Looking North:

Australia's Relations with South East Asia

1919 -1939

By Nicole Adler, BA (Hons) UNSW

A Thesis for Submission for the Degree of Master of Arts (Honours)

1996 Acknowledgements i - ii

Introduction - Australian Independence and the Search for a Foreign Policy 1-14

Chapter One The White Policy and Perceptions of South East Asia 15-36

Chapter Two The Australian Government - Diplomacy, and Defence 37-74

Chapter Three Trade:- South East Asia, Australia's New Market? 75-114

Chapter Four Intellectual Responses to South East Asia 115-135

Chapter Five Travelling and Working in South East Asia:­ 136-153 Australians Confront the North

Conclusion 154-159

Bibliography 160-180 Looking North Acknowledgements

This thesis has been to greater and often smaller extents a part of my life for the past five years. Not surprisingly, its end is something of a welcome relief as well as providing a sense of accomplishment. While the views and work contained within this thesis are my own, it could never been completed without the help of many people.

My first thanks go to my supervisor, Professor John Ingleson. His guidance and patience over the length of this thesis have been invaluable. He managed to push me to greater efforts without pushing me over the edge. His particular understanding of my 'isolation' from the University and the need to work and live, at the same time as studying, made all the difference. The completion of this project could never have been achieved without his academic advise and input.

As with all things in my life, I have been strongly supported by friends and family. Special thanks go to my 'old' University friends, Sean Brawley and Susan Shaw, whose continuing friendship and interest in this thesis have meant much. Other friends who have always asked after the progress of my work and encouraged its completion include Anita Khosla, Dianne Montgomerie, and Marlene MacDonald. Pamela O'Hara has been my friend and constant support for the last six years. Her continued love and encouragement of all I do, can never be underestimated. John has put up with my visits from the early Narellan days and has always made me welcome in his home.

My special network of friends within the Postgraduate Section at UNSW, have also provided special support, not just of my University studies, but of my life generally. Many of the faces have changed, but the interest and nagging of me to finally submit, have remained constant. Particular mention of Jane Gatwood and Anne Gordon needs to be made, as they have been there from the beginning. Anne in particular has become a friend and ally in the joys of postgraduate study. The new comers to the 'Nicole Adler Thesis Saga' have been no less supportive. The constant humour of Edwina has made work at UNSW a pleasure, and she along with my other lunch Looking North Acknowledgements i i time buddies, Anne and Jill, have always given me an excuse do something else besides my thesis.

Ben O'Hara, is of course the one who bore the brunt of this thesis. His love and understanding can never be measured. He gave me a confidence in myself that others could not see. Any success I have in the future will be partly his. Our friendship will always continue.

As has always been the case my family are my strongest support. My sister Penny is there for me always and even with her busy life, and as we live far apart, she is a constant source of friendship, love and strength. Peter, Dorian and Millicent are as dear to me as family can be. They are what makes everything else have value.

My final thanks go to my mother Val, to whom this thesis is dedicated. Everything I am, or will be, I owe to her. She has always given unfailing and unquestioning support and love. She has never doubted me and more importantly she has made me believe that I can achieve anything. She certainly made it possible for me to complete this thesis. This work is not completed just because of her moral support. It is completed because of the number of times she was a proof reader for me; the suggestions, or should I say corrections, she made to both my grammar and my spelling; the financial support she has given me throughout my University years; and the new found interest she displayed in all things South East Asian. While this thesis, is in the end, my accomplishment, the fact that I had the good fortune to attend University and develop an interest in history is hers.

Nicole Adler March 1996 Lookiq North Introduction 1

HN1'RODUCTiON

Australian Independence and the Search for a Foreign Policy

In late 1993, Professor Stephen Fitzgerald, Chairman of the Asia-Australia Institute at The University of , giving the annual lecture at the St James Ethics Centre, spoke critically of Australia's approach to Asia. Australian business interests went for the

.... short haul, the quick return and profit jackpot. .... Instead of providing leadership in the public discussion on Australia's involvement with Asia, he said Australian education institutions went to Asia for the money. The change was led by people who had no knowledge of or intellectual interest in the societies they visited ... .1

Fitzgerald believed that Australia's discovery of Asia had been largely unplanned and ill conceived.

The result is that our engagement with Asian countries have tended to be a succession of waves of collective enthusiasm, without thought, without context, dominated by short-term material goals.2

Indeed, it is very difficult to make a case for Australia ever having viewed Asia in general, or South East Asia (SEA) in particular, differently. Even if SEA was not taken as a whole and we focus only on Australia's nearest neighbour, Indonesia, it is hard to judge the importance of each nation to the other. There seems to be a general assumption that, at least politically, Indonesia is very important to Australia. The question is whether or not Indonesia feels the same way about Australia. When Australia and Indonesia are concerned with defence or foreign affairs they both tend to look north. This leaves Indonesia looking away from Australia.

111te Australian, November 10, 1993, pg 1 2The Australian, November 10, 1993, pg 2 Looking North Introduction 2

History also conspired to make it difficult for Australia to even speak with its own voice, rather than that of the Empire. It is this independence that was at the crux of Aus~ralia's relations with SEA in the inter-war years. The issue of exactly when Australia gained her 'independence' from Great Britain has been dealt with by many writers and, for the purposes of this thesis, the exact timing is not as important as the extent to which Australia was truly independently governed. In the main

It will be seen that the major steps in the independence process can be isolated, that the process began in 1917 and effectively ended with the Statute of Westminster in 1931, that Australia in general opposed the process. Other struggled for independence; Australia struggled for continuing dependence and, frustrated, tried to proceed as though independence had not occurred.3

Even prior to the cessation of hostilities in World War I, Australia was struggling with its desire to represent its own interests in the expected new world while, at the same time, remaining loyal to Great Britain. Australia wanted a voice, but essentially a voice that would sing in complete harmony with the 'motherland'. The exact form this new relationship would take was viewed differently by different people. Prime Minister William Morris Hughes wanted "Australian influence in the formation and execution of empire policy, with the whole empire at Australia's call if that policy should misfire."4 Others like Dr Walter Henderson, who became head of the new External Affairs Branch of the Prime Minister's Department, did not believe that Australia needed any form of independence from Great Britain. For Henderson, Australia's

····:Population was British, her trade was mainly British, her investment sources principally were British, she had few contacts with the world outside the empire, and these few could be handled through connections.5

3W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp, Australian Independence: to Reluctant Kingdom, Melbourne University Press, 1988, pp 6-7 4W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp, Australian Independence .... , pg 70 5W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp, Australian Independence .... , pg 88 Looking North Introduction 3

From today's stand-point it is often impossible for Australians to comprehend what the really meant. Nevertheless, it was this often highly emotional tie which was at the crux of so many of the decisions made by Australia in the early post-war years. To better understand Australia's bond with Great Britain is to better understand her lack of ties with SEA.

Australia had for its first hundred years of white colonisation focused solely on its own borders. It was too busy maintaining a tenuous hold on a relatively hostile landscape. There was no time, or energy, left to look beyond its own shores. As the nation grew into the 1900s, this attitude changed. Australians now had the luxury of looking further afield but, for many years, further afield still meant Britain and Europe. In time, looking beyond Australia's borders meant looking at all of Asia.

It is difficult to assess whether or not Australians in the 1920s and 1930s had a concept of regions in Asia. Perhaps they viewed colonised countries, like Malaya and the NEI, differently than independent nations like Thailand and Japan. This would certainly explain the fact that relations with the countries we now term as SEA, seemed easier in developing. The presence of another colonial power seemed to act as a bridge in forging relations. Nevertheless, it was generally accepted that Asia could be viewed as a whole. What occurred in one area could readily be applied to another and Australian attitudes could be fitted into a broader Asia framework.

The end of the war produced two, almost contradictory, responses from Australia. The British proved itself to be no more than a co-operative confederacy, "Its war-time unification ended with the war-time emergency; when peace came its scattered members were emphatic in asserting before the world that they had come of age as individual nations."6 Unfortunately, after the promising beginning that Hughes made at Versailles, it seemed that successive conservative governments were content ".... .in the field of foreign relations, almost to revert to Australia's earlier quasi-colonial status, ..... ".7

6w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 124 7Russel Ward, A Nation for a Continent: The 1901-1975, Heinemann Educational Australia, Melbourne, 1977, pg 125 Looking North Introduction 4

Australia, it seemed, found herself in a real quandary - not yet a fully grown adult, but no longer the dependent child of the earlier twentieth century.

The truth is that the war had shown the mother country to be so much less omnipotent than the men of the early Commonwealth had believed her to be. The moral was that Australia, though much more important in her own right than before, was also much more totally dependent on her junior partnership with Britain - or some other distant protector.8

Since 1917, the dominions had been receiving summary reports from the Colonial Office in London. The problem was that these snippets of information were, more often than not, out of date by the time they arrived in Australia. Hughes fought, if for nothing else, to make Australia better informed - what Australia did with this information is the story to be told later.

Australia's first moves towards representing itself on the world stage began with Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference. Although speaking specifically of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, T.B. Millar's view on foreign affairs could be readily applied to the 1920s and 1930s.

In foreign affairs, the main continuity has been simple inertia and apathy. There have been no significant Australian initiatives in the past twenty-five years and only a few in this century..... For the rest, there have been policies, changes of direction, emphasis, or tone, but Australia has been essentially a reactor rather than an actor on the world stage.9

The 1980s and 1990s have proved to be a better time for Australia. Initiatives in Cambodia, in particular, have shown that, as we have grown as a nation, so too has our place on the world stage grown. There was no doubt that apathy had existed, but through circumstances rather than desire. One hundred years as a colony could not be changed overnight. Although by today's standards and, perhaps even the standards of the 1920s, Australia

8Russel Ward, A Nation for a Continent.. .. , pg 127 9T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1978, pg 2 Lookin& North Introduction s was slow to develop a foreign policy, the efforts of Prime Minister Hughes after the end of World War I were worthy of being considered marked departures from what had gone before.10

It is not an easy task to demonstrate Hughes' opm1ons on Imperial connections, nor explain why he held such views. It would appear to W.J. Hudson in his book Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom, that Hughes "..... wanted no interference by the in Australia's internal affairs; he wanted freedom for Australia to operate in the international community but not to the point of sundering the existence of the empire as a unit, on which he saw Australia's security depending."11

This link between Empire unity and Australian security was at the very essence of Hughes' policy. For the purposes of the Paris Peace Conference, however, Hughes focused on three main topics:- those of reparations, the mandate territories, and racial equality. Hughes set about getting the best deal possible for Australia in a way that made him, if nothing else, impossible to ignore. Agreement was another matter.

Even before the Conference, Hughes had not been pleased with the way in which Australia was being treated. He was furious that the Versailles Council held in October and November 1918 did not include Australia. Referring to the importance of this meeting to Acting Prime Minister W.A. Watt in a cable on 6 November 1918, Hughes stated that,

..... the great point is that terms peace have been in effect settled, that Australia has not been consulted nor had any opportunity to state its views and that, although formal Peace Conference will follow, we shall be limited to Wilson's 14 points, with such qualifications as are here set out.12

10The truth was that in the 1920s Australia did not compare well with many of the other Dominions who were making their name in foreign affairs. Canada, for example, had a minister in Washington in the early 1920s. By the end of 1929, Canada had extended this to include Paris, Tokyo and Geneva. 11W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp, Australian Independence .... , pg 67 12L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography. Volume 2 - The Little Digger 1914-1952, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1979, pg 355 Looking North Introduction 6

John Latham, who could in no way be said to be a Hughes-man, agreed that Australia had, indeed, been wronged, as did the likes of Cook and Sir Robert Garran. On this issue the Australian contingent was not to have Lloyd George on their side, as he had at one point expressed the opinion that the Dominions should not even be represented at the Conference.

Much of this opposition to Hughes and Australia may have been based on the fact that, personally, Hughes was not popular with many of the delegates at the Conference. It was well known that Hughes and Prime Minister Lloyd George did not get on, and jokes about the two 'Welshmen' going head-to -head were rife. Smuts put it the simplest, by saying that "Hughes gets on Lloyd George's nerves".13 Borden commented that Hughes was "..... cranky and unworkable"14, and the relationship between Hughes and President Wilson balanced on the brink of open hostility. In this vein, two of Hughes comments about Wilson are, perhaps, the most amusing when in a letter to the Governor-General on 17 January 1919 after one week in Paris, he wrote,

Wilson is the god in the machine to the people outside: but his stock declines daily in spite of much fulsome and persistent puffing. Between ourselves he is rather a stick when it comes down to the facts of life. He is great on great principles. As to their application: he is so much like Alice in Wonderland that I suspect him of having sat in a former incarnation for that dear little lady to Lewis Carron.ls

And later in the same letter,

He regards the League of Nations as the great Charter of the World that is to be and sees himself through the roseate cloud of dreams officiating as the High Priest in the Temple in which the Sarcophagus or Ark containing the body or ashes of this amazing gift to Mankind is to rest in majestic seclusion for all

13L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Diggerr .... , pg 364 14L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 365 l5L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger.... , pg 373 Looking North Inboduction z

time. Give him a League of Nations and he will give us all the rest. Good. He shall have his toy.16

An American , also at the Conference, commented on the way Hughes,

..... morning, noon and night bellows at poor Lloyd George that if race equality is recognized in the preamble or any of the articles of the Covenant, he and his people will leave the Conference bag and baggage. Even the President, usually so restrained not to say formal in his language, says Hughes is 'a pestiferous varmint' - but still he represents a continent.17

In fact, the only delegate who seemed to have a genuine liking for Hughes was Clemenceau, and that may just have been because they were united in their dislike of Wilson.

For all his dislike of Wilson, Hughes unwittingly played into the hands of the American by speaking so openly and so forcefully against the racial equality clause. Sean Brawley in his book, The White Peril, outlines the political machinations which resulted in Wilson coming out of Versaille virtually unscathed in relation to the race issue. Hughes' most strident opposition to the clause in all its formats, gave Wilson the escape he needed. In the end America was not even called upon to publicly express its opinion one way or the other, and for this it could thank Hughes.

Hughes for his part, while not thrilled at the prospect of being left holding the bag when the clause was defeated, was not beyond giving his own parting shot at Wilson. After the defeat of the proposal, Hughes called a press conference with sections of the Japanese media to explain that Australia alone could not be held responsible. While not openly stating it was the Americans to which he was referring, Hughes made it clear to all that America was his target. He concluded that

16L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 373. Unfortunately for Hughes he did not in fact get 'all the rest' from Wilson. 17Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles, Prentice-Hall Inc, New York, 1946 Looking North Introduction 8

it is not only contemptible but absurd to say that Australia alone is responsible for the rejection of the amendment. The Japanese people are not fools but on the other hand are very keen and wise people and they will know how to interpret correctly the motives of these so-called friends of Japan who have circulated these insidious rumours.18

Hughes seemed solely unconcerned about the reactions of others to his behaviour. He was there to represent Australia to the best of his ability and, if his antics upset other delegates then that was their problem. It must be noted to the credit of Hughes that had he not fought long and hard for representation,Versailleswould have been much more a vehicle of 'The Big Four' than became the case. Not surprisingly, on his return to Australia Hughes was more than happy to play the conquering hero. However, it should be remembered that, just as Hughes had saved Wilson, so too, Wilson's declaration that the majority decision not be carried, stopped the issue of racial equality in its tracks.

In regard to the issue of control of New Guinea and, indeed, all the mandate territories, Hughes saw a direct link with Australian security and the White Australia Policy. Even at the 1918 Imperial Conference held in London, Latham, then the Naval Staff Officer accompanying the Minister of Defence, expressed Australian concerns about the security of the Pacific islands to the north of Australia once the war was over. In this, he shared the worries of Hughes at Versaille.

While many other authors have covered the complex negotiations surrounding the mandate territories, it is important to record here several aspects, events and comments which illustrate the Australian position. In October 1918 The Times published extracts from an article by Marquis Okuma, a former Prime Minister of Japan, on 'Peace Problems and the Future of the Japanese Empire'. The article claimed that Japan should have continued possession of the Marshall, Caroline and Ladrone Islands. Upon reading the piece, Hughes was prompted to write a 'most secret' letter to Lloyd George making him aware of Australia's extreme concerns over this position held by Japan. He reminded Lloyd George of "Australia's deeply

18Sean Brawley, The White Peril, Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-1978, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1995, pp 27-28 Looking North Introduction 9 rooted mistrust of Japan" and sought "to enter an emphatic protest against Japan's right or even claim to the islands mentioned by Marquis Okuma."19 Lloyd George's reply gave an indication of what the Empire's stand at the Paris Peace Conference might be.

It is clear that His Majesty's Government can neither now or at the Peace Conference, go back on this official assurance without committing a breach of faith of which no Australian Government would wish them to be guilty. I am confident that you will not assist the enemies of the Empire by exposing before the nations in council a difference of opinion on a point with regard to which Britain has obviously no selfish interest, and the honour of the two great Australasian Dominions is no less pledged than that of the Mother Country. Let me further point out that if successful objection were made from a foreign quarter to Japan retaining possession of the German Pacific Islands north of the Equator, it would probably be on the plea of 'no annexations' and would equally apply to our retention of islands south of the Equator.20

Lloyd George was clearly indicating to Hughes that there was no way in which Australia was going to get complete satisfaction regarding the islands. The proceedings of the Conference were to bear this out, but none of this stopped Hughes from repeating the Australian position. A memo by Hughes on Australia and the Pacific to the British Empire Delegation spelt out clearly what Hughes was about.21 On this issue, Wilson once again

19L.f. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 348 20L.f. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger ... , pg 350 21Latham Papers, MS 1009/21/1300-1304. Memo by Hughes to the British Empire Delegation: Australia and the Pacific Islands, 6th Feb 1919. "Australia has seen, in the United States of America and elsewhere, the evils which follow from the introduction into a country of large populations of widely different race, type and habits of life - a population which cannot, without the most disastrous social and racial consequences, either be absorbed or remain unabsorbed. And she is resolved that, at any cost and at any sacrifice, Australia shall be kept free from these evils." Referring to the issue of Mandate Territories in the Bismarck Archipelago, "Now with regard to the whole of this group, the Australian demand - backed by the overwhelming weight and force of Australian public opinion - is that Australia must have the unfettered power to control them, in all matters which affect her defence and her security, as an integral part of her territory ...... ln Looking North Introduction 10 confronted Hughes. Telling his story of the man buying real estate who would not stop as long as anyone else owned land adjoining his, Wilson sought to lessen the importance of Australia's concerns by trivialising them. Australia's display of a fundamental lack of faith in the League was not a trivial matter for Wilson. In this, he was right on the mark. In The Sun on 4th February 1919, Hughes made the point that a satisfactory solution to the Mandate question had not been found. "There has been no solution, but a reference to a body which does not exist."22

Another reason why Hughes was unlikely to get full satisfaction in relation to the mandate territories was that Wilson had been left in the position of ensuring that Japan save face after the defeat of the racial equality clause. America had to now 'side with Japan' in relation to both the mandate territories north of the equator as well Japanese claims in China. While at the outset Wilson may have believed that Japanese claims on China should not be granted, within a few months he was trading them against the defeat of the racial equality clause. The President in the end, conveyed to the Chinese delegation a message that said he was 'very sorry he had been unable to do more for China, but that he had been compelled to accede to Japan's demands in order to save the League of Nations'.23

The League of Nations was accepted not least because of its appeal to a weak nation. Nevertheless, acceptance was mingled with scepticism about its ability to perform its role as a securer of peace. Hughes, in a speech to Parliament in 1921, asked "If, then, any Australian is asked whether he will trust his fortunes to the League of Nations or to the sea power of the British Empire, will he hesitate for one moment in his answer?"24 As Bruce was to say,

No one has greater hopes than I, or greater belief in the League of Nations, but anyone who says that a nation may be careless of particular, she must have full power to control immigration into these territories, and full power to control trade with them. They are in fact the back door to Australia, and the effective guarding of the door requires the exclusive control of them all." 221ne Sun, 4/12/1919 23Sean Brawley, The White Peril, Foreign Relations .... , pg 33 24Piesse Papers, MS 882/7 /192. Speech by Rt. Hon.W.M. Hughes (Parliamentary Debates 7 April 1921). Looking North Introduction 11

its own defence at this time, and may rely upon the League of Nations to save it should its hour of trial arise, is only deceiving himself.25

It was hoped by all that there would never again be an occasion for war, but if the League was to take its part in ensuring that peace, then it needed to play a part in areas that member nations, most definitely Australia included, saw as solely within domestic jurisdiction. The most obvious of these areas was immigration and it was this perceived link between immigration and the racial equality clause that saw its ultimate defeat. Immigration control was at the very essence of the White Australia Policy and this, as far as Australia was concerned, was not negotiable, no matter what its impact on the functioning of the League. For Australia it was an issue of self government, and the failure of the United States to ratify the League displayed in the strongest terms the importance that nation placed on immigration control. The choice of nationalism over all else had been made.

* * *

At Versaille it was also decided that an Imperial Conference be summoned as soon as was feasibly possible. It was obvious, after the performance of various Dominions at the peace talks, that it was necessary for Empire members to clarify just where the British Empire stood. What power did Great Britain now have over the Dominions and, more particularly, what rights did the Dominions have to really act on their own behalf?

In Hughes' biography, Fitzhardinge stated that the aim of the Conference was to,

..... review the constitutional arrangements of the Empire and, recognizing both the autonomous national status of the Dominions and their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, to provide effective arrangements for

25Gordon Greenwood (ed), Australia: A Social and Political History, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1955, pg 288 Looking North lnb'Oductiog 12

continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.26

In many ways it seemed that Australia simply wanted the appearance of independence, but was not keen on acting on that freedom. Latham, who attended the previous Imperial Conference, believed that just because Australia could speak for itself "..... was no reason for it to express its own separate views; what was required was an Imperial foreign policy."27 For Hughes the issue was, more often than not, one of communication. He wanted Australia's voice heard in foreign affairs and, more importantly, he wanted Australia kept completely up-to-date on what was happening in the Empire. In a speech at the Conference Hughes said that,

If the Dominions were to have a continuing voice in foreign policy, their governments must be 'in the closest possible touch with you and with each other', and must know 'not when the thing is done, but before the thing is done, what is intended or what is desired to be done.' At present delays in transmission were such that even direct cables between prime ministers were usually anticipated by the press.28

The Chanak Incident was proof of just how little Great Britain did consult the Dominions. The incident, which occurred in September 1922, involved Lloyd George requesting dominion troops to support a United Kingdom force at Chanak under threat from Turkish nationalist forces. Of the other dominions, Canada refused, South Africa did not reply, and only responded immediately in the affirmative. Hughes was outraged by the United Kingdom's actions for several reasons. Firstly, he saw it as England trying to take the entire Empire into a war without any consultation. Secondly, he was angered by the fact that the press knew about the appeal made for troops before the Australian Government was officially notified. It seems that the British Government had not taken the problem

26L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 459 27Michael Dunn, Australia and the Empire; From 1788 to the Present, Fontana/Collins, Sydney, 1984, pp 104-105 28L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 468 Looking North Inb'Oduction 13 of time differences into account. Finally, Hughes had already publicly stated that he rather admired the Turks. In a private letter from Hughes to Lloyd George his anger is all too apparent.

And as it would appear that the Press was notified before your telegram reached me of the fact that you contemplated hostilities, and that the Dominions were asked to associate themselves with Britain and send contingents, the Commonwealth Government found itself in most (sic) embarrassing position of being asked to decide not between peace and war, for Britain had already determined that issue without consultation with the Commonwealth, but whether after Britain had decided to go to war and had notified the Press that she had asked the Dominions whether they wished to join her, it was impossible for us in all circumstances to say that we could not do so. The point the Commonwealth Government desires to emphasize most strongly is this, that consultation with the Dominions ought to take place before any action is taken or irrevocable decision is made by Britain, as then and then only can our voices be heard and our counsel heeded. Either the Empire is one and indivisible or it is nothing ...... ! feel that I ought to speak quite frankly and say that the unity of the Empire is gravely imperilled by such action.29

Reporting back to Parliament after the 1921 Imperial Conference, Hughes heralded the way in which he believed Australia should be heading in the field of foreign relations.

It may be that there are still some people in Australia who regard Foreign Affairs as something outside the realm of practical politics, which do not concern us, or with which Britain acting alone can and ought to deal. This, I believe, is not the view of this House, nor of the bulk of the people of Australia.30

29Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1983, pg 238 30Australian Parliamentary Papers, Volume 97, 30 September 1921, pg 11632 Looking North Introduction 14

Given what had gone before, Australia had made a remarkable entry into the world of foreign affairs. Hughes had done all he could to place Australia firmly at the centre of Empire matters and it is this that gave Australia the freedom, and perhaps confidence, to progress further. Australia's contact with Asia was never going to be easy. Its role models were the British in and Malaya, the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the NEI. Links with Asia were based around European nations colonising Asian nations. Australia had to develop a new approach.

The 1920s and 1930s were always going to present Australia with a conundrum. Memories of World War I were still fresh and the vast majority of Australians had a genuine fear of invasion and, more specifically, threats to their freedom and way of life. The fact that invasion from an Asian nation in this period may never have been a real possibility, in no way lessened the fears. No matter how irrational they may seem in hindsight, they existed, and they coloured Australian perceptions and actions.

What is being assessed is, given that Australia was leaping into new areas, why was it establishing contacts with SEA, and were the mistakes that it was making justified in the circumstances? Australia's main mistakes in the inter-war period in relation to SEA, stemmed from a swing between wanting to run before it could walk and not understanding why it needed to run at all. Australia wanted to sell its flour to the NEI, but it did not take the time to work out the best way to achieve this; it wanted to feel safe from invasion, so it helped build a naval base rather than helping to make friends. Australia was, of course, no different to any other nation; the rules on foreign relations were not set in stone. Much was, and still is, trial and error. What was important was did Australia's actions match its rhetoric - the answer, I would say, was no. Looking North White Ausbalia 15

CHAJPTJEJR ONJB

The White Australia Policy and Perceptions of South East Asia

When Europeans expropriated the last available continent from its Aboriginal people in the late eighteenth century, they set about establishing Australia as the only Western society, apart from New Zealand, in the Asia-Pacific hemisphere. In the process, if they so decided, they could jettison the European imperial practice of exploiting colonised people. They could reject Orientalism: the European vision of all Eastern peoples as exotic, remote, inferior, and subject to the political, military, economic, cultural, and sexual dominance of the West. It didn't happen as we know.1

So begins Alison Broinowski's wonderful account of Australian attitudes to, and perceptions of, Asia over the past two centuries. Given the times it was, perhaps, a little unreasonable to have expected Australians to embrace Asia. Australia was set up as colony. It would take a great deal of time and effort to unload the burdens of the past.

If it is possible to generalise at all in this matter, it would be fair to say that Australians saw Asia as a threat. They were threatened by the possibility of cheap labour flooding their shores; they were threatened by the disease these people would obviously bring; they were threatened by the belief that, at any given time, all of Asia might strike out against them and, with force, physically invade their country.

All these beliefs and prejudices were conveyed through the various media and art form of the times in such a way that they became common place. Anti-Asian hostility was the subject matter of everything from newspaper

1Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992, pg 2 Looking North White Australia 16 articles to films, from cartoons to novels. Cartoons and illustrations were among some the more powerful images presented about Asians, not least because of their wide readership.

In particular, it is necessary to look no further than the cartoons appearing in The Bulletin, a magazine which for almost 60 years carried the statement under its title of 'Australia for the Australians'. During the 1920s, 30s and beyond, Asians were presented as " a pestiferous insect plague, an Oriental dragon, or a Mongolian octopus whose tentacles wormed into every hallowed Australian institution, a venal usurper of Australian jobs, and a creeping threat to their wives and daughters."2

No Asian could escape these preconceptions. As it is with all racism, the entirety of Asia was tarred with the same brush. It was not possible for there to be different Asian countries, or for the people in those countries to have different behavioural patterns. The assumption was that any Asian was interchangeable with any other. This concept was most dominant in the film media where extras played both Australian settlers, then aborigines with black put on their faces, and finally Asians by having a stocking pulled over their head.

Some commentators even fell back on Darwinian theories of the Asiatics being unable to compete against the industrial might of the West. Asians were simply not fit enough to survive. The concept of 'race' within scientific circles reached its peak in the hundred or so years between 1840 and 1950. During the first twenty or so years in this period many scientists on both sides of the Atlantic were putting forward theses, based around similar assumptions. These arguments revolved around the concept that racial differences caused individual differences in ability and temperament, and that race was the driving force of history.

Darwin's Origin of Species published in 1859, added strength to these ideas. For the rest of the century scientific arguments were used to justify political actions in relation to western expansionism and colonialism. Social Darwinism, as the name suggests, grew out of the ideas expressed in Origins of Species. His two main concepts of evolution and survival of the fittest, when combined with already existing attitudes on race, produced an

2Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady:.... , pg 9 Looking North White Australia 17

ideology very attractive to colonial powers. These ideas can be summarised as follows; 1 I Separate races are in fact separate species which have developed through natural selection and survival of the fittest. 2/ Cultural differences can be analysed the same way as genetic differences 3/ The survival or otherwise of cultures is ruled by these 'natural laws'. 4/ The same can be said of individuals within the groups, as of the groups themselves.

Social Darwinism, then, established a framework against which white colonial powers dealt with coloured peoples whom they had conquered. Within white Australia, the early twentieth century was a period for establishing laws and practices to institutionalise the ideas of Social Darwinism. The contradiction in Australia's attitudes came, though, in relation to its fear of Asian invasion. Asians were supposedly inferior, yet successive Australian governments and individual Australians spent many years setting up mechanisms to protect themselves from the 'Asian threat'. A force that, no matter how inferior, had the potential to completely overrun the entire nation and break down the entire fabric of Australian society. Australians of the 1920s and 1930s may not even have been aware of this contradiction themselves, so strong was the indoctrination of Social Darwinism.

Australia's ideas and beliefs took shape against a 19th Century European background and as Stargardt has argued "If any one belief can be described as ideological in Australian public life until the second world war, it was the fear of Asia and the unquestioned need for 'White Australia"'.3 This European background revolved around the believed application of Darwinian theory which obtained a degree of currency in Australia. For Australia, racial questions were based on the so called White Australia Policy (WAP), and it was this policy that was at the centre of all race related issues.

The realization and defence of a 'White Australia' came quickly to be seen as a 'settled policy' of the new nation. Racial homogeneity was felt to be important to Australia as

3A.W. Stargardt, Australia's Asian Policy: The History of a Debate 1839-1972, The Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg, 1977, pg 143 Looking North White Australia 18

was naval supremacy to Britain or the Monroe Doctrine to the United States.4

Ken Rivett, in his work on immigration in Australia, defined an even more specific origin of the W AP. For him

... the history of the White Australia Policy is the story of response to pressure from Japan. Japan was a country able to claim equality with Western nations on their own terms, and the story of the policy necessarily moves from one of immigration legislation to one of defence and foreign policy. Both the defence and the foreign policy of the new Commonwealth emerged as a corollary of the White Australia doctrine.5

There is no denying that this was the case, but the W AP manifested itself in other ways and was perceived differently by different people

.... the White Australia policy exists on two levels. On one, it is the government's response to a general consensus - to keep Australia white and racially homogeneous. In this sense, it is a fixed, unquestioned objective of Australian society. But on the other level, the White Australia policy is the difficult and complex business of implementing the consensus.6

Senator Pearce believed that the chief objective of the WAP was entirely racial. Likewise, J.C. Watson, leader of the Labor Party in 1901, discounted any economic motive. He was primarily concerned with "The possibility of racial contamination."7 Humprey Mc.Queen's analysis was that the WAP

4A.T. Yarwood & M.J. Knowling, Race Relations in Australia: A History, Methuen Australia, Sydney, 1982, pg 225 5Kenneth Rivett (ed), Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?. The Background to 'White Australia' and a Proposal for Change, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1962, pg 15 6F.S. Stevens (ed), Racism: The Australian Experience, Vol I Prejudice and Xenophobia, Australian and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1971, Chapter 13, pg 136 7Kenneth Rivett, Immigration: Control or Colour Bar? .... , pg 14 Looking North White Australia 19

.... helped to create for the new nation a sense of identity, a mark of how it differed from other peoples in the region. It was a major force in the generation of Australian nationalism, as the perceived threat to racial purity and British/ Australian institutions performed the classic function of the external enemy.8

The concept that if Australia was populated by one race only, national unity and security would follow, was at the basis of early political attitudes. Australia's first Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, supported the White Australia Policy on what can only be described as racial grounds. Like most of his contemporaries he feared miscegenation and sought to control all coloured immigration. Deakin also supported restriction stating that "We here find ourselves touching the profoundest instinct of individual or nation - the instinct of self-preservation - for it is nothing less than the national manhood, the national character, and the national future that are at stake."9

Federation itself was seen as stemming from the need for racial unity. In a speech on 12 September 1901, Deakin claimed that no motive had been more powerful in bringing about Federation than

the desire that we should be one people without the admixture of other races ... .It is only necessary to say that they do not and cannot blend with us; that we do not, cannot, and ought not to blend with them .... Unity of race is an absolute essential to the unity of Australia.to

This 'unity of race' also meant for Deakin that the people involved must possess "the same general cast of character, tone of thought, the same constitutional training and traditions."11

8A.T. Yarwood & M.J. Knowling, Race Relations in Australia .... , pg 227 9H.I. London, Non-White Immigration and the "White Australia" Policy, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1970, pg 13. 10L.F. Fitzhardinge, W.M. Hughes: A Political Biography, Volume I, That Fiery Particle 1862-1914, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1964, pg 134 11W.K. Hancock, Australia, The Jacaranda Press, London, 1930 (1961 edition), pg 61 Looking North White Australia 20

The Immigration Restriction Act became law in December 1901 with the intention being to completely exclude coloured immigration from permanent residence. Deakin's major input to the development of the White Australia Policy, was to shore up in 1902, and again in 1905, loopholes that allowed the entry of wives and children of Australian residents under certain conditions. This change in policy was directly aimed at the approximately 30,000 Chinese already resident in Australia in 1901.

During the Deakin years, Australian contact with the world outside the United Kingdom was limited. Australians could voice their opinions on a White Australia without really having to defend them. World War I was to change that isolation forever and, Hughes as Prime Minister, was forced to be the spokesperson for the WAP. Not that this was necessarily something Hughes was not keen to do. All it meant was that it was essential to explain or justify the policy to the international community. Hughes used as his main weapons the perceived threat to Australian security and 'independence', and the right of individual countries to shape their own destiny. Given this, it was impossible for Hughes to separate the W AP from the perceived threat from Japan and, in turn, all of Asia.

