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MOHAMAD ROEM'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND ISLAMIC <[email protected] .$ . . POLITICAL VISION (1908-1983)

1

by Hamdan Juhannis

A thesis submitted to the Institute of klamic Studies Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGU University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies McGU University May 1999 O Harndan Juhannis National Library Bibliotheque nationale of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON Kt A ON4 Ottawa ON Kt A ON4 Canada Canad

The author has granted a non- L7auteura accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, preter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format electronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts from it Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othemise de celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT

Author : Hamdan Juhannis Title of thesis : Mohamad Roem's Political Activities and Islamic Political Vision (1908-1983) Department : Institute of lslamic Studies, McGU University Degree :Master of Arts (MA.)

This thesis deals with the political activities and Islamic political vision of

Mohamad Roem (19084983), a prominent Masyurni leader and Indonesian diplomat in

the first half of the twentieth century. His life and earIy education as well as his works are discussed in order to trace the sources which inspired his vision. In his political activities,

Roem expressed his Islamic nationalism by joining and founding Islamic movements from the late Dutch colonial period through the beginning of the New Order. He had much political success, especially in the Republican period. However, he was one of many Muslim leaders who also suffered for his political involvement in the Soekarno era, he was jailed for about four years, while in the Soeharto era, he was banned born participating in political activities. He was a moderate Muslim leader who aspired to cooperate with "secular" leaders in his time for the sake of a larger cause. His

Islamic political vision had a significant impact and was a major contribution to both the

Indonesian state and the Islamic community. His moderation is reflected in his political correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid in which he argued for the need of an Islamic political party without demanding the creation of an Islamic state. Finally, Roem's political activities and Islamic political vision point to a model of activism in a religiously pluralistic country and could possibly serve as an inspiration to Muslim politicians, especially after Soeharto's fall when Islamic political parties found fertile ground for growth. Auteur: Hamdan Juhannis Titre: Les Activitgs politiques et la vision islamique de Mohamad Roem (1908-1983). Departement: hstitut des ~tudesIslamiques, Universit6 McGill. DiplGme: M&trise b Arts (M.A.)

Ce mhoire aborde les activit6s et la vision politique islamique de Mohamad Roem

(1908-1983)' leader important du Masyumi et diplomate indonksien pendant la premi5re

moiti6 du vingtisme si2cle. Sa vie privke, son education ainsi que son oeuvre seront

analysees afin de remonter aux sources qui ont inspire sa vision. A Eavers ses activites

politiques, Roem a pu exprimer son nationalisme islamique en se joignant et en fondant

divers mouvements islamiques depuis la £inde la p6riode coloniale derlandaise jusqu'au d&ut du rkgime de l'Ordre Nouveau. Il obtint beaucoup de succ~s,particuli2rement durant la pgriode r6publicaine. Cependant, iI fut un parmi tant d'autres leaders musuhans qui ont eu it souffrir de leur implication politique: pendant la pdriode Soekamo, il fut emprisom6 pendant pr5s de quatre ans et durant le regime Soeharto, il fut exclu de toute activite politique. Roem fut un leader musulman modM qui esperait collaborer avec les dirigents

"s6culiers" de son epoque pour le bbnkfice d'une cause plus importante. Sa vision politique islamique eut un impact significatif et ktune contribution majeure ti la fois pour 1'Ctat indoobien et la comrnunaute islamique. Sa modCration se reflgte dam sa correspondance politique avec Nurcholish Madjid, par laquelle il plaide pour la nkessite d'un parti politique islamique sans pour autant exiger la creation d'un Btat islamique. Enfin, les activites et la vision politique islamique de Roem indique un modele de militantisme dans un pays de pluralisme religieux pouvant servir d'inspiration aux poIiticiens musulmans, tout particulii5rement suite la chute de Soeharto alors que les partis politiques islamiques ont trouvk un terrain fertile pour se developper. NOTE ON TRANSLATERATION

For Arabic names and Islamic terms, the system of Arabic transliteration employed

by the institute of Islamic Studies McGill University will be employed. Indonesian

t ems are written according to the &am B&sa hdonesia ymg Disempmakm (EyD)

1972, but the titles of books and articles will remain as quoted. The following is the

t ransliterat ion table for Arabic alphabet :

To indicate long vowels of i j x, these are typed by placing a macron above characters: Z, G, r.

The ta' marbutah (E) is translated as "ah" rather than "a", e.g., dacwa6rather than da 'wa or madrasah rather than rnahwa.. My thanks go to a number of people without whom this thesis would never have been completed. I would Iike to express my foremost thanks to Prof. Howard M.

Federspiel, my supervisor, for his continuous guidance, and for the time he spent reading and correcting my rough drafts until this thesis took shape. Special thanks also to Prof. A.

~nerTurgay, my thesis co-supervisor, academic advisor, and Institute director, for being available any time I needed his assistance and fcr helping me form my critical faculties.

I wish to thank all the staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University for their warm welcome; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for its financial support during my two years of study; the Indonesian Ministry of Religious

Affairs for initiating my overseas study; the staff of McGill-Indonesia Project for their untiring service; and the staff of the Islamic Studies Library of McGiU University, especially Salwa Ferahian and Wayne St. Thomas for their assistance in locating libarary materials.

I am grateful to Steve Miller, Reem Meshal and Alan Guenther, for their editorial assistance; to kakak Dr. Andi Faisal Bakti for his spiritual motivation and scholarly advice; to pak Haji Fauzan Shaleh, Ph.D. cand., for being a friendly and an academically helpful roommate, and teman kelas Sukiati Sugiono for our daily academic discussions. I want to thank many other individuals whose names are impossible to list here. All sustained me intellectually during difficult times in Montreal.

No amount of thanks can properly express my special gratitude to my mother,

Sitti Madinah, who is closest to my heart -- far away in the Southern part of Sulawesi.

She wove the traditional sarong so that my brother, two sisters and I could go to school, our father having passed away during our childhood. My older sister Faridah, older brother Ilham, and younger sister Fatma all deserve my thanks for being models of patience.

Finally, completing this thesis brings to mind my grandmother's last words, "You will not see me anymore," just prior to my departure to Montreal; she had taken care of - me while my mother was working to provide for the family- She died shortly after my departure. I dedicate this work to my mother and to the memory of my father and grandmother.

vii TABLE OF CONTENTS

. Abstract,...... u.

Note on Transliteration...... v

Acknowledgement...... vi ... Table of Contents...... w

Introduction...... -1

Chapter One: A Biographical Sketch of Mohamad Roem...... 8

A. His Life and Early Education...... 8

B. His Works...... 23

Chapter Two: Mohamad Roem's Political Activities ...... 3 1

A. Roem and the W (Jong Islamiten Bond), the SIS (Studenten Islamie- . ten Studieclub), and the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia...... 3 1

B . Roem, Masyumi, and His Diplomatic Activities...... -52

C. Roem andparmusi...... 77

Chapter Thee: Mohamad Roern's Islamic Political Vision...... 89

A, An Overview of Roem's Political Vision...... 89

B. Roem's Vision of an Islamic Political Party...... 95

C. Roern's Vision of an Islamic State...... I01

Conclusion...... -1 15 The history of the Indonesian fight for independence involved various nationalists

from different backgrounds. In the historical writings on the period they are usually

divided into two large groupings; those who struggled for strictly national goals are

referred to as secular nationalists,' while those who based their position on Islam as the

spirit of their struggle are called Muslim nationalists. Both groups wanted an independent

Indonesian state free f?om Dutch control. but they employed different ends to accomplish

their goal. Within each of these large groupings there were autonomous sub-groups that

complicated the task. The Muslim nationalists themselves were divided into

traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalists, who for the most part belonged to the

NU (Nahdatul ~larna): were considered conservative because they adhered to the

teachings of the four medieval schools of law on religious matters. The term

"modernists" is applied to those who celled upon Muslims to refer directly to the Qur'iin and badfh. The organizations engaged in these modernist activities included

~uhammadi~ah,~Persatuan 1slam4 and al-Irsyad.' It seems that the ideas of the

' The secular nationalists pioneered the national movement in the early years of the twentieth century. Their movement arose out of an awareness that unity was the key to independence and that religion need not play apart. At this time, Tjipto Man_pkusumo and Wahidin Sudirrohusodo founded Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor) which was the nationalist organization against the colonialism. Also, Soekarno began to play a role, and later created the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia). For details, see M. Joenoed Poesponegoro and N. Notosusanto, Sejurah NmiomI Indonesia, vol- 5 (Jakarta: Bdai Pustaka, 1990); Bernhard Dahm, History of lndonesia in the Twentieh C'enzury (London: Praeger, 197 1).

2 There have been excellent studies of the NU both by Indonesian scholars and Western ones. See for examples: Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdatul-Ulama Party: An Inquiry into the Origin of its Electoral Success," (MA thesis, McGill University, 1960); A Farichin Chumaidy, The Jamiyyah Nahadatul 'U lama: Its Rise and Early Development (1926- 1945)," (M. A, thesis, McGill University, 1976); Sidney Jones, "TheContraction and Expansion of the 'Umat' and the Role of the Nahdatul Ulama," fnclbnesia. 38 (1984), 1-20. modernists were inspired by developments of Islamic thought in Middle East pioneered

by Iamal al-D*hal Afghs, Muhammad 'Abduh, and RasEd RidL

With respect to the nationalist struggle, there were a number of modernists who

contributed significantly toward Indonesian independence. Agus Salim, Mohamarnad

Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Mohamad Roem are recognized as playing key

roles in the formation of Indonesia as a sovereign state. Their contribution as well as the

development of the movements they led are known through a wide number of historical

books and articles on the subject, both in Indonesian and English.

The discussion of the modemist political contribution in the post-independence

era often focuses on the modemist factions within Masyurni (Majelis Syuro Muslimin

Indonesia or Counsel of Indonesian Muslim ~ssociation)! Masyumi was at one time the

only Mushpolitical party after its estabLishment in 1945, before the PSII (Partai Sarekat

Lslam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic United Party) and the NU Ieft the Masyumi respectively in 1947 and 1952. However, in discussing the contribution of Mush modernists in the post-independence era, it must be remembered that Muslim movements were not united groups, but rather factions within a general movement. Some scholars

For further information on Muharnmadiyah, see Achmad Jainuri, "The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth-Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study," (MA. thesis, McGiU University, 1992).

' For complete information on the Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel. The Persafum Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia. (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1970).

See Deliar Noer, Modernist Mush Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1973), 63-69. I

Masyumi was founded in November 1945 in Yogyakarta. It then became the only Islamic party composed of IsIamic organizations such as the NU, Muharnmadiyah, PSII, al-Xrsyad, etc. This party is thought to have had a vital role during the period of Parliamentary Democracy. Masyumi will be dealt with in depth due to the fact that Mohamad Roem began his important political career with this party. have looked beyond the movement to the importance of the individual modernist

Muslims themselves. Kahin, for example, grouped some modernist members of Masyumi

as religious socialists. The principal leaders of this group were Mohamad Natsir,

Sj-ddin Prawiranegara, Mohamad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, and Abu ani if ah.^ This

categorization is in line with the description given by Abu Hanifah himself who pointed out that leaders like Natsir, Sjafruddin and Roem were grouped in the Masyumi faction as a moderate group and were inclined politically to Sjahrir, the leader of the PSI (Partai

Sosialis Indonesia or Indonesian Socialist party).'

Although the contribution of the Muslim nationalists has been discussed in previous studies and is regarded as being significant, only limited attention has been given to the details of the Muslim nationalists' Islamic vision as compared to the attention given to their political activities. Their role has been discussed in previous writings, but writers usually limit themselves to laying out the nationalists' agenda, restricting their focus to biographical details or a compilation of the Muslim nationalists' writings and speeches. Their political activities are often emphasized, but a systematic analysis of the wider historical backgrounds is generally not given. Therefore, in the depiction of Muslim nationalists' political activities, their role in influencing events is often misinterpreted. The reason for this is that their actions are interpreted without regard to the reality of the dynamics of the political context. For example, the

' George McTurnan Kahin, Natio~lisrnand Revolution in indonesio (Ithaca: Corneli University Press, 1952), 157.

Besides the moderate group, Abu Hanifah also mentioned the more Western thinking religious Socialists such as Sukiman, Jusuf Wibisono and himself. See Abu Hanifah, Tales of Revolution (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, Education, 1972). 16 1-162. traditionalist NU activists who chose to cooperate with Soekamo's Guided ~emocracg

have been criticized for being opportunistic. The analysis of the involvement of some

Masyumi leaders in the PRRI~' (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) movement is another example

of common misinterpretation. Due to their involvement, these leaders have been accused

of being revolutionary and confrontative proponents of their ideology. The Islamic inspiration of the Masyumi Leadership as in their call for the founding of an lslamic state in the Constituent Assembly meeting of 1952 is also commonly misinterpreted. This particular instance has been used to make unwarranted generalizations regarding their motivations in other historical episodes. Although the Islamic state was an important god, the Masyumi leadership was pragmatic and usually willing to make the necessary political concessions to ensure the solidarity of the nation.

Because of such categorizations, scholars sometimes ignore the significant contribution of the Muslim nationalists concerned. Von der Mehden says, for instance, that the involvement of the Muslim traditionalists in the nationalist movement was more negative than positive in its influence." One Indonesian scholar also claimed that the

Islamic political party failed to contribute to Indonesian development in general in

Xndonesian history.12

This sort of democracy will be touched upon slightly in Chapter Two in connection with the end of Roern's political career.

" See the discussion of this movement in Chapter Two. 68-70.

I' Fred R von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: Burma Indonesia, the Plzilipines (Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1968). 138 and 202.

lZ See Chapter Three below, 104. Such judgements need to be reassessed. The purpose of this thesis is, in part, an

effort to do that. It will concentrate on Mohamad Roem whose contribution in the founding of Indonesia as a sovereign country should not be ignored, because of his crucial diplomatic activities in that effort. Although, he is often seen as one of

Indonesia's most prominent diplomats in the early years of the Republic, this recognition has often been separated from his position as a Muslim nationalist and an activist in

Islamic movements. In. this study, an assessment of his political activities will be undertaken and juxtaposed against his personal vision. This should allow the reader to come to an appreciation of all aspects of his Life and political activities and provide a broader perspective than the studies that present only one aspect of his life.

Mohamad Roem was an Indonesian nationalist who participated in several periods of history-- late Dutch, Japanese, Old Order, and New Order. He was a national hero during the revolution and always was a Muslim nationalist. A discussion of the relevance of his Islamic poIiticd vision in relation to his national contribution will form the core of this thesis. The interesting aspect of Roem's legacy is that, despite his position as an

Islamic leader of the past, his Islamic political ideals have found a following in the contemporary era among newly emerging Muslim intellectuals.

Although there have been previous works on Roem, they mostly emphasized

Roem's diplomatic contribution to the Indonesian struggle for kdepecdence. For some books published about Roem, whether a compilation of Roem's writings or a biography, the editors chose titles that immediately referred the readers to his diplomatic career." In a work written by Suratmin, the information given is restricted to his political biography

l3 See Soernarso Soemarsono, et al., eds.. Muhumad Roem 70: Pejuang Perunding (lakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1978), Mohamad Roem,Diplomasi: Ujung Tornbak Perjuangan RI (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989).

5 and supplemented with other accounts that had been written before.14 Even Muslim

writers have been selective. Deliar Noer's account discusses Roem but only his general

contribution to Indonesian history as an activist of ~as~umi.'~A similar treatment is

given by Saidi when he discusses the emergence of the Islamic youth movement within

which Roem was active? Western scholars continue this pattern where Roem usually is

only discussed with respect to Indonesia's diplomatic struggle or when they refer to

points in Indonesia's 'political history when Masyumi cannot be ignored In one

encyclopedic work on Islam in Indonesia, Roern's name is not found among other

prominent Masyumi leaders.I7 Such a treatment indicates the tendency to separate Roem

from his roots within the Islamic movement.

The objective of this study is, therefore, to analyze Roem as a contributor to

Indonesian nationalism and as an activist of the Islamic movement. Since Roem's character made him a stronger activist than thinker, his political activities are the major concentration of this work.'* In this study, his political activities are related to his political opinions in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of his Iskunic political vision. This thesis is an historical analysis, showing how Roem is different fiom other nationalists of his time, especiaily the Muslim nationalists with whom he is often grouped. A comparison with other leaders of the time is used to show the significance of

I4 See Suratmin, Mr. Mohamad Roem: Karya ahPengabdiamp (Jakarta: Depdikbud, 1986).

l5 See Deliar Noer, Parfai Islam di Pentas Nasional1945-1965 (Jakarta: GrafitiperS, 1987).

l6 See Ridwan Saidi, Cendikiman ishdi hunBe&mh: Study Pergerh InfefIektuaI JIB dm SIS ('25- '42) (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1990).

17 See Kafkwi Ridwan et al., eds., Em'kiopedi Ldam (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Barn van Hoeve, 1993)-

l8 See the discussion of his political character in Chapter Three below, 95-96. Roem's activism and his Islamic political vision, and place him in political context-

Through this investigation, the activities of other Muslim nationalists in both pre- and post-independence periods is also reviewed

In the history of the Islamic political discourse, Roem is often regarded as a moderate Mush scholar who was not representative of any mass Islamic organization, even when he was on the main board of Masyumi. This is also true for the early days of the New Order, when he had an opportunity to speak and act on behaif of Islam in general rather than for specific factions. This study helps to define his relationship to specific organizations, even while he was a committed part of the entire Islamic movement.

This thesis consists of three chapters in addition to this introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter gives a biographical sketch of Roem, con4Caining his early life, his career and works. The second chapter offers an account of his political activities by tracing his involvement in nationalist activities from the pre-independence era until the beginning of the New Order em The third chapter discusses his Islamic political vision, investigating his ideas on an Islamic political party' and his interaction with the young intellectuais of the New Order regarding the concept of an Islamic state.

The primary sources used for this study are Roern's own writings, speeches, and reports. Reference is made to other writings that touch on Roem's ideas, especially writings regarding Islam and politics in contemporary Indonesia, so as to obtain a comprehensive understanding of Roem's political vision. CHAPTER ONE

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MOHAMAD ROEM

A. His Life and EarIy Education Mohamad Roem was born in Parakan (Kedu, CentraI Java) on May 16, 1908. The

year of his birth was the same as that of Mohammad ats sir' who later became Roem's

colleague in the Indonesian fight for independence, and in the operation of Mas-. At

the time Roem was born, Indonesians were beginning to give shape to a modem

nationalist movement, particularly in the field of socio-educational reform. Before 1900,

as Deliar Noer has indicated, the system of Muslim education was comprised of the

pesantren: surau,' langgar4 and mosque, i.e., the heart of the traditional system. The

material that was taught dealt exclusively with religious rituals, and little thought was

given to an organized movement challenging the colonizers, despite the traditionalists'

claim that the Dutch or the West in general were infidel^.^ An attitude of opposition to

the Dutch coloniaiists had emerged, but it had no organizational structure in the form of

'~uhammadNatsir was born on July 17, 1908 in West Sumatra. This means that he was only two months younger than Roem. In the course of his career, Natsir became the most prominent Indonesian Muslim scholar and politician. When Roem and Natsir both reached the age of 70, a committee was formed to recognize these two prominent figures. For more information, see Badruzzaman Busyairi. Pesan dan Kesan: Pertemuan Silarurrahmi Moharnmad NarsirMohammad Roem 70 Tahun (Jakarta: Fajar Shadiq, 1978); Soemarsono, Moharnad Roem-70Tahun: Pejuang dan Perunding.

' The pesantren is a traditional Islamic boarding school. This kind of school concentrates on religious teachings and has different methods of instruction, curriculum, and administration from modem schools (madrmahs and general schools). It is usualiy headed by a charismatic IsIamic teacher and leader under whom the students can Iearn various aspects of IsIamic teachings, See Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, dmSekolah: Pendidikan Islam cialam Kurun Modern (Jakarta: LP3ES, 198 6).

' The surau is a small prayer house where religious and Qur'Mc reading lessons are given. 'The langgar is a small and simple mosque. but it is only used by a small community group. not a large congregation, such as the one at Friday prayer. political movements. Nevertheless, Indonesians came to believe that they would not be

free of Dutch control, or what they regarded as Christian incursions, if they remained

attached to traditional ways of interpreting Islam. Consequently, many began working to

introduce reform at all levels of society f?om socio-educationaI institutions to socio-

political movements. While the rise and development of the modernist movement is

beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is important to understand that by the time

Roem was born, the idea of reform had already been introduced. And it was this

phenomenon that exposed Roem to reformist ideas that, in tum,influenced his religious

and nationalist activities.

Roem was the fifth and last son to be born in his family. His four older brothers bore the names of the f~stfour caliphs of 1s1am.~His own name was taken from the sGah

(chapter) of the Qur'k entitled al-R& -Roem in the Indonesian spelling of the time.

The fact that this same s&ah contains a revelation to the Prophet Muhammad explaining the future of the Roman empire carrying a political inteqretation, makes Roem a very appropriate name in view of his political career and his contribution to the formation of the Indonesian state.'

Judging by the names they chose for their children, Roem's parents must have had a deep interest in the Islamic tradition, However, we know that their Islamic befiefs were

------Deliar Noer, ''The Rise and Development of Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942); (Ph..D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963), 57.

His eldest sister was Mut'ah, his eldest brother Abu Bakar, his second oldest Umar, his third oldest Usman, and his fourth oldest Ali. Roem himself was the filth child. His younger sister was Siti Chadijah. It should be noted that giving a child an Islamic name in Javanese society can be used as one factor by which to judge the interest of a family in Islam, since nominal Muslims tend to name their children using- Javanese names.

'Soemarsono, Mohammmad Roem 70 Tahun: Pejuang Perunding, 1. to some extent mixed with animistic elements, including seeing life in inanimate objects,

worshipping ancestors and spirits.8 This animism was a legacy of the pre-Islamic times

and had been sync~etizedwith other beliefs such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and local

tradition or adat- In Roem's family, it was mostly his grandmother who introduced him to

these syncretized beliefsSgThis animistic tradition was common enough among Javanese

Muslim families, and Roem's family was Javanese. But there were so many factors at work in Roern's case that is difficult to say whether his relatives were sanh-i (devout

Muslim) or abangan (nominal Muslim).

Muchtarom writes that santri are those who are pious and who embrace Islam seriously, practicing in fill the Islamic precepts as they how them, and keeping their beliefs free of local idolatry. The abangan, on the other hand, are people who have very little concern with the precepts of Islam and are less strict in fidfilling religious teachings.

They are instead much influenced by the pre-Islamic Javanese Based on this

Roem says that one day when he fell ill, his grandmother called in a number of &kunv (traditional healers), but it seems his illness did not show any improvement, His grandmother then gave him some water, performed some magic, mixed the water with paper inscribed with Arabic charms. In order to prevent Roem fiom falIing ill again, his grandmother told him to wear Jimat (a written formula considered to contain a blessing or magical properties). Suratmin, Mr. Mohamad Roem: Kqa &I Pengabdimnya, 6-7. For a good definition ofjimat, see Howard M. Federspiel, A Dictionary of Indonesian IsIm (Ohio: Ohio State University, Center for International Studies. 1995), 1 16. Based on this information, it is clear that some of his grandmother's practices were influenced by pre-Islamic teachings, - specifically by animism- practices that were not recognized in Islamic teachings.

'~~eakin~about his childhood, Roem explained how his grandmother dominated the everyday family life- At each meal, for example, it was his grandmother who distributed the food to Roem and his brothers. In addition, Roem's family was an extended one, so that he Lived with his parents, brothers and sisters and with his grandmother.

10 Muchtarom's categorization of the religious tendencies in Javanese society into santrf and abangan may be a reaction to the early categorization of Javanese society proposed by Clifford Geertz, who differentiated them into pri-, untn*and abungan. To Geertt, abangm represented the animistic aspects of overall Javanese syncretism, and was broadly related to the peasant elements in the population; sanfri on the other hand, represented the Islamic aspects of syncretism and was generally related to the trading elements; and priyayi on the other hand, stressed the Hindu aspects and was related to the bureaucratic eiements. See Clifford Geertz, fie Religion of Java (London: McMillan Limited 1%0), 6. On the other hand, Muchtarom suggests that the division made by Geertz is cofising and misleading, since it categorization by Muchtarom, it cannot be said that Roem came from sanfiz family since

certain members of his farnily, most notably his grandmother, still followed animistic

practices.11Further, if the definition of santri includes a formal Islamic education such as

in a pesarztren, Roem's family again did not quai@' since no fdymember had yet

benefited from such schooling.

