DlttFT
1 March 1962
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GCNGO
(July I960 - February 1?62) * Table of Contents
Foreword by the Acting Secretary-General Beginning of the Operation Objective of the Operation Difficulties Confronting ONUC Tasks Confronting (MUG (a) Withdrawal of Belgian troops (b) Maintenance of la%tf and order First ach&t.vefflents and difficulties Measures taken during the Constitutional crisis . Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 Incidents after th® constitutional crisis Reorganization of Congolese armed forces (c) Constitutional crisis Dismissal of Mr. Patrice Lumumba and its aftermath Conelli.iti6n: efforts Re=opening of Parliament Remaining obstacles (d) Problem of Katanga Movement towards secession Secession and the OMUC mandate Consolidation of secession in Katanga Mercenaries and other foreign elsments First United Nations action against forsi^i elements i& Katanga Events of August and September 1961 Tragic flight of the Secretary-Generals the cease-fire Events of December 1961 Kitona Declaration and its implementation (e) Civilian Operations
I. Glossary II a Chronology of events III0 Map of the Republic of the Congo FOREWORD BY THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL
The United Nations Operation in the Congo is undoubtedly the biggest and most challenging task ever undertaken by the international Organization, Since the beginning of the Operations on 14 July I960, the United Nations has hud to face an immense and musually c U BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION On 12 July 19609 the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) addressed to the Secretary-General,, Mr, Dag Hammarskjold, an urgent appeal for United Nations military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against the external agression perpetrated against it, which it considered as a threat to international peace. More specifically, it requested the despatch of United Nations troops to the Congo to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops, which had intervened in its territory without its consent* and to end the secession of Katanga which, it said5 had resulted from a conspiracy between "Belgian imperialists" and a small group of Katanga leaders0 The Govemrient also requested United Nations technical assistance for the reorganization of the army and the administrative machinery of governnentc The Secretary-Generals, who considered the Belgian intervention to be a source of tension which, if not removed, could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, insnedlately brought this request to the attention of the Security Council* The Council met on 13 and 14 July I960. By its resolution of 14 July I960, it called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary- General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the latter with such military and technical assistance as might be necessary until its national security forces were able fully to meet their tasks0 The appeal to the United Nations was the culmination of a series of events which have their cause and origin in the failure of the former Belgian colonial administration to prepare the Congolese adequately for the independence which was granted to them on 30 June I960. Under that administration a policy of paternalism was consistently practised,, While the Congolese enjoyed a standard of living higher than that of most other African countries, the Belgian authorities did not promote their political advancement. The education of the African population was oriented to produce at best clerks, skilled workers and sergeants rather than managers, engineers and officers. Not until 1957 were political activities tolerated in the territory. Arrangements for independence were made only at the beginning of I960, at a round table conference in which Congolese leaders participated. The first legislative elections ever held in the Congo took place in May I960; Parliament met for the first time on 17 Juno and the first Central Government was established on 23 June, merely a week before independence. A consequence of this policy was that when the Congolese \rsra given indspendence they were ill-prepared for it. There were at that time only seventeen Congolese university graduates3 not a single doctor ay engineer0 There were few political leaders with any experience and none with truly national experiences and there were no experienced African administrators. In order to keep the administrative machinery and technical services running after independence, the Belgian Government put at the disposal of the Congolese Government, under the treaty of friendship, assistance and cooperation - signed by the two Governments but never ratified by their Parliaments •= more than 10,000 Belgian administrators, technicians and army officers,, Much hope was placed in the Force Publique, well-trained and armed and entirely officered by Belgians, which in the past had carried out its task of maintaining public order with great, if harsh, efficiency,, On 5 July I960, five days after the Congo attained independence, certain elements of the Force Publiqua in Leopold-villa, dissatisfied over the failure of the authorities to Africanize their cadrgsB mutinied =, The mutiny soon spread to Thysville, Elisabethville, Luluabourg and elsewhere in the Congo0 Some of the mutineers went on the rampage during which they manhandled Belgians in general and in some cases committed rape,. These disturbances led to a mass exodus of the Belgian population, including almost all the administrators and technicians put at the disposal of the Congolese Government under the friendship treaty,. Their departure entailed a nearly complete breakdown of the essential services and the stopping of economic activities in many parts of Stes oTaa&sy» When the disturbances broke out, the itelgi&n Government sought to impress upon Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba the need to invoke the Sslgo- Congolese friendship treaty and to request the intervention of the Belfjlan -3- troops stationed In the military bases of Kamina and Kitona under that treaty to maintain law and order. This Mr. Lumumba adamantly refused to do, contending that his Government was able to restore law and order with- out outside help. In this connexion* Or« I&lph J, Bunche, who had come to the Congo to attend the independence ceremonies as the representative of the Secretary-General^ warned the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville of the serious consequences which could follow if the Belgian troops were called out without the Congo Government's consent. .He pointed out that tha Belgian Government could appeal to the Saeurity Council about the excesses„ But despite Dr. Bunche°s warning, the Belgian Government unilaterally decided to intervene. On the morning of 10 July I960, Belgian troops, following an appeal by the President of the Katanga provincial government., Mr. Moise Tshombe, moved into Elisabethville, Subsequently9 other Belgian troops occupied Luluabourgj Leopoldville and other towns in the Congo, On 11 July, one day after the arrival of Belgian troops in Eliaabethville, Mr* Tshombe proclaimed the independence of Katangao V'ith the national independence and territorial integrity of its country threatened by foreign military intervention and secessionist activities, unable to maintain law and order and to ensure the operation of its essential services, the Congo Government turned to the United Nations„ OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATION The United Nations Operation in the Congo - also known as OKUC, from the initials of the French title. Operation des Nations Uniesr aujConpo ~ had initially three objectives: (a^ It sought to renove the threat to international peace and security by bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo9 including Katanga and the Belgian military bases of Kamina and Kitona. (b) It was to assist the Congo Government in restoring and maintaining law and orderj this task included the training and reorganization of the Force Publique, now renamed the Ajmoa nationale conKolaise (ARC). (c) It was to provide technical assistance to the Congo Government to ensure the continued operation of all essential servicesj, to restore and re-organise the administrative machinery of government and to train Congolese to run that machinery0 In order to achieve these objectives^ the Secretary-General set up, in addition to the civilian team of technical assistance expertSj, an international aimed force composed of contingents from States other than the great Powers, mainly African0 This force* named the United Nations Force in the Congo, was to follow a set of special principles. It was to be placed under the exclusive command of the United Nations and its national contingents were not to take orders from their governments! it was not to be a party to internal conflicts in the country; and it was not to use force except in self Defence. The Force was to be under United Rations command because few governments of sovereign States would contribute troops to the United Nations if their contingents were to be placed under the orders of another government. As to the other two principles, obviously the United Nations could not send its Force into a friendly country to meddle in its internal affairs or to fight against its people. These principles were announced by the Secretary-General before the Security Council adopted its resolution of 14 July I960 and were therefore tacitly approved by It0 .5- The principles and objectives laid down by the Secretary-General for ONUC were upheld by the Security Council on 22 July, 9 August and again on 21 August I960 when the question was brought back before it. After the constitutional crisis broke out in Leopoldville on 5 September I960, ONUC continued to apply the same principles, but a new objective was added to the three already set: It endeavoured to encourage and facilitate the efforts of Congolese leaders to achieve a peaceful solution of the crisis through negotiation and conciliation* Later, as the internal conflicts dangerously deepened in i'.he course of 1961, the Security Council twice strengthened the mandate of ONUC to enable it better to cope with increasing difficulties,, On 21 February 1961, the Council authorized the Seeretary=General to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war. On 24 November 1961 => shortly aftes* the death of Dag Hammarskjold and the election of U Thant as Acting £>aer In order to realize fully the magnitude of the task confronting ONUC, one must bear in mind the land and people to which that task relates. With an area of 2,344*000 square kilometres (about 900,000 square miles), the Congo is as large as Western Eta-ope or eighty times the size of Belgium, its former ruler0 A large part of this vast country, the "bush", is still isolated frcm the outer world., although its main centres are linked to each other and to the exterior by an intricate system of rail,, river and air transport. Its African population, which numbers about 14 million, is composed of a great many tribes having different languages and customs? and tribal animosities among them are still very strongo Besides the Africans, there is a sizable European community which plays an important role in the economic life of the country, but has few affinities with the rest of the population. Many of the Europeans, most of tdiom are Belgian, do not aeem to have fully understood the nature and principles of the United Nations Operation in the Congo„ When the United Nations operation got underway in the Congo soon after the middle of July I960, it found the country In a state of chaos. The administrative machinery of government and the essential services had in a large measure collapsed. The economic life had almost completely stopped, resulting in widespread unemployment. There was an acute food shortage in many areas, not for lack of food but because the food distribution system had broken dorm. The Belgian military intervention had raised among the Congolese intense feelings of hatred and fear« As the Government was unabis to assume its normal responsibilities, the task of maintaining law and order, ensuring the continued functioning of the essential services and restoring the normal economic activities fell almost entirely upon ONUC, In order to carry out this immense task, OS5UC needed the full co- operation of the Congo Government and it has sought on all occasions to cooperate with ita Unfortunately, its relations with Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba became strained after the first few weeks over a grave conflict regarding the Interpretation of its mandate„ The divergent positions of the Secretary-General and Mr, Lumumba regarding secession are dealt with in the section on the problem of Katanga? suffice it to say here, that tha resulting hostile attitude of Mr. Lumumba greatly hampered CWUCvs work. After the dismissal of Mr, Lumumba by President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the situation further deteriorated. Different factions engaged in a struggle for power which increased ONUCBs burdens and hindered its action. During this struggle for power, OKUC adopted an attitude of strict impartiality. At the same time promoting reconciliation between the various factions became a crucial part of the GKUC effort. But this policy was not under- stood and was bitterly resented by the de facto authorities of the time* The difficulties experienced by CNUC have not all cone from Congolese sources. Since independence, foreign interference has manifested itself in many, forms in the Congo. It has been most active in Katanga, but by no means limited to that province. It certainly constitutes a major obstacle to a peaceful solution to the Congo crisis and has made G&UC's task con- siderably more difficult. TASKS CONFRONTING ONUC Since its inception, ONUC has had to deal with a complex set of problems with no parallel in the history of international operations, and has had to devise new solutions for many of them,. For the aak? of clarity, these problems and the actions taken to solve than are set forth separately below, although many of thsn are closely interconnected and oftei overlapping0 (a) Withdrawal of Belgian j/roogs The intervention of Belgian troops was the very ©vent which caused the Congo Government to appeal to the United Nations9 and the Security Council in its resolution of 14 July I960 called upon the Belgian Government vo withdraw its troops from the Congo. At the time of the resolution, there were about 10,000 Belgian troops in the Congo. Some were in the two military bases of Kamina and Kitona; others were deployed in the country where thoy occupied a number of main centres. Because of the tension they generated, the presence of Belgian troops was a constant danger not only to Congolese but also to th© Belgian population whom it was their very purpose to protg<&, for while they succeeded in occupying a number of cities, the country at large was outside their control? In this connexion, it may be recalled that then were in fact t\ro series of mutinies of the Force Publiqus in July I960. Dur.lng the first series which took place from 5 to 10 July, unruly elements did ccsaait excessesj, but the majority of the troops did not resort to hostile acts against, Belgians. The second and incomparably more violent outbreak took place after, and because of the Belgian military intervention of 10 July I960 and parti* eularly the attack on the port of Matadio The objective of ONUC was to achieve the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic and without using force„ Immediately after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 and before the arrival of the first contingent of the United Nations Force, the Special Representative of the Secretary=Genaral in the Congo, Br0 Ralph J0 Bundle,, entered into negotiations with the Belgian representatives in Leopoldvillo for the speedy withdrawal of their troops. It was agreed that the Belgian troops would withdraw from the positions they occupied as soon as these positions were taken over by the United Nations Force,, In order to achieve a speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops, it was necessary to bring in and deploy the United Nations contingents with the least possible delay. The plan was to take over all the positions occupied by the Belgian troops in three stages* first the city of Leopold-villas then the rest of the Congo except Katanga and the two Belgian military bases of Xamina and Kitona, and finally the three remaining areasP The first United Nations detachment* composed of about 70 Tunisian soldierse arrived in Leopoldville on the evening of 15 July I960 and was joined by others in tho following days. There were about 3*500 United Cations troops in the Congo on 18 July, 11,000 on 6 August and 16,000 at the beginning of Septsaber I960. A few hours after the arrival of the first contingent of the Force on the evening of 15 July I960, United Nations soldiers replaced Belgian troops in the central part of the city of Leopoldville= On the following two days, as more United Nations troops arrived, they took control of the remaining parts of the city and began relieving Belgian troops in the main centres of Baso-CongOo Although this speed could be achieved only at the cost of strenuous efforts, the Congo Government did not consider it fast enough,, On 1? July I960 Mr. Patrice Lumumba and Mr. Joseph Kasa~Vubu addressed an ultimatum to the United Nations whereby, if the Belgian troops were not completely with- drawn within 48 hours* they would appeal to the Soviet Union. The Secretary- General brought the matter before the Security Council which, by its resolution of 22 July I960, commended the action taken by the Secretary- General and called upon Belgium to speed up the withdrawal of its troops. The original plan was therefore continued without change. As soon as new United Nations contingents arrived, they were deployed in the positions occupied by Belgian troops. Thus, they brought about the complete with- drawal of the Belgian troops from Leopoldville and the surrounding area on 23 July I960, and from the whole of the Congo except Katanga and the two bases by the beginning of August I960. The next step was the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga. On this question the Secretary-General ran into a grave conflict with the Congo Government. Mr0 Lumumba wanted OBUC to help his Government to put down the secession of Katanga by force0 This OKUC could not do for under its mandate it could not be a party tofr or in any way intervene in, or be used to influence the outcome of any conflict in the Congo. Another difficulty encountered by the Secretary-General was the resistance of the Katangese secessionist authorities and the Belgian Government. The Katangese authori- ties strongly opposed the entry of United Nations troops and, allegedly because of this opposition, the Belgian Government was reluctant to withdraw its troops from Katanga0 On 4 August I960, the Secretary-General, xho had arrived in Leopoldville a few days earlier, sent Dr. Bunche to Elisabethville to stake arrangements with the Belgian representatives there for the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga whichf if no difficulties arose, would take place on 6 August,, But in the face of unqualified and unyielding opposition of ths Katanges® secessionist authorities9 Dr, Bunche concluded that the entry of United Nations troops could not be achieved without using force. The Secretary- General therefore decided to postpone the original plan and brought the matter before the Security Councils By its resolution of 9 August I960, the Security Council confirmed the authority conferred upon the Secretary- General by its previous resolutions and called upon Bslghan immediately to withdraw its troops from Katanga. At the same time, the Council reaffirmed that the United Nations Force would not in any way intervene in any internal conflict in the Congo* After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-^Qeneral returned to the Congo and9 on 12 August, personally led the first United Nations unit into Katanga. But Mr» Lumumba strongly criticized the manner in which the Secretary=Gensral had implemented the Security Council resolutions and II refused henceforth to cooperate with him. In view of Mr« Lumumba8s violent reaction, the Secretary-General once again referred the matter to the Security Council,, The Council met on 21 August I960, but did not vote on any resolution. During the discussion,, the Secretary«General indicated that in the absence of any new directive,, he would consider his interpretation of the OJJUC mandate -li- as upheld. He also made known his intention to appoint an Advisory Committee composed of member States having contributed troops to the United Kations Force to advise him on future policy on the Congo, The entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on 12 August I960 set off a process of withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga and the bases, which was completed by the beginning of September I960, Thus, despite difficult circumstances» ONUC brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo within six weeks and, by so doing, removed one of the main sources of tension in the country at that time, (b) Maintenance of law and order First achievements and difficulties The maintenance of law and order undoubtedly has been the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon ONUC0 In order to carry out that task, the Secretary-General set tip a United Nations Force which at its peak strength numbered about 20S000» But even at its peak strength the United Nations Force was hardly sufficient when its responsibilities had to encompass as vast a land as the Congo„ At their arrival in the Congo, United Nations soldiers were told in official instructions that they were members of a peace force, not a fighting force, that they had been asked to come in response to an appeal from the Congo Government, that their task was to help in restoring order and calm in a troubled country and that they should give protection against acts of violence to all the people, Africans and Europeans alike0 They were also told that9 while they carried arms, they were to use them only in self- defence and that they were in the Congo to help everyone and to harm no one. These instructions spelled out one principle under which the Force must functions restraint in the use of force„ Another principle was that the Force should never be used to intervene in the internal conflicts in the Congoo Because the United Nations came to the Congo to assist the Congo Government in maintaining law and order, it did not seek to act as a =12= government., VJhat it sought to do was to assist the Congolese authorities to perform their normal dutiesj for instance, by undertaking Saint, patrols with the local police for the maintenance of law and order in a given area* When, however9 this was not possible on account of the breakdown of the security forces8 the United Nations Force alone had to perform the normal security duties in the place of Congolese authorities, but in so doing it always sought the consent said cooperation of the Congo Government» Such wae the case in