L.F. Fitzhardinge, in his biography of Billy Hughes, wrote of this inability of the present day Australian to identify with the Australian of the 1910s and 1920s. Australian identification with Britain during this period was a matter of instinct, rather than reason. For a long time after World War I this attitude continued with Australians, irrespective of where they were born, referring to England as 'home'. Originally, the "settlement of Australia was seen as establishing a British island in an alien sea. Home news was English; England was home."12 Even though there were many Australians who distrusted 'the porns', the dominant opinion was acceptance of English values, way of life and right to lead Australian society.

Anglophiles within Australia maintained the belief that Australia's very prosperity depended on Britain and her navy. They believed that British imperialism represented the highest level of civilisation known to man.

12Zelman Cowan, "Australian Traditional Attitudes" from J.T.F.Jordens, The Generational Gap and Australian-Asian Relations. The Australian-Asian Association of , Melbourne, 1969, pg 10 Looking North White Australia 21

Anglo-Saxons had developed the democratic system and their pride in it made them assume that any other form of government was barbaric.

Against the apparent thinness of Australian life and the assumed mediocrity of Australians were set the challenges of sacred words ..... the Throne, the British heritage, the Mother of Parliaments, the Bank of England.13

The idea that. the Scullin Government would even think of suggesting that the Governor-General should be an Australian was, to many, an affront. There was also censorship of books which were deemed to be blaspheming the Empire. "The Australian people has sprung from transplanted British stock", and that is how it should remain.14 Australians may have identified themselves as "independent Australian Britons", but there was no doubting that the greater emphasis was laid on the latter word.15

The fact was that Australia saw itself as being more British than Britain. Writing in the late 1920s, W.K. Hancock quoted information from an official Year Book of the Commonwealth, which stated that 98 per cent of Australians in the last years of the 1920s were British subjects, born either in Australasia or the British Isles.

This does not mean that no more than 2 percent of Australians are of foreign origin. 'Non-Britishers' have played a far from negligible part in developing Australia, and they and their children number more than 10 percent of the population. Yet they have been so easily assimilated that the Australians, misreading the official figures, have persuaded themselves that they are '98 percent British' in blood - far more British, they are want to boast, than that diluted (and therefore inferior) mixture in the British Isles.16

13Donald Horne, The Australian People: Biography of a Nation, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, pg 207 14w.K.Hancock, Australia,.... , pg 24 tsw.K.Hancock, Australia .... , pg 50 t6w.K. Hancock, Australia .... , pg 38 Looking North White Australia 22

The Bulletin, for nearly 50 years one of the most influential mouthpieces in Australian press, went even further by claiming that " ..... the British race is better represented in Australia than in 'cosmopolitan and nigger-infested England' ."17

In 1916, Hughes visited Britain with one of the main reasons for his trip being "his concern about Japan's activities in the Pacific and her post-war position there in relation to Australia."18 Hughes maintained that, for him at least, it was not a matter of racial superiority, but rather of cultural differences. Given Hughes' approach throughout Versaille and in other international forum, this appears to be genuinely what he believed. Whether or not Hughes' views were shaped by opinions of race prevalent at the time, his primary concern was Australia's right to shape its own destiny. He held no illusions about the way other countries might perceive the WAP, but continued to insist that Australia be allowed to develop its own society and future, unhampered. Hughes' support of the WAP against League of Nations demands to have a racial equality clause placed in its charter was, in turn, supported by all Australia.

Not only Australia, but its Australasian neighbour, New Zealand, was concerned about the prospects of a racial equality clause and its possible impact on domestic policies, such as immigration. Many New Zealanders spoke of the White Australia Policy with the same fervour as did Australians, and the drafting of legislation had begun for their own version of a White New Zealand Policy. Again, contrary to what the United States or even Britain may have wanted everyone to believe, Australia and New Zealand were not alone in their reaction to the proposed clause. Both these great powers, as well as several of the other Dominions, were concerned at the possible ramifications of the proposal.

It was not always assumed by everyone that any international organisation would even contain non-Europeans. In the end, it was recognised that the non-white nations of the world could not be excluded from any league.

The war was not seen to have been just a white man's war, and therefore, Asia was entitled to discuss its peaceful resolution.

17w.K. Hancock, Australia .... , pg 50 18L.F Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 147 Looking North White Australia 23

If the west was still under the impression that Asia, though perhaps disturbed, was still asleep, it was wrong. One Occidental warned: "The rise of the East is the great new factor which we have only just begun to feel, but which all thinking men must either fear or welcome:•19

It seemed inevitable that Hughes would, eventually, encounter directly the Japanese who were also represented at Versaille. Hughes saw Japanese efforts to have an "explicit statement of the equality of races", placed in the covenant of the League of Nations, as an "insidious threat" to Australia.20 Hughes saw the racial equality clause as providing "non-European countries a legal and moral platform from which to launch a sustained attack on the ramparts of White Australia."21

While Hughes may have been singled out as the most vocal opponent of the racial equality clause, he was not the only one. Lord Balfour, while not directing his comments specifically at the Japanese, stated that the concept of all men being created equal "..... was an eighteenth-century proposition that he did not believe was true. There might be some sense in which all the people of one country were equal, but he did not believe 'that a man in Central Africa was created equal to a European'. "22

Not surprisingly, the Japanese were less than impressed by the outspoken Hughes. A Japanese report to the Japanese Foreign Minister contained the following summary of the Hughes position,

Hughes alone persisted along his stubborn solitary path: he was not unsympathetic to the Japanese stand; however as representing Australian public opinion he had no alternative but to express his opposition - root and branch; it was not a problem of drafting, ninety-five out of every hundred Australians would unite in rejecting the idea which underlay our proposal. The

19Sean Brawley, The White Peril, Ph.D. Thesis, UNSW 1991, pg 14 20L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 400 21Sean Brawley, The White Peril: Foreign Relations .... , pg 15 22L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pp 401-402 Looking North White Australia 24

other Prime Ministers were free to do as they liked - he would do what his duty demanded. So saying he left the meeting.23

The concerns of Hughes were based on the fact that he believed the Japanese claims for racial equality were nothing more than attempts to alter the immigration policies of countries like Australia. For Hughes, matters that were seen to be involving domestic policy such as immigration, were "not the proper subjects for inquiry for the leagues."24 Hughes claimed that, as the Japanese would not give him an undertaking in writing that immigration was not a part of the concept of a racial equality clause, then they must mean it to be. Hughes, therefore, could not accept the clause as it was a direct attack on the White Australia Policy. Sean Brawley in his Phd thesis, The White Peril, deals in some detail with this issue of race equality being linked to the immigration issue. More importantly, Brawley rightly brings out the point that, in many ways, Hughes became a fall-guy for Wilson and the United States. Most historians have pointed to Hughes as the main and, indeed, sole opponent of the Japanese proposal. A careful analysis of the American position shows this not to be the case.

Most attention had been focused on America's early position, which was one of tacit support for the clause. What was not sufficiently revealed was the change in American attitude which showed increased reluctance to accept the Japanese proposal. Just like Hughes, Wilson found himself having to take note of growing public concern back home about the effects the racial equality clause would have on immigration policy. Bowing to the clear pressure of his own people Wilson, in an interview in the Chicago Daily Tribune, stated that

Any declaration in the constitution of race equality or just treatment which may be construed to give the League jurisdiction over immigration, naturalisation, elective franchise, land ownership and marriage should be avoided.25

23L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger .... , pg 404 24Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIX, 10 September 1919, pp 12174-76 25Sean Brawley, The White Peril .... , pg 18 Looking North White Australia 25

Unlike Hughes, Wilson was not willing to appear to be in opposition to the Japanese. If the true stand of the United States had been made obvious, clearly less would have been made of Hughes' objections.

The desire of Hughes to state the Australian position meant that the American delegation could claim to Japan that the changes to the clause were made in order to gain British Empire approval. It was not necessary to point out, it just so happened, that this concurred with American public opinion. Perhaps the most startling act by Wilson was to not pass the majority decision vote on the inclusion of the racial equality clause. Wilson, who was chair of the session at which the Japanese demanded once and for all a vote, ruled that while 11 of the possible 17 votes supported an amendment, it could not be passed. The reason, he claimed, was that it was not unanimous. Other majority vote decisions had supposedly been allowed to pass, as there were no serious objections from the minority voters. This, he stated, was not the case with the racial equality clause. Thus, Wilson successfully manoeuvred to have the motion defeated without the Americans having to show their hand.26

Likewise, the other Dominions also saw the advantages to themselves of isolating Hughes on this issue. Everyone it seems was saved by Hughes' objections. Consequently, the racial equality clause turned from a British Empire thing into an Australian thing. Hughes could not have been pleased at being left 'holding the bag', but what other alternatives where left open to him?

Unlike Hughes, Scullin in his years in office was rarely called upon to defend the WAP. There was no doubting Scullin believed that "to be patriotic was to be an advocate of 'White Australia'."27 His fullest defence of the policy occurred in 1926 when he stated that "I believe first in maintaining the purity of the Australian race. "28 Importantly, he acknowledged that the industrial and economic aspects had to be considered in addition to the racial ones.

26Sean Brawley, The White Peril .... , pg 26 27John Robertson, /.H. Scullin: A Political Biography, University of Press, 1974, pg 120 28John Robertson, /.H. Scullin:.... , pg 121 Looking North White Australia 26

Mainstream Australians were initially far from happy about having Asians as their neighbours. This is not to say that members of such groups as the Institute of Pacific Relations or The Round Table were not more liberal in their outlook, but they were the minority. Most Australians saw Asians having territorial ambitions on Australia; ambitions that involved taking their land, their gold, and their women. Australians saw to their north " ..... vast reservoirs of yellow humanity, whose outpourings, if unchecked, would ruin what she held most precious - the economic and racial foundations of her homogenous egalitarian society."29 The facts were that " ..... Australians and their leaders were unreceptive to any ideas coming from Asia, Australians simply had a blank mind on Asia; a total lack of interest."30 In the 1920s and 1930s Australia wanted to be left alone.

Just as Hughes was one of the first to push foreign policy analysis in Australia so, too, he was one of the first to look at Asia. True, his views were based on years of stereotypes, but at least he was recognising that Australia could no longer remain alone .

..... we dwell on the very threshold of the mystic East, with which we have nothing in common. When we tum our eyes outwards - which we do but rarely - we look not towards our nearest neighbours, the teeming millions of the East, who gaze with envious eyes towards this rich and spacious land, but to that far-off country from which we or our fathers come.31

W.K. Hancock finishes his book, Australia, with the following paragraph,

One hundred years ago Australia was still a gaol. Some of her greatest cities are less than a century old. The poets have seen truly that Australia's life is in the future. It may extend through European centuries; it may be short. Australia lies opposite an awakening Asia. She shares a civilisation whose destiny is beyond prediction.32

29w.K. Hancock, Australia .... , pg 50 30Zelman Cowan, "Australian Traditional Attitudes", pg 11 31W.M. Hughes, "Australia and World Politics", from The Royal Australian Historical Society Journal, Vol XII, Part N, 1926, pg 192 32w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 271 Looking North White Australia 27

With all that has gone before, one wonders just who was awakening - Asia or Australia.

* *

There were many, both inside and outside politics, who were trying to show that the WAP was not about race. This was not an easy task as many commentators of the time were advocating one view one minute, and an apparently opposing view the next. An author could emphasise the need for "white races abandoning the idea that all coloured people are inferior beings."33, while at the same time claiming that

It should not be difficult to enforce a law making any coloured man found in any State liable to imprisonment and deportation unless he could produce a passport granting him permission.34

We are still left with the question - if the WAP was not about race, what was it about? Returning to the ideas put forward by Ken Rivett, it was clear to him that

The concept of 'White Australia' emerges as a response, first to a wave of immigration, widespread but special in character, then to an intense but uneasy consciousness of the appearance of a military threat which the young nation seemed unable to meet. There are no grounds for thinking that it was ever the most appropriate or accurate response to either situation.35

Whether or not the WAP was the right response, it appeared to be the only response Australia had. If it was not simply about race, it was still about the

33E. Pottinger, Asiatic Problems Affecting Australia, Robertson and Mullens Limited, Melbourne, 1928, pg 5 34E. Pottinger, Asiatic Problems .... , pg 66 35Kenneth Rivett, Immigration: Control or Colour Bar? .... , pg 27 Looking North White Australia 28 notion that "internal racial conflicts create social and political difficulties that should be avoided as far as practicable."36

The concern for men like Latham was that the W AP was turning into a battle between Australia and Japan. In June 1919, Edmund Piesse, Director of the Prime Minister's Department (Pacific Branch), visited Japan. On his return he began to strongly advise the Government to once and for all address the issue of the WAP. In the initial phases he called for at least a toning down of public statements on the policy. Piesse was not denying that race was an intergral part of the WAP, he just believed that, in order to survive, the WAP must be justified on the international scene on economic grounds. Piesse's main contention was that the racial aspects of the policy be down played and the economic ones brought to the fore.

Those within academic circles, who were doing their best to forge new relations with Australia's neighbours, were also doing everything they could to avoid the use of the term 'White Australia'. The Australian delegation to the Honolulu Conference in 1925 was of the opinion that the term incorrectly placed the race issue at the forefront.

The term, "immigration policy", in that it is non-committal and is more in accord with the facts, has therefore been used in its place. But, of course, the more customary term is that employed within Australia and in other countries.37

Stephen Roberts in the same article was wont to point out that it had not escaped the attention of people within the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) that, while, "In the Act, no specific country or race is anywhere mentioned and, although all knew that it was primarily against Asiatic immigrants, it is not primarily on a racial basis."38

360.B. Copland, "Australia's Century of Progress" from The Listener, Vol 10, No 251, 1 November 1933, pg 658 37 A4311l1 - 16415, Australian Archives. Stephen H. Roberts, "Australian View of Pacific Relations", pp 61-62 38A4311/1 - 164/5, Australian Archives. Stephen H. Roberts, "Australian View of Pacific Relations", pp 61-62 Looking North White Australia 29

In an article entitled "What of the Pacific?; A Searchlight on its Problems", H Duncan Hall and J.B. Condliffe wrote, when referring to the IPR, that

At the Institute the Australian group studiously avoided the use of the term 'White Australia', which they insisted placed a racial emphasis upon our immigration policy, that the policy itself did not justify. They insisted upon the right of sovereignty in the matter of immigration. They emphasised the economic and the democratic basis of Australia's Immigration Act. They pointed out that in conquering a peculiarly difficult economic environment, and in making its resources available to the world, the Australian people had done good service to humanity.39

Curiously enough, Chinese and Japanese delegates at the Conference were more interested in America's exclusion policy than they were in Australia's exclusion policy. Perhaps it was the very nature of the IPR conferences that made them untypical of mainstream views. After all, those present were there because they believed in a concept of regional co-operation, rather than of isolation. As the delegates to the various conferences were to discover

Nothing is so confounding to feelings of race superiority, ...... as to be brought into intimate contact with highly cultivated individuals belonging to races which are usually thought of generically, often with some adjective of color attached - yellow, brown, black or white.40

Articles written for circulation amongst Round Table Members were also trying to point out the non-racial aspects of the WAP, some less successfully than others. One claim being made was that the desire by Australia to exclude coloured races was

... not in any way an assertion of race superiority. It turns almost entirely upon the effect of differences of outlook and

39Officer Papers, MS 2629/6/313-316, H. Duncan Hall & J.B. Condliffe, "What of the Pacific?: A Searchlight on its Problems", pg 8 40Sir W. Harrison Moore, "The Institute of Pacific Relations", from The Australian Quarterly, Vol 4, No 13, March 1932, pg 38 Looking North White Australia 30

culture on the life of a modern democratic community and their tendency to destroy standards of social conduct which have been built up by generations of common effort in a community which shared common ideals. 41

Hughes, for example, may have sympathised with such opinions. In an article where it was also stated that "Actual exhibitions of race prejudice are rare in Australia"42, it is difficult to accept wholly the above argument. Nevertheless, the idea that racial prejudice was not a prevalent, let alone dominant, factor in Australian society had its supporters. W.E.H. Stanner writing the introduction in a book entitled Racism: The Australian Experience, published in 1971, believed that the issue of race only came into the spotlight in reaction to some sort of perceived threat to Australian security.

Australian racialism could, perhaps, have shallower roots than some of us may have supposed. Where peoples other than the Aborigines were concerned, it seems to have been a thing of occasion or situation. In the absence of cause, it lapsed or hung on only in fringe-mentalities. To bring it to the fore, a manifest threat to domestic or national securities seemed needed.43

If we are to accept Stanner's argument, it may help explain why the White Australia Policy was eventually abandoned with relatively little tension. Is racism any less abhorrent if it is only expressed 'on occasion' and when the individuals are, perhaps, not even aware of their own motives? Australians during this period were not merely trying to cover basic racist attitudes by covering them in fancy arguments about cultural unity. There was a real and powerful belief that individuals who were unlike them, would simply not fit in and neither group would be satisfied.

41iatham Papers, MS1009/19/117-127, Article written by a member of the Victorian Group of The Round Table circulated for Group Criticism 42Latham Papers, MS1009/19/117-127, Article written by a member of the Victorian Group of The Round Table circulated for Group Criticism 43F.S. Stevens (ed), Racism: The Australian Experience, Vol 1.... , pg 13 Looking North White Australia 31

The vital thing to remember in respect of the W AP was that "... Australians speak with discordant voices on the subject of migration, although they present an almost united front where White Australia is concerned."44 The simple fact was that the WAP had the whole-hearted support of the Australian public. Not just the workers, who saw it as protecting their job rights against the possible influx of cheap overseas labour, but also business and government who sought to maintain Australia's current standard of living.

Having said all this, it is still often possible to come back to the conclusion that the W AP was based on race.

The White Australia policy, finally, no matter how often officially explained as a social necessity and acknowledged as such by Asian officials, nevertheless represented a barrier to friendly relations because there were always Australians who justified it on racist grounds and Asians who interpreted it accordingly.45

* *

One fact which cannot, and should not, be overlooked is that, if the WAP was aimed against any one group of peoples, it was the Asians. The development of the W AP was closely connected with what was seen as "the awakening of the East."46 Australia, up until World War I, had been able to virtually ignore its nearest neighbours. The war had put an end to that isolation with Japan, followed closely by other Asian nations coming well and truly on to the world stage. To many, it appeared that the white races were making every effort to kill each other off, which would then leave the yellow races open to take the leftovers.

44P. Campbell; R.C. Mills; G.V. Portus, Studies in Australian Affairs, Macmillan & Co Ltd, Melbourne, 1930, pg 53 4Swemer Levi, Australia's Outlook on Asia, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1958, pg 40 46Myra Willard, "The History of the White Australia Policy", from The Royal Australian Historical Society Journal, Vol VIII, Part I, 1922, pg 1 Looking North White Australia 32

The general attitude towards Asia during the Nineteenth Century and into the Twentieth Century was one of seeing its inhabitants as unequal and, indeed, inferior. Granted, most of this was based on vague and general impressions, but it was predominant, nevertheless. The attitudes ranged from "paternal benevolence at best, political dominion at worst."47 What was accepted was that there was little basis for contact between Australia and SEA, as their values, culture, way of life and standard of living were simply too disparate .

... the 1920s and 1930s have, in the imperfectly formed image of popular memory, been seen as a period when Southeast Asians, 'natives' in the terminology of the times, were stereotypes: self-effacing and industrious peasants, faithful servants, courtly but ineffective princes, rare and occasionally rebels against modem colonial rule ...... 48

Likewise, Annette Hamilton in her article entitled 'Fear and Desire: Aborigines, Asians and the National Imagery', recognised a similar portrayal of Asians in films of the 1990s. Most importantly, Asians were identified as one mass of peoples indistinguishable from one another. As Hamilton was to point out, even

from early Hollywood productions on, it is apparent that any native can substitute for any other. In the same way, locations for films set in Asia today are determined not by the actual text of the narrative, but by film-production convenience. The Philippines for a long time provided the essential Asian background for Vietnam War films, for example, but Thailand now seems to have taken over this role. The clothing, speech and habitations of the Asian are interchangeable, as long as the essential 'atmosphere' of Asia can be presented - scenic rice fields, mountain ranges, rivers and peasants, on the one

47wemer Levi, Australia's Outlook .... , pg 7 48Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, Second Edition, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, pg 102 Looking North White Austtalia 33

hand; bustling, dirty, confusing, congested cities on the other.49

Holding such attitudes did not mean that Australia could ignore Asia, and so the W AP was the mechanism for controlling contact. What really needed controlling was 'the teeming East'. This concept of hordes of Asians looking to invade Australia at any moment was very strong. Referring to the Asiatics, one writer in 1920 argued that

Against their teeming populations living in primitive conditions in narrow areas of fertile land - like dams under heavy pressure - the small population of Australia - rich because of immense resources commanded by a few - feels the need for protection. 50

Views like those of Senator Lynch in 1931 that, "the teeming East did not exist, and had never existed,"51 were few and far between.

As an illustration of Australian attitudes to SEA one could do no better than look at its approach to the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). J.G. Latham's "Goodwill Mission" through SEA in 1934 displayed some of the problems with Australia/NE! relations. While Latham's mission will be considered in more detail in another chapter, it is important here as a means of highlighting Australian attitudes, based on certain racial assumptions of Asia.

The attitude that Latham displayed on more than one occasion towards the native population of the Indies suggested that, not only did he have little knowledge of them and their lives, but saw no reason why he should. The native population was not within the scope of Australian awareness or interest.

49 Annette Hamilton. "Fear and Desire: Aborigines, Asians and the National Imagery", from Australian Cultural History, No 9, 1990, pg 24. SO"The Problems of Australian Security", from The Round Table, Vol XI, December 1920 - September 1921, pg 320 51Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 130, 26 June 1931, pg 3105 Looking North White Australia 34

Ruth Megaw made the point that "Contact with the indigenous population was ceremonial rather than substantive."52 For example, on arrival in Yogjakarta a reception was held for the delegation at the court of His Highness the Sultan of Yogjakarta. The evening was, naturally, reported on favourably by all who attended, yet the feeling from Latham's report was that it was simply an evening where a good time was had by all, and was of little real importance. It was enjoyable to be able to look on at the quaint customs of the native peoples, but the real business at hand lay with the Dutch. Latham in his report even went so far as to say that Australia was lucky in that it was "at least free from the additional complication due to the presence of a large native and a large immigrant population of differing racial origins. "53 In this Latham was reflecting the attitude of the ruling class in Australia. Races simply did not mix. Most importantly, Latham's approving comments on the Dutch in the NEI leaves us with the implication that it is really the native population that should be in minority. An attitude that, in many ways, Australia had already put in place in its own actions against the Aboriginal population of Australia.

It was interesting that Australians viewed a mixed race population as a major problem while, for the most part, the Dutch did not believe it was of any real concern. Mind you, it was of no concern to the Dutch as long as a mixed race population existed within a colonial framework. For Latham, and probably all of Australia, the NEI's future would be as it was then - Dutch dominated. There was no hint of any post-colonial future and, as a result, the native population was not worth knowing about. Australians, like all white nations of the time, seemed unable to reconcile the fact that, while there may have been colonial societies, there existed within them a vast native population that could not be treated as uneducated and unimportant. The natives were a force that had to be taken into account, not because, as Australians feared, they had territorial designs on Australia, but because they were there and they were not going away.

52Ruth Megaw, "The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its Significance in the Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy", from Journal of The Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol 59, Part 4, December 1973, pg 248 53A981l1 - Far East 5, Part 16, Australian Archives. The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934 - Report of the Right Honorable J.G. Latham, Leader of the Mission. Looking North White Australia 35

Australia's lack of knowledge about Asia meant that it was all too ready to accept negative opinions of the area, but seemed to find it more difficult to accept the more positive aspects. Rather than being pleased about, and taking advantage of, the fact that the native Indonesians were a hard working people apparently eager to develop reciprocal trade arrangements, Australians concentrated on any aspect that could possibly give them cause for fear and resentment. When for the first time the Peoples' Assembly in had a native majority, it was portrayed as being of immense interest to Australia.

This swing over to native control is of decided interest to us in Australia. We are but little conscious of this teeming native population in the Dutch Indies, which is only a day's aeroplane flight from the north of Australia. 54

Australia had always felt a sense of security from the fact that Asia was essentially a European sphere of influence, dominated as it was by colonial powers. It was clearly an over reaction on the part of someone like Casey to talk of a 'swing over to native control'. In any event, the Peoples' Assembly in Java was only a token body and had no real power. Real power lay with the Dutch. It was obviously bad enough that Australia was located in the Asian region, but to be there amongst independently governed Asian nations was of the utmost concern.

Australia's opinion of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies was, of course, another matter. Australians had long felt an affinity with the Dutch, as fellow white people in a predominantly Asian populated area. The overall impression, however, was that Australia felt a greater sense of security knowing that the Dutch were there, while the Dutch for their part were little concerned with Australia.

Ironically, even today, Australia still finds herself more concerned with, and alarmed by, events in Indonesia, than is Indonesia interested in Australia. As the Dutch pointed out, even though Australia and the NEI had dissimilar populations and systems of government, there was no reason

54R.G. Casey, Australia's Place in the World, Robertson & Mullens Ltd, Melbourne, 1931, pg49 Looking North White Australia 36

why they should not be able to view Pacific problems in the same spirit.55 That was just what Australia was counting on, for as long as Australia was on cordial terms with the Dutch, then that was seen as enough.

As Alison Broinowski was to point out, it was only those Australians who were "specially imaginative, disaffected, or eccentric thought the chance of East-West fusion worth investigating."56 Images Australians held of themselves and of their neighbours seemed too simplistic to foster any kind of real contact. Australians had to first overcome their own perceptions of their neighbours to the north before there could be any hope of real fusion. It seemed that "Politics in Australia sided with history and against geography, even to the detriment of economics."57

55"Australian and Netherlands' Interests in the Pacific", from The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 1, No 5, 1937-38, pg 18 56Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady:.... , pg 198 57 Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady:.... , pg 198 Looking North Diplomacy and Qefenc;e 37

CHAJPTEIR TWO

The Australian Government - Diplomacy and Defence

It could be said that many of the incidents already cited were nothing more than rhetoric. Given the changes that were happening world-wide, it could also be said that Australia was merely being caught up in the tide of events, rather than initiating the changes itself. It is necessary then, to look at the first practical moves made by Australia to develop her own foreign policy, and the best starting place would be the Department of External Affairs. Hughes had actually eliminated the Department during the 1914-1918 war, but it was revived in 1921. This time, however, it was a branch of the Prime Minister's Department and remained so until 1935 when a permanent head was appointed.

One man who was more instrumental than most in ensuring that Australia developed a competent Department of Foreign Affairs was E.L. Piesse. A solicitor with degrees in science and law, and a citizen-soldier in the Australian Intelligence Corp, Piesse was the work-horse of the section, and it was he who fought to make reality the rhetoric of the politicians. In November 1914, Piesse had been transferred to Melbourne to take charge of the intelligence section of the Directorate of Military Operations. When the section was expanded in March 1916, he became Director of Military Intelligence. It was not until May 1918, however, that any specific moves were made to focus on Asia. The acting Prime Minister at the time, Watt, requested Defence Minister Pearce to allow Piesse to "concentrate exclusively on collecting and collating information from all government departments on Far Eastern questions."1

There was no doubting that this new Pacific Branch was "intended to be an embryonic foreign office."2, and in April 1921 when it was replaced by a new foreign section in two parts, the way was cleared even further. Piesse became

1P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, pg 53 2P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 53 Looking North Piplomac;y and Defence 38 head of the Foreign Section (Pacific), while G.F. Ainsworth was in charge of the Foreign Section (General). In the period between the wars it was evident that " .... external affairs were seen in Australia as a civilian extension of defence intelligence."3 Accordingly, Piesse was joined by the likes of Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Hodgson, Lieutenant Commander Latham, and Major R.G. Casey. Piesse remained the key figure. "At a time when the Commonwealth Public Service included very few university graduates, Piesse had the inclinations and talents that would have made him a fine professor of international relations, had such a position then existed in Australia. "4

The intellect of Piesse could, perhaps, also be judged by those people whom he called friends and with whom he corresponded. Piesse, it seemed, was well acquainted with many of Australia's leading intellectuals. Likewise, he was in regular correspondence with George H. Blakeslee, lecturer in History and International Relations, at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts. Apparently the two met during Piesse's visit to the United States for the Washington Conference. Their correspondence was not only of a personal nature, but included discussions on the topic that interested them both - that of Pacific relations. It appears that Piesse kept Blakeslee informed on such issues as the Mandate islands, Japan, and the Pacific generally, and advised him on appropriate Australian journals to consult when seeking an overview of the Australian scene. Blakeslee, for his part, provided Piesse with not only tangible information - as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations he sent Piesse the first copy of 'Foreign Affairs' and helped Piesse publish an article on Australia and Japan in the April 1926 edition - but he was also a much needed outlet for Piesse's own ideas and feelings of frustration with the new foreign office.5

Unlike his intellectual and academic friends, Piesse was constantly being forced to accommodate his own personal views to that of his position as a public servant. In 1921, replying to a request by Professor Peden for him to write an article for the Round Table journal, Piesse was forced to decline. It appears that it was not the specific title of the article - Pacific problems Affecting Australia, 'Washington Conference' - that was the problem, but

3P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats ..... , pg 53 4P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 58 5Piesse Papers, MS 882/1/108, MS 882/3/133-136, MS 882/9 /8-16 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 39

rather that Piesse was not supposed to be involved in any article writing. This was not a decision arrived at by Piesse, but rather by Prime Minister Hughes. In January, Piesse had read a descriptive paper on the Australian Monroe Doctrine. Hughes had found out about it too late to prevent it being read, but he did stop publication. As Piesse told Peden in his letter, "Hughes has twice defined my position in such matters with sufficient clearness." Piesse quotes Hughes as saying that, "..... no public officer should do anything towards moulding public opinion."6 As a Boobook though, he had occasion to give an address on the Washington Conference to the group in April 1922.7 Unfortunately, for a nation that could only have benefited from the input of such a well informed man, Piesse's contributions to mainstream debate on foreign affairs were few and far between.

It becomes clear from Piesse's reactions to such edicts from Hughes that there was no love lost between the two. As Piesse clearly states, "I am not hampered by any feelings of personal loyalty, and so far as these edicts are not justified by the Public Service Act and the usual conventions of the service I shall feel free to disregard them. "8 Even a year earlier in a letter to H.S. Nicholas, Piesse makes the point that he " ..... can afford to take no risks, for W.M's interest in me just now, if he has any, is probably malignant."9

This inability to publicly express his opinions on foreign policy matters must have been frustrating in the extreme for Piesse, and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for his eventual resignation from the service. Piesse discovered that, not only was it next to impossible to discuss Department matters in the public arena however innocently, so too within the confines of government the transfer of information was slow. He particularly objected to the way in which so many papers were marked 'confidential'. It seemed that this was done more as a matter of routine than because the material was really of a sensitive nature.to

While, in a general sense, it is obvious from the title of the Pacific Branch that it would focus on Australia's Pacific relations, the specific agenda it

6Piesse Papers, MS 882/3/79, Letter from Piesse to Prof Peden dated 20/8/1921 7Piesse Papers, MS 882/7 /21 8Piesse Papers, MS 882/3/79, Letter from Piesse to Prof Peden dated 20/8/1921 9Piesse Papers, MS 882/2/48, Letter from Piesse to H.S. Nicholas dated 14/10/1920 10W.J. Hudson (ed), Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914 - 1941, Cassell Australia, 1967, pg 37 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 40 would follow was less clear. Piesse was doing his utmost to improve Australian contact with the Pacific region yet, at the same time, there was still in the back of his mind and at the back of all his decisions the issue of Empire relations.

In June 1921, a conference of Empire Prime Ministers was held. Notes prepared by the Pacific Branch on 'Arrangements for Securing a Common Imperial Policy in Foreign Affairs' can be seen as illustrative of the Branch's and, perhaps, Piesse's views on Empire relations. One section ran as follows,

Prior to the war the gravest defect in the organisation of the Empire for the conduct of Foreign Affairs, from the point of view of the Dominions, was that, except on rare occasions, the Dominions had no share in determining the policy which the government in London conducted on behalf of the Empire as a whole. But after the war, at all events in the present state of the world relations, the gravest danger, from the point of view of the Dominions, is rather that they may conduct policies of their own without being sure of the support which other parts of the Empire will give them.11

This may have been just a case of writing with a specific audience in mind. It was one thing to advocate Australian 'independence' to an Australian audience, but to a group of Dominion Prime Ministers, Empire unity was probably the best line to take. It is interesting that, in a summary of discussions by Australian writers commenting on the Conference, many also held to the Empire line. Frederic Eggleston, who was later to become a leading advocate of Australia finding its place in an Asian context, had stated that,

It is clear, however, that the ordinary citizen of Australia does not want to share in the actual conduct of Imperial foreign policy. He never complained about being drawn into the last war. He recognises that the skilled Ministers of the British

11Piesse Papers, MS 882/7 /173-177, Notes prepared by the Pacific Branch on 'Arrangements for Securing a Common Imperial Policy in Foreign Affairs'. Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 41

Crown are better qualified for this function than his own statesmen.12

If the likes of Eggleston were openly proclaiming these sorts of ideas in the early 1920s, but were able by the mid to late 1930s to see a new way for Australia, what part could Piesse have played if he had remained on the scene? A letter to Piesse from Herbert Gregory, the Director of the Bernice P. Bishop Museum in Honolulu, expressed Gregory's dismay at Piesse's resignation. "It doesn't seem natural to think of you as detached from the government service. Men like you are needed to supply vision and unless my diagnosis is astray, Australia needs a clearer picture of what it can and should become."13 Australia did not have the luxury of letting such people go.