It is difficult, however, to make a clear-cut categorization. Muchtarom regards the

term santrz as the antithesis of abangan, not simply as its counterpart; thus in this view if

a person is not santri, he or she must be abmgm But Roem's family cannot be said to

be abangan either, since they fulfilled the obligatory duties of Muslims such as five-time

daily prayers and fasting.'2 The devotion of Roem's family to Islam is observable also in

how Roem and his brothers and sisters had been given Islamic names. It was said that

during childhood, Roem learned Islamic teachings and the Qur'ih through the surau

- -- is not based on consistent criteria. He is confising two divisions of a different order, mixing up what Muchtarom calls horizontal and vertical divisions, According to Muchtarom, the terms mrri and abangan are used to classify with reference to religious behavior. or the vertical dimension. While the term priyqi is much more related to the social strata of the Javanese society, or the horitontal dimension, placed with other strata such as &a (nobel people), xmabgar (merchants)and wong ciiik (little people). Since santri and abmgan are indicated by religious behavior, these can come from any stratum of Javanese society, including p~ytzyi,santri priyayi, or abangm priyyi. Zaini Muchtarom, "Santri and Abangan in Java," (M.A thesis, McGill University, 1975), 12-14. The debates over Geertz' ideas of santri, priyuyi, and abangan, can be seen in Robert B. Cruikshdq "Abangan, Santri, and Prijaji: A Critique," JmmI of Southeast Asim History, vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1972): 38-43. In addition, Muchtaram's description of Javanese tradition seems to agree with Roem's description of his childhood in Javanese tradition. He classified Javanese social structure as wong Jowo (Javanese peasants) and prjuyi. However, Roem added that the pQayi were generally not known to perform the five time prayers. Mohamad Roem, "Rmitu Anak Orang Muharnmadiyah" in Mohamad Roem, Dipiomasi: Wung Tombak Perjuangan RI (Jakarta: Gramedia), 109- 113 -

Roem's grandmother usually indoctrinated her grandchildren by the use of tdhqyuL For example, to prevent her grandchildren fiom leaving the house at night, she said that the night time was crowded with the devils and monsters that can make humans ill. She dso forbade her grandchildren &om eating the heart of a cow, in the belief that it was not good for little children to eat it. See Soemarsono, MohadRmm 70 Tahun, 8.

l2 Suratmin, MU Mohcmrad Roem: Kqudon .Pengobdiamya, 11. method13 This explains in part the uniqueness of Roem in that even though his family

was not strictly religious, unlike the families of other prominent Indonesian Muslim

modernists, it was not difficult for him to develop into a Muslim modernist based on his

educational experiences. The religious background of Roem' s family is revealing because one aspect of Roem's later mission was the purification of Islamic teachings from any animistic beliefs. One possible reason for this was his tendency since childhood to try discover logical alternatives to the animistic doctrines taught by his l4

Roem's father was a Iwah (village head), and his mother also came from a Iwah family. Koentjaranginrat writes that the social stratification of the old Javanese can be classified into four levels; i.e. the ndara (nobility), the priyuyi (bureaucrat), the wong dagung or sudngar (traders), and the wong cilik (We people). ls Based on these divisions of the early Javanese society, Roem' s family with his father as a Id,may be categorized as priyuyi (bureaucrat) since members of this class largely served in the government bureaucracy and were often academically trained intellectuals. During the

Dutch colonial period, the priyayi held important positions since they participated in the running of the Dutch administration. The Dutch preserved the rigid exclusiveness of this

l3 The surm method does not have any formal -durn. Qm'inic recitation was the main subject of study. Students brought their individual copies of the Qur'Gn to their teacher who then recited the text while the students followed until they could pronounce the verses correctly.

14 Roem stated how one day, while travelling with his father to a city, he asked his father about his grandmother's superstitions. He asked why he needed to wear jimat, for instance. His father said that old people believed that it could prevent people fiom becoming ill and that it was an animistic belief_ Roem then asked why he shouldn't eat the heart of a cow. His Mersaid, laughing, that it was the best part and that children are denied it in order that older persons could have it. Roem then asked why his father kept silent when his grandmother did something irrational- His father replied it was only to show respect to parents. Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem, Pejuang Pemnding, 8-9.

IS RU Koentjaraningrat, as cited in Muchtarom, "Santri and Abangan in Iava,"12. For more information about old Javanese society, see ibid-, 13-15. See also D-H. Burger, Strucncral Changes in Javanese Society: fie Supra-Village Sphere, trans- Leslie H. Palmier (Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project group by restricting admission to training schools to children of administrative officials.

Hence, only applicants who could prove kinship with a member of the administrative

service could enjoy that privilege. I6 By this means, Roern's family had an opportunity to

gain access to the Dutch school system, commonly called Western schools.

Roem succeeded in gaining admission to the HIS (Hollandsche Inlandsche

School), a Dutch language elementary school in Ternanggung (Central Java) in 1917, a

prestigious schooI for young villagers at that time." While still in his third year of

studies, his family moved him from that area due to an outbreak of a contagious disease:

he followed his eldest sister to Pekalongan, where he completed his Idandsche School

requirements. Having completed his primary schooling, Roem then continued on to

STOVLA (School ter Opleiding Voor Indiesche Arts), a preparatory medical school for

indigenous residents, in 1927.18 After finishing his fust session at that school the same

year, he moved on to the AMS (Algernene Middelbare School), a general high school.

Having graduated from the AMS in 1930, he went on to GHS (Geneskundige Hoge

School), a medical institute in Jakarta.

From his own account, Roem stayed in this latter school for only two years,

having failed the exams there It seems that Roem's failure at the medical

Cornell University, 1956), L2; R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd, 1960). 15-16.

'' Muchtamm, "Santri and Abangan," 13.

" Soemarsono, Mohamad Roern 70 tahun, 2.

l8 Even though STOVIA was a medical school and controlled by the Dutch, many such as Sukiman Wyosandjojo who later Ied the Muslim resistance to coloniaIism received their education here. He once led what was formerly the largest Muslim party, Masyurni. Arnir Hamzah Wiryosukarto, Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim patriot Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjoja (1898-1974) (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984). - a Soemarsono, Moharnad Roem 70 Tahun, 5. Institute was due to his involvement in the organizations that he joined But from this stage, he began to shape his career as a nationalist, in which capacity he would play a key role in Indonesia's diplomatic struggle for freedom He interrupted his formal education for a time, and began to participate in the political life of his day, joining the PSII (Partai

Serikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic United Party), which was a very influential

Islamic political party in the Dutch colonial era. As of 1929, he had also become active in the JIB (long ~slamietenBond or United Islamic Youth) which was established in 1925 and became an important Islamic youth movement. When the JIB congress was held in

Jakarta in 1930, Mohamad Roem was elected as the chairman of the committee, his first experience in the public limelight. (His involvement in the JIB and the PSSI will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Two,) In 1932, Roem went back to complete his fonnal education, and entered the RHS (IXechts Hoge School), a law school. He completed this course of study in 1937, earning a MR degree (Meester in de Rechten), a title he always affixed to his name (i.e. MR. Mohamad Roem).

Roem's religious education was obtained during his HIS period at Pekalongan under the instruction of a Muhammadiyah activist of the Pekalongan branch. His brother-in-law, ~anuwihardjo?' who chose to become an activist of Muhammadiyah, contributed to Roem's understanding of the Islamic movement Muhammadiyah itself is a modernist Muslim organization, established by ICH- Ahmad Dahlan in 1912, aimed at rejuvenating Islam, enabling it to adopt Western science and learning, while trying to purify it from any doctrinal deviation and within Islam itself to heighten the awareness of

2buwihardjo was basically a secretary of the Sarekat Islam in PekaIongan. But at that time the relationship between Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah was very close, allowing them to work together in movement. Ranuwiharjo pioneered the founding of Muhammadiyah school using part of his house. He its adherent^.^' Ranuwihardjo established an biamic institution in Pekalongan where

Roem and other school children learned modem Islamic ideas. Roem attended the Islamic

recitations where he couId study from a modernist like Sutan ~ansur?This seems to

have been the first intensive religious education that Roem received and his first contact

with modem Islamic ideas. In this stage, Roem describes how difficult it was to

overcome the obstacles encountered in putting into practice modem Islamic ideas which

society was not ready to accept. He notes that at that time, he was told by people around

him not to follow the pattern of teaching Islamic lessons introduced by the scho01.'~

It was Haji Agus ~alim~~who exercised the greatest influence upon him in religious as well as political matters. As Roem himself once said, his relationship with

Agus Salim was less a political than a personal one, extending even to his family. Roem's first meeting with Agus SaLim took place in 1925 when he began his activities in the JIB, during which time Agus Salim was an advisor to the group. Their encounter was at the

- -- -- . married Roem's elder sister, Mut'ah. See Mohamad Roem, 'Xoern itu anak Muhammadiyah," in Roem Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RT, 116.

2' On this organization, see Alfian, Muhammcrdiyah:The Political Behavior of a Mzsiim Modernirr Organization under the Dutch Colonklis4n (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989); Chapter Four and Five of Alwi Shihab, 'The Muhammadiyah movement and its controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1995). 138-267; Jainuri, "The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth-Century Indonesia: A Socio-ReIigious Study."

a Sutan Mansur was a leader of Muhammadiyah Pekalongan.

The people of the village refused the new way of studying Islam, believing that the interpretation of Qur'iinic verses was destroying religion. The use a of local language in the Jum'at congregation speech went against the religion. This unhappy situation made Roem and his family move to another village. However, they continued Eo manage the Muhammadiyah Institution they had built earlier. See Roem, "Roem itu Anak Muhammadiyah," 117-1 18.

24 Haji Agus Salim was a prominent Muslim intellectual and nationalist in the early twentieth century. For more information on Agus Salim, see Erni Haryanti Kahfi, '?slam and Indonesian Nationidism; The Political Thought of Haj i Agus Salim," Studia Islamica, vol. 4 no. 3 (1997): 6-57. For his biography see Kafrawi Ridwan, et al., eds., "Agus Salim," Ensiklopedi Islam, vol. 1 (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, I993), 67-69. initiative of his colleagues Kasman and Soepamo, both of whom already hew Agus

Salim and wanted to ask Agus Salim to give Islamic lessons to the JIB members. Roem

already knew who Salim was, and was familiar with the wide range of his Islamic and

political ideas. In their initial meeting Roem was amazed at Salim's personality, and

admired his simple way of life, low public profile, and intellectual ability. 2S

At that meeting with JIB activists, Agus Salk agreed to give a course on IsIam.

The Islamic lessons were taught intensively during the whole of the first year, while the teaching in subsequent years was less intensive due to the responsibilities of Agus Salim as the leader of the PSII, which included having to travel throughout the countryside on behalf of his organization. Roem attended the class and apparently learned much. Since their relationship was personal, he learned fkom Salim not only in the classroom, but also from their daily conversations with one another and from the way Salim educated his children. Roem's relationship with Salim's family continued even after Salim' s death. In short, his close relationship with Salim allowed Roem to adopt his perspectives of the role of Islam in education and politics. St. Rais Alamsjah writes that many people in his time thought that Roem was the son or the son-in-law of Agus SaLim because of their close relationship." Professor Schermerhom, a former Dutch diplomat during the

Indonesian revolution, describes in his diary Roem's closeness to Agus Salim by referring to Roem as a c'foundling"of Agus ~alirn.~'This term was intended symbolically by Schemerhorn who observed that Agus Sahn appeared to shape Roem's worldview.

Mohamad Roem, ''Haji Agus Salim." in Panitia Peringatan Buku Haji Agus Salim Seratus Tahun, Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim (Jakarta: Pustalca Sinar Harapan, 1996). 174- 177.

26 St. Rais Alamsjah. 10 Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang (Djakarta: Bintang Mas, 1952). 51.

" Soernarsono, Mohamad Roern 70 Tahun, 117. Roem's relationship with Agus Salim will. be fuaher addressed in Chapter Two, in the

context of his political activities, particularly in the JIB and PSII - in the former Agus

Salirn worked as an advisor, while in the Iatter as an organizational Ieader.

One aspect that may not be ignored in the success of Roem's nationalist activities

was the support of his family, especially his wife, Markisah Dahliah. Roem and Dahliah

first met at a JIB event, the congress of the JIB'S scout movement called Natipij (National

Indonesische Padvinderij) of which both were members, and which Roem later ledS2'

Many of Roem's achievements as a nationalist can be related directly to his wife's own

career as an activist. Alamsjah, for instance, describes DahIiah's commitment to Roem's

nationalist activities and how she helped him provide for their family's daily needs early

in their marriage. Dahliah established a kindergarten which, although drawing little

salary, dowed her to actualize her nationalist aspirations by educating the next generation.29 She continued to support Roem's nationalist activities under the Dutch colonial regime, the Japanese occupation, the struggle for independence, and in Roem's political setbacks under both Soekarno and Soeharto. She remained at his side until the day he died. .

Significantly, although Roem was formally educated in the Dutch school system he never became a Dutch official, even though by degree and education he might have done so. Inadvertently, Roem thwarted efforts of the Dutch to educate only a few selected

Indonesians and to integrate them into their colonial operation. During the Japmese occupation from 1942 Zo 1945, Roem also successfully avoided cooperating with the

Roem's involvement io Natipij will be further discussed in Chapter Two.

" St. Rais AIamsjah, 10 Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang, 50. Japanese by working as a lawyer in private practice. It was only after independence was

declared that he entered government service on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.

The revolutionary period came immediately after the Japanese surrender to the

AUied forces, of which the Dutch forces were a part. Indonesian leaders used the

occasion of the Japanese surrender to proclaim independence, known as the "1945

Independence roc lama ti on."^^ In the year after the proclamation, the government set up

KNlP (Komite National Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National Committee), which worked as a legislative body? Initially, Roem was appointed chairman of the local KNI, Jakarta. Most KNIs were appointed rather than eIected because no real institutions existed for holding elections. The KNIE' had a working committee, which did much of the selecting of local KNI leaders. Since this working committee was chaired by

Sjahrir, an anti-Japanese collaborationist, it was assumed that Roern's appointment was based on his record of non-collaboration with the Japanese. However, Roem was shot in his home soon after returning from a meeting of the KNI which led to political inactivity for half a year and caused him to limp for the rest of his life.32

The key role that Roem was to play began with the proclamation of independence in 1945. The Dutch did not acknowledge Indonesian independence and still regarded the country as part of the Netherlands Union. But the return of the Dutch was met with fierce resistance by the new Indonesian government, by the infant army it had formed and even by Indonesian people. The fiercest battle to maintain Indonesia's independence broke out

'O On the process of surrounding the Indonesian proclamation of independence and the difficult times faced by Indonesian leaders at the time, see Moharnad Roem, Pentjklikun, Proklamasi dan Penifaian Sejarah (Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970).

3' On the formation of KNIP, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolurion in Indonesia, 152-154. in Surabaya, East Java on November 10, 1945 - now celebrated as a national holiday and

day of c~mmemoration.~~The United Nations sought to intervene in the conflict between

Indonesia and Netherlands favoring a resolution of the conflict through diplomatic

means. From this moment, Roem, a talented diplomat, began to play an important role.

Roem was involved in nearly every diplomatic negotiation that the government

undertook. First, he was a member of the Sjahrir delegation to ~in~~arjati~~in 1948 that

attempted to end the military confkontation. In 1949, Roem served as chairman of the

Indonesian delegation holding tab with the Dutch in Jakarta, which resulted in the

"Roem-Royen Statement'' named for him and his Dutch counterpart. This statement not

only elevated Roem's reputation as a dipIornat, but also paved the way for the eventual

acknowledgement of Indonesian sovereignty. Next came the Round Table Conference, a

follow-up to the Roem-Royen Statement, held in The Hague in 1949. Mohammad Hatta

(Vice-president of Indonesia) chaired the Indonesian delegation to this conference, while

Roem acted as vice-chairman. (Roem's diplomatic activities will however be further

discussed in Chapter Two).

Roem was appointed to several ministerial portfolios in different cabinets under

Parliamentary ~emocrac~.~~In 1946, he was chosen to serve as Minister of the Interior in

the Sjahrir cabinet, a post he held also in the Amir Syarifuddin cabinet (1948). I.the

32 On this accident see, Seornarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 50-52.

'' See M.C.Ricklefs, A Hirtory of Modem Indonesia since c- 1300.2 17. " Linggarjati is the name of a locale in West Jakarta where the negotiators met. '' The Parliamentary Democracy regime was also called Constitutional Democracy lasting from post-independence until the emergence of Guided Democracy under Soekamo. For a detailed analysis of this form of democracy, see Herbet Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (New - York, Cornell University Press, 2962). Hatta cabinet (1949), he was appointed as Minister of state, a post he left following his

appointment as High Commissioner to the Netherlands. Later, he became Minister of

Foreign affairs in the Natsir cabinet (1950). Again in the Wilopo cabinet (1952), he was

nominated as Minister of Home Affirs, while in the Ali Sastromidjojo cabinet (1956), he

served as Vice-Prime Minister. Roem, together with Mangunsarkoro, was once offered

the chance by president Soekarno to form a government after the demise of the Wilopo

cabinet, but this effort was unsuccessful due to internal conflicts among the parties

Another important aspect of Roem's political career was his involvement in the

Muslim political party named Masyumi. Although Roem never became the general

chairman of this party, his influence among its members of this party was certainly

important, probably equivalent to that of other prominent leaders such as Natsir,

Sjafruddin, Sukiman, and Prawoto.

From 1953 to1956 Roem was associated briefly with educationat activities as a

rector of North Sumatra blamic University. This was a senior administrative position and

an attempt to use his talent appropriately since his role as a Masyumi politician was no

Ionger possible and because academic rectors were in short supply. During the same

period he traveled to the United States and other countries to promote knowledge of Asia.

His steadfast opposition to colonialism led him also to attend the conference against

colonialism held in New Delhi in 1959 when he no longer sat in the formal government.

36 The cabinet formed during the Parliamentary Democracy phase comprised members of differenr parties, including Masyumi (largest Islamic party), the NU (a former faction of Masyumi that became an independent political party), the PM (Indonesian National Parry) founded by Soekarno, PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party ) and other srndler parties. For more information about the parties' roles in each cabinet see Deliar Noer, Parrai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Ternprint, 1987); R. William Liddle, 'The Indonesian Party System 1950-1964," in Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration (New Haven: Yale -_ University Press, 1970), 67-98. With Soekamo's establishment of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy)

folIowing the disbanding of Masyumi in 1960, Roem became inactive politically. As a

Masyumi activist, he was even jailed for a time along with other Masyumi leaders by the

Soekarno regime. Soekarno saw the Masyumi activists as disloyal and an obstacle to his

goal of implementing Guided Democracy. Like the others, Roem was not even given a

trial, being held on suspicion of plotting to assassinate Soekarno during a visit to South

~ulawesi."

After the fall of Soekarno and the emergence of the New 0rdeP8 in 1966, Roem

and other political prisoners were released. Roem's attempts to reenter poLitica1 life,

however, were checked at every turn by Soeharto's government because New Order

leaders saw the Masyumi leadership as untrustworthy and as contributing to the earlier

failure of parliamentary government. For instance, when Parmusi (Partai Muslimin

Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim party), a new Islamic political party established in the

New Order era, held a congress in Malang, East lava, in 1968, Roem was unanimously

elected as the general chairman, but resigned when the government found him

unacceptable because of Masyumi connection.

Although Roem never again became formally active in politics, he engaged in

other activities where his abilities and experience were important, such as serving as an

executive member of the Mu'tamar al-%;lam al-Isl- (Islamic World Congress) in

37 Agus Edi Santoso, ed., Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid and Muhamad Roem (Jakarta: Djarnbatan, 1997). 1 11.

The New Order is an era of government under Soeharto ranging from 1966 to 1998, marked by the demise of Soekarno era, which was then identified as an old era. The fall of Soeharto in May I998 aiso marked the fall of the New Order and was associated with the emergence of the reformation era. -I. -I. 1975. He participated in other international religious conferences, such as the 1971

International Conference on Bangladesh in New Delhi, and the 1977 Conference of

Religion for Peace in Singapore. Roem used this respite fiom politics to write books and

some articles in the mass media. Natsir once said "One of Roem's [greatest] skills which

is just now being realized by society was his writing. His writing was precise, simple and

condensed. Everybody was eager to read what he wrote in books, newspapers or

magazines."39 Alongside this, Roem continued to be active in the legal profession.

Aisyah Amini, Roem's legal office associate, states that "despite Roem's previous

promioent position in Indonesian politics, such as being a Vice-Prime Minister between

19564957, he always put himself equal with his staff, including myself as a junior

lawyer."" In terms of Roem's personality and political achievement, Kahin states:

Never at the top of the pyramid of power, he was heavily relied upon by some who were, and during the course of the revolution he emerged as his country's ablest diplomat. He was one of the leaders of the revolution whom I respected most, and our friendship began with our first meeting in Yogyakarta in 1948. Intrinsically Roem was modest man, known for his openness, absolute honesty, gentleness of manner, and thoughtEd regard for others. Many were struck by how genuinely concerned he was to understand the views of those with whom he interacted, whatever their religion-- whether in his home or at the negotiating table. But there was also a formidable inner iron to his character that derived fiom his strong and unflagging adherence to principle.41

Nurcholish Madjid says:

Roem was a person who could detect the modern problems of a nation. He was uninterested in the sloganeering practices that were used to unite the masses, a favorite tactic of Soekamo, who promised utopia in the under-developed society. A man like Roem was not interesting to the people, but he represented an unseen

" Mohamad Natsir, "Insya Allah Roem Tetap Roem," in Soemanono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun. 2L3.

'"Aisyah Amini: Singa Betina yang Doyan Mengaum," Gatra, 28 November, 1998. 0 George McT. Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohamad Roem (1908-1983)." Indonesia, no. 37 (April 1984): 135. foundation that supported an entire nation. It was only Iater on that people realized his inestimable contribution toward the development of the country."

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said "the important characteristic that Roem possessed was his personal integrity and his honesty, not only in social affairs but also in political matters.'43 h'bdah Khan, former Secretary General of the Islamic World Congress, said:

Roem's interest is not confined to Indonesia only. He was equally interested in worId affairs .... From my personal knowledge I can say how conscientious a member he is; he believes in team work and he does his part patiently and well; he listens to others and has a ready wit. It is a pleasure and an honor to work with such a duty-conscious, eminent, co-operative and respect worthy colleague.. . Indeed Dr. Roem is a past-master in the game of

In general, Roem was a statesmen, a prominent diplomat and a Muslim scholar who devoted his life to Indonesian independence, to the formation of a government shortly after independence and to Islamic political organization.

B. His Works

Roem was a prolific writer, and wrote hundreds of articles which were published in various magazines and newspapers." Roem left more than ten books written in

"Nurcholish Madjid, foreward to Roem, Diplomacy: Ujung Tombak PeiwgnRI, xii- xiii.

" Syafruddin Prawiranegara. "Roem, Manusia dan Kawan Ideal." in Soemarsono, Moharnad Roem 70 Tahun, 222- 223.

44 InamuUah Khan, 'Master in the Game of Politics," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 274-275.

" For further information on the articles, see Roem. Diplomasi Ujwrg Tombak Perjuangan RI. Indonesian In spite of his age and chronic health problems, he kept writing unt.1 only

sixteen days before breathing his last in Jakarta in 1983.46

Roem touched on a great many subjects in his writings: Islam in general, law, the history of the Indonesian independence struggle, politics, international affairs, and miscellaneous themes. Among the writings he produced, Indonesia's struggle before independence was his particular specialty, given that he witnessed many events directly.

He also wrote about his own involvement in negotiations with the Dutch and about the operation of Masyumi. He was a competent writer on law, because of his legal practice spanning several decades. The following is a general survey of his writings, classified according to subject.

I. lslm and Politics

Roem wrote extensively on Islam and politics, with the most important topic being the idea of an Islam-c state. Responding to a Panji ~asyarah~'article in 1982 by

Arnien ~ais,~Roem agreed that the idea of an Islamic state is not dealt with in either the

Qur'Gn or the Traditions of the Prophet- In turn his article led to a correspondence with

Nurcholish Madjid, who at that time was a student of philosophy at the University of

~hica~o.~~Roem and Madjid exchanged letters four times on this issue, a correspondence

His last writings consisted of his political correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid, compiled in Agus Edi Santoso, ed,, Ti& Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Swat Poliiik Ntncholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem.

47 Panji Mi& is one of the foremost Islamic rnagatines in Indonesia

Aden Rais is the former general chairman of the Muhammadiyah, currently the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia besides the NU. He is now the chairman of the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Trust Party), a newly established political party in the post-Soeharto era

49 Nurcholish Madjid is an Indonesian Muslim reformist of the contemporary period; for more information on his life, see Mark Woodward, 'Wurcholish Madjid," in John L. Esposito, ed., word EncycIopedia of M&m Islamic world, voL 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 255. "a which was later published in book form under the title Tidak Ada Negarn Islam: Surat- Surat Politik Nurcholish Mudjid-Mohamad Roem (There Is No Islamic State; The

PoliticaI correspondence of Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad ~oem)."

Other important articles relating to Islam and poLitics written in the 1970s were

compiled in a small book entitled: Islam Dalm Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dm

Pembangunun Indonesia (klam in Independence Struggle and Indonesian

~evelo~rnent)~'in which Roem described the contribution of Islam in early nationalist

political organization through the Sarekat Idam movement in the fmt quarter of the 20"

century. In 1982, Roem wrote further on this theme in an article entitled "Sebuah

Tinjauan Perjuangan Politik: Pasang Surut Perjangan Ummat Islam Indonesia" (A

Perspective on the Political Struggle: The Fluctuation of the Struggle of the Indonesian

Muslim ~o~~l~llunity)~~which traced the emergence of the Islamic movements and their

efforts in the late Dutch era, in the Soekarno era, and finally under the New Order. Roem

also wrote two short articles on international Muslim concerns: Trospect Dunia Islam

Abad XV Hijriyah" ( Prospects for the Islamic World in the Fifteenth Century ~ijra)"

and "Masalah Islam Yang Dihadapi Dunia" (Problems Faced by the Mush

Agus Edi San toso. ed., Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Sum PoMk Nurcholish Madjid- Mohamad Roern. " Mohamad Roem, Islam Dalarn Perdjuangan Kemerdekaan dan Pembangumn Indonesia, (Djakarta: DDII, 1972?).

'* Mohamad Roem, "Sebuah Tinjauan Pe rjuangan Politik: Pasang Sumt Pe rjangan Umat Islam Indonesia," in Roem, Dipplomasi: Ujung Tombak Petjuangan RI, 220-228.