Leopoldville during the first stage of the operation, when United Nations soldlsrs performed police duties on the main arteries of th® city and ensured the protection of its essential services„ Following these procedures, the Force restored law and ordere protected life and property, and ensured, the continued operation of essential services •wherever it wento In many areas it brought under control unruly AWC elements9 many of whom laid down their arms voluntarily or at the request of their Government» Thus the Force carried out its task of maintenance of law and order with success in the initial phase of the Operation. Unfortunatelys the task of the Force became more difficult after mid- August I960. The relations between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Secretary-Generalj Mr, Dag Hsntmarskjold, deteriorated over the question of Katangas ands after the esatry of the United Nations troops into that province, the Prime Minister withheld the cooperation which he had hitherto given CNUC. Moreovers as the inevitable consequence of the unprsparednesa of the Congolese leaders for the responsibilities of independence, the internal situation began in August rapidly to worsens Tribal rivalries,, which had plagued the country before independence^ flared up in Kasai between Baluba and Luluas with added intensity0 Persecuted by Luluas without the effective intervention of the Government, the Baluba of the Luluabourg area fled en masse to their tribal lands in the Bakwanga region* where their leader, Mr, Albert Kalonji$ proclaimed the secession of South Kasai« In Equateur and Leopoldville provinces„ there was increasing opposition to the Government. To put dcnm opposition and secessionist movements, Mr0 Lumumba resorted to extreme action. Sams opposition leaders were arrested and beaten, and anti-Government newspapers were suspended. At the end of August, ANC troops were sent to South Kaaai^ vihere they behaved in the most cruel y manner and killed many civilians, including women and children0 th@r ANC -13- troops were being massed near the northern border of Katanga in preparation for the invasion of the province0 To make possible these military moves, Mr. Lumumba sought and obtained direct assistance outside United Nations channelsa During those dayse the ASC, v&ich the Government was using to achieve its political objectives, but which it did not always seem to be able to controlj> was a constant danger to the civilian population. Even QNUC personnel were not always immune from its brutal assaults, There were* in particular, two serious incidents in which ONUC personnel vsre the victims of brutal and unprovoked assaults by ANC elements„ One of these incidents took place at the Ndjili airport on 18 August I960 and the other in Stanleyville on 2? August. Vfithout the cooperation of the Congo Government which it had come to assist, ONUC faced a frustrating situation. Its action was further hampered vtien the Government itself resorted to actions which tended to endanger law and order, or restrict human rightse Whenever this happened, OMJC endeavoured to induce and persuade Congolese authorities to change their course of action and, to the extent possible, took measures to ensure the protection of the threatened persons. But it refused to use force to subdue Congolese authorities, or the ANC under their orders. Even when its own personnel were attacked* GfcUC intervened only to prevent further excesses and to urge the Congo Government to take disciplinary action against the culprits. The policy of restraint of GSUC was not always understood. This, for example, was reflected in certain remarks made in August I960 by Major- General H.T. Alexander, then Chief of Defence Staff of Ghana. The General viewed the restraint on the use of force as a weakness. He considered that the problem of maintenance of law and order could be solved only by disarming the AUCj, and he proposed that the United Nations should do so even against the Congo Government» This stand was firmly rejected by ONUC, Dr« Bunche, then Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, pointed out that the only basis the Force had for operating in the Congo was the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 in which, acting upon the request of the Congo Government, the Council had decided to provide that Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until its national security forces were fully able to meet their tasks. In the light of this resolution, the United Cations policy in the Confro had been one of seeking to cooperate with the Governmentj it had neither sought to replace the Government nor to make it captive,, The United Nations Force was in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation, and had studiously avoided any suggestion of replacing in any way the former colonial administration. Obviously, Dr» Bunche added, if the Force began to use its arms to wound and kill Congolese* its doom would be quickly sealed, for it could not long survive amidst a hostile public0 Measures taken during the constitutional eriaia On 5 September 1960S the situation in the Congo was suddenly changed as a consequence of President Joseph Kasa-Vubu's decision to dismiss Mr8 Patrice Lumumba0 The dismissal of Mr0 Lumumba set off a grave constitu- tional crisis which t&s ended only eleven months later. During that period,, there was no legal government in the countly and; after a confused struggle for power, the country found itself, in effect, divided into four camps, each ruled by a de facto regime based more on its armed forces than on popular supporto The difficulties of ONUC were naturally increased by this state of affairs. There was now no government with which it could deal. Its policy in the field of maintenance of law and order was to cooperate with the authorities actually in control of the area wherever necessary. In so doing, it carefully avoided any interference in the political struggle under way and endeavoured to observe the strictest impartiality towards the various contending parties. As before, ONUC would use persuasion rather than coercion to achieve its objectives* and its troops were ordered not to use force except in self=»def one®» Immediately after the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba9 OKUC took two emergency measureSo These measures were taken in view of the exploeive tension among the population generated by the conflict between the two most powerful Congolese leaders* Mr* Kasa»Vubu and Mr0 Lumumba* which might well have led =15- to an imminent breakdown of law and order throughout the country and to an extension of the civil war already under way in South Kasai* OKUC decided on the night of 5 to 6 September I960 to close all major airports* The following dajj in view of the dangerous effect of inflasmsatory speeches on an already disturbed populace and aftar a number of Solent demonstrations had taken place in the city, ONUC temporarily closed down th© Leopolds/ills radio station. These measures were lifted on 12 and 13 September I960 as soon as the tension had subsided below the explosive level. Thanks to thorn there were no major clashes during those ominous days. In response to frantic appeals for protection from political and other leaders of all sides in LgopoldvilleP OKUC also agresd to protect the threatened leaders^ and in so doing it endeavoured fco show absolute impartialityo ONUC guards were stationed around the residences of Mra Kasa-Vubu and Mr0 Lumumba* Protection was also given the othar leaders, though not to the same extent,, Indeed^ all political and military leaders of consequence were given a measure of protection by CiviUC and not a few probably owe their lives to it« In the following months3 the continued efforts of Q&UC led to a number of important achievements. In South Kasai, OMUC helped in arranging a cease-fire between AKC troops arsd the secessionist array of Mr0 Kalonji and in establishing a neutral aone placed uradsr OKUC control0 It also parsuadsd the MC command to withdraw its troops from ths northern boMer of Katanga,, When these troops, Tdhich moved without any logistical support, engaged in looting and pillage along the remiss they followedp OKUC transport planes v;srs brought into us© to airlift them to tlieir destination,, In North Katanga^ where violent fighting broke out bstwsea pro-Tshomba gssidaraes and the anti- Tshojnbe Baluba population, OJJUC put an end to the fighting by setting ups in agreement with both parties, neutral sones under its protection* Else- ^ere endless efforts trere exerted to prevent violence,, uphold law or pro- tect Iife0 Protected areas ware set up at various tiaes and places^, >jhsr© threatened persons, Africans and Europeans alike^ could repair for safety. Neutral zones were established to stop tribal warfare. During this period of unrest, Europsansj many of whom ware scattered settlers in remote areas9 were often threatened by hostile local authorities or population„ Whenever possible ONUC took measures to rescue and protect them and, if they so desired, to evacuate them to safer areas„ In carrying out its mission of peace, the United Nations Force suffered many casualties. On 8 November I960 a patrol of eleven Irish soldiers was ambushed and eight of them killed in North Katanga. Another incident occurred on 24 November when AKC troops attacked the Ghana Embassy in Leopoldville. The Tunisian unit which guarded the Embassy incurred several casualties,, including one dead? Here again, wh®n the authorities in power indulged in actions which endangered peace and order, or violated human rights, ONUC could not always prevent these actions but sought to redress the situation by the use of persuasion or good offices* Thus ONUC could not pi-wont a number of political arrests made by the various local regimes„ At the time., these regimes endeavoured to strengthen their armed forces by importing anas and sdlitary equipment from abroad. While ONUC did its best to stop such imports9 its forces were insufficient to control all points of entry, and, therefore^ could not prevent quantities of arms and equipment from being smuggled into different parts of the country. One of the most delicate problems confronting CKUC during the constitu- tional crisis related to the fate of Mr* Patrice Lumumba*, It was this question which so strained the relations between ONUC and the Kasa-Vubu- Mobutu regime that cooperation between then became almost impossible. After the military coup of 14 September I960, the de facto regime of Leopoldville, supported by President Kasa-Vubu, attempted repeatedly to arrest Mr. Lumumba., but was prevented from doing so by ONUC. The position of ONUC was dictated mainly by its concern to maintain law and order, for it well knew that Mr* Lumumba^s arrest would dangerously deepen the current crisis and make any reconciliation so much more difficult, ONUC also held the view that even though dismissed as Prime Minister9 Mrn Lumumba was still a deputy of the National Assembly and therefore was under parliamentary immunity whieft only Parliament could Iift0 Its troops, therefore^ vigilantly guarded Mr, Lumumba0s residence and, so long as he remained there,, ha was in safety„ However, it became impossible to protect him when he voluntarily laft his residence on the night of 27 to 28 November I960, in an apparent attempt to get to Stanleyville, his political stronghold,* Before he could do sos he was arrested by ANC soldiers near P©rt~Franequi and brought back to Leopold- -17- ville. Once Mr. Lumumba wag arrested., CKUC had neither the strength nor the right to liberate him from his captors, but it exerted all possible pressure to ensure him legal and humane treatment. Upon learning of the arrest9 the Secretary-General sent two successive messages to Mr» Kasa^Vubu, expressing his concern over the event and stressing the importance of giving the prisoner all the guarantees provided by law. Similarly repeated representations were later made to Mr. Kasa-Vubu by Mr. Eajeshwar Dayals the Special Representative of the Secretary-Gensral in the Congo. CtvUC could not do more without exceeding the mandate given it by the Security Counei 1« However, nothing was done to give Mra Lumumba a trialo He remained detained in Thysville until 17 January, \&en he and two other political prisoners, Mr. Joseph Okito and Kr0 Maurice Mpolo, were transferred secretly to Katanga. This move brought strong protests from both the Secretary-General and the Conciliation Commission for the Congo which was then in the territory,, In particular, the Secretary-General took immediate action to urge the authorities concerned to return Mr. Lumumba to Leopoldville Province and to apply the normal legal rules» But no remedial action was taken? and four weeks later, the shocking news came from Katanga that the three prisoners tad been murdered„ The circumstances of their death were later investigated by a United Nations commission, which accepted as substantially true the evidence indicating that the prisoners had bean killed as early as 17 January 1961 and probably in the presence of high officials of the Katanga provincial government. Security Council reisoiution of 21 February 1961 The news of tho murder of Mr. Lumumba brought the crisis to its most dangerous point. It was followed by a series of reprisals and counter- reprisals by pro-Lumumba and anti<~Lumranba leaders, including summary executions of political prisoners,, The civil war, already under way in North Katanga, threatened to spread into other regions. In the shadow of this threat, the Security Council met again on 15 February 1961B After a long and tense debate„ the Council adopted,, on 21 February, a resolution by which it authorised ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo0 It also urged that the various Congolese aimed units be re-organised and brought under discipline and control,, The period immediately following the adoption of the Sacurity Council resolution of 21 February 1961 was a critical one for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. After the death of Mr« Lumumba^ several contributing States had withdrawn their national contingents from the United Nations Force, reducing its strength from a maximum of about 20,000 to less than 15*000., Thinly deployed throughout the country, the United Nations Force had great difficulties in coping with its overwhelming tasks. Its difficulties further increased because of the hostile attitude of the authorities of Leopoldville and Elisab©thvillec These authorities interpreted th© new resolution of the Security Council as an attempt to subdue than by force ands in retaliation^, ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel. The most serious of these measures was the attack by ANC troops on the United Nations garrison in Hatadi on k March 19610 In order to cope with these difficulties and to implement the new resolution of the Security Council^ the Secretary~Gensral took urgent action to increase the strength of the United Nations Force. New eontribu» tions were obtained from several governments* bringing the total of the United Nations troops to more than 18,000 in April 196l0 In April, the situation began to improvea first because of the increased strength of the Force, and secondly because after patient negotiations, ONUC reached an agreement with President Kasa-Vubu on 17 April 1961 for the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The limited use of force3 as authorized by the Security Council, was resorted to by ONUC at the beginning of April 1961 to stop the civil war which was spreading dangerously in North Katanga,, Since mid-March 1961., Katangese gendarmerie led by foreign mercenaries had launched an offensive against the anti-Tshombe forces in North Katanga in a determined effort to crush all opposition there. On 27 Marchs the United Nations Force Commanded warned Mr. Tshombe to stop the offensive, but the warning was unheeded and gendarmes entered Manono three days later and prepared to attack Kabalo0 It was at this point that United Nations troops intervened;, stopped the gendarmes and established control of the area between Kabalo and AlbertvillQo At the end of Aprila a most tragic incident occurred when a United Nations detachment in Port-Franequi was suddenly attacked and overpowered =•19= by ANC troops and /.& of its members ruthlessly massacred. It was generally agreed that this brutal assault was mainly an act of madness by undisciplined and unpredictable armed troops. After this incident, the GKUC Command mad© it a rule not to station small units in isolated areas. ONUC realized that, as a result of this policy, many areas could no longer be covered by its troops, but it considered it had no right to jeopardize the safety of its soldiers„ From the ead of April until August 1961, thsrs were fewer incidents. The most important one was the arrest of Mr. Tshojnbe by the Leopoldvllle authorities during the Conquilhatville Conference at the end of April. As in the case of other political prisoners, OHUC exerted its efforts, within its mandate, to ensure that he would be treated humanely and be given the guarantees provided by the law. He was released four weeks later unharmed. During that period, the United Nations Force played a major role in the conciliation efforts between Congolese leaders which resulted in the re-opening of Parliament and the setting up of the national unity Government led by Mre Adoula. These efforts are set forth in tho section on the con- stitutional crisis, but it should be pointed out here that they could not have succeeded without the protection afforded by the United Nations Force to the leaders of the various groups. This was fully recognized by the House of Representatives of the Republic of the Congo which expressed its appreciation to the Force in .a.formal resolution. Incidents after the constitutional crisis After the investiture of the Adoula Government, on 2 August 1961, ths /j task of OKUC became considerably easier. Once again, it could v/ork vdth a legally constituted Government and it did so in a spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence. However, law and order was threatened by several grave incidents, all of which broke out because national unity had not yet been fully achievedo On two occasions, as a result of attacks launched by the mercenary-led Katanga jgsndanaerie on United Nations troops, fighting broke out between them in Katanga. This fighting is set forth in detail in the section on the problen of Katanga« -20- Another series of incidents waa related to the ANC campaign, late in , to occupy North Katanga* In connexion with this military campaign, •which is discribed in the section on the problem of Katanga^ a number of grave incidents were caused by undisciplined AKC elements„ At the beginning r,;.of Hcvember 1961, AKG soldiers of the Leopoldville Grouping assaulted : "several Belgian women in Luluabourg. On 11 Novembers AKC soldiers of the Stanleyville Grouping massacred 13 O&UC aircrew members of Italian mtionality in Kindu* Tvro days laters AKC soldiers of the same Grouping $ who had just entered Albertville, began to loot houses and threaten civilians there» On 1 January 1962, 22 European missionaries and an [email protected] number of Africans were killed in Kongolo by AKC soldiers, also from Stanleyville„ in an incident reminiscent of the Kindu massacre*. In the first three cases, as soon as GNUC learned of the incidents„ it intervened to restore law and order, and to protect the threatened population. It could not take punitive action which lay clearly with Congolese authorities* but it urged the Congo Government to exert every effort to ensure that those guilty would be quickly found aid severely punished. In the case of Kindu, where United Nations personnel were involved, a Joint investigation commission mas set up by CKUC and the Congo Government to investigate the incident and identify the culprits» As regards the Kongolo incident, the December hostilities in Elisabethville had obliged CNUC to withdraw most of its troops from North Katanga and there were no United Nations troops in or near Kongolo at the time of the incident. ONUC immediately urged the Congo Government to take speedy action to identify and punish the culprits and to prevent the recurrence of like incidents, and offered all possible assistance to achieve those objectiveso With the agreement of the Government two officers of the Nigerian contingent later went to Kongolos investigated the incident and organized the evacuation of the threatened persons from the area? Finally, an important incident took place in Stanleyville in January 1962,, As a result of deteriorating relations between the Congo Government and Mr a Antoine Gisenga? fighting broke out on 13 January between pro-Gisonga gendarmes and AKC troops led by General 7ictor Lundula9 t&ich were now loyal to the Central Government,, The fighting, v&ich resulted in 14 deaths^ stopped the next morning when the gendarmes surrendered to General Lundula0 =21- During the fighting, ONUC troops were on guard throughout the city to pro- tect the civilian population, bub did not have to intervene* After the gendarmes had surrendereds ONUC assisted AftC troops in disarming them at the request of the Central Government. After the fighting, Mr. Gizenga was censured by ths Chamber of Representatives and dismissed from the post of Vice-Prime Ministers and the Central Government ordered a judicial investigation to determine his responsibilities in the inddento Here again, ONUC scrupulously avoided any interference in the internal political struggle, but sought to ensure the observance of the law. The Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, addressed [I to Prime Minister Adoula a personal appeal in this connexion and was given full assurance that Mr. Gizenga would be granted all practical and legal safeguards for the protection of his interests0 Mr» Gizenga was brought to Leopoldville on 20 January 1962 in an ONUC plane, at his request and with the agreement of the Government, and he spent his first two days there at ONUC Headquarters. He left OMJC Headquarters on 22 January voluntarily and after informing ONUC that it was relieved of all responsibilities for his personal protection. Re-organization of Congolese armed forces In going over the United Nations Operation in the Congo as regards the maintenance of law and order, one cannot fail to observe that all the grave incidents have been caused by unruly elements of Congolese armed forces, whether they be part of the ANC, the Katanga gendarmerie or the Kalonji forceso From the outset, it has been considered an essential task of CKUC to assist the Congo Government in establishing discipline in armed forces. These armed forces were to be brought under unified command, the unruly elements eliminated and the remaining ones rs-organizod and restrained,? In order to achieve these objectives, ONUC has offered full support and co- operation to the Congo Government,, Thus, in August I960, ONUC took the first step toward the reorganization of AKC when the Deputy Commsader of the United Nations Force, Genaral Ben Hamou Kettani, was appointed as adviser to the AKC at the request of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Shortly after this appointment, the ANC began to re-form in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and men,, But this =22- programme was interrupted at the end of August because of the Government's plan to Invade Kasai and Katanga, and later ONUC was compelled to abandon it altogether because of the political struggle which began in September I960. After the setting up of the Adoula Government, in August 196ls CNUC's efforts were resumed. General Mengasha lyassu, who was appointed to con- tinue General K«ttani°s work, has prepared a re-organisation programme which is designed to be carried out in full cooperation with the Government. It is hoped that with the improving political situation this programme can be successfully completed0 C&'UC will exert all possible efforts to that end* in order that the national security forces of the Republic of the Congo might be able fully to meet their tasks , (c) Constitutional Crisis Dismissal of- Mr0- Patrice Lumumba and its aftermath The task of ONUC was made immeasurably more difficult at the beginning of September I960 by an event not foreseen when its mandate was defined by the Security Council* On 5 September, the Chief of State9 Mr. Joseph invoking the power which, he claimed; was vested in him by the dismissed Mr. Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister of the Congo0 This decision set off a grave constitutional crisis which was to sad only H months later « During that period there was no generally accepted central government in the country j and its parliament was kept from functioning. In the days following the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba , utter confusion prevailed in Lsopaldville „ Mr« Lumumba refused to recognize Mr. Kas decision and in turn dismissed him as Chief of Statep Parliament supported Mre Lumumba although it refused to endorse his decision to dismiss the Chief of State;, but Parliament itself was soon suspended by Mr» Kasa»Vubu0 Each contending party sought the support of the araiy and, whenever it eouldj, ordered the arrest of its opponents. On 24 September I960 3 General Joseph Mobutu^, then Colonel and Chief of Staff of AKC9 imposed by a coup an assay- backed regime run by & College of Commissiojws and suppos-ting MTO Kasa~Vubu0 But the coup was not fully effective in that Mr0 Limumba and his supporters resisted the Commissioners0 authority. -23= Naturally, the contending parties turned to OKUC for recognition and support. ONUC continued its policy of avoiding intervening or taking sides in the internal conflicts under way. While it recognised the unimpaired status of Mr. Kasa»Vubu as Chief of State* it refused to help him achieve political aims by force andp in particular, to recognise the College of Commissioners supported by him. Without interfering directly9 it favoured a speedy return to legality through reconciliation between Congolese leaders and encouraged the efforts being made towards that endc Several moves were made at the time by Parliament leaders and others to reconcile Mr* Kasa=Vubu and 1'iTo Lumumba* Unfortunately, none of then yielded positive results. The crisis was examined by the Security Council from 14 to 1? September I960 and, when it failed to take a decision, by the General Assembly from 17 to 20 September. By its resolution of 20 September 1960$ the General Assembly fully supported the position taken by the Secretary-General. in an effort to solve the constitutional crisis, it appealed to all Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution, by peaceful means,, of all their internal conflicts and requested the Advisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission to assist them in that endeavour. During the meeting of the Security Council two Congolese delegations? one appointed by Mr. Kasa-Vubu and the other by Mr. Lumumba, were sent to Hew York, but neither could win approval^ Two months later, during the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly,, Mr. Kasa-Vubu himself came to New York as the Head of his delegation, which v&s seated by the General Assembly after a long and bitter debate,, The decision of tha General Assembly considerably enhanced Mre Kasa-Vubu°s personal prestige8 but did not bring an immediate solution to the crisis,, In the meantime, the internal situation rapidly worsened in the Congo« While the College of Commissioners consolidated its position in Leopoldvilles Mrc Antoine Gizenga, acting on behalf of Mr, Lumumba, succeeded in establish- ing a government in Stanleyville which was formally recognized as the legitimate government of the Republic by a number of Member States* With the support of the local AHC troops, led by General Victor Lundula, Mr0 Giaenga extended hia authority, beyond the Oriental province, to Kivu and the northern part of Katanga0 At the same time, the secessionist governments o* Mr. Moise Tshcmbe and Mr. Albert Kalonji consolidated their hold relatively over South Katanga and South Kasai with the aetiv® assistance of certain foreign powers. Thus the Congo was divided into four major rival cramps o efforts OMJCh efforts at that time ivere mainly directed at two objectivss „ On the one tand, ONUC endeavoured to prevent the leaders holding the reins of power from using force to subdue their opponents within or outside the zones they controlled. On the other , it encouraged all leaders to saek a solution of thsi.' differences through negotiation and conciliation, Conciliation efforts were also made by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the C-mgo, established under the General Assssnbly resolution of 20 September I960, This Commission, which was composed of representatives of African and Asian cc/intries having contributed troops to the United Nations Force, visited th© Congo >t the beginning of the year 19610 After spending seven weeks in the countiv the Commission eanve to the conclusion that, whil® there was among most leadevs a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to achieve peaceful tolutions to the crisis, a small number of other leaders, among the very persons holding the reins of power, appeared to prefer a military rather than a political and constitutional solution,, Because of their uncooperative md intransigent attitude the attempts made by the Commission to reconcile fio opposing groups had not led to positive result 30 Th® Cesnmission also cam to the conclusion that the crisis could : be solved only if Parliament was reconvened and a national unity government approved by it and that one of the nain obstacles to a speedy solution was foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo0 These views were very similar to vhose expressed by the Secretary- General. "they were largely reflected in the decision taken by the Security Council., which met at the end of February 1961, to examine once again the Congo problem. In its resolution of 21 February 1961, the Security Council urged that Parliament be convened and that the necessary measures of protection be taken in that connexion » It also expressed the view that the solution of the Congo problem lay in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside, that there could be no solution without con- ciliation and that the imposition of any solution, including the formation -25- I of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issue, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and of threat to international peace and security. After January 19619 a number of steps were taken by various Congolese leaders in an attempt to solve the crisis. On 25 January a preliminary round table conference was sponsored by Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu in Leopoldville0 It was boycotted by pro-Lumumba and pro-Tsfeombe leaderss which considerably limited its usefulness* However, at the end of the conference^ Mr. Kasa-Vubu decided to replace the College of Commissioners by a provisional government headed by Mr, Joseph Ileo, a decision which was considered by the Conciliation Commission as a step in the right direction*, At the beginning of March 1961, a conference was held in Tananarive^ Malagasy Republic^ on the proposal of Mr« Moise Tshcmbe, It was attended by a number of top Congolese leaders9 but Mr. Antoine Gisengap who had first agreed to ccme9 did not show up. The Tananarive Conference proposed that the Congo be turned into a confederation of sovereign States «> Under the proposed arrangements^ the Central Government would be abolished^ and legislative and executive powers vested in the individual States0 The Conference also provided for the establishment of new States, but did not determine the criteria to be followed in that connexion. This decision led Congolese leaders, through personal ambition and tribal animosities, to lay claims for the creation of a score of new Stateso But the influence of the Tananarive Conference was short-lived. Soon thereafter* Mr« Kasa=»Vubu and other leaders revised their positions and made it clear that tha decisions of Tananarive were mere statements of intentions ands unless approved by Parliament9 had no force of Iaw0 Some time later* on 24 April I96ls a more important conference was convened in Coquilhatvillos on the proposal of Mr0 Kasa°*>Vubu* Mr0 Gisenga again refused to attend. MrD Tehombe eam^nd sought to re-create the Tananarive situation. When his attempt was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the representatives, he decided to boycott the conference, but as he prepared to fly back to Eligabethville* he was arrested by the Lecpoldvilla authorities. The conference continued Mvertheless, and at the conclusion of its work; it recommended a re-organization of the govern- ment- structure of the Congo on a federal basis., From the outset» it had =-26= been made clear that the decisions of the Conference would have to be endorsed by Parliament, and during the conference, on 12 May, President Kasa-Vubu announced that Parliament would be re-opened in the near future and requested United Nations assistance and protection for this purpose. While carefully avoiding interference in the discussions between Congolese leaders, ONUC facilitated those discussions whenever it was requested to do so. Thus it placed a guard at the site of the preliminary round table conference in Leopoldville,, It agreed to facilitate Mr. Gisengaes trip to Tananarive when he first accepted to go there. Before the Coquil- hatville Conference9 Mr. ClSophas Kamitatu went to Stanleyville oh an CMUC plane in an effort to bring about a rapprochement between Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Kasa^Vubu,, Re?opening of Parliament After Mr0 Kasa-Vubu announced his intention to reconvene Parliamentfi ONUC spared no efforts to help achieve this purpose. An essential condition for reconvening Parliament was a rapprochement between leaders of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville groups« To these two groups belonged the great majority of parliamentarians and, if one of them refused to attend Parliament meetings"t there -would be no quorum0 But ths maaory of Mr* Patrice Lumumba "s death and its aftermath was still vivid and leaders of the two groups were divided by deep suspicion and distrust. Through good offices and persuasion, ONUC officials did everything possible to dissipate their mutual suspicion and lay the ground for negotiations between than,, After Mr* Kasa-Vubu called the Parliament session in Leopoldville, Mr« Gizenga condemned his bid as illegal and ordered Parliament to meet in Kamlnao Thanks to ONUC'3 good offices, Mr0 Gizenga softened his stand and agreed not to insist on Katnina provided that full protection were given to parliamentarians by ONUC. Later, a meeting between Lsopoldville and Stanley- ville representatives was arranged in Leopoldville, under ONUC auspices, to consider the modalities of the re-opening of Parliament,, The Stanleyville representatives were brought to Leopoldville in an ONUC aircraft and the meeting took place at OKUC Headquarters, After long discussions, an agreement was reached by the representatives of the two groups., At their joint request, QNUC accepted the responsibility for making arrangements for the session of Parliament and ensuring full protection to the parliamentarians„ -27- In accordance with the request made by both delegations^ OKUC also sought to persuade Congolese leaders of South Kasai and South Katanga to subscribe to the agreement on the reconvening of Parliament,, Both Mr<> Albert Kalonji and Mr. Moise Tshombe, who was released from confinement by the Leopoldville authorities on 22 June 1961, promised to cooperate„ Mr, Tshombe even signed a protocol calling for the reconvening of Parliaments but he changed his position after he returned to E3isabethville0 Parliament re~opsned on 22 July with more thin 200 — out of a total of 221 =*= members attending. Most of them were brought to Leopoldville with the assistance of CNUCU On 2 August 196l? Mr. Cyrilla Adoulas at the request of President Kasa-fVubu, constituted a government of national unity^ which was unanimously approved by both Chambers,, Remaining obstacles With the approval of the national unity government, the constitutional crisis -was ended. In response to a letter from Prime Minister Adoula, the Secretary-General confirmed that the United Nations would, deal with his Government as the Central Government of the Republic and that whatever aid and support the United Nations was in a position to give to the Congo would be rendered to his Government. Howevers there still remained two obstacles to. the achievement of full national unity. One obstacle to full national unity relates to the secessionist activities of Mr. Tshombe. Soon after the re~opening of Parliament, Mr. Tshombe somewhat softened his stand and allowed the parliamentarians of his party t«> participate in the work of Parliament« However, he himself resnained in Elisabethville and showed no intention of relinquishing the powers he Meld isa Katanga0 When all attempts at negotiations f;/ileds Prime Minister Adoula resorted to sterner action. In order to xwov© what it believed to be the main obstacle to a peaceful solution of the Katanga question, the Central Government formally ordered the expuleiox of mercenaries serving in Katanga and requested CNUC to assist it in carrying cut this decision. The efforts made by ONUC to remove the mercenaries from Katanga, and the hostilities which broke out when merc@nary»lsd gendamsss attacked United Nations forces are dealt with in the sections on law and order and on mercenaries*, -28- After almost four months of hopeless deadlock* the problem of Katanga seemed to be nearer a solution in December 19610 Following a request made by Mr. Tshombe on 14 Decembers 3 meeting was arranged at Kitona, in Leopoldville Province, between him and Prime Minister Adoula with the assistance of the United States Ambassador in the Congo and ONUC0 At ths conclusion of the Kitona talks, on the night of 20/21 December 196ls Mr» Tshombe signed an eight=»point declaration in which he accepted the applica- tion of the Loi fondamentalg>, recognized the authority of the Central Govem- mant and pledged himself to ensure respect of the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council,, Since then, ONUC has bssn exerting all possible efforts? through parsuasion and good offices, to ensure that the provisions of the Kitona Declaration will be fully observed., as an indis- pensable step toward the solution of the problem of Katanga by peaceful means» The other obstacle was the equivocal attitude of Mr. Antoine Gizenga* At the time of the re-opening of Parliament, he had remained in Stanleyville and9 although he was appointed Vice=Prime Minister in the new governmentft made no move to proceed to Leopoldville. Mr0 Adoula endeavoured to secure his cooperation with the active assistance of other Stanleyville leaders and ONUC* His efforts seemed at first successful. On 7 August 196ls Hr0 Gisenga recognized the Adoula Government as the sole legal government of the Republic,, Four Keeks later he came back to Leopoldville to assume the post of Viee=PrimQ Minister and accompanied Mr. Adoula in that capacity to a conference of none-aligned nations in Belgrade9 Yugoslavia. Howeverf Mr. Giaenga left again u for Stanleyville at the beginning of ctobers ostensibly to collect earns personal effects* and refused to return to Leopoldville despite the many appeals from Mr0 Adoula» While he was in Stanleyvillef he attempted to form a new partya the Pana-Lumumba,, and made several statements strongly hostile to the Government„i. On 6 January 1962, the Chamber of Representatives adopted a resolution ordering Mr0 Gisenga to return without delay to answer charges of secessionisnu Mr0 Gizenga refused to obey the order and his defiant attitude lad to the fighting^, on 13 January 1962, between gendarmes supporting him and ANC troops loyal to the Government9 which was easily won by the latter. Thereafters Mr« Gizenga was dismissed from the post of Vice-Prime I Minister following a motion of censure by the Chamber of Representatives^, -29- The Stanleyville incident considerably increased the authority of the Central Government, which is now in control of all regions of the Congos except South Katanga» 30 (d) Problem of Katanga Movement toward SecBsaion The Congo, which became independent on 3C' June I960 and was recommended for membership in the United Nations on 7 July, was a well-defined entity consisting of six provinces. 7or three-quarters of a century it had been governed as a unit, the provinces being regarded as mere administrative divisions. TJhen the political future of the Congo was discussed at the Brussels round-table conference at the beginning of I960, all Congolese leaders agreed that "the Congo within its present frontiers shall constitute an independent State, the inhabitants of which .,„ possess one and the same nationality". The Loi fondamentale which took into account the varying views expressed by Congolese leaders at the round«=table conference of January-February I960, kept the Congo a united country while permitting a measure of decentralisation. '•'ith the approach of independence, however, and with the intensification of political activity, there was a resurgence of demands for provincial autonomy or even independence. This development was especially marked in some sections of Katanga, the province which, with 12.1/2 per cent, of the Congo's population, contributed 50 per cent, of its total revenue. A reluctance to continue to share its wealth was not unrelated to advocacy of secession for Katanga. At the same time, political differences gradually widened on the national scene between 1'r*. Patrice Lumumba, the main proponent of unitarism, snd Ilr. l-'oise Tshorabe, the Katanga leader who advocated n loosening of ties between the Congo's provinces. These differences were paralleled elsewhere in the Congo; several parties found a government based on the Lunmmba- Kasavubu alliance not to their liking, and turned to separatist policies. The trend gathered strength owing to the fast that, with one or two exceptions, Congolese political parties have strong tribal and territorial associations. At this point various foreign interests began to enter the picture, providing financial and political support to secessionist movements. As Belgian relations with Prime Minister Lumumba deteriorated, ther® was an increasing tendency among Belgians to support groups in the Congo which sought to escape Central Government control, With Belgian financial and political support Mr. Tshombe was accordingly in a position to proclaim the independence of Katanga on 11 July I960. -31 - But Mr. Tshombe's own position in the province was aftgrthing but secure. In the May I960 elections to the provincial Assemblys his party, the Conakat, won 25 seats out of 6C as compared to 23 seats for the rival Cartel Katangais. The latter group, which is dominated by the Balubakat party, felt aggrieved because, in its opinion, the distribution of seats did not tally with the popular vote. Mr. Tshombe was able to form a provincial government only with the support of independent and eo<=®pted members, and after a last-minute revision by the Belgian Parliament of the Lol fondamentale had reduced the quorum for meetings of the Assembly from two-thirds to one-half. Foreign support was vital in helping I'.r. Tshonbe to assert his control over Katanga itself, as well as to make good his secession. He welcomed the occupation of Katanga by Belgian troops - which remained there until the beginning of September 196C, He was also assisted by Belgian military personnel in the task of turning the Katanga gendarmerie into an effective military force. When under the pressure of ONUC Belgian troops withdraw from the province. Belgian officers in command of the gendarmerie remained; they were instrumental in helping Tshombe carry out his subsequent secessionist policies. Secession and th® QHUC mandato Along with the breakdown of law and order and foreign armed intervention, the secession of Katanga was thus one of the main problems which confronted the Congo when, in its hour of need, it appealed to the United Nations for help. In its appeal to the United Nations, the Congo Government specifically requested military assistance to end the secession of Katanga, but the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 contained no mention of this point* On 22 July, the Council recognised that it had dealt with the Republic as a unit, and asked all States to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. In August, the Council called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katangaj it also made it clear, however, that the United nations was not to take sides in Congolese internal conflicts, constitution?1 or otherwise; nor was the Organization to be used to influence the outcome of any such conflict. -32 - Thus the United Nations position was clear from the beginning. It recognized and supported the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and was opposed to secession. The United Nations obviously could not go into a country at the invitation of its government, find there support or accept an effort of one area to break away from that country. But the problem was especially acute because }r. Tshombe, in proclaiming the independence of Katanga, was not acting alone. The move wans made with the unconcealed help of Belgian advisers. and was backed by Belgian troops. Thus, outside intervention became inextricably linked with the secession of Katanga from the very outset, and so it has remained. Since it had been brought about in great part through foreign support the secession of Katanga, which led directly to action by the Central Government. would have led inevitably to counteraction by other states. This posed a threat to international peace and security in the immediate area of the Congo and in Africa as a whole which was made more dangerous by the evident interest of certain groups in the riches of Katanga. Faced with this complex situation* the Secretary-General drew a clear distinction between what the United Nations could do in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, and what it could not do, and on this issue Prime Minister Lumumba chose to break with him. Mr. Lumumba argued that the United Nations had been asked by his Government, and had agreed, to help maintain law and order throughout the Congo; from this