While the work of the Pacific Branch continued, Australia's leading politicians were still going about their merry way of proclaiming the strength and righteousness of the British Empire, and how Australia could not be happier to be a part of it all. In the House of Representatives in July 1921, Sir Joseph Cook said that, if a preliminary conference on the Pacific question was to be held before the Washington Conference, it was " ..... vital and imperative that Australia should be represented ..... " .1 4 His strong suggestion was that the conference be held in London rather than in a country that actually bordered the ocean in question. A year later, Cook now the High Commissioner for Australia in London, speaking at a Royal Colonial Institute luncheon, waxed lyrical about the Empire and the Institute specifically. He claimed the Institute " ..... had become the clearing-house of the Empire - a place where Imperial relationships were renewed, where people could breathe an Imperial atmosphere, and revivify their faith in it."15 Meanwhile, Hughes was proclaiming that " ..... Our religion is yours, our life is yours. We are British of the British. There is no community in Great

12Piesse Papers, MS 882/7 /178-191, A summary of discussions by Australian writers, Conference of Prime Ministers, June 1921 13Piesse Papers, MS 882/9/2, Letter from the Director of the Bernice.P. Bishop Museum in Honolulu, Herbert Gregory, dated 10 June 1924 14Hughes Papers, MS 1538/25/1621, Daily Mail, 21 July 1921 15Hughes Papers, MS 1538/16 subseries 2/4746, article from The Times, 6 July 1922 Looking North Diplomacy: and Defence 42

Britain that is more British than these islands of Australia and New Zealand."16

By 1926 Hughes was writing articles about Australia no longer being able to pretend that it exists in isolation. "We may deplore, but we ought not to wonder, that the Australian does not yet take the keen interest in what is called 'foreign affairs and foreign policy' that we could desire."17 Later in the article, Hughes echoed the comments made by T.R. Bavin in the Sydney Daily Telegraph on the 21st July 1919. Bavin was referring to the way in which it was often impossible to separate internal and external policies.

Our old constitutional dogma about independence in local affairs combined with dependence on another Government in foreign policy, has been shown to be meaningless ...... But we might as well recognize the facts. And the facts are that, if another authority settles our foreign policy for us, complete autonomy and independence in local affairs is impossible.18

Hughes' remark was that " ..... to insist upon our rights of self-government in domestic affairs while leaving the control of foreign policy to others is like building a fortress and leaving the gate open to the enemy."19

Australia was still not able to grasp what it meant to have an independent foreign policy. Its reluctance to take that final step over the edge, a step that was necessary to break free of Great Britain, meant that the resulting policy was without substance and, if possible, worse than if Australia had remained a colony. Decisions needed to be made and risks taken in order to win the prize of international recognition.

* *

16Hughes Papers, MS 1538/25/1621, Hughes speaking at a luncheon after getting the freedom of the City of Bath, 24 July 1921 17Rt. Hon. W.M. Hughes, "Australia and World Politics" from The Royal Australia Historical Society. Vol XII, Part IV, 1926, pg 189 18Piesse Papers, MS 882/7/178-191 A summary of discussions by Australian writers, Conference of Prime Ministers, June 1921. 19w.M. Hughes, "Australia and World Politics", pp 197-198 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 43

Australia's next leader was both a joy and a disappointment. S.M. Bruce was an Empire man through and through, so it was not surprising that his moves in the field of foreign policy were related to the Commonwealth. While Bruce was to do much to develop Australian access to the world, Australia remained firmly anchored in the Empire network. Like no other Australian, Bruce was the quintessential Englishman. Frank Anstey's description of Bruce is noteworthy.

Stanley Bruce, an English gentleman, born in Australia - as other Englishman are born in China, India or Timbuctoo - moved in the best society, and in the soundest financial and commercial circles of Britain. He was a good looker with..... a mental alertness hidden by his nonchalance..... Nothing was permitted to ruffle the calm of his superiority. No insult could draw from him the slightest protest - only a gaze of curiosity, such as an entomologist might give to a bug.20

To be English, it seemed, was not just a case of being born in England. It was a way of life; an attitude; a mode of thinking. In this, Bruce was, indeed, an Englishman. Likewise, to be an Australian was more than just being born in this newly developing continent. Individuals had to accept not only the history of Australia, which was inextricably linked to that of the Empire, but also accept Australia's geography. Physically, Australia was a part of SEA and the foreign policy implications of that had to be addressed. A collective identity and desire to enter the world arena needed to be developed over time. The process would be evolutionary and the relative disinterest of Bruce in breaking the ties that bind would only delay the inevitable.

On becoming Prime Minister, Bruce's interest in international affairs increased. His initial concern seemed to be focused, not on Australia being actively involved in the decision making process, but rather on her being kept informed of the process as it developed in London. Like Hughes, he wanted no repeat of the Chanak episode. The position, as it stood, was most unsatisfactory. Delays in the transfer of information meant that the Australian Government was constantly one step behind international events. Bruce became more and more determined to ensure effective consultation

2~ussel Ward, A Nation for a Continent.... , pg 150 Looking North Piplomac;y and Defence

between Empire and Dominions and, to this end, the idea of a liaison officer in London was born.

In 1924 Bruce commissioned the services of a Melbourne-born Foreign Office official, Allen Leeper, to offer advice on how the Australian Government could best administer its external relations. The result was Leeper suggesting a High Commissioner be appointed to London. The very real problem with this was to find a suitably qualified person. As Leeper noted, " ..... egalitarianism, devotion to seniority rather than merit and low salaries effectively limited recruitment of able and ambitious men from the public schools and universities."21 It was Bruce who suggested to his friend Richard Casey that he join the Public Service, and Casey was to be Bruce's personal choice for London. Following due course, Dr Walter Henderson and Casey were appointed to two of the positions open in the foreign section, while H.A. Peterson gained a third position a year later.

Apart from politics, Bruce and Casey had much in common.

..... there quickly developed between them a close rapport, though not quite friendship of the usual kind in that Bruce assumed superiority and Casey deferred. However, while the relationship began as one between patron and protege, it soon took on a familial tone.22

But what of the man Casey? Perhaps the best phrase to describe Casey is that of 'Anglo-Australian'. In Hudson's book on Casey there is a paragraph concerning the memory Casey's wife had of him, which is illustrative of him and the concerns of the era.

When, many years later, Maie reflected on what in Richard Casey had drawn her, she recalled that he was a handsome man with an affecting voice, but she also listed as a bond between them their devotion to the British Commonwealth. To the modern eye, this might seem pitifully vapid, but what it indicated was a kind of shared loneliness, the penalty suffered

21W.J. Hudson & Jane North (eds), My Dear PM. -R.G. Casey's letters to SM. Bruce 1924 - 1929, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1980, pg xii 22W.J. Hudson, Casey, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1986, pp 53-54 Looking North Diplomac;y and Defence 45

by the Anglo-Australian..... Australianness was more a frame of mind than a reflection of nationality.23

While, possibly, not the Empire man that Bruce was, Casey did advocate the retaining of the allegiance. He acknowledged that not everyone agreed with his views, but his stand was an example of one side of the intellectual response to Empire issues. Casey's final position seemed to be that, if the Dominions were insisting on taking steps away from Great Britain, at least it should be done correctly and with control. He claimed that many foreigners were watching " ..... this rapid and pathetic post-war evolution with evident delight."24 He saw his job in London as ensuring Australia received the information that she was demanding, but in a regulated manner. Also of importance was that Casey definitely saw his appointment as the first step in developing a small foreign office.

By 1927 it wa~ clear that he was frustrated by Bruce's disinclination to proceed down this path. Writing to Bruce, he complained that,

It is surely time ..... that we should do something to break down the proverbial silence of the Dominions. H.M.G. plays a lone hand; they tell us all they do, but we never offer a word of comment or approbation - occasionally only do we sound a note of dissent. We have means through the Press or through foreign Consuls-General to make ourselves heard in a way that would be of assistance to Great Britain.25

In February 1927 Casey returned to Australia, but by December was back in London. He did not see the success in Bruce's term of office that he would have liked and, with Scullin having taken over in October, Casey lost most of his interest in the London job. He remained in London, however, until February 1931, and only one month later he completed this phase of his career by resigning from the Public Service.

23w.J. Hudson, Casey, pp 65 - 66 24R.G. Casey, Australia's Place in the World, Robertson & Mullens Ltd, Melbourne, 1931, pg 10 25w.J. Hudson, Casey, pg 69 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 46

For his part Bruce saw Casey's appointment in a slightly different light to Casey himself. He had in mind for Casey " ..... to be his agent and to burrow into the British governmental machine, thereby ensuring that he would have his own source of information from London, and that he would have a personal and informal channel of conveying his views to London."26 Bruce was especially pleased that they managed to get Casey into Sir Maurice Hankey's office in the Cabinet Secretariat, rather than in the Foreign Office. It was thought to be a better position from which to collect information, and Bruce became convinced that the letters written to him by Casey, were probably " ..... the best picture that exists of the political and international situation at that time."27

In these letters Casey was to illustrate much of the relationship between Australia and Great Britain in the late 1920s. Not surprisingly, many of his references to this relationship were often linked to the importance of his own position. He was always pleased, and rightly so, to convey to Bruce praise from others for the job he was doing, and to point out the value of having an Australian in London. In a letter on the 16th December 1924, he wrote,

Hankey recently said to me that there was good value in the actual presence of an Australian representative here even if he did nothing, as he acted as a constant reminder that Australia (and indeed other Dominions) should be kept fully informed, as that was the reason for his presence."28

This idea of Australia being kept informed on policy still did not, at least for Casey, translate into making policy. Rather, he believed that " ..... the foreign policy of the British Government is one which is pursued after consultation with Australia and the other Dominions, ..... British foreign policy may accordingly be regarded in a very real sense as Australian foreign policy."29

26w.J. Hudson, Casey, pg 57 27 Alfred Stirling, Lord Bruce: The London Years, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1974, pp 8- 9 28w.J. Hudson & J. North, My Dear P.M ..... , pg 10 29R.G. Casey, "Australia's Voice in Imperial Affairs.", from W.G.K. Duncan, Australian Foreign Policy, Angus & Robertson Limited, Sydney, 1938, pg 51 Lookin& North Piplomac;y and Defence 47

On the 20th January 1925, he further elucidates his understanding of the state of the Empire in regard to Australia.

Australia and Great Britain are for practical purposes two intimately allied countries. Friendly co-operation and complete frankness on both sides, fortified with active personal liaison, should, from the little I have seen of things, enable the present position to be continued without constitutional change. Abstract discussions as to the exact constitutional relations of Great Britain and the Dominions does not seem to me to be within the range of practical politics.30

While Casey's letters to Bruce are the most thorough record of the situation in England, Walter Henderson during his time there kept a personal diary of events. Like Casey, he was emphatic about the value of the liaison officer but, even so, despaired of Australia ever having a voice in the policy that was pursued.

.... .I am struck with the impossibility, in practice, in the great majority of cases where it is necessary to hammer out a policy, of this ever being realised. It is not feasible ..... My scepticism therefore increases as to the possibility of Australia ever 'having a voice' in the general foreign policy of the Empire.31

One entry on the 26th May is worth quoting at length. It shows Henderson's shift in attitude from viewing Australia as being best served through the Empire, to wanting Australia and her population to take control of their own destiny.

The presence of so many Australians in London at this time of the year, whose consuming ambition is to be received at Court and to attend Garden Parties, has confirmed my idea, based on entirely other considerations, that it would be preferable, from a wide point of view, if Australia were a completely independent State. This radical and revolutionary idea does not perturb me in the least. The moral effects of such a position

30w.J. Hudson & J. North, My Dear P.M..... , pg 15 31Henderson Papers, MS 2611, Diary 1927, 14th April. Looking North Piplomac;y and Defence 48

on the minds of the Australian people would be incalculably great. It would shake them from their apathy. It would make them realise that they are living in a fool's paradise. It would bring them face to face with the fact that they have to stand on their own feet in all the essentials of national and international life, and would make them accept responsibilities to which they have at present closed their eyes or which they have deliberately shirked. It would tend more than anything else to destroy the bad aspect of the 'colonial mind' which still persists, and will persist indefinitely, in the present state of things.32

All this was written in 1927, but it could just as well have been 1995 with the current discussions in relation to Australia becoming a republic. A part of the argument behind a quest for independence by any nation runs along the lines that prosperity, both cultural and economic, will follow. As long as Australia in the 1920s and 1930s was tied to the Empire, it could never fully realise its potential. Likewise, to still have an English head of state in the 1990s, is seen by many as Australia being held back from finding its own place in the world and, specifically, SEA.

* *

What then was Australia's stand on foreign policy by the close of the 1920s? P.G. Edwards would claim that if the word policy " .... .is taken to mean a government's actions and a continuing philosophy guiding those actions, there was relatively little during the 1920s and 1930s to justify the term."33 It would appear that there could be no continuing action as long as Australia persisted in vacillating between independence and Empire ties. Australia was not willing to take the risks required of individual nations. Latham speaking in Parliament in 1923 pointed out that,

Foreign affairs have been the subject of much rhetoric, particularly since the establishment of the League of Nations.

32Henderson Papers, MS 2611, Diary 1927, 26th May 33P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 66 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 49

We are sometimes told that we are now almost an independent nation. There can be no independence without full responsibility and full risk. A great deal of nonsense is talked about the international status of Australia. Until we are prepared to take full international responsibility it is absurd for us to say that we are an independent or separate nation.34

For most Australians, foreign affairs was related to one of two things - security or trade. In terms of security, much of what Hughes had pursued at Paris was the right for Australia to remain secure. As Hancock maintained " .... .immigration restriction is, in fact, a frontier policy. It is a policy of security, ..... "35 and that all Australians wanted " ..... was security, and this to them meant isolation."36 Australians claimed control over domestic issues - as they maintained immigration was - but took no account of its effects on the international scene. For real security, however, Australia was still dependent on Britain. "Singapore was Australia's fortress and the British Navy the bastion of her defence."37

The Australian public tends to think of defence, both local and Imperial, in simple terms of immediate security - actual defence against actual aggression. But, notwithstanding a desire to keep out of foreign quarrels and a reluctance to make promises beforehand, most Australians probably regard the security of all parts of the Empire as a single problem in which Australia is vitally concemed.38

For Australians in the 1920s and 1930s defending their homeland was as natural as breathing. Certainly most of the nation's actions in relation to foreign affairs had defence at its base. It would not be unfair to say the issues that preoccupied Australians in the 1920s and 1930s, such as White Australia, immigration, economic prosperity, all had as a factor in them the

34Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 102, 7 March 1923, pg 178 35w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 204 36w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 206 37c.M.H. Clark, A History of Australia IV: The Old Dead Tree and the Young Tree Green 1916-1935. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1987, pg 291 38 Piesse Papers, 882/9/616-623, "Australian Defence Policy:- Australia and the Defence of the Empire" Looking North Diplomacy: and Defence so security of Australia. Much of it was justified, as above, as being loyalty to the Empire. Australians, it appeared, could not wait to fight in World War I to ensure the safety of the Empire. Once involved, their interest in maintaining their own security, as distinct from that of England, developed and attitudes towards Asian expansionism were born.

Australians were obsessed with national defence. In a letter to Piesse in January 1924, Blakeslee writes of going through Australian newspapers, particularly the Sydney Morning Herald. He writes that

I have noted particularly the continuing and earnest discussion of 'defense'. I am a little perplexed as to this, and the query recurs as to whether there is not some organized propaganda back of it. The present situation in the Pacific would hardly warrant so much defense discussion.39

Outsiders could rightly not understand that papers like the Sydney Morning Herald were feeding the Australian lust for defence news.

Pacific islands close to Australia were not seen as neighbours, but as potential bases for armed attacks on Australia. Japan was not just a trading partner, but also a nation that might be tempted to attack Australia. In order to illustrate Australia's concerns about defending its shores, it is interesting to focus on its relations with two specific countries in SEA - namely Singapore and the NEI. For their own distinct reasons these two locations became important to Australia in its quest to ensure the safety of its own people.

To begin with the NEI, Piesse's comments in 1920 display Australia's self­ interested view of that nation.

The Netherlands East Indies. It does not seem useful to write much about the future control of these islands; .... But the interest of the British Government and of India in these

39Piesse Papers, 882/1/186, letter dated 5th January 1924 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 51

islands is much the same as ours - namely, that they shall not pass into the hands of a power stronger than Holland.40

The NEI was seen as virtually indispensable to any defence scheme of the British Empire in the Australasian region. As one Dutchman put it, "... the Netherlands Indies were Australia's political Barrier Reef".41 Australia, it would appear,. saw it as a much stronger barrier than that. Australians believed that Asia was a threat, but that the Dutch in the NEI were 'on their side'.

Criticisms were being made of the External Affairs Department, particularly in relation to the information they were charged with collecting on SEA. Lord Casey in one of his many letters to Prime Minister Bruce elaborated at length on his own opinions on where Australia stood in the 'intelligence' gathering stakes .

.... The Defence Department is charged with collecting such Naval, Military and Air intelligence as would be of value to them in war. The External Affairs Department is charged, in my opinion, with correlating all the Defence intelligence and superimposing political intelligence on the top of it. In my opinion the Defence intelligence is none too good about the NEI, and our External Affairs Department intelligence is worse still. We are in a deplorable state of ignorance about our back door. It should be the function of the External Affairs Department to stir up the Defence Department in this regard and to recruit any and every possible line of communication that might bring light to our darkness.42

While the Netherlands policy of neutrality meant that open collaboration between the Dutch, and either the English or the Australians, was not possible, the belief in the 'friendliness' of the Dutch calmed the nerves of the anxious Australians. This interest in the NEI, as it related to Australia's

40Piesse Papers, MS882/3/1/26, Memo from Piesse to the Prime Minster's Department, 8th December 1920. 41"Australian and Netherlands' Interests in the Pacific", from The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 1, No 5, Dec-Jan 1937-38, pg 18 42Hudson W.J. and North, Jane (eds), My Dear PM..... pg 391 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 52

own defence policy, naturally grew as the years of the 1930s passed. By 1938 members of parliament, in this particular case Mr Rankin the Member for Bendigo, were suggesting that once again Australians should be fighting on foreign shores to protect their own nation. This time the foreign shore was the NEI.

It is unthinkable to me that any man who takes a reasonable view of the matter could say that we could allow any hostile nation to seize the Dutch East Indies, which are on the air mail route - our connexion with the rest of the world - and which could be used, if taken by a hostile power, as a base from which to attack Australia. In their hour of need Australia, in self-defence, should help the inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies to defend their country. It is just as necessary that no power hostile to Australia should obtain a footing in Java or Sumatra as it would be to prevent a landing at Darwin.43

There was even the suggestion that Australia's shores could best be protected through some expansion of her own. The island of New Guinea, at this time, was effectively split in half with Dutch New Guinea on the one side and the Commonwealth controlling the other half. While there was obviously no suggestion that Dutch New Guinea should be acquired by force, it was felt that Holland had done little in the way of developing the area and might be predisposed to negotiating some form of deal. It was felt that it would be worth Australia's while, in the future, to have no neighbours on this big island so close to its shores. In all events, there seemed to be no sense of assurance in Holland and the NEI being able to withstand any concerted invasion force. The 1930s only saw an increase in this Australian obsession to keep the islands of the NEI free and friendly as a barrier to invasion on Australia.

The 1930s was a time when Australia became increasingly concerned about military activity in the Pacific area. With the NEI being something of a bridge between Australia and the rest of Asia, it was only natural that interest should have been shown in it concerning defence. It was not to be until the late 1930s, however, that the real interest was shown by

43Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 155, 4 May 1938, pg 831 LookinK North Diplomacy: and Defence 53

government officials in both Australia and the NEI in forming a closer military association. Australians came to see the Dutch as possible allies in the Pacific, and, even more importantly, saw the NEI as forming that elusive barrier to the north. Maintaining Australia's borders and independence was, perhaps, the one thing that mattered more to Australians than economic gain.

The first contact between the military of the two countries occurred in 1930 when the East Indies Squadron of the Dutch Navy paid a visit to Sydney. Two battle cruisers, the 'Java' and the 'Sumatra', along with six torpedo boats, were to be included in the visit, though in the end the 'Sumatra' did not come.44 The story behind the late exit of the 'Sumatra' from the Australian visit was interesting in itself. It was originally said that it was the intention of the Dutch Navy not to man the vessels exclusively with European personnel. In the end the 'Sumatra' was unable to attend due to the outbreak of a fire on board.

... .it was rumoured that the real cause of the fire was sabotage by the Japanese element on board who had heard that, on the forthcoming visit of the cruiser to Australia, the Javanese and native portion of the crew were to be left behind in deference to what were believed to be Australian susceptibilities, and also in order not to lower Dutch prestige.45

The squadron was commanded by Rear-Admiral C. C. Kayser and was greeted in Sydney by Premier Bavin. In his welcome speech, Bavin made reference to the Netherlands and NSW as having much in common, but he did not touch upon what this was. Admiral Kayser for his part stated that the squadron was visiting Australia in order to strengthen the ties of friendship. He further pointed out that it was this "sense of friendship and mutual esteem" that was the "soundest foundation of trade".46

44sydney Morning Herald, October 3, 1930, pg 10 45A981l1 - NEI 19, Australian Archives, Memo from Keith Officer to the Secretary of the Department of Defence 46sydney Morning Herald, October 8, 1930, pg 14 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 54

Some four years later Latham was to advocate with, perhaps less economic thoughts in mind, that there be an exchange of officers between the Australian and Dutch navies. His wish for a closer liaison between the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Dutch Navy was based, no doubt to some extent, on the belief that these two would bear the full force of any southward advance by enemies, as yet, unnamed.

In 1938 rumours abounded that overtures had been made by the Netherlands Government to Great Britain for an understanding on mutual protection of interests in the Pacific. While there seemed little chance of a formal pact, there was the widespread belief that closer relations, generally, would be established with the Dutch Government in the Indies. The talk everywhere was that because of the increasing threat perceived to emanate from Japan, the NEI's importance had also increased. The government of the Netherlands seemed less than pleased with such rumours and continued to stress that the Netherlands, and her territories, would continue with their policy of neutrality. In a letter to the Department of External Affairs, it was also made clear that the Netherlands did not appreciate the way in which the press had ".... more than necessary stressed our parallel interests in the Pacific.... ".47

The Dutch policy of neutrality was, however, a little disingenuous. There was more than just a suspicion that, in some Dutch circles, a sympathy was held for fascist principles. The belief was that it would not be too difficult for the Netherlands to collaborate with any fascist power, including Japan. So, as logic went, there was no need for any alignment with any Commonwealth nation. On the other hand, by far the majority of the Dutch population had faith that the British and French could hold off Germany for relatively defenceless Holland. 'Impregnable' Singapore, together with the USA in the Philippines, were to perform that function in the Pacific. Lastly, the Netherlands had remained neutral in World War I with reasonably good effect, so Nhy not follow the same course of action?

For all the lack of interest shown by the Dutch in creating explicit defence ties with the British Empire, Australia was still highly interested in the NEI. At a conference of British and French defence experts held in Singapore in June 1939, the importance of the position of the NEI was discussed. It was

47 A981 Netherlands East Indies 48, Australian Archives, NEI Relations with Australia Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 55 found that "Forming as it does part of the great network of islands which links Australia to the Asiatic mainland, the Dutch island empire occupies a position of unique strategic importance for Australia".48 Australia had now decided that it could simply not afford to let the NEI pass out of Dutch hands. From that point on, defence in relation to our closest neighbour was to continue to be of primary importance, just as it is today.

* * *

Australia's overriding impression of Singapore in the inter-war years related in no small part to the Singapore Naval Base. The effect of the base on Australia's feeling of security is difficult to measure. However, its fall confirmed all those fears of Asian expansionism. In the 1920s the belief was that "If work on Singapore was not resumed, completed and rendered impregnable before an emergency, Australia, New Zealand, and other British interests in the Pacific were absolutely vulnerable".49 The base could somehow stop the teeming populations of Asia as an active force in times of war, and as a huge deterrent in times of peace.

The building of an enormous new naval base at Singapore had been approved by the British Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and Cabinet in 1921. The point of the base was to allow one fleet to protect two oceans - and with the rise of the USA and Japan moving strategic importance to the Pacific region - this was viewed as being more and more essential. Indeed, by the beginning of 1921 three clear themes were to be evident in relation to defence in the period between the wars. Firstly, the relationship between the British Empire, Japan and the USA would be decisive in any naval strategy. Secondly, there was an appreciation of the predicament involved in entering into a two ocean war. Finally, the question over Dominion

48Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East, Institute of Pacific Relations, Publications Office, New York, 1940, pg 124 49 A594l1 - Box 786, Australian Archives, "A Study in British Commonwealth Co-operation Part 9 Chapter 63", pg 1 Looking North Diplo:mac:y and Pefence 56

subsidies for Imperial defence was revived with possible contributions towards the Singapore Naval Base.SO

While in the end Australia did not make any substantial financial contributions to the construction of the Base, this did not mean that, politically, it was not in support of its construction. In 1924 in a cable from Prime Minister Bruce in response to Great Britain action on the base, he expressed the opinion that

We believe that the existence and prestige of the British and the British Empire has been and is the greatest factor in the maintenance of the peace of the world .... That strength has depended mainly on the British Navy, its power and mobility. We are convinced a base in the Pacific is imperative for that mobility.51

As the conservatives took power in Great Britain it was claimed, not least by the previous labour government, that they deliberately incurred political and financial obligations that would be exceedingly hard to rescind. Once again the conservatives in Great Britain had the political and moral support of Australia; if not the financial support. By 1930 the basic position in Australia was that the greatest contribution to the security of Australia would be the belief by other countries that Singapore was unassailable. For 'other countries' it was no doubt meant to read, Asian countries.

Of course, in the 1920s when neither the British nor the Australians were actually at war with any Asian country, it was a fine diplomatic line to explain why it was necessary to build the supposedly ultimate naval base, to defend the Empire against possible invasion. In 1925 for example, , Foreign Secretary in Great Britain, stated that he considered any chance of war with Britain's former ally to be very remote. Nevertheless, Chamberlain was firmly in favour of the decision to proceed with the Singapore Base as it was ".... a necessary link in our line of Imperial communications .... and in itself something of a guarantee of peace because it is never a guarantee of peace that you should have great territories open

50w. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base 1919-1942, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979, pp 24-25 Slw. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall .... , pg 43 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 57

without defence to possible attack .... ".52 Thus, the argument over keeping the Empire united and providing clear and obvious support to the Australasian Dominions was weighed against the problem of implying that a former ally was likely to attack at any moment.

The 1920s were a remarkably peaceful and optimistic era in international relations and it was not unreasonable to calmly accept the risks of not being able to fight a war on two fronts. The idea of the base at Singapore always contained an element of risk in relation to whether or not it would ultimately be enough to defend the Empire if a war broke out in Europe and Asia. For Australia, the question was whether or not the Base was enough to defend Australia's shores.

It is somewhat difficult to assess Australia's real support of the concept of the Singapore Naval Base, given that it appeared singularly uninterested in ; providing any monetary assistance. Perhaps this was just shrewd politics. Australia simply needed to continue publicly blowing the trumpet of Empire unity, and Great Britain for whom this was becoming vital, to continue to emphasise the importance of the Base to this unity. It is almost certain that construction on the Base would have continued, even if every last person in Australia had publicly voiced their opposition to it, as it was the prevailing opinion in Great Britain that it would somehow hold the Empire together.

There is no doubt that there was overwhelming support in Australia for the construction of the Singapore Naval Base. It gave Asia-weary Australians a heightened sense of being a part of the Empire's global picture. It reinforced all those things that were right and good about Empire unity and made Australians feel less isolated from their 'homeland'. Most importantly, it was a visible, tangible barrier against the threats inherent in being located in SEA. Support came from everyone from the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union to the Federal Executive of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers' Imperial League of Australia; from the National Council of Women in Western Australia to the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Australia, all supported the Base and, indeed, sent

52Ian Hamill, "Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924-1929", from the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol XI, No 2, Sept 1980, pg 279 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 58

telegrams, letters etc. to the government to that effect.53 The problem was that no-one was overly keen to contribute money towards it. It is almost unnecessary to state that, at a meeting of the Admiralty in mid 1922, the strong opinion was expressed that Australia, New Zealand and India should all contribute a considerable portion to the cost of developing the Base as they were most directly concerned with it.54

Australia, like Great Britain, was taking its own risks. The risk that its lack of monetary contribution would delay the development of the Base and that open conflict in Asia may erupt before the so called 'impregnable' Base was completed. In 1932 when the thoughts of war were being forced once again into people's thinking, Senator Lynch indicated that, should discussions in relation to the Base come up at the Ottawa Conference, then the Australian delegates "should make it known that Australia desires the work to be completed as early as possible, and to that end is willing to share in the cost, if necessary".55 Cynics might say that Australia was once again only acting in international affairs when forced to through circumstances or fear. This may be a harsh indictment on a nation that, to all intents and purposes, was getting what it wanted without having to pay for it.

There were some isolated objectors in Australia to the development of the Base, putting forward the case for more understanding between nations as being the best defence. The ethos of attack or be attacked, however, was more prevalent. Pacifists wanted there to be no bases in Singapore, or anywhere else for that matter, while others like Frederic Eggleston believed that Australia had to start being responsible for its own defence and develop its own defence strategies. Reliance on any other nation, even Great Britain, was not the answer.

In the 1930s much of the buzz in Government circles was concerned with the idea of a Pacific Pact. As was to be expected, there were differing opinions on whether the Australian Government should begin to direct its attention towards the Pacific. W.K. Hancock in Australia seemed somewhat non­ plussed by the importance placed on the Pacific Rim.

53 A981l1 - Singapore Naval Base Pt 1, Australian Archives 54A981l1 - Singapore Naval Base Pt 2, Australian Archives, Meeting at the Admiralty on 11th July 1922. 55Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 134, 24th May 1932, pg 1244 Looking North Diplomacy: and Defence 59

Australia's future is, to a considerable degree, bound up with the future of the Pacific, but a good deal of nonsense is talked about that rather over-rated ocean.56

He did acknowledge that, although "The Pacific was until recent times a backwater; it is one no longer."57 What part then, would Australia play? As early as 1924 The Secretary of State for the , Mr L.C.M.S. Amery, was proclaiming that "In the vast developments pending in the Pacific, Australasia must give the lead to the old world."58

The real action did not begin until the late 1930s with the work of Prime Minister Lyons in developing a Pacific Pact. In an article in The Austral­ Asiatic Bulletin in April 1937, it was pointed out that

...... the duty of Australian statesmen is to study the Pacific, to formulate a national position, to maintain friendly relations with her neighbours there, and to refuse to allow her attitude to be influenced by antagonisms bred elsewhere.59

The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, like it was to do many times in the. future, pre­ empted the path the Government should take. Some time later, D.B. Copland was to cite Lyon's proposal for a Pacific Pact and the establishment of The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin as examples of the way in which Australians "...... are taking our responsibilities in the affairs of the Pacific area much more seriously now than we did even twenty years ago."60

What then was Lyon's proposal? At the First Plenary Session of the 1937 Imperial Conference, Lyons stated that

S6w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 215 S7w.K. Hancock, Australia, pg 215 58The Argus, 10 December 1924 59 Anonymous, "Wanted- An Australian Policy", from The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 1, No 1, April 1937, pg 4 60D.B. Copland, "Australia and the Far East", from The Listener, Vol 18, No 449, 18th August 1937, pg 324 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 60

Australia would greatly welcome a regional understanding and pact of non-aggression by the countries of the Pacific, conceived in the spirit of the principles of the League.61

His claim was that the Australian Government had long been interested in a Pact, and saw such a Pact as a way of helping to solve problem relations in the region. Although the Pact was recognition of Australia's emphasis on the Pacific region, the Australian Government "...... assumed that its foreign policy would remain based on, and harmonised with, the collective system of the League of Nations."62 The Pacific Pact was seen as extending the idea and intent of the League.

Not seen as a military device, the Pact was more a safeguard against potential aggressors. Emphasising this aspect was seen by the Government as a way to encourage those nations in SEA who feared being the object of aggression, to unite. The Australian Government, in particular, claimed that it had,

evidence that the Netherlands East Indies are apprehensive about their position, ...... and believe that their future safety is closely linked with that of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and more especially of Australia.63

While many leading figures in the Australian community, such as F.W. Eggleston and Professor D.B. Copland, seemed to support Lyon's suggestion, there were those who were asking questions. Curtin, speaking in Parliament in August 1937, pointed out that "This trade diversion policy was a curious sort of prelude to the submission of proposals for a Pacific Pact."64 Curtin's observation is valid, assuming, of course, that the Pact was never meant as a pact directed against Japan, certainly a contentious issue. The questions

61R.G. Neale (ed), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Vol 1, 1937-38, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, pg 66 62R.G. Neale, Dot:".1ments on Australian.... , Memorandum prepared by the Delegation to the Imperial Conference, pg 91 63R.G. Neale, Documents on Australian.... , Memorandum prepared by the Delegation to the Imperial Conference, pp 93-94 64Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 154, 25 August 1937, pg 103 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 61

continued, however, and in early September 1937, a Mr Baker from Griffith was also stating in Parliament his doubts about the worth of any pact.

Most of the people of this country - excluding perhaps the members of the Ministry - realize that within recent years there have been unlimited numbers of pacts, and that in the final analysis no nation keeps a pact unless it suits his own interests to do so ...... It therefore appears to be only a waste of time to add another pact to the countless number which have been made, .... 65

Well into 1939 Prime Minister Menzies was still talking about a policy for the Pacific "...... which will not merely consist of making pious statements about our desires and friendships with the Netherlands East Indies, French Indo­ China, China, Japan, Canada or the United States; but which will exhibit itself in a positive policy,. ... "66

* * *

The importance of economic links was the other area in which Australia was forced to take stock of its position. There was no doubting that, economically, Australia was heavily dependent on the British market and on British capital. Most important was the change in emphasis brought about by the war. Perhaps the most significant difference between conditions before the war and after was the change which occurred in political emphasis. Whereas before the war most attention had been given to the translation into actuality of certain agreed social values, after the war attention was concentrated rather on material exploitation and economic development.67

65Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 154, 7 September 1937, pg 561 66Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies .... , pg 199 67Gordon Greenwood, Australia: A Social and.... , pg 294 Looking North PipJomlQ' and Defence 62

The attention of the Government was not concentrated on international political questions, but rather on trade. Decisions were made and policies evaluated on the basis of economic gain. Whether by choice, or by lack of choice, Australia found itself in a position of being unable to ignore the presence and importance of SEA. The active role the Government played in this, as opposed to that played by public pressure groups and cliques, may serve to illustrate the slowness of pace with which Australia sought an approachment with the region to its north. Indeed, it could almost be said to be peculiar the way in which the Australian Government rarely took advice from, perhaps, more knowledgeable members of the public who could have done much to aid the work of expanding Australia's external affairs program. There seemed to be little co-operation between the public and private sectors, and Australia as a nation, was the loser. It could be said that,

Indeed, not only did the government not attempt to form public opinion, it tried to repress it wherever possible. There was a distinct tendency to be vague, or to produce complicated gibberish, on the assumption that the people were ignorant...... Not only did the government ignore and leave ignorant the general public; it also ignored and snubbed knowledgeable Australians.68

This same ignorance on the part of the Australian public was noted in 1919 by an Australian pressman in a letter to Prime Minister Hughes concerning the "Asiatic Question". He wrote that he was

prompted to do this by the fact that a rigorous censorship has virtually kept the world ignorant of the incidence of events in Asia during the past four or five years, and ignorance on the part of the people of Australia is certain to militate seriously against their best interests. The future of Australia is so closely bound up with the development of countries of the Pacific Ocean that it is vitally essential that Australians should have no misconception regarding

68W.J. Hudson (oo), Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914-1941, Cassell Australia, 1967, pp 107-108 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 63

what is proceeding politically in the Asiatic among those coun t nes,· .... 69 Naturally, not everyone believed that Australia's future was bound up with that of SEA. The general public's ignorance in matters relating to SEA left them unable to make an informed decision. More sections of Australian society may have viewed increasing relations with SEA as a good thing if they were at all aware of what was happening there, and what the benefits to Australia might be.