Mohamad Roem. 'Trospek Dunia Islam Abad XV," in Roem Diplomari Crjung Tornbak Perjuangan RI, 280-283. " Mohamad Roem, "Masalah Islam Yang Dihadapi Dunia," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak - PerjuanganRI,288-292. These two articles, are based on Roem's perspectives as an executive member of

Mu'tamar al-%am al-IslirmT (World Muslim Congress). He discussed the prospects of the Islamic world in the emergence of a number of independent Muslim counbries on one hand., but also some existing problems faced by Muslims, especially in the countries where they have become a minority on the other band

2. History of Pre-Independence Indonesia

Roem produced several monographs on this topic in which he paid close attention to the historical events that led to Indonesian independence. In his short monograph Tiga

Peristiwa Bersqbrah (Three Historical ~vents):~he suggested that there were three historical events of significance which most Indonesians did not appreciate: the first

National Congress in 1916, the emergence of Pancasila in 1945 and the return to

Yogyakarta as the Indonesian capital in 1949. The anniversaries of these events are not recognized as national holidays in Indonesia and yet they were events of great national consequence. The first National Congress was held by Sarekat Islam and served to unite

Indonesians against colonialism. The adoption of Pancasila was an event that united

Indonesian perceptions on the national ideology after many months of debate. The retum to Yogyakarta resulted in the formation of the government in that city by Indonesians fighting for independence, and served as proof to the Dutch that the new state was a reality.

Roem's works on a number of other aspects of Indonesian history, mostly in the form of speeches and articles, are also available. One example is Suka Duka Benmding

55 Mohamad Roem, Tiga Peristiwa Bersejarah (Djakarta: Sinar Hudaya, 1972).

26 Dengun Beiandu (Sorrow and Happiness in Negotiating with the ~utch)?~Roem writes

from his perspective as a participant in negotiations with the Dutch, describing the

difficulties of dealing with an adversary. He states that gaining sovereignty through

diplomacy was not an easy task. The Dutch tried every means possible to prevent

independence from becoming a reality, even though Indonesia had begun to receive

international support, especiaUy in the United Nations. In the end, Indonesia was

successll when the Dutch were forced to attend the Round Table Conference that

achowledged Indonesian sovereignty.

Roem's own participation in the events surrounding the Indonesian struggle for

independence allowed him to write an important account of the proclamation of

independence. He pointed out, that it actually was preceded by the kidnapping of

Soekamo and Hatta by who insisted that the announcement be made without waiting for instructions £?om the Japanese. These youths were of the opinion that the

Japanese, having surrendered to the Allied forces, no longer had any authority; hence they could not confer legitimacy. They held that a simple proclamation would confer as much legitimacy on the act as any Japanese declaration. Soekarno made the proclamation two days later, apparently agreeing that this was the most advantageous way of doing it.

Roem also put foward the various views of other historians of this period regarding the

56 This short book was based on Mohamad Roem7s speech presented on May 31, 1975, to a gathering in the Kebangkitan Nasional building in Jakarta- Mohamad Roem Suku Duka Beding Dengan Belm& (Jakarta: Idayu Press, 1977).

This group of young people, included SM,W~kana, and Singgih went to Soekamo's home on August 15, 1945 and took Soekarno and other senior nationalists to Rengasdengklok (a village), due to Soekamo's refusal to make the proclamation of Indonesian independence at that time. This event is known in history as the "Peristiwa Rengasdengklok" (Rengasdengklok event). See Mohamad Roem, Pentjulikan, ProkZamasi ahPeniIuian Sejarah. (Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970); Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional I'ndotrtesia, vol. 6, 82- $3. issue of the proclamation as well as the strategy followed by the Indonesian government to win freedom in his work Penjulkun, Proklarnasi dun Penilaian Sedarah (Kidnap,

Proclamation and Historical ~~~raisal)?

Roem produced other historical writings in the form of articles on Indonesian revolutioaary events, including anecdotes of the struggle for independence collected in

Bunga Rompoi Don' Sejarah (Selections from This book is interesting because it is enriched with ~oem'scomments on the involvement of other Indonesian nationalists in the struggle, such as Sutan Sjahrir, Faqih Usman, and ~rawoto.~~

3. Law

In the compilation of Roern's articles entitled Diplomasi: r/img Tombak

Perjuangan RI (Diplomacy: Spearhead of the Indonesian Struggle, 1989), one finds some writings of a legal nature. Here Roem dealt with controversial issues of his day, such as human rights, capital punishment, and marital justice. As might be expected he often used

Islamic values as a source.

According to Roem, the Qur'in had already determined the basic human freedoms long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ever produced. He notes that in the Qd-iithe freedom to choose one's religion is guaranteed as an essential human right that affects other rights in human Life. In his writings he also describes how the rights of Indonesians had been oppressed since the coming of Dutch

'' Moharnad Roem, Penjdih, ProklmmaS2don PeniIaian &@zrah (Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970).

59 Mohamad Roem, Bunga Rampi ami Sejrrmh (Djakarta: BuIan Bintang, 1972).

Sutan Sjahrir was leader of the Socialist party and the first Indonesian Prime Minister, while Faqih Usman and Prawoto were Roern's colleagues in the Masyumi leadership. colonialism and how this had had a negative impact on the development of Indonesian

human rights. Fortunately, he adds, Indonesians were wise enough to include human

rights provisions in the 1945 Constitution, which resembled the declaration that had been

produced by the United ~ations.~'

In his article Tentang Huhn~atlbz (On the Law of Execution), Roem argues

against a literal interpretation of some elements of Islamic law. He suggested two

alternative punishments *forserious crimes: execution or life imprisonment. Roem states

that execution should be applied only in the most egregious of crimes, but he does not

specify which crimes. He states, however, that life imprisonment is In this

article, Roem based his views on the positive law applied in Indonesia without trying to

reconcile it with the Islamic law.

Roem's other work of a legal nature is 500 exMasjrrniP.S.I Kehilangan Hak

Di'ilih ? (500 of Former Mas yWSI10s t their Elected ~i~ht?),@which questions the

basis of the government's ban on the election of the former Masyumi and PSI leaders as

members of the House of People's Representatives in the 1971 national election. Roem

saw the inappropriateness of the policy in the light of democratic and constitutional

principles. Some of Roem's other works contain matters of a legal nature but are

classified as historical and political.

Mohamad Roem, "Hak Azasi," in Roetn, Diplomasir Ujung Tombak Pejuangan RI, 310- 32 1.

62 Moharnad Roem, "Tentang Hukuman Mati," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 295- 298.

63 Roem's idea was based on a story told by Mohamad Hatta in the course of their discussion on how to irnpIement the constitution. Hatta told of a criminal that was once brought before a judge for trial, only to coIIapse and die there due to malnutrition, - a Moharnad Roem, 500 exMasjumi/PSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih? (Surabaya: Dokumenta, 1970. 4. Reports on International Islamic Affairs

As an activist in international IsIamic organizations, Roem wrote some articles on

issues affecting Muslims throughout the world. As a pro-hlamic activist Roem criticized

the founding of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people. He expressed concern

about the problems faced by Islamic countries in recent decades: the lslamic government

in Pakistan, the independence of Bangladesh, Afghanistan's resistance to the Russsian

invasion, the Iran-Iraq war, and the struggle of South Philippine Muslims for autonomy.65

Roem published many other pieces in various newspapers, but these are more

difficult to classify as they are more general in nature and tend to be anecdotd, referring

to events during his participation in the Indonesian struggle for independence. Roem's

writing style consists of brief but pithy descriptions of these events. In his writings on

Indonesian history, he frequently criticized Soekarno, especially after the era of Guided

Democracy, even though in the early years after the Independence he showed respect for

Soekamo as a father of the independence proclamation.66 Another marked feature of his

writings is his strong dislike for the Indonesian communist movement which parallels

that of most other Islamic leaders in Indonesia, apparently because of its rejection of

religion and the deep mistrust between Communist and Muslims in 20' century

Indonesian politics.

65 These matters may be found in the artides entitled: "Kekuatan Dunia Sedang Bergeser" (The Change of World Power), 'Tengaruh Lobi Yahudi" (The Impact of the Jewish Lobby), 'Tntemensi Militer Rusia di Afghanistan" (The Russian Military Intervention in Afghanistan), "Perang Iran-In&" (The Iran- Iraq War), and "Mendalarni Hasil Konferensi Islarnabad" (Understanding the Results of the Islamabad Conference). A11 of which are included in Roem, Diplomi: Ujung Tornbakpejuangan RI, 176-204.

See the discussion of his criticism of Soekamo in Chapter Three, 94-95; Mohamad Roem, "Sukarno, Otobiografi yang Diceritakan kepada Cindy Adams (Timbangan Buku)," in Roem, Bunga Rampai Dari Sejarah, 148-162. CHAPTERTWO

MOHAMAD ROEM'S POLITICAL ACTl3lTLES

A. Roem and the JIB (Jong Islamieten Bond), the STS (Studenten Islamieten Studie-

club), and the PSI1 (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia).

Roem's nationalist activify prior to independence has significant links with his involvement in nationalist movements, principally the JIB (Jong Islamieten Bond), the

SIS (Studenten Eslamieten Studieclub), and the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia). The

JIB was the first movement that Roern joined, and it was there that he first met Agus

Saiim who later contriiuted greatly to the development of Islamic nationalist ideals. The

SIS can be seen as having emerged in reaction to the declining influence of the JIB and as a continuation of the academic anti-colonial movement in that members of the JIB were for the most part pre-college students while those of the SIS were college students proper.

The PSII, on the other hand, was the focus of Roem's fist formal political activity - one in which Agus Salirn featured prominently.

Roem's formal involvement in natiodist activities began when he took part in the .JlB. Pioneered by Samsurizal, the JTB was established in 1925 in response to existing local youth organizations which did not regard the teachings of Islam as important-

Samsurizal, a chairman of one of these youth organizations, called Jong Java, felt that

Islamic doctines among the younger generation could be utilized to promote a united national front if they were effectively disseminated. The idea, however, found few supporters since many were from Java where nominal beliefs on Islam were prevalent and because the education of the period portrayed Islamic values as opposed to modem science and ideas of progress. Roem once commented that this rejection within Jong

Java of Samsurizal's Islamic agenda was a "blessing in disguise" because the ID3 would

never have been founded otherwise. Accordingly the JIB was at first simply a vehicle for

Samsurizal's Islamic programs and made efforts to inculcate Indonesian Muslim youth

with Islamic teachings and values. The goal of the JIB itself was to spread Islamic beliefs

among young Muslims, as well as to foster their interest in Islamic doctrines, while

remaining tolerant of other faiths? These gods were especially appropriate for young

Muslims of the period, as they were meant to counter Dutch efforts to downgrade Islam

as a point of identification among the Indonesian elite.' Due to the political content of its

message, therefore, the JIB cannot be viewed exclusively as an educational organization.

It was a vehicle for the training and grooming of Muslim students, many of whom were

later to dominate Indonesian political life and thought in the years following the struggle

for independence. A nucleus of leaders, trained in the Jong blamiten Bond later came to occupy a central position in Islamic political parties.4 Apart from its Islamic goals, in its later development the W is considered to have been one of the first nationally oriented youth organizations, its membership open to alI young Muslims, without consideration for ethnic origin.

Roem writes that in the early years following the establishment of the JIB, some people questioned whether the JIB would assume a constructive role in the nationalist

See Ridwan Saidi, Cendikiawan Islam di Zam~Behndu: Study Pergerakan inteilectual JIB dan SIS ('25- '42) (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti nmu, 1990). 12- 13.

Mohamad Roem, "Sejarah Berdirinya Iong Iskamiten Bond," in Roem, Dipiomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 29.

Deliar Noer. "Jong Islamiten Bond," in Soemanono, MohruMd Roem 70 Tahun, 240.

4 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1958), 56. movement emerging among the educated young, and whether the .TIE3 could provide

adequate guidance to young Muslims, without destroying their effectiveness as future

leaders. Due to its commitment to Islam, it was feared that the JIB would be incapable of

fostering nationalist sentiments and would, instead, erase the ideals of national

independence. These questions were generally raised in good faith, but sometimes the

criticism was designed to discredit the For instance, within nationalist circles there

was a concern that the Jl3's presence would detract from the importance of the

Indonesian national struggle, since nationalism was not stressed among its objectives!

The concerns of the IIB's critics seem in retrospect to have been exaggerated, as

during each congress of the IIB the problems discussed by the participants did not merely

revolve around the problems unique to Islamic youth but also included the concept of national identity.' In his writing, Roem tries to counter the idea that the JIB lacked nationalist orientation because IIB representatives did not attend the 1928 National

Congress which produced the "Sumpah Pemuda" (the Youth Oath). Roem disputes the

5 Mohamad Roem, "The Genesis of the Islamic Youth Movement: The JIB," Mizm, voI. 2 no. 3 (1986): 27.

6 Roem writes that the aims and purposes of the JIB were as follows: 1. The study and promotion of the observation of Islam. 2. The cultivation and promotion of sympathy for Islam and its foltowers, while giving positive tolerance with regard to those who think otherwise. 3. The cultivation and promotion of contacts among intellectuals and with the people through Islam. 4 The promotion of physical and spritual development of its members through self-training (education) and self-activity. Mohamad Roem, "Jong Istamiten Bond yang Saya Alami," Panji Masymakat 348, Januafy 2982, 24-

7 See Cahyo Budi Utomo, Dimika Pergerakan Kebangsaatz itrdonesia. Dari Kebarrgkif~n Hingga Kemerdekaan (Semarang: MIP Semarang Press, 1995), 125. disputes the charge, saying that many JIB members did attend, including himself as a JIB

member of the Jakarta ranch?

At the next stage of its developmenf the SIB established two organs for

disseminating information among its members. The first of these was the magazine an-

NG (the ~ight).~The second was the Natipij (National Indonesixhe Padvinderij), an

organization that offered Kewirm (national pride) lessons to its members.'O The establishment of the latter is considered a historic milestone, it is one ofthe first instances

of the use of the name Indonesia. At the time, the Dutch did not allow public acknowledgement of this name in organizational titles, referring instead to the region as the East Indies.

It was from the educational activism of the JIB that Roem acquired his first basic understanding of Islam and nationalism. In the JIB he met the senior Muslim nationalist,

H. Agus Salim, described earlier, who, since the establishment of the organization, had been active as an advisor and instructor in Islamic teachings to its members. Hariyanti

Kahfi writes that at the time Salim had become a beacon for young lndonesians who wished to discuss the complex problems confronting Muslim society. From the first generation of Muslim intellectuals, he more than anyone else contributed to the emergence of the second generation of Muslim intellectuals. Among his students were

In this case, Roem tries to comer Abu Hanifah's statement that not only did the W not actively take part in the discussions of the Second Youth Congress, but it also took no part in the formulation of the Youth Declaration which constituted the climax of that congress. For more information, see Roem, The Genesis of an Islamic Youth Movement: JIB," 25-26.

This magazine was aim known by its Dutch title Het Licht. It was first published in 1925. See Deliar Noer, "Jong Islamiten Bond," in Soemarsono, Moharnad Roem 70 Tahun, 247.

'' Saidi, Cendikiuwan Islam Zamm BelcatcILl, 19. Mohamad Roem. Mohammad Natsir, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo and others

who were for the most part sP~dyingat the AMS at that time." As mentioned in Chapter

One, Agus Salim taught intensively in the early years of W's establishment, while

giving moral suppa to its members. Salim also transmitted his hlamic ideas to a wider

audience through the JIB journal, an-~zk'~In view of Salim's vital role in the education

of the young Muslim generation, Roern later hailed him as "the spiritual father" of young

Muslim inte~ectuals." An example of this guidance came as stated in Roern's writings in

honor of Haji Agus Salim, through SaLirn's attitude while he was an hoofdredacteur

(editor) of a Dutch-operated newspaper, Hindia Baroe. In addition to arranging daily

news items, Salim's task at this newspaper included providing a weekly religious column.

Here Salk not only commented often on Indonesian practices in contradiction to IsIamic

teachings, but also commented on actions by the Dutch that he found objectionable. The

Dutch eventually demanded that Salim retract his criticism of their authority. Rather than

doing so, Salim resigned the following day from his position. When Roem asked Agus

Salim why he resigned so hastily, without first giving the Dutch notice first and without

securing another source of income, Salim contended that his position as leader of the

newspaper was different from his leadership in the Sarekat Islam. In Hindia Baroe, he

demonstrated his commitment to the truth as he saw it regardless of what common

" Erni Hariyanti Kahfi, "Haji Agus Salim: His Role in Nationalist Movement in Indonesia During the Early Twentieth Century," (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1996), 118.

l2 Ibid., 1 18.

l3 See Ridwan Saidi, Pemudn Islam &lam Dinamiko Poiirik Bangsa (1925-1984) (Iakarta: Rajawali, 1984), 106. d opinion or party doctrine may have been.14 Thus, despite his general political moderation

and his willingness to work with the Dutch in most situations, there were important

moments of confrontation where he exercized moral courage and opposed then. Roem

was particularly impressed with Salim's simple and rather austere lifestyle, seen in

moving from one rented house to another and making no display of his position or

influence.15 Later in life Roem said of SaLim: 'What I am now is due to the teachings and

training of Haji Agus ~alim"'~

Whde a member of the JIB, Roem became involved in the Natipij which was a

boy scout organization, and even was its Ieader for a time. The Natipij was established in

March 1925, soon after the establishment of the JIB, and was designed to function as a

feeder group, bringing new recruits to the JIB. It was also to emphasize Islamic teachings

rather than Western values generally in vogue with other scout groups of the time.17 The

Natipij implemented various programs such as camping, scouting, courses and other

activities which were adjusted with Islamic attitudes. Roem and other Natipij leaders also

gave Kewiraan (materials for national pride) to the members. During one of the

congresses of the JIB when activists made speeches to the congress participants, the

Natipij was once represented by Roem. Saidi said that the involvement of Roem and

other Muslim youth in the Natipij and their stress on Kewiraan materials were crucial for

14~oharnadRoem, "Haji Agus Salim" in Panitia Buku Peringatan Haji Agus Salirn Seratus Tahun, Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, l984), 178- 179.

For more information on Sdim's economic state see ibid., 277-178.

l6 This quotation, without mentioning the resource, was cited by Solichin Sdarn, Hdji Agu Salim: Hidup dan Pejuangannja (Djakarta: Djajamurni, 1961), 171.

Syamuddin AbdulIah, et.aI., Organismi Kaum Muda Islam di Jawa Pada Masa Akhir Penjajahan Belanda, 1925-1942 (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Research and Survey Institute Agarna IsIarn, I986), 71-72. the future of Indonesian Muslim youth in that it fostered an awareness of a state that

deserved their support and loyalty. The suspicion with which the Dutch regarded the

scout organizations gives testimony to their significance. The Dutch government tried to

bring scout organizations udner the NIPV (Nationale Indische Padvinderij), an Indies-

wide organization which, naturally, de-emphasized nationalist sentiment and promoted

notions of good citizenship under the Dutch colonial authority. However, this unification

effort was unsuccessfid, since only one boy scout troop, JIPO (Jong Indonesische

Padvinders-Organisatie) actually affiliated itself with the Dutch while the other scout

troops remained independent of such direct Dutch control and were able to continue

effort toward forming a united youth nationalist front?

As Natipij leader Roem apparently had expressed his dissatisfaction with the

continued dfirliation of Natipij with the JIB, and at the congress held in Madiun (East

Java) in 193 1, Roem proposed a separation. He said that it was important for the scouts to

be independent since the JIB could no longer give priority to the concerns of students in

Natipij. But the JIB rejected Roem's suggestion and then dismissed Roem and his board

from the Natipij's leadership. In reaction, Roem and his board established another

organization based on the Muslim student community. This organization was called the

SIS (Studenten Islamieten Studieclub), a group which will be dealt with a little later.

Roem's association with the JIB was highly influential in the formation of his

Islamic and nationalist ideals. Regarding this link, Titi ~arsoetji's'~analysis in the an-

NGmagazine on the motivations for membership in the IIB gives some insight:

IS A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakun Rabat Indonesia (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1994), 122- 123.

-d Titi Marsoeji was a member of the JIB. but her background is not clearly known. Those who received education in western schools, and got religious education at home, but felt it necessary to enter the JIB to meet their religious aspirations. Those who were really consistent in their religion. Those who felt soq for other religious followers and wished to introduce hlam to them. Those who believed that hdonesian nationalism would not stand without Islam Those who wished to learn about IsIarn and politics20

Many of Marsoeji's ~Iassifications describe Roem's involvement in the JIB. His

formal education was western but it was through his involvement in the JIB that he

became aware of Islamic modernist ideas, especially those of Agus Salim. Even prior to

acquiring a formal western education, he was heady in possession of a religious culture

inherited fkom his parents. It was through involvement with the W, that Roem began to

be concerned about the fate of his young fellow Muslims, many of whom attended Dutch schools and consequently, knew nothing of their religion. Roem writes:

At school pupils were taught Dutch, German, French and English literature. When there was anything related to Islam, either now or in history as Western people saw it, they viewed Islam in a manner that would not promote understanding or appreciation. This may not be really due to any ill on the part of the Western world, but only due to their own ignorance. However, sometimes there also existed the deliberate intent to present an unfavorable image of Islam such as Islam allows men as many as four wives. In Islam, women have a very inferior position. The harem still exists in the Moslem world, as does slavery. Moslems are discouraged to have my initiative, as their destiny has been predetermined. Mohammad was an epileptic, and every time he had an attack he spoke, and people wrote down his sayings during such attacks; this is what the Moslems regard as divine revelations. Islam only repeats the Christian and Jewish teachings. As his country was poor, Mohammad told every Moslem to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in his life, so his country may have some earnings. This was taught at school, kom the HIS up to the university- level colleges. And it was not surprising therefore, that educated people were to some degree, affected by these allegations.21

zo Deliiu Noer, "Jong islamiten Bond," in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 T'hrm, 247.

21 Roem, 'The Genesis of an Islamic Youth Movement," 20-21. Roem then describes the contribution of the JIB in countering the above problem:

The JIB courses and articles gradually succeeded in eliminating these feelings of inferiority, and we no longer felt ashamed of being Moslems; to the contrary, we felt proud and were convinced that &lam was giving sound guidance to the modem world. We no longer acted as people who had to defend themselves against attacks, and through directly studying the religion we became indifferent as to whether other people liked or disliked our relig5on."

Roem contended that the JIB members did not love their own country any less

than did any secular youth organization since Islam commanded the struggling against

inequity and upholding justice at any price. To his mind, fighting for national

independence clearly was the same thing. He justified such a view on a &mDh which read

(in translation): 'Uve of one's country and nation is part of the true faith." Accordingly,

Indonesian Muslims could not be less patriotic than those of other religious convictions."

This nationalist view continued to be emphasized long after his involvement with the W

came to an end. Through his involvement with Agus Salim in the JIB, Roem learnt a

brand of politics imbued with Islamic ethics.

Despite the W's nominal position as an educational movement for the young, the

JIB was at its core a political movement, whose aims focused on countering Dutch

secular views. Cahyo Budi Utorno writes that the organization was not formally involved

in politics, but its adult members (those over 18) did participate in political activitie~.~~

Husni's analysis points to the W as contributing to the Muslim ideological development

at a period of time when movements in Indonesia were going through a formative

22 Ibid., 28-29.

23 Ibid., 28.

. ** Cahyo B udi Utomo. Dinamika Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia Dari Kebangkitan Hingga V Kemerdekaaan. (Semarang: TIKIP Semarang Press, 1995). 124. phase.2s In fact, the JJB was extremely important in training Roem and others for later

leadership roles. Even though Roem never Ied the central JIB, his name became

synonymous with the history of the JIB movement, together with other Muslim leaders such as Natsir, Kasrnan, Wibisono, and Wiwoho.

Before embarking on a discussion of Roem's activities in the SIS, it is important to state that the JIB not only encouraged high school students but also youth who had dropped out of school to take up membership in the JIJ3. Thus the JIE3's membership extended not only to students, but also to the youth as a whoIe. Even those 30 years of age or older were permitted to remain members. This effectively maintained the organizational coherence of the XB membership, although it was somewhat contrary to its original mission of educating youth. The primacy of the religious agenda for the young was further diminished as a greater number of its members was influenced by the newly emerging spirit of nationalism, that is being free from the Dutch colonialists, and thus the JIB no longer paid close attention to its basic mission as an educationd organization. This internal tension, Roem believed, distracted the organization from its true c&g.26

zs Dardiri Husni who wrote his thesis on the JIB, posits that the establishment of the ID3 involved three important factors. First, ideological interest characte&ed some Muslim students who regarded Islam as the religion of most Indonesians. Second, the political agenda proposed by Samsurizal, the pioneer of the JIB, included teaching TsIamic courses in Jong Java and was opposed by some students probably for the reasons that some belonged to other religions, others did not want to introduce an element into society that was in itself volatile, while others who belonged to a secular view may have found it offensive. Third, in socio-historical terms, the students of the 1920s were living in an intellectual climate of emerging new ideoIogies (Tslamic, socialist, nationalist) and new directions in political developments, such as the awakening of their own identity. Dardiri Husni, "Jong Islamieten Bond: A Study of a Muslim Youth Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Era, 19241942," (M.A. thesis McGill University, 1998), 47.