he inferred that the United Nations was to help put down the lawless rebellion of the Katangese authorities. The 3ecretary~General's position was th?t, while the United Nations Operation originated from a request by the Congo Government, the purpose of the United Cations intervention as determined by the Security Council was not to achieve the domestic aims of the Government but to preserve inter- national peace and.security./ The United Nations Force therefore could hot, under the Security Council decision, be used on behalf of the Central Govern- ment to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action in regard to an internal political controversy, ttor would OMJC transport Central Government civilian or military personnel into Katanga against the viiahes of the provincial authorities, or protect such personnel - 33 - there beyond what followed from its general duty to maintain law and order. Conversely, 01JUC, according to Mr. Hamraarskjold's interpretation, had no right to prevent Central Government action in relation to Katanga, if such action was taken by its own means, or similar action by Katanga, provided it was not carried out by foreign troops or resources. While freely using persuasion to bring about reconciliation on the basis of unity, CIJUC accordingly refused to intervene directly to put down the secessionj its mandate did not allow it to exercise military initiatives for this or any other purpose. ONUC refused to help the Central Government under Mr* Lumumba to subdue Mr, Tshorr.be, and its stand has not changed to this day. What the United Nations can do find has sought to do is to encourage efforts at reconciliation and eliminate foreign interference which has been instrumental in bringing about the secession of Katanga and which hns helped it to endure. The withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga, was brought about by G'u'UC within the first six weeks of its operation. Cut after the departure of the Uelgian troops, foreign interference took more subtle fonrs *»nr! the secessionist regime, which had been set up following the 13elgisn military intervention, was strengthened by the introduction of foreign political advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, and the import of arms, aasnunition and military equipment. To cope "with this aspect of the problem, the Security Council strengthened the GIIUC mandate in February 1961 and again in November by authorizing it to eliminate those foreign personnel, by force if necessary, and to prevent further introduction of such elements as well as of arms and military equipment. Consolidation of secession in Katanga As explained in previous sections, the internal situation rapidly deteriorated throughout the Congo in the course of August I960, and thia deterioration led to the constitutional crisis which broke out in Leopold- ville on 5 September. During this crisis, the secessionist regime of Mr. Tshorabe was able to consolidate its hold over South Katanga, with active foreign assistance, ./hile Belgian officers, supplemented by an increasing number of foreign mercenaries, continued to strengthen the gendarmerie, fas Tshombe imported large quantities of arms and war materiels -34 including aircraft,, from abroad. With his improved armed forces, he launched a merciless extermination campaign against the Baluba and other political and tribal enemies. Helping to maintain law and order in Katanga and protecting large parts of the Katangese population against the brutal lawlessness of the gendarmerie accordingly became one of the principal aspects of the OJ1UC effort, along with the removal of the foreign ;x>litical advisers, nilitary and :^j*a-=^ilitary personnel and mercenaries. In carrying out its functions in Katanga, CNUC continually found itself opposed by certain foreign financial interests which in effect control the economy of the province. These interests, centred about the vast industrial and mining complex of the Union MinieTe du Haut-Katan^a.. with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, had apparently committed themselves to Mr. Tshomba's secessionist policies. The Union niniSre supported Mr. Tshombe in four principal ways. First, it paid nearly all of its taxes not to the Central Government, to which they were due, but to the Katangese provincial authorities. Secondly, it shipped its production not by way of the traditional "national" route, but by way of iortuguese Angola; this enabled it to credit hard-currency export duties to the account of the provincial government. Thirdly, the Congo's part of Union Miniere stock was withheld from the Central Government and was kept in Brussels. Fourthly, the firm allowed its industrial facilities in ELisahethville and other places to be used by the mercenary-led gendarmerie for military purposes, including the making of some implements of war. It is estimated, on the basis of recent figures, that the Union Kiniere and connected companies supplied the major part of Katanga's revenue and thus, in effect, may be said to have furnished the financial basis of the whole secessionist movement - including the high wages of the mercenaries, ample military equipment, snd a vigorous propaganda machinery, with branches in some of the most important cities in the world, which spread tendentious nnd often viciously inscc^rate reports directed against the United Nations. However, despite Kr. Tshombe's efforts and the powerful financial end political support he enjoyed, his separatist movement never gained official international recognition either in Belgium or elsewhere. Moreover, neither Belgium nor any other Government publicly espoused the cause of Katangese secession. In fact, after the establishment of the coalition Goverrsnent in -35 ~ Brussels in the spring of 1961, its Foreign Minister, I'r. Paul-Hsnri Spaak, announced publicly its stand in opposition to the secession of Katanga. This stand did not seem to carry much weight, however, with the supporters of secession abroad, and the foreign elements pressing for secession in Katanga, -who had gone far in their efforts to prevent reconciliation bastl on the Congo's unity. Mercenaries and other foreign elements The problem of foreign elements who sought to influence the Congo's destinies in their own interests first came into prominence when these men instigated Katanga's declaration of "independence" in Ju^r I960, and this scourge has beset the Congo ever since. In the beginning, the bulk of these persons were Belgian professional military and civilian officials(known as "Minaf" personnel) placed at the disposal of the Central Government of the Congo under the treaty of friend- ship with Belgium, which was signed but never ratified. After the severance of diplomatic relations between the Gongp and Belgium, many of these men gathered in Katanga, viiere they gained prominent positions in the provincial administration and the. gendarmerie. From these vantage points they vigorously promoted secession. In effect they waged war on the Congolese Government at whose disposal they had been placed by their Government. Later these Belgians were joined by some elements of other nationalities. On 21 February 1961 the Security Council urged "the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries". Implicit in this language was the finding that while the Congo was admittedly and direly in need of assistance from outside, and especially of personnel to carry out technical and professional tasks which the Congolese had not hitherto been trained to perform, there were other types of foreign personnel whose actions were incompatible with genuine Congolese independence and unity. In certain parts of the Congo, end especially in Katanga, such personnel had come to play an increasingly harm- ful role, obstructing thfe application of United Nations resolutions, and in effect working in their own interest and in the interest of certain financial concerns, to break up the country into a balkaniaed congeries of politically and economically unviable states. -36 - Immediately after the adoption of th© resolution ©f 21 Febrwaz^v the Secretary-General «cdsrtook intensive- ciiploiaatic eff carts to bring about til® withdrawal of the f cs?ei§n military and political personnel. The Belgian Government took the position that there mist be so diser&ainatlon against Belgians in engaging non-Coagolese technical parsoaaels as for railitary personnel anl mercenaries, the Belgian Governsssnt divided thsa into several categories. Of these it. undertook to recall those uhoa it considered that it had the legal right to request to return. But it would take no smeh action in respact ©f mercenaries, a&d of Belgiaa personnel engaged -by ths Cong© QovenBttentj arguing that it was tap to the Secretary-General to agms with the Congolese authorities on hovs to d©al with them. The-Secretary- General exprsssed the ^i®w that the measures indieafeed by tfa® Belgiaa Govern- inent fell far short of full cosspliajica >dth the Security Council resolution. '/ The exchanges with Belgium contissued,'fsiflj incoaelusi^ely, until th® change of government in the spring of 1961, when sosie progress wss made. new Belgian Gorex^iment notified 23 of its nationals serving in Katanga as political advisers to return to Bolgiaau It also acted to pxwe&t recruitment of mercenaries proper. But the effeetivemss ®£ thsgs soon became open to doubt. On 30 October 1^61 the Ckr^erraaeEt ia Brussels acknowledged that this was the case and took more rigomss steps « including the vjithdrawal of passports. ISr. Tshorabej, however, would not eo°operate ^th CfJUG. He eontismed to recruit foreign psrsonnel, whose influence in the councils of the pxwineial goverianent in fact tended to rise sharply, Th© esBpleasion of the groap also changed noticeably as mercenaries replaced the "Miaaf" staff. Thus the traditional colosdal adraissistrative aa3 military elements were feeing supplemented thr<3ag]i an influx of s©n=»Belgiari adventurers and soldiers of forttuae, including outlawed elements previously involved in extremist activities in Algeria aad elsewhere. Similarly., political sd^iseps active in the provincial goveriimant wer© increasingly eonsnitted to estrsadst,, repressive and separatist policiesj th©^ drew political eustenane© froa the substantial nois-Gtrrtgolese eonmuHit^ to which Katanga's extractive processing ..industries had given rise. - 37 - First United Nations action against foreign elements in.Kjtaijga Only after the United Nations had strengthened its position in April 19^1 did the Katanga secessionist authorities, acting while Mr. Tshosabe was under detention in the West, officially accept the resolution of 21 February. Those authorities drew up lists of persons whom they considered as falling within the terms of the resolution. I3y the end of June 1961 j forty~four Belgian mtionals were thus selected for repatriation, and the cases of twenty-two others were under consideration. It was noted, however, that persons clearly not coming under the resolution had been included for political reasons, while others notorious for their activities had been omitted. OIJUC representatives continued to press for revision of the lists, and brought home to the provincial authorities their determination to take drastic action, if need be, to comply with the United Nations mandate. In April 196l3 forty-four mercenaries who were members of the "compagaie internationals" were apprehended by the United Nations and evacuated from the Congo. By addWune an estimated sixty more mercenaries had withdrawn from Katanga, and on 24 June the mercenary unit known as "compagnie inter- national©" was formally dissolved by the provincial government. On 7 June 1961, following discussions with the Katanga authorities, the United Nations Force Commander dispatched a military mission to Katanga for the purpose of helping the authorities there to remove non-Congolese elements falling under the resolution. The mission reported that there were 510 foreign officers and non-commissioned officers active in the gendarmerie as against 142 Congolese "cadres". Of the non-Congolese. 2C# were the remaining Belgian professional military men. 302 were mercenaries. But despite the unrelenting efforts of LJiUC, the provincial authorities refused to take effective action to remove the foreign elements without whom the secessionist movement might have collapsed. For its part, the Belgian Government said that it was prepared to help in the removal of its professional officers and NCC's who had been serving the Congo and were now in command of the gendarmerie, but it professed itself unable to do anything about the "volunteers" and mercenaries. Persuasion by the Secretary-General, who discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Spaak in Geneva on 12 July 1961, was unavailing in this regard. Gradually, the United Nations was compelled to shift its ground to more vigorous and direct measures to achieve compliance with the Security Council resolution., Mr. Tshombe's chief military adviser, Lajor Weber, M- ,- was compelled to leave on 16 June 1961; Kr. Thyssens. a prominent political adviser, was apprehended, taken to Leopoldville, and evacuated on 14 July. ONUC warned the Katangese authorities that it was prepared to compel the evacuation of other advisers and officers. Five French officers in politically sensitive gendarmerie posts were dismissed and repatriated, and a Joint commission was established to list foreign political advisers, both those in official posts &.nd others acting unofficially, who were to be repatriated. Events of August and September 1961 The formation of the Adoula Government, enjoying unquestionable and internationally recognized authority, was of crucial importance in enabling the United Nations to proceed with the elimination of foreign elements. Before the for nation of a legal Government, the United Nations' efforts had been restricted by the requirement of avoiding political interference, or support of one Congolese faction against another. Now the United Kations was able to do more effectively what the eleven-month-long constitutional crisis had impeded it from doing - that is, help the Government in removing the foreign elements which had furnished the backbone, and provided the teeth, of the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the Congo's richest province from the rest of the country. It was not the United Nations' intention - any more than it had been in the summer of I960 - to proceed against any Congolese elements, Katangese or otherwise. Nor would the United nations seek to conquer or subdue Katanga on behalf of the Central Government; its action vjas to be directed primarily at the removal of non-Congolese elements, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. For weeks, ONUC representatives urged Mr. Tshombe to co-operate in removing nefarious foreign elements, but to little avail, In. the meantime, the Central Government issued its Crdinance of 24 August 1961, which called for the expulsion from the Congo of the foreign officers and mercenaries who stood behind the secession policy, and requested ONUC assistance in carrying out the decision. -39 - On 28 August, CHUG proceeded to round up the mercenaries for deportation. In the face of inflammatory rumours about an invasion by the ARC which had been disseminated by Mr. Godefroid Munongo, the provincial t'dnister of the Interior, certain security precautions were taken by ONUC in Elisabeth viHe, including surveillance over Radio~Katanga, gendarmerie headquarters, and some other key points* Inflammatory broadcasts were thus prevented, and appeals for calm were put on the air. The precautions lasted for only a few hours. On this occasion Mr* Tshombe, who had been fully informed of the goals of GNUC's action, expressed his readiness to co-operate. He broadcast a statement to the effect that the Katangese authorities accepted the decisions of the United Nations, and that the services of the foreign military personnel were being terminated by his government. At that point, Oi'iUC representatives mat with the Elisabethville Consular Corps, which was presided over by the Belgian "Consul". The latter offered to assume the responsibility, together with two senior Belgian officers formerly in the gendarmerie, for the orderly repatriation of the foreign personnel, most of whom were Belgians. OliUC iramediately accepted this arrangement, and suspended its own rounding-up operation, but three sets of ominous developments soon marred the picture. In the first place, it developed that the foreign military men being made available for repatriation were in the main the "Minaf" personnel whose withdrawal had been earlier agreed to by the Belgian Government j there were also a few persons of other nationalities. By 9 September 1961, 273 had been evacuated and 65 were awaiting repatriation. But, while some of .the volunteers and mercenaries proper had left, many others - about 104 of whom were known to be in Katanga - were "missing". They were reinfiltrating into the gendarmerie, distributing arms to groups of soldiers over whom they could assert control, and getting ready for violent resistance. In the second place, the political police (Sjarete) under Mr. Munongo and largely directed by foreign officers, launched a campaign of assaults and persecution against anti-Tshombe Baluba tribesmen in Eliaabethville. An effort was made to convince the world that GKUC's actions suers causing disorder. The terrorised Baluba streamed out of the city and sought safety by camping in primitive conditions near ONUC troop quarters. OIJUC arranged protection for the encampment, into which 35,OOC Baluha had crowded by 9 September, creating a serious food and health problem, as well as continuing danger of tribal violence. In "the third pla ce, the foreign elements - including some French persons from Algeria and local settlers who had volunteered for the purpose - contrived terroristic actions against CwUC personnel. Led by a group of extremists in the SjSrete, they were reported planning to blow up CMJC head- quarters in Elisabethville. Ga 11 September 1961, they .-..ri'ested thft deputy OiiUC representative. When OOTC realized that the Katangese authorities had no intention of fulfilling their promises, it pressed its demand for the evacuation of foreign personnel in the Surete and of the remaining mercenaries by 9 September. The Katangese, however, led by Mr, Tshombe, had manifestly fallen back under the domination of the foreign elements, and had let themselves be persuaded to launch violent action against OHUC« ONUC's plans for a solution of the difficulties in Elisabethville were rejected, and when on 13 September 1961 security precautions similar to the ones of 28 August were applied, the e United Nations troops were violently attacked by gendarmes led and instigated by non-Congolese personnel. In the morning of 13 September, Mr, Tshombe requested P. cense-fire. on the understanding thnt the United Nations troops would be enabled to continue their misslonc 0*IUC representatives agreed and repeatedly sought to meat the provincial president to secure 9 cessation of hostilities,, However, I'TO Tshombe and seme of his lieutenants <#ere prevented by their foreign military advisers, or allowed themselves to be prevented, from appearing at scheduled meetings with CNUC representatives. In the meantime, the attacks on the United Nations troops continued, causing casualties» From the building housing the Belgian consulate, where a number of Belgian officers were known to be located, sustained firing at the United Nations troops went on. The United Nations bass at Kamirta was attacked, as were the United Nations garrison and installations at Albert- ville. Reluctantly, United Nations troops had to return the fire. All over Elisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga, the foreign officers who had gone - 41 - into hiding came out into the open to lead operations against the ONUC "blue helmets". It is noteworthy that hostilities occurred only where such foreign elements led or forced Congolese soldiers into them. Despite the apprehensions repeatedly expressed by Belgian officials, there were no difficulties whatever between &IIUC troops and those Katangese units whose foreign officers and mercenary cadres had been duly withdrawn, ifhere this was the case, CKUC and Katangese soldiers usually fraternised, and n,aintained order. Similarly, QKUC troops remained on friendly terms with Katangese civilian Africans. The situation became serious because efforts to reinforce the United Nations troops were frustrated by the depredations of a Pouga 1'agister jet fighter„ piloted by a non-Congolese Eercenaryj, which quickly managed to immobilize ONUC's unarmed air transport craft. The Fouga Jet also played havoc with the ground movements of OI.'UC, which had deliberately refrained from securing offensive weapons such as fighter planes or tanks as Incompatible with its mission as s peace force. This Jet, among other things, prevented action to remove a gendnrmerie roadblock between Elisabethville and Jadotville in order to relieve an Irish CKUC detachment ambushed and besieged in Jadot- ville. The Irish detachment, ironically, had been sent there ?t the request of the consular representatives in Elisabethviile, who appealed for immediate protection of the European community at Jadotville. .tfhen the Irish detaeh- aient arrived there for that purpose, some members of that conauunity helped in the attack which the gendarmerie promptly mounted against the detachment. At both Kamina and Albertville, where they were not faced with such treachery, OMJC forces were able to stand their ground successfully. Tragic flight of the Secretary-Generalt the cease-fire In the meantime, the Secretary-General had arrived in Leopoldville at i-'rime Minister -doula's invitation to discuss future prospects of the United Nations operation in what was hoped would be a new setting created by the completion of the principal tasks assigned by the Security Council and General Assembly, Confronted instead ./ith a ruthless attack on the United Nations Force by foreign elements, Mr, Kaar.iarsk.joM threvr himself into the task of securing a cessation of hostilities, achieving reconciliation among Congolese and fulfilling the United Nations mission peacefully. In pursuit of peace, he flew to Ndola., northern Rhodesia, to meet Mr. Tshombe, and on this flight on 17 September 1961 he lost his life. So did seven other United Nations staff members.