For the moment, however, it is more the action and reaction of the Government than that of the public which is of concern. There is no denying Australia's move away from Britain as its focus of commerce, culture and defence. For some,

Sentimental attraction may still leave Great Britain as the pivot and centre of much of our thinking of the outside world, but the unmistakable equality of other nations forces us to a re-appraisement of her position. Vaguely, the Australian perceives a new vulnerability resulting from this change of status, and gradually develops a mixed sense of fear and responsibility as he realizes the inevitable nature of the independence which necessarily results. 70

* *

Jack Shepherd in his book, Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East, wrote that,

...... it is important to notice that at least until the end of 1935, the Federal Government seemed to share the hopes rather than the fears and to be adopting a policy calculated

69Hughes Papers, MS1538/16, Subseries 11/2125, letter dated the 1st Sept 1919 from pressman, former editor of the Far Eastern Review, to Hughes. 70P.D. Phillips, "The Far Eastern Situation: Some Aspects", from The Australian Quarterly, Vol 5, No 20, Dec 1933, pg 28 Looking North Pi:plomac;y and Defence 64

to foster good relationships, economic and otherwise, with the countries of the Far East.71

Shepherd's assumption seems to be that Australian attitudes changed in the years leading up to World War II. A more accurate evaluation of the situation might be that, with war once again looking increasingly possible, Australia's negative opinions about Asia simply became more open and pronounced. They had never really disappeared. Rather than taking full opportunity of her potential position as mediator between Asia and the West, Australia drew back from the region in which she was located and sought the company and protection of Great Britain. In 1935 Frederic Eggleston proposed that Australia was ideally situated to mediate between East and West.

Australia lives in the Pacific near the East, and if she can only rise to the height of her opportunity she could interpret the British Empire to the East, and interpret the East to the Empire.72

Australia never took up this challenge.

For the Government, it was like a school child starting from scratch. It had to learn not just how to relate to SEA, but it had to begin with the basics of who, what, why, and where? Considering how vital it should have been to practical politics in Australia, accurate information on the region was sorely lacking. In an'article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 12 August 1938, W.M. Hughes voiced criticisms of the Dominions Office. He stated that, "Australia wants an effective voice in moulding foreign policy ...... and this is impossible unless we are kept not only fully, but promptly, informed." Further, he pointed out that "...... the Dominions Office now served no positive purpose, and that it merely delayed messages by forcing them along a circuitous passage rather than by the direct route."73

71 Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests .... , pg 34 72Warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, pg 34 73Hughes Papers, MS1538, Series 42, Folder 3, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 August 1038 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 65

Instead, the 1930s saw only the beginning of Australia finding her feet in SEA, with her lack of overseas representation in the region being the most indicative of that situation. In 1936 the breakdown of Commonwealth countries and their dominion legations looked as follows: Canada operated legations at Washington, Paris, Tokyo; South Africa, at The Hague, Brussels, Rome, Washington, Berlin and Stockholm, Paris and Lisbon; , at Washington, The Holy See, Paris and Brussels, Berlin, Madrid; while Australia had none.

Australia's shaky entry into the world of diplomacy can, perhaps, be explained by the lack of interest shown by the likes of Piesse in the early 1920s. This is not to say that one person can be held solely responsible for the state of Australian diplomacy, but it is true that Piesse was the instigator of much of Australia's contacts with SEA. Hence, if he was not actively involved in pressuring the government to set up overseas representation, it was very unlikely to come about of its own accord.

At the conference of Prime Ministers held in June 1921, the notes prepared by the Pacific Branch, and which Piesse signed, make it clear he did not see the value of each Dominion having envoys or representatives in other countries. "..... the influence of the envoy on the negotiations he conducts, and his influence in the country in which he is accredited, are commonly much exaggerated."74 Piesse also listed expense and the risk of upsetting Empire unity 1 as other reasons why overseas representation was to be avoided. He did concede, however, that having an Australian attache in a British Legation was a possible alternative.

Dining and Holmes in a piece entitled, "Australian Foreign Policy 1934", published in 1935, argued that

.... .intercourse between Australia and Southern and Eastern Asia will lead to some direct and other indirect relationships. The direct relationships will be with:- (a) India and Ceylon; (b) , Siam, French Indo­ China, Netherlands India; and the Philippine Islands; (c) China; and (d) Japan and Manchoukuo. The indirect

74Piesse Papers, MS882/7 /173-177, Notes prepared by the Pacific Branch on 'Arrangements for Securing a Common Imperial Policy in Foreign Affairs'. Looking North Diplomacy: and Defence 66

relationships will be with:- (a) the United Kingdom (on account of India, Ceylon, and British Malaya); (b) The Netherlands (on account of Netherlands India); (c) (on account of French Indo-China); and (d) The United States of America (on account of the Philippine Islands).75

Their general assumption was that the people of British Malaya, Siam, the NEI and the Philippine Islands would not become "politically significant".76 Even so, the building of any direct relationships with the countries of SEA was not reflected in reality. As far as the Philippines was concerned, the Australian government was receiving more information about the island group via H.M. Ambassador at Washington than through the British Consulate General in Manila. Not surprisingly, most correspondence was concerned with British and American interests, vis-a-vis the Philippines. Australia was merely kept informed of events after they had occurred. It could be said that at least we were being kept informed, but it hardly seems worth the effort if we still had no input.

The initial problem with the contact that did exist between Australia and SEA was that, rather than being on a government to government and population to population level, it existed of Australia, through Britain, dealing with the respective colonial powers. Consequently, the Governor General of Australia made visits to the Governor General of the Netherlands India - the representative of one King visiting the representative of another Queen - hardly a meeting of mainstream thought. Equally, visits by various members of the Thai royal family in the late 1920s and again in the late 1930s, while a step in the right direction, were still somehow seen as something of novelty events by Australians.77

The other problem with Australia/SEA relations at this stage was that the relationship was primarily geared towards trade. Rather than seeking to have political or diplomatic representatives placed in various Asian nations, Australia looked first to having trade representatives. For the purposes of

75H Dinning and J.G. Holmes (eds), Australian Foreign Policy 1934, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1935, pg 27 76Dinning and Holmes, Australian Foreign Policy .... , pg 30 77 A981l1-Thailand 20 and A981l1-Thailand 27, Australian Archives. Letters from British Legation in Bangkok dated November 3rd 1927 and November 18th 1939 respectively. Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 67

this thesis, the development and placement of trade commissioners overseas will be dealt with later.

*

Moving on from the initial work of the Pacific Branch, the appointment of J.G. Latham as Minister for External Affairs in 1932 saw the separation of External Affairs from the Prime Ministership for the first time since 1916. Latham was followed as Minister by G.F. Pearce from 1934-1937. Pearce's time as Minister may not have been outstanding, but in the words of Peter Heydon it was " solid, consistent and useful. "78

By 1937 the Department contained 15 officers, apart from typists and messengers. There was even a move towards utilising Australia's human resources with "Practically the whole staff,. .... recruited from the Universities, including some individuals with distinguished records."79 It is still important to remember exactly what the Department was up against.

The collection and collation of material is at once the most urgent and most valuable task in a country in which insularity of outlook is equalled only by ignorance of foreign affairs.80

It was this sense of insularity and ignorance which was the main enemy of Australia, and 11ot any real or imagined foreign power.

By far the most obvious and active sign of the Government attempting to develop better relations with SEA was, what was generally known as, the Latham Mission, or the Australian Eastern Mission. Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs, J.G. Latham, in 1934 visited several countries in Asia as a representative of the Australian Government and the people. The aim of the trip, while questioned at the time, was claimed to be the

78Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: a study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne University Press, 1965, pg 132 79 Anonymous, "Our Infant Foreign Office", from The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 1, No 1, April 1937, pg 6 80 Anonymous, " Our Infant Foreign Office", pg 6 Looking North Diplomacy: and Defence 68

promotion of goodwill between ourselves and those countries to our north. Whatever its intentions and results, it was the first, and for many years the only, effort made by the Government to get in touch with Asia.

The choice of Latham to head the Mission was both an unusual and an obvious one. His position as Minister for External Affairs made him the most likely candidate to represent Australia overseas. The question is whether he was chosen because of the position he held, or because he was the best person for the job. What kind of man was Latham? Manning Clark in his work, A History of Australia, gives his interpretation of Latham and what he stood for. He wrote that,

Latham's Rationalism was that of a man who saw religious beliefs as evidence of the stupidity of human beings. Latham had a sense of humour, but, as one observer noted, it was humour of the mirthless sort. Latham had the power to dazzle people by his knowledge and his speech ...... He was a snob. He deferred to those in power: he whipped verbally those beneath him, either by not acknowledging their existence, or by using some icy words of dismissal, words to make them aware of their insignificance in the eyes of John Greig Latham.St

Further on, Clark spoke of Latham as standing "always aloof, always separate, his one pleasure in life seeming to be in listening to or relating stories of weakness or folly."82

None of this impresses as the description one would chose for someone who is essentially a diplomat. To be thought of as 'aloof' and 'separate' and even dismissive, is hardly the image for which a diplomat would strive. Nevertheless Latham's foray into the world of international diplomacy was, taken in the context of the time, a success.

Exactly who was involved in this Mission, where did it go, and to whom did it speak? Apart from Latham himself, those present on the journey were, Mr Eric E Longfield Lloyd from the Attorney-General's Department who

81C.M.H. Clark, A History of Australia IV.... , pg 109 82C.M.H. Clark,A History of Australia IV.... , pg 248 Lookin& North Diplomacy and Defence 69 travelled as an adviser; Mr Arthur C Moore from the Department of Trade and Customs, who was the Information Officer; Mr Henry A Standish, Latham's Secretary; Mr John L Ferguson, Assistant Secretary; Miss Marjory M Grosvenor, stenographer; and finally Latham's wife and his daughter, Freda.

The itinerary of the trip was as follows:- lst April to 11th April, and 2nd June :- The Netherlands East Indies (Macassor in the Celebes and later Menado, Bali Island, Surabaya, Djokjakarta, Bandoeng, Soebang, Batavia) 11 th April to 14th April :- Malaya (including Singapore and Johore) 16th April to 19th April :- French Indo-China (Saigon) 22nd April, 25th April and 2nd May:- Hong Kong 25th April to 7th May and 25th May to 26th May :- China (Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Peking, Canton) 9th May to 21st May :- Japan (Nagasaki, Kobe, Tokyo, Nikko, Yokohsama, Kamakura, Miyanoshita, Kyoto, Nara, Yamada, Osaka, Unzen via Shimoneseki) 29th May to 31st May:- The Philippine Islands (Manila, Davao)83

The length of time spent in China and Japan, in comparison to the other countries, clearly indicated the emphasis placed on them by Australia. For the purposes of this thesis they will not be looked at closely. Suffice to say that they were the main focus, with the countries of SEA taking secondary place.

P.G. Edwards claimed that the mission was often seen as "..... a personal initiative by Latham with little discernible impact on government, parliament or people."84 This may have been partly true, but it is hard to imagine that, without it, Australia's initial contacts with SEA would have proceeded as they did. It may have been slow, but it would no doubt have been even slower had Latham's Mission not occurred. Pinning down exactly what the aim of the venture was remains difficult. Edwards wrote that,

83 A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Report of the Right Honorable J.G.Latham, leader of the mission - "The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934", pg 4 84P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 91 Lookin1i North Diplomacy and Defence 70

In 1934 Latham led what was described as the Australian Eastern Mission, a title devised to obscure whether its principal motive was to improve trading relationships or to establish political goodwill.SS

Consequently, the prime question was the motivation behind the Mission.

Though the Commonwealth Government insisted that the Latham Mission was simply intended to create 'goodwill', it was widely believed that the ground was being prepared for the conclusion of trade agreements, .... 86

Latham's own reports, put together on return to Australia, give an indication of what the Mission's aims may have been. Latham's Official Report was published with copies being sent to such varying people as the Consuls-General of Japan, the Netherlands, France, U.S.A., and China in Australia; plus Colonial Secretaries of the , Singapore; the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs; and the Consuls of Finland and Denmark. Latham also prepared a secret report which was strictly confidential and sent only to the Prime Minister in the first instance and, thereafter, to all the Ministers.87

This secret report, in contrast to the official one, delves into areas that were, perhaps, considered too sensitive for public consumption. The most notable of these was the defence issue. Latham barely touched on the question of South East Asian defence in his official report but, in private, his fears were made clear. The main aspects of the 'defence issue' was, undoubtedly, the fear of a Japanese move south. He claimed that,

It is obvious that an attack by Japan upon the Dutch East Indies would raise important questions for the British Empire, the United States of America, and France, as well as for Holland.88

SSP.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 90 86Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies .... , pg 35 87 A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Secret Report to Prime Minister Lyons, 2nd August 1934, by J.G. Latham 88A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Secret Report, pg 2 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 71

It is clearly this concern that prompted informal discussions by Latham on the possibility of a closer liaison between the Royal Australian and Royal Dutch Navies. "It was agreed that if considerations of policy permitted this to be done it would be advantageous from the point of view of both Navies."89 The assumption being, of course, that in any conflict Holland and Great Britain would be on the same side. In fact, it was assumed that all the colonial powers in SEA would unite against the common enemy: independent Asian nations. Latham obviously saw some kind of exchange between the two armed forces as a way of showing Japan, in particular, exactly where the European powers stood in regard to control of SEA.

Referring back to the official report, Latham's opening comment is worthy of note. Latham pointed out that,

The Australian Eastern Mission is the first mission of a diplomatic character which the Commonwealth of Australia has sent to foreign countries. There is no precedent for the authorization and despatch by any Dominion of the British Empire of a mission of this precise character. All the self-governing Dominions are entitled to accredit Ministers to foreign countries if they think proper to do so. This right or power has been exercised in several cases, but not by Australia.90

Having said that Australia had not exercised this right, Latham went on to say that "Australia, however, has a special relation to the Far East. The continent of Australia is actually in the geographical area often described as 'the East"'.91 It would seem to be to Australia's shame that an area with which we held such a 'special relation', did not warrant some sort of independent, official contact before 1934.

Latham also attempted to clear up the issue of whether or not his was a trade mission by claiming that,

89 A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Secret Report, pg 5 90A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 3 91A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 3 Looking North Diplomacy and Defence 72

It was not the object of the Mission to deal with trade matters and I made no arrangements and gave no undertakings with respect to trade matters, except that I stated that trade agreements were now receiving the attention of the Government of Australia.92

Latham, rather, sought to emphasise the 'goodwill' aspect of such a venture. He claimed that it took Australians

...... some effort of the imagination to understand that the psychological effect of such a Mission might be very real and valuable. The Western mind does not always realize that in the East there are many people who appreciate a compliment even more than a bargain, and who see a genuine significance in a sincere act of courtesy.93

He spoke of the impossibility of exaggerating "the warmth and cordiality of the welcome which was extended to us everywhere."94 The Mission, he believed, was an act of friendship without looking for, or expecting, immediate personal benefit. Referring specifically to the trade question he stated that,

The tendency to act upon the belief that the curve of friendship should follow the curve of trade is, the Government considers, one that will be fatal to the world if mirrored in the policies of the nations.95

This being said, Latham also proclaimed that "If we die by war, we live by trade".96 Much of the report was occupied with pointing out how Australia was disadvantaged trade-wise in its dealings with SEA. He notes how

It was remarkable to see how anxious people were to obtain information with respect to Australia, and how the absence

92A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 4 93A98111-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 3 94Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 144, 6 July 1934, pg 330 95Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 144, 6 July 1934, pg 329 96Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 144, 6 July 1934, pg 328 Looking North Piplomac;y and Defence 73

of any authoritative source of information handicapped not only Australian trade, but also prejudiced the general position of Australia.97

Reference was made, not for the first time, to the second-rate quality of many Australian goods being sent to the East. The focus in the NEI, for example, was clearly on this aspect. It seemed that,

The general opinion was that this increased trade would result only if Australian exporters would study the market requirements, paying greater attention to quality, standards and continuity in grading, and to more attractive labelling.98

While the exact details contained in the report concerning trade will be dealt with in the next chapter, the overall results of the Mission were positive. As Latham claimed of his time in the NEI,

...... the whole reception of the Mission was a magnificent compliment to the Government and the people of Australia - not only by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, but by all sections of the community - official, commercial and native.99

Friendly relations with the countries of SEA had to be more than just words and posturing. At the basis of any relationship with SEA, for most Australians, were two primary issues - first defence and then trade. This is not to say that such an approach is necessarily wrong, but it must be recognised if progress is to be made.

The Australian government and its people were doing their best to come to terms with Asia, the Latham mission being the most obvious of several attempts to blend defence, trade and goodwill. The truth remained, however, that foreign relations in respect of SEA still remained a matter of opportunity. We dealt with SEA for profit, or we did not deal with them to

97 Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 144, 6 July 1934, pg 333 9S A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 7 99 A981l1-Far East 5 Part 16, Australian Archives. Official Report, pg 7 Looking North Piplomac;y and Defence 74

ensure protection. To combine both profit and safety was not yet a balance Australia had achieved, though it was, inch by inch, moving that way. To outline Australia's trade relations with SEA is to better understand the basis of her so called foreign policy, and it is towards this area that we now look. Looking North Trade 75

CHAIPTEIR THIREE

Trade:- South East Asia - Australia's New Market?

Perhaps the burning issue of Australia's connections with SEA in the inter­ war period was that of trade relations. It was also the most complex because of the motivations behind it, and its long term effects. Of all the connections set up between Australia and SEA in this period, trade is one of the few that stands on its own without, what one might call, ulterior motives. Australians were in SEA to make money. Any other benefits that might have accrued were incidental.

Australia had to learn that trade, to be successful, could not necessarily be a thing of emotion. We could no longer trade with Great Britain simply because we had always done so and it was our 'traditional' trading partner. The WAP, and our own lack of knowledge in relation to SEA and its markets, could no longer prevent us from dealing with our northern neighbours. The following outlines clearly the inroads Australia made during the 1920s and 1930s, just as it shows the mistakes it made. The final balance sheet, however, placed Australia well with its initiatives being slow, but eventually effective.

For Australia, trade was one of the least complicated fronts on which to interact with Asia. For some reason, the business of doing business gave us a desire for success that, more often than not, superseded any prejudices. If Australia could boast of successes in its approachment with SEA in the inter­ war period, then it was invariably in some way linked to the issue of trade.

As far as links with the Empire were concerned, in the 1920s Bruce believed that economically Australia was dependent on the United Kingdom in two ways.

Australia must find markets for her surplus products. It is to the Motherland ...... we must look primarily in considering the question of markets and the disposal of our surplus products. Lookina North Trade 76

Australia needed population. Australia needed capital: Australia must look to the Motherland to borrow that capital.1

Bruce's idea was that everything we required in the area of trade could be found within the United Kingdom. Given Bruce's business background, which had his family business boasting a London branch, his commitment to Imperial trade is not surprising. The conviction of his government was that there was no need to pursue markets in Asia while England was still accepting Australian goods. It is difficult to assess the impact of such an attitude on the developing trade with SEA but, given the conduct of trade generally, it had to be great. Frederic Eggleston took more of a middle ground approach.

...... an Empire trade policy based merely on past traditions and patriotism may be entirely fallacious and dangerous ..... The role of Australia in this new Empire is to represent British ideas, British interests and British conceptions of the world order in the region in which she is situated - the Pacific basin ..... Her ideas, her traditions have been formed by her Western culture, but without sacrificing this ethos she must apply these ideas in a new environment. She must study the Pacific, know its geography, its peoples, its trade, its communications.2

This in 1936 was, perhaps, the very best that could be hoped for by those like Eggleston who sought increased links with the East. Much of the work that had been done in the 1920s was wasted after the events of the Ottawa Conference. The currency of the Ottawa Agreement extended over the five years from late 1932, and saw the tariff preference go from 65% of British imported goods in 1913 to 90% of goods after the agreement.3

The Ottawa Agreement was itself a product of the Imperial Conference of 1932. While "Economic historians recognise that the conference decisions

1C.M.H. Clark, A History of Australia IV: .... , pg 198 2F.W. Eggleston, "The British Empire, Australia and the Pacific" from The Australian Quarterly, Vol 8, No 31, September 1936, pg 7 3Brian Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia; An Economic History, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1%9, pg 314 Looking North Irade 77

established a framework within which Empire trade and economic diplomacy were to be conducted for many years"4, the Conference itself was not exactly the height of organisation.

The Ottawa Conference, in fact, was a muddle, and its Agreements were the result of 'ad hoe' concessions and desperate last-minute bargaining. Nothing could have been less contrived or calculated - less 'Imperial'.5

It may have been disorganised in the making, but it is clear at least what the British hoped the outcome would be. In a speech in October 1936, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain stated that,

There was a period after the war when we were passing from the old conception of a mother country and her colonies to the newer ideas of a free association of equal nations, during which the assertion of their independent nationalism seemed to be more important in the eyes of some of the Dominion Governments than the remembrance of their common origin and common ideals. It looked for a time as though there were a real danger lest, in the event of a clash between sentiment and immediate national interests, sentiment might be overwhelmed. Ottawa was an attempt to bring the Empire together again and to supplement and support the common sentiment by bringing more material interests into line with it.6

It is to Australia's credit that, under this sort of Imperial pressure, she was able to forge as many trade links with SEA as she did.

Much of the planned up coming discussions on trade representatives were an attempt to correct the wrongs of many Australian manufacturers and traders working in the East. It was felt that the Ministry of Commerce was not in a position to devote as much attention to the concerns of Eastern

4Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1974. pg 170 5Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy.... , pg 31 6D.B. Copland, and C.V. Janes, Australian Trade Policy: A Book of Documents 1932-1937, Angus and Robertson Limited, Sydney, 1937, pg 146 Looking North Trade 78

traders as was necessary. So, by placing a person in SEA whose sole task it was to guide traders, it was hoped that greater benefits would accrue to all Australians.

The first problem to be overcome was simply one of attitude and understanding. Few traders really comprehended that the East must be considered as a new and alien market, which needed to be approached under a new set of guidelines. Mr E.J. Harrison, speaking in Parliament in 1932, noted that trade with the East had increased but, that

Still it is obvious that our sales could have been still more increased had we understood better the Eastern conditions and requirements, and had a better knowledge and a spirit of sane understanding regarding the requirements of the markets there.7

Further on, he pointed out that

It, therefore, behoves us to watch the Eastern markets carefully. It may be that our proximity to the East, or our neglect to take advantage of the conditions operating in the Eastern countries, or even our White Australia policy, has prevented us from exploiting their markets as we should. It may be that we have naturally built up jealousies and prejudices which other countries avoided.8

Harrison's concluding points mark him as someone who had thought seriously about the reason for Australia holding back in SEA. For him, it seemed that even more was needed than the sending of one person to SEA to assist traders. What was required was that

A study of Eastern business methods, and of the psychology of Eastern peoples, should be undertaken ...... Not only should we send a special delegation to Eastern countries to study their business methods, but we should also encourage them to send their trade representatives here ...... It would be to the

1Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 136, 18 October 1932, pg 1325 8Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 136, 18 October 1932, pg 1326 Lookin& North Trade 22

advantage of Australia to accept from these Eastern countries students to study our methods of business.9

Another parliamentarian to make an interesting point regarding trade in general, yet particularly relevant to SEA, was Mr McCall, Member for Martin. He noted that

People outside Australia do not, as a rule, purchase Australian goods because of any special regard which they have for the Australian people. On the whole they buy them because they believe that, as compared with similar products offered by other countries, Australian goods are of equal quality, or represent better value for the money. Our own purchases from abroad are also - to a large extent - governed by similar motives. Again we must remember that trade is almost entirely carried on between individuals and not between govemments.10

The one point that Mr McCall seemed to be making was that, with competition amongst international traders being so intense, every chance at having an edge on your competitors should be snatched. Thus, if making that extra effort to, say, learn the language of the native traders or learn the relevant social customs will result in you having an advantage, then surely that is better than expecting your market to always bend to your ways.

Discussions in the Parliament during the 1920s were filled with references to Australia's trade with the NEI in particular. The dominant line, unfortunately, seemed to be that Australian traders were missing out, the reason being that they were making mistakes. Mr Jackson asked the Prime Minister in Parliament about the case of a contract with Java that was lost to Germany. The contract involved the supply of cast-iron pipes to a private firm in Java. The deal was called off owing to the "serious delay which occurred in the delivery of the goods." The contract had been entered into with the Government Dockyard in Newcastle. The complaints revolved not only around the "strikes and stoppages", which made final delivery

9Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 136, 18 October 1932, pg 1329 10Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 147, 18 October 1935, pp 859-860 Looking North Trade 80 impossible, but also the supply of inferior material under the same contract.11

The Prime Minister was painfully aware of the problem, yet turned away from this particular case, perhaps because of the links with wider industrial issues, and moved on to other cases for which he obviously felt the private sector to be responsible.

The case the honorable member has mentioned is not an isolated one... We ought to trade with the East in leather, but the samples sent away were calculated to bring discredit upon the name of the Commonwealth.... The Eastern market is ours if we like to cater for it in a sensible and business-like way. Therefore we should not allow private firms to bring the Commonwealth into disrepute.12

In numerical terms, the NEI was considered to be a 'bad customer' country. All this meant was that Australia was importing more from the NEI than it was exporting to it. In fact, the balance of trade between the NEI and Australia in the 25 years preceding 1940 was enormously favourable to the NEI.

For each year of the first 18 years the balance against Australia has averaged 2,826,000 pounds per year and for the remaining period, which is generally known as the Ottawa Agreement (seven) Years, the balance against Australia has increased - on a mixed currency basis- to 4,129,745 pounds per year.13

To select the periods 1935/36 and 1936/37 would display quite clearly this trade imbalance. For the two periods mentioned our trade with Japan for example, resulted in a favourable trade balance of 9,131,213 pounds sterling and 3,754,489 pounds sterling, respectively. Likewise with British Malaya the favourable balances were 519,319 and 1,290,051. With the NEI the

11Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 98, 30 November 1921, pg 13363 12Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 98, 24 November 1921, pg 13203 l3A461l1 - V323l1l7, Australian Archives. Trade Relations Series No 7 A of 1940 Looking North I@de 81

unfavourable trade balance was in the region of 3,905,090 pounds sterling in 1935/36 and grew to 5,105,497 pounds sterling in 1936/37.14

As a region - and in this it would be necessary to include China, Japan, British Malaya, the Philippine Islands and the NEI - the equation was better with SEA providing about one-seventh of our total imports and taking about one-sixth of our exports.15 In numerical terms the year 1936 saw Australia move from having a favourable trade balance with the region to having an unfavourable one. In 1935/36 the balance was a favourable 5,399,477 pounds sterling and by the end of 1936/37 this had changed to an unfavourable 1,320,933 pounds sterling. The main reason for this decline was not as result of problems in SEA, but rather resulted from a huge drop in exports to Japan as a result of the trade dispute.

The following graph shows the trading situation between Australia and the NEI for the twelve year period from 1922-1934. The NEI's share of the Australian imports can be seen to have grown quite steadily over the period, although the growth was still minor, considering the potential. While in value terms there was a reduction, particularly during and after the depression years, the NEI still managed to maintain and improve its place in relation to other nations; ie. its share of the Australian market. Likewise, in the value of Australian exports to the NEI a drop can be seen. The real concern was that Australia was not maintaining its share of the NEI market, dropping from a high of 1.7% in 1929-30 to 0.9% in 1933-34. One wonders if such trade figures could have influenced Latham's 'goodwill' mission to SEA. A mission, of course, that was not aimed at increasing trade.

14A601/1 - 4011212, Australian Archives. Trade Balances With Eastern Countries, Stencil No.1937 I 482 15J.G. Crawford, "Australia as a Pacific Power" from W.G.K. Duncan, Australia's Foreign Policy, Angus and Robertson Limited, Sydney, 1938, pg 74 Looking North Trade 82

Year Imports fr NEI Exports to NEI Value (pnds) % total imports Value (pnds) % total exports

1922-23 4,361,302 3.3 1,862,864 1.6 1923-24 4,607,681 3.3 1,602,013 1.4 1924-25 5,640,881 3.6 2,045,882 1.3 1925-26 6,191,895 4.1 2,159,898 1.5 1926-27 6,451,688 3.9 2,012,708 1.4 1927-28 5,703,345 3.9 1,932,194 1.4 1928-29 7,091,619 4.9 2,048,023 1.4 1929-30 6,282,653 4.9 2,122,722 1.7 1930-31 c4,011,194 6.8 al,412,525 1.4 1931-32 c2,648,948 6.1 al,333,959 1.2 1932-33 c2,930,954 5.1 al,207,890 1.0 b964,768 1933-34 c3,960,233 6.7 al,149,167 0.9 b917,499

(a) Australian Currency Values (b) Estimated British Currency Value for 1932-1933 (c) British Currency Value16

While acknowledging the intrinsic problems of using figures to analyse any situation - that is, the need to take into account who is supplying the figures, for whom, and for what purpose - there is a certain value in being able to quantify trends and movements, particularly in regards to trade. In this way, if we take the years 1927-28 and make comparisons between the NEI and Australia's other trading partners, an interesting pattern emerges.

161.Clunies Ross (ed), Australia and the Far East: Diplomatic and Trade Relations, Angus and Robertson Ltd, 1%5, pg 217 Looking North Trade 83

Country Imports% Exports%

U.K. 42.65 37.90 British possessions 12.98 10.63 Total British 55.707 48.53

China 0.46 0.29 NEI 3.86 1.36 Japan 2.89 8.78 France 2.62 10.59 Germany 3.12 8.40 Italy 0.92 3.59 U.S.A. 23.66 6.25 Total foreign countries 44.293 51.4717

The graph shows us that Australia's dependency on the U.K. was not just a matter of emotions but, also clearly, a matter of trade. The percentage of Australian trade done with the U.K. had to be expected. What may not have been so expected was the relative poor standing of the NEI. In regards to exports, of the trading nations chosen, only China ranked below the NEI.

A further comparison that can be made, when adding the extra data below, is the trade between Australia and the U.K., as opposed to that between the NEI and Holland. The proportion of trade between the NEI and Holland is markedly less. Given that, as an official colony of Holland, the NEI would be expected to have majority links with that country, the results are enlightening.

17w.K. Hancock, Australia .... , pg 216 Lookin& North Trade 84

Table which shows the changes in the percentage share of the trade of the principal countries engaged in the import trade of the NEI.

Country 1930% 1931 % 1932%

Holland 16.8 15.4 15.8 Great Britain 10.5 8.0 9.6 Germany 10.1 9.4 7.7 U.S.A 10.7 9.3 6.7 Australia 3.0 3.3 3.3 Singapore 11.2 11.4 12.5 Japan & Formosa 12.0 17.0 21.318

The unique nature of the trading relationship between Holland and the NEI must be considered when looking at what areas, or what products, Australian trade focused on in regards to the NEI. In 1933 of products exported to the NEI, butter, an item synonymous with Holland, was top on the list of value exports.

1931-32 value of exports to DEi

Butter 419,000 pounds Milk 102,000 Flour 529,000 Coal 28,000 Leather 34,000 Biscuits 26,000 Fresh Fruit 30,00019

The fact that the top four items were primary products is an indication of how little Australia understood the potential in the NEI.

In the 1934 report on Australian trade with the NEI it was written that

18A461l1 - V323l1l7, Australian Archives. Report on Australian Trade with the NEI 1934. 19 Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 138, 29 March 1933, pg 673 Looldu& North Trade 85

..... many of his requirements the native is unable to produce, and thus there exists throughout the Netherlands East Indies a demand for the manufactured and semi-manufactured foodstuffs and products of the countries of temperate climates. It is in this demand that the interest of Australian exporters lies, for they are able to supply many of the commodities which are required, while the geographical position of Australia in relation to the Netherlands East Indies gives them a decided advantage over many competitor nations in supplying these commodities.20

True, geographical proximity was not in itself a reason for trade, but the fact that Australia, should she choose, had the means to provide the NEI with many of its imports, was.

The recognition of the position of both Singapore and Malaya in respect to Australian trade only came on the heels of the NEI. It was, perhaps, the work being done by Critchley in the NEI, and the fact that he was the only person available to help with the co-ordination of Australia in the Singapore Trade Fair, that made Australia realise the hole that existed in its relations with Malaya and Singapore.

At present the Australian Trade Commissioner in this part of the world is established at Batavia, while Singapore and the rest of Malaya - a valuable market for Australian produce - is neglected. The Commonwealth has a valuable trade with the Dutch East Indies, and although it might not be wise to abandon representation there, the fact remains that Singapore is the most important trade centre in this part of the world.21

There were examples during the 1920s of one-off trade links between Australia and Singapore. The problem seemed to be that no trend of consistent and continuous trade was emerging. Everything from beef dripping to ponies, from trees to cattle, was being exported by Australia to Singapore, but never was there an indication of long term contracts. The

20A461l1 - V323l1l7, Australian Archives. Report on Australian Trade with the NEI 1934, pg2 21The Mercury, 1 July 1939 Looking North Trade 86

orders appeared to be single events prompted by an immediate need, rather than as a result of any marketing on Australia's part.22

Not surprisingly Australia's major import from Malaya was rubber. Its exports to Malaya were a little more varied with butter, meats, milk and cream, fruits, flour, sheep, coal, leather, machinery and metal manufactures, and soap all figuring in the equation.23 In value terms Australian trade with Malaya is revealed in the following table.