26 Saidi, Cendikiawan Islam di Zaman Belanda, 31- 32. To address this problem of organizational direction, in 1934 Roem and Jusuf

~ibisono,~'decided to found the SIS, which was a campus-based organization Both

were university students at the time and knew that the JIl3 would not be taken seriously

by university students. Roem stated at the time the SIS was designed "to perpetuate the

JIB in the universities." Wibisono explained that the SIS was to be much more serious

and academic in its orientation. Its purpose was to act as 'a medium to meet the

aspirations for more scientific discussion" 28

The SIS followed the original S[B intention by acting as an instrument for the

transmission of Islamic teachings among students who were not familiar with the tenets

of their own faith due to the secular nature of the educational system introduced by the

Dutch Roem and Wibisono both realized that Muslim university students had been

alienated from their religion by the Dutch colonial system of education This was a

conscious policy as the Dutch were aware of the potential danger of those University

Muslim students to become intellectually consolidated and thereby challenge the Dutch

regime. Therefore, Roem and Wibisono felt that if the fslamic faith was not reinforced in these students, a cultural vacuum would emerge and their minds would then be

dominated by the intellectual heritage of a colonialized mentality. Instead, Roem and

Wibisono sought to awaken these students to fully appreciate their Islamic heritage and,

as an important byproduct, support the struggle against colonialism. Islam, the faith of the

majority of the students, thus became a tool for arousing nationalist sentiment.

27 Wibisono was one of the Muslim nationalists who was later active in the Islamic party, Masyumi, and thus a colleague of Roem.

28 Saidi Cendikiawan IsIm di Zirman Belamb, 33. This vision shared by Roem and Wibisono can be seen in the basic charter of the

SIS. It states that its purpose was to impart a general knowledge of Islam and its doctrines

to any university student that joined the organization.29 Roem and Wibisono also realized

that the number of devoted Muslims was not plentiful in the universities of the day, and

that they would have to recruit fkom among the nominal Muslims. The organization's

determination to accommodate nominal Mush involvement may be inferred from the

fact that its fmt chairman, Soediman Kartohadiprojo, was not categorized as a devoted

Muslim before he held this position.30 Roem and Wibisono served as committee

members initially, but later Roem led the organization himself between December 1936

and March 1937.~'

The expansion of the organization's membership was the main objective in the

first years of its existence. Recruitment was quite difficult. One problem was that the

number of universities was small, less than ten at the end of the 1920s' with a total

student population at the university level being only about 3000.'~Of this number, only

about 100 initially expressed any interest in learning about Because of the

intense competition for a limited pool of members, SIS success was achieved largely at

the expense of the W, hastening the decline of the latter organization.

" The change in the organization was not initiated by the congress. Unlike the JIB, which extended its branches into other areas, the SIS was based onty in Jakarta. Its concentration on Jakarta was due to the fact that most universities at the time were found in Jakarta

Roem. "Sejarah Berdirinya Jong Islamiten Bond." in Roern. Diplornari: Ujmg Tonzbak Pejuangan RI, 124. " S.U. Bajasuc, Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Pejuangan Pmwoto Mangkusasmito (Surabaya: .- Documents, 1972). 140. Roem, besides being a founder of the SIS, was also active in Muslime Reveille,

published by the association as a means of propagating its message. It was first pubIished

in 1935, about one year after the establishment of the SIS?~The contents of Muslime

Reveille were designed to counter Dutch and elite Indonesian impressions of Islam, and

stressed the orthodox understanding of Islamic teachings such as prayers and fasting, as

well as the presentation of Islam as a logical religion in touch with modem times. The

magazine used scientific discourse to analyze a variety of contemporary topics. It was

constantly subject to Dutch censorship, but continued to be published until it was shut

down by the Japanese when they banned all Indonesian organizations, including the SIS,

in 1942. The Dutch were not the only ones suspicious of the SIS motives. There were

those in the Indonesian national movement who feared that it would divide Indonesian

university students3' This fear was exacerbated by its occasional success in recruiting

members from the university student population who had been associated with nationalist

groups.

The role of the SIS in the history of the struggle of Indonesian youth movement

against the Dutch was sigruficant. Although it started out with little more than 100

students, and its membership was never Iarge, its members showed great determination.

Significantly, three of its leaders, Roem, Wibisono, and Prawoto Iater played key roles in

the independence struggle from 1945 to 1949.

" Saidi, Cendkiawan lslam Zzrnan Beland., 37.

35 This suspicion was cited by Saidi from the book Sejarah Pewngan Pemudn Indonesia -. published by the Dcparrment of Education and Culture. See ibid.. 40. Roem began his involvement in the PSII (Partai Serekat Islam Indonesia or the

United Party of Indonesian klazn) in 1933 when he was 25 years old and still belonged to

the JIB. The PSII was fist established under the name of SDI (Sarekat Dagang Islam or

Islamic Mercantile Association). It was founded by Haji Samanhudi in 1912 as a

reaction against the Chinese who occupied the key-positions in the Indonesian economy

at what was felt to be the expense of the natives. Its activities were, of course, mainly directed against the Dutch who gave privilege and priority to the Chinese in matters of trade and imports of vital chemicals for the batik-ind~str~.~~Roem, in one of his accounts of Indonesian history, notes that the awareness of the Islamic merchants movement towards the pressure of the Chinese was inspired by Raden Mas

Tirt~adijos~o,an aristocratic Javanese merchant, who published the magazine Medan

Priyayi in 1909 voicing the concerns of the pribumi (indigenous) merchants." Not wishing to limit its membership to merchants, the SDI then dropped the word dagang

(mercantile) from its title.

Since its foundation in 1912-theSarekat Islam had served as the foremost Islamic pw, and for a few years, the only truly mass party in the colonial period.38 Federspiel posits that the Sarekat lslam dominated the Indonesian political scene from its inception until 192%~~At the latter time, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National

'' Anton Tirnur Jaylani, 'The Sarekat Islam: Its contribution to Indonesian Nationalism." (M.A. thesis, McGill Universtiy 1959). 35.

" Mohamad Roem. Iskm DahPejuangan Kemerdekaan ahPembangum Indonesia. 2.

John Ingelson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Natiomlirt Movement, 1927-1934 (Singapore, Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1979). 45. For more information, see J. TEK Petrus Blumberger, De Narionalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (HaarIern: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon), 55- 104. '' Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, 88. Party) emerged and challenged the domination of Sarekat Islam. The PNI concentrated

on the issue of nationalism rather than Islamism as the Sarekat Islam had done. In

response, the SI (Sarekat &lam) leader, HOS Colcroaminoto shifted the organization's

orientation to national issues. Early in its work the SI was simply a movement without

much definition espousing political, social, religious, and economic causes. In its later

development, the organization assumed the form of a party, and renamed itself the PSI

(Partai Sarekat Islam or Islamic United Party) in its seventh national congress in 1923.

The reason behind this transformation Erom union activities to a political party lay in the fact that the Sarekat Islam had allegedly contained communist ideological elements.40

Aside from this political factor, there was also an organizational need to strengthen the forces of non-cooperation with the colonialist government. An integrated political party seemed to be the solution to both these problems. A loose movement with a floating, ill- defined membership and weak bonds between the central organization and the local ones was replaced by a centralized party called the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or

Indonesian Islamic United party.)" The successful change of the SI into PSI can be attributed, in part, to the presence of Agus Salim who began to play a key role in the organization and to emphasize, as he did in his introductory speech to the congress, the importance of the organization's shift to a party format.

Roem joined the Sarekat Islam after its evolution into a fomal party. It is probable that his decision to join the PSII was strongly influenced by Agus Salim.

Roern's major contributions to the PSII were made in his capacity as a lawyer, defending

" For information on the Communist uprising within the Sarekat Islam. see Vishal Singh, 'The Rise of Indonesian Political Parties," Journal Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1961): 43-65.

4 1 Jaylani, "The Sarekat IsIam," 100-102. people facing trial in Dutch courtrooms. He also worked to defend the right of the poor

Muslim vis-a-vis powerful landlords." At the time, Roem was a law student of Rechts

Hoge School, making him a rare commodity in an age of scarce intellectual resources. He

was influential enough in the orghation to eventually become a member of the central

board.

In 1936 Roem decided to leave the board of the party, and followed Agus Sah

who established the Barisan Penyadar (Consious-Making Forces), an opposition group

within the party. The reason for the establishment of this organization was related to the

adoption within the PSII of a non-cooperation policy against the Dutch, referred to

officially as the hijrah policy. The hijrah policy was first employed by the Sarekat Islam in 1923, due to the party's conviction that acquiescence to or cooperation with Dutch rulers would not bring it closer to its goals." At first, there was a debate within the PSII over whether to refer to the policy sknply as non-cooperation or to use the religious term hijrah. It was decided that the term hijrah was preferable because, in addition to conveying the spirit of non-cooperation with the Dutch, it also conveyed a sense of solidarity in mind and action within all aspects of life, whether social, economic, or political." Salim, who opposed the policy, doubted whether such a policy could actually be applied against the Dutch, a conviiction based on his own personal experience. He had been a member of the Volksraad between 19N-1923 representing the Sarekat Islam, but then resigned from the Volkraad feeling that his membership supported only the Dutch

- - - -

42~oemarsono,Mohammad Roem 70 Tahun, 36.

43 Noer, The Rise and the Development of the Modernisr Muslim Movement in Indonesia,229.

44 Ibid., 229- 230. government, not the hdonesian peopIe. After his resignation, however, SaIim realized

his action only isolated his organization fkom the political scene and from public society.

The reality that the Dutch were in control had to be recognized." Yet Salim saw a

cooperation policy merely as a tactic, rather than a tenet of ideology. He believed that in

order to ensure the continued existence of the party, a pragmatic strategy needed to be

adopted. So, in I935 as chairman of the Dewan Panai (Party ~ounci~),~~Salim asked the

Ladinah Tarzfidziyah (Executive Committee) to review the hijrah policy due to the

promulgation of stricter regulations by the colonial government against the political

activities of the nontooperative parties. He believed that this regulation would paralyze the party, and consequently argued for the abandonment of hijrah and the adoption of a cooperative AS his close ally Roem apparently supported this position.

Salim, however, was unsuccessful. Due to a new electoral system, Salim was ousted from the leadership at the party congress of I936 and his question on the abandonment of the non-cooperation policy was deferred by the congress.48 In view of this difference over policy, Salim and Roem ventured to create within the PSII a faction called the Barisan Penyadar (Conscious-Making Forces). As its name suggests, the

-- -- 45 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 37. " The central structure of Partai Sarikat Islam's organization at its center is divided into two leadership/councils, Dewan Partai and Ladjnah Tanfidziyah. Salim chaired the Dewan Partai (Party Council) after the death of Cokroaminoto whiie Abikusno chaired the Ladjnah Tanfidiyah (Executive Committee). For more information on this division, see Noer, "The Rise and the Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia," 222-223.

47 Mohamad Roem, "Pergerakan Kesadaran dalam PSII" cited in Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement in lndanesia 1908-1942, 145.

48 The 1936 congress elected the chairman of the party who was to act as a formatter (one who is in charge of the board structure) for the central committee members, so that he would have a free hand in making his own seIection. However, Salim, who was very much zppreciated for his activities in the party was excluded by the elected formatter, Abikusno. See Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 145. movement sought to make the PSII members aware that the policy adopted by the central

board should be overturned, i.e., become aware of the real effects of the hijrah policy and

return to a policy of cooperation.

Roem's decision to follow Salim to establish the Barisan Penyadar PSII was due

to his belief that the Indonesian people, who were dependent in many respects, could not hope to realize their aspirations except through a temporary accommodation with the

Dutch government. It should not, however, be assumed that Salim, Sangadji and Roem were, as leaders of the Barisan Penyadar, less nationalistic than those who disagreed with the cooperative policy. They merely differed with their colleagues over how freedom from colonialism could be best achieved. The Barisan Penyadar, for example, supported the petition of Sutarjo, an empIoyee of PPBB (Persatuan Pegawai-Pegawai

Binnenlandsch Bestuur) which demanded a dialogue with the Dutch government over the future independence of the Dutch lndies (Indonesia). " Roem argued that this strategy gave the movement an opportunity to play a constructive role since more radical forms of action against the Dutch were impossible. In an atmosphere where the word rnerdeka

(free) was banned and where the movement's meetings were strictly controlled by the

Dutch, Roem championed a strategy that set realistic gods in order to reach its political target.

However, the movement could not be active for very long following decision of the central board to suspend all assistance to the Barisan Penyadar. This policy extended to all branches of PSII. The suspension of assistance came into effect in January 1937.

The folIowing month, Salim, Sangadji, and Roem and other prominent members of the the Barisan Penyadar were expelled from the party? The Penyadar itself ended its

activities in 1942 with the onset of Japanese control. Even though the PSII had tried to

solve this internal problem, the decision to curtail the activities of Salim, Sangadji and

Roem, who had a large following among the members, was a factor in the party's huther

decline. In the same period, the PSI1 began to face competition fiom various other

Islamic organizations, ail of which appealed to the Muslim community for support. The

Muhammadiyah (founded in I916), and the Nahdatul UIama (founded in 1926) were the

strongest of these organizations. The PSII dominance within the nationalist debate

steadily declined from mid 1920s onwards, and was finally terminated by the coming of the Japanese.

The Japanese occupation had a considerable effect on Roem's political attitudes.

By this time, all organizations or movements fiom the Dutch period including Islamic movements like the SIB and SIS were banned by the Japanese. After defeafing the Allied in the Pacific War, the Japanese occupied Indonesia, bringing inevitable changes? ' The

Japanese were quick to dissociate themselves from the policies of the Dutch, choosing instead to set their own agenda. Thus all nationalist parties which had existed in the

Dutch period were disbanded, a move which heralded a new chapter in the history of the

" For information on the contents of the petition, see Poesponegoro and Notosusanto. Se~nrnh Nmiotlal Ituionesia. vot. 5+22 1-230.

'O Noer, MdenrisfMuslim Movement in Indonesia, 46.

3 L The pacific war was initiated by the Japanese who tried to build an empire in Asia. The war began when the Japanese suddenly attacked Pearl Harbor, the center of US Naval forces in the Pacific in December 194 1. In January 1942, the Japanese invaded Indonesia, overthrowing and replacing the Dutch by March 8, 1942. Dutch government ended in Indonesia and was replaced by the Japanese. One reason why the Japanese were able to control lndonesia so quickly was that the people themselves remained passive onlookers to these events as a consequence of their opposition to Dutch colonial policy. For an explanation of the absurdity of the Dutch which made Indonesian people passive spectators at the time of the kpanese invasion, see Bob Hering, ed., Sianv Giok Vhan Remembers: A PeranakLul-Chinese and Re @esl for fndonesiun Nation-hood (Queensland: James Cook Unvirsity of North Queensland, 1982), 40. Muslim community in Indonesia Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese eventually realized the expediency of treating the Muslims, the largest segment of the Indonesian population, with greater leeway in the political domain Knowing that much of the political opposition to the Dutch had come fiom the Muslim community under the leadership of its

'U~Q~~the Japanese strove to harness the Muslim aspirations in favor of its own interesd2 Part and parcel of that strategy was allowing Muslim organizations to grow, but only on condition that they obtain official Japanese permission to operates3

In the beginning, people's attitude towards the Japanese seemed to have been positive, largely due to their resentment of the Dutch. The chauvinist and imperialist elements of the Japanese authorities had not yet become known to the general public."

However, Roem experienced very Little interference fkom the Japanese, and was allowed to hction as a Iawyer and was not forced to collaborate with the Japanese. Yet, Roem appears not to have played an active role in politics during the Japanese occupation

There are a number of factors which might explain this inactivity. First, Roem might have realized the danger of fascism and the new imperialism represented by the Japanese, and that opposing them would lead to personal harm, imprisonment or even death.

Second, his aversion to cooperation with the Japanese, might have deprived him of the role he wanted to play in the institutions established by them, though Roem's nationalist

53 Benda suggests that a apart kom the bad effects of the Japanese colonialization, there were some political organizationaI benefits acquired by Muslims during their occupation, i-e., the establishment of Masyumi (the one which was formed by the Japanese before the independence era), the creation of the Ministry of Religion and the formation of Hizbullah (an army training for Muslim youth), For fbrther information, see Harry J- Benda, the Crescent caad the Rising Sun: Irvionesian Islam Udrthe Japanese Ocatpation (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 2958). activities had not come to an end." To a large extent, the sudden change fkom Dutch to

Japanese rule meant that the situation was very fluid. AU these factors contributed to

Roem's near resignation fkom formal political invohement. This was not unusual for the

time since many other nationalists at that time chose to avoid cooperation with the

Japanese. Sjahrir, for example, actively campaigned against collaboration and fascism?

Ahmad Hasan of the Persatuan Islam and Haji Rasul in Minangkabau did much the same.

Roem reemerged as an active player soon after the proclamation of independence

following the defeat of the Japanese by the AUied forces in the Second World War. The

proclamation of independence itself was announced by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta

on August 17, 1945, prior to the Japanese departure fkom Indonesia. In the new

Indonesian government, Roem was made chairman of the KNI (Komite National

Indonesia or Indonesian National Committee) of Jakarta. In this capacity, he helped

orchestrate the first large-scale meeting between the new government and the generaI

population. This rally was held in Merdeka square where Soekarno appeared, as the

newly elected president, and was welcomed by thousands of people who enthusiastically

" During the Japanese occupation some nationalists, both secular and Muslims nationalists, tended to work with the Japanese. But there were a few other nationalists who chose to avoid cooperation such as Mohamad Roem. The eagerness of the nationalists to cooperate with the Japanese was as a result of Japanese propaganda, for instance, claiming to be the elder brothers of the Indonesians, or that the victory of the Japanese in the Pacific War meant the victory of Asia over the West. Nationalists who worked with the Japanese, such as Soekarno and Hatta, even thought they were anti-fascist, and that the Indonesian people were in a crisis and needed the help of the Japanese who were at the peak of their power. The reason for the cooperation of MusIim nationdists with the Japanese was that the 'uluma-'and other Muslim leaders were allowed to continue their Islamic activities even though they had to be under Japanese surveillance. This situation was considered an improvement over the Dutch rule. " See Sutan Sjahrir, OurStnrggle, trans., Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern -_- Indonesia Project, 1983). attended the historic assemblage? The gathering had initiaIIy been banned by the

Japanese, who were in nominal control by command of the AUies, but people converged

on the square in great numbers long before the scheduled hour. The situation created

the potential for a serious confrontation between the Japanese and the masses. As a chainnan of the KNI of Jakarta, Roem together with Soewj'o, the Mayor of Jakarta, met with the Japanese officials and urged them to allow the gathering to proceed unhindered.

The Japanese proposed that the rally should last for no more than 15 minutes.

Soewirjo and Roem then secured Soekarno's cooperation and the rally was held as planned. Even though it lasted for only 15 minutes, the event was historic in that it represented the first offkid meeting bemeen the government and the people. The identification of the state with its people was a sure confirmation of Indonesia's status as a nation. Unfortunately, Roem and Soewirjo's contribution to this first large mass meeting following the proclamation is almost always neglected in accounts of the history behind the proclamation of Indonesia's independence?

B. Roem, Masyumi, and His DipLomatic Activities

The period after Indonesian independence marked a shift in Roem's political career. His politicd activities in this period are discussed with respect to his important role in the Masyumi and his role in diplomatic activities as a means of fortifying the

Indonesian government against the second Dutch invasion, and how these roles relate to the objective of Indonesian sovereignty. Roem's role in Masyumi in the post-

- Merdeka square was called Gambir square in Dutch times, and in the Japanese it was called Ikada.

See Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 48. revolutionary period is then addressed with reference to the role of Masyumi in the

running of the government and its relationship with the PDRI (Pemerintah Danuat

RepubIik Indonesia or The Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and the

PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the Revolutionary Government of

the Republic of Indonesia).

Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Counsel of Indonesian Muslims

Association) was founded in November 1945, three months after the proclamation of

Indonesian Independence. The emergence of Masyumi after the proclamation of

independence should be viewed in the context of the political situation prevailing in

Indonesia at that time. The political position of the Muslims was weak.'' In the I(NIP

(Komite National Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National Committee), for

example, only 15 members of its 136 member body represented political Another

factor which weakened Mush activities is that independence itself brought a

tremendous comfort which seemed to dampen political commitment to the Islamic

movement. There was an assumption that having won independence, the Mushs

majoriv would naturally exert its influence within the system without special Mush

political efforts6'

59 The term '?slam" and ''Muslim" here are related to the ideological struggle, not to the formal religion that someone professes. This is important to clarify since the other nationalists like Soekarno and Sjahrir were also Muslims, but advocated a secular nationalism.

Roem was one of 15 members, while the others were: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf, Jusuf Wibisono, Dahlan Abdullah, A.R. Bawedan, A. Bajasut, Harsono Tjokroarninoto, Ny, sunajo Mangunpuspito, Wahid Hasjim, Ki B agus Hadikusumo, ZainuI Arifin, Haji Agus Salim, Haji Ahmad Sanusi, and Anwar Tjokroaminoto. Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965 (Jakarta:Temptprint, 1987), 46.

Deliar Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Rote in Indonesia," (M. A thesis, Cornell University, 1960). 39. d' Thought turned to the importance of reactivating and transforming the Islamic

political heritage. Roem, aIong with other Islamic leaders Like Abdoel Kahar Muzakkir

and Wahid Hasyim, held a meeting in September 1945 to discuss the ways to realize this

god.62 It should he noted that the idea of establishing an Islamic political party preceded

the Vice-presidential MaWumat, No. X 5 November 1945, regarding the institution of a

multi-party system. Roem asserts that the decision to establish an Islamic political par^

was not based on the Maklumat but on the awareness of Muslims for the need to continue

the movement for the survival of Islam in a free ~ndonesia.~~The follow-up to the meeting above was a national Muslim congress in Yogyakarta in November 1945, gathering most of the Mushelements in Indonesia, and resulting in the establishment of

Masyumi. The choice of the name Masyumi was disputed at the congress as the title was shared by an organization founded by the Japanese to channel the Muslim political aspirations and thus held negative connotations for some. Roem sided with Agus Salim and others, preferring the name Partui Rakjat Islam (Muslim People's Party), but they were defeated in a vote on the issue." Since the party was supported by most Islamic organizations across Indonesia, it was considered the only Islamic party of Indonesia.

Masyumi's status as the sole Muslim political channel prevailed until one of its mass supporting organizations, the PSI1 withdrew its membership in 1947. This would occur again in 1952 when the NU, the largest mass organization, left Masyumi and proclaimed itself as a separate political party. Still Masyurni endured as a major political actor until outlawed in 196 1 by presidential decree.

- - 62 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas National, 45.

63 Soernarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 60. Roem was involved in the leadership of the Masyumi upon its creation.

Membership in the MasyumI was divided into two categories: individuals and

organizations? Roem was classified within the individual group. In spite of his former

membership in the PSLT in pre-revolutionary times, his political activities in the post-war

era were no longer related to any mass or political organization, except the Masyumi

itself. In the first period of his involvement with Masyumi, Roem could not concentrate

on party activities, because of his role as chairman of KNI (Komite National Indonesia or

Indonesian National Committee) Jakarta and his incapacitation from being wounded.66

Yet, Roem still maintained active contact with his Masyumi counterparts.

Meanwhile, a newly independent Indonesia required the formation of a

government capable of running the nation. The independent preparatory committee which

was formed in the Japanese period expanded and elected Soekamo and Hatta respectively

as President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. Thereafter the national

constitution was also promulgated.67 Soekarno soon formed a cabinet and the

Independent Preparatory Committee was dissolved and replaced by the KNIP. The

formation of a new government was completed in a very short time because of the threat

of occupation by AUied troops who saw Indonesia as territory to be returned to Dutch

control. In addition to the external threat, the newly-formed govemment also faced a feud

-- -- Ibid., 63; Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology. and Political Rok in Indonesia," 43.

65 For information on the. membership system of Masyumi, See Noer, 'Masjurni: Its Organization, Ideology and PoIiticaI Role in Indonesia"

66 For Information on Roem's wound &om the Dutch bullet, see Suemarsono, Mohumad Roem 70 Tahun, 50-52.

" The national constihxtion was written in the last month of the Japanese occupation. and - completed a day after the proclamation of Independence, August 18 1945. between those who had collaborated with the Dutch and those who had opposed Japanese

control. In Perjuangun Eta (Our Struggle), Sjahrir maintained that the Indonesian

government was in danger of being infected with the fascist symptoms caused by

identification with the ~a~anese."Moreover, the Allies who were about to land in

Indonesia, would, he reasoned, be more disposed to negotiate with and to recognize an

Indonesian government untainted by collaborator^.^^ Sjahrir also rejected a one-party system for the same reason and urged his peers to replace the monolithic presidential system of government with a parliamentary-presidentid system where power would be widely diffi~sed.'~Soekarno, a collaborationist himself, saw some truth in the Sjahrir position and converted the Indonesian political system to one modeled on the parLiamentary system, in which the cabinet was responsible to the Parliament. Sjahrir was also given the opportunity to become the Prime Minister.

With the adoption of a multi-party system, Masyumi emerged as one of the strongest parties, dong with the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National

Party) and the Socialist Party. A strong cabinet, therefore, had to be composed of a coalition of these three parties. But of the three times Sjahrir formed cabinet, Masyumi never formally declared its inclusion. Members of Masyumi who were in the cabinet represented only themselves as individuals. The rejection of Masyumi in the organization of the cabinet was initially caused by the dominant influence of those Masyumi leaders

" See Sjahrir, Our Srnrggk.