-^ The Secretary-General's mission was immediately taken up by the Officer=dn-Charge of 013110, Dr. Sture Unner, and his colleagues. Mr. Mahmoud Khiary flew to Ndola and, on behalf of the United Nations forces, signed a military cease-fire agreement on 20 September. This provided, among other things, for the establishment of joint connnissions, exchange of prisoners, and for the prohibition of troop movements. It was understood as an express condition that the agreement would not affect the application of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, including, of course, the continued removal of mercenaries. On this understanding it was approved by United Nations Headquarters. rt protocol for carrying out the provisions of the cease-fire, including such matters as prisoner exchange and the fixing of troop positions, was signed on 13 October 1961 at Ellsabethville. rfhile the protocol allowsd firing back in case of attack, it prohibited Katangese and OIJUC troop movements. In approving this protocol, United Nations headquarters stressed its military nature, re-emphasized United Nations support of the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo fnd, as indicated earlier, insisted on continued enforcement of the Security Council resolution which called for the evacuation of mercenaries. Although the prisoners were in fact exchanged and certain positions held by ONUC in Elisabethville throughout the fighting were duly released, Mr> Tshon.be's regime was soon flouting the provisions of the cease-fire. In Leopoldville, his emissaries made it clear that nothing less than independence along the lines of the Tananarive decisions would be acceptable to the IH »&Ji)»iVitvi.\le authorities. Meanwhile, the remaining Katanga mercenaries were I/ Mr. H.A. Wieschhoff, Director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs; Mr. Vladimir Fabry, Special Counsellor to the Cffieer-in-Charge of CKUC; Mr. 'Jilliam Ranallo, Persons! Aide to the Secretary-General; Kiss Alice Lalande, Secretary to the Officer-in-Charge; Sgt. Harold K. Julien, Acting Chief Security Officer; Sgt. Serge L. Barrau, Security Officer, and Sgt. Francis Eivers, Investigator. 43 leading the gendarmerie in a long series of violations of the cease-fire agreement, going so far as to launch offensive air action along the Kasai~ Katanga frontier. This was sternly protested by the United Nations, which warned that Katangese aircraft involved - all of them piloted by mercenaries - would be brought down. ™hile strictly abiding by the cease- fire in Katanga, OKUC had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of the September situation when it found itself powerless to stop the attacks of Katanga's Pouga Magister jet Tipster. Three member States - Ethiopia, India and Sweden - had contributed jet fighter squadrons to the United Nations Force to strengthen its defensive capacity. At the same time, however, the Force ground strength was being whittled away. In August, the Tunisian contingent had been withdrawn in connexion with events at Bisertej the Ghana contingent subsequently withdrew, and certain other OIRJC units were reduced. Not unaware of these developments, Mr. Tshombe and the foreign elements supporting him were determined to turn secession into an Accomplished ffict. 0!,UC-sponsored tplks between the Central Government and Katangn were obviously subjected to stalling tactics. £t le?st 237 persons, chiefly mercenaries, falling under the Security Council resolution remained in Ilatanga, many of whom donned civilian garb. Despairing of a peaceful solution, the Central Government attempted to deal with Katanga's secession independently, by the use of force, in late October 1961. AUC strength was built up on the border of North Katanga in preparation for entry into that region. At the beginning of November, a detachment from the Leopoldville Grouping entered North Katanga in the Kaniama area, but was immediately repelled by Katanga gendarmes. Later, ANC units from the Stanleyville Grouping succeeded in reaching Albertville, Nyunau, Kongolo and other towns of North Katanga. To facilitate this move, the Government had requested ONUC assistance for the transport of its troops. The request was turned down because, as it had been from the beginning, it remained against OMUC principles to become a party to an internal conflict. Events of December 1961 In the latter part of November 1961, the Security Council was convened once again to examine the situation in the Congo. By its resolution of 24 Hovember 1961, the Council opposed the secessionist activities in Katanga and authorized the Secretary-General to use force to complete the removal of 44 mercenaries. After the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Moise Tshombe launched an inflammatory propaganda campaign against ONUC which soon degenerated into instigation to violence. The results *rere not long in cosiing. On 28 Moveaber 1961, two senior United Nations officials in Elisabethville were abducted and badly beaten; later an Indian soldier was murdered and an Indian major abducted. On the following day, several members of the United Nations Force were abducted, and others were killed or wounded. Roadblocks were established by the gendarmerie, impeding CIJUC's freedom of movement and endangering its lifelines. It subsequently became known that this was part of a deliberate plan to cut off the United Nations troops in Elisabethville, and either force them to surrender or otherwise destroy them. For one week United Nations officials sought to settle the crisis by peaceful negotiations. But when it became evident that, in the face of the bad faith displayed by Katangese authorities, no negotiations were possible, that, while protending to negotiate, these Katangese authorities were preparing for more assaults, and that they had a plan the purpose of which was its very destruction, ONUC finally decided to take action to regain and assure its freedom of movement and to restore law and order. Because this defensive action was forced upon it, OMUC had few troops in Elisabethville when the fighting broke out on 5 December 1961. Until 14 December, CNUC forces endeavoured to hold their positions and to maintain communications between them while reinforcements were hurriedly flown in from other parts of the Congo. On 15 December, having received enough reinforcements, ONUC troops moved to seize control of those positions in Elisabethville necessary to ensure their freedom of movement. In so doing, they worked their way around the perimeter of the city, in order to keep destruction and civilian casualties to the strict minimum. This objective was achieved within three days. During the fighting, CKUC troops limited their attacks strictly to military objectives and so did ths ONUC aircraft which were sent into action only wh®n absolutely necessary. Some civilian installations were. unfortunately, hit aecidently by misguided fire but they weare very few. Strict orders wera given to ONUC troops to safeguard to all extent possible the lives and properties of the civilian population. Throughout the operation they exercised a remarkable measure of self-restraint, which wae all the more noteworthy in view of the comportment of many non-°Congolese - 45 - civilians which made their task extremely arduous. Time and again OKUC units found themselves subjected to murderous fire from civilian installations and by persons in civilian dress, A flagrant instance of misuse of important civilian installations was the firing directed against United Nations troops from the plants of the Union Einiire du Haut-Katanffa. where many weapons were subsequently found. Vehicles with Red Cross markings were frequently used as cover by mercenaries ani their civilian volunteer allies. Since the outset of the hostilities, United nations military and civilian officers did their best, in co-operation with the Hed Cross, to relieve the distress caused to innocent civilians. Persons caught in areas where firing had been initiated by the gendarmerie were escorted to safety, at the risk of the OKUC personnel's lives; food supplies were provided where needed; special arrangements for the evacuation of women and children were made by ONUC. Notwithstanding the shortage of troops, OUU'C employed a whole battalion to guard the Baluba refugee camp, where more than 40,000 anti-Tshombe Baluba lived under United Nations protection. 01JUC troops, on the one hand, prevented them from raiding the city and, on the other, protected them from the gendarmes who launched several attacks on the camp. On 19 December 1961, having ensured the positions necessary for its security, CLTJC ordered its troops to hold fire unless fired upon. The same day, Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville to confer with Prime Tinister Cyrille Adoula in Kitona, the United Nations military base in the Leopoldville Province. After that, major fighting between CKUC and Katanga forces ceased. ONUC immediately turned its effort to the re-establishment of normal conditions in Elisabethville. It co-operated closely with the local police to stop looting, to rid private houses of squatters and, in general, to restore and maintain law and order* JJltrona Declaration and its implementation The Kitona meeting was arranged with the assistance of ONUC and the United States Ambassador in the Congo following a request B0.de by Mr. t.oise Tshombe on 14 December 1961 when the fighting in Elisabethville was in full swing. After meeting Prime Minister Adoula all day long on 20 Deceniier, Mr, Tshombe signed early in the morning of 21 December an eight-point Declaration. In this Declaration, he accepted the application of the Ix>i fondameptale. recognized the authority of the Central Governnsent in Leopoldville and agreed to a number of steps aiming at ending the secession of Katanga. He also pledged himself to ensure respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly and to facilitate their implementation. Since the Kitona talks, ONUC has been exerting all possible efforts, through persuasion and good offices, to ensure that the provisions of the Kitona Declaration will be fully carried out, as an indispensable step toward the solution of the Katanga problem by peaceful means. But its efforts have been greatly hampered by the changing attitude of Mr. Tshosribe, who constantly shifted from lukewarm co-operation to calculated opposition and vice-versa. In accordance with the provisions of the Kitona Declaration, l-tr. Tshombe sent the Conakat parliamentarians to Leopoldville to participate in the session of Parliament. Three Katangese officials were also dispatched to the capital to participate in discussions for the modification of the constitutional structure of the Congo. In both cases, ONUC ensured the safety of the Katangese representatives during their journey to and from Leopoldville and their stay there. But while making those concessions, Mr. Tshombe stated that he had no authority to decide on the future of Katanga and summoned the Provincial Assembly to meet in Elisabethville for the purpose of discussing the Kitona Declaration* In this connexion, Mr. Tshombe requested the temporary assistance of a United Nations legal expert. After consulting Prime Minister Adoula and securing his agreement, the United Nations promptly acceded to Mr, Tshombe's request and placed at his disposal the United Nations Legal Counsel. During the session of the Provincial Assembly, Mr. Tshombe made befor® it two statements strongly criticizing the Central Government and ONUC. However, on 15 February, the Assembly decided to accept the Declaration of Kitona as a basis for discussions with the Central Government. Following this action, Prime Minister Adoula invited Kr. Tshombe to meet with him in Leoroldville to discuss the procedure for carrying out the provisions of the Declaration. But Kr. Tshoirbe was reluctant to go to Leopoldville :md suggested that the meeting take place at the United Nations military base of Kamina. QttUC exerted its best effort to persuade Mr. Tshonsb® - 47 to accept Mr, Adcula's invitation and gave him a full guarantee of his safety, throughout hia journey to and from Leopoldville and of his freedom to leave the capital at ft time of his choice, should he decide to go there. At the time of writing this paper, 1'r. Tshombe hns not yet directly replied to llr. Adoula'a invitation. While endeavouring to persuade the Katangese authorities to co-operate vilth the Central Government, OIvUC pressed for the urgent and complete elimination of mercenaries from Katanga. After a series of discussions Ydth OKUC officials in January 1962, Kr. Tshombe indicated the Provincial Governsaent's intention to liqiddate the problem of mercenaries once and for all, and firmly couEnitted his Government to that course. In order to ensure the elimination of ESS reenari.es,, joint ccnstissione composed of QUUC and Katangese representatives were established on the proposal of GNUC at the beginning of February. ONUC also insisted that in accordance with the principle that it was to enjoy absolute freedom of movement, its troops should have free entry to Jadotville, Kolwezi and other places in Katanga. But this request was so far opposed by Mr, Tshombe who, to support his stand, arranged for the "customary grand chiefs of Katanga" to meet in Jadotville. '«t the conclusion of their meeting on 18 February, these chiefs adopted a resolution opposing the entry of United Nations troops into the places indicated. In the meantime, the situation in North Katnnga underwent a change. For reasons yet undetermined, the A1IC troops withdrew from Kongolo, which was iramRdiately reoccupied by Latnnga gendarmes. There were no clashes between them, but the reoccupation of Kongolo by Katangese forces under- standably worried the Central Government, which decided to reinforce its garrison in Albertville. Shortly after it had learned the entry of Katanga ganyUtnues into Kongolo, ONUC sent a plane there to investigate the situation. It is exerting all possible efforts to prevent a deterioration of the situation in North Katanga. As this paper is written, the Katanga problem seems to be nearing a solution. The Kitona Declaration provides an adequate basis for ending the secession of Katanga. The provincial Assembly has now accepted th© ' Declaration, although conditionally„ The next step is a meeting between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr,, Tshombe to determine the procedure for carry- ing out the provisions of the Declaration,, ONUC has spared ao effort to make such a meeting possible. There are reasons to hope that the meeting will take place in Lsopoldville in the near future. (*') Civilian Operations When the United Nations want into the Congo, it found the country in the throes of a dire emergency, chiefly caused by the breakdown of law and order. The mass exodus of Belgian technicians and administrators was threatening to paralyze the Republic's entire economy| essential services were in imminent danger of breaking down; unemployment was rising catastrophically in the cities; hunger and disease loomed. One of the main objectives of the United Nations in the Congo has been to provide the Congolese Government with technical assistance for th@ smooth operation of all essential services and the continued development of the national economy- But the situation faced by CliUC immediately assumed un- precedented proportions, of a nature different from thst of normal United Nations technical assistance operationsj these presuppose a reasonably functioning governmental and economic machinery which is prepared to receive and use expert advice, training services, and the aid of a few operational and executive officials for integration in the national civil service. Faced with this emergency, the Secretary-General nsobilised the resources of the United Nations family of organizations under the authority of a chief of civilian operations. A consultative group of experts was set up, consisting of senior officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned. The first task was to restore or maintain the operation of ffidairaum essential public services. Engineers, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio operators, postal experts, physicians, teachers and other specialists were rushed into the country. Ail emergency project was carried out to halt the silting of the port of Matadi and restore navigation. In rasponse to the Centre! Government's appeal, the United Nations agreed, in August I960, to provide $5,000,000 to finance essential governmental services as well as essential imports. In the economic and financial fields, CNUC helped in setting up and managing monetary, foreign exchange and foreign trade controls, without which the country's slendsr resources might have been drained awry and all semblance of a monetary system might have collapsed. In all these fields, as well aa in agriculture, labour and public administration, its effort was chiefly designed to improve the ability of the Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities toward the population despite the precipitous departure of non-Congolese technicians and administrators. As it soon because obvious - 49 - that the needs would continue for some time, the Secretary-General proposed, and the General Assembly in September I960 approved, the establishment of a United Nations J\ind for the Congo, financed by voluntary contributions. Its purpose was to restore the economic life of the country and to carry on its public services as best as possible. The Assembly's action coincided with the outbreak of the constitutional crisis, as a result of which OMJC could not deal with any authorities, except for President Joseph Kasa-7ubu, on the nation-wide plane, and could not furnish advice at the ministerial level. Pince the emergency conditions continued, however, the OKUC effort did not flag, and was carried on in co- operation with such Congolese authorities as exercised de facto control in the provinces or localities where United nations civilian operations were being undertaken. Famine conditions, in some areas, and widespread unemployment, led the Secretary-General to institute refugee relief and relief work programmes. The worst conditions developed in South Kasal in the autumn of I960, where some 200 persons daily were reported dying from starvation as a result of the disruption caused by tribal warfare. For six months, th© United Nations shipped and distributed food and medical supplies in the area. While several thousand persons died before the United Nations effort began, the number of lives saved approximates a quarter of a million, In the meantime, foreign exchange reserves were running short owing to the political and economic situation, Accordingly, in June 1961, an agree- ment was arrived at between President Kasa-Vubu and the Secretary-General by which the United Nations put funds at the disposal of the Republic for the financing of s programme of essential imports. It was agreed that such assistance must benefit the population of the country as a whole. Despite the constitutional crisis, United Nations training services continued as a working long-range operation, and were regarded as an invest- ment in the development of human resources so as to fill ths huge void caused by the shortage of indigenous operational and executive personnel„ Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, agricultural assistants, farm mechanics, foresters, medical assistants, labour officials, police commissioners, etc. To train Congolese operators and instructors, & Tele- communications Training Centre was set up; to train primary and secondary . 50 - school teachers and inspectors, a National Pedagogical Institute was establishedo Undergraduate medical studies were fostered,. & National School of ka*r and Administration was opened to produce competent civil servantsj a technical college was set up to train junior engineers, public works foremen and the like. Fellowships for studj abroad were awarded to school directors, medical students, police officers, social workers and others in need of training for whom adequate facilities were not available in the Congo. Furfchemsor©, as already indicated in the section on law and order, a programs has been prepared for the reorganisation and retraining of the Congolese national Anagr. Since the re-establishment of a constitutional government in the suramsr of 1961, ONUC civilian operations have been again rendering advisory services to the Government. These services should gain in relative import** ance as the Congolese authorities find it possible gradually to rely less on the United Nations for operative staff. In any case, be it in the fom of medical teams with doctors from more than twenty countries, of school teachers from eleven different countries, in the provision of judges and prosecutors, or in the form of more conventional technical assistance activities, United Nations assistance is now limited by the resources of the Congo Fund. Though originally envisaged to readh a level of &10C million as a matter of urgency, the Fund had received up to 31 January 1962 only sots© $34 million from some fourteen member Governments, and badly needled replenishment. In I960 and 1961, GEUC civilian operations have been able to provide about 6CC experts and technicians to do the job of departing Belgian personnel, nnd the thousand-odd Cf'JUC fellowships awarded so far are important seeds of .