Year Exports to Malaya Imports from Malaya

1923-24 1,549,220 494,930 1924-25 1,528,303 612,314 1925-26 2,131,211 1,701,508 1926-27 1,920,956 2,025,757 1927-28 2,027,724 1,804,602 1928-29 1,978,084 1,133,963 1929-30 1,399,321 812,513 1930-31 b818,917 a 274,894 1931-32 b916,462 a 276,654 1932-33 b962,970 a 271,630

C 769,637 a 328,720 1933-34 bl,015,315 c810,631 a - British Currency Values b - Australian Recorded Values c - Estimated British Values for 1932-33 and 1933_3424

22A597l1 - 24Al1929, Australian Archives. Order of beef dripping from Messrs H.C. Sleigh to The Ho Ho Biscuit Factory, 12 January 1924. CP703l2l1 - 241138368, Australian Archives. Purchase of 11 ponies from Dalgety and Company Ltd and 11 from H.C. Sleigh by Selangor Turf Club 1924 A981l1 - Malaya 15, Australian Archives. Supply of trees to line Canberra Road in Singapore 23P Campbell, R.C. Mills, G.V. Portus, Studies in Australian Affairs .... , pg 149 241.Clunies Ross, Australia and the Far East.... , pg 217 Looking North Trade 87

The situation between Australia and British Malaya was quite clearly more advanced than that already shown with the NEI. For a start, in every year shown except for 1926-27, Australia had a favourable trade balance with British Malaya. As the Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr Gullett, pointed out in 1932

Malaya, however, promises perhaps the best colonial field for an expansion of Australian trade. In 1929-30 our exports to British Malaya were valued at 1,400,000 pounds, and with the valuable brandy concession ..... and a number of other increased preferences, notably upon butter, the market there should be one worth vigorous exploitation by our exporting interests.25

* * *

Having already referred in Chapter Two to the Australian Government's efforts to create general links between Australia and her neighbours, the linked issue, in terms of trade, was that of establishing trade commissioners in various Eastern countries. For some time there had been within the issue of Australian representatives in SEA an element of confusion. There were those who advocated that they be of a purely diplomatic nature, as well as those who, believing themselves more pragmatic, saw trade relations as the hard, tangible truth. In this light, I will be discussing here the idea of a trade representative as someone located in SEA with the purpose of improving Australia's trade position.

As early as 1917, in a report by J.J.Long, it was being advocated that

Australian interests would undoubtedly be further safeguarded and advanced by the creation, either at Batavia - the capital of Java, and really the distributing centre of the Dutch East Indies - or at Singapore, the capital of the Straits Settlements, of a commercial agency, the duty of which would be to fasten

25Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 135, 13 October 1932, pg 1163 Looking North Irade 88

and extend trade relations between the merchants of the two countries and the Commonwealth.26

While this may have been the ideal that was promoted by the government, the reality that existed, at least in the first few years of the appointment, was far from ideaL Criticism seemed to come from many quarters.

The original terms of the appointment appeared reasonable enough. The appointment was to be for an initial twelve months with the provision for extending it to four years with Parliamentary approval. The commencing salary was to be 2000 pounds p.a., though no other allowances were set aside. Finally, while the appointee, Mr Little, was a member of a trading firm in Shanghai, he, or future representatives, were not permitted to engage in business or employment other than in connection with duties under the agreement.27 Although Little was replaced in 1922 by Mr E.T. Sheaf, the criticisms did not necessarily end. While the complaints were aimed more at the office than the individual, Little was the best initial choice. He was particularly criticised in parliament for sponsoring one firm above others, with the firm in question being Little Brothers Limited.28 It was clear that such an unsatisfactory situation could not be permitted to continue.

In Parliament in March 1923, Mr Lazzarini of Werriwa quotes Mr H.H. Cohen of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce as saying,

All that the Trade Commissioners in the East have written about is what exporters already know - the enormous business done with the East by other countries. Both Mr Little and Mr Sheaf have not increased the business between Australia and the Eastern Countries by 1 pound.29

An even more scathing account came from a Dr Maloney of Melbourne a day later.

26 A98111 - NEI 28 Pt 1, Australian Archives. Report of the Commissioner, Senator the Honorable J.J. Long, on "Java and the East Indies, Singapore and the Straits Settlements" 1917-1918, pg 15 27 Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 96, 16 August 1921, pp 10957-58 28Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 104, 24 July 1923, pp 1467-1475 29Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 102, 1 March 1923, pg 104 Looking North Trade 89

I now come to that abomination of representation which exists in the East. Is there any Chamber of Commerce in Australia but condemns the Government of the past for sending two trade Commissioners to the East? I have been in the East, and I have made inquiries about their work. What did they do? They cannot even speak the language of the country. A man who went over there, and whose friendship I value, speaks the language, and would be of infinitely greater service to the Commonwealth than are the other two. One of these trade representatives was a cinematographer, while the other was at one time a parson. I am always suspicious of parsons when they enter politics. At the present time we are wasting money on the representation of Australia in the East. Did not one of the Commissioners write a report conveying the wonderful intelligence that it would be unwise for us to expend our money on the purchase of Chinese wool? These men should not represent the Commonwealth, and I am ashamed of the little work they have done. Let us follow the splendid example of every large firm in Australia by sending out commercial agents and paying them a commission on the value of the goods which are exported by us as a result of their efforts.30

It seems extraordinary that Dr Maloney would list a knowledge of an Asian language as an essential skill of any potential trade representative. In 1923 it would have been a near impossibility to find individuals with a suitable trade background and who spoke an Asian language. Perhaps Dr Maloney's emphasis on language skills had more to do with his friend who 'speaks the language' than it did with acknowledging language skills as being advantageous in dealings with SEA.

Dr Maloney's idea of commission-based appointments was not in accordance with the government view. While the obvious purpose of a Trade Commissioner must be to promote increased trade links between the two countries or regions in question, any plan to promote or advantage one firm above another was not government policy. J.G. Latham joined in the criticism of Sheaf, but from the opposite angle. He felt that Sheaf was wrong,

30Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 102, 2 March 1923, pg 150 Looking North Trade 90

in principle, to contact individual merchants directly, but rather should report through the Trade and Customs Department or the Chamber of Commerce.31

This is not to say that Sheaf was not fighting his own battles, due to lack of support from key Ministries. In a letter to P.E. Deane in the Prime Minister's Department in April 1922, Sheaf outlined the obstructions placed in his way, particularly by the Minister for Customs. By all accounts it appeared that Sheaf was totally bound in his actions by Customs. He could neither hire or fire his own staff; he was to make no statement to the press without prior approval, and he was not permitted to set up any show rooms in order to display Australian goods overseas.32

All of this confusion and criticism took place in the 1920s when Australia was only beginning to enter the new and strange area of independent contact with SEA. It was not until the 1930s that the work of the Trade Commissioners became better established and of greater advantage to Australia. After what some would describe as the debacle of Mr Little and Mr Sheaf, it was important that Australia think clearly about what was actually required of anyone working on the nation's behalf in SEA.

In 1932 the Minister for Commerce, Mr Stewart, was happy to announce that,

I am now able to advise ...... that arrangements are being made for a convention of producing, trading, financial, shipping, and all other interests concerned, to discuss the whole subject of our Eastern trade, including the appointment of trade representatives in Eastern centres.33

This convention referred to a conference held in Sydney in February 1933. The Conference on Eastern Trade was attended by representatives of the Commonwealth and State Governments; the Consuls-General of Japan, China and the Netherlands; representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Manufactures in most states; representatives of primary

31Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 102, 7 March 1923, pg 179 32A457l1, Q306l3, Australian Archives, Letter from E.T. Sheaf to P.E. Deane Esqr, Prime Minister's Department, Melbourne, April 17th 1922, pg 1 33Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 136, 8 November 1932, pg 2024 Looking North Trade 91 producers; and a number of other organisations. Three important outcomes emanated from the Conference. One was the Trade Commissioners Bill. The second was that "committees representative of the business interests which trade with Eastern countries have been set up in each State, the object being to stimulate the development of trade between Australia and those countries"34 And finally, the recommendation that a trade delegation be sent to the East; the indirect lead to the Latham Mission.

The lead given by J.G. Latham in areas of diplomacy was just as evident in the area of trade. Latham was a man in power and one with direct access to others in power. He was also not adverse to giving his opinion, for example, to the Prime Minister if he felt it important. Trade with SEA was important to Latham, as was Australian trade representation in the East. As he pointed out in a letter to Prime Minister Lyons in 1933

Other countries take pains to assist and make opportunities for their traders. We do almost nothing in this direction. I consider that we should begin with New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies and then extend to the East. Possibly an officer of the Commerce Department attached to the British Trade Commissioner in Tokio would be useful as a beginning. In Java an officer working for a time with the British Chamber of Commerce there might be tried as an experiment.35

Latham's visit to SEA in 1934 resulted in his submitting various reports to the government on different issues seen as being of importance. One such report was submitted on 2 August 1934 and was entitled the "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners.". The report consisted of his impressions of SEA and the best way in which Australia as a nation should be represented there.

After considering the conditions in each of the countries visited by the Mission the recommendation is made that Trade Commissioners representing Australia should be appointed at Batavia, Shanghai, and Tokio. It is also recommended that the

34Australian Parliamentary Papers Vol 143, 6 December 1933, pg 5610 35Latham Papers, MS1009, 1009/54/25, Letter from Latham to Prime Minister Lyons, 27 July 1933 Looking North Trade 92

Overseas Department of Trade, London, should be approached with a view to ascertaining whether the British Trade Commissioners stationed at Singapore and Hong Kong could be appointed to act on behalf of Australia; the Commonwealth on its part to be prepared to pay a certain sum towards overhead expenses and to remunerate the two officials concerned .... Undoubtedly the greatest advantage to Australia and Australian trade arising out of such appointments would be the !confidence which would be inspired in the commercial communities in the various trading centres. This aspect of the matter is very important in the Netherlands East Indies, Straits Settlements and China.36

Latham's balanced view of the options available to Australia was most probably the result of him taking into account, not only his own experiences but also, the opinions of others. For example, Latham's idea to consider British Trade Commissioners initially representing Australia may have come from opinions like those expressed by H. Cohen. He wrote from the Premier's Office in Melbourne that

The proposal to send gentlemen possibly selected outside the Government Department at considerable salaries is one against which there is a very considerable body of opinion in Melbourne. An alternative suggestion which has found considerable favor is that intelligent officers of the Department of Commerce, such men of the calibre, for instance of Mr Murphy and Mr Tonkin, should be sent to Eastern countries and that it should be arranged that they should work in conjunction with the British Commercial Attaches there. It is thought that what is wanted is not people concerned with social matters or what has been termed glorified commercial travellers but trained departmental officers who will be able to supply information as to Australian customs and other matters and make the like enquiries for

36A981l1 - Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. J.G. Latham:-"Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners", 2 August 1934 Looking North Trade 93

Australian merchants abroad and supply information as to markets from their enquiries and investigations.37

Quite obviously, Latham had also carefully considered exactly what the tasks of the Trade Commissioner should be. The general view was that a Trade Commissioner could help prevent Australian firms from adopting practices that had long been complained about in Asia. The more specific functions of the Trade Commissioner would be: 1 I Placing the Australian point of view to Governments and peoples of other countries. 2/ Correcting mis-statements concerning Australia and Australian policy. 3/ Taking steps in advance to correct probable misapprehensions concerning Australian policy. 4/ Reporting to the Commonwealth Government on general economic, industry and trade questions. 5/ Reporting about the activities of foreign competitors. 6/ Ascertaining probable tariff changes likely to affect Australia.38

While Government discussions on trade commissioners included the possibility of placements in both Japan and China within the SEA region, the main options were seen as being Batavia in the NEI, and Singapore. Turning firstly to the NEI, the Minister for Commerce, F.H. Stewart, stated that,

The opinion has been expressed by competent observers that Australian trade interests in Netherlands India warrant the appointment of an official Trade Representative. It is known that such an appointment will be received by the Netherlands Indian Government, not only from the commercial viewpoint, but also from the financial, political, fiscal and economic aspects of the' trade between the two countries.39

37Latham Papers, MS1009, 1009 /54/27-29, Letter from Harold Cohen, Premiers Office, Melbourne, to J.G. Latham, 13 September 1933 38A981l1- Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners" by J.G. Latham, 2 August 1934, pp 2-3 39F.H. Stewart, "Australian Commercial Representation Abroad" from Dinning and Holmes, Australian Foreign Policy 1934 .... , pg 13 Looking North Trade 94

Latham supported Stewart in this regard, claiming that everything pointed to someone being assigned to these islands.

The office of the Commissioner should be located at Batavia. It is the commercial capital of the Netherlands East Indies and it is here that the headquarters of all Consuls-General and Trade Commissioners are located. In my opinion the Commissioner's area of control should be limited to the Netherlands East Indies. The representative appointed will have an onerous task confronting him in the Indies ..... 40

Latham's views on the kind of person to take up the position were firmly rooted in the perceptions of the time. Diplomacy, even trade related, was the work of a 'gentleman'.

The Dutch officials are well educated; most of them speak English; they are well grounded in economics and are good administrators. Above all they are gentlemen. In selecting an Australian representative it is important that the standing and attainments of the official administrators with whom it would be his duty to deal should be kept in mind. The appointee must be a gentleman with a good education. Further, I consider that an undertaking should be required from him that he will commence the study of the Dutch language immediately he is appointed, so that he should be able to speak it within a year of his appointment. He will also find it necessary to speak Malay ..... The need for a knowledge of the two languages is obvious. Such knowledge is of great value in both official and business intercourse.41

Finding a gentleman was not the problem. Finding one adequately versed in NEI affairs, and both the Dutch and Malay languages, was the problem. It

40A98111-Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners" by J.G. Latham, 2 August 1934, pp 4-6 41A981l1-Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners" by J.G. Latham, 2 August 1934, pg 5 Looking North Trade 95

was this need for a man already knowledgeable in dealings with the NEI that led, perhaps not surprisingly, to an offer from the British Chamber of Commerce for the NEI to act as Australian representative in the area. A persuasive case was presented by the Chamber, through H.F.D. Burke and Charles M. Morrell, the General Secretary to the Chamber, in various correspondence with Australian Government officials.

Morrell in letters to the Minister of Commerce pointed out that "... during my visit to Australia, it has become still more apparent that the presence of a suitable Australian, working with our Batavia Office, would be highly desirable."42 In an earlier letter, Morrell wrote that ".... we feel that in view of present day efforts to strengthen Empire unity, it is only proper to place at Australia's disposal our knowledge of and experience in the Netherlands East Indies especially at the moment when she is seriously considering an expansion of her trade with the Far East."43

What the British Chamber of Commerce was specifically offering was a permanent Australian section in the Java Gazette, the magazine of the Chamber; one or more Australians appointed as members of the council; and perhaps, most attractively, the full experience of the Chamber at a much lower cost than establishing a separate office. To the credit of the Australian Government, the decision was taken to move forward with the establishment of direct and independent contacts with the NEI, rather than relying on the old Empire ties.

This offer by the British Chamber of Commerce seemed a generous one, and it is unclear why Stewart on behalf of the Government would have turned it down. There is no doubting that, as Minister for Commerce, Stewart had devoted much time and energy to discussions on trade representation in SEA. He had already been involved in the arrangements for the Conference on eastern Trade and there was no doubt that the various states were letting him know that they too wished to be involved. Perhaps discussions and

42A2910l1-437/5/104, Australian Archives. Letter from Charles M. Morrell, General Secretary to the British Chamber of Commerce, to F.H. Stewart, Minister for Commerce, dated 21 August 1933 43A2910l1-437/5/104, Australian Archives. Letter from Charles M. Morrell, General Secretary to the British Chamber of Commerce, to F.H. Stewart, Minister for Commerce, dated 23 June 1933 Looking North Trade 96

plans had achieved such momentum that to fall back on the kind of offer Mr Morrell was making would be unattractive to a politician who had given open support to independent trade representation in SEA.

Most significantly, it speaks of a realisation that Australian and British interests in SEA were different. In the area of trade, Australia was there to compete with Britain, not to simply accept its leftovers. If Australia was to succeed in trade in SEA, then it was essential it fight its own battles and, no matter how genuine the offer from Morrell, when Australia weighed up Empire unity against monetary gain, the balance fell against the Empire.

The appointment of C.E. Critchley as Trade Commissioner, with his assistant C.J. Carne, on 30th May 1935, heralded a new phase in trade relations. The government was now directly informed on conditions in the NEI, most obviously through monthly memos sent by Critchley to the Department of Commerce. Critchley was reporting on current economic conditions in the NEI and transferring this back to a government whose professed desire was not only to affirm old trade links but, more importantly, to establish new ones. While the system of the monthly reporting was, in essence a good one, the reality was that it often only provided the facts, with little advice or interpretative information being given. As Australia's man on the spot, this was something that needed to be rectified if the position was to be completely effective.

More time and energy, it seems, was spent on discussing the finer points of Critchley's position than was spent on actually performing the necessary functions. While observers noted correctly that "Greater importance attachs to status right throughout the East than is relatively attached to such things in Australia", there seemed little evidence to support the idea of raising Critchley's status from Trade Commissioner to that of Consular Representative. The functions of the two positions would seem to differ and would, one assumes, require different skills. While it may be that Australia was ready to have a Trade Commissioner in SEA, as yet ".... .it is not the policy of the Commonwealth Government that the Commonwealth shall appoint its own Ministers or Consuls."44

44A461l1-W323l1/7, Australian Archives. Memo from The Secretary of the Prime Ministers Department dated 3 September, 1936 Looking North Trade 97

Similar patterns developed in both Singapore and Malaya where attempts were made to establish trade representation. It was thought that, not only would the appointment of a professional working to assist traders and manufacturers increase Australians' knowledge of the market, but it would possibly override what was seen as "..... a certain antagonism towards Australia by the British ... 45

Once again, it is easiest to turn to J.G. Latham for expressions of what the more forward thinking members of Parliament were envisaging as Australia's future. It was not difficult to acknowledge that

Singapore lies at the crossroads of the East and is a British port. It is in closer touch with the rest of the world than is Batavia. In this area a strong sentiment exists in favour of British goods and under the Ottawa Agreement preferences there is an increasing trade to be done by Australia in British Malaya.46

The territory that would come under the control of the Singapore agent would include British Malaya, Siam, British , Brunei and Sarawak. Unlike the NEI, it was proposed that it would be better to ask if the British Trade Commissioner in Singapore could also represent Australia.

After a careful survey of the area and consultation with official representatives and business executives the opinion was formed that some form of representation was desirable in Singapore. It was considered, however, that the appointment of a full-time Commissioner was not justified at the moment.47

At a meeting of the Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade held on 30 September and the 1 October 1937, the issue of exactly what form any representation in Singapore should take was also discussed. Various options

45A461l1-H323l1/5, Australian Archives. Letter from Ernest G. Mozar of Master Limited, Associated Advertising Services to H.V. Jaques M.L.A. dated 19 June 1930 46A981l1-Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners" by J.G. Latham, 2 August 1934, pg 8 47 A981l1-Far East 5 Pt 16, Australian Archives. "Australian Eastern Mission: Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners" by J.G. Latham, 2 August 1934, pg 8 Looking North Trade 98

were put forward, but after a full discussion it was proposed that there should be a "Continuance of the office of Trade Commissioner in Batavia, recommended with an Assistant in Singapore and Batavia under the control of the Trade Commissioner in Batavia. "48 Most agreed that there should be no objection to the appointment going to a civil servant and, indeed, the consensus was that this would be preferable to a businessman being given the post.

With the following memo drafted by George McLeay, Minister for Commerce, on the 1 August 1939, one wonders what did, or more to the point what did not, happen in the intervening five years.

Under existing arrangements, Singapore is visited periodically by the Australian Government Commissioner in the Netherlands India. It is intended, however, that the activities of the Commissioner at Singapore should embrace not only British Malaya, but the adjoining territories of Burma, Siam, and French Indo China, countries with which Australian exporters have established useful trade connections. It is also proposed that the Philippine Islands, which do not at present come within the territory of any of the Australian Commissioners in the East, be included in the territory of the Commissioner in Netherlands India.49

* *

In a report made by Senator J.J. Long a glaring bias is evident. The issue of the language in which business was conducted was often filled with much emotion. For reasons most obvious, Australia was solely an English speaking country. Most of our trade had been with English speaking

48A60111 - 4011218, Australian Archives. Victorian Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade. Draft of Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade:- Minutes of Fourth Meeting Held at Parliament House, Canberra on 30 September and 1 October 1937 49 A461l1 - AD323l_1l7, Australian Archives. "Commonwealth Government Representation in British Malaya-Trade Commissioner Office at Singapore". Department of Commerce, 1 August 1939, George McLeay, Minister of Commerce Looking North Trade 99

countries or, at the very least, countries from within Europe. The idea that we would conscientiously have to develop language skills, particularly Asian languages, in order to trade, seemed an anathema. Only a few small voices, such as those in the Chamber of Commerce mentioned earlier, saw the reality of trade links without language skills. This exceedingly insular idea revolved around the notion that our trading partners should learn to speak English. The paradox, of course, was that most of our trading partners had already taken the trouble to learn English. J.J. Long picks up on this when he writes that,

..... :.a knowledge of the English language is a condition precedent to employment in the Dutch East Indian Civil Service. And, as a rule, remarkably good English is spoken. But this is not only noticeable in the official world, but in commercial circles also; and this fact alone is surely indicative of the facility with which our trade may be expanded when the opportunity arrives.SO

Would a trade commissioner placed on the spot be able to communicate the reality of trade with SEA? The reality was that while the top layer of commerce may have been English or Dutch speaking, the vast majority of people were speakers of their own native language. If one wanted to take advantage of all that trading with SEA offered, then a native language had to be learnt.

* *

If a change in attitude was required, then the way to go about it was through education and promotion. One event, if it can be called an event, that went some way towards this idea was the 'Goodwill Cruise' of 1933. Speaking in Parliament in April 1933 the Minister for Commerce, Mr Stewart, informed the members that

50A981l1 - NEI 28 pt 1, Australian Archives. Report of the Commissioner, Senator The Honorable J.J. Long on "Java and the East Indies, Singapore and the Straits Settlements 1917- 1918", pg 10 Looking North Trade 100

The trade ship Nieuw Holland has been chartered by the Chambers of Manufactures. The Government is not responsible for initiating the project, but, realising its potentialities for good, has given its benediction to it.... Believing the enterprise to be fraught with great possibilities of benefit to Australian trade, the Government has given every encouragement to the promoters. 51

The decision was originally taken by a group of businessmen in Sydney and Melbourne to send to the East an advertising show boat of samples of Australian primary and secondary products. Organised by the Australian Chamber of Manufactures, the Nieuw Holland was to leave Adelaide on the 8 April, arriving in Macassar on the 28 April, calling at Surabaya, Semarang, Ceribon, Batavia, Belewan Deli, Singapore and Penang. The Prime Minister's Department was quick to notify the various British Consuls­ General that, while the cruise was organised by the Chamber of Manufactures, the

Commonwealth Government has officially recognised the venture, and Mr J.A. Tonkin, an officer of the Commonwealth Department of Commerce, will travel in the vessel as Government representative.52

The Australian Government's desire to distance itself, in some way, from the organisation of the venture, was to prove relevant later on when British officials in Batavia expressed their criticisms, albeit unofficially, of some aspects of the trip. In a letter from the Consul-General to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department dated 30 May 1933 it was expressed that, "British Consular officials here were, one and all, glad to assist Australia's effort, but it is still felt by some, that a little trouble might have been taken to give them more advanced information."53

51Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 138, 5 April 1933, pg 832 52A981l1 - Trade 93, Australian Archives. Cablegram from the Prime Minister's Department to British Consul-General in Batavia, 9 February 1933 53 A981l1 - Trade 93, Australian Archives. Unofficial letter from Consul-General to Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 30 May 1933 Looking North Trade 101

The Australian Government's response seemed to do all it could to disclaim any responsibility for problems. It stated that,

It is thought that possibly the advice and assistance of Government representatives, including His Majesty's Consular Officers, was not sought lest it should tend to detract from the public appreciation of the work of the Committee itself.54

Having said this, by far the main reaction to the Trade Ship was one of unbridled enthusiasm. While it may have had faults, the intentions behind it were admirable, and many of the outcomes promising. The Java Gazette, the official organ of the British Chamber of Commerce in Batavia, devoted much space to a discussion of the venture during the ship's visit. P.E. Scrivener, in an article, "The Australian Trade Ship", wrote that

Many intending exporters have a great deal to learn from older and more experienced exporting countries as to the manner of handling export business, and also in respect to the special and individual requirements of Eastern markets. To my mind one of the greatest advantages which will accrue from this cruise of the 'Trade Ship' is that the various exhibiters will have an opportunity of investigating these matters at first hand, and, having returned to Australia, apply this knowledge where necessary to their future production. A very important fact which Australian exporters must assimilate is that in dealing with Eastern markets it is not a matter of offering what they wish to sell, but what their prospective clients wish to buy, and of sparing no trouble or expense in adapting their goods and packings to conform to these requirements. 55

Scrivener rightly picks up on the importance of first hand knowledge. It is one thing for Australian exporters to remain in Australia and gain information through various media or government agencies, it is another again to be on the spot discussing the issues with your potential trading partner. It must have come as something of an education or, indeed, a shock

54A981l1 - Trade 93, Australian Archives. Return letter to the Consul-General 55A2910l1 - 437/5/104, Australian Archives. P.E. Scrivener:- ''The Australian Trade Ship" from The Java Gazette, pg 537 Looking North Trade 102 for a large number of the Australians to be told quite bluntly that many of the methods of business they were employing were simply not going to work in the Asian context. But just as the Australians had much to learn so, too, the Asian traders had undertaken a learning curve.

To the residents of the East Indies who have been accustomed to think of Australia mainly as a primary producer of butter, wheat, cattle, sheep and fruits, it may come as a revelation to learn that this young country feels such confidence in the quality of her manufactured goods and turns them out in such quantities that she can look for export trade. 56

Much was made during the course of the cruise of the strong links that would be established between Australia and the Dutch community in the NEI.

...... the active spirit of co-operation shown by the Dutch authorities and by Dutch commercial associations could scarcely have been exceeded. Dutch circles have naturally not done this without bearing in mind the importance of reciprocal trade and the value to Netherlands India of Australia as a potential customer.57

R.J. Moorehead in his book, The Cruise of the Goodwill Ship, further emphasises this link between the 'European' groups in SEA.

In short, it seems to be time that Australians, Dutch in the East Indies and British in Malaya, representing the vanguard of the forces of ordered government in the post-war world, should lift their heads from their individual tasks and immediate

56A2910l1 - 437/51104, Australian Archives. R.J. Moorehead:- "The Hand of Fellowship. Australia to the East Indies" from The Java Gazette, pg 1 57 A981l1 - Trade 93, Australian Archives. letter from H. Fitzmaurice, British Consul­ General in Batavia to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 29 May 1933 Looking North Trade 103

responsibilities, and greet one another as allies in a common cause and highly responsible situation.58

While much was written at the time in newspapers and journals, and spoken of in parliament and in business circles, Moorehead's book appears to be the only detailed account of the cruise. His reporting of events is interesting in that his account, in many places, shows clearly the prejudices of the time. The book was rife with what would only be described now as racist comments. His description of the natives of the NEI ranged from-,

These hatless, shirtless, bootless, oily-backed natives crowded on the landing stage to unaccustomed Australian eyes, looked more like corsairs than customers

to-

over seventy million of these black, brown and brindled brethren of the tropics, all more or less willing and competent to buy something made or grown in Australia.59

The implication through many sections of the book is that it is apparently all right for members of the delegation to tempt "the belles of Celebes ..... ", but the native traders were portrayed as being in some way crafty or underhanded if they were to play on the weakness in the white women in order to sell their wares. 60 In the final analysis it was obvious to Moorehead that the ideal of white supremacy in all things, including trade, be upheld .

.... .it is the avowed policy of the Dutch East Indies Government to extend political and commercial relations with Australia, their close white neighbour in the Eastern Pacific, where the fellowship and mutual support of the white races is obviously of paramount importance. 61

58R.J. Moorehead, The Cruise of the Goodwill Ship, The Ruskin Press Pty Ltd, Melbourne, n.d, pg55 59R.J. Moorehead, The Cruise of the.... , pg 31 60R.J. Moorehead, The Cruise of the .... , pp 32-34 61R.J. Moorehead, The Cruise of the .... , pp 70-71 Looking North Trade 104

The general consensus at the end of all discussions was that the Cruise had been a long time coming but, for all that, was worth the wait. Even the likes of the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Batavia, pointed out that,

Your visit is overdue, ..... For years, by neglecting to come here and find out things for yourselves, you have been allowing other people to get ahead of you, which is not as it should be, seeing you have the necessary products for sale here and are in the next neighbouring country. 62

Charles Morrell is perhaps the best to give the last word on the Cruise.

Quite apart from the business done by individual firms during her visit, the Showboat was the best advertisement Australia has ever had in the Far East. The Showboat's mission has not ended - it has only just begun - and it now remains for Australian individual firms to take advantage, without delay, of the friendly atmosphere which has been created.63

* * *

Trade Commissioners and Trade Ships aside, the reality of everyday trade continued on its slow and often laborious path. As yet, still grappling with the idea of various Asian regions, the Government often just focused its attention on individual countries. Following that pattern, the most obvious place to begin was in the NEI.

In J.J. Long's report of 1917, it was stated that,

It is my deliberate opinion, indeed, that the only obstacle in the way of acquiring the whole of the trade of the Dutch Indies and the Straits Settlements is the indifference of Australian merchants and manufacturers.. .! will go as far as to assert,

62R.J. Moorehead, The Cruise of the .... , pg 12 63 A2910l1 - 437/51104, Australian Archives. Letter from Charles Morrell to F.H. Stewart, Minister for Commerce, dated 23 June 1933 Looking North Trade 105

indeed, that the trade carried from Australia - and, of course, I am referring to normal times - is but a very small proportion of the possible. 64

Long seemed to hold the opm1on that Australian manufacturers and merchants had paid little attention to trade matters in the NEI, and that the assumption that all imports were being absorbed by the Europeans was not only wrong, but was the cause of many errors. It was not as if Australian traders had not been given the opportunities to extend and improve their links with the NEI. Since the beginning of the 1920s the Netherlands India Industrial Fair was held at Bandoeng in Java, and Australia had been extended invitations on all occasions. Its response to the invitation to the 1922 Fair was contained in a letter to the State Premiers

... that the matter has received the careful consideration of the Commonwealth Government but after obtaining the views of the Australian Trade Commissioner in the East, and the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, it is considered advisable to leave the matter of participation in the Dutch East Indies Fair to private enterprise this year.65

The result was minimal participation by Australian firms and no Commonwealth or State Government representation or support.

Considering the political makeup of SEA and Australia's inclination for all things even remotely British, it would be expected that Australian trade in the region would be geared towards the more relatively familiar territory of Singapore and Malaya. Australia, though, had not always taken her chances as they arose. In particular, the Australian Government and individual firms had shown a disinclination in the past to participate personally in trade shows, fairs or expos in SEA. Various reasons had always been given as to why it was not considered advantageous, or even desirable, for Australia to play its part. Reasons why it would benefit Australia were less forthcoming.

64A981/1 - NEI 28 Pt 1, Australian Archives. Report of the Commissioner, Senator The Honorable J.J. Long on "Java and the East Indies, Singapore and the Straits Settlements 1917- 1918", pp 12-13 65 A458/1 - D10414, Australian Archives. Exhibitions-Netherlands East Indian Fair, Bandoeng Java. Letter from the Prime Minister to the Premier of N.S.W., 22 May 1922 Looking North Trade 106

The Malaya Borneo Exhibition was held in Singapore from 31 March to 8 April 1922. While the Prime Minister's office was notified early the preceding November, little came of it. The Melbourne Herald for its part was critical of the lack of government action.

Apparently, nothing has been done in the interval towards preparation to take advantage of this excellent opportunity for making Australian goods known in a region where our export trade - at least, in several important lines - is entitled to hold the foremost place. 66

In the end there were private exhibits sent, although there was no Commonwealth or, with the exception of Western Australia, State Government representation. More than ten years later, the Australian Government was still balking at promoting itself amongst the countries of SEA. In 1936 C.E. Critchley notified the Government of the upcoming British Trade Fair in Singapore, and the fact that Australia was being invited to be a participant. In the past, Australia had been represented by agents of individual firms and, once again, even though the Government had been made aware of the invitation in November 1935 and the Fair was not until May 1936, it was decided that there was not enough time available to organise Australian attendance. Instead, it was decided that Critchley should attend as an observer and report back. The result was a "Report on The British Trade Fair-Singapore, May 1st to May 9th, 1936." In this Critchley reported most favourably on the possibilities of promoting Australia and Australian products in the region.67

In a letter accompanying the report, Critchley wrote that "Singapore undoubtedly impresses me as a place with possibilities for the extension of Australian trade .... ".68 By 1937 the idea of the Fair was becoming more attractive in that general publicity and tourism aspects were now permitted

66The Melbourne Herald, 29 November 1921 67A60111 - 666/4/5, Australian Archives. "Report on The British Trade Fair-Singapore, May 1st to May 9th, 1936", by the Australian Trade Commissioner in the Netherlands India, Batavia, May 28th 1936 68A601l1 - 6661415, Australian Archives. Letter from Critchley accompanying the ''Report on The British Trade Fair-Singapore, May 1st to May 9th, 1936", by the Australian Trade Commissioner in the Netherlands India, Batavia, May 28th 1936 Looking North Trade 107

in the displays which had not previously been the case. The Secretary of the Department of Commerce, J.F. Murphy, was now saying that, "I incline very strongly to the opinion that it would be wise for Australia to participate in the 1937 Fair.... ".69 And on a more public platform, in a press statement, "the Department of Commerce considers that it is one of the best markets for Australian goods in the East and special efforts are being made to increase their sale there. "70

This idea of slap-hazard business with the NEI was illustrated time and time again in the 1920s. Reports were coming back to the Government from all sectors of the community regarding the problem. In January 1922, a group from the Commonwealth Public Works Committee visited Java to conduct an investigation into the proposed construction of the North-South Railway. As a result of the trip, J. Newland and D. Jackson submitted a report to the Prime Minister on their impressions of trade with the NEI during, and after, their visit. The two made it clear that they were making personal observations about Australia's trade with Java,

.... .in the hope that they may be found of interest and perhaps lead to such action being taken as will tend to an improvement of Australian relations with Java and the East generally, and help us to secure that share of the immense trade offering there to which our geographical position and the excellence of our products entitles us.71

Their findings were not encouraging. They believed that

Distasteful as it is to our national pride it is nevertheless a fact that, in Java, with the exception of flour, Hutton's hams and Resch's beer, scarcely any article will commend itself to the

69 A601l1 - 666/415, Australian Archives. Letter from J.F. Murphy, Secretary for the Department of Commerce, to C.E. Critchley, Australian Trade Commissioner in the NEI, 10 November 1936 70A601/1 - 666/4/5, Australian Archives. Press Statement from J.F. Murphy, Secretary for the Department of Commerce 71A458l1 - B51014, Australian Archives. Memorandum to the Right Honorable W.M. Hughes fromJ. Newland and D. Jackson, 17 January 1922 Looking North Trade 108

purchasing public if it bears an indication that it had been produced in Australia.72

The frightening aspect of this remark is that it indicates that consumers did not just show preferences for goods other than those from Australia but, rather, they actively avoided them.