Kahin. Nationalkm and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project). 66. '' Bid., 166. such as Sukiman and ~bikusno,~~representing a faction in Masyumi leadership who

wished to give no concessions to the Dutch. They refused to support Sjahrir's position on

the need for dipIomatic initiatives engaging the former colonial regime. On the other

hand, there was another faction in Masyumi which was more moderate, consisting of

mostly young activists of Masyumi, such as Roem, Natsir, Prawiranegara, Prawoto and

others. They were the rising stars of Masyumi and had already played an important role

in the struggle for sovereignty. With the formation of the Sjahrir cabinet, these figures

grew in prominence, even though their own party was not involved in the ruling coalition.

Roem was appointed as a Minister of Home Affairs in the third Sjahrir cabinet, an

appointment that may well have been based on Sjahrir's belief that Roem was not tainted

by any hint of collaboration with the Japanese.

While the formation of the new hdonesian government was under way, the

Dutch, tagged along with the AlIied forces and landed in Indonesia on September 29,

1945. In addition to disarming the Japanese, the Allied forces took military control of the archipelago and then recognized the Dutch in political control. Needless to say, the nations of the Allied forces chose not to acknowledge the independence proclaimed by the Indonesian people, although the Republic of Indonesia was recognized as the de facto power in the territory it controlled. To win sovereignty over the entire region the

Republican army pursued an armed revolution from 1945 to 1949." Indonesia did not limit itself to the battle field, it also engaged in diplomacy that ultimately brought an end

Sukiman was the first president of Masyumi. He was a respected leader in both Dutch and Japanese times. Abikusno was a former PSII leader ir. the Dutch period, known to have championed non- cooperation with the Dutch.

72 This era is calIed revolutionary times. See the complete information on the war of Indonesian independence in M.C. RickIefs "The Revolution 1945-1950)" in A Hisrory of Modern Indonesia since c.1300 (london: Macmillan, 1993),212-233. to the confrontation, after a long and intricate bargaining process engaged in by

Indonesian nationalists, since the Dutch were determined not to give up their interests in

~ndonesia.'~This is the time Roem emerged as a very important figure.

Roem began to play a role in the central government after being appointed

Minister of Home Affairs in Sjahrir's third cabinet formed in 1946. His first diplomatic

experience came when he attended the Linggarjati meeting, led by Prime Minister

Sjahdr, in 1946. The settlement reached at this meeting established broad principles of

agreement for implementing independence gradually. According to this agreement, Java

and Sumatera became the de facto authority of the Republic. The Republic together with

the state of Borneo and the Great Eastern would be set up as a sovereign federal state, the

United States of Indonesia. This union would then be amalgamated into the Netherlands-

Indonesian Union together with the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao under the Queen

of the etherl lands. 74 This agreement had its advocates and detractors. Some Indonesian

parties rejected the content of the agreement, arguing that it fell short of bringing true

sovereignty. But Sjahrir tried to convince the other political leaders that this agreement

was not to be interpreted as a final solution. It was intended only as a stepping stone to

the real end, which would be independence. The agreement recognized that Indonesia

now existed. Indonesia, he reasoned, needed not just juridical status, but also political

power.7s Roern held a similar position. As a member of the negotiating team, he

'' See ragarding the diplomatic activities between Indonesia and Holland in Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, "Diplomacy Sebagai Sarana Penylesaian Pertikaian" in Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, 123-127.

74 For more complete list of the provisions of the Linggarjati Agreement, see Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, L96-197. See also, Indonesian Independence and the United Nation, 28-33. '' Poeponegoro and No tosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, vol. 6. p. 132. considered the Linggarjati Ageement a success. He once pointed out that the mere

participation of the Netherlands in the negotiations had been a tacit recognition of

Indonesia' s e~istence?~

Sigmficantly, Masyumi, Roem's own party, was among the politicd parties

opposing the agreement. Masyumi's opposition was based on belief that the agreement

gave too many concessions to the Dutch. In particular, Masyumi rejected the articles

which provided for a Netherlands-Indonesia Union under the Dutch Crown and the

restoration to all non-Indonesians of their previous rights and propem.77 Masyumi's

objections came early, namely when the presidential cabinet was changed to a

parliamentary model.'* This sparked disagreement between Masyumi and those of its

members who followed Sjahrir. Dissident party members even complained of their

party's decision before seeking a confirmation from any Masyumi minister^.'^ Roem

said, even though Masyumi rejected the agreement, those ministers belonging to

Mas yumi who supported the agreement did not represent their party. He complained that

Masyumi had taken the decision to reject the agreement even prior to his return from

" Moharnad Roem, "Arti Perjanjian van Roijen-Roem bagi Sejarah Diplomasi Republik Indonesia," in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Pejuangan RI, 7.

Kahin. Natio~lismand Revolution, 198.

"~as~umipreferred a presidential cabinet rather than a parliamentary one, since members of the KNP were an appointed body and it did not represent the existing parties. Therefore, in Masyumi's views, the body did not qualify yet to work in the system of Parliamentary Democracy. However, Soekarno prefered Sjahrir's idea and the idea was agreed by the KNIP. Masyumi had little choice but to accept the decision. See Anwar Haryono, Pejalanan Politik Bangsa. Menoleh ke Belakang Menarap Masa Depan (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997), 86-87.

79 There were five ministers of the third Sjahrir cabinet from Masyumi; Moharnad Roem as Minister of Domestic affairs, Harsono Cokroarninoto as Minister of Defense, Moharnad Natsir as Minister of Information, Yusuf Wibisono as Minister of Social welfare, Syafruddin Prawiranegara as Minister of Finance and K.H. Fathurrahman as Minister of Religious Affairs. See Noer, Pattai Islam di Pentas Nasio ml, 164. --..- Linggarjati with a report on its actual content^,^ Roem had suggested that Masyumi

postpone its meeting until the Linggarjati Agreement was signed, at which time he and

the other ministers fkom Masyumi could attend and explain the details. Roem, whose

suggestion was disregarded, sent a letter of protest to the Masyumi leadership in

Yogyakarta voicing his concerns about the party's non-democratic character. He argued

that the voice of its members had been neglected. To him, the party had deviated from the

democratic principles of its own constitution; accordingly, he reminded the Leadership

that priority must be given to consultation among its members." Roem and other

members of Masyurni in the cabinet who accepted the agreement, believed that a party

member who was elected to cabinet or to some other governmental post owed his loyalty

to the country rather than to the party. Complicating the issue was the nature of the

appointments they held; the agreement of Roern, Natsir, and Prawiranegara's with

Sjahrir, a Socialist Prime ~inisterymade these Masyumi leaders appear to be "religious

socialists." Roem respected Sjahrir as an Indonesian revolutionary and valued his

contribution in bringing the Dutch to the negotiating table.83 However, Roem asserted

that he and other Masyumi members who supported Sjahrir did so only in so far as the

negotiations were concerned, and not in respect to his socialist ideology? The internal

80 Soemarmno, Mohamcrd Roem 70 TQ~IPI,68.

81 Interview with Roem in 1956 as cited in Noer, Partai Islorn di Penlas National,. 166 " See the introduction of this thesis on Kahin who argued that the progressive leaders of Masyumi were influenced by Sjahrir's pany, pages 2-3-

" Roem's respect for Sjahrir is evident &om his writings in remembrance of the late Sjahrir. Roem saw Syahrir as a little man who did a big thing. He calls Sjahrir a little man due to his physical stature but accomplishing a big thing for the nation. For a complete account see Mohamad Roem, "Bung Kecil yang Berbuat Besar" in Rosihan Anwar, ed, Mengenang JYahrir (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2980), 139-165

Moharnad Roem, "Ilusi Kawan-Kawan PSL" in Santoso., ed., Ticink A& Negara Islmn: Surar- Swat Politik Nwcholish Madjid -Mohamad Roem, 60-6 1. conflict among Masyumi members represented a codkt over the means to an end and

did not imply a permanent rupture in the party. Opposition to Sjahrir's cabinet from

various parties led to its collapse and returned the mandate to the president.

Despite the internal opposition, international support was garnered soon after the

agreement to ensure the recognition of Indonesia as a sovereign nation. Unfortunately,

the Linggarjati Agreement itself broke down when both the hdonesian government and

the Netherlands tried to interpret the contents according to their respective interest^.^'

The Dutch finally terminated the agreement, complaining that the Iodonesian government

consistently refused the concessions made by them. In July 1947, Dr. Bell, the Dutch

Governor General in Indonesia, decided to use military force to occupy those areas excluded fiom the agreement. While somewhat successful, the move created an internationd backlash against the ~utch.'~The British, who had been supporters of the

Dutch for over a hundred years were under the leadership of a labor party government which wanted an end to colonialism. Therefore, British leaders urged the Dutch to end hostilities. Other nations, particularly the Arab governments had similar responses. This international support was seen as a clear indication of rising political support for

Indonesia in the rest of the world.

In response to Dutch "police action," the Security Council of the United Nations engaged in active diplomacy to end the confrontation. The Security Council formed a mediating body known as the KIN (Komisi Tiga Negara or Three Nations Commission),

'* Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 209.

86 The first reaction came from Hasan al-Banni' of LkwZnu1 al-Muslimin who sent a wire to the United Nations. The Secretary General, on behalf of the Arabs and Islamic WorId, insisted the UN take action to end Dutch aggression. At the same time, protest came fiom lawahailal Nehru of India. Australia also hoped the confrontation would end in favor of international peace, consisting of Australia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the Netherlands), and

the United States of America (chosen by mutual consent)." Subsequent to this effort,

several meetings were held leading to agreements such as the Renville ~greernent.'~

Indonesian concerns also found an international forum at the New DeIhi Asia

~onference.~~At the signing of the RenvUe Agreement, the cabinet was led by Amir

Syarifuddin. Syarifuddin was personally disliked by Masyumi since he was Muslim born

but had converted to Christianity when he was 24 years old.'' For Masyurni such a

conversion in matters of faith threw his political sincerity into question. They saw him as

little more than an opportunist with no moral convictions. However, heeding the call for participation in the diplomatic process, Masyumi participated in Syarifuddin's second cabinet. Five of its members became ministers, incIuding Roem who was again appointed as Minister of Home Affairs. His chance of taking part in the UN sponsored negotiations was thwarted, however, when Masyumi decided to withdraw from the cabinet before the agreement was signed. The rejection was justified by Masyumi on the grounds that the agreement ceded too much to the ~utch?'Little can be said for Roem's decision to acquiesce to his party's wishes. Instead of opposing the party leadership as he

" For further information on the commission, see Alastair M. Taylor. Indonesian Independence and the United Nazions, 54-55; Poeponegoro and Notosuanto, Sejarah Nasioanal hdonesiu, 137 and Mohamad Roem, Diplornasi: Lljung tombak Perjuangan RI, 8.

"~envilleis the name of the US navy ship on which the meeting was held. For a comprehensive understanding of the Renville agreemsnt, see KM.L Tobing, Perjuangan Politik Bangsa Indonesia. Renville (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1976).

Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, 139.

" See OcGaIelano."Oportunis PoIitik dan Negarawan." RepubZika Online, 11 August, 1998.

or the points of the agreement that benefited the Dutch, See Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 21 3-229. had done in support of the Linggarjati Agreement, he followed the party's hard line on

this occasion. However, the agreement evoked opposition not only from Roem and his

Masyumi collogues but also from Sjahrir of the Socialists.

The general feeling of mistrust proved well-founded. The provisions of the

Renville Agreement were broken by Dutch military action in January 1948, known as the

agresi Belanda kedua ( the second Dutch police action). During this attack, Yogyakarta,

the capital of Indonesia at the time, was occupied by the Dutch and the government

leaders and personalities were captured. Roem was one of the nationalists who was

arrested and exiled to Bangka, an island near Sumatera. He was part of a larger group of

political prisoners which included President Soekarno, Hatta, Haji Agus Salim, and Ali

~astromidjojo?~The Dutch were of the view that by taking over the capital and arresting

the national leadership, the Republic of Indonesia would be destroyed. During this time,

when the President and the Prime Minister and most other leaders were under arrest by

the Dutch, the PDRI (Pernerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia or Emergency Government of the RepubLic of Indonesia) was formed. Based in Sumatera and led by Sjafhddin

Prawiranegara from Masyumi, this temporary government attempted to fill the leadership vacuum left by the arrests.g3 The coordination of PDRI itself was not easy, due to the disruption in the channels of communication between Sumatera and Java. In Java, a military government under the coordination of General Sudirman, dso claimed to be the legitimate continuation of state authority. Those ministers who were not arrested

92~estikaZed. Somewhere in the Jungle: Pernerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia. Sebuah Mata Rantai Sejarah yung Terlupakan (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1997),254.

93~ora comprehensive understanding of the PDRI, see Sekitar PDIU (Pernerintah Damrat Republik Indonesia) (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982); Dwi Purwoko, Pe juangan PDRl (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1991). continued to work under the leadership of Sukiman, a Minister from the Masyumi party.

Eventually however, after hard efforts to pmduce cooperation, all those that were still

free of the Dutch were united under the PDRI chaired by ~rawirane~ara.~~

Contrary to Dutch expectations, their "police action" ody heightened

international pressure. The demand that the Dutch end their violent intervention in

Indonesia was impossible to ignore. Moreover, the strong resistance shown by the

Indonesian army during this period frustrated the Dutch who began to see the futility of

trying to impose their will militarily. Roem talked of how the world changed the way it

regarded the situation, moving from a neutral stance to one of support for Indonesia's

position?5

In response to these developments, the United Nations passed a resolution

demanding a Dutch retreat from Yogyakarta, the Republic's capital. The resolution also

called for a conference to discuss the end of hostilities. Roem, who was still under Dutch

arrest, was appointed by Hatta, the official Prime Minister at this time, -- also under arrest

- to become the chairman of the delegation to the UN negotiations. This was considered

a crucial negotiation since the agreement would be a continuation of the Renville talks,

which it was felt, had not gone in Indonesia's favor. As a chainnan of the delegation,

Roem was determined to win sovereignty for his country.96

For more information on the situation of central government at the time the PDRI was formed in Java, see Mestika Zed,Somewhere in the Jungle, 189-209.

'* Mohamad Roem. "Arti Perjanjian Roem Royen," in Roem,Dipiomnri(ljung Tornbok Perjuangan RI, 1 I.

96 See Rais Alamsjah. "Mohamad Roem" in Rais Alamsjah. 10 Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang, 56. After three-weeks of negotiations, however, the talks yieIded no signtficant result.

The main obstacle was a difference of opinions on the proposed plebiscite that was to

determine popular will as to the existence of an Indonesian state.* However, in April

1949, negotiations resumed between the two parties in Jakarta under the auspices of the

UN Commission for Indonesia. A week later, the negotiations again reached an impasse

due to the insistence of the chief of the Dutch negotiation team, J.H. van Royen, that his

government would ody restore the Republic of Yogyakarta after the Republican

government had ordered its Armed Forces to cease guerilla warfare and to cooperate in

the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order. He also demanded that

they agree to attend a proposed Round Table Conference to take place in The Hague.

Roem, as chief of the Indonesian delegation, argued that such demands were

unreasonable in view of the fact that members of the Indonesian government were

dispersed, out of contact with one another, and unable to meet in the capital.

Through the efforts of the UN Commission an agreement was reached in May

1949, and both Roem and Royen read their statements publicly. This agreement became known as the Roem-Royen Statement. Afterwards Roem said that the treaty represented not one, but two different agreements.98 In general, they provided for the restoration of

Yogyakata as the Republican capital, which implicitly recognized the authority of

Soekarno's government, and also prepared the way for the Round Table Conference.

" Indonesia did not refuse the plebiscite but the Dutch, feeling that it would weaken their position, did. The plebiscite was conducted in the areas which were confronted, namaely Java, Madura and Sumatra.

'' Mohamad Roem, "An Perjanjian Royen-Roern."ll. For more information of the content on the agreement see K.M.L. Totring, Perjuangan Politik Bangsa Indonesia. Persetujuan Roem-Royen dan KMB (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, L987). 92-94. With the return of the government to Yogyakarta, arrangements were begun for opening

the talks. At the same time, the Dutch continued to maneuver against the formation of a

united and sovereign Indonesian nation. The Dutch engaged in what the Indonesians

referred to as politik rnemecah belah (policy to create disunity) among the different

Indonesian states that were to constitute the new federal system, of which the Republic of

Indonesia would be only a part. For its part, the Indonesian government was able to unite

the country by conducting a conference called the Konfrensi Antar Indonesia

(Conference Among Indonesians), resulting in the creation of the United States of

Indonesia with Republican officials assuming control of the new federal state. An integral

aspect to this new political arrangement was the establishment of a standing army, the

Indonesian forces, at its disposal?g

On August 23, 1949 Roem accompanied Hatta, who now led the Indonesian

delegation to the Hague for the Round Table Conference, formally resulting in the

acknowledgment of Indonesian sovereignty, as the United States of Indonesia, on

December 27, 1949.Ioo This process ended the confrontation between the two nations,

even though the status of West Irian was delayed until a later time. For the Indonesian

perspective, what happened on December 27, 1949 was no more than Dutch

acknowledgment of an Independence gained earlier on August 17, 1945. As Soekarno put

it, this did not amount to the giving of sovereignty but to the acknowledgement of

sovereignty.lo'

99 For Wer information on this conference and its results, see Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, vol. 6, 69-170.

lrnOne year after attaining sovereignty, Republican and Federal States of the archipelago decided to unite under the United Republic of Indonesia. - 0 "'~oern, "Arti-Pejanj ian van Royen-Roern," 18. The Roem-Royen Statement was not accepted without internal dissent. For

example, Prawiranegara, the leader of PDRI and Roem's colleague in Masyumi, felt he

had been ignored by Roem during meetings. Prawiranegara compIained that Roem should

have consulted with the PDRI as the de facto government. Prawiranegara insisted that the

PDRI was, at the time, more informed than either Soekamo-Hatta, who were in jail.

However, Prawiranegara finally conceded that Roem had merely acted in the best

interests of the country, attributing their problems to the deficient communication

infiastru~ture.~~~Since Prawiranegara accepted that the agreement was concluded in good

faith he vacated his position as chairman of the emergency government in favor of Hatta.

Within Masyumi itself, discontent was also expressed with the agreement. It was

even claimed that a debate occurred between Roem and Natsir over the result of this

agreement.lo3Natsir dissociated himself from the contents of the agreement, feeling that

it benefited the Dutch only, as the area assigned to the Republic in the agreement was only within Yogyakarta. This also Ied to Natsir's resignation from an advisory position to the delegation. In this internal debate within Masyumi, Roem led the faction in favor of the agreement while Natsir led the opposition. Roem asked his colleagues not to see the agreement as a final goal, arguing that the fight had not ended. The agreement merely nudged the international community towards an acknowledgment of the Republic's existence. The return of the Republic of Indonesia to Yogyakarta was a strong start to achieving that objective. Roem asserted that the Dutch were reluctant to negotiate with

IrnThe difficulty in communication between the leaders in Java who were arrested and the PDRI was proven at the time for the formation of PDRI when Soekarno sent a letter to Prawiranegara to form a cabinet; the letter never arrived. The formation of the PDRI was purely the initiative of Prawiranegara himself who visited Sumatra and was supported by local leaders. See the interview with Syafiuddin Prawiranegara as cited in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas nasional, 188. the Republic of Indonesia because of their conviction that the Republic had been

destroyed. By extending the negotiations, the Dutch position had been altered to

recognize the legal existence of the ~e~ublic.'~~Despite the debate within Masyumi

members, the party finally chose to accept the agreement.

More internal dissent over the Roem-Royen Agreement came fiom S.M.

Kartosuwijo, another Masyumi leader who used the agreement as a pretext for leaving

the party and establishing the Nn (Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State) in

West ~ava''' His movement was popularly known as Darul Islam. '" Kartosuwirjo saw

the agreement as poisonous for the Indonesian struggle. He accused Roem of

embarrassing the Islamic leadership.Io7The realization of the Roem-Royen Agreement

was politically very difficult, since it was also initially rejected by the TKR (Tentara

Keamanan Rakyat), former Indonesian Amed Forces, who believed that the Dutch

would renege on their part of the deal, as they had done in the Linggajati and Renville

cases.

Having analyzed the intricacies of the diplomatic process and outlined the

obstacles facing Roem, whether external or internal, it can be seen that the Roem-Royen

Statement played an extremely important role in the process. Through the Statement,

Yogyakarta was recognized as the seat of Republican power by the Dutch, an event

'03 Mestika Zed, Somewhere in the Jungle, 268.

Interview with Roem as cited in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 194.

'05~oora comprehensive account of Dm1 Islam in Indonesia, see C. Van Dijk. Rebillion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul fsfamin Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

1%or a comprehensive account oEDarul Islam in Indonesia, see C. Van Dijk, Rebillion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 198 1).

d- '07 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 182. which led to the consolidation of the Indonesian government The agreement thus paved the way for the Indonesian success at the Round Table Conference, and brought to an end the confkontadon It is clear that Roem's contriiution to the foundation of a sovereign

Indonesia was truly significant. His involvement in the Roemaoyen Statement proved h~mto be the most prominent diplomat of his day. His speech at the Roern-Royen meeting transformed tbe lives of Indonesians who left an era where their hture was unclear as to whether they were to be Dutch subjects or not and recognized them as having association with an Indonesian state. This fits J.H. Ritman's conclusion:

It is clear that Mr. Mohamad Roem was one of the toughest negotiators on the Republic side. After the transfer of sovereignty he turned out to be a staunch defender of the restoration of good relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Io8

Natsir who at first expressed pessimism later said "Soekamo and Hatta could return to

Yogyakarta from exile because of the Roem-Royen Statement. The way was paved to the

Round Table Conference because of the Roem-Royen Statement; Yogyakarta could be taken over by the Republican army also became of the agreement."10g

When the revohhooary period ended, Roem continued to play an important role during the Soekarno era. While the country still had a parliamentary system, Roem sat in the cabinet led by Mohamrnad Hatta, as Minister of State. But he left this position when

Hatta asked him to serve as High Commissioner to the Netherlands, that is the hdonesian ambassador to that country. Commenting on his activity in this position, J.H. Ritman said:

log J.H. Ritrnan, "Mohamad Roem S.HWinSoemarr;ono, Mohamrsd Rmm 70 Ti,296.

109 Mohamrnad Natsir, "Insya Allah: Roem Tetap Roem" in Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 213. ....I appreciate the logic of his attitude; being a formidable antagonist he was allowed to be a generous victor, As the first High Commissioner of the Republic not only as a successful dipIornat, he and his wife approached the Dutch at home with an open mind and corn lete understanding. No more stand-oafishness but cooperation and friendship. 118

When Mohamad Natsir was appointed by President Soekarno to form a new

cabinet after the RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat or United States of Indonesia) became

the United Republic of Indonesia in 1950, Roem was recalled to act as Foreign Minister.

Here Roem together with the cabinet faced the daunting task of pursuing the issue of

Irian Barat (West Irian) which was still under Dutch control.111 This cabinet, however,

failed to fulfil this mission and others it sought to undertake and Natsir lost power.1L2In

the Wilopo cabinet (1952-1953),Roem sat as Interior Minister, and in the second Ali

Sastromidjojo's cabinet (1956-1957), Roem served as Vice-Prime Minister. Thus,

during the years from 1950 to 1957, Roem sat on four of the cabinets that were formed,

showing his importance as a senior statesman.'14 In the negotiations leading to the

forming of a new coalition cabinet, Roem sometimes represented his party. For example,

prior to the formation of the Sukiman cabinet (1951-1952). Roem and Prawoto represented the Masyurni party in negotiations with Sartono, a representative from the

[I0 Ibid., 296.

I" It is now called Irian Jaya, one of the provinces in Indonesia. Indonesia successfdIy took it from the Dutch in 1963, and changed its name. "' Roem admitted that the problem of West Irian's integration was difficult in view of the difference of vision between Soekarno and Natsir. Soekarno was of the opinion that West Irian should be taken over without permission of the Dutch, while Natsir felt that West Lrian was included in the international agreement which must be obeyed, See Mohamrnmad Hatta, "Mahamad Natsir and Mohamad Roem 70 tahun" in Soernarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 203.

'I3 Ali Sastrornidjojo was appointed twice by Soekarno to form a cabinet. The first was in 1953- 1955.

lL4 For further information on the demise and emergence of these cabinets, see Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 197- 256. PNI appointed by Soekamo to form a new a cabinet. This, however, resulted in a failure

to form a cabinet, since Roem and Prawoto insisted that the Prime Minister assume the

leadership of their party.115His position in Ali Sastromijojo's second cabinet was his last

formal government post. Thereafter Parliamentary Democracy in Indonesia came to

end."6

During this period of Parliamentary Democracy, coalition cabinets often collapsed

because the conflict generated by parties interested in gaining more seats in the cabinet.

Moreover, the hard fine ideological orientation of each party fueled the conflict."' The

situation was exacerbated in 1957 when some provinces expressed dissatisfaction with

the central government and demanded autonomy. They believed that Java was receiving

far more than its fair share of resources. This situation led to the creation of separatist

movements in those ared8Soekamo ultimately took action to quell these separatist

sentiments and used the instability as an excuse to increase a presidential role in politics

and reduce that of Soekamo bIamed the multi-party democratic system for the ferment within Indonesia. The existing political system, he argued, was a poor copy of a model which might work in Europe, but not in Indonesia He argued for the creation

"6 See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Canstitutio~lDemocracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Come11 University Press, 1962). "'For specific information on the failures of Liberal Democracy in Indonesia, see J.D. Legge, Indonesia (New Jersey: Prentice-HaI1, 1964), 138-144.

'I8 See Poeponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasionul Indonesia, vo1.6, 272-283.