*» Congolese professional, technical ,-md administrative force. They have been of unquestionable value in preventing a collapse of organized economic life under uncertain and trying conditions. In 1962, United nations assistance in the civilian field will continue as funds perroit. There is no doubt that this assistance has helped and will help the Congolese in finding their own feet, and put them on the way to full recovery and development as an independent nation. CONCLUSION Since its inception^ the United Nations Operation in the Congo has had many achievements« It brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo; thanks to ite law and order were maintained throughout this vast country to a large degree although a number of acts of violence could not be *; prevented; it encouraged and made possible a peaceful solution of the consti=> tutional crisis. Without the United Nations, the Belgian military intervention would have undoubtedly led to dangerous reactions by other govemrasnts., including the big Powers! fanned by open foreign intervention^ the civil war would have flared up with irresistible intensity; & situation comparable to9 or worse than, that of Korea or Spain would have prevailed in the Congo, The United Nations Operation has stopped all that0 Admittedlys the Operation has met with great difficulties. Because on® does not talk about a situation when it is normalP much publicity was given to difficulties while achievements passed unnoticed. It should also be pointed out that most of the difficulties which arose during the operation were the legacy of the pasts the inevitable consequence of events ^jich had taken place long before the United Nations cams to the Congo« To solve those difficulties^ the United Nations had to act mthin the mandate given to it by the Security Council and the General Assembly and in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Chartsr0 In particular^ it firmly abided by two principles which bind any undertakings of the United Nations as an international organization composed of sovereign States and devoted to peace: non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and restraint on the use of force. It was a cardinal principle of ONUG not to attempt to impose a political solution by the use of force„ Whatever difficulties and delays may have been entailed by such a policys how much more dangerous it trould b© if the United Nations used its armed force to meddle in the internal affairs of the sover- eign couatxy of the Congo9 siding *dth one party against another end helping Congolese subdue by force other Congolese«. OWUG has also showed noteworthy restraint in the us® of force during ;\1X phases of the operation. The first directive given tJi© United Nations Forco was never to use force except in self=dsfenee« Later,, as the crisis dangeroxsly deepened in the country the Security Council authorised the Seeretary=Genepal to use force as a last resort to prevent civil t-sr and to eliminate and other foreign psrsonnel not under United Nations commande But ©yen the enlarged mandates ONUC has constantly showed the greatest restraint in the use of force0 During its operation., OMUC has b& In this connexiona it nay be recalled that certain persons have wondered t0hj ff OMJC troopa hav© fou^t Mr0 Tshbs&eVs gondarasss in Ifatanga but sot Mr0 Giaenga s forces in vStanl©yville0 The answer is quite simple: OMUC was attacked by the fonners not by the lattera This restraint has scrag times been mistalcen for a tts&knesst, In particular^ ONUG has been criticised for not having dealt with tiis ANG mor© forcsfaUj, and more specifically, for not having disarmed it, Ad!aittedly9 it might have been easier to ensure the maintenance of law and order if certain unruly elements of the AWC had been disarmed,, But ONUC could not and -&®uld not disarm the AKG against t4ie will of the Congo Governments not only because it ^®uid have to use force to aehievs this purpose, but mainly because its Force came to the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an arngr of occupation. What ONUC has sought to do is to assist the Congo Government in reestablishing dis- cipiine in the ANC and the reorganising of its units. In carding out its missicns ONUC has resorted to persuasion rather than force,, to cooperation rather than coercion. It considers it axiomatic that the solution to the Congo crisis oust come from the Congolese themselves,. Its action i»s therefor©., mainly directed at encouraging asid facilitating the efforts of Congolese leaders to settle their own problessaw and to reach a solution of their difficulties in their own way. It does so by persuasione by good offices, by technical and material assistance^ and finally by endeavour- ing to eliminate all foreign interference that seeks to drive them apart,, It is gratifying to note that the patient efforts of ONUC have begun to bear fruit * The break-through occurred on 2 August 1961 when Parliament •was re«opened and a national unity government, led by Prime Minister Cyrill® Adoula9 was unanimously, endorsed by it. Another important step was ciade on 21 December 1961 when, at the conclusion of the Kitona talksf i !4r. Moiss Tshombe signed an Eight-point Declaration recognizing the authority of th© Central Governn»nt0 Admittedly mny difficulties still He ahead on the road to a final solution of the Congo crisis. But it is the hope and indeed the conviction of ONUG that5 in a not too distant future, the Congolese will be able to settle their regaining differences and to achieve a satisfactos^ solution of a crisis that has too long plagued their country. When this has been achieved, the main task of (M)G will have ended. 'Ojg&pation &ss Stations ffaies aa Coa@o (Halted KatSons Operation in the Congo)* ABC AragQ IstioiBle Congolaise (Congolese fetionai Ifoit of the MC whos© sain concern is the maintenance of public order . It asgr fee sot®a that the secessionist of S&tasagp. Is also named ^ State Security police <> Public Force, tlie title of t&© Congolese Ar^ "bsfosa it law™ Ths FaaSasental tew of 19 the structure of the Coogo. SM on th@ Ijasis of th@ resolutions of the Bound 3&&1© of ^OKuayy-Feferuasfy 196D afiogfasd bjr the BsS^isn is to o^xet® as the constitution for1 the Bepublic of the Congo psading the adoption of & definitive constitution fey the A'fe'teswiation fos- Mnisst^e dtes for African Affairs) of Miaing Union of Kpp®i° Mtaoga. Industrial eoaples mining and other interests in Sairih !&Ltaa@a0 ®se ISOT® of a sse^ces^gy unit in f©3Ei®d ia Oetolier 1958. fes pasty split in two sections in ^uJ^- 1959, one leg. fey fe -flfefeswistion fo? [email protected] fes Bakoago (Alli®ffle€$ of the founded in Jtsssaasiy 1959* 3l®& ligr HP. Joseph -rr- PSA Bagfci iSpliaalg© Aftpicala (African founeleS In April 1959; IssL ^r Ife. Asfcoiae fa? Bagti i(g@i l^U^ti^tioaa Birfey founded In Hazels l^SO, led fey Associations _. I960 23 June Central Government led by Mr.. Patrice Lumumba approved by Parliament . 24 Jun® Mra Joseph Kasa-tfubu sleeted Chief of State. 2? June Dr. Ralph J. Buneha arrives in Leopoldvill e to attend Independence Ceremonies as personal representative of Seoretaiy«>General Dag Hamraarskjoldo 29 Juns Representatives of Congo and Belgian Government sign treaty of friendship, assistance and eo-oparatioru 30 June Belgian Congo proclaimed independent. 5 July Mating of Force pub^jLaua begins in LeopoldvillQj, soon spreads to other parts of Congo0 7 July Security Council adopts resolution recommending admission of Congo to membership is United Nations <, 10 July Belgian troops intervene in SlisabethviHe asd Luluabourg. 11 July iMr0 Moise Tshomb® proclaims independence of Katanga „ Belgian troops attack Matadi0 12 July Congo Govema»nt apfjeals to UN for technical and railitas^r 14 July Security Council adopts resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congo and authorizing Secretary-General to provide Congo Government idth military assistance. Secretary General sets up ONUCa appoints Dr0 Ralph J. Bunche as Special Representative in Congo, Major-General Carl Carlsson von Horn as Supreme Commander of UH Force and Dr, Stura Linner as Chief of Civilian Operations* -o- 15 July First ONUC contingent arrives in 2.6 Julj Congo Govemmmt decides to SOT©? diplomatic ?©latioas -with Belgtusi. 17 Julgr Congo Goverspesit addresses ^Itinstum to US to eleaj? all Belgian troops fyosa the Congo before 19 July zaisSnigfrto Gsasral voa Horn arrives ia LeopoH^lH®. s 22 July Security Couneii adopted resolution asking speedily its resolution of 14 Jwly I960 and authorising General to take all aeeossary action to tteat eff©ot« 23 JxOy EvacuatioR of Belgian troops from Lsopold^illa comploted, 24 Jul^r Priffie Hiniste? Patric© Lumumba asrives in Kew York« 26 JuGLgr Secretas^-=Genss>al arrives in Leopolduille, 27 July Dr« ftelph J, Busicfes and s'spresentatives of Cbsjgo GoTremmeEt signed basis agreerssnt regarding OMJC0 2 August Sscz^tarj'-General anncasiess plan to send OMJC troops into Katanga on 6 August I960. 4~5 August Dr0 Bunehe goes to Elisabe-U-s^llo, eoneludss that in idew of tu^rieldiag opposition oS I4p. Tsfeoisbe tJie entjy of OWUG troops into Katanga could b@ achieved only by use of force* 5 August Secretagsr-GensFaL ealls off plan for iisaediate entsy of OHUC troops into Katanga., asks urgent nesting of Security Coiancila leaves for Haw Yorke 9 August Security Council adopts resolution calling $pe icEasdiate tdth= drawal of Belgian troops from Ka-fcang® and re«affisajiiag principle of non='iaterfQr®acSo 10 August MP« Albert Kalosjji announses creation of Mining Stste ia South -.ff - 11 August Seeretary«»Czeneral arrives in Leopoldville0 12 August Seeretajy-General enters Elissbethville9 -with tw& Swedish eoapanies of UN Force. August S9er©tary<=Gensral returns to Leopoldvilles is accused by Ere Lus»gnba of unilateral and erroneous interpretation of Security Couseil re solutions $ ask® fop rasotiag of Sseorit^- Council ascl leaves for W©w Yoi?k0 16 August Congo Gotrd'na&siit • decrees "state of emergency" throughout th@ Congoc 13 August ANC ©lenssnfea arrest and raanhandle 14 Canadian msiabers of UM Force at Hdjni sirporta 21-22 August Security Council meets but does not vote on resolution <> Secretasy<=Gffln®yal announces appointis^at Advisory ConHaittsa on Congo^ also announces Belgian Govemsssfs sssuranc© that all Belgian troops mil be *dthdraMi by 29 August I960,, 24 August Advisor/ Comraittes on Congo holds first iE8©tinge 25=31 August Pan=-African Oonferense nsets ia teopoldvillQo 27 August ASJG eleiasnts arrest and manhandles QMIC personnel in Stanleyville c 29 August ANC troops massaer® Baluba popxalation ia Bafejanga,, 31 August SeGr®taz^-=GQaeral sends protest to Belgian Government regarding continued presence of Belgian .military units in Congo after deadline of 29 August !%Qa 1 Dr« Bunche returns to Msw York* is replaced by !-lre Andrew ¥« Cordier as Special Representative in Congo until arrival of Mr» Rajesfosiar Dayal* 5 September President Kasa-Vubu dismisses Mr. Lumumba as Prim® Minister,, Shortly thereafter,,, Mr« Lumumba announces he is dismissing Mr,, Kasa^Vubu as Chief of Stats. 5=6 September "ONUC closes all major airports in Congo and Leopoldville Radio Station. 7 September Chamber of Representatives rescinds decisions of Mr<, Kasa-Vubu and Mr, Lusmmba dismissing each other and appointed Parliamentary conciliation commission« 8 September Mr, Cordlar leaves for New Yor^., is replaced by Mr0 Rajeshwar Dayal as Special Representative in Congo„ Senate opposes Mr. Kasa~Vubuss decision to dismiss Mr. Lumumbao 12-13 September ONUC re<~opens airports and Leopoldvill® Radio Station,, 13 September Chambers of Parliament meet in joint session and confer full powers on Mr. Lumumba, 14 September Colonel Mobutu decides to "neutralise" existing central institutions. 14~17 September Security Council neets, fails to agree on representation of Congo, fails to adopt a resolution, calls Einergency Special Session of General Assembly. 17-20 September General Assembly holds fourth Emergency Special Session,, adopts resolution 1474 (ES~IV) of 20 September I960 requesting Secsretary=General to continue to a ssist Congo Government in maintenance of law and order, appealing to Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution of the internal conflict^, asking the Advisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission and calHng upon all -to- States to refrain from providing unilateral assistance for military purposes to the Congo* 20 September General Assembly begins fifteenth regular session9 decides to admit Congo to membership in UN. 14 October Mr0 Antoine Gizenga arrives in Stanleyville,, 5 November Conciliation Commission for Congo appointed by Advisory Committeeo 8 November President Kasa-Vubu addresses General Assembly and asks for seating of his delegation,, Irish soldiers of UN Force ambushed in North Katanga0 21 November ANC troops attack Ghana Embassy in Leopoldville and slash with Tunisian soldiers of UN Force guarding the Enfoassy, 22 November General Assembly decides to seat Congo delegation appointed by President Kas&<=-Vubu» 2? November Mr0 Lumumba flees from his Lsopoldvill© residence0 29«30 November Nigerian unit of UN Force ambushed by tribesmen in North Katanga. 2 December Mr. Lumumba arrested near Port Francqui, brought back to Leopoldville and then transferred to Thysville0 7-O.S December Security Council neets^, but adopt© no resolutions,, 12 December Mr0 Giaenga proclaims Stanleyville as Headquarters of f "• Central Government and provisional capital of Hepublie0 December ONUG Austrian medical team arrested by ANG0 16-20 December General Assembly discusses Congo problem but adopts no resolutionse 19 December Bureau of Conciliation Commission for Congo arrives in Leopoldville„ 20 December Secretary-=Gen$ral appoints Lieutenant General Sean MaeEoin to replace Major General von Horn as Supreme Commander of United Wationa Force in the Congo « 22 December Katanga authorities issue separate currency. 27 December Stanleyville ANG forces take over Kivus arrest provincial president Jeaia Miruho0 1 January ColQ Mobutu's ANG troops fleam to Usumbura attempt unsuccessful invasion of Kivu. 2 January Presidsnt Kass=Vubu announces convening of round table conference of Congolese leaders on 25 January „ 3 January =• 20 February Conciliation Commission for Congo visits Congo 0 8=9 January Stanleyvill® AMG troops invade Morth Katanga* Goveznnssnt of "Province of Lualaba" set up in Manono» 13 January ANQ elements mutiny in Thysville0 17 January jMr0 Lumumba and tvro companions 9 Mr. Joseph Okito and Mr« Maurice Mpolos transferred secretly froia Tiiysvilla to Katanga0 25 January "Preliminary round table conference" opens In Leopoldvill<80 30 January Katanga aircraft bomb Manonoc 9 February President Kasa=Vubu dissolves College of Cormnissioners and appoints provisional government headed, by Mr* Joseph Ileo0 10 February Katanga authorities annomnce "escape" of Mr0 Lumumba arid his two companions0 11-12 February Katanga gendarnsss begjjti military operation in North Katanga. 13 February Katanga authorities announce that Mr. Lumumba and his two companions have been murdered by tribesmen in asi undisclosed place. 21 February Security Council adopts resolution authorizing Secretary- General to use force to prevent eivil war and urging with- drawl offfiereenariesj ,re-openin g of Parliament and reorganisation of Congolese armed forces „ 28 February Mr. XI®©0 MJ?O Tshorab© and Mr0 Kalonji sign military and political agreement in Elisabethvillea torch United Nations and ANC troops clash in Mat&di, 6-11 March "Summit meeting" held at Tananarive^ Malagasy Republic, 10 March Mr« D^yal leaves Lsopoldville for Kew S"o2»k; Mr* Mekki Abbas takes over as Acting Special Representative of the Secretary=• General in the Congo. 30=31 March Katanga gend&ftuerie enter !4anono0 7 April UN Force stops fighting betvraen Katanga gendarnsa and Baluba •warriors in North Katanga0 15 April General Assembly adopts three resolutions on Congo0 Resolution 1599 (*V) calls for vdthdrai«al of mercenaries and other foreign psrsonnel: resolution 1600 (XV) urges re~opening of Parliament and establishing second Conciliation Coramissionj resolution 1601 (XV) establishes Investigation Comsaission on death of Mr» Lumumba and his companions0 1? April Agreement concluded by representatives of Secretary-General and President Kasa^Vubu for implerasntation of Securitj'- Council resolution of 21 February 196lc 24 April 28 May Conference of Congolese leaders meets in Coquilhatvilleo 26 April Mr<> Tshcmbe arrested by Leopoldville authorities in Coqui3Jiatville0 27-23 April UN garrison in Port Franequl overwhelmed and massacred by ANC troopso 12 May President Kasa-Vubu calls for Parliament maetingo 19 May Ms-o Mekki Abbas leaves Leopoldvilleo 25 May Mr0 Bayal resigns as Special Eepres®ntativ©0 Mr0 Stura Linaar appointed Officer in Charge of OMKJ0 22«24 June Mr0 Tshomba releaseds aigns protocol calling for re-opening of Parliament., 22 July Pariiaifisnt re -opans at LovaniiM University near L@opoldviUe<> 2 August National Unity Government headed by Priias Minister Cyrille Adoula Taianinously approved by Parliacisnt, 24 August Central Government issiies ordinance for expulsion of mercenaries from Katanga and requests QWS assistance to that effeeto 28 August QWB moves to round up ftereenazlas in Eiisabethvilleo Second Conciliation Coiaudssion holds first meeting in £few 1 September Mr0 MahmotaJ Khiary appointed Chief of Civilian Operations a 3 September Mr0 Gizengs retxsrns to Leopoldville to assume post of Vic®-» Prixoe Minister o Oa saies dayj, he leaves vith Prinia Minister Adcmla for Belgrade to attend Conference of Ion-aligned September OMJC resvisss operation of rounding up atereenaries;, is attacked by Katanga gendarsass led by mercenaries o Saerstas-y-Ganessal asrives in Lsopoldville at invitation of Central 17 September Secretary-General flies to Ndola9 Northern Rhodesia^ for ceasa-fira talks with Mr0 Tshombe, dies in plane crash near Ndolac 20 Septenfoer Mr. Mahmoud Kfaiazy concludes provisional cease-fire agreement with Mr o Tshombe in Ndola0 4 October Mr0 Gizenga returns to Stanleyville ostensibly to settle personal affairs* 13 October Mr. Mahraoud Khiary and Mr. Tshombe sign protocol for implementation of cease-fire agreement „ 26 October General Assembly sets up Investigation Conaaission on death of Mra Hanunarskjoldo 31 October ANG elements from Leopoldville Grouping attempt unsuccessful invasion of Katanga in Kaniama ares, 1-2 November ANG elements from Leopoldville Grouping assault Belgian civilians in Luluabourg. 3 November U Thant elected Acting Secretasy=General0 11 November ANC troops from Stanleyville Grouping massacre 13 Italian aimen of JM For eft in KindUo of LomJsa iKvasitigitios Consmlaaion is sued0 13 November Congo Government iosues ordinance regarding iraprisonnsenfc of mercenaries,, 13=14 November ANC troops from Stanleyville Groupings wiho have entered Albert viJile p commit loo ting 0 24 November Security Council adopts resolution denouncing secessionist activities and authorizing use of force for elimination of mercenaries,, 25 November 5 December Katanga authorities launch series of attacks against ONUG*, 27 November Acting Secretary General and Mr. Justin Bomboko sign status agreement regarding ONUC0 5<=>19 December Fighting between UM troops and Katanga gendarmes in Slisabethville, 19 December UN troops IK Erisabethville ordered to hold firs unless fired upon0 20=22 Deeember Prim© Miniate." Adoula and Mr. Tshombe hold talks at Kitona^ at the conclusion of which Mr. Tshombo signs Eight~potnt Declaration recognising authority of Central Government„ 27 December Belgian Embassy in Lecpoldvill© re-opened„ 29 Deeesaber Parliament lift*', parlianentary inmwnity of Mr0 Albert Kalonjic 1 January European missionaries and African civilians massacred in Kongolo by ANC troops from Stanleyville Grouping0 8 January Chamber of Representatives enjoins Mre Giaenga to return to Leopoldville to &nswer charges of secessionist activi,ties0 13 January Fro-Gizenga gendarmss overpoxv'sred by pro«»Governm3nt ANC troops after clash in Stanleyville0 15 Mr, Giaenga dismissed as Vice^Prime Minister 20 Mr0 Gizenga brought back to .Leopoldville in ONUC plane. 2=8 February Pr3jne Minister visits New Yorks addresses General AssemblyB has ta3,ks with Secretary=G-en©ral and delegationsn '-f 10 February Mr0 Robert Gardiner replaces Mr0 Linnsr as Officer=-in=Charg@ of ofaic „ 11 February Chamber of Representatives approves Government's action regarding Mr, Giaenga0 15 February Katanga Provincial Assembly adopts resolution accepting Declaration of Kitona as basis for discussions i.lth Central Government^ 1 March 2.962 THE UNITED NATIOKS AMD I-RE GC&3GO ' I960 ~ Febz»uary 1962) ftrjrffir*-jirtG,'tY"'Table oK^fn"^ :'t'r""Go&tsntr****"ii~ ifi'^'i'***s* ~bj the Acting ISteglaaing of the Operation ObjeetiTOS of the Operation Difficulties Goaf renting Tasks Confronting CHUG (a) Withdrawal of Belgian troops (b) Maintenance of lafer and order First aehlftvesaeaits and difficulties Measures taken during the Constitutional Security Coraieil resolution of 21 February 1%1 Incidmfes after the constitutional cr&sis R®=«?ganisation of Congolese amscl forces (a) Constitutional crisis Dismissal of Mr. Patrice Liaammba and its aft&nsaih Coaeilidtlisit- efforts \ R@moponing of Parliament Rssnaiaing obstacles (d) Problem of Katanga Movement towards secession Secession and the OKUG mandate Consolidation of secession in Katanga Mercenaries and other foreign eleraasits First United Rations action against foreign @l@aents in Katanga . " ' S^nts of August and. September 1961 ...... flight of the Seeretary-Genaral; the csase»fir® of D@c^ab@r 1961 Kitona Declaration and its implementation (©) Civilian Operations I, Glossary Ho Chronology of events III, Map of the RepulsOLic of the Congo FOREWORD BY THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL The United Nations Operation in th© Congo is \jndoubtsdly the biggest and most, challenging task ever undertaken by the international Organisation* Sinee the beginning of tha Operation^, on 14 July I960, the United Nations has h&d to face an immense and ^usually cos^plex set of problems« Jly pr On 12 July I960, the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) addressed to the Secretary-General,, Mr, Dag Haassnarskjoldj an urgent appeal for United Nations military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against the external agression perpetrated against it, which it considered as a threat to international peace* More specifically, it requested the despatch of United Nations troops to the Congo to ensure ths withdrawal of Belgian troopsg which had intervened in its territory without its consent, and to end the secession of Katanga which, it said, had resulted from a conspiracy betwsen "Belgian imperialists" and a small group of Katanga leaders „ The Government also requested United Nations technical assistance for ths re-organisation of the army and the administrative machinery of government0 The Secretary-General* who considered the Belgian intervention to be a source of tension which, if not removed,, could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, immediately brought this request to the attention of the Security Council* The Council met on 33 and 24 July I960. By its resolution of 14 July I960, it called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary- General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the latter with such military and technical assistance as might be necessary until its national security forces wrs able fully to meet their tasks» The appeal to the United Nations was the culmination of a series of events which have their cause and origin in the failure of the former Belgian colonial administration to prepare the Congolese adequately for the independence which was granted to them on 30 June I960* Under that administration a policy of paternalism was consistently practised0 Whil© the Congolese enjoyed a standard of living higher than that of most other African countriess the Belgian authorities did not promote their political advancement. The education of the African population was oriented to produce at best dorks& skilled workers and sergeants rather than managers, engineers and officers, Not until 195? were political activities tolerated in the territory. Arrangements for independence were made only at. the beginning of I960; at a round table conference in which Congolese Isadevs participated. The first legislative elections ever held in the Congo took place in May I960; Parliament met for the first time on 17 June and the first Central Government was established on 23 June* merely a week, before independence. A consequence of this policy was that when the Congolese us?© given independence they were ill»prepared for it. There were at that time only seventeen Congolese -university graduates., not a single doctor ©£» engineer.. There were few political leaders -with any experience and none with truly national experience* and there wsre no experienced African administrators8 In order to keep the administrative machinery and technical services running after independence9 the Belgian Government put at the disposal of the Congolese Government» under the treaty of friendship., assistance and cooperation «- signed by the two Governments but never ratified by theia? Parliaments •» more than 10,000 Belgian administrators, technicians and arnny officers. Much hope was placed in the Force Publiqu©., well-trained and armed and entirely officered by Belgians, which in the past had carried out its task of maintaining public order with groat,, if harsh, efficiency o On 5 July I960, five days after the Congo attained independence, certain elements of the Force Publique in Leopoldvills, dissatisfied over the failure of the authorities to Africanize their ea%esa mutinied. The mutiny soon spread to Thysville, Elisabethvill®a Luluabourg and elsewhere in the Congo. Some of the mutineers went, on the rampage during which they manhandled Belgians in general and in some eases committed ?apa<> Those disturbances led to a mass exodus of the Balgian population, including almost all the administrators and technicians put at the disposal of the Congolese Government-under the friendship treaty? Their departure entailed a nearly complete breakd0x-si of the essential services and the stopping of economic activities in nany parts of tt& 3-Tdnf<5t!?