The crux of Newland and Jackson's report was that Australian merchants had approached trade with Java in totally the wrong way. The Australian idea was to provide cheaper goods to compete with the local products, as they perceived them. The reality was that price was not the main issue for the Javanese consumer as, ".. .in the majority of cases they have plenty of money - but they insist that it shall be of first quality, and it is no use Australia sending goods to Java except of the best quality and attractively got up."73

It must be recognised, however, that the report submitted by Newland and Jackson did not show the other side of the Australia/SEA trade problem. Australia was fighting to create a place for itself in the SEA market. In this context it was necessary to not only establish its own niche, but to also woo custom away from other traders and other nations. Merchants in SEA were "being well catered for and served by their old-established connections, and as far as they are concerned, if Australia ceased to exist as an exporting country, their welfare would not be materially affected."74

Australia had to fight against such harmful incidents as inferior Indian flour being sold in bags labelled 'Australia'; they had to try and take the milk and dairy products trade away from the likes of Holland who had at its disposal both quality of product and the historical link with the NEI. Australia, to all intents and purposes, was the new face in the export world. To perfect its craft in only a year or two was, perhaps, expecting too much.

72A458l1 - B510/4, Australian Archives. Memorandum to the Right Honorable W.M. Hughes from J. Newland and D. Jackson, 17 January 1922, pg 6 73 A458l1 - B510/4, Australian Archives. Memorandum to the Right Honorable W.M. Hughes from J. Newland and D. Jackson, 17 January 1922, pg 2 74A458l1 - 151012, Australian Archives. Report from E.T. Sheaf, Australian Government Trade Commissioner in the East to Percy Deane.Esq, Secretary, Prime Ministers Department, 16th July 1923 Looking North Trade 109

Unfortunately, almost ten years later in 1931 members of Parliament were still operating under the misconception that the people of the NEI had no purchasing power. Senator Crawford from , stated in Parliament that, "It may be possible to increase our trade with the East, but I very much doubt if it can be done rapidly or to any great extent, because the people of the East are too poor to purchase the commodities we produce.75

The report was also supportive of the idea of establishing a Commonwealth Commercial Agency in Java, and of promoting exchange visits between Australia and the NEI. There was the implication that not enough advice was being sought from those who were well acquainted with conditions in Java and were in a position to offer valuable help. Meanwhile, at least some members of Parliament were coming around to noticing the advantages of having "..... some organized system of marketing Australian products."76

If it seemed that the private sector was self-destructing over trade with the NEI, then the Government was not all that far behind. In the 1920s one of the apparent problems was that of trade tariffs. There was a clear concern that Australia would suffer reprisals from the NEI over duties that it was placing on imports.,. The NEI was obviously taking the matter seriously in that it prompted a letter from the Consul-General of the Netherlands to the Prime Minister dated the 24 July 1924. In it the Consul-General stated that, "..... Her Netherlands Majesty's Government, in view of the liberal regime under which Australian imports are admitted into Holland and its colonies, is very anxious to secure in return the benefits of the intermediate tariff for our import trade. 77

Three years down the track similar letters were continuing to flow between the NEI and Australia concerning the imbalance in tariffs between the two countries. Given the NEI's more open policy, Australia was oblivious of not just the trade, but also the goodwill implications of its hard-line policy. It appeared that Australia's preferential treatment of the U.K. was stronger than that of the NEI to Holland, and the NEI was a colony, as opposed to

75Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 130, 1 July 1932, pp 3212-3215 76Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 109, 10 September 1924, pp 4160-4161 77 A458l1 - C510l4, Australian Archives. Letter from the Consul-General of the Netherlands to the Prime Minister, 24 July 1924. Imports into Australia were subject to three categories of tariff:- British Preferential, Intermediate, and General Looking North Trade 110

Australia which was a supposed independent member of a commonwealth of nations.

Consul-General Teppema was again pointing out that

Your Government is undoubtedly aware that several Australian products exported to Netherlands India are in a position to compete successfully with similar Dutch products, owing to Holland's liberal tariff policy, which abolished all differential duties in favour of the Motherland. Australia was thus enabled to obtain a strong footing on the East Indian Market in essentially Dutch products like butter, bacon and hams, preserved milk, confectionary, soap, and jams and sundry manufactured articles. 78

In this instance there is a direct reference to a tariff on coffee, though Teppema does express concern over trade in general. Others in industry were also expressing, directly to Prime Minister Bruce, their concerns over the same coffee tariff. As one General Manager points out, "We have spent a good deal of money building up a trade in Java and we have no wish to see this jeopardised by a harmful tariff ... 79

Even into the early 1930s questions were continuing to be raised in Parliament over the appropriateness of certain tariffs, in the light of the effect they may have on trade with the NEI.80 As Senator Payne conveys to Parliament,

We have in the Dutch East Indies magnificent customers; yet, only a year or two ago it was proposed in all seriousness by the

78A458l1 - C510l4, Australian Archives. Letter from Consul-General Teppema to Prime Minister Bruce, 29 November 1927 79 A458l1 - C510l4, Australian Archives. Letter from General manager of W.E. Woods Limited (Manufacturing Chemists) to Prime Minister Bruce, 14 December 1927. There was also a similar letter to Bruce dated 10 December 1927, from the Director of Gillespie Bros Ltd (Flour Mills) 80Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 120, 14 March 1929, pg 1245 - referring to butter and coffee; Vol 123, 21 March 1930, pg 382 - referring to flour and cotton; Vol 138, 23 March 1933, pp 530-531 - referring to Sago and Tapioca Looking North Trade 111

then government to impose a duty on one of the items with which they had been doing a considerable volume of trade with Australia, although it was nothing like the extent of the trade that we were doing with them.St

While it is true that the tariff did not eventually come into effect, Payne continues that,

While doing all that we can to maintain the solidarity of the Empire, we should not lose sight of the fact that we cannot afford to ignore the claims of other countries to a share of our trade.82

* * *

The 1930s saw some extension of the trade with the NEI, but also saw an extension of the criticisms about why trade was not developing more rapidly. In a report from the British Consulate General in Batavia in 1932, H.A.N. Bluett stated that,

Although Australia's share in the import and export trade of the Netherland East Indies is considerable, no Australian firms are established in this country and very little Australian capital is invested in plantations or industrial undertakings ..... The representatives of Australian merchant houses often remain in Java for months at a time, nevertheless it cannot be said that the Commonwealth is well represented here by her own nationals or that Australian merchants have made any real effort to increase their sales to the Netherland East Indies by opening branch offices through which they could push the sales of Australian goods.83

81Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 133, 24 February 1932, pg 172 82Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 133, 24 February 1932, pg 172 83 A2910l1 -437/5/104, Australian Archives. Report by H.A.N. Bluett from the British Consulate General, Batavia, September 1932 on "Australian's Commercial Interests in the Netherlands East Indies." Looking North Trade 112

Two years later, in another report on Australian trade with the NEI, similar problems were identified, but with different solutions.

Australian commercial interests are not well represented in either the Netherlands East Indies or British Malaya, and very few Australian houses have branch offices in either country. Various methods have been followed by exporters in their efforts to establish their products on the market, but it would appear that the only satisfactory method of doing this is through one of the well-established and reputable Dutch or British importing houses.84

Obviously the appointment of C.E. Critchley as Trade Commissioner a year later showed the Government's disinclination to follow the latter path. Nevertheless, the basis of the criticism remained. Australian traders were not formulating individual policies aimed at getting a greater share of the NEI market. What was important was that Australia provided products that consumers in the NEI wanted and requested, and not simply what Australia thought would be suitable.

The talk was of expansion and exploitation; growth and development; improved trade balance and money making. The reality fell somewhat short. The real situation was best summarised at a meeting of the Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade held in 1937. Lengthy discussions were held on business representation and trading methods in the East, and the conclusions reached are best summarised in seven points.

1 I It was deemed that "Australian manufacturers and exporters, although often keen to extend their business relations in the East, do not always exercise the greatest discretion in their activities." It was thought best that they work through the Trade Commissioner, where possible. 2/ It has still not been conceived that, in fact, the Eastern market is the keenest of all. As a result ill-conceived and misdirected efforts only result in the East being perceived as a difficult market. 3/ The finance and credit terms demanded by Australian firms often preclude the markets to which they are trying to sell.

84A461l1 - V323l1l7, Australian Archives. Report on Australian Trade with the NEI 1934 Looking North Trade 113

4/ Connected to this is the fact that there seems to be a lack of knowledge of Eastern conditions and methods amongst the Australian banks. The idea of placing some men in Eastern banks for a time was suggested. 5/ The various Trade Commissioners have noted that most of their enquiries come from Australians or others already in the region, rather than from Australia itself. This displays a certain lack of "export-mindedness" on the part of some Australian firms. 6/ Merchant firms are more eager to go into the Eastern market than are manufacturers 7 I It is important to educate the exporting public on quoting prices in sterling; approaching Trade Commissioners for help; avoiding indiscriminate shipping on consignment; maintenance of continuity of supply and high quality; and avoidance of an intransigent attitude in disputes.85

Here, then, was the blueprint for success in the SEA. They were all basic ideas revolving around good trade practices. All Australia had to do was implement them. Trade was to become the connection with SEA by which Australia could begin to breakdown the barriers of its isolation while at the same time maintain the appearance of White Australia. We were in SEA because there was economic advantage to us being there. In the twenty year period under discussion Australia moved economically into SEA, and was as a result forced into a contact that, if trade were to succeed, Australians would require a greater knowledge and tolerance of Asia and Asian peoples.

In many ways Australia met this challenge, which placed it in a good position for the future. Individual incidents, however, often told a different story. Without the proper direction and advice individual traders made mistakes that reflected poorly on the whole of Australia. Placed within the larger picture, Australia's entry into trade with SEA was as successful as could reasonably have been expected. As stated at the outset, Australia was in SEA to make money and there is no doubt that was achieved. Most importantly, the additional benefits of sustained personal links, as well as the

85A601/1 - 4011218, Australian Archives. Victorian Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade. Draft of Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade, Minutes of Fourth Meeting Held at Parliament House, Canberra on 30 September and 1 October 1937 Looking North Trade 114 lasting good impressions created through this direct contact, came without too much effort on Australia's part. Looking North Intellectual Responses 115

CHAJPTJER FOUR

Intellectual Responses to South East Asia

If there were individuals and groups promoting more than just economic contacts with the South East Asian region, what were they really saying and what effect were they having? It would be difficult to come up with an overall Australian view on matters concerned with SEA. Labor organisations did not necessarily agree with the rural sector, nor did the 'manufacturing' classes always see eye to eye with the 'thinking' classes in Australia.

Although not necessarily widely known, the best advocates of a more Asian­ centric thought were in academia. At this time, Australian universities were few and small in size, and many academics were expected to be experts in wide fields of study. Perhaps, because of the expectations placed on them, many intellectuals came to see it as their duty to use their training to inform and, indeed, lead public opinion. The various organisations which were to grow out of the 1920s and 1930s were important in that, at least in a small circle, they managed to progress the discussion of imperial and international affairs as they affected Australia. They acted as forums where ideas could be aired and discussed and, at a time when little attention was given to foreign affairs, their contribution seemed all the more important.

As Sir Robert Carran was to say,

To know and understand a country, one must know something of its history, of its politics, of its economics, of the life and customs of its people and their language, ideas, and modes of thought, their way of looking at themselves and others, their philosophic and cultural outlook, their art and literature.1

1 Robert Garran, "A School of Oriental Studies", from The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 2, No 6, February-March 1939 pg 15 Looking North Intellectual Responses 116

Fortunately for Australia, there were people who recognised the importance of having a well rounded knowledge of SEA. There were forward-thinking people in the area of academia and education who were " ..... deeply interested in this subject, and willing to devote time and energy to its study, and to amassing facts and elaborating theses to facilitate its study by others".2 Sir Robert Garran, for one, believed that,

...... Australia's great role in international relations is that of interpreter of the East to the West, and of the West to the East. We have the opportunity, and the duty, of making a close study of the Orient.3

The group of people to whom knowledge and understanding was paramount formed a vocal, albeit small, clique of well known and well educated individuals. Their agenda was simple. Educate Australians on SEA and promote contact for the sake of intellectual exchange, and all the rest would follow. The way to go about this re-education was relatively straightforward. Australia had to find its own place on the international stage as an active member of the Asian community. For their part, these individuals formed, or joined, groups to ensure that this came about as soon as possible.

If we are to discuss Australia's intellectual or educational growth into SEA, it is best to examine firstly what our own educational system was providing. Zelman Cowan, in an article, reflects on his own educational experience. His undergraduate years at Melbourne University in the mid to late thirties, focused on Europe and Britain. To all intents and purposes, "Asia was a complete blank."4 Like any educational courses in any country, they were a product of their time, place and attitude.

My courses and studies reflected widely held attitudes about Australia. It was seen as an Anglo-Saxon annexe in the Antipodes; and it remained a continent isolated from its

2carran, "A School of Oriental Studies", pg 15 3Garran, "A School of Oriental Studies", pg 15 4Zelman Cowan, "Australian Traditional Attitudes", pg 7 Lookin& North Intellec;tual Responses 117

neighbours in Asia until war in the fourth and fifth decades of the twentieth century broke that isolation down. 5

John Legge was in agreement with this assessment when he wrote that, "For the most part Australia's perception of Asia was vague and undifferentiated, ... ".6 There was nothing within Australia's education system which would prepare its youth for easy relations with Asia. In fact, as far as Melbourne University was concerned, it was not to gain a Department' of Oriental Studies until 1960 when H.F. Simon M.A. was appointed as foundation professor of Oriental Studies.7

Garran wrote that what was needed was an in-depth and intense programme which would be a step towards abolishing the prejudices which coloured so much Australian thought in regards to its neighbours. One of the most obvious ways to do this would be to implement his suggestion for introducing oriental studies into Australian schools and universities. Garran had, of course, supported the actions that had been taken by both the Government and unofficial groups up to this point, but he believed that there was now a need for a centralised and comprehensive system of study which should have full Government financial support. He saw it as Australia's ,duty to make a closer study of the Orient. Thus, the establishment of an institute, college or school of oriental studies would be beneficial, not only on the study of the East, but also for training students to carry on with the work Garran, and the like, had started.

This is not to dismiss those other efforts which were being made. In 1918 the Australian Government sponsored the establishment of the study of Oriental history and languages. A Department of Oriental Studies was created at the University of Sydney in 1922 and, interestingly, part of the financing for this project came from the Department of Defence. This contact with defence was to be illustrated in other ways with Professor James Murdoch, who held the chair from 1918 to 1921, being required to also instruct at the Royal Military College. Given Murdoch's background in

5Zelman Cowan, "Australian Traditional Attitudes", pg 8 6 John Legge, "Asian Studies;From Reconstruction to Deconstruction", from Australian Cultural History, No 9, 1990, pg 93 7Asian Studies Initiatives: A Twenty Year Review 1960-1979, The Myer Foundation, pg 11 Looking North Intellectual Responses 118

Japanese history this was, perhaps, not surprising and, indeed, even a good idea.

Unfortunately, these activities at Sydney University did not spread far enough, or fast enough. In fact "The development of Southeast Asian studies in Australia - and indeed the development of the study of Asia in general - is almost entirely a post-World War II phenomenon."8 Likewise, Australian students studying in SEA and, more importantly, SEA students coming to Australia, did not eventuate until well after World War II. Before 1941 students from Japan, China and India were admitted to Australia on passports issued under the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1904 and 1912. Most came privately sponsored and their numbers remained small. In 1937, for example, there was only 140 private students in Australia, rising to 225 in 1940.

As Cowan had already intimated, before the war undergraduate courses were overwhelmingly British and European in bias. Australia's teaching of history was influenced by its perception of its place in the world. Australia's complacency regarding isolationism

.... .is reflected in the lopsided teaching of history, both at schools and universities, and the hesitant growth of anthropology and sociology as academic subjects. Instead of critical thought and scholarship, there has been the shibboleth of the 'White Australia' policy to fall back on.9

It is when held up to comparison, perhaps, that Australia's efforts at educating its citizens about Asia seemed most inadequate. One of the more interesting con:,parisons could be made between the preparation given to an Australian representative in SEA and that to a Dutch resident in the NEI. The preparation given to a Dutch civil servant stationed in the NEI was so thorough, compared to that given to an Australian, as to be embarrassing. Initially, five years had to be spent at a University in Holland studying, among other things, East Indian ethnology, economics and history, as well as two Asian languages, one of which had to be Malay. Those in the East

8 J.D Legge, "A survey of the development of Southeast Asian Studies in Australia since 1945", from Symposium of SEA Library Resources, pg 4 9 F.S. Stevens (ed), Racism; The Australian Experience ..... , pp 1-2 Looking North Intellec;tual Responses 119

Asiatic Affairs Department were then sent to China or Japan for a few years to polish up their language skills and study the political climate at first hand.10 Consequently, those Dutch people sent to live and work in Asia had been given a intense educational grounding to assist them in their duties.

Even if one is to look at international studies generally, and not focus on SEA, the picture is not much better. ".. .international studies were a matter of personal inclination, not of professional pursuit. There were hardly any political scientists in Australia in 1933."11 The problem seemed to be - and this is something already shown in previous chapters - that "... much of the Australian Government's attention, and that of scholars concerned with its overseas position, was concentrated upon trade, not upon international political questions."12

* * *

Fortunately, there were a few Australians who were not willing to leave international affairs solely in the hands of the Prime Ministers. In the 1920s and, more particularly, in the 1930s, there sprang up in Australia organisations ~hose members sought to play a role and, in some cases, take the lead in Australia's struggle to forge a new identity in SEA. The Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the League of Nations and others, which were " ... composed mainly of academics, businessmen and professional men, made probably their greatest contribution to Australian life during the inter-war period,. .... "13 One of the distinct features, and some might say problems, of these groups in Australia, was the overlapping of members. This overlapping had to be taken into account, particularly when trying to quantify the influence or value of the groups. It was easy, for example, to overestimate the level of participation

lOsydney Morning Herald, 7November 1938, pg 10 11J.D.B. Miller, "The Development of International Studies in Australia 1933-83", from Australian Outlook, Vol 37, No 3, December 1983, pg 138 12J.D.B. Miller, ''The Development of International Studies in Australia 1933-83", pg 139 l3r.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 93 Looking North Intellectual Res.ponses 120

when certain people were active members of more than one organisation. Further, this overlapping of members

.... blurred the distinctions between the various bodies: those that sought to act only as a forum and those that were overtly pressure groups; those that sought a small elite membership and those of a more proselytizing nature; those with a broad and those with a narrow field of interest.14

Whatever the crossovers, one thing is clear, "At a time when parliamentary debates on foreign affairs were virtually unknown, they served as forums in which ideas could be aired and discussed"15

Nicholas Brown, in an article on Australian intellectuals and the image of Asia in Australia, divided Australian perceptions into two categories. These categories also showed quite neatly the differences in the intellectual organisations of the time and, because of this, are worthy of note in some detail.

... .In the first theme, carrying the marks of progessivist influence, Asia signified a synthesis of culture, authority and productivity, underpinned by stereotypes of endemic passivity, corruption and poverty...... For those adopting this perspective, Asia seemed to demand extensive, holistic intervention in the name of progress...... In Australia this theme was mainly developed by commentators associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organisation based in the United States of America.

The second theme emphasised political issues, and was evident among those commentators who saw the signs of emergent nationalism in Asia as a challenge to the strength of their liberal tolerance. Economic internationalism and constitutional stability were their central concerns in relation to Asian affairs. Rather than 'development' or intervention in the name of social progress, this second theme stressed

14P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 95 lSr.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats .... , pg 95 Looking North Intdlectual Jfflponses 121

trade, co-operation and the acquisition of appropriate expertise in government and diplomacy as a way to secure international stability. This line of analysis was associated with British institutions, and was expressed in Australia in the early formations of the Institute of International Affairs.16

Let us turn to the first of the divisions Brown identifies and look specifically at the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The IPR first met in Honolulu, Hawaii from June 30th to July 15th, 1925. The final format of the gathering was very different from that originally proposed some five years earlier. The first idea was to convene a Young Men's Christian Association Conference to deal mainly with that organisation. The second plan was to hold a conference under the auspices of the YMCA, but to look at Pacific problems with the solutions to come from a Christian perspective. In the final analysis, however, the IPR looked to being a self-governing body concerned with promoting better relations between the peoples of the Pacific.

It comprises groups of private citizens in all major countries of the Pacific and in Great Britain, organised to study the conditions of the Pacific peoples, with a view to the improvement of their mutual relations.17

As H. Duncan Hall was to say at the Honolulu Conference,

Our fundamental thesis is that the Pacific Area has certain needs which existing machinery of international co-operation, either in the British Commonwealth or in the League of Nations, is inadequate to meet.18

The IPR was adamant in disclaiming any specific political or ideological programme. Indeed, it specifically stated that

16Nicholas Brown, "Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia 1920-1960", from Australian Cultural History, No 9, 1990, pg 81 17P Campbell; R.C. Mills; G.V. Portus, Studies in Australian Affairs .... , preface 18A4311/1 ; 164i5. Australian Archives. H. Dunce Hall, "Political and Legal Co-operation". A paper presented to the IPR Honolulu Session 1925 Looking North Intdlectual Responses 122

..... the individuals who come to the biennial conferences are not 'representatives' or 'delegates' from their respective countries or from any organisations in those countries. They are certainly influential men and women but they come as private citizens committing no-one but themselves.19

Regarding the Australian chapter of the IPR and observing comments made by J. Merle Davis, it can be shown that such an organisation was sorely needed in Australia. Davis, an organising secretary of the IPR from Honolulu, stated that

The average Australian, on the other hand, feels very content and remote in his isolated corner of the world, and it is not easy to stir him to an active interest in Pacific affairs. Some of the wisest men are concerned over this fact and welcome the Institute as adapted for breaking up this isolation and educating the people to an understanding of their responsibilities and opportunities in the Pacific. I believe that in coming to Australia the Institute has met its 'acid test'. If the Institute principle can win Australians, it can win anywhere.20

In the same series of comments made in letter form to the IPR's Chairman of the Pacific Council, R.L. Wilbur Davis made further comments on his reactions to establishment of the IPR in Australia. Referring to his visit to Brisbane, Davis stated that while some of those in University circles were interested, "Others are frankly sceptical as to the value of this line of approach to racial problems."21 His impressions of the Sydney group, however, seemed much more positive.

19"The Kyoto Conference", from The Round Table, Vol 20, December 1929-September 1930, pg 336 200fficer Papers, MS2629/6/387-400, "Notes from a Pacific Circuit" - Report Letters of J. Merle Davis, General Secretary to President Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council, IPR, 1927, pg 44-45 21A981l1, Organisations 93. Australian Archives. Report letter No IV, Australia, 14 August, 1926 from J. Merle Advise to President R.L. Wilbur, Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR Looking North Intellec;tual Responses 123

Duncan Hall has left a strong impress in Sydney. I am still puzzled to know how they could let such a man go. Due to him there is a group of very able men in Sydney who are interested in the Institute, now organized into the New South Wales Branch, with Sir Mungo McCallum, vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney, at its head. The chairman of the Executive Committee of the Branch is Professor Griffith Taylor, the Geographer, who headed one of the parties of the Scott Expedition to the South Pole. These gentlemen are outstanding leaders in the academic world.22

To get some idea of the interest aroused by the IPR in academic circles in Australia, one need only look at a further list of the members. In Sydney these members included Sir Mungo McCallum, Vice Chancellor of Sydney University; Professor Griffith Taylor, Geographer; Professor A.H. Charteris, International Law; Professor R.C. Mills, Head of the Department of Economics at Sydney University; Professor J.G. Peden, Law School; Professor G.A. Wood; Professor A.R. Radcliffe Brown; Professor Sadler; Mr H.A. Nicholas, a barrister; Mr Brunsden Fletcher, editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, and Miss Persia Campbell, Honorary Secretary of the group. The Melbourne group was no less impressive with Frederic Eggleston, Sir Harrison Moore and Mr P.O. Phillips making up their numbers.

Referring once again to the Sydney branch, Davis notes that it is made up

primarily of academic leaders and has not yet attempted to bring in men of public affairs. This is perfectly natural and will be righted in time, as the group begins to seek the means and channels for making an impact upon the community. The work has started in the right place and with splendid leadership. It is emphasizing quality in its membership and is expecting a high grade of co-operation from the other groups and the headquarters office.23

22A981/1, Organisations 93. Australian Archives. Report letter No IV, Australia, 14 August, 1926 from J. Merle Davis to President R.L. Wilbur, Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR 23A98111, Organisations 93. Australian Archives. Report letter No IV, Australia, 14 August, 1926 from J. Merle Davis to President R.L. Wilbur, Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR Looking North Intellectual Responses 124

If one were able to get some kind of profile on the kind of person becoming a member of the IPR, a distinctly individual figure would emerge. One who was interested in international affairs, but not one who necessarily wished to accept the current power play as being enduring. Someone who genuinely sought to see the point of view of Australia's neighbours and believed that doing this was the only way to ensure Australia took its place in SEA.

While it would be foolish to suggest that all the members of the IPR came from the same: cultural, economic and ideological stock, it is interesting to focus on at least one of those people, that being Frederic Eggleston.

Charles Manning Clark speaking of Eggleston, claimed that

He was a Methodist who had lost his faith, but not the Methodist morality. He was a Deakinite Liberal with nowhere to go in Australian public life. He was an intellectual in a country where intellectuals often find themselves besieged by hostile people. He loved to belong to groups of special people.24

This is certainly not the most flattering image, but one that may not be all that far from the truth. It would be just as wrong to overplay Eggleston's importance as it would be to underplay it. Even Eggleston's biographer, Warren Osmond, wrote that he was ".... only known to small circles of Australian diplomats, administrators, academics, politicians, and readers of newspapers and magazines. "25 While Eggleston as a person, may not have been widely known, his actions and his influence spread much further. On IPR business alone, he was to visit the USA, the Philippines, China, and Japan. He was elected to the Pacific Council of the Institute and helped to shape the IPR's constitution.

There is no denying that Eggleston had previously been committed to British world leadership. To his credit, however, as this commitment diminished "... the Institute of Pacific Relations provided him with new

24<:.M.H. Clark, "A History of Australia", pg 110 25Warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics, Allen and Unwin,Sydney, 1985,pgix Looking North Intellectual Responses 125

loyalties and a more satisfactory vehicle for his 'regionalist' conception of Australian interest."26 This change in attitude by Eggleston spoke well of a man able to accept the situation as it was, but more importantly, able to search for a path to the future. He was not adverse to stating things as he saw them, even if that meant going against the United Kingdom. In a letter he wrote to Jerome D. Greene, President of the IPR in 1930, Eggleston was clearly referring to the United Kingdom when he wrote that

delegates from regions which do not border on the Pacific, should be particularly careful to understand the point of view of those who do. A nation may possess interests in the Pacific but not understand the settings and the ideas of those who live there.27

This idea of regional solutions to regional problems was vital to the successful working of the IPR. The first step was to bring together neighbours to discuss their shared, or individual, concerns. In this coming together it was hoped that a degree of understanding would occur in order that real gains might be made. It had to be learnt that Australia's concerns were not necessarily the same as other nations in the region. Professor J.B. Condliffe, in an article in the monthly journal of the Workers Educational Association of Australia, wrote that

Australians and New Zealanders, meeting for the first time with able, cultured and courteous Orientals, have had to adjust their points of view and shift their attitudes.... .lt was rather a setback also to find that 'White Australia' or the 'Singapore Base' did not loom up as large in Oriental eyes as they do with us at home. With an effort the polite Japanese could be got to listen to an exposition of the necessity for immigration restriction, but they were not really interested.28

26warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston:.... , pg 137 27Eggleston Papers, MS423/14/59, Letter from Eggleston to Jerome D. Greene dated 18 September 1930 28O/ficer Papers, MS2629/6/307, Article by J.B. Condliffe from The Australian Way, 1 September 1925, pg 154 Looking North Intellectual Rnponses 126

One of the main methods used by the IPR to promote discussion and exchange of ideas was to hold international conferences. These conferences were always well attended by the member nations and were "a meeting place, a forum, where national aspirations may be voiced, national grievances aired, and common problems solved by co-ordinated thought.29

As H. Duncan Hall pointed out,

The business of the Institute will be to submit the most complex international problems in the Pacific area to a patient and impartial, scientific investigation ..... The Institute will function through a representative central council, a secretariat, and a periodical - probably biennial - conference.30

The very fact that the IPR was unofficial meant that it was able to discuss issues which may have been viewed as too delicate for diplomats. Part of the policy of the Institute was that attendees at the conferences should be sufficiently varied so "as to form a mirror, or at least serve as a link with, national opinion".31

Indeed, one topic which the various Australian delegates spent time discussing and explaining was the WAP. As Edmund Piesse has so often advocated, the WAP had to be explained with as little emotion as possible, and it was with this aim in mind that Australians attended the first meeting of the IPR. The objective was to present the W AP on economic and democratic grounds, rather than on highly emotive race grounds. Not surprisingly, the Japanese were seen as the ones needing to be won over and, given that for most Japanese their experience with Australians was limited to Prime Minister Hughes, this would be no small task.

29Tristian Buesst, "The Kyoto Conference", from The Australian Quarterly, Vol 2, No 5, March 1930, pp 95-96 30A981l1 Organisations 93. Australian Archives. H. Duncan Hall & J.B. Condliffe, 'What of the Pacific?. A searchlight on its problems." 31Sir W. Harrison Moore, "The Institute of Pacific Relations", from The Australian Quarterly, Vol 4, No 13, 14 March 1932, pg 32 Looking North Intdlectual Rnponses 127

The leader of the delegation, H. Duncan Hall, was, in the end, able to report a degree of success. At the very least the Japanese and the Chinese attendees at the Conference came away with a higher regard for Australia and its policy. The extent to which this new understanding was evident in the people and government of Japan and China is less easy to determine. None of this suggests, however, that the Asian delegates accepted without question the WAP now that it had been 'explained' by the pre-eminent Australian academics of the day. Modifications of the policy were still sought and even a suggestion that the title, White Australia Policy, be abandoned in order to avoid offence.

The learning and discussion process was not limited to the Asian delegates. The Australians, through their attempts to explain their own policy, learnt much about it as well. By coming face to face with those individuals against which the W AP was aimed, the Australian members of the IPR were to discover the costs involved in maintaining this policy. It was these costs - the risk of jeopardising trade with Asia; the decreased international standing of Australia in the eyes of Asia; the difficulty a totally exclusionist immigration policy - that encouraged many in academic circles to seek a modification of the policy.

The conference syllabus was to make the point that

Nothing was so confounding to feelings of race superiority, ... as to be brought into intimate contact with highly cultivated individuals belonging to races which are usually thought of generically ... 32

It was hoped that the contacts made at the various conferences would go towards doing just that. The problem was, of course, that most Australians did not have that sort of contact with Asia, but rather only a few, select academics. It was said that one of the advantages of the conferences was they allowed "a large number of people to travel intelligently".33 It would be more correct to say that they allowed a small number of people to travel repeatedly.

32w. Harrison Moore, 'The Institute of Pacific Relations", pg 38 33w. Harrison Moore, 'The Institute of Pacific Relations", pg 39 Looking North Intellectual Responses 128

Naturally the IPR was not immune to criticism. This mainly took the form of criticism directed towards its methods, rather than its motives. There was general agreement that such an organisation was long overdue. One of the criticisms levelled at the Kyoto Conference of 1929, was that member nations were discussing problems from too nationalistic a viewpoint. Such accusations were never directed at Australia, not because it was seen as international in its outlook, but rather because of its "inability to find a national view on the problems ventilated at Kyoto".34 Tristian Buesst in an article in The Australian Quarterly, pointed out that the Kyoto Conference, in particular, dealt with the international politics of the day and, as such, the delegates

could not but be aware that in consequence our well­ inte;1tioned deliberations would for a brief space attract the notice of more than the narrow world that ordinarily gives heed to the doings of the Institute of Pacific Relations.35

Labour and union groups were voicing their concerns over the place the 'worker' would have in the IPR's agenda for the Pacific. S. Carpenter, in an article in The Pan-Pacific Worker, criticised everything from the opening prayer of the IPR which included the line, "Bless especially the rulers and those in responsible positions .... "36, to the fact that 90% of the IPR's members were university professors and educators. For Carpenter it was of great concern that no labour body was represented and, more specifically, there seemed to be a lack of a place for workers in the scheme of the Pacific.37 Carpenter was, perhaps, most scathing when he wrote that

At the July, 1927, Conference, also held at Honolulu, we find as the spokesman of the Korean group a certain Miss Helen K. Kim, Dean of Ewha College, Seoul. Judging by her representation of the Korean case, we got the impression of a typical helpless, scared intellectual creature steeped in 'higher values' and an idealism reeking with that nauseating

34Tristian Buesst, "The Kyoto Conference", pg 93 35Tristian Buesst, 'The Kyoto Conference", pg 87 36s. Carpenter, "Honolulu Institute of Pacific Relations", from The Pan-Pacific Worker, Vol 1, No 3, 1 May 1928, pg 8 37Similar Carpentt:r article from The Pan-Pacific Worker, Voll, No 4, 15 May 1928 Looking North Intellectual Responses 129

'spirit of humility' which was prescribed by the callers of the Honolulu Conference. It is tragic to see these miserable, scared-stiff creatures come up before these pacifist conferences and claim to be speaking for their peoples. 38

The press, at least in America, was also not adverse to questioning the IPR. Glenn Babb from the Tokyo Bureau of The Associated Press of America, was concerned over the relationship between the IPR and the press, and expressed as much in a letter to the Acting General Secretary of the IPR in 1930.