"'Noer, Pacai Islam di Pentas Nasianal, 351. For more information on the Guided Democracy, see Daniel S. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesia Politics 1957-1959 (Tthaca: Modem Indonesia Project Southeast Asian Program Cornelf University, 1966). of an indigenous system,'" and proposed a new model called Demobussi Terpimpin

(Guided ~emocrac~).'~~Soekamo's idea was to retain political parties, but to change the

way in which they operated. On this notion, Kahin says:

He maintained his hostility to the idea of an institutionalized opposition and continued to advocate that decisions be made by consensus rather than voting. Moreover he spoke repeateedly of the need for a more dynamic society: evidently he hoped to fashion institutional forms through which to combat mass apathy and political indifference and keep the revolutionary spirit alive. Several times he advocated establishment of an appointed advisory council of high status which would not be established on a party basis and would reach its decisions on the basis of consensus. Most important, he spoke of the need for a cabinet of all large parties, including the PKI (Communist party).'"

Legge writes that Soekamo's concept of Guided Democracy was merely an attempt to test the political climate. Beyond his conviction that parliament and the party system had failed, he had not yet determined his precise gods or evolved a precise plan for attaining them? Accordingly, Soekamo's real design for Guided Democracy was

0bsc~re.I~~Its implementation was designed to meet the contemporary situation and reflected his obsession to unite religion, nationalism and communism which had been an ideal of his since 1920.~~'With the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, the new system

'*'Lev. Transition to Guided Democracy, 50,

12' Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In mdonesia, pp. 538-541. The Dernokmsi Terpimpin was in line with Soekamo's konsepsi which contained two basic proposals; the first was the formation of a new cabinet based on the four major parties in which the PKI shouId be included. The second was the formation of Dewan National (National Council) under Soekamo's Ieadership. For the further descriptions of the konsepsi, see Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, 17.

'* Ibid., 539. The PKI was one of the four largest parties after the general election 1955. But the PKI was never involved in the cabinet formation, due to the refusaI of other Parties to work with it.

'" J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Politicd Biography (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, I972), 279

124 Noer. Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 365.

See Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, 316-317. was inaugurated-126Soekarno made himself Prime Minister, and Later was to be named

President for life on the vote of a People's Assembly whose membership was appointed by him. He raised the Indonesian Communist Party to special prominence, much beyond what its actual support in the population warranted.12' Tnus Soekarno refashioned the government in accordance with his personal vision, and all individuals, groups and parties which represented an obstacle were brushed aside. This included Masyumi, which opposed his plans to cooperate closely with the PKI and to build a non-parliamentary governmentd system.

Finally Soekarno found a clear reason to dismiss Masyurni in to the involvement of some of its leaders in the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia or the

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) which was an alternative government declared in Central Sumatra in 1958.12"e PWreceived support f7om areas in Sumatra and Sdawesi which prior to the formation of the PRRI had already begun to show their resentment of the dichotomy between Java and Outer Islands, as well as their resentment of the increasing influence of the Communist Party who received privilege from President Soekarno. In general, the Charter of the PRRI opposed the constitutional changes President Soekarno undertook when he introduced his konsepsi in 1957.''~ Several Mas@ leaders were involved in the PRRI, namely Mohammad

IZ6 This decree refers to the return to the UtrD of 1945 (Basic Constitution), made just after the proclamation. The constitution used after sovereignty was the UUDS of 1950 (temporary Basic constitution).

127 For more information on the growth of the Communism in Indonesia, see Arnold C. Brockman, Indonesian C'ommtcnism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

128 For details on the PRRI, see Kahin, The Decline of Constitutionai Democracy in Indonesia, 586-588; Rosidi, "Pemerintah Revolutioner Republik Indonesia" in $@&in Prawiranegara Lebih Taht Kepada AIM SWT Sebuah BiogrM, 199-223. Natsir, Sjafiudin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin ~araha~.~~~The involvement of these activists was linked to the official support that Masyumi gave the movement, giving

Soekarno sufficient reason to dissolve this party in 1960.

Roem was not part of the PRRI effort to force a change in the go~emment."~

Roem actually tried to mediate the afhir on behalf of his party and the central government by meeting Natsir, Prawiranegara, and Harahap in central Sumatra and asking them to negotiate and bring the matter to an end But Roem admitted beforehand that changing his counterparts' position seemed unlikely. After the central government made an attempt to resolve the situation peacefully, Soekarno lost patience and decided to bomb cities in Sumatra and Sdawesi which had become centers of the PRRI re~istance."~Once the government opted for a military solution, the PRRI power base quickly dissipated-"' The central Armed Forces remained loyal to President Soekamo whom they regarded as essential to the operation and advancement of the Indonesian

lW The charter of the PWsummoned President Soekarno to dismiss the Juanda cabinet which the PRRI considered not credible since it was formed by Soekarno himself and had no representation from existing political parties. The PRRI also called on Soekarno to return to his position as constitutional head of state and give an opportunity to Hatta and Hamengkubuwono XI to form a zaken cabinet, composed of credible and anti-Communist members. For the complete content of the charter, see RZ.Leirissa, PKHI- Pennesta: [email protected] Itrdonesian Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997). 185- 189.

130 For fimher information on other leaders involved in this movement, see Soernarsono, n/lbhamad koem 70 T'm, 86.

131 The PRRI was centered in Padang, West Sumatera At the time of the establishing of the PRRI; Roem went to Medan in the capacity of the Rector of UISU (Universitas Islam Sumatera Utara or Islamic University of North Sumatera)- In Medan, he met Natsir- Roem's wife who also went, invited Roem to visit Bukimnggi, West Sumatra where she once studied during her childhood. When he arrived in Padang, Roem was surprised to meet Syafiuddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap both Masyumi leaders, along with other PRRI pioneers such as Soernitro Djojohadikusumo, Colonel SimboIong and Dahlan Djarnbek Roem was asked by Natsir to attend the special meeting in a place called Sungai Dareh, but he said that he would not join because he was undecided. For firrther information on this issue, See Ajip Kosidi $4qthmWn Prawiranegara Legih Takut Kepactz Allah SWT, 202-203.

'32 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasiotlal, 377.

13' Despite the eradication of the PRRI's power in 1958, the affair was really hastened in 1961. state. Since his presidency had become a symbol of unity for a divided nation in the army and they moved against PRRI out of a desire to secure stability in the country rather than out of support for any specific ideology.

The absence of Roem in the PRRZ movement may be seen as a reflection of the diff'ering strategies adopted by Masyumi leaden in opposing Soekarno. The character of each Masyumi member was, undoubtedly, influenced by his individual and socio-cultural background. For example, Roem and Prawoto, of Javanese background tended to be calm in their opposition to Soekarno, while Natsir, Prawiranegara, and Harahap, of

Sumateranese background in spite of having their careers in Java, tended to be reactive in their opposition. "'

Roem's effort to seek islah (reconciliation) between the hhqmmi leaders involved in the PRN and the central government proved that Masyumi as a whole was not behind the movement. Maarif asserts that if the Masyumi leaders involved in the movement had spoken to Roem and other Masyumi leaders before taking that action, their involvement might have never occurred and they might never have left for

~umatera."~Such a statement is merely speculation, but it reflects the feelings of respect that later Muslim writers had for Roem, and his powers of negotiations and persuasion.

Immediately after Masyumi was dissolved in 1961, Roem, on the initiative of

Prawoto, the Masyumi chairman when it was dissolved, went to the court to challenge the

134 In an interview conducted by Syaf5i Maarif, he asked Natsir whether he knew the subcuiture of Indonesians. For example Soekarno, a Javanese, was not used to being opposed openly, Natsir answered that he did not know that. Ke treated Soekamo just like his other Masyurni counterparts. This indicated that Natsir did not realize his other Masyumi counterparts were of Javanese background. See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Neo-Masyumi?" in Ahmad Syafii Maarif, lsh KekU~2UnDokrrirn dan Kegantangan Umat (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 1 17

13s Ahmad Syafii Maarif: "Dialog Dua Generasin in Santoso, ed., Ti& Ada Negara Is~m,xv. dissolution. Mas yumi complained of the injustice of the arbitrary dissolution, done

without being taken before the chief justice. Roem registered his case but the courts

chose not to hear the case.'36

The central government granted a pardon in 1961 to PRRI leaders and gave them

permission to return to Jakarta. However, they did not enjoy complete freedom, but were

gradually taken into custody one by one and were imprisoned for various lengths of time

from 196 1 until 1967.L37 Roem himself was in jail from 1962 to 1967. He described his

imprisonment as a bbwintersleep,"referring to a period of forced retirement from political

and social activity because the Soekarno government feared him as a potential

competitor.138Roem, in spite of being one of the founding fathers of the republic, and in

spite of a flawless record in public service, was accused of joining a plot to assassinate

President Soekamo when he visited Makassar (South Sulawesi) in 1962."~ This

accusation was never proven through an actual trial and the same charge was used against other Masyumi leaders who were not involved in the PRRI, apparently to remove them from active politics where they were viewed as impediments to Guided Democracy

13' Roem sent the petition to the Jakarta court which decided that the matter was not within its jurisdiction. Then Roem appealed to a higher court but it was forced to keep quiet and no produced resuIt at all. For the complete story of Roem's prosecution, see S.U.Bajasut, "Menggugat Rezim Soekarno" in Alam Pikiran dan Jejak Pejuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmiro (Surabaya: Dokumenta, 19721, 264-167. '" The Masyumi leaders who were jailed included Mohamad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Prawoto Mangkusasrnito, Syafkuddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, Yunan Nasution, Kasman Singaodirnedjo, Anwar Haryono, Hamka and haAnsjary.

13' Mohamad Roem, "langan Main-Main dengan Negara Islam" in Santoso., Tidak Ada Negara Islam. Swat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Moharnad Roem, 45.

Nurcholish Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai Pernikiran yang HiIang," in ibid., 3 1. policies. Roem was later released along with the other imprisoned leaders when the New

Order emerged ending the Soekamo era in 1966.'~~

C. Roem and Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia)

After the extermination of the coup attempt of September 30, 1965 called

~esta~u/~.~I,'~~followed by Soekarno's relinquishment of the power of the presidency to Soeharto, the New Order emerged- Roem and other Islamic leaders hoped that the new regime would allow greater freedom in political life. They considered the retease of political prisoners as an initial good sign that democratic life in Indonesia would be restored. The optimism of the Muslim Leaders led them to consider reconstructing their political party, anticipating that political parties working in a parliamentary setting would be a likely scenario. The enthusiasm of these Muslims was publicly expressed when the tasyakkur (thanksgiving) celebration was held around the ol-Mzar mosque in Jakarta on

August 14~,1966, welcoming the Islamic leaders released fiom imprisonment.

Approximately 50,000 cheering individuals greeted the appearances of the leaden of the former Masyumi: Natsir, Sjahddin, Asaat, Prawoto, Kasman Singodimedjo, and

Mohammad ~oern.~~~During the tasyakkur festivities, more than one speaker called for the rehabilitation of Masyumi. In his speech, Prawoto, for exampie, said that the return of

'" For Information on the fall of Soekamo, see Legge, Stkmo: A Politicri Biography, 384409; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routlegde & Kegan Paul, 1W8), 27-1 59.

'"~estapuis an Indonesian acronym for the September 30' movement. It is now usually called G. 30. S./PKI, Through this movement, the PKI kidnapped and killed the elite generais called ''Dewan Generals," on the pretext that the Dewan Generals intended to overthrow the president. This was the PKI's bid for power in Indonesia, but turned out to be one of the bi est disasters of the nation's history. For details on the destruction of the PKI, see The September 30'Stg Movement. 7he Attempted Coup by the lrrdonesian Communist Party: Its Backgrd Actions, and andadication. (Jakarta: The State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995); Jerome R Bass, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup," Jorrnlal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 1 no. 1 (March 1970): 96-103.

14' 14' Boland, the Struggle of Islam in Madem Irrdonesia, 118. Masyumi leaden meant that the cadre of the Islamic party was once more available for

actions. There is little doubt that there was an expectation that Masyurni should be

reactivated '43

The optimism, both of former Masyurni leaders and their supporters, was

followed up by actions of the BKAM (Badan Koordinasi Arnal Muslimin or Coordinating

Body of Muslim Activities), an umbrella organization comprising various social and

educationd organizations established at the end of Soekarno era, working towards the

rehabilitation of Masyumi. Unfortunately, the optimism was unfounded The cooperation

between the Army and the Muslim groups in the action against the Communists was

short-lived Secular groups and much of the military believed that the Islamic parties still

clung tenaciously to a singular vision of an Islamic state. The new regime was suspicious

of any attempt to rekindle such ideological On December 21, 1966 the

regional military commanders of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or

Indonesian Anned Forces) stated that they would take firm steps against anyone, &om

any side, who deviated fiom Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The statement referred especially to the Communist Revolt in Madiun (East Java), Gestapu, Dam1 Islam, and hlasyumi-Socialist Party. '45 This statement may be seen as the essence of the New Order

Government which presented itself as a correction of what it considered to be deviations fiom the 1945 Constitution perpetrated by Soekamo's Old

--

IJ3Ibid., 148.

t44 Alan A Samson, "Indonesian Islam since the New Order" in Ahmad Ibrahim, et. al., eds., Readings or1 Islam in Southeast Asia, 165.

145 See the quotation adopted by Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics" Asian Survey ~01.8no. 12 (December 1968): 1005. Former Masyumi activists resented the association of their cause with that of the

PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Prawoto, the chairman of Masyumi when it was

dismissed, sent two letters requesting meeting with president Soeharto to discuss what he

regarded as official misperceptions about Masyumi. However, Soeharto did not reply to

Prawoto's request, and the government and the Armed Forces did not reconsider its

judgement of Masyumi. Aside &om Masyumi's earlier espousal of an Islamic state and

association of its members with a group in rebellion against the Indonesian government,

there were political reasons for the government decision. It was expected that the Armed

Forces would become the dominant political force and removing both rightists and leftists

from the competition made assumption of that role easier.'"

When the rehabilitation of Masyumi was ruled out by the government, Muslim

groups tried to found another Islamic party through the agency of the BKAM. This

organization successfully put together a committee called the "committee of seven,"

consisting of some of the former Masyumi activists and some individuals from various

existing Islamic mass organizations.L48The effort roused the suspicions by the

government that Masyumi leaders were simply creating Masyumi under a new name.

After some modifications, to allay government concerns the committee succeeded in

forming a new Islamic party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim

party). In this new arrangement Masyumi leaders were excluded fiom leadership roles.

Soon after its establishment, there was discussion among members concerning the place

'46 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis. Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order, Development, Pressure for Change (London: Routledge, 1993), 33.

14'~lexander Nadesan, The Founding and the Development of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Minesota: Bemidji State College, n.y), 3.

'48~orfufther information on the committee, see ibid., 30. of former Mas yumi activists in the new party. Some said that the new party should have

nothing to do with Masyumi, wMe others held that the former Masyumi members could

participate but only later in the upcoming congress of the party. For his part, Roem was

displeased with government actions against re-establishing Masyumi and resented its

interference in the establishment of P-usi. 14'

The issue of the place of the Masyumi members in ~~~siwas answered at the

congress held in MaIang, East Java, in November 1968 when Roem was unanimously

elected as the general chairman of this party. Roem was apparently chosen on the basis

of his career as a moderate politician who had not been iildved in any opposition to the

government under the Old Order. There were actually some other former leading

Masyurni activists, especially Natsir and Prawoto, but Roem won over them since it was

deemed that the government would object to them.''' His election was greeted with

enthusiasm by the party members, but soon after the election, a radiogram from the

central government was received by the conference participants refusing to accept

Roem's eIection. Nadeson likened it to "thunder striking in clear weather," evoking

disappointment, sadness and anger in the participants of the conference. Their

disappointment stemmed from the realization that the government had violated its own

guarantee to respect the right of Parmusi to exist in a democratic Indonesia. Redking

that the government intended to assert some controls over the new Party, the Party

149 Soemarsono, Moharnad Roem 70 Tahun, 10 1.

IMFor information on the elected board of this congress, see &id-. 52-53.

151 See the interview with Roem in 1969 cited in the footnotes by ICE. Ward, The Foundation of -/ 0 ParraiMus~iminIndonesia,52. organizers decided to delay fuaher election of officers until government "cIearance" was

obtained for candidates, living the board in the hands of the old management. l"

The govenunent apparently interpreted the election of Roem and other Masyumi

members to the leadership of Parmusi to mean that Masyumi had been reborn under a

pseudonym. This attitude invited much protest fkom Mushactivists who objected to the goverriment interference in the affairs of Parmusi. The Soeharto government had stated that the prohibition of Masyumi members participating in the Partai Muslimin Indonesia was effective only until the Malang congress, but in reality, it did not keep to this deadline. The government interference provoked a stormy response from Muslim newspapers and magazines. A noted journalist asked whether Parmusi was a wadah

(re~e~tacle)"~that caught the aspirations of Muslim cormunity or one that caught the aspirations of the Some non-Masynmi sympathisers described this attimde of Soeharto and that of the army officers towards Roem as inexplicable, since this ex-Masyumi politician, originating &om Java, was not involved in the PRRI rebellion. An American observer, Benda, stated that Roem would have given good leadership to the party and revitalized Muslim political action.'*' In retrospect Dawam

Rahardjo points out that the rejection of Roem caused great disappointment among

Modernist Muslims. He reasons that had the New Order government welcomed the

lS2 In fact, soon after he was elected as the general leader of Parmusi, Roem declared his acceptance to be conditional on the government's ccclearance."See the discussion of the term "clearance" in ibid., 99-100. '* Wadah is a Javanese word which literally means bowl or receptacle. Politically, this term refers to a formal political entity which receives and retains the aspirations of similarly oriented people grouped in it. For further elaboration, see Samson, Islam in Indonesia Politics, 1006-1007.

Rosidi in ibid., 1007.

'" Boland. The Struggle of Islam, 152-153. election of Roem, it would have gained wide support from the Moderate Muslim elements and would have promoted an image of Islam acceptable to Indonesian nation.'56

Government interference in Parrnusi's affairs fiom its establishment until its 6rst congress was described by some writers as marking the beginning of Muslim downgrading in the political life of Soeharto's New 0rder.15' Roem himself saw this problem cautiously. He was personally disappointed about the New Order government' s treatment of himself and other former Masyumi leaders. Yet confrontation with the government, he reason4 would only lead to national instability.'58 He graciously suggested that the congress avert such problems by electing younger men to lead the party- Angkatan Bersenjuta, a newspaper affiliated with the Armed Forces, referred to the removal of Roem as Masyurni impatience. "Why are we not patient until the general elections are held? Isn't it necessary for us to absorb the teachings of Abu T(aAib (the

Prophet Muh}arnmad's uncle) who said that patience is of two varieties: patience in averting what you do not like, and patience in seeking what you wanty7159This statement was a reiteration of Soeharto's position that former Masyurni leaders could be involved in

Parmusi only after the general election of 1971. From the Parmusi view this was

'" Dawam Rahardjo, Islam dan Modernisasi: Catatan Atas Paharn Sekularisasi Nurcholish Madjid" in Nurcholish Madjid, Islam. Kemodemm~.dm Keindonesian Bandung: Mizan 19871, 13-14.

157 See for example Natsir Tamara, Indorlesia in he wake of IsIm (1965-1 98S), 15; BoIand, Be Struggle of Islam, 149; Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1009.

158 Soemarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 T',99.

A~gkPanBersenja~a, November 15, 1968, as quoted fiom Ward, Ihe Fcnfndariot~of Partai Mushin Indonesia, 60. inconsistent, since Soeharto had initially said that Masyumi leaders could be elected in the Parmusi congress.

The rejection of Roem as a Muslim party leader was probably a case of "likey7 and "dislike." The New Order government simply preferred leaders that they considered

"amenable7' to their policy. Despite being moderate and uninvolved with the PRRI,

Roem was seen as committed to activist Islam and a competitor with the new regime.

Under his Leadership the Pannus4 could, they womed, dominate the Indonesian political scene as the dominant influence of Masyumi had done before, while the government and the ABRI had already planned to control all other potential political parties by activating

Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Group). Golkar was designed as an alternative to political parties, one which reflect ideological groups in society and was a wadoh

(receptacle) of the army in the political arena? The army also reasoned that it was appropriate for Masyumi leaders to be released from imprisonment and restricted to da 'wah activities rather than being involved in political activities.

As permission for Masyumi activism was not forthcoming, the party's board was taken over by other Muslim politicians who were regarded as being closer to Soehartoys government'61 This may be related to the frictions in the Parmusi board that began to appear in the pre-congress period especially when the government was directly interfering in the party. There were two groups that Samson describes as "idealists" and

"realists." These factions were divided more on the basis of strategy rather than ideology.

The idealist group wanted the direct involvement of Masyumi leaders in Parmusi

160 For a comprehensive information of Golkar, see David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Word University Press, 1985).

Ward, The Fou~tionof Pmfai Muslini Indonesia, 55-56. leadership as a means to get strong support from the Islamic community. On the other

hand, the realist group considered the principle held by the idealistic group to be dogmatic and quite rigid. The realists believed they could work to charmel Muslim political aspirations into a party which was independent of the legacy of Masyumi, even though they recognized and valued the services of the Masyumi and the important role played by Mas yumi leaders. The realist group seems to have been more irnfluential as is evident in that as soon as the government rejected the committee of seven's $arty board prior to the congress, an accommodating position was readily adopted to comply with the government's wishes. Also, when Roem was rejected by the government, far example, the reaction of the internal board was subdued, indicating a shift in favor of the realists.

As a result of the attitude of the New Order government to Parmrusi, Roem criticized the government's improper manipulation of the democratic process and expressed his pessimism through his writings and speeches. One of Roem's major points of criticism was the People's Representatives Assembly elected in 1971 which Roem saw as marked by election irregularities. He did this when Hamengkubuwono IX, first

Vice-president in the New Order, stated that to achieve stability, it was important to create a clean government. In particular, Roem responded by arguing that clean government was determined by a clean general election, pointing to the 1971 general election where the government introduced inappropriate regulations. 163 Roem was referring to the Regulation (Permen) No.12 from the Minister of Inteeor which established the concept of "political quarantine." One of the Regulation's article states

'62 Samson, 7sslam in Indonesian Politics," 1010.

Soernarsono, Mohamud Roem 70 Tahun, 102. "A citizen of the Republic of Indonesia who is ex-member of the prohibited organization

of the Indonesian Communist party (Pa,including its mass organizations or those

which were directly involved in the contra-revolutionary movement G. 30. SPKI or any

other prohibited organization is not given the right to elect and to be elected."'64 The

question emerged as to what would be considered prohibited organizations. When some

said that it referred to ex-Masyumi and PSI activists, the Minister of Interior clarified that

Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party were not considered prohibited by the

government under the terms of its Election Act. However, due to the fact that some

members of MasyumiPSI were involved in the PRRI rebellion, the government

rationalized that among the 35 million MasyumimSI supporters, about 2500 former

members of Masyumi/PSI would not be allowed to sit in the parliament.'65 Roem said that the Interior Minister's move was hardly surprising, given the mass media's pre- emptive report on the ex-Masyumi and PSI leaders who lost their right to be elected. The mass media also reported that former Masyumi members, excepting certain figures, could become involved in politics on the Pmusi platform. Roem categorized the excluded fig~~esas members of the Masyumi board, influential people who were not necessarily members of the board, and prominent thinkers.

In Roem's view, this regulation restricted people's electoral rights and contradicted the spirit of the Indonesian national ideology, Pancasila, and the 1945 Basic

Constitution. He maintained that the exclusionary politics the New Order had adopted

Department of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, Act on General Elections and Act on the Composition and Position of the MPR (congress), DPR (Parliament and DPRD (Regional Parliament) cited in Nadesan, The Founding and Development of Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 35.

'" Harian Abadi, February 5, 1970 cited in ibid., 35-36. 2500 ex Masyurni/PSI Kehilungan Hak Dipilih? (Surabaya: Dokumenta, 1970), 11. was an insult to all international standards of justice. Roem however conceded that

former members of the PKI should indeed be barred fkom holding office, since the PKL

had violently threatened Indonesian democracy and would continue to do so since its

ideology contradicted Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. According to Roem,

therefore, members of the PKT had no place in Indonesian political life.I6' But the

conditions surrounding Masyumi were entirely different. In his words, "when some of

Masyumi leaders were involved in the PRRI, whose goal was to revolt against the

dictator Soekarno and the influence of the PKI, why should they then be excluded from

politics at this new dawn of democracy? How is it that another PSI activist such as

~oemitro,'~~did not lose his electoral right when he was known to be involved in the

PRRI? Why was Prawoto denied of his electoral rights despite having no connection

with the PRRI?"'~~Roem also criticized the government's policy of allowing people

without party affiliation to sit in the current parliament. He questioned the political responsibility of a representative who was not registered with a party. Roem also challenged the quota system of elections which often disqualified those who were elected in the parliament.'70

In response to Roem's criticism of the national election regulations, general staff spokesman observed in an interview that keeping Soemitro's electoral appointment was understandable because he had something to contribute to the improvement of the

Roem, 2500 Ex Masyumi/PSI Kehilangan Hak Dipilih?, 9.

16' 16' Soernitro was of the activists of the PSI (Indonesian SociaIist Party) who was also involved in the PRRI. He was not banned since he was needed by the government for his economic expertise.

Roem. 2500 ex Ma.syurnr%PSI Kehikngan Hak Dipilih ?, 13-14.

Ibid., 16-17. economy, whereas Roem and other Masyumi leaders intended to organize a mass

movement and hinder the attainment of political stability."' This stripping of political rights from former Masyumi activists was designed to prevent their retum into the political arena. For its part, the government reasoned that the decision was in the best interests of a nation which had just left behind Liberal and Guided Democracies which had created much political instability, and in which Masyumi had played an important role. Masyumi was often depicted as being obsessed with establishing an Islamic state, something which would be a danger to national stability due to the impossibility establishing it within the pluralistic society of Indonesia Roem's criticism during the initial stages of the New Order period was stated in terms that were intended to portray him as an advocate for democratic forms.

