected the vast material wealth of the Empire and the resurgent condition of the British economy in the 1930s. CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS iv PREFACE v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 NEW RULES FOR AN OLD GAME: THE SHAPING OF FOURTH ARM CONCEPTS IN A FLUID ENVIRONMENT, 1919-1931 23 1:1 Peace, War and a New Concept of Financial Control 25 1:2 British Attitudes to Gold Between War and Crisis 38 1:3 American Attitudes to Gold and the Onset of Crisis 42 1:4 A Chance to Rebuild 46 CHAPTER 2 "ON THE UPGRADE": BRITAIN'S UNWELCOME RECOVERY, 1931-1936 54 2:1 The Economic Foundations of Strategic Strength 56 2:2 American Problems 63 2:3 Limiting Factors in the Perception and Consolidation of British Strength 70 CHAPTER 3 "THE DESTINY OF TOMORROW": A TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE FORMS AGAINST OTTAWA, 1936 82 3:1 Opening Shots 83 3:2 A Different Tack 88 3:3 Morgenthau Tips the Scales 99 3:4 A Decisive Shift 103 i CHAPTER 4 THE DEVIL IN THE DETAIL: A NECESSARY CASE FOR ECONOMIC DANGER AND THE FORMULATION OF THE FOURTH ARM POLICY, 1937-1938 108 4:1 Breaches in the Dam 110 4:2 The Home Front 116 4:3 Manoeuvres 119 4:4 Tying the Knot 128 4:5 Available "weapons from the authoritarian armoury" 134 4:6 The Starting Gun 136 CHAPTER 5 BETWEEN HITLER AND WALL STREET: UNDECLARED WAR VERSUS BUSINESS AS USUAL, MARCH-OCTOBER 1938 143 5:1 Ideological Constraints on Policy 144 5:2 A Sea Change 147 5:3 The Sterling Crisis Begins 149 5:4 The 'Roosevelt Recession' and the 'Billion Four' 153 5:5 Morgenthau's Gold Dilemma 157 5:6 Morgenthau's Sterling Dilemma 160 5:7 Morgenthau Sees His Way Clear 165 5:8 'Business as Usual' Tested to the Limit 167 5:9 Paralysis in Washington 172 CHAPTER 6 "IT SEEMS LIKE INSANITY": THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1938 AND THE POINT OF NO RETURN 180 6:1 The Trade Agreement: An Invisible Assassin 181 6:2 The Cabinet Falls Hesitantly into Line 187 6:3 Irrational Hopes and Fears 193 II CHAPTER 7 A "MAGINOT LINE FOR THE POUND": PROFLIGACY IN DEFENCE OF A BANKRUPT POLICY, NOVEMBER 1938 - JANUARY 1939 196 7:1 Holding the Line 196 7:2 Thinking the Unthinkable: Exchange Control 198 7:3 American Fears 200 7:4 British Reassurances 202 7:5 Hard Facts and Righteous Satisfaction in London 205 7:6 The Bear Squeeze Fails 207 7:7 Desperate Remedies: "absolutely shooting the works" 212 7:8 A Parting of the Ways 215 7:9 Defence Pays the Price 217 7:10 Policy Consumes Itself 226 CHAPTER 8 "NOT A DAMNED BIT GOOD": THE CONCEALED CATASTROPHE, 1939 232 8:1 The "large blank spaces on the map" 232 8:2 The "time which we dare not regard as peace" 239 8:3 A Minor Revolt 245 8:4 The Crunch: "a real bad day" 250 8:5 Preparations for War: "well into the 1917 stage" 255 CONCLUSION 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY 273 Unpublished Primary Sources 273 Published Primary Sources 273 Secondary Sources 274 111 ABBREVIATIONS PRO Public Record Office, London FO Foreign Office Papers, PRO PREM Prime Minister's Office Papers, PRO CAB Cabinet Office Papers, PRO T Treasury Office Papers, PRO BT Board of Trade Papers, PRO CID Committee of Imperial Defence, PRO FDR Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York MD Morgenthau Diary, FDR SD General Records of the Department of State RG.59, National Archives, Washington D.C. FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936-1938 Various Volumes DBFP Documents on British Foreign policy, 1919-1939. Second and Third Series iv PREFACE THE FALL OF STERLING, 1938-39 AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS This graph illustrates events described in Chapters 5, 7 and 8 of this thesis. It portrays the concurrence between the international events of 1938 and 1939 and pressure on sterling's rate of exchange with the dollar. The British authorities were in no doubt that a connection existed between the two, and four distinct phases can be observed. Before March 1938 the pound-dollar exchange and the level of reserves were stable. It should be noted that even at this stage Great Britain was running a substantial current account deficit, thus weakening the argument that subsequent changes were primarily influenced by this deficit, as would be expected according to classical economic theory. Between March 1938 and January 1939, both the level of gold and foreign currency reserves and the sterling exchange rate against the dollar fell, as reserves were spent to mitigate the pound's decline in preference to the institution of formal exchange controls. These movements began with the Anschluss and gathered pace through 1938. The Munich Agreement afforded scant respite. Between January 1939 and August 1939, the pound-dollar exchange rate was stable. However, in January the bulk of the gold in the Issue Department of the Bank of England was transferred to the Exchange Equalisation Account for the purpose of supporting the currency. Thus, although the pound was stable, continuing and unabated pressure on the exchanges is indicated by the accelerated decline of gold and foreign currency reserves. The sums involved were more than considerable. The total reserve loss of more than £400 million in the period covered in the graph can be measured against a total budget for the Army of £81 million in the financial year 1937-38. Finally, as war became imminent, the threat of total loss of reserves forced abandonment of support operations and an instant depreciation of Sterling to $4.03. Exchange controls were finally introduced on the outbreak of war and this exchange rate became official for the duration of hostilities. V W3 co a) .9...)c/) ',.. ct I:14 cd CO > c.) 0 c.) 7;1 00 0 5 01.... cn :-. .4 cL) c.) %.0 0 —,-4-- al) C • —4 N 11 (1) ,.t'- Z C.) > ct LLJCD -5 C • n 771 Tti 45 C cn to 0 .c.:?. E ..ct S ;..,8 • Cn E ,,b1) 4.) --4, 46 42 c.) v) ID C CC E2 LL < ›, ct .4 CD ,,,c) 00 .re) n I- C C\! Cq (1). LC .1- $/3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks are due to many people who helped the thesis along its course. I would like to thank the University of York for providing essential funding during the second and third years. I am also indebted to the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute for awarding me a scholarship to work in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and to the staff at the Library who were unfailingly helpful and friendly. On a level between the personal and the official I should like to thank my supervisor, Bill Trythall, for his help and encouragement during the last three and a half years and for his open-minded interest in what must at first have seemed a rather peculiar project. Friends and acquaintances who provided much appreciated assistance along the way are too numerous to mention, so I shall try to be specific. I remain indebted to Pat and Art Costello and family of Hyde Park, New York for their marvellous hospitality during my American trip, especially during the blizzard and its aftermath when the English visitors must have been a heavy burden. I should also like to thank Steve Casey of Jesus College, Oxford, whose company and knowledge of American ways were an enormous help. Back in York but continuing the American theme, I should like to thank Dr. Heidi Schubert for encouragement and support in general and for help with travel arrangements in particular.