Undoubtedly you would like also to prevent any delegation from using your conference as a sounding board for its national propaganda, but that is a problem that concerns the fundamental character of your organisation, and not merely its press relations. If delegations come with such purposes, they will feed their propaganda to reporters regardless of what the press arrangements may be. I may point out, however, that such delegations, who really are undermining the work of the Institute, would get much less attention from the press if the Institute, itself held a more sympathetic, more generous and less hostile attitude towards the newspapers. The more the reporters obtain from the regular approved sources the less they will seek for cloakroom sensations. 39

While Babb is obviously interested in making his own job easier, it does seem strange that the IPR's concept of an open forum did not extend to the reporting of its own conferences. It may have been, as Babb suggests, the IPR would not care for the general population learning what the members have to say.

The secrecy with which the 'heart-to-heart' round tables are enwrapped is carried to ludicrous extremes. 'Experts', many of

38s. Carpenter from The Pan-Pacific Worker, Vol 1, No 5, pg 13 39Eggleston Papers, MS423/14/73, Letter from Glenn Babb, Tokyo Bureau of the Associated Press of America, to Charles Leomis, Acting General Secretary of the IPR, dated 19 November 1930, pg 1 Looking North Intellec;tual Rel!pooses 130

the:n rank amateurs, propound prodigious piffle under the shelter of this secrecy.40

Babb may have been a little harsh in his assessment that the delegates were 'amateurs', but questions certainly were being asked about exactly who the delegates at the conferences should be. Sir Keith Officer in a conversation with Eggleston expressed the opinion that

.... considerably more care will have to be taken as to the personnel of the Delegation. It should be more in touch with Australian affairs instead of being rather academic in character and should have some representative of radical opinion in Australia.41

The IPR may have been forward thinking, but it can in no way be seen as radical. Likewise, the Round Table movement was not what one would call radical. In fact, it was formed in 1909 by young men convinced that "the British Empire needed to unite in order to ensure its interests were fully protected in an increasingly hostile world."42 Given this aim The Round Table group could be seen as the antithesis of everything for which those who sought an approachment with SEA were fighting. Its aims and agenda fell neatly into the second group of Institutes as described previously by Nicholas Brown.

Like the members of the IPR, the occupations of the Round Table members reflected their relatively privileged status and education. The largest group of Round Table members was drawn from universities. The remaining members came from legal and other professions; various fields of scientific research; the upper levels of public and diplomatic service; from large pastoral, business and financial enterprises; and from politics. Many of the Round Table members were also active in other groups, the most

40Eggleston Papers, MS423/14/73, Letter from Glenn Babb, Tokyo Bureau of the Associated Press of America, to Charles Leomis, Acting General Secretary of the IPR, dated 19 November 1930, pg2 410fticer Papers, MS2629/6/62-63, Notes of a conversation with Mr F. Eggleston, Leader of the Australian Delegation to Honolulu Conference 1927 42Leonie Foster, High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1986, pg vii Looking North Intellectual Responses 131 predominant being the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House); the Australian Institute of International Affairs; the League of Nations Union; the Bureau of Social and International Affairs; and the Australian Institute of Political Science.

The Round Table was different to other groups, in that its

.... primary concern was with Commonwealth affairs and the presentation, through the journal, of important local issues in Australia to an overseas readership, especially in the United Kingdom. And it was at times propagandist.43

The journal referred to may never have had a wide circulation, especially in Australia where there could not have been more than 400 subscribers, but its influence should not be underestimated. As Sir Keith Hancock said in the context of a discussion on The Round Table, "Don't ignore influence because it can't be measured. Often the most important issues can't be quantified. "44

Much of this attitude may have been due to the fact that up until 1929 The Round Table was the only journal which catered for those with an interest in international and public affairs. In that year The Australian Quarterly began publication and much of the interest shown in The Round Table transferred to it. Consequently, while The Round Table was never "a popular organ of communication between members and the masses"45, for those who had a particular interest in international events, it was an important source of information on the inter-war period. Articles contributed to the journal focused mainly on inter-imperial relations but, even so, member nations also presented their views on their own relations with other world powers: For Australia, there was a growing emphasis on its links with Asia.

To attempt to quantify in some way the value of the Round Table group it can be seen that, in its sixty odd years, the Australian membership was only about 263 persons, with 20 or 30 year memberships being common. While

43Leonie Foster, High Hopes .... , pg 58 44Leonie Foster, High Hopes .... , pg 159 45Leonie Foster, High Hopes .... , pg 186 Looking North Intellectual Rel!ponses 132 numerically the group may never have been strong, the members were almost always without exception "important, highly-placed men in a variety of fields in Australian life .... ".46 In fact, "The most satisfying description of most Round Tablers seems to be a middle-class, educated, intellectual elite, a group of achievers."47

The real importance of the Round Table group in the context of this thesis, is that it displays quite clearly that there were those who were still more concerned with Empire issues than with Australia/SEA relations. The interests of some sectors of academia were being focused on the United Kingdom, and not SEA. This must be taken into account when trying to place a value on the work being done by the groups and individuals who were 'Asia active'. The facts were that other organisations, with equally impressive memberships, were successfully propagating opposing views and if a head count were to be taken of Australians who sided with them, they would probably be way out in front. I

In the late 1930s, journals such as The Round Table, were to get some competition to the spreading of their own specific ideological base. Likewise the influence of this relative newcomer should not be underestimated. With its first edition hitting the presses in April 1937, The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin was welcome news for those with an interest in SEA. The bulletin had an impressive pedigree with the initial editor being R.L. Curthoys and the editorial board consisting of F.W. Eggleston, W. Macmahon Ball, E.C. Dyason, P.O. Phillips and Ernest Scott. The bulletin contained articles, book reviews, letters to the editor, as well as excerpts from periodicals. Page one of the first edition set out its approach to world issues by stating that

The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, concerned as it is to review and comment upon current opinion regarding the Orient, does not espouse the easy solution of international problems - that of finding a scapegoat and assigning him to the wilderness. It is committed to the wider but less easy task of ascertaining the facts and summing up the evidence.48

46Leonie Foster, High Hopes .... , pg 3 47Leonie Foster, High Hopes .... , pg 72 48The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, Vol 1, No 1, April 1937, pg 1 Looking North Intdlectual Rnponses 133

It is hardly surprising that the likes of Eggleston were supportive of a magazine like The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin. In a letter to Sir Keith Murdoch in 1940 Eggleston wrote that

... universities in Australia have never produced any magazine which is worthwhile. The Austral-Asiatic Magazine is not read by intellectuals, they never read or support anything. It is read by about 1500 subscribers in Australia who come from the business, professional and political classes and are anxious for thoughtful unjournalistic contributions from people who know something and think.49

* * *

All the above initiatives were in a group format and primarily in the area of academic pursuit. In the world of art and literature, however, there were individuals making their own small mark on Asia or, more correctly, Asia was making its mark on them. This mark was not necessarily always a good one. The genre of adventure stories, reinforced images in the minds of Australians of Asia being a place of constant excitement. As much of the literature showed, many of these authors went into Asia with their colonial baggage firmly in tow. The heroes in these "Asian boys own adventures" were nearly always British, rather than Australian. He brought with him all that is good and right from the west in order to civilise the east. From the 1920s well into the 1970s, writers like Frederick Thwaites, Richard Moorehead and Frank Clunes produced fiction that presented Asia as an adventure playground.

In the world of art and music, the likes of Percy Grainger were encouraging others to see and appreciate for themselves the beauty emanating from all of Asia. Grainger himself collected fascinating pieces, including musical instruments, from all over Asia. A greater tribute to Grainger, though, was the belief that "He led the way for Australian composers, and for some writers and visual artists, to see the rejection of Europe as the basis for Australian national identity and to accept in its place a wide range on non-

49Eggleston Papers, MS423, 423/15/38, Letter to Sir Keith Murdoch, 20 June 1940 Lookin&North Intellectual Responses 134

Europeanness."50 Grainger saw it as natural that Australia should develop as the centre for Asia-Pacific music studies. There was no excuse for public ignorance in this area - or so he believed.

The juxtaposition of Grainger's position was that he held strong with the racial views prevalent at the time. He did not see that showing an informed interest in the art and music of Asia meant that integration should follow. He reflected the view that coloured races caused racial tension and that white and coloured races were best living apart.

It was Australia's right, according to the orthodoxy, to study their neighbours' culture and to offer them aid and education, but they were unfit to live in Australia because they would introduce 'race-hatred•.51

One of the main problems faced by the likes of Grainger and, indeed, artists like Norman Lindsay and Arthur Streeton was that they were struggling to give some definition to an Asia of which their knowledge was limited, and of which they had little or no education. In addition they were faced with their own impressions which were tainted by a prejudice inlaid over many years. Thus, Lindsay's 1927 sculpture of a Balinese women presented her as the Asian model of moral laxity, rather than like the sculpture of Tina Wentcher, who having lived in Indonesia in 1930, presented two Balinese women as innocent and gracefuI.52 This example alone can be cited as evidence of the variance of perceptions of Asia based on the degree of individual direct contact.

*

The appearance of The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, the work of the IPR, and the individual writers and artists as outlined, all implied that Australia was finally acquiring a degree of intellectual and political maturity where Asia was concerned. This new found maturity did not necessarily equate to real

SO Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady... , pg 48 5l Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady... , pg 49 52Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady... , pg 51 Looking North Intellectual Rnponses 135 influence and change. For all the good intentions of the learned few in Australia struggling to advance new attitudes in society, there seemed to be little visible result for their efforts. The simple fact was that the vast majority of the population was not aware of what the academics or the various organisations were saying or doing. Consequently "... despite the varying attitudes of pressure groups in the inter-war period, the Australian public in general remained apathetic ... ".53

53E.M. Andrews, A History of Australian Policy: From Dependence to Independence, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, pg 69 Looking North Travel &; Work 136

CHAFJfJBR JFJIVJB

Travelling and Working in South East Asia - Australians Confront the North

Travel and live long. Travel and learn - nothing educates like travelling. Travel and see the world. To dwellers in other parts of the world, a trip to Australia and the South Seas offers a wide range of interesting attractions; .... For Australians there is equal inducement to travel. From an educational or holiday-making point of view, to see all they can of their own country and the rest of the world. From a business point of view to visit Australia's neighbours and customers in Java, China, Japan, Manila, the Straits Settlements, Burma, India and elsewhere, to further stimulate trade, and to visit still farther afield in search of additional outlets for Australian products and manufactures.1

The increased ease with which it was now possible for Australians to travel to SEA if, of course, they could afford the price, leads directly to the issue of tourism. The way in which SEA was promoted as a possible destination for Australian tourists was very interesting, to say the least. If an Australian was financially able to make an overseas journey, the most likely destination was still Europe or more specifically, 'home' to England. Asia was not usually considered a first option. After all, what possible reason could Australians have for visiting such a foreign land? In the 1920s and 1930s the NEI, for one, began to be presented as an attractive place for Australians to visit for holidays.

In 1911 companies like Burns Philp were moving away from the traditional Europe-Australia tourist traffic and were, instead, promoting the benefits of cruises to Asia. With cruise ships being the primary method of tourists getting access to Asia, Burns Philp had in that first decade of the century already established holiday links to places in SEA, such as Borneo and Manchuria,

1Picturesque Travel under the auspices of Burns Philp and Company Limited, 1911, pg 50, from N115l625, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University Looking North Travel & Work 137

which even today are considered as somewhat uncommon holiday destinations. As the above quote from their magazine Picturesque Travel shows, travel in SEA was still seen to be linked with business. The idea for Burns Philp was that there was no reason why fun could not be had along the way. We focus then on Australians at work and play in SEA.

Travel companies like Burns Philp emphasised, of course, the positive aspects of journeys to SEA. For those who had seen it all, locations like Java became the place to be.

The·question, 'Where shall I go for a holiday?" often poses the jaded traveller who has seen everything that Europe and the United States can show; or the untravelled citizen who wishes I to begin with an attractive and picturesque journey; or the invalid who desires a smooth-water sea trip. A short stay amidst strange and interesting surroundings, and a quick return to his home. To those who know, there is but one answer to the question - Java!. Java, the Wonderland of the East. Java, the land of strange and luxuriant vegetation, of mild and picturesque peoples, of marvellous ruins, of quaint customs and strange religions, gorgeous Courts and Sultanates.2

In the inter-war period, though, travel in SEA was a double edged sword. Just as ignorance often breeds prejudice, so too Australians being confronted with the reality of1 SEA first hand, merely came away feeling justified in their preconceptions. A tourist who knows little of the country or the language, can arrive in a defensive state and may generalise individual unpleasant incidents into an indictment of a whole nation. The idea that since only a very small proportion of those who travel ever actually meet people of their own interests and social standing in other countries, it is impossible for them to gain a favourable impression of their destination. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the idea of the IPR conferences was so attractive to the delegates who attended.

2Picturesque Travel under the auspices of Burns Philp and Company Limited, 1911, pg 95, from N115/625, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University Looking North Travel & Work 138

Alison Broinowski, also, acknowledged the challenge of travel but did not necessarily believe that Australia confronting its prejudices was a bad thing. There is no doubting that generalisations ensued. As Broinowski pointed out,

A piece of glass bought at a jewel's price could be taken as proof of the dishonesty of all Ceylonese. Boys diving for pennies in Bombay pointed an abject lesson about the impoverished millions of Asia which it could be perilous to ignore.3

Australian preconceptions about SEA had to be confronted by reality if they were ever to be broken down. Every attempt seemed to be made to stress the likeness of SEA to Australia. In the case of the NEI, the influence of the Dutch was emphasised. The promotion material focused around getting the best of both worlds. The traveller could see all the variety of SEA, but from the comfort of Australian ships and European style hotels.

In order to prepare for the potential journey to SEA, the tourist was advised to read about, and study, their destination. The likes of Burns Philp presented their own version of today's travel guide in, Picturesque Travel. The problem with such guides was that they simply fed the existing preconceptions. Perhaps this is what the tourist really wanted. They wanted to find what they already believed was there. Thus, Burns Philp was only doing good business when it wrote the "The native people are of a yellowish-brown tint; industrious; intelligent, and virile" or "The Javanese religion is a quaint mixture of Mohammedanism founded on sheer paganism".4 The magazine was liberally smattered with photographs from the region. Not just shots of famous landmarks like the Boroboedoer Temple, but also the seemingly obligatory photographs of the traditional dressed dancers and the under-dressed 'pacific bells'. This imagery was not new of course. It fitted quite neatly into the prevailing opinion in relation to Orientals. For Australians the orient was exotic and this image of the 'far away' is what sold Asia to the Australian tourist.

The aim of Burns Philp was to get people on its ships on journeys to SEA. As a result, it was in its own interests to play down some of the more extreme views

3Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady .... , pg 12 4Picturesque Travel under the auspices of Bums Philp and Company Limited, 1913, pp 65, & 66 from N115l625, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University Looking North Travel & Work 139

Australians had about the region. They naturally did not emphasise nor, more correctly, even mention such issues as military threats, immigration and discontented natives. Rather, the emphasis was on the exotic nature of SEA. "South-East Asia in the inter-war period was thought of more in terms of exotic travel pictures than in those of war and political strife ..... Places such as the capitals of Laos, and Cambodia were almost unknown."5 Java, for example, was described as

the Garden of the World, offers the tourist and traveller some of the most beautiful and exotic scenery in the tropics, providing as well an inexhaustible supply of interesting features in the shape of ancient culture, barbaric customs, and the present-day ritual of the temple dancers and the impressive cremation ceremonies. 6

' The whole ethos of the travel market to SEA could be summed up in the idea that "Novelty lies always awaiting - brown-skinned natives, their customs and ceremoma. 1 s, ... 117

By and large, these were the impressions of travel before World War I and well into the 1920s. The war no doubt changed travel for many people in that many more were given access to it.

No longer is travel a luxury for the few. It is speedier and more convenient now than ever. It should be part of the education of all, and is rapidly becoming so even for the people with but little money. It is and ever has been a restorer of health more potent than all the drugs, and as a source of pleasure for young and old it is unrivalled.8

5Fred R. von der Mehden, South-East Asia 1930-1970: The legacy of colonialism and nationalism, Thames and Hudson, London, 1974, pg 7 6"Java and the Pacific Islands" pg 3 from N115l626, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University 7Java and the Pacific Islands" pg 3 from N115l626, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University 8Picturesque Travel under the auspices of Burns Philp and Company Limited, 1920, pg 5, from N115l625, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University Looking North Travel &; Work 140

While there were those who were travelling solely for pleasure or health, there were still more who were combining a few days holiday with what was essentially a business trip. Burns Philp, as well as organising package holidays, was also servicing its business offices in Surabaya, Semarang, Singapore, Batavia and numerous other locations in the Pacific. Their Semarang office, established in 1908, and was doing good business importing and exporting Australian and Javan products.

Burns Philp was naturally not the only shipping company seeking to take advantage of the growing tourist and business traffic between Australia and SEA. The K.P.M. Line, founded in 1911, was subsidised by the NEI government until 1920. Like Burns Philp its main ports of call were Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, Thursday Island, Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. In 1921 the Commonwealth Line also began a tri-weekly service from Sydney to Java and Singapore. Unfortunately by 1924, it proved unprofitable and was surrendered to the British line, Ellerman and Blacknall Co. Ltd. Likewise, the 1930's Western Australian Government operated service from Fremantle to Java and Singapore, was handed over to the Blue Funnel Line.

* * *

For people to become accepting of other people with divergent beliefs and practices, it seems necessary for them the have regular associations. So it was those Australians who had the most contact with SEA who were the most approving of it. Probably the simplest way of ensuring that more Australians were aware of SEA was to make it easier to travel between the two regions. As already discussed, shipping services had been operating for some years between Australia and ports in Asia, but it was to be the age of the aeroplane that was to have the greatest effect. For the first time SEA was literally less than a day away. The reality of Australia's geographic position had to hit home.

As early as January 1927, Western Australian Airways Ltd., was pushing for aerial communications between the NEI and the Commonwealth. In a letter to the Governor-General of the NEI, the airline asked

under what conditions we could be allowed to operate an airline linking up Sourabaya, Bima and Port Darwin, using Looking North Travel &; Work 141

large seaplanes or flying boats, and operating on a regular weekly schedule.9

Western Australia was, in fact, to be the strongest advocate of increased air communications between Australia and the NEI. Not only this, but Western Australia's relative proximity to SEA, in comparison to the eastern states, meant that it was also one of the earliest to establish sea links.

At 6.00 a.m. on May 12th, 1931, a three-engined Fokker by the name of 'Abel Tasman' left Batavia bound for Melbourne on an air mail run.10 The Dutch had always appeared keener than the Australians or the British to establish an air run. The Dutch air mail company sought to set up a regular air mail service between Europe and Australia, even though it had little chance of receiving any financial assistance from the Australian Commonwealth Government. Holland seemed determined to have some share in what it perceived as the potentially lucrative Anglo-Australian service, and was more than prepared to operate without the help of a subsidy. Even the chief pilot, Captain M. P. Pattist, on this inaugural flight pointed out that the flight had been organised, in part, to help develop trade between the two countries.11

The new air link had not initially been directed at passenger traffic, but rather at the carriage of goods, particularly mail. Nevertheless, a request was first made in 1933 by the Dutch Government that the Royal Netherlands Airways (KLM) and its subsidiary company, Royal Netherlands Indies Airways (KNILM), be allowed to extend their passenger services from Java to Australia. The request had been refused by the Commonwealth "in order that the development of Imperial services should not be hampered".12 By 1937 the request was being re­ evaluated by the Federal Cabinet, as well as the British Government. On July 19th 1938, the inaugural flight by KNILM arrived in Sydney from Batavia. From then on KNILM was to run two services weekly.

Even countries like Siam were pushing for better air links. Prince Purachatra, it seems, ".... spoke of the proposal that Bangkok should be made a stopping-place in the Imperial Airways Service to Australia. The Siamese Government, he said,

9A981 - Aviation 91 Old, The Australian Archives 10sydney Morning Herald, May 13th, 1931, pg 12 11Sydney Morning Herald, May 22nd, 1931, pg 10 12sydney Morning Herald, March 22nd, 1937, pg 11 it Looking North Travel & Work 142

had expressed their readiness to agree to this, provided that they were given some participation. By this he meant that they should be allotted a few shares."13

In 1928 when discussions were underway concerning the possibility of the development of long-distance wireless stations throughout SEA, the British planned a conference to talk over the issue. In a dispatch from the British Embassy in Siam, S. P. Waterlow wrote,

What I would recommend is that His Majesty's Government should promote an international conference at which representatives of the countries of South-East Asia should meet to consider the wireless situation and to try to put an end to the present chaos and to work out a joint policy. The countries immediately concerned are Siam, India, Burma, Malaya, Indo­ China, Hong Kong, Manila and the Dutch Indies.14

It is unfortunate, though perhaps not surprising, that such a British initiative did not include Australia amongst the list of concerned countries in SEA. Nevertheless, as the dispatch came via Keith Officer in London, Australia was at least informed of the situation even if it was not invited to take part. Australia was to have better luck at a Meteorological Conference held in Batavia in 1935. Mr E.W. Timcke attended as the Commonwealth representative to discuss the issues of the importance of meteorological report to air services in the SEA region.15

Maybe it was just as well that tourism and commerce were linked, as the impressions of tourists can not always be seen as reliable. Tourists, no matter from what nation they come, very rarely present the best image. It is a collective image and is, therefore, often generalised, distorted and magnified to such an extent that a false picture is received. Australian tourists on their beach holiday in Bali have little or no interest in learning, and the nature of many resorts means that there is little to learn of the host country anyway.

l3 A981l1 - Thailand 4, The Australian Archives. Dispatch from Mr C. Dormer to Mr A. Henderson (UK), March 24th, 1930 14A981l1 - Thailand 4, Australian Archives. Dispatch from S. P. Waterlow to Sir A. Chamberlain, July 3, 1928 15A981.1 -Aviation 52, Australian Archives. Report by Mr E.W. Timcke, 6 August 1935 Looking North Travel & Work 143

Australians visiting the NEI in the interwar period, for example, had little chance to learn about Indonesian life merely because they chose to spend all their time in the company of the Dutch and within Dutch-dominated society. What it did do, was confirm their vision of the way the world should be. A world dominated by the white races.

It could almost certainly be assumed that potential holiday makers would not go out of their way to enquire about an Asian destination. Hence, the effort put into marketing by Burns Philp. The most likely source of information for the traveller was the newspaper, to which most people had access. Such articles were few and far between, and while they may have presented the NEI as an exciting, mystical place, they did little to give the reader a real understanding of what the country and its people were like. In the last months of 1934 a series of articles appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald by S. Elliot Napier. These were basically a descriptive view of time spent in the Indies by a tourist. The articles were full of stories about quaint experiences, but there was little solid information about people or places. Noticeably lacking was factual information, the aim apparently being to present the NEI as a land of mysticism, potentially attractive to Australians for that reason. The temples of the NEI were simply a substitute for the cathedrals of Europe.16

Denzil Batchelor, writing several articles in 1937, disapproved of the native population of the Indies. He believed that as long as the tourist remained a guest of the Dutch, then he had no fears. However, if he ventured into the native villages and countryside he "must expect to be disillusioned".17 The feeling from the article is that it is more than possible to have an enjoyable vacation amongst the Dutch people of the NEI, and to have little contact with the Malays and, indeed, that was the most preferred option.

In 1935 an interesting book was published by Ethel Jarman, which was in the form of a diary of her travels through Asia the year before. The first paragraph of the foreword sets quite clearly the mind set of Ms Jarman and the preconceptions with which she set off on her travels. She opens by saying that,

The lure of Eastern lands and peoples to an Australian is natural, for our great white Commonwealth - vast in area, but

16Sydney Morning Herald, December 29th, 1934, pg 7 17Sydney Morning Herald, July 31st, 1937, pg 13 Looking North Travel & Work 144

dangerously small in population - must inevitably be influenced by future events among the teeming millions of her near and far neighbours of the East.18

In this statement Ms Jarman summed up what was at the core of Australians' fear of Asia. Australians were few and Asians were many, and the assumption was that at some point the people of Asia would seek more space. For example, while Ms Jarmon speaks favourably and fondly of the Javanese as a mild and industrious people, it seems she is still overwhelmed by the 'millions of babies' throughout the tiny island. Ms Jarman herself admits that her main impression of the Javanese and the Sudanese is that they are a quiet people. Why then the fear?

The Chinese of Singapore did not rate so well in Ms Jarman's estimations. This most certainly was due in no small part to the perceived ratio of white to coloured people. The Javanese may have been in their millions, yet the Australian on tour could quite happily have to only deal with them as periphery. This did not appear the case in Singapore. Ms Jarman pointed out after only three days in Singapore that

I should think it rather difficult to live here, unless one has social friends. One feels absolutely cut off from one's own colour - much more so than in Java, where the hotels are always kept by Dutch people. The sight of a white face is a rarity in the streets. Here the white man in a shop looks out of place. He cannot compete with the heathen Chinese, and the Armenians, who own, and now run the Raffles Hotet.19

If an effort was being made to make Australians more aware of the advantages of planning a holiday in SEA, rather than in Europe, then what did the people from countries like the NEI, know of Australia as a place in which to spend their vacations? Tourism can be a two-way street, and just as the NEI was promoting herself, so too Australia began to realise the value of the tourist, to say nothing of the tourist dollar. In July 1929, Mr Charles Boon, correspondent of the official tourist bureau of Holland and the NEI, visited Sydney. His

18Ethel Jarman, Eastern Glimpses - Being the daily diary of an Australian woman on tour in the Far East, Varden and Sons Ltd, Adelaide, , 1935, pg 4 19Ethel Jarman, Eastern Glimpses .... , pg 24 Looking North Travel & Work 145

argument was that there was much that could be done to make the residents of the Indies more aware of Australia. He believed that "many wealthy planters of Java and Sumatra would certainly come to Australia if their attention were called more often to this country's attractions. "20 It seemed that advertising was the key. The Java Gazette promoted the tourist value of Australia. In an article in November, 1932, the suggestion was made to combine a holiday in Australia with a business trip. It was clear that the writer knew what he/she was talking about. The idea of linking business with pleasure was, as mentioned previously, the linchpin to the tourist traffic. The value of visiting Australia as a tourist was also viewed favourably by the Royal Packet Navigation Company, who like Burns Philp, sought to sail the potential holiday maker to Australia in one of their fine ships.21 Where then were the Australian promoters?

The trade ship in 1933 was probably one of the first occasions on which Australia was promoted as a tourist destination, for example, to the Dutch population of the NEI. The entire promenade deck of the ship had been assigned to the Australian National Travel Association so as to provide space in which to advertise Australian tourist attractions. It was obvious that the tourist traffic was also seen as a kind of trade, but like others on the ship, the Travel Association failed to print any of its material in Malay or Chinese. The native population was not the kind of tourist Australia wished to encourage. Australian tourist representatives met with their Dutch counterparts in the NEI, and provision was made for a program of exchange of tourists.

This is not to say that once SEA tourists arrived in Australia they were always welcomed openly. Complaints were received about the treatment given to Asian tourists by officials at ports, by customs and police. Gertrude Owens, who had been a long-time resident of Malaya, wrote to the Minister of External Affairs that Asian people

.... come here timidly on account of the White Australia Policy, and probably make more mistakes on account of their fears ... .l think with a little encouragement we could promote the tourist traffic, for there are many very wealthy Asiatics who seem to

20sydney Morning Herald, July 6th, 1929, pg 16 21"Shipping News - Pleasure Cruises to Australia", from The Java Gazette, Vol 1, No 5, November 1932, pg 257 Looking North Travel & Work 146

spend lavishly on their travels. Not enough of them know they can be admitted here as tourists, and as students. 22

In his response the Minister agreed that any "unsympathetic treatment" of visitors to Australia was unacceptable. He did not indicate if steps were being taken by the government to ensure it did not happen.

As we have alrt:?ady seen, Australia was doing reasonable business with SEA. Much of this trade, though, was being done from the safety of an office in either Sydney or Melbourne. Even so, there were individuals, more adventurous of spirit, who were willing to not only do business with SEA but to also actually work in SEA. The area in which Australians made their largest mark was in that of mining. There were other ventures, but the mining industry dominated. This Australian presence in SEA, for whatever reasons, has not been given its full credit. Australia's almost umbilical link with Britain may have done much to downplay the role of Australians as distinct from the English. Jennifer Cushman in her article entitled "An Australian 'Tales from the South China Seas'?", focuses on Australians in Asia as distinct from the British. As her opening statement attests,

In the years before World War II Australian economic and technical expertise was put to use in many parts of the Asian and Pacific region. It was not limited to the tin industry. For instance, Australians ran cane plantations in Fiji and rubber plantations in Malaya, as well as gold mines in New Guinea, Malaya and Thailand. Yet Australia's role in the export of technology and management to Southeast Asia in this period, and the men who were instrumental in that spread, are not well known. The fact that the educated mining engineer supervising tons of clanking machinery and his colleagues in a host of small Southeast Asian and Pacific outposts was often an Australian, seldom penetrates our consciousness of the Southeast Asian past.23

22A981l1 - Malaya 14, Australian Archives. Letter from Gertrude Owen, National General Secretary of the National Young Women's Christian Association of Australia, 31 July 1940 23Jennifer Cushman, "An Australian 'Tales from the South China Seas'?", from Review, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Vol 9, No 3, April 1986, pg 23 Looking North I@vel &; Work 147

What was, perhaps, so surprising about the Australian presence in SEA was that, traditionally, Australia was still seen as struggling to cut the Imperial apron strings. However it was to be ".... Britain's slowly receding position in Australia's trade and growing fears about Australia's vulnerability in the Pacific area in the 1930s united to force Australian governments to take stock of the nations to the north".24 Before 1900 Australian investment in the Asian mining industry was sporadic. The only major gold-mine in Malaya in the 1890s was run by a Queensland enterprise. The Perak Tin Mining Company N.L., was formed and registered on July 3, 1883, with its offices in Bendigo, but even then it was still a relative rarity.

The 1920s were to be the heyday of Australian mining overseas. In the period up to 1930, ".... Australian-owned and -controlled companies accounted for a sizeable proportion of foreign mining companies in Malaya and, indeed, the majority of foreign mining companies in Siam".25 Just as dramatic as their rise though,

Australian investments reached their peak relative to other European investments after the mid-20s, but by the end of the decade, British trusts had wrested control from a majority of the Australian firms in Malaya, and independently-controlled Australian firms were reduced to an insignificant proportion of total investments. 26

In the 1920s in Siam, The Miles-Palfreyman and Pratt-Palfreyman groups were the most active, and according to the Australian Mining Standard, fifty-seven Australian-owned Malayan and Siamese tin companies were registered in Australia. The reasons for Australia's particular success in Siam were many and varied. On an official level, relations between the two nations were becoming warmer. Prince Purachatra, for example, made the first Siamese royal visit to Australia in July 1927. Also Australians were managing to build up a special personal relationship with powerful families like the Khaw's from the southern provinces. Thus, these

24F.D. Birch, Tropical Milestones: Australian Gold and Tin Mining Investments in Malaya and Thailand 1880-1930, M.A. Thesis, University of Melbourne, December 1976, pg 3 25f.D. Birch, Tropical Milestones: .... , pg 1 26f.D. Birch, Tropical Milestones: .... , pg 12 Looking North Travel &; Work 148

.... steadily improving personal and official relationships between the Siamese and the Australians in the 1920s may have led to the Siamese differentiating between British and Australian companies. The recognition may simply have been in deference to the fact that Australians pioneered the industry.27

Ambrose Pratt visiting Singapore, Malaya and Siam in the early 1930s visited many of the tin dredging and tin mining locations throughout SEA, including the Tinsinghkla Company mines at Besar, Alor Star, Prai, Penang and Tongkah Harbour and the Rangeng Tin N.L. Company on Puket. In addition he stopped off at many English owned mines in Malaya. He found much on his visit to reinforce the impression that Australian managers were highly respected within the industry.

The purpose of Pratt's visit was twofold. On the one hand he had been requested by the Commonwealth Government to discuss with certain Towkays the operations of several Australian dredging companies, as well as investigate the methods used in rice culture in Malaya and Siam. Pratt it seemed was well versed enough in Malaya and Chinese culture to know that business was not to be hurried.

On the other hand in relation to the dredging companies, the purpose of his visit to Siam was best outlined by an acquaintance when he stated that you come "on behalf of Australian Tin Dredging interests to petition the Siamese Government to permit your companies to cease operations or to defer the equipment of their properties without prejudice to their titles until the price of tin is restored to a profitable level." This acquaintance proved to be more than a little valuable in the up coming negotiation.

Mr Samuel Brighouse was an English lawyer who had been living in Bangkok for some twenty years and held the position of Legal Advisor to the Royal Privy Purse and was a man of some power in Siam. During his discussions with Pratt he pointed out that several powerful British interests had placed similar requests recently and had been refused. He advised Pratt that, given the right skill and tact, he could yet succeed. Brighouse arranged a meeting for Pratt with His Excellency Chow Phya Boladeb to discuss the issue. While His

27F.D. Birch, Tropical Milestones: .... , pg 24 Looking North Travel & Work 149

Excellency readily admitted that Siam owed much to Australian enterprise and capital, he initially seemed unmoved by Pratt's petition. Pratt's forthright approach paid dividends, just as the meeting seemed at an end, with Boladeb shaking hands and stating "Tell your Australian companies to pay no more fines or fees until I shall demand them - until you hear from me!."28 Brighouse informed him later that with that comment, Pratt's mission was accomplished.