« ttnen the disturbaftees broke ouis the Belgian Goveriiffient sought iw impress upon Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba the need to invoke the B3lgo» Congolese friendship treaty and to request the intervention of the Belgian -3= troops stationed in the military bases of Kaanina and Kitona under that treaty to maintain law and order. This Mr. Lumumba adamantly refused to do9 contending that his Government was able to restore law and order with- out outside help. In this connexion, Dr, Ralph J. Bunehep %Sio had corns to the Congo to attend the independence ceremonies as the representative of the Secretary-General* warned the Belgian Ambassador in Loopoldvilie of tdie serious consequences which could follow if the Belgian troops ware called out without the Congo Government's consent. Ho pointed out that the Belgian Govemroant could appeal to the Sseority Council about the excesseso But despite Dr« Bundle's %*amingg the Belgian Government unilaterally decided to intervene* On the morning of 10 July I960*, Belgian troops, following an appeal by the President of the Katanga provincial government., Mr, Moiae Tshombe, moved into Elisabethvilleo Subsequently^ other Belgian troops occupied Luiuabourgd Leopoldville and other towns in the Congo0 On 11 July, one day after the arrival of Belgian troops in Elisabet-hviile, Mr0 Tshoaibs proclaimed the independence of Katanga0 Vith the national independence and territorial integrity of its country threatened by foreign military intervention and secessionist activities, unable to maintain law and order and to ensure the operation of its essential services9 the Congo Government turned to the United Nationse OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATION Ths United Nations Operation in the Congo <= also kno-ssi as OKUGj, from the initials of th© French tit.les had initially three objectives? It sought to remove the threat to international psace and security bjr bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo,? including Katanga 'and the Belgian iniHtary bases of Kaiaina asnd Kitoaa. (b) It was t© assist the Congo Gcverair.ent in restoring and maintaining law and orderj this task included the training and ?©»orgemisatioa of the Fores Pubiiqaej, now reriansad the jtonjgjQaMgnaljg_ciM^3glgg (A£C)» (c) It was to provide technical assistance to th® Congo Government. to ensure the continued operation of all essential services t> to restore and rs-organiae the administrative machinery of govsrmiant and to train Congolese to run that Eiaehinorya In order to aehi.w© these objectivsss the Sscretary-Qeneral sat i3.ps in addition to the civilian team of technical assistanc® ©xpsrtss an international aimed force composed of contingents frosn States other than the great Powers^ mainly African,, This force., nasnsd tha United Nations Fore© in the CongOj, was to follow a set of special principles. It was t® be placed tinder the sxelusiv© command of the United Nations and its national contingents were not to take orders from their governments; it wae not to be a party to internal conflicts in the country? and it was not to use forca eaccept in self-=d®fene@« The Force was to bs raider United Kations coimoan-d because few governments of sovereign States would eoa'lislbiifc© troops to th© United Kations if thsir continents TOre to be placed tsndsr fehs orders of another government,, As to the other two prisaeiplssj, obviously the United Kations could not send ita Force into a friendly coimts^- to raaddls in its internal af fall's or to fight against its people » Thess principles were announced by the Secretary-General before the Security Council adopted its r resolution of 14 Julgr I960 and ware therefor© fcaeitl^r approved bj ifc0 The principles and objectives laid down by the Secretary-Ceneral for ONUC were upheld %• the Security Council on 22 July, 9 August and again on 21 August I960 when the question was brought back before it. After the constitutional crisis broke out in Lsopoldville on 5 September I960, ONUC continued to apply the same principles, but a new objective was added to the three already set: It endeavoured to encourage and facilitate the efforts of Congolese leaders to achieve a peaceful solution of the crisis through negotiation and conciliation. Later, as the internal conflicts dangerously deepened in t.feg course of 1961, the Security Council twice strengthened the mandate of OJiUC to enable it better to cope with increasing difficulties. On 21 February 1961; ths Council authorized the Secretary<=General to us® fores as a last resort to prevent civil war. On 24 November 1961 <=» shortly aft®* the death of Dag Haarstarskjold and the election of U Xhant as Acting £>©cretary~ General « the Council gave a similar authorization for the ©limitation of foreign military and para°«dlitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations coMoand^ and mercenaries. DIFFICULTIES CONFROOTIHG ONUC In order to realise fully the magnitude of the task confronting ONUC9 one mist bear in mind the land and people to which that, task relates* With an area of 2,3445OOQ square kilometres (about 900,000 square miles)f the Congo is as large as Western Ewopa or eighty tiaas the size of Belgium^ its former ruler» A large part of this vast country, the "bush"p is still isolated from the outer worlds although its main centres are linked to each other and to the exterior by an intricate system of rstls river and air transport« Its African population* which numbers about 14 million, is composed of a great many tribes having different languages and customs, and tribal animosities among them are still very strong,; Besides ths Africans, there is a sizable European community which plays an important role in the economic life of the country, but has few affinities with the rest of the population. Many of the Europeans, most of whcaa are Belgian,, do not seam to have fully understood the nature and principles of th@ United Nations Operation in the Congo. When the United Nations operation got underway in the Congo soon after the middle of July I960, it found the country in a state of ehaos» The administrative machinery of government and the essential services had in a large measure collapsed. The economic life had almost completely stopped, resulting in widespread unemployment* There was an acute food shortage in many areasf not for lack of food but because the food distribution system had broken down. The Belgian military intervention had raised among the Congolese intense feelings of hatred and fear*, As the Government was unable to assume its normal responsibilities, the task of maintaining law and order, ensuring the continued functioning of the essential services and restoring the normal economic activities fell almost entirely upon CKUC, In order to carry out this imesase task9 ONUC needed the full eo«- operation of the Congo Government and it has sought on all occasions to cooperate with it« Unfortunately., its relations with Prime Minister Patrice Lureamba became strained after the first few weeks over a grave conflict regarding the Interpretation of its mandate. The divergent positions of the Secretary-General and Mr. Lumumba regarding secession ar© dealt wifch in the section on the problem of Katanga; suffice it to say here that tha resulting hostile attitude of Mr. Lumumba greatly hasapQred ONUG?s i^rk. After the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba by President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the situation further deteriorated. Different factions engaged in a struggle for power which increased ONUC's burdens and hindered its action. During this struggle for power, OKUC adopted an attitude of strict impartiality. At the same time promoting reconciliation between the various faefeioas became a crucial part of the CKUC effort. But this policy was not under- stood and was bitterly resented by the de .facto authorities of th© time. the difficulties experienced by CNUC have not all come from Congolese sources. Since independence, foreign interference has manifested itself in siany forms in the Congo. It has been most active in Katanga, but by no means limited'to that province. It certainly constitutes a major obstacle to a peaceful solution to the Congo crisis and has made (MJC's task con- siderably more difficult. -ft. TASKS COHFEOKTIMG ONTO Since its inception, OHUC has had to deal with a complex set of problems with no parallel in the history of international operations, and has had to devis© nevf solutions for many of them* For the saks of claritys these problems and the actions taken to solve them are set forth separately belows although many of thsn are closely interconnected and often overlapping. (a) Withdrawal of Belgian troops The intervention of Belgian troops was the vary event which caused the Congo Government to appeal to the United Rations, and the Security Council in its resolution of 14 July I960 called upon the Belgian Government -co withdraw its troops from tho Congo. At the time of the resolution, there ware about 10,000 Belgian troops in th® Congo. Some were in the two military bases of Kamina and Kitona; others were deployed in the country where th*y occupied a number of main centres. Because of the tension they generated^ the presence of Belgian troops was a constant danger not only to Congolese but also to the Belgian population whom it was their very purpose to protect* for while they succeeded in occupying a number of cities» the country at large Idas outside their control* In this connexion; it may be recalled that there were in fact two series of mutinies of the Fores Pub2iqae in July I960. During the first series which took place from 5 to 10 July, unruly elements did caaait excesses, but the majority of the troops did not j^ssort to hostile acts again it Belgians. The second and incomparably more violent outbreak took place after* and because of the Belgian military intervention of 10 July I960 and parti- cularly the attack on the port of ffetadi* Th© objective of ONUC was to achieve the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from the whole of the CongOj, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic and without using force,, Xnsnediately after th© adoption of the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 aid before the arrival of the first contingent of the United Nations Force, ths Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo., Dr» Ralph J. Buneh@p -9= entered into negotiations with the Belgian representatives in Leopoldvill® for the speedy withdrawal of their troops. It was agreed that the Belgian troops would withdraw from the positions they occupied as soon as these positions were taken over by the United Nations Force« In order to achieve a speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops, it me necessary to bring in and deploy the United Nations contingents with the least possible delay. The plan was to take over all the positions occupied by the Belgian troops in three stages9 first the city of Leopoldville, th©a the rest of the Congo except Katanga and the two Belgian military bases of Kamina and Kitona9 and finally the three remaining areasP Th© first United Nations detachment, composed of about 70 Tunisian soldiersg arrived in Leopoldville on the evening of 15 July I960 and was Joined by others in the following days. There were about 3*500 United Cations troops in the Congo on 18 July, 11,000 on 6 August end 16,000 at the beginning of Septsaber 19600 A few hours after the arrival of the first contingent of the Force on the evening of 15 July I960, United Nations soldiers replaced Belgian troops in the central part of the city of Leopoldville. On the following ttso days, as more United Nations troops arrived, they took control of the remaining parts of the city and began relieving Belgian troops in the main centres of Bas«=CongOo Although this speed could be achieved only at the cost of strenuous efforts, the Congo Government did not consider it fast enough. On 1? July I960 Mr. Patrice Lumumba and Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vwbu addressed an ultimatum to the United Nations whereby, if the Belgian troops vnsr© not completely Kith- drawn within 4$ hours, they would appeal to the Soviet Union* The Secretary- General brought the matter before the Security Council which, by its resolution of 22 July I960, commanded the action taken by the Secretary- General and called upon Belgium to speed up the withdrawal of its troops. The original plan was therefore continued without change* As soon aa new United Nations contingents arrived, they tsere deployed in the positions occupied by Belgian troops. Thus, they brought about the complete with» drawal of the Belgian troops from Leopoldville and the surrounding area on 23 July I960, and from the whole of the Congo except Katanga and the two bases by the beginning of August I960. The naxt step was the entry of Unite! Nations troops into Katanga. On this question the Seeretary-General ran into a grave conflict with the Congo Goverrsnent. Mr* Lumumba wanted CflUC to h®lp his Government to put down th® secession of Katanga by force. This CfcUC could not do for under its mandate it could not be a party to* or in any way intsrvens inP or be used to influence the outcome of any conflict in the Congo* Another difficulty encountered by the Secretary-General was the resistance of the Katangese secessionist authorities and the Belgian Government. The Katangese aufehori~ ties strongly opposed the entry of United Nations troops andt allegedly because of this opposition^ th© Belgian Government was reluctant to withdraw its troops from Katangaa Csi 4 August 1960$ th© Secretary-General, \&io had arrived in Leopoldville a few days earlier,? sent Dr. Bunche to Eliaabethville to sake arrangements with the Belgian representatives there for the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga which9 if no difficulties arosas would take place on 6 August, But in the face of unqualified and unyielding opposition of tho Kafeangeso secessionist authorities^ Dr. Bunchs concluded that tha ©atjy of United Nations troops could not be achieved without using force., The Secretary- General therefore decided to postpone the original plan and brou^it the matter before the Security Council,, By its resolution of 9 August I960, the Security Council confirmed the authority conferred upon tha Seoretary=» General by its previous resolutions and called upon BelgLran Immediately to withdraw its troops front Katanga. At the same tim@a the Council reaffirmed that the United Nations Force would not in any way intervene in any internal conflict in the Congo* After the adoption of the resolution, the Seeretary^leneral returned to the Congo and* on 12 August* personally led the first United Nations unit into Katanga. But Mr. Lumtsztba strongly criticised th® manner IB tMch the Secretasy^Gasiaral had ioipl©s!0nt©d the Security Council resolutions asid refused henceforth to coopamfc© Kith him<, In vi@& of Mr« LtsaymbaQs violent reaction^ the S@eretary~General once again referred tfc@ matt@r to the Security Couneilo The Council get on 21 August 1$60$ but did not vote c& @ny ?@solution« During th© discussion^ the Secretary«=6ensral indicated that in the abseaca of any new directives he would consider his interpretation of the C&SU3 mandate as upheld. He also made known hio intention to appoint an Advisory composed of menber States having contributed troops to the United Nations Force to advise him on future policy on the Congo, The entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on 12 August I960 set off a process of withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga and the bases, which was completed by the beginning of September I960, Thus, despite difficult circumstances^ ONUC brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo within six weeks and, by so doing, removed on® of the main sources of .tension in the country at that time* (b) Maintenance of law and order First achievements and difficulties The maintenance of law and order undoubtedly has been the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon OHUC0 In order to carry out that task, the Secretary-General set up a United Nations Force which at its peak strength numbered about 20,000. But even at its peak strength the United Nations Force was hardly sufficient when its responsibilities had to encompass as vast a land as the Congo„ /It their arrival in the Congo, United Nations soldiers were told In official instructions that they wero members of a peace force, not a fighting force, that they had been asked to come in response to an appeal frosn the Congo Government, that their task was to halp in restoring order and calm in a troubled country and that they should give protection against acts of violence to all the people, Africans and Europeans alike. They were also told that, while they carried arms, they were to use than only in self*, defence and that they were in the Congo to help everyone and to harm no one. These instructions spelled out one principle under which the Force must function: restraint in the us© of force „ Another principle was that the Foroe should never be used to intervene in the internal conflicts in the Congoo Because the United Nations came to the Congo to assist the Congo Government in maintaining law and order, it did not seek to aet as a government. tthat it sought to do was to assist the Congolese to perform their normal duties | for instance, by undertaking joint patrols with the local police £br th© maintenance of law and order la a given area, Mien, however, this was not possible on account of the braakdoisn of the security forces , the United Nations Force alone had to perform the normal security duties in the place of Congolese authorities, but in so doing it always sought the consent and cooperation of the Congo Government* Such was the case in Lsopoldville during the first stage of the operation; uhen United Hations soldiers performed police duties on ths main arteries of th® city and ensured the protection of its @ss@ntial Following these procedures, the Force restored law and order, protected life and property,, and ensured the continued operation of essential services 'wherever it want* In many areaa it brought under control unruly MC elements , many of ushosi laid down their arms voluntarily or at the request of their Government » Thus the Force carried but its task of maintenance of law and order with success in the initial phase of the Operation. Unfortunately* the task of the Force became more difficult after mid- August I960. The relations between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Secretary-Sensralj, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, deteriorated over the question of Katanga, and, after the entry of the United Hations troops into that province* the Prime 1-ilnister withheld the cooperation which h® had hitherto given (MJC0 Moreovers as the iassitable consequence of the unpreparsdaess of the Congolese leaders for the responsibilities of independence, the internal situation began in August rapidly to H&reeiu Tribal rivalries, which had plagued the country before independence* flared up in Kasai Between Baluba and Luluas with added intensity,, Persecuted by Luluas without the effective intervention of the Government* the Baluba of the Luluabourg area fled en masse to their tribal lands in the Bakwsmga region, where their leader j, Mr, Al&srt Kalonjli proclaimed the secession of South Kasai, In Equateur and Leopoldville provinces, thsra was increasing opposition to the Government. To put dm® opposition and secessionist movements^ Mr0 Lumumba resorted to ©xtr^ss action. Sms opposition Isaders were arrested and beat^i, and anti-Government newspapers were suspended. At- the ©ind of August, ANC troops were sent to South Kasaij, v.iiere they behaved in the most cruel and killed many civilians, including women and children,, ythsr AKC 13 troops ttfere being massed near ths northern border of Katanga In preparation for the invasion of the province. To male© possible these military moves9 Mr, Lumumba sought and obtained direct assistance outsid® United Nations channels « During those day39 th© ANC, which the Government was using to achieve its political objectives* but which it did not always seem to be abls to control; was a constant danger to the civilian population. Even QKIKJ personnel wsre not always immme from its brutal assaults. There were* in particular? two sexdoua incidents in v&ieh CNUC personnel *©re the victims of brutal and unprovoked assaults by ANC elements* On® of these incidents took place at the Kdjili airport on 18 August I960 and th© other in Stanleyville on 27 August. Without the cooperation of the Congo GoveHiment which it had com© to assists GNUC faced a frustrating situation. Its action was further hampered when the Government itself resorted to actions which tended to endanger law and order^ or restrict human rights. Whenever this happened^ OJJUC endeavoured to induce and persuade Congolese authorities to change their course of action and, to th® extent possible-, took measures to ensure the protection of the threatened parsons. But it refused to use force to subdue Congolese authorities? or the ANC under their orders. Even v&sn its owi personnel tssere attacked^ QwUG intervened only to prevent further excesses and to urge the Congo Government to talcs disciplinary action against the culprits. The policy of restraint of CKUC was not always understood. This, for oxaaapl9fl vas reflected in certain remarks made in August I960 by Major*- General H.T. Alexander^ then Chief of Defence Staff of Ghana. Th® General viewed the restraint on the u@@ of force as a *@akness» Hs considered that the problem of raaintomne© of law and order could be solved only by disaming the ANCj and he proposed that the United Nations should do so even against the Congo Government0 This stand was firail^ rejected by OSUC, Dre Bunch®9 then Special Representative of the Secretary-General in th® Congo9 pointed out that the only basis the Force had for operating in the Congo was tha Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 in which9 acting upon the request of the Congo -24= Government, the Council had decided to provide that Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until its national security forces were fully able to meet their tasks. In the light of this resolution, the United Nations policy in the Conp,o had bean one of seeking to cooperate with the Governments it had neither sought to replace the Government nor to make it captive* The United Nations Fores was in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation* and had studiously avoided any suggestion of replacing in any nay the foraer colonial administration. Obviously, Dr» Bunehe added, if the Foree began to us© its anas to wound and kill Congolese,, its doom would be quickly sealed? for it could not long survive amidst a hostile