Despite his lack of participation in politics and especially in Parmusi, and despite his not being allowed to be elected in the 1971 general election, he supported Parmusi from behind the scenes working towards the participation of its members in the election.

From this time on, Roem began to shift his attention from practical politics. Van Royen,

Roem's political rival on the dipIomatic stage in an earlier era, pointed out in a letter to

Roem that although Roem was no longer active in any formal position in the government, his ideas and energy were still needed by the larger environment, i.e., the Islamic

~or1d.I'~Indeed, Roem was recognized in the wider Muslim world as one of Indonesia's foremost Muslim activists. This was shown in that when Abdoel Kahar ~uzakkir,'~~the

"' Sinar Harapan, November 14, 1968 as cited in ibid, 60-61. '" Soernarsono, Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun, 164. '" Abdoel Kahar Muzakldr was a Muslim modernist and a former leader of Muhamrnadiyah. He was also one of the nine members of BPUPKI (Independence Committee) that produced the Jakarta representative of Indonesian Muslims in the Mu'tamar al-'~;lamal-Isl-arrii (World

Muslim Congress), passed away, the Mu'tamar immediately contacted Roem to take his

place. He was eventually asked to sit on this body's executive council in 1975.

Charter. See Endang Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentlemen's Agreement between the Isiamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia (M.A. Thesis, McGiII University, 1976). CHAPTERTIBEE

MOHAMAD ROEM'S ISLAMIC POLITICAL VISION'

A. An Overview of Roem's Political Vision

Since Roem was no Ionger active in practical politics, he used his time to set

down in writing the historical facts behind the estabIishent of Indonesia. As someone

who had directly Iived during the various phases of the Indonesian struggle, Roem felt

himself capable of compilhg a historical record of this process. In so doing, he expressed

his opinions on many topics. Besides showing his concern for democracy, as mentioned

previously, Roem aIso attacked the record of the PKI and Soekarno. Here, Roem's

attitude demonstrates a change from the early days of independence, when he showed his

loyalty to Soekamo and the cause of Indonesia's freedom. But soon after Soekarno's introduction of Guided Democracy, and on recognizing the dangeis of cooperating with the PKI, Roem began to distrust Soekamo. He even chdenged Soekarno's claim to'have been the creator of Pancasila. He expIained that before Soekarno had ever talked about

Pancasila, Mohammad Yamin, an Indonesian nationalist, had already introduced the concept in his speech to a meeting on the formation of national ideology2 Roem felt

' One of the definitions of "vision" offered in the Random House Unabridged Dictionary is that it is the act or power of anticipating that which wiIl or may come to be. See 'Vision," Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2ndedition, 1993, 2116. According to WiKilIiam C. Byham, a human resource specialist, vision is the foundation of someone's attitude. Vision is a person's perspective on the ideals intended. Vision is to answer the term 'khere" consisting two aspects: "what" and "how." "What" is an objective, or what to achieve, whiIe "how" is a value, or how to achieve it. See William C. Byham as cited in Arvan Pradiansyah, ''Mernilih Pemirnp in Nasional: Negarawan atau Politisi?" Republika 6 Fe bmary , 1999. Online. Available: http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetaW99OW15/OPINI/part45.hm.14 February, 1999. In relation to this topic, the writer prefers the term "vision" rather than "thought," due to the nature of the discussion which involves not only Roem's thought on political Islam, but also his actions in responding IsIamic political development.

Roem, 2500 Er MosyurnflSI Kehihgan Hok dipilih?, 20. Pancasila to be the work of nationalists as a whole, not of any individual, as Soelcarno

claimed. In his historical accounf Roem also reminded the Indonesian people that some

monumental events of their history, such as the first national congress of the Sarekat

Islam had been neglected. Roem said that apart fiom being an Islamic congress, this

event was attended by delegations from all over Indonesia The event was considered the first national action of the Indonesian movement in the colonial era, and thus very significant He also reminded his readers that the emergence of Pancasila was perhaps the most important event in the country's history, along with the return of the Indonesian capital to ~o~~akarta~What Roem did, in essence, was to invite Indonesian people to be more aware of the significance of the history of this struggle which had been mentioned in Indonesian historical accounts but had received less recognition compared to other historical events.

Roem's political criticism began after he was released fiom jail in 1966 and continued until sixteen days before his death in 1983. However, despite the classification of his works s given in Chapter One, Roem wrote mainly an historical account of the politics of Indonesian Islam in particular and the Islamic world in general, rather than any work of substantive Islamic political theory.

An elaboration of Roem's Islamic political vision can be evaluated fiom two perspectives, that of his formal political activities as discussed in Chapter Two, and that of the political ideas which were expressed in his writings after his exclusion from the formal politics of the New Order era Unlike some Masyu.leaders, such as Natsir and

Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Roem did not involve himself in the discourses on the theory of

3 See, Mohamd Roern, Tigu Perisliwa Berse~aruh.

90 political islam, whether through his writings or speeches during his Masyumi period.

Roem's reluctance to propose a theory of political Islam could have been due to a number

of factors. First, Roem was not well known as an Islamic thinker. He was a graduate with

a Western education, and his religious education was formed during his struggle in the

Islamic nationalist movement. Federspiel suggests that Roem was more interested in

Islamic practices rather than in theories. He says that Roem was more a Muslim activist

than a thinker, and that he did what he thought beneficial for the Indonesian people, the

majority of whom were Muslims. Federspiel points out that the reason behind Roem's signature on the Roem-Royen Statement is that Roem considered it to be beneficial to the

Indonesian people, despite the opposition of other Masyumi figured The character of

Roem as an activist is also indicated by Sastrosatomo who says that Roem went no fuaher than Sjahrir in political thought and Natsir in Islamic thought, but his practical contribution to the country made him an equal of those thinkers.' He adds that Roem's contribution to the political struggle of the country can be deduced from the results of what he did, rather than fiom the doctrines and theories he believed or the fanaticism he espoused. Therefore, as Sastrosatomo says, for the fanatical Islamic groups Roem was too moderate, while for the radical, revolutionary nationalist groups Roern was too compromised and legalistic.6

Another notable reason for Roern's lack of involvement in developing a theory of political Idam was that he was more deeply involved in the practical aspects of

4 Howard M. FederspieI, interview by author, Montreal, February 6, 1999.

Subadio Sastrosatomo. 'hilohammad Roem yang Saya Kenal" in Soemarsono, Mohammnd Roem 70 Tahun,268.

Ibid., 267. nationhood- As mentioned in the discussion of his political activities, he continued to

Wllhis duties in the cabinet and was busily involved in diplomatic activities during the revolutionary period Additionallyy during the Parliamentary Democracy period, he served in the cabinet several times in different capacities: Minister of Home Affairs,

Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vice-Prime Minister. In his position as Minister of

Home Affairs in Wilopo's cabinet (1952-1953), he successfblly dealt with the regulation of the first national general election which was conducted in 1955 by Harahap's cabinet.

In his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he concentrated on Indonesia's foreign policy, that is a neutralist or independent policy. In his conversation with Fedenpiel,

Roem apparently indicated that he was in part the architect of Indonesia's foreign policy.

Roem said that when the Korean war broke out in 1950, and Hatta, who was then Prime

Minister, had decided that Indonesia should not become involved in the conflict and should not side with either of the two great power blocks, - the USA and the USSR -

Roem pointed out that the struggle was between the two great powers with neither of whom Indonesia wished to become entangled He said that when he served in Natsir's cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had decided to follow the same basic policy as

Hatta ha4 except that instead of merely being neutral, Roem wanted Indonesia to have a more active and positive role. The Natsir's cabinet then decided to pursue a policy independent of the power blocks but active in attempting first to end the Korean conflict and second to end the cold war.' Roem said that the greatest success of this independent

7Mohammad Xoem, interview by Houard U Fedenpiel, Jakarta, February 8, 1967. For more information on Roem's ideas on Indonesia's foreign policy, see Mohamad Roem, Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Penyiaran Ilmy 1952). See also Mohamad Roem "Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia: Lahir, Tantangan, dan Pertumbuhannya" in Roem, Diplomasi: Ujung Tombak Perjuangan RI, 83-89. policy was the Bandung conference of 1955, in spite of the fkct that the PNI Ali's cabinet

was in power at the time, a cabinet in which Masyumi members did not sit-

Roem's final post in government was as Vice-Prime Minister in Ali

Sastromijojo's second cabinet (1956-1957), representing Masyumi, which was one of the

largest parties in parliament as a result of the election8 His being appointed as Vice-

Prime Minister removed him from being a member of Constituent Assembly from

Masyumi in which the debate over ideological basis of the state was opened This

situation prevented Roem from having the opportunity to state his ideas on Islam as a

state ideology. It was in the Constituent. Assembly, where members of Masyumi and

other Islamic political parties were proposing Islam as the basis of the state.

Roem often approached political problems from a legal point of view, partly due

to his degree in law. When Soekarno dismissed Masyumi, Roem tried to argue the legal

invalidity of the dismissal, despite the fact that it was not merely a legal problem but also

a political one? He opposed the ban on former Masyumi leaders from candidacy in the

legislature from a legal standpoint as reflected in his speech 2500 exMasyumi/PSi

Kehilangan Hak DipiZih? (2500 former MasyumimSI Lost their Elected Rights?). lo

However, the decision of the government should not be seen merely as a limitation of

human rights, or as undemocratic and unconstitutional acts as Roem argued; rather, the decision was based on the government's own political considerations. Despite his practicality, Roem's actions indicate that he was still influenced by the idealistic

8 There are four large parties sitting in parliament resulted of the national election: PNI (57 chairs), Masyumi (57 chairs), NU (45 chairs), and PKI (39 chairs). For more information on the election, see Herbert Feitk The Indonesfan Election of 1955 (rthaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957). 9 See above Chapter Two, 68. lo See the discussion of his ideas above, pp. 80-8 1. character of Masyumi leaders in general, and like them preferred to use constitutional argumentation in expressing his political views, as ~aarifposits.'

Based on Roem's writings and speeches produced after his resignation &om formal politics, we can conclude that he included political Islam within his treatment of the historical context12In relation to his vision of Islam and politics, it seems important to him to adopt the ideas of an Islamic political pm,since the ktmovement he chose to join was an Islamic movement, and the peak of his political career was when he was in the Masyumi party- His vision of the Islamic state is also important to adopt since the idea commonly perceived, that an Islamic political party should uphold an Islamic state, can be confirmed in Roem's idea Though Roem's idea of the Islamic party might be included in his discourse on the Islamic state,'' it is preferable to discuss them separately because of the nature of Roem's vision of the two, and incidentalIy still reflected in the debates on both the Islamic political party and the Islamic state tbat continue to take place in Indonesia. This debate has received new life especially after the demise of

Soeharto's New Order, now that Pancasiia is no longer required as the sole state ideology, and several new political parties used Islam as their azas (basic principle).'4

11 Syafii Maarif, "Dialog Dua Generasin in Santoso, ed., Ti& A& Ncgara Islam. XVT. See also Syafii Maatif, "Neo-Masyumi?" in Syafii Maarif, Islam Keharan Dokctrim h Kegamangim Urnmar (Yo@carta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2997), 1 17.

l2 See his works of Islam and Politics in Chapter One above, 19-20.

13 See, for examples, Masudul Hasan, Reconstructiom of Political Zhught in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1988); Rohani Abdul Rahim, Muslims in Irdonesia and the Notion of an Islamic State (Kuala Lurnpur: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991)-

L4 See for examples: Daud Rasyid, "Partai Agama, Why Not?," Republika, 20 June 1998. Online; Kuntowijoyo, 'Enam Alasan Untuk Tidak Mendirikan Partai Islam," Republika 18 July 1999, Online; Agus Muhammad, 'Xedefinisi Politik Islam," Kompas 14 September 1998. Online. Available: http://www. Kompas-cetak/9809/14/0PINyrede4.htm 14 September 1998; Basri, "Partai Islam dm Utopia Demokrasi," Jawapos, 15 September, 1998. Available: htt~://.www.iawapos.com/lSsedal Ssep 1 .htm. 14 B. Roem's Vision of an Islamic Political Party

Roem was committed to democracy, and criticized what he viewed as improper and undemocratic procedures used by the government in its interference in Pannusi in the early New Order era Roem was convinced of the necessity of an Islamic party in

Indonesia because it would give Muslims proper guidance rather than being led astray by those trying to take advantage of them-He says:

Ninety percent of the former Indonesian Communist Party was fiom the Islamic community, as well as of the Golkar and some other Indonesian political parties. However, the Islamic fight, in the political sense, is indicated by the presence of the political parties which use Islam as their basis, such as: the NU (when it was still a political party), Partai Muslimin, PSSI, and PERTI." I5

In his correspondence with M&ciji&I6 Roem said that for him, Eslam is a way of life and the Islamic party is a place to struggle for the sake of Islam. He adds that even for

Soekarno, the party was important "Soekarno would be no one without his PNI (Partai

National Indonesia, Indonesian National art^)."" It is clear that for Roem, the Islamic party plays an important role in channeling the Muslims' aspirations in Indonesia This

September 1998; DeIiar Noer, "Partai IsIam," Forum Keadi'Zan, October 17, 1998; Hajriyanto Y Tom Daur Ulang Politik Islam," Kompas January 1999. Available: htt~://www.komvas. com/komuas- cetakl9901/21/OPINI/daur45. htm. 20 January 1999; RusIani, "Politik Islam di Tengah Pluralisme PoIitik," komp, 22 January 1999. Available: http/www. kompas.cornlkompas-cetak/99012UOPINI1p01io4. htm 2 1 January 1999. M Alfian Mfian M "Dari Islam Politik Menuju Islam Integrafif," 12 February 1999. Available: htt~://~.mediaindo.~0.id/~ubj~l.999/02/12/0POIhd. J I .Febnrary I -999; Muh- Hanif Dhakiri, "Partai Islam dan Islam Berpartai," Kompas 15 February 1999. Available: http://www. kompas.~om/kornpas-cetak/9902/15/OPINVpart45~h~14 January 1999; adSyamsui Arifin, "Mewaspadai Pudarnya Islam Kultural," RepubIika 19 February 1999. Available: htt~://~.republika~co.id/99OWt9/7488.h 18 February 1999-

" Roe% Islam hiam Perfiangm Kemer&kaan ahPembangum Idunesiay 13.

I6h mentioned in the discussion of Roem's work in Chapter Oney Madjid had some correspondence with Roem discussing various Islamic political issues in general, and Masyurni in particular, Their correspondence and the writings which preceded the correspondence have been published See Santoso, Ti& A& Negma Islam: Surat-Swat Poiitik Nwchalish Madjid-Mohanrad Raem.

" Mohamad Roem, "Bagi Saya: Islam? Yes Partai Islam Juga Yes," in Santoso, Ti& Adz Negmo Islam, 88-89. was a common perception held by older Muslim leaders who identified the Islamic struggle with that of the Islamic political parties.

iioem would state: "Islam? Yes; Islamic Party? Atso Yes." This assertion counters the influential idea of Madjid who suggests: "Islam? Yes; Islamic Party, NO?," which was title of one of the papers he presented when he offered his refomkt ideas.''

Madjid's questions the validity of an Islamic political party in the New Order atmosphere, since it no longer fit with the situation. Madjid rejects the refirtation of his argument by other writers responding to "Islam? Yes, Islamic Party? No." His statement

"Islamic Party, No?" does not mean that Madjid disclaims the importance of an Islamic party; rather, he questions the validity of an Islamic party at that time since it does not seem attractive to people in the New Order era

Madjid not only points the Muslim commlmity's negative attitude toward the

New Order, he himself is critical of Islamic parties. In one of his essays, he says:

So if Islamic parties constitute a receptacle of ideas which are going to be fought for on the basis of Islam, then it is obvious that those ideas are now mattractive. In other words, those ideas and Islamic thinking are now becoming fossilized and obsolete, devoid of dynamism. Moreover these Islamic parties have failed to build a positive and sympathetic image; in fact they have an image that is just the opposite. l9

With regard to Islamic political parties on the part of young intellectuals, it may be said that they argue that Islam should help Indonesia's growth without direct invoivement in political practices. Their ideas were formulated during the Soekarno era when Islamic parties failed to build stability in the lives of Indonesian Muslims. Madjid,

'' Muhammad Kamal Hassan. Musiim InteiIecfuai Responses to New Or&r M&rni'on in Imbnesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982), 187-1 88.

Ibid., 188. who represented young Muslim intellectuals, opposed the ideas of the former Is~amic

political leaden, especially those of Masyumi. Madjid does not claim that the Islamic

party was no longer important; rather, his concern is the lack of interest in the 'cIslami~'~

label among the younger generation, especially among university students. Madjid's

concern is rooted in his experiences during his leadenhip of the HMI (Himpunan

Mahasiswa Islam or Islamic Association of University Students). He had received a

complaint fiom his HMI colleagues in Bandung that it was difficult to find new members

for the organization, since university students were of the opinion, "Islam, yes, IMI, no!"

However, students showed interest in the teaching offered at Salman mosque20 which

discussed Islamic but not political Madjid came to believe that for Islam to be

inclusive and universal, political matters should be put aside. He argued that da 'wah in

Islam was the means of universalizing Islam, so that the whole of the urnmah was

involed Thus implementing of da 'wah could be accomplished without Islamic political

parties, which sometimes caused political fictions among Muslims. Madjid's statement that the idea of the Islamic political party was obsolete and out of date was based on his belief that a cultural movement for implementing Islamic values in Indonesia was more appropriate than a political one.

Roem reacted positively to Madjid's ideas, since he thought that reformation meant positivism and thus should be welcomed. Roem describes himself as fossilized after his imprisonment for more than four years." However, Roem does not seem ready

20 SaIman mosque is well known as a center of Islamic preaching for students at the Bandung Institute of Technology.

2 1 Madjid, "Saya Banyak Kesalahan," in Santoso, Ti& A& Negara Islam, 105-106.

Roem "Jangan Main-Main Dengan Negara Islam," 45. to admit that an Islamic political party was no longer important It is odd to attribute to

Roem the claim that the Islamic political party, especially the Masyumi during the era of

the Parliamentary Democracy, did not contribute to the national development in

Indonesia's history. Roem felt that he was a leader of Masyumi, which was a part of the

Indonesian government fkom the early years of independence until its dissolution, and

Roem was, himsele one of the founders of Indonesia as a sovereign natioau He regarded

all this as important and as proof that Islamic political activity was valuable and

necessary.

Roem disagreed with the notion popular during the period of New Order, that

ideologicai issues were no longer important, and that only development issues should be

put forward," He said that this seemed. to imply that people who were involved in

politico-ideological activities were against development Roem that the Islamic political

'' In his writing Busyairi quoted Munawir Djazali, a former Minister of Religous Affairs, saying that Islamic political parties in Indonesia's history failed to contribute directly to Indonesia's development and they tended to avoid cooperation with the government. However, his statement is countered by Busyairi who tries to prove the contribution of Islamic political parties in Indonesia's history. Busyairi traced their history fkom the fight against the Dutch in which the Hizbullah and SabililIah forces of Masyumi joined with the formal hdonesian army which at that time was called TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People's Security Army). Busyairi pointed out the diplomatic struggle of Roem of Masyumi that resulted in the transfer of Indonesian sovereignty As a foreign diplomat, Agus Salim of Masyumi successfidly promoted Indonesia as an independent nation among countries of the Middle East. Busyairi also pointed out that the emergency government chaired by Sjafiuddin Prawiranegara of Masyurni was created due to the arrest of the central government by the Dutch, Natsir's Integral Motion is also proof of an Islamic political party's contribution to the creation of a united Indonesia out ofthe Indonesian Republic and other Indonesian states Busyairi questioned Sjadzali's statement that the IsIamic party avoided cooperation with the government. Busyari said if Sjadzali was referring to the Islamic party's non- cooperation in the time of the Dutch then it was true, since it was the Sarekat Islam which pioneered the non-coopemtion movement against the Dutch government- But after independence, the Islamic political parties were actively involved in running the country as part of the Indonesian government. Badruzzaman Busyairi, "Peranan Part5 Islam dalam Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara" in Endang Saihddin Anshari and Amien Rais, eds., Pak Natsli 80 Tahun, (Marta: Media Dakwah, 1988), 154.

24In the beginning of New Order era, some slogans which indicated the superiority of politics were replaced by other slogans that indicated a change of the country's orientation; for example, "ideology a oriented" was replaced by "program oriented." fight had been for stability and prosperity, since people who adhered to ideology (Islam)

were supposed to support the ideals of development. Roem then asked: "Can

development proceed without an ideological basis?" He answers that Pancasila is a

national ideology that is in agreement with Islamic ideology.25 Roem's insistence that an

Islamic political party was necessary was based on the fxt that Maspni gained

tremendous support fiom the Islamic community, and that the same community

enthusiastically welcomed the Masyumi leaders when they were released fiom jail and

ardently supported Parmusi when it was first established. However, Roem's argument

for the necessity of an Islamic political party was inflexible. He once said in a speech

after he was no longer active in the Islamic party, that the Islamic fight can be achieved

not only through political parties but also through social means and do *w4hhRoem said that he himself could not be involved any more in practical politics but still had an opportunity to campaign for Islamic teachings through social activities. He gave

examples of what he was doing at that time, making speeches to the Islamic community and disseminating his ideas through the mass media26 Despite his strong defense of the

Islamic political party, Roem shows by this a tendency to give way to the young inteliectual Muslims' reformation ideas as represented by Madjid Roem indicated that the task of the former Masyumi leaders was no longer to manage the party, but to continue to fight for their Life mission, not in political activities but in da4wahand educational endeavors in the New Order era.27

26 Roem, Islam &lam Perjuangan Kernerdeh ahpembangunan Indonesia.

27 Mohamad Roe- "Ilusi Kawan-kawan PSI," in Santoso, Ti& A& Negma Isk,63. Despite the different areas of social activities in which they were engaged in the

New Order era, 28 Roem and other former Masyumi leaden sought to preserve their silat

al- ri@habiin(brotherhood). This commitment was based on the unity they had built earlier

in Masyumi period, in facing crises together. For example, Roem and other members of

the Masyumi board refused to follow the instruction of President Soekarno to dismiss the

Masyumi leaders who had been involved in the PRRI &om the leadership. Madjid stated in his correspondence to Roem that if the Masyumi leaders had dismissed these men fiom the leadership of Masyumi, they would have eroded the unity for which they had struggled They would have weakened the mmh, in which all of them were important

Islamic leaders, and would have blamed one another over the dismissal.29Madjid pointed out that the dismissal of Soemitro, who had been involved in the PRRI, by the PSI had not guaranteed the survival of the PSI or prevented President Soekarno fhm disbanding it Therefore, the reM of Roem and other Masyumi leaders to obey Soekamo's instructions to dismiss those involved in the PRRI at that time should be seen as an important and historical decision on the part of Masyum leaders to preserve their unity in the post-Masyumi era.

Although Roem represented the Masyurm generation and Madjid represented the

HMT both were moderate and progressive in their views. While Roem was a

2g Mobamad Roe% "Ilusi Kawan-kawan PSI," in Santoso, Ti& A& Negm Islam, 63. En their non-political acvities, Natsir formed and led the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, The Indonesian Council for Islamic Mission), ZainaI Abidin became the Director of the Institute of Qur'hic Teaching of Jakarta, Prawiranegara Ied Husami (Himpunan Usahawan Muslimin Indonesia or Association of the Indonesian Muslim Businessmen), and Roem himself became active in International Islamic conferences.

*' See Nurcholish Madjid, "Saya Tak Rela Peran Pak Natsir Dikucilkan" in Santoso, Ti& A& Negm Islam, 79-80.

Madjid was a former influential leader ofthe largest Indonesian University student association. Muslim politician who focused on the nationalist struggle in the Islamic movement and

party, Madjid, on the other hand, is a Muslim intellectual who formed his intellectual

views in the New Order era He could compare the various visions of different

generations and had the advantage -bigher education. Roem's goal was to gain political

power in order to "Islamize7' Indonesian Islam, while Madjid's goal was to ccIslamize"

- Indonesia through cultuml means and thereby to gain power, including political power.

Both saw how Islam could play an important role in Indonesia as the force ofthe majority

and become a blessing for the Indonesian population or m&atan lil- 'ad(blessing

for the universe) in a religiously pluralistic country-

C. Roem's Vision of an Islamic State

To understand Roem's vision of an Islamic state* the discussion should be placed

in the context of -Masyumias an Islamic party. If we look at Masyrrmi's constitution, we

find that the party's objective was to uphold the sovereignty of the Indonesian people and

Islam, and implement Islamic ideas in state affairs.31To implement Islamic ideas in state

affairs, Masyumi conducted an action program, aimed at repeats creating a society based

on justice according to Islamic teachings. In external relations, Masyumi would

emphasize the value of the Indonesian Islamic ummh to place the Republic of Indonesia

on an equal footing with other democratic countries. Domestically, Masyumi would

endeavor to enhance the dissemination of Islamic ideology throughout Indonesian society

without obstructing those of dissimilar views.3'

3 1 See Munawir Sjadzali, Islam arad Govementol System (Jakarta: INIS, 199 I), 129.