Even in official reports the good work of Australians in the mining industry was being recognised. A report by Keith Officer to the Secretary of the Department of External affairs, dated 4th February 1937, contains references to a tour by the British Consul, Mr Whittington, at Songkhla in Southern Siam to the provinces of Nakorn, Sritamaraj, Bandon and Chumpon. Making particular reference to the tin dredging companies which were managed by Australians, Whittington found that

.... relations with the local Siamese authorities were good and that while difficulties and delays on the part of the latter were not infrequent, the mine-managers and others showed more patience and understanding than they are given credit for by current local opinion. 29

This patience and understanding seemed to be reflected in much done by the Australians who spent long periods working in SEA. Australians, it seemed, were known for maintaining a high level of equality with the coolies who worked under them. Warren Parsons, for example, who worked for the Rangeng Tin Company and at various times in the 1930s and 1940s managed mining companies in Malaya and Thailand, believed that

Australians invariably got on much better than the English or Scots or whatever. A big part of it was because of their sense of humour. But Australians generally treated your average coolie not as a coolie, but as - just another bloke.30

28Ambrose Pratt, Magical Malaya, Robertson and Mullens Ltd, Melbourne, 1931, pp 11-112 29A981l1 - Thailand 20, The Australian Archives. Report by Keith Officer to Secretary of the Department of External affairs, 4th February 1937, pg 7 30Jennifer Cushman, "An Australian 'Tales from .... , pp 24-25 Looking North Travel & Work 150

If nothing else the comments above suggest clearly that the WAP may have been more a matter of convention then the personal opinion of the average Australian. It suggested that the WAP may have been for many the rule but not the practice. If the tin miners could relate with ease to the native populations of SEA why could not other Australians? Was the difference that the tin miners were on foreign soil and so had to adapt, or could this same tolerance have been transferred upon their return to Australia?

It must be noted that Parsons learnt to work in SEA over many years. Becoming fluent in both Chinese and Thai he may have been particularly sensitive to the problems there. Parsons put in the effort to understand the locals and their customs in order to best utilise them as workers. His clear understanding of the Thai worker is illustrated in the tale below.

It didn't make any difference whether a fellow was a Thai or a Chinese providing he came to work. That was the main criteria. It was not much use having a very good Thai who, like many Thais, would work three or four days a week, find he had enough money and then refuse to work the next couple of days. The Chinese wouldn't do this. He would work the full seven days because he didn't want to lose any money. We had a case of this at Ronpiboon when I was trying to get the place going over there. I had a Siamese dragline operator - a very good operator, too - and we had a big job to get all the tailings from the dredge chucked well back because I was trying to get the dredge down deeper. This fellow would work only five or six days - he would always have at least one day off a week, and som~times two. The manager over there said, "We're not paying him enough - you give him a decent sort of wage and he'll come to work." I said, "No, he won't, it works the other way." And he bothered me about this and said, "Look, let's give him another 50 satang a day." And I said, "Well, look, I don't think it's right, but your managing this mine, you get the work done, all right, you give him another 50 satang a day and see what happens." He only worked three days a week after that.31

31Jennifer Cushman, "An Australian 'Tales from .... , pp 25-26 Looking North Travel & Work 151

Parsons relates another fascinating story highlighting differing opinions between the British and individuals from a nation where the White Australia Policy was in full flight, and from whom one would not necessarily expect this kind of attitude. Like Malaya, social life in Phuket seemed to revolve, for the Europeans at least, around private clubs. In the early days there were two main clubs - the Miners Club which was patronised mainly by Australians, and the United Club, the home of the Western firms. While relations were generally friendly between the two clubs, differences did sometimes appear.

When one of the Tongkah Harbour mine people proposed that the local doctor, an Indian 'black as your hat', be put up for the United Club, this chap was blackballed. The mining mob were mad - very mad about this. About three months later the British Consul came over and they wanted to take him over to the Miners Club. But the Miners Club said "No way. We won't have him down here. None of these damned Pommie blokes down here!" They blackballed him. That really caused a lot of trouble that ended in a sort of war between the two clubs.32

The final seal of approval on Parsons, and the Australian approach in SEA, was given when, after World War II, Parsons was appointed British Vice-Consul in Phuket, chosen as he was over a British subject because of his familiarity and understanding of the region at its people.

To holiday and do business were not the only reasons for Australians to be interested in SEA. Some groups had loftier, more all encompassing, aims than that, even if they took time to evolve. "Enmeshed in the business of prosecuting social reform at home, the Labour movement was consistently unmindful of anything outside the shores of this continent. In that, it reflected the general Australia outlook."33 In 1921 the Australian Trade Unions sought to convene a special conference on labour organisations in the Pacific, but the proposal came to nothing. It was not to be until 1927 in Hankow, China, that a Pan-Pacific Conference was held with the result being the creation of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat which was "to be a permanent organ for information and

32Jennifer Cushman, "An Australian 'Tales from .... , pg 26 33G.V. Portus; "The Australian Labour Movement and the Pacific", from Pacific Affairs, Vol 3, October 1930, pg 924 Looking North Trayel & Work 152

propaganda."34 While without ACTU affiliation in Australia the Secretariat was ultimately to have little influence, the perceptions that brought about its creation are important.

One of the main policies to come out of the conference was that the Secretariat should ".... support actively the liberation movements of the oppressed peoples and exploited classes in China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Latin America."35 These ideals are almost identically echoed in a manifesto to Japanese trade unionists by Mr J. Ryan, a prominent official of the Sydney Labour Research and Information Bureau, when he wrote that

No Pan-Pacific trade union organisation can properly begin the solution of its problems unless it places as a primary item on its programme the support of the struggles of the oppressed peoples for freedom, the independence movement of China, India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippine Islands, .... 36

Such views must have been like a red rag to a bull. There was, of course, the suspicion by the government and parts of the business community that like all labour organisations, there was a hint of communism, or at least socialism, in everything they did. The main concern however, centred around their supposed hostility to, and criticism of, the WAP. It was the recognition by the Government of such ideals that led to it refusing permission to convene a Pan­ Pacific Conference in Australia. In what became the official organ of the Secretariat, The Pan-Pacific Worker, the group quite clearly stated that they sought to ".... break down the racial and national barriers."37 It is no wonder then, that the Australian Government saw this as a threat to the WAP. What they did not see, was that the Secretariat perceived the W AP very differently from some other Australians.

34c.v. Portus; "The Australian Labour Movement ..... ", pg 927 351ne Pan-Pacific Worker, Vol 1, No 1, 1928, pg 2 36Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 118, 17 May 1928, pg 4943. Senator Duncan discussing the proposed Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress to be held in Australia the next year 37 Australian Parliamentary Papers, Vol 119, 19 September 1928, pg 6836. Senator Sir replying to a query by Senator Lynch regarding Pan-pacific trade unions supposed hostility to the White Australia Policy Looking North Travel & Work 153

For them, the W AP was viewed as being a mechanism to divide the working classes. They did not see it as discriminating against Asians, per se, and so sought to liberate the Asian peoples, but rather saw it as being against the working classes and so tried to liberate them, no matter where in the world they might be. To suggest that the Secretariat's support of "liberation" for the workers in SEA, extended to inviting them to come and live and work in Australia, was a gross misunderstanding of their aims and a miscalculation of their views on Asia in general. If the labour movement's somewhat controversial entry into the SEA scene was not given due approval by sectors of Australian society, then this was not to say that other, so called Pan-Pacific, ventures were not more successful and better received. The main problem with the more acceptable conferences was getting an invitation.

The strangest thing about all these personal tales and experiences, is that they show that Australians working and living in SEA were not openly displaying the same prejudices as their country folk at home. For their times, they became clear thinking individuals who were moderate in their dealings with Asians, and, more importantly, were able to call them equals and friends. They were not perceived as a threat, but rather as just another bloke working the mines. Was it because, as the minority, the Australians were forced to confront their prejudices and re-evaluate them when they were found to be baseless? Or was it just that in order to make their lives easier, they chose not to display them?

Working with individual coolies who now had names, faces and families, must have forced those Australians in SEA to take a second look at the generalisations on which they had based so much of their knowledge of the East. It was quite clear now that Asia was not just one indistinguishable mass. The Malays were different from the Chinese, who were different again from the Thais, and so on. And within those groups there were some with whom you might choose to have a beer, and some you would not. Many of those who went to SEA in the first instance, went in search of work. Their plan was not centred around building bridges between SEA and Australia, that only happened as a happy consequence. Nor can it be assumed that when those workers returned to Australia they did not just fall back into the comfortable ways of the White Australia Policy. At least for a while they presented Australia as being something more than the last bastion of racism in SEA. l,Qokin& North Conclusion 154

CONCLUSKON

In this thesis I have endeavoured to show, at least in part, the relationships which were beginning to develop between Australia and SEA in the period between the first and second world war. It is not an attempt to recount all relations between Australia and Asia as a whole. Rather, it is an attempt to outline some of the experiences and events that occurred in this dynamic period in Australian history, and to use SEA, in particular, as an example of the way in which Australia and Asia interacted. As part of illustrating these connections we are given an insight into the kind of country Australia was in the 1920s and 1930s and, most importantly, the attitudes it held towards its Asian neighbours.

There is no denying that Australia was in no small part a victim of its own history. The path that led to closer ties with SEA was an arduous one and one from which we quite frequently deviated. Nonetheless, it may be harsh to condemn Australia for merely being a product of its time. We were not alone, for example, in viewing people from Asian nations as inferior. We were not alone in desiring a strong and united Empire after the horrors of World War I. We were certainly not alone in wanting to control those individuals who came to our shores. And we were not alone in fearing strong and powerful neighbours. What is vital is that, against all the odds, we somehow managed to make inroads into SEA. We made many mistakes along the way but we began, at least, to find our independent feet.

From those early moments at Versaille when Prime Minister Hughes stood out against the Empire to defend what he believed to be the desire of the majority of Australians, we grew into a nation better able to give voice to its own future. To deny The White Australia Policy would be to deny much of what Australians in this period held to be true and of value. Regardless of the racist base of the policy, it was at the core of all future dealings with SEA and like it or not decisions, whether economic or social, were for a long time made within that framework. It was no small task to throw of the shackles of years of preconceptions. Looking North Conclusion 155

So while Versaille showed to the world Australia's stance on race and immigration, it at least showed the world that we had a stance. We were making our own way by slowly breaking the ties that bind with Great Britain and, in doing so, it gave us a chance at an independence that would provide opportunities in SEA that we had never had before. The fact that many of these opportunities were not taken up with the speed that could have been the case is a disappointment, but not a condemnation. Hughes had placed Australia centre stage in both Empire affairs, and to a lesser extent, world affairs. Our contacts with SEA were never going to be easy and, as time would tell, we needed to find our own path rather than blindly follow that already made by Great Britain.

One of the great hurdles for Australia was to allay the fears that many had of invasion. No matter how irrational those fears may now appear, at the time they were real and widespread and they influenced many of the decisions made by various governments throughout the twenty year period. Australia's problem was that it believed economic contact with SEA would bring prosperity, but it also opened the possibility of entry to a way of life both foreign and somehow dangerous. Australia took refuge in its isolation. One of its failings was that its public voice did not always match its actions, resulting in confusion, mistakes and often inertia.

Australian impressions of Asia were bound up in a general attitude to coloured races prevalent at the time. Social Darwinism was the order of the day and Australia was in many ways simply following the lead of Europe in setting up institutionalised practices based on the ideas of Social Darwinism. Australia had to deal with the two-fold and contradictory problems of maintaining a racially superior attitude towards Asia, while openly fearing its ability to overrun Australia, both culturally and physically.

All race related issues in Australia, and in that we obviously include contact with SEA, were based around the White Australia Policy. Government decisions as well as those from the private sector were tempered by the constraints of this policy. It was a policy that could be bent for financial gain or political expediency, but it is not one that, in the short term, could be broken. The need for a white Australia was unquestioned.

This political expediency took many forms in the 1920s and 30s. In the public arena, Australia towed the Empire line and, as such, moved in Lookinic North Conclusion 156 directions that this dictated. Imperial arrangements on security in the Pacific as well as discussions at the Washington Conference were Empire driven, yet Australia was a more than happy participant. When Empire decisions went against Australia, however, her leaders took their own platform and fought to break down our isolation. We were told we should take a greater interest in foreign affairs.

Examples like the Latham Mission, the Pacific Branch established by Piesse, and the appointment of Casey in London, were all examples of the Australian Government displaying an 'interest' in foreign affairs. To say that during this same period it had developed a foreign policy, may be assigning more credit than is due. The desire to promote goodwill and friendly relations was correct and appropriate, but alone did not make a policy. There appears to be no continued or sustained action in relation to foreign affairs that could be called a 'policy'. Australia's vacillation between independence and Empire ties made this difficult.

Foreign policy to most Australians revolved around one of two things - security or trade. In relation to SEA, we did not have the bond of a common history on which to base a policy as we did with great Britain; nor did we have a common race on which to base a policy as we did with the USA. Instead, we developed relations based on two things that, at the time, were of primary importance to both Australia and Asia. Trade had the potential to bring us closer, while defence had the potential of pushing us further apart.

Australians wanted the Dutch to remain in the NEI as this was seen as the best way of ensuring the security of Australia. The NEI was our barrier to the rest of Asia and it was vital that it remain in the hands of a friendly and European power. The naval base in Singapore also received overwhelming support as it was another such barrier to invasion. The base had the two­ fold benefit of reinforcing the idea of Empire unity. Australia still needed to find the balance between this security and the contact required in order to develop trade relations.

Australia was in SEA to make money and the side benefits which may have resulted were incidental even, if in the end, welcomed. Geographic proximity was not in itself a reason for trade as indeed our historical connections with Great Britain would show. For a long time Australia's Looking North Conclusion 157 market was Great Britain and it was to be the period of the 1920s and 30s which was to break this tradition. Of course there had been one-off trade links between, for example, Australia and Singapore, but for the first time a consistent and continuous trade was emerging.

Australia was sending its own trade representatives into Asia and, for the first time, was getting direct information out. There was no doubt that various circles in Australia were critical of the work done by the likes of Sheaf and Critchley. Most of the criticism revolved around the fact that the individuals with the complaints were not the ones getting the benefits. This should not diminish the effort, however.

Trade Commissioners and Trade Ships aside, the reality of day to day trade continued on its difficult path. Perhaps the greatest criticism levelled against Australia and its traders was that they were too intent on giving SEA what they had already decided SEA wanted, rather than actually asking their new market what they wanted. The examples of poor quality goods and inappropriate packaging, did little to assist Australia in its quest to export its goods to SEA. It was these few publicly damaging events that gave Asia the reputation of being a difficult market. By the close of the 1930s Australia had yet to overcome this barrier of perception, but it was at least heading in the right direction.

There were others who were heading in different directions. They were less intent on economic prosperity than they were keen to develop intellectual and cultural prosperity. Those within academia saw it as their duty to influence and even l2ad public opinion and to promote contact with SEA as valuable in its own right. It was seen as important that Australia take its place on the world stage, as we had something valuable to contribute. We must become active members of the Asian community, and individuals and groups were uniting to bring this about.

In the 1920s and, more particularly, in the 1930s there were organisations whose aim was to take the lead in Australia's struggle to forge a new identity in SEA. The Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the League of Nations, The Round Table and others were all composed mainly of academics and business men who firmly believed that Asia was Australia's future. There is no doubting that these groups were elitist in their membership and they could never have been said to Looking North Conclusion 158 represent the broadest spectrum of Australian life. What they did do, however, was provide a forum for the airing of ideas on foreign policy and they brought powerful individuals together who, united, had the ability to influence government actions.

The various conferences organised by these different groups meant that opportunity was given for academics and the like to meet face to face with their counterparts throughout Asia. At the same time, there were individual Australians, of no influence or power, choosing to travel to Asia for the purposes of rest, relaxation and learning. Asia was becoming the new tourist destination for Australia. It was its new exotic locale with all that it offered. This tourist traffic created its own problems, with many Australians being confronted for the first time with their own prejudices about Asia and Asians. Many came away feeling justified in their preconceptions. The true juxtaposition in this was that most simply moved in European circles in SEA and had little or no contact with the native population. Travellers wished to see all the delights of SEA, but from the comfort of European hotels and Australian ships.

Travel articles were beginning to appear in Australian newspapers inviting Australians to come and try the delights of Asia for themselves. Personal tales of journeys through SEA gave the reader the feeling of lands open and welcoming to the Australian tourist, and while promoted as 'exotic', it was always stressed that travellers were mixing within European circles. It was this that, at least in the early years of tourism to SEA, sold it as a destination to Australians. Some individuals could feel comfortable travelling as a native throughout Asia, but for most the view was from a colonial window.

Those few Australians working in SEA were also having their preconceptions challenged. The previous indistinguishable mass of Asians, now had names and faces and Australians were working with them on a day to day basis. These Australians, perhaps for the first time, were showing Australia to be more than just the home of the White Australia Policy. They proved themselves to be capable of working in Asia and relating to the native population as individuals, not as the dreaded threat from the north, as they had traditionally been painted.

The 1920s and 1930s were a time of growth and learning in Australia. Asia aside, Australia was beginning to move in its own directions and develop Looking North Conclusion 159 its own approach as to where it wanted to be as a nation in ten, twenty or fifty years time. Our movement was no doubt slow, but in light of our short history, it was perhaps more than could have been expected. Mistakes were made, but the movement continued. Bringing Asia into the picture, Australia was faced with its greatest challenge. Asia presented to Australia the antithesis of everything it saw as being its own heritage and way of life. Many of the examples of Australia's mistakes and missed opportunities may appear to be a criticism of the government and people of the 1920s and 30s. This is not the case. It is simply recognition that errors occurred and, indeed, it is a testament to the progress that was made, often against incredible odds. Australia owes much of what is today to the events in the inter-war period, and its relations with SEA stem in no small part from the milieu of that time. Ultimately, the story was one of optimism and growth as Australia began to find its place in Asia. Looking North Biblio~pby 160

Secondary Readings

Books

Asian Studies Initiatives: A Twenty Year Review 1960-1979 The Myer Foundation

Andrews, E.M. A History of Australian Foreign Policy:From Dependence to Independence Longman Cheshire Melbourne 1974

Andrews, E.M. Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia Australian National University Press Canberra 1970

Arndt, H.W. Australia and Indonesia-Neighbours Forever University of Western Australia 1986

Arndt, H.W. Australia and Asia: Economic Essays Australian National University Press Canberra 1972

Bahrin, T.S. A Colloquium on Southeast Asian Studies Jeshurun, C Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Rambo, A.T. United Selangor Press Kuala Lumpur 1981 Looking North Bibliogravby 161

Birch, Francis David Tropical Milestones: Australian Gold and Tin Mining Investments in Malaya and Thailand 1880-1930 M.A. Thesis University of Melbourne December 1976

Bonsal, Stephen Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles Prentice-Hall Inc New York 1946

Brawley, Sean The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-1978 UNSW Press Sydney 1995

Brawley, Sean The White Peril Phd. Thesis UNSW, Sydney 1991

Broinowski, Alison The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia Oxford University Press Melbourne 1992

Brown, I Malaysia Ampalavanar, R World Bibliographical Series Clio Press 1986

Burley, Kevin British Shipping and Australia 1920-1939 Cambridge at The University Press 1986 Looking North Bibliogrc1phy 162

Cady, John.F. Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia Prentice-Hall Inc New Jersey 1966

Cairns, J.F. Living with Asia Landsdowne Press Melbourne 1065

Campbell, P Studies in Australian Affairs Mills, R.C. MacMillan and Co. Ltd Portus, G.V. Melbourne 1930

Casey, R.G. Australia's Place in the World Robertson and Mullens Ltd Melbourne 1931

Clark, C.M.H. A History of Australia IV: The Old Dead Tree and the Young Tree Green 1916-1935 Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1987

Clunies Ross, I (ed) Australia and the Far East: Diplomatic and Trade Relations Angus and Robertson Ltd 1935

Copland, D.B. Australian Trade Policy: A Book of Janes, C.V. Documents 1932-1937 Angus and Robertson Ltd Sydney 1937 Looking North Bibliography 163

Crowley, F.K. Modern Australia in Documents, 1901-1939 Volume 1 Wren Publishing Pty Ltd Melbourne 1973

Cumpston, 1.M. Lord Bruce of Melbourne Longman Cheshire Melbourne 1989

Dinning, H Australian Foreign Policy 1934 Holmes, J.G. (eds) Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1935

Drummond, lan.M. Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection George Allen and Unwin Ltd London 1974

Duncan, W.G.K. Australia's Foreign Policy Angus and Robertson Ltd Sydney 1938

Dunn, Michael Australia and the Empire; From 1788 to the Present Fon tan a/ Collins Sydney 1984

Edwards, P.G. Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949 Oxford University Press Melbourne 1983 Looking North Bibliogll)phy 164

Fitzhardinge, L.F. William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography. Volume 1-That Fiery Particle 1862-1914 Angus and Robertson Sydney 1964

Volume 2 -The Little Digger 1914-1952 Angus and Robertson Sydney 1979

Fitzpatrick, Brian The British Empire In Australia: An Economic History Macmillan Melbourne 1969

Foster, Leonie High Hopes: The men and motives of the Australian Round Table Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1986

Fox, J.J. Indonesia: Australian Perspectives Garnaut, R. Research School of Pacific Studies McCawley, P. Australian National University Mackie, J.A.C. (eds) Canberra 1980

Fricke, Graham. Profiles of Power: The Prime Ministers of Australia Houghton Mifflin Australia 1990

Greenwood, G (ed) Australia: A Social and Political History Angus and Robertson Publishers 1955 Looking North Biblio~phy 165

Greenwood, G Australia in World Affairs 1950-55 Harper, N F.W.Chestine Melbourne 1957

Hancock, W .K. Australia The Jacaranda Press London 1961

Hancock, W .K. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. Volume 1: Problems of Nationality 1918-1936 Oxford University Press London 1964

Heydon, Peter Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce Melbourne University Press 1965

Horne, Donald The Australian People: Biography of a Nation Angus and Robertson Sydney 1972

Hudson, W.J. Casey Oxford University Press Melbourne 1986

Hudson, W.J. Australia and the League of Nations Sydney University Press 1980

Hudson, WJ. Towards a Foreign Policy; 1914-1941 Casell Australia 1967 Looking North Bibliography 166

Hudson, W.J.and My Dear P.M. - R.G.Casey's letters to Jane North (eds) S.M.Bruce 1924-1929 Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1980

Hudson, W.J. and Australian Independence; Colony to Sharp, M.P. Reluctant Kingdom Melbourne University Press 1988

Jarman, Ethel Eastern Glimpses - Being the daily diary of an Australian woman on tour in the Far East Varden and Sons Ltd Adelaide, South Australia 1935

Jordens, J.T.F. (ed) The Generational Gap and Australian-Asian Relations The Australian-Asian Association of Victoria Melbourne 1969

Jumsai, M.L. Manich History of Thailand and Cambodia Chalermnit Bangkok 1970

Levi, Werner Australian Outlook on Asia Angus and Robertson Sydney 1958

London, H.I. Non-White Immigration and the "White Australia" Policy Sydney University Press Sydney 1970 Looking North Bibliogr.1phy 167

Mcintrye, W. David The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base The Macmillan Press Ltd London 1979

Meaney, Neville Australia and the World; A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s. Longman Cheshire Melbourne 1985

Mehden van der, South East Asia 1930-1970: The Legacy of Fred R. Colonialism and Nationalism Thames and Hudson London 1974

Millar, T.B. Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977 C.Hurst and Company London 1978

Moorehead, Richard.J. The Cruise of the Goodwill Ship The Ruskin press Pty. Ltd. Melbourne n.d.

Neale, R.G.(ed) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937-49 Volume One: 1937-38 Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1975

Volume Two: 1939 Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1976 Looking North Biblio'1'flphy 168

Osborne, Milton Southeast Asia: An Introductory History Second Edition George Allenn and Unwin Sydney 1983

Osmond, Warren.G Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics Allen and Unwin Sydney 1985

Palfreeman, A.C. The Administration of the White Australia Policy Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1967

Pelzer, Karl.J. West Malaysia and Singapore: A selected bibliography Human Relations Area Files Press New Haven 1971

Pottinger, Eldred Asiatic Problems Affecting Australia Robertson and Mullens Limited Melbourne 1928

Pratt, Ambrose Magical Malaya Robertson and Mullens Limited Melbourne 1931

Rivett, Ken (ed) Immigration: Control or Colour Bar ?: The Background to 'White Australia' and a Proposal for Change Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1962 Looking North BibliogRphy 169

Robertson, John J.H.Scullin: A Political Biography University of Western Australia Press 1974

Shepherd, Jack Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East Institute of Pacific Relations Publications Office New York 1940

Spartalis, Peter The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes Hale and Iremonger Sydney 1983

Stargardt, A.W. Australia's Asian Policies; The History of a Debate 1839-1972 The Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg 1977

Stevens, F.S. (ed) Racism; The Australian Experience Volume One - Prejudice and Xenophobia Australian and New Zealand Book Company Sydney 1971

Stirling, Alfred Lord Bruce: The London Years The Hawthorn Press Melbourne 1974

Tregonning, K.G. A History of Modem Malaya Eastern Universities Press Ltd London 1964 Looking North Bibliography 170

Tsokhas, Kosm.as Australia and the Ottawa Conference Working Paper No 122 Department of Economic History Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University January 1989

Vandenbosch, Amy The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics University of California Press Berkeley Third Edition 1944

Ward, Russel A Nation for a Continent: The History of Australia 1901-1977 Heinemann Educational Australia Melbourne 1977

Yarwood, A.T. Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-1923 Melbourne University Press Melbourne 1964

Yarwood, A.T. and Race Relations in Australia: A History Knowling, M.J. Methuen Australia Sydney 1982

Journals

The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin

Australian Cultural History

Australian Outlook Looking North Bibliogr;1phy 171

The Australian Quarterly 1929-1939

Economic Journal

Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

The Listener 1919-1939

New Statesman

Pacific Affairs 1928-1939

Political Quarterly

Quadrant

The Round Table 1919-1939

The Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings 1919-1939

United Empire

"Australian and Netherlands' Interests in the Pacific" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 1,No 5, Dec-Jan 1937-1938

"Dutch Air Services" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 1, No 2, June 1937 Looking North Bibliography 172

"Our Infant Foreign Office" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 1, No 1, April 1937

"Shipping News - Pleasure Cruises to Australia" The Java Gazette Vol 1, No 5, November 1932

"The Kyoto Conference" The Round Table Vol 20, Dec 1929-September 1930

"The Netherlands Indies" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 2, No 1, April-May 1938

"The Problems of Australian Security" The Round Table Vol 11, December 1920-September 1921

"Wanted - An Australian Policy" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 1, No 1, April 1937

"What is our Defence Policy" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 1, No 6, February-March 1938

Benham, F.C. "Australia's Trade in the Pacific" Pacific Affairs Vol 1-2 January 1929

Brown, Nicholas "Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia 1920 - 1960" Australian Cultural History No 9, 1990 Looking North Bibliography 173

Buesst, Tristan. "The Kyoto Conference" The Australian Quarterly Vol 2, No 5, March 1930

Carpenter, S "Honolulu Institute of Pacific Relations" The Pan-Pacific Worker Vol 1, No 3, May 1928

Copland, D.B. "Australia and the Far East" The Listener Vol 18, No 449, 18 August 1937

Copland, Prof D.B. "Australia's Century of Progress The Listener Vol 10, No 251, 1 November 1933

Cushman, Jennifer "An Australian 'Tales from the South China Seas'?" Review Asian Studies Association of Australia Vol 9, No 3, April 1986

Eggleston, F.W. "The British Empire, Australia and the Pacific" The Australian Quarterly Vol 8, No 31, September 1936

Carran, Sir Robert "A School of Oriental Studies" The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin Vol 2, No 6, Feb-Mar 1939

Annette Hamil ton "Fear and Desire: Aborigines, Asians and the National Imagery" Australian Cultural History No 9, 1990

Hamill, Ian "Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924-1929" Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol XI, No 2, September 1980 Looking North BibliolPJl;phy 174

Hughes, W.M. "Australia and World Politics" The Royal Australian Historical Society Journal Vol XII, Part IV, 1926

Legge, John "Asian Studies; From Reconstruction to Deconstructionll Australian Cultural History No 9, 1990

Legge,J.D. "A survey of the development of Southeast Asian Studies in Australia since 1945" Symposium of SEA Library Resources

MacMahon Ball, W "Australian Foreign Policy" The Listener Vol 22, No 548, 13 July 1939

Masey, Edward "The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin" The Australian Quarterly Vol 9, No 4, December 1937

Megaw, Ruth "The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its Significance in the Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy" Journal of The Royal Australian Historical Society Vol 59, Part 4, December 1973

Miller, J.D.B. "The Development of International Studies in Australia 1933-83" Australian Outlook Vol 37, No 3, December 1983

Moore,Sir W .H. "The Institute of Pacific Relations" The Australian Quarterly Vol 4, No 13, March 1932

Phillips, P.O. "The Far Eastern Situation: Some Aspects" The Australian Quarterly Vol 5, No 20, December 1933 Looking North Bibliography 175

Portus, G.V. "The Australian Labour Movement and the Pacific" Pacific Affairs Vol 3, October 1930

Willard, Myra "The History of the White Australia Policy" The Royal Australian Historical Society Journal Vol VIII, Part 1, 1922

Primary Readings

Newspapers

The Bulletin 1920 - 1939

The Sunday Telegraph July 1990

The Sydney Morning Herald 1927 - 1939

The Melbourne Herald 1921

The Australian

The Sun

Australian Archives

Al/1 19/515 Planters Association Malaya, Unemployment in Australia

A981/1 Malaya 8 Straits Settlements (Malaya), Intelligence

A981/1 Malaya 14 Malaya relations with Australia Looking North Bibliography 176

A981/1 Malaya 15 Malaya-Australia, Presentation of Australian Trees

A981/1 Malaya 16 Malaya-Australia, Visit by J.V. Mills to Australia

A981/1 Defence 330 Singapore Base, Australian Interests

A981/1 Defence 331, Defence, Defence of Singapore Part 1

A981/1 Trade 102 Australia, Commercial Relations with the Philippine Islands

A981/1 Singapore Naval Base Part 2

A981/1 Aviation 51 Singapore-Darwin Air Services, Facilities by Part 1 Netherlands and Portugal

A981/1 Aviation 52 Singapore-Darwin Air services, Meteorological Conference, Batavia 1935

A981/1 Aviation 91 Aviation/Netherlands East Indies, Air Services and Landing Grounds

A981/1 Thailand 4 Communications Cables and Wireless

A981/1 Thailand 11 Thailand, defence

A981/1 Thailand 12 Thailand, economic and financial

A981/1 Thailand 15 Thailand, internal situations

A981/1 Thailand 20 Thailand Relations with Great Britain

A981/1 Thailand 22 Visit of members of the Royal Family of Thailand Looking North Biblio!Wlpby 177

A981/1 Thailand 27 Visit of the Director General of Public and Municipal Works to Australia

A981/1 Consuls 273 Consuls, Thailand at Melbourne

A981/1 Consuls 274 Consul Thailand, Sydney

A981/1 Philippines 3 British Consuls-General Report

A981/1 Philippines 4 Engagement of Natives as crews of vessels employed on Australian Coast

A981/1 Philippines 11 Philippines, Economic and Financial

A981/1 NEI 1 Part 1 Netherlands East Indies - General Information

A981/1 NEI 1 Part 2 NEI - General

A981/1 NEI6 Watch Tower Bible Society /Visit of Netherlands East Indies

A981/1 NEI 19 Netherlands East Indies - Defence/Navy

A981/1 NEI 28 Part 1 Netherlands East Indies - Economic and Financial

A981/1 NEI 28 Part 2 Netherlands East Indies - Economic and Financial

A981/1 NEI48 Netherlands East Indies - Relations with Australia

A981/1 NEI73 NEI-Australia, Visit of Governor General of Netherlands East Indies to Australia 1939

A981/1 At:stralia 88 Australian Scholarship for Overseas Students at Australian Universities Looking North Biblio'1flphy 178

A981/1 Trade 93 Australia-Commercial Relations with the Netherlands East Indies, Visit of an Australian Trade Ship 1933

A981/1 Singapore Singapore Naval Base Naval Base Part 1

A981/1 Far East 5 Australian Eastern Mission 1934 - Reports Part 16

A981/1 Organisations Australian Institute of International Affairs 56, Part 1

A981/1 Organisations Pacific, Institute of Pacific Relations 93

CP78/22/1 24/122 Passport for residents of Nth Qld who desire to visit the Philippines

A3934/1 SC 15 Part58 Spare Copies Press Statement, re Singapore cuttings etc.

A1606/1 G 4/1 Part 1 Air service between England and Australia

A461/1 H323/1/5 Trade, Singapore Straits Settlement

A461/1 B349/3/4 Migration, Philippine Islands

A461/1 C305/1/5 Horses for Netherlands East Indies

A461/1 W 323/1/7 Trade Representative, Netherlands East Indies Appointment

A461/1 V 323/1/7 Australian Commercial Representation, NEI - General

A457/1 E 116/3 External Affairs, Singapore Exhibition March/ April 1922 Looking North Bibliography 179

A457/1 N 300/16 Commodities, timber for Singapore Naval Base

A457/1 Q306/3 Trade - Representation in the East: Unofficial Correspondence with Mr Sheaf

A1963/ 316/B/1 Philippine Islands 77/1

A597 /1 24A/1929 Export of Beef Dripping to Singapore

A601/1 666/4/5 British Trade Fair, Singapore 30th April-8th May 1937

A2910/1 410/1/92 Slaughtering of Australian Cattle in Singapore

A5954/1 Box 786 Australian Defence Policy to 1938

A816/1 19/305/58 Netherlands East Indies, Defence Committee Secret File - International Relations Series (Prewar) Sept 1939

A816/1 19/305/63 Netherlands East Indies, Defence

A816/1 6/301/247 Thailand

A458/1 C 510/4 Trade - Netherlands East Indies

A458/1 H510/2 Trade, Sheaf E.T. - Correspondence with

A458/1 1510/2 Representation Abroad E.T Sheaf Reports

A5954/1 786/3 A Study in British Commonwealth Co- operation/Part 9 - The deferment of the Singapore Naval Base forces Australia to strenghten its local defence, Chapter 62-64

A458/1 B 510/4 Trade/NEI Policy File Looking North Bibliography 180

A4311/1 164/5 Institute of Pacific Relations Honolulu Session

A6006/1 1933/12/31 40 hour week

CP703/2/1 24/B8368

CP703/1/1 24/672

Australian National Library

MS423 Sir F. W. Eggleston Papers

MS882 Edmund Leolin Piesse Papers

MS1009 Sir John Latham Papers

MS1538 William Morris Hughes Papers

MS1633 Sir Earle Page Papers

MS2198 League of Nations Papers

MS2611 Henderson Papers

MS2629 Sir Keith Officer Papers

MS2887 Longfield Lloyd Papers

Noel Butlin Archive Centre

NllS/625 Burns Philp and Company Limited

NllS/626

Australian l'ar!iamentary Papers

1919-1939