public„ Measures taken during the constitutional crisis On 5 September I960, the situation in the Congo was suddenly changed fl as a consequence of President Joseph Kasa-Vubu s decision to dismiss Mr0 Patrice Lumumba. The dismissal of Mr0 Lmutaba set off a grave coastitu= tional crisis which Trias ended only eleven months later. During that period* there waa no legal government in the country and, after a confused struggle for power, the country found itself, in effect, divided i»to four camps, each ruled by a de facto regime based more on its armed forces than on popular supporto The difficulties of QMUC were naturally increased by this state of affairs. There mas now no government with which it could deal* Its policy in the field of maintenance of law and order was to cooperate with th© authorities actually in control of the area wherever necessary. In so doing, it carefully avoided any interference in the political struggle under way and endeavoured to observe the strictest impartiality tot-sards the various contending parties. As b©fores OWUC would use persuasion rather than coercion to achisive its objeetives9 and its troops i*ere ordered sot to use force except in self=>d©f@ne©8 Immediately after the dismissal of Mr» Lumumba^ ONUC fcoek two ©aargencj measures,. These measures were taken in view of the eaplssive tension among the population generated by the conflict betwseei th® two most powerful Congolese leaders^, Mr,, Kasa=>?ubu and Mr0 Lumumba^ which might K@ll have led =15- to an imminent breakdown of law and order throughout the country and to an extension of the civil war already under way in South Kasai« ONUC decided on the night of 5 to 6 September I960 to close all major airports. The following day, in view of the dangerous effect of inflammatory speeches on an already disturbed populace and after a number of •& olent demonstrations had taken place in the city, ONUC temporarily closed dots* the Leopoldville radio station. These measures were lifted on 12 and 13 September I960 as soon as the tension had subsided below the explosive level. Thanks to them there were no major clashes during those ominous days, In response to frantic appeals for protection from political and other leaders of all sides in Leopoldville, ONUC also agreed to protest the threatened leaders,., and in so doing it endeavoured to show absolute Impartiality« OKUC guards were stationed around the residences of Mr, Kasa-Vubu and Mr, Lumumba« Protection was also given the other leaders9 though not to the same extent0 Indeed» all political and military leaders of consequence were given a measure of protection by CKUC and not a few probably owe their lives to it. In the following months'* the continued efforts of OKUC led to a number of important achievements. In South Kasai, ONUC helped in arranging a cease-fire between AKC troops and the secessionist army of Mr° Kalemji and in establishing a neutral zone placed under OKUC control. It also persuaded the ANC command to withdraw its troops from the northern border of Katanga,, When these troops, which moved without any logistical support, engaged in looting and pSLage along the routes they followed? ONUC transport planss were brought into us© to airlift them to their destination. In North Katanga, where violent fighting broke out between pro-Tshomba gendarmes and the anti- Tshombe Baluba population, ONUC put an end to the fighting by setting up, in agreement with both parties, neutral zones under its protection» Elee- t&iere endless efforts were exerted to prevent violence„ uphold law or pro- tect life* Protected areas were set up at various times sad places, where threatened persons, Africans and Europeans alike5 could repair for safety,, Neutral zones were established to stop tribal warfare. During this period of unrest, Europeans, many of whom were scattered settlers in remote areas9 were often threatened by hostile local authorities or population0 Whenever possible ONUC took measures to rescue and protect them and, if they so desired, to evacuate them to safer areas» =16- In carrying out its mission of peace, the United Nations Force stiffered many casualties. On 8 November I960 a patrol of eleven Irish soldiers was ambushed and eight of them killed in Korth Katanga. Another incident occurred on 24 November when ANC troops attacked the Ghana Embassy in Leopoldville. The Tunisian unit which guarded the Embassy incurred several casualtiesf including one dead*, Here again, when the authorities in power indulged in actions which endangered peace and order, or violated human rights, ONUC could not always prevent these actions but sought to redress the situation by the use of persuasion or good offices. Thus ONUC could not prevent a number of political arrests made by the various local regimes. At the time, these regimes endeavoured to strengthen their armed forces by importing arms and military equipment from abroad. While OHUC did its best to stop such imports, its forces were insufficient to control all points of entry, and; therefore? could not prevent quantities of arms and equipment from being smuggled into different parts of the country* One of the most delicate problems confronting ONUC during the constitu- tional crisis related to the fate of Mr« Patrice Lumumba*. It was this question which so strained the relations between ONUC and the Kasa-Vubu- Mobufcu regime that cooperation between them became almost impossible«, After the military coup of 14 September I960, the de facto regime of Laopoldville, supported by President Kasa-Vubu, attempted repeatedly to arrest Mr. Lumumba, but was prevented from doing so by ONUC. The position of ONUC was dictated mainly by its concern to maintain law and order, for it well knew that Mr, Lumumba8 s arrest would dangerously deepen the current crisis and make any reconciliation so much more difficult, ONUC also held the view that even though dismissed as Prime Minister,, Mr0 Lumumba was still a deputy of the National Assembly and therefore was under parliamentary immunity which only Parliament could lifto Its troops., therefore, vigilantly guarded Mr» Lumumba°s residence and, so long as he remained there, he was in safety0 However, it became impossible to protect him when he voluntarily left his residence on the night of 2? to 28 November I960, in an apparent attempt to get to Stanleyville, his political strongholdo Before he could do so, ha was arrested by ANC soldiers near Porfc-Francqui and brought back to Leopold- -17- ville0 Once Mr. Lumumba veaa arrested, CKUC had neither the strength nor the right to liberate him from his captors, but it exerted all possible pressure to ensure him legal and humane treatment. Upon learning of the arrest, the Secretary-General sent two successive messages to Mr<> Kasa«»Vubu, expressing his concern over the event and stressing the importance of giving the prisoner all the guarantees provided by law. Similarly repeated representations were later made to Mr. Kasa-Vubu by Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General In the Congo. CfcUC could not do more -without exceeding the mandate given it by the Security Cound. 10 However, nothing was done to give Mr. Lumumba a trial. He remained detained in Thysville until 17 January, v&en he and two other political prisoners, Mr. Joseph Oklto and Kr0 Maurice Mpolo, were transferred secretly to Katanga. This move brought strong protests from both the Secretary-General and th© Conciliation 'Commission for the Congo which was then in the territory, In particular, the Secretary-General took immediate action to urge the authorities concerned to return Mr. Lumumba to Leopoldville Province and to apply the normal legal rules. But no remedial action was taken, and four weeks later, the shocking news came from Katanga that the three prisoners had been murdered,. The circumstances of their death were later investigated by a United Nations commission, which accepted as substantially true the evidence indicating that the prisoners had been killed as early as 17 January 1961 and probably in the presence of high officials of the Katanga provincial government. Security Council resolutionof 21 February 1961 The news of the murder of Mr. Lumumba brought the crisis to its most dangerous point. It was followed by a aeries of reprisals and counter- reprisals by pro-Lumumba and anti=Lumumba leaders^ including summary executions of political prisonsrsc Th© civil war, already under vay in North Katanga, threatened to spread into other regions. In the shadow of this threat^ the Security Council met again on 15 February I96le After a long and tense debate, the Council adopted, on 21 February, a resolution by which it authorised CNUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo, It also urged that the various Congolese aimed units be re-organized and brought under discipline and control., The period immediately following the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 was a critical one for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. After the death of Mr* Lumumba, several contributing States had withdrawn their national contingents from the United Nations Force, reducing its strength from a maximum of about 20,000 to less than 1590000 Thinly deployed throughout the countrys the United Nations Force had great difficulties in coping vdth its overwhelming tasks. Its difficulties further increased because of the hostile attitude of the authorities of Laopoldville and Elisabethville,, These authorities interpreted the new resolution of tha Security Council as an attempt to subdue them by force andp in retaliation* ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel. The moat serious of these measures was the attack by AHC troops on th© United Nations garrison in Matadi on k March 196l0 In order to cope with these difficulties and to implement the new resolution of the Security Council^ the Secretary-General took urgent action to increase the strength of the United Nations Force. New contribu~ tions were obtained from several governments, bringing the total of the United Nations troops to more than 18,000 in April 19610 In April, the situation began to improve, first because of the increased strength of the Force,, and secondly because after patient negotiations9 ONUC reached an agreement with President Kasa-Vubu on 17 April 1961 for the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The limited use of force, as authorised by the Security Council, was resorted to by OMJC at the beginning of April 1961 to stop the civil war which was spreading dangerously in North Katanga* Since mid-March 196ls Katangese gendarmerie led by foreign mercenaries had launched an offensive against the anti-.Tsb.ombe forces in Korth Katanga in a determined effort to crush all opposition there,, On 27 Marchs the United Nations Force Commander warned Mr. Tshombe to stop the offensive., but the warning was unheeded and gendarmes entered Manono three days later and prepared to attack Kabaloe It was at this point that United Nations troops interveneds stopped the gendarmes and established control of the area between Kabaio and AlbertviHe0 At the end of Aprils a most tragic incident occurred when a United Nations detachment in Port-Francqui was suddenly attacked and overpowered -19- by ANC troops and /& of its members ruthlessly massacred. It was generally agreed that this brutal assault was mainly an act of madness by undisciplined and unpredictable armed troops. After this incident, the ONUC Command made it a rule not to station small units in isolated areas. ONUC realised that, as a result of this policy, many areas could no longer be covered by its troops, but it considered it had no right to jeopardize the safety of its soldiers <> Prom the e:ad of April until August 1961, thare were fewer incidents. The most important one was the arrest of Mr. Tshwnb© by the Leopoldville authorities during the Conquilhatville Conference at the end of April. As in the case of other political prisoners, OHUC exerted its efforts, within its mandate, to ensure that he would bs treated humanely and be given the guarantees provided by the law, Ke was released four weeks later unharmed. During that period, the United Nations Force played a major role in the conciliation efforts between Congolese leaders which resulted in the re-opening of Parliament and the setting up of the national unity Government led by Mr0 Adoula. These efforts are set forth in the section on the con- stitutional crisis, but it should be pointed out here that they could not have succeeded without the protection afforded by the United Nations Force to the leaders of the various groups. This was fully recognised by the House of Representatives of the Republic of tha Congo which expressed its appreciation to the Force in a formal resolution. Incidents after the constitutional crisis After the investiture of the Adoula Government, on 2 August 1961, the task of OKUC became considerably easier. Once again, it could work v.lth a legally constituted Government and it did so in a spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence. However, law and order was threatened by several grave incidents, all of which broke out because national unity had not yet been fully achieved. On two occasions jj as a result of attacks launched by the mercenary-led Katanga (gendarmerie on United Nations troops, fighting broke out between them in Katanga. This fighting is set forth in detail in the section on the problem of Katanga* ' 20- Another series of incidents was related to the ANC campaign, late in 1961, to occupy North Katanga. In connexion with this military campaign, which is discrlbed in the section on the problem of Katanga* a number of grave incidents were caused by undisciplined ANC elements. At the beginning of November 1961, ANC soldiers of the Leopoldville Grouping assaulted "several Belgian women in Luluabourg. On 11 November $ ANC soldiers of the Stanleyville Grouping massacred 13 CKUC aircrew members of Italian nationality in Kindu. Two days later, .AKC soldiers of the same Grouping, who had just .entered Albertville, began to loot houses and threaten civilians there. On 1 January 1962, 22 European missionaries and an undetermined number of Africans were killed in Kongolo by ANC soldiers, also from Stanleyville, in an incident reminiscent of the Kindu In the first three cases, as soon as CNUC learned of the incidents, it intervened to restore law and order, and to protect the threatened population. It could not take punitive action which lay clearly with Congolese authorities* but it urged the Congo Government to exert every effort to ensure that those guilty would be quickly found and severely punished. In the case of Kindu, where United Nations personnel were involved, a joint investigation commission was set up by CKUC and the Congo Government to investigate the incident and identify the culprits* As regards the Kongolo incident, the December hostilities in Elisabethville had obliged CKUC to withdraw most of its troops from North Katanga and there were no United Nations troops in or near Kongolo at the time of the incident. ONUC immediately urged the Congo Government to take speedy action to identify and punish the culprits and to prevent the recurrence of like incidents, and offered all possible assistance to achieve those objectives „ With the agreement of the Government two officers of the Nigerian contingent later went to Kongolo, investigated the incident and organized the evacuation of the threatened persons from the area, Finally, an important incident took place in Stanleyville in January 19&2<, As a result of deteriorating relations between the Congo Government and Mr. Antoine Gisenga, fighting broke out on 13 January between pro-Gissnga gendarmes and .ANC troops led by General Victor Lundula, which were now loyal to the Central Government. The fighting, which resulted in 14 deaths, stopped the next morning when the gendarmes surrendered to General Lundula0 -21- During the fighting, ONUC troops were on guard throughout the city to pro- tect the civilian population, but did not have to intervene* After the gendarmes had surrendered, ONUC assisted ANC troops in disarming than at the request of the Central Government. After the fightings Mr. Gizenga was eensured by the Chamber of Representatives and dismissed from the post of Vice-Prime Minister, and the Central Government ordered a judicial investigation to determine hie responsibilities in the inddento Here again, ONUC scrupulously avoided any interference in the internal political struggle, but sought to ensure the observance of the law. The Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, addressed to Prime Minister Adoula a personal appeal in this connexion and was given full assurance that Mr. Gizenga would be granted all practical and legal safeguards for the protection of his interests. Mr. Gizanga was brought to Leopoldville on 20 January 1962 in an ONUC plane, at his request and with the agreement of the Government, and he spent his first two days there at ONUC Headquarters. He left OMJC Headquarters on 22 January voluntarily and after infowning ONUC that it was relieved of all responsibilities for his personal protection. Re-organization of Congolese armed forces In going over the United Nations Operation in the Congo as regards the maintenance of law and order, one cannot fail to observe that all the grave incidents have been caused by unruly elements of Congolese armed forces, whether they be part of the AhC, the Katanga gendarmerie or the Kalonji forceso From the outset, it has been considered an essential task of GNUC to assist the Congo Government in establishing diociplina in armed forces. These armed forces were to be brought under unified command, the unruly elements eliminated and the remaining ones re-organized and restrained., In order to achieve these objectives, GNUC has offered full support and co- operation to the Congo Government„ Thus, in August I960, ONUC took the first step toward the reorganization of AKC when the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force, General Ben Hamou Ksttani, was appointed as adviser to the ANC at the request of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Shortly after this appointment, the ANC began to re°form in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and iaenc But this =22= programme was interrupted at the end of August because of the Government's plan to invade Kasai and Katanga, and later ONUC was compelled to abandon it altogether because of the political struggle which began in September I960. After the setting up of the Adoula Government, in August 1961, CNUC's efforts were resumed. General Mengasha Xyassu, who was appointed to con- tinue General Kettani°s mtfk, has prepared a reorganization programme which is designed to be carried out in full cooperation with the Government, It is hoped that with the improving political situation this programme can be successfully completed,, CWUC will exert all possible efforts to that end* in order that the national security forces of the Republic of the Congo might be able fully to meet their tasks« (c) Constitutional Crisis Dismissal of Hr0 Patrice Lumumba and its aftermath The task of ONUC was made immeasurably more difficult at the beginning of September I960 by an event not foreseen when its mandate was defined by the Security Council. On 5 September, the Chief of State, Mr, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, invoking the power which, he claimed, was vested in him by the . Loi fondamentale. dismissed Mr* Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister of the Congo„ This decision set off a grave constitutional crisis which was to end only 11 months later* During that period there was no generally accepted central government in the country, and its parliament was kept from functioning. In the days following the dismissal of Mr<, Lumumba, utter confusion prevailed in Lsopoldville0 Mr. Lumumba refused to recognize Mr. Kasa^Vubu" s decision and in turn dismissed him as Chief of Statee Parliament supported Mr. Lumumba although it refused to endorse his decision to dismiss the Chief of State, but Parliament itself was soon suspended by Mr» Kasa=Vubu0 Each contending party sought the support of the azsny and, whenever it coulds ordered the arrest of its opponents. On 14 September I960, General Joseph Mobutu, then Colonel and Chief of Staff of ANC, imposed by a coup an army- backed regime run by a College of Commissioners and supporting Mr. Kasa-Vubu., But the coup was not fully effective in that Mr, Lumumba and his supporters resisted the Commissioners9 authority. Naturally, the contending parties turned to GKUC for recognition and support. OKUC continued its policy of avoiding intervening or taking sides in the internal conflicts under way. While it recognized the unimpaired status of Mr. Kasa-Vubu as Chief of Stats, it refused to help him achieve political aims by force and, in particular, to recognize the College of Commissioners supported by him. Without interfering directly^ it favoured a speedy return to legality through reconciliation betwean Congolese leaders and encouraged the efforts being made towards that endc Several moves were made at the tints by Parliament leaders and others to reconcile Mr0 Kasa~?ubu and Mr» Lumumba„ Unfortunately, none of than yielded positive result s« The crisis was examined by the Security Council from 14 to 1? September I960 and, when it failed to take a decision, by the General Assembly from 17 to 20 September* By its resolution of 20 September I960, the General Assembly fully supported the position taken by the Secretary-General. In an effort to solve the constitutional crisis, it appealed to all Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution, by peaceful means,, of all their internal conflicts and requested the Advisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission to assist them in that endeavour. During the meeting of the Security Council two Congolese delegations«, one appointed by Mr* Kasa-Vubu and the other by Mr. Lumumbas were sent to New Yorks but neither could win approval. Two months later, during the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly, Mr. Kasa-Vubu himself «. came to New Tork as the Head of his delegation, which iras seated by the General Assembly after a long and bitter debate* The decision of the General Assembly considerably enhanced Mr* Kasa-Vubu"a personal prestige,, but did not bring an immediate solution to the crisis„ In the meantime, the internal situation rapidly worsened in the Congo. While the College of Commissioners consolidated its position in Leopoldvill@9 Mr,, Antoine Giaenga, acting on behalf of Mr, Lumumba? succeeded in establish- ing a government in Stanleyville which was formally recognised as the *. legitimate government of the Republic by a number of Member States. With the support of the local ANC troops, led by General Victor Lundula, Hr0 Glsenga extended his authority, beyond the Oriental province, to Kiru and the northern part of Katangac At the same time, the secessionist governments o* Mr, Moise Tshombe and Mr. Albert Kalonji consolidated their hold reneetlvely over South Katanga and South Kasai with the active assistance of e-rtain foreign powers. Thus the Congo was divided into fora- major rival samps « Conciliation efforts efforts at that time were mainly