32 See ibid., 129-130. Based on its constitution, action program and political manifesto, it is clear that

Masyumi espoused an Islamic ideology and defined democracy in line with Islamic teachings. Even though the tern "Islamic state" was not mentioned in Masyumi's constitution, the application of Islamic ideology implied that the state was to be based on

Islam In fact, Masyumi activists always referred to the ideal of an Islamic state. Among the important Masyumi leaders who wrote and worked to establish an Islamic state in

Indonesia were Muhammad Natsir and Zainal Abidin Ahmad, who both outlined their views in their speeches in the meeting of Constituent Assembly 1957."

At the time of the proclamation of Independence, Indonesia was faced with the debate over the basis of the state. In the preparatory meeting of the Indonesian

Independence committee set up by the Japanese in 1945, Muslim and secular nationalists debated the philosophical foundation of the state. The result reached in the compromise was in the form of the "Jakarta Charter," which stipulated that the state was to be founded on belief in God "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic ~aw,"~~in addition to four other bases: humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia; democracy; and social justice.'' Non-Muslim Indonesians protested, stating that Indonesian independence was gained not only by'the effort of Muslims but also by followers of other religions. For the sake of Indonesian unity, the Muslim nationalists agreed that the clause "with the

" For Funher information on Natsir's theory of an Islamic state and his speeches in the Assembly, see Moharnad Natsir, Islam Sebagai I&ologie (Jakarta: Pustaka Aida, 1995); Tentang Dasar Negara Republic Indonesia &hm Konstihrante, vol. I (Bandung, ap., 1952)' 109-142; and on Ahmad's, see Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membenhrk Negara Islam (Jakarta: Wijaya, 1956); Tentang Dasar Negara RepubZic lndonesia &lam Konsfrnsfrtuaplfe,vol. 1,353-375.

34 B.J Bolami, The Struggle ofIshn in Mdrnlmbnesia, 27.

For more idomation on this charter, see Endang Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentlemen's Agreement between the Islamic and Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia," @LA thesis, McGill University), 1976. obligation of Islamic adherents to practice Islamic law" be erased, and changed to

"Oneness of God." Many Muslim leaders were disappointed but united with other

factions to heIndonesia fiom a common enemy, leaving the problem of ideological debate to a later agenda.

Another opportunity to place Islamic values as the official philosophy occurred in the Constituent Assembly of 1957. Three concepts were proposed as the basis of the state: Pancasila, Islam, and Social Economy. Social Economy had a limited number of followers in the Assembly, so the debate was mainly over Pancasila and AAer lengthy presentations and debate, the issue was lei3 unresolved Before fkther debate could occur the Soekarno government dissolved the Constituent Assembly and also declared Pancasila to the official state philosophy, thereby deciding the issue unilaterally.

The Soeharto government confirmed this stand when it assumed power in 1966.

It was in the light of these developments that Mohamad Roem addressed the issue of an Islamic state in 1983. In his article " Tidak Ada Negara Islam" (There is no Islamic

State), Roem shows his positive response to the ideas of Amien Rais, a younger scholar associated with the ~uha~madi~ah.~~Roem accepts Amien Rais's conclusion that an

Islamic state is not mentioned in the Qur'iin and Islamic Tradition and is, therefore, not obligatory for ~uslirns.~*Rais says that what is important for a nation is a knowledge of how Islamic ethics can be implemented, the establishment of social justice, and the

37 Amien Rais is one of Indonesia's leading intellectuals and the former leader of Muhammadiyah. He is now the General Leader of the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, Nasional Trust Party), a new emerging potitid party in post-Soeharto government.

Arnien Rais "Tidak Ada Negara Islam" in Santoso, ed., fidzk A& Negma Islm xxii. creation of an egalitarian society in which there is no exploitation. This would meau, he suggests, a nation with such characteristics is already ~slamic.~~

Responding to Rais, Roem traces the work of the Prophet M-ad in building a society based on Islamic values. Roem emphasizes that the Prophet had completely fulfilled his task as a messenger of Allah to spread Islam on the earh He says further that during his mission as Allah's messenger, Mulpmmad was a model leader. He led his troops to war, delegations to negotiation, and becarne the head oif the community.

However, Roem adds, the Prophet alone never put himself in any pos5tion other than as

Rastifzzf'd (God's messenger). After Makkah and Madinah were united, the Prophet did not give a new name to the temtory. Roem emphasizes that the task orf the Prophet was only to achieve his mission as a messenger of Allah and implement ~.evalues of Islam, thus completing the perfection spoken of in the last verse of the Qur'in (sGab al-MZdd or the Table, verse 3)? Consequently, the Islamic state is achieved in substance, though not in name.4!

Roem emphasized that Maammad is more a messenger than a head of state.

Whatever Mdpmmad did, whether leading society or expanding the Isnamic nation, was part of his mission as God's messenger. The notion reminds us of the controversial figure, the modernist 'Ali 'Abd al-Riiziq, who stated that Maammad was only a Prophet like the Prophets before him. The Prophet's task was limited to preackng to people and inviting them to search for safety in this world and the hereafter by accepting Islam, and

39 Ibid., xxii-xxiii. " The following is the tramlation of verse three of sikeb ai-Midab: "....Today, 1 have perfied your religion for you, completed Mygrace on you approved Islam as a religion for yau-.," Majid Fakhry, trans., The Qur 'an: A MimEngIish Version (Reading, UK :Gurnet Publishing, 1997), 67.

4 1 Ibid., 3. that Allah did not give to the Prophet the right of forcing people to convert to Islam. By

accepting the Prophet's invitation and becoming a Muslim, a set of laws and regulations

became incumbent on the person, regulating his rights and duties in his relationship to

Allah and his fellow Muslims: as a member of a family, of a community and of a wider

political grout To assure the effectiveness of these rules, a ruler is equipped with the

shd6ab, with authority to enforce the rules on those who reject them." This task, which the Prophet performed, normally belonged to the authority of a head of state. 'AM al-

Riziq held that there is a separation between religion and worldly affairs in Islam. His ideas are based on the Prophetic saying "You know more abut worldly affairs-" Roem himself sees worldly affairs in the realm of religious tradition. For example, he says that the ba&th taq&T(traditions of the Prophet's silence)43play a more important role in the worldly life of society includiag political matters, since they deal with that which is not clearly explained in the ~ur'in.~Although Roem did not discuss the governmental system in Islam as thoroughly as did 'Abd al-RZziq, he demonstrated his position as a modernist who eschewed secularism. His idea of the relation of IsIamic tradition to society means that Islam should also manage temporal life among Muslims who are creatures for whom morals and ethical issues are important

" 'Ali 'Abd aI Wq, al-bf'wa Gdal-H- d M@ammad 'ImiErah, (Bayd: ai-Muassasah aLbArab?yah li al-&Gilt wa al-nashr, 1972), 154. 43 The Prophet's hdth are divided into Werent types: baditbfi16is a tradition consisting of the Prophet's words, &aF4thqawficonsisting of actions by Prophef and &&tb re The ba(i?th raq&frefen to a certain deed performed by a Prophet's companion in fiont of or reported to the Prophet, unaccompanied by any direct statement of approval or disapprod by the Prophet but tacitly implying his approval. For more information, see M. Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy, Sejarah dim Pengantar IImu Hadits (Jakarta: Bdan Bintang, :991), 27; M&ammad MusJafa A'-: -it fi aI-&T.rrd?th al-Nc~-~ wa- TiZ0 Tadwhib(al-Mamlakah aL'Arab5ah d-Sa'iidcyah: Jami'at al-Riyiid, 1976)-

44 Roem "Tidak Ada Negara Islam," 4. Roem says that the efforts of modem countries to establish an Islamic state is only

idealism. Saudi Arabia, which people consider to be an Islamic state, has a political

system which is contradictory to the governmental system of the Rophet's time. The

Prophet did not implement a monarchical system as Saudi Arabia has. Roem says that

when the Prophet passed away, leadership was not transferred to his descendants, and a

republican system as practiced in Indonesia is closer to the Prophet's traditions than is the

system of a monarchy." Roem does not elaborate as to why he considers the Republican

system to be more compatible with Islamic teachings. However, his idea can be

understood when it is put into the context of the struggle of Masyumi's leaders to

transform a republican system into an Islamic state. Isa Anshari of Masyumi, for

example, says ccOurgoal is a republican state... led by an elected Head of State who

accepts his nomination as a trust fiom God and fiom the people.'A Zainal Abidin

Ahmad, another Masyumi leader, refers to the £irst four khalifas as having characteristics of a republic rather than a monarchy. He says that they were not monarchs but

"Presidents elected" by the people. The BIZ2 (caliphate), Ahmad argues, existed ody until the death of Ali, after which it was abolished by Muciwiah's introduction of the monarchical system.4yThese ideas were given expression in the Constituent Assembiy and reflect thinking in the liberal democracy era. Roem's thinking on this subject, on the other hand, not was expressed until later in the New Order period when Pancasila had

45 Ibid., 8.

46 M. Isha Anshari, Falsqtiah Pecti-/uangmIslam (Medan: SeihI, 195 I), 218.

47 Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Mmt, 119. become established as the state ideology. Still his thinking seems quite similar to that of

his former colleagues in Masyumi.

Roem's idea of an Islamic state is simi1a.r to that of Nurcholish Madjid who stated

that this idea tends to be apologetic.48 In his correspondence with Roem, Madjid

generally agreed with Roem's response to Rais when he suggested the term c41slamic

state" is only a linguistic means to convey the substance. The means was not the essential

thing-" What ~adjidwas referring to was the Muslim politicians of the Old Order who

spent their time struggling to locate some Islamic symbol in "Islamic state" while

ignoring the more intrinsic Islamic values of justice, social welke7 people's education, and the like. Madjid also supported Roem in his contention that the last revelation to the hophet Mdymmad announced tbat Islam was perfect MAjid said the last revelation indicated that w&yzi (Qur'inic revelation) reached its complete form in the Qur'Zn which functions as a foundation for a system of life, while its development is based on the human civilization and culture. Madjid emphasized the role of 'aql (intellect) in actualizing the mission of humankind as kba.LiXiabon the earth. Madjid posited that within the system of life proposed by the Qur'iin, Muslims can work with other non-Muslims as shown by the Prophet in the ''Madinah ~onstitutiol~'~~What Micljid meant is that the

" See Masykun' Abdillah, Re.ym~t.w.ro/ Irdn~ze.m'an Miilim inteZ!ec!ual:~to the Cortcept of Democracy (19662993)(Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1997), 2 10.

49 Nurcholish Madjid in "Menyarnbung Mata Rantai yang Hilangn in Santoso, 27rLslk Adrr Negmo Islam. 22.

For information on the Madinah Constitution, see Muhammad S. al-Awa, On the Pofitid System of the Islamic Stale (Indiana: Trust Publications, 1980), 15-20; Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Piagam Nabi MuhammadS-A. K: Komtihrrsi Negau Terrulis Yang Pertama di Dunia (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973). system can vary and can inciude statehood, as long as the ideals of Islam are achieved5'

That is why Madjid agreed with Roem's emphasis on the importance of developing

Gtiiid" as a way to interpret Islamic teachings to be compatible with the needs of contemporary society.s3

With regard to Islamic teaching in relation to the Indonesian context, Roem writes that since the rise of the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Merchant Union), its leaden had emphasized the importaace of Islamic teachings without necessarily mentioning the term Islamic state.They said: "'Please conduct life based on the Islamic teaching, without necessarily waiting to be ruled by the state constitution, since conducting life based on Islam will surely never damage other^.'"^ Roem says that in

Masyumi's statutes and constitution the term ccIslamicstate" is not to be found This is in line with Harun Nasution who writes that Masyumi basically made no mention of an immediate establishment of the Islamic state by force in its program." He says that

Masyumi as has no detailed official theory on the Islamic state. Its official political program included only the six items: a republi&m form of state with the teachings of

Islam as its basis, fieedom of religion, a presidential democracy, a parliament consisting of a house of representatives and senate, human rights, and the equality of women in political, social and economic spheres. Nation also indicates that all existing

51 Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai yang Hilang," 28-29.

'' &tiidisan exaction of personal effort in making a legal decision regarding a matter not explicitly covered by the Qur'ik and the ba&tI,.

53 See Roem "Tidak Ada Negara Islam," 11; Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai yang Hitang" 29.

54 Ibid., 9. '

5s Harun Nasution ia a contemporary Indonesian reformer, usually considered to be Muytadli. statements, apart fiom the official short program statements, are the ideas of prominent

Masyumi leaders.56 Therefore, what Roem means by Islamic ideals in Masyumi's constitution can be understood as the same as what the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) leaders meant, namely, the practice of Islamic teachings under any circumstitnces, not necessarily in an Islamic state.

Basically, Roem was trying to erase the term cTslamic state," since he claimed people were tired of hearing the terd7 The question that can be posed here, however, is whether Roem's moderation is a result of his time and place in the New Order era and his acceptance of Pancasila as a national ideology or whether he was more moderate than his colleagues in the time of Masyumi, such as Mohammad Natsir, Zainal Abidin Ahmad,

Kasman Singadimedjo, Isa Anshari, and others who spoke of Islam as the basis of the state in the Constituent Assembly in 1957. To answer this question, we should remember that Masyumi activists came from different ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds.

These different backgrounds contributed to their different visions of how the Masyumi programs should be applied The political positions they held also influenced their vision.

Those who talked about an Islamic state were working mainly on the constitutional level, sitting in the Assembly, while other Masyumi leaders who were members of the cabinet,

Roem for example, concentrated on those national programs that they considered relevant to their party's platform. The political visions they developed were also influenced by the

J6 Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for its Creation and the Theory ofthe Masjumi," (M.A thesis, McGill University 1%5): 78, 124.

'' Ibid., 2. changing political situation of the countrytryWhen the members of the Masyrnni proposed

Islam as the state ideology in the Constituent Assembly, it was the only way to counter

the danger of the Communist party, which was very strong at that time. Therefore, in his

recent writings, Madjid divides the history of Masywni into two periods: during the

1940s Masyumi which was very liberal, inclusive, and democratic, and during the 1950s

Masyumi which was ideologically Islamic- oriented?' Roem's idea seems to be

connected to the 1950s Masyumi. There is no clear indication that Roem insisted on the

necessity of an Islamic state. What can be concluded that Roem was more moderate than

his moderate Masyumi colleagues. His activity in the Lin-ati Agreement and his

bravery in signing the Roem-Royen Statement, (while some of the Masyumi leaders

objected) also indicates his moderation. His absence from the PEUU movement, where

some Masyumi leaders were involved, and his attempt to mediate a reconciliation

between his Masyumi colleagues and the central government also demonstrates his

moderations9 Roem's inclusive and moderate vision continued even into the post-

Masyumi period This is indicated by Madjid who says that when Roem celebrated his

birthday, those who were invited were not the ~~ai.,~but leaders of other religious

communities such as Mr. Simatupang, a Christian leader. Furthemore, Roem did this

without my psychological resewations.6'

58 Nurcholish MBdjid, Dialog Keterbukaan: Ar-tikulanlanMIm' Idmahh WarnSosiai Politik Koniemporer (Jakarta: Paramadha, 1998), 2 10.

'' Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohamad Roem (1908- l983)," 137.

Kiyai is a traditional title given to the 'Urn2in Indonesia.

'' Madjid. Dialog Keterbukaan, 210. After his release from prison, Roem simply pointed out the compati'bility of Islamic ideology with Pancasila ideology and discussed Islamic ideology as the basis of an Islamic political party, not as an ideology of the state- That Roem was always distancing himself from the idea of an imposed Islamic state is seen in one of his essays where he states that when he observed Pmcasila, he could see himself as a real

~us1i.m.~~His positive acceptance of Pancasila can be seen in his preface to Anshari's book, where he traces the process of change in the content of '3he Jakarta Charter." Roem says that the Jakarta Charter is a part of history, and to regret that history is like crying over spilled mik" " Roem adds that the change in the first of the five points of the

Jakarta Charter which became Pancasila is understandable. He says that the words

Ketuhanan Yang Muh Esa (the Oneness of God) can be found in the holy books of all the major religions. Therefore, as an ideology, Pancasila is a unifying factor among the followers of various religions in Indonesiaa Roem also mentions that despite the replacement of one point ofthe Jakarta Charter in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, its spirit remains. This is shown by the fact that in the Presidential Decree

July 5,1959 returning to the 1945 ~onstitutionystates that the Jakarta Charter

62 Mohtmad Roem, Saj=wMene~ma Panm&z Kmew 5@w Orang Isk(Jakarta: DDD; n.d).

" Endang Sfiddin Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 fi SSejah Komertsus EIosonai antaru nusionaIis lslami ahNesiolaalis "Sekular " Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 19454959 (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaarn Salman ITB, 198 1).

The national constitution was changed several times in Indonesian history. The 1945 Constitution was replaced by the 1949 temporary Constitution, followed by the 2950 temporary Constitution Due to the &lure af the Constituent Assembly to determine a new rational constitutios the President issued a decree on July 5, 1959 to return to the 1945 Constitution which has remained in use until today. of June 22, 1945 inspired the constitution in its unity?

Roem's thought cannot be seen as offering a complete picture with regard to the

relationship between Islam and the state. He did not develop a comprehensive theory;

rather he spoke in his capacity as a former Muslim politician, who, when he first entered

politics, struggled within the Islamic movements which took Islam as their ideology. It

can be concluded that Roem's ideas on Islam and the state are presented specifically in

reference to the Indonesian context This is demonstrated by his interest in quoting C-A0

van Nieuwenhuijze:

What stands out is, that Indonesia appears in the world as an Islamic nation and that at the same time Islam is not merely a more or less accurate copy of Islam elsewhere: whether of Islam in lndia, fiom where it first came to Indonesia, or of Islam in the heartlands, which have for such a long time been the pole orientation for Indonesia Muslims- There have been those - non-Muslims, no doubt - who thought they saw an ambiguity here. If ambiguity it be, it could in no way be an exclusive feature of the Indonesian situation. In ever different variants ever the same ambiguity should be traceable anywhere in the world of Islam, perhaps more manifestly in the outlying parts, but essentially everywhere, even in the original centers of 1sla1.n.~~

'The most interesting point in relation to Roem's ideas is their political implication for the New Order. As noted above, Muslim politicians, especially those who belonged to

Masyumi are often represented as activists who intended to exercise c'political Islam" while the young Muslim intellectuals, on the other hand are interested in "cultural Islam-77

The development of Roem's thought casts doubt on that common perception. Roem appears to hearken back to the early period of Mamiwhen its basis was Islam, but at

66 Mohammad Roem, foreword to Endang S. Anshari, KembaIinya Piagam JaGmta 22 hi1945 h &ja~ahKollseltslls Nmional An- Nasiomlis Islami dm N~SIOM~~S''~hfca" ienlnng Dasar negara Republikindonesia 19454959, (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 198 1). ix.

Roern, "Tidak -4da Negara islam," 9-10. For the original wording of the quotation, see C.A.O. van Neuwenhujze, "Indonesia," in Joseph Schacht with C.E. Bosworth eds, Legucy of Islam (Word: Oxford University Press, 2 974), 155. the level of state ideology, Masyumi accepted Pancasila This might have been shown by

Roem had he been given "clearance" by the government to lead Pmusi in the New

Order.

In his correspondence with Roem, Madjid said that Roem's ideas would have a

tremendously positive effect on the young generation of Muslims. Madjid argued that the

clarity of such ideas had long been expected fiom old Indonesian Islamic leaders such as

Roem and that this had become a barrier for young scholars of the New Order who

eagerly anticipated the reformation of Islamic thoughtg Madjid believed that the ideas

proposed by the Islamic parties of earlier periods were no longer of relevant, and their

image was not generally of a positive and sympathetic nature-" To support his refomkt

ideas, Madjid wrote 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the

Integration of the mmnh," 'More on Secul-tion," "The Perspective of Renewal of

Thought in Islam," and "Reinvigorating Religious Understanding in the Indonesian

Mush ~ommunity."'~In these writings, Madjid pioneered the release of Indonesian

Muslims £?om the sacredness of political Islam championed by the older generation-

From these writings too, Madjid's slogan "Islam? Yes; Parhi Islam, No?" (Islam? Yes;

Islamic Party, No?) became popular. To some extent, this position was criticized by the

68 Madjid, "Menyambung Mata Rantai Pemilriran Yang Hilang," 18.

69 Abdillah, Heqomes oflndonesirm Muslim intellectuals, 2210.

His ideas of reform were promulgated between 1970 and 1972. For the complete account of the above titles, see Hassa~Mz~siim Infelleclud Respomes, 187-215. For obtaining a better understanding on Madjid's ideas of Islamic reform at the time, see Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kerakyatan dhn Keindonesian: Pikiran-Pikiran Nwcholish Mu& (Bandung: Mizan, 1993); Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Kernadem dm Keiradonesfm (Bandung: Mizm, 1987). older generation that was still in favor of Islamic parties, but the idea slowly began to take shape in the vision of young Muslim intellectuals."

In shorf Roem's rejection of the necessity of the Islamic state shows that the old leaders that could adjust to the New Order's Pancasila Roem's ideas can, therefore, inspire young Muslim scholars critical of the old leaders to work freely witbout king troubled by earlier debates over ideology. This is why Roem's ideas are enthusiastically welcomed by young Muslims who want to see Muslims concentrating on modernization and development.

For more information on Madjid's cultural Islam, see Syarnsul Asifin, "Mewaspadai Pudamya fslam Kultud," Republika, 20 F&mq 1999. CONCLUSION

In Roem's biography we see different phases in his religious understanding, fiom a traditional way of learning when he lived with his family, to the modem way after his move to the city where he entered a Western system of education, In my opinion, whiIe he was a product of Westem-style education, his involvement in the Islamic nationalist movement was tremendously influential in shaping his religious understanding. It was the modem thrust of the Eslamic movement with which he was associated that placed him more in the modernist camp than in the traditionalist.

Roem's Islamic views appear to have taken shape through his involvement in the

Islamic movement rather than through a study of Islamic doctrines. This may be an important reason why he distanced himself from doctrinal ideas of Islam as compared to his Masyumi collegues. Haji Agus Salim also had a prominent role in providing Roem with a model of Islamic activism, and had a tremendous influence on Roem's political vision.

Roem's contribution to Indonesian politics was not limited to the role he played as leader of a political party. It was not uncommon for him to oppose his party colleagues for the sake of what he thought profitable for the larger cause. Roem's political contribution can be seen in the way Indonesians represent the founding fathers of

Indonesia. When they think of the war against the Dutch, they automatically remember

General Sudirrnan, who led his troops to face the challenge of the Dutch army. When people talk about the proclamation of Indonesian independence, Soekarno and Hatta appear as figures who signed and announced ~e proclamation on behalf of the

Indonesian people, and are therefore called the fathers of the proclamation. Likewise, when we trace the development of Indonesia's sovereignty through diplomacy, Roem appears to have been the most important figure. The Roem-Royen Statement was of crucial importance in the history of the founding of a sovereign Indonesia-

We may conclude that throughout the time of the Dutch and of the Japanese, and from the Old Order to the New, Roem made use of lslamic political organizations and parties for national causes. It is also clear that his pditical vision sees the Islamic political party as an appropriate means of channeling the Muslim majority's aspiration. In

Indonesia Roem did not consider the Muslims' majority status as necessarily a problem in Indonesia because Indonesia is an ideologically pluralistic country. Roem's readiness to work with secular movements and religious nationalists other than his own party proves his flexibility as a Muslim politician However, his fierce attack on the communist party in Indonesia reflects his hostility to doctrine of atheism, a proposition that is shared by other Muslim leaders as well, Roem's moderate attitude shifted to a more rigid and exclusivist position when obstacles he encountered touched the principle aspects of his faith. This is in line with Maarifs description of Roem, "moderate leader but principled." '

Roem's argument against the necessity of an Islamic state seems to be the result of his long participation in the struggle of the Islamic movement beginning with his membership in the JIB, the SIS, the PSII and then Masywni and Parmusi. He believed that the substance of the Islamic political struggle is not to impose an Islamic state, rather, to capitalize on the Indonesian people's Islamic values in raising support for nationalism. He was convinced that Pancasila as the national ideology should not be

Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Golput: Mengapa Dipersoalkan?" in Syafiii Maarif, Membumih Islam (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1995), 200. criticized by Indonesian Muslims because not one of its points contradicts Islamic

teachings. He quotes Alamsjah Ratu ~erwirane~ara~who said that Pancasila is the

worthiest gift of Indonesian Muslims to the Indonesian people in general because without

the readiness of Muslims to sacrifice, Pancasila would have never appeared3

Roem's rejection of the idea of an Islamic state is clearly seen when he quotes the

Shakespearean expression "what's in a name?" This shows the moderate view of a leader of the former Masyumi and shows that Masyumi and its leaders did not aIl have the goal of establishing an Islamic state. One can argue that Roem was not trapped by the use of symbolic language. However, one can ask :why then does he favor the idea of an Islamic political party' which uses symbolic language? We surmise that Roem's inconsistency is related to the fact, that during the time of his nationalist activities in the pre- and post- independence periods, he was always involved with Islamic movements and mes, making it difficult for him disassociate himself from such the concept of an Islamic party.

The strong attachment of the old Islamic leaders to an Islamic party became the object of

Madjid's and other young Muslims' concern, who saw the irrelevance of tying political struggle to an Islamic political party. Roern's association with Islamic politics tends to be ignored by young intellectuals in their critique of the old Islamic leaders, a fact which not infrequently has resulted in creating offence.

Finally, it is interesting to relate Roem's political views to the post-Soeharto era, in which several newly established political parties use Islam as their basis. The Muslim poiiticians involved in these political parties now have a choice, whether to apply what

2 He is a former Minister of Religious Affairs in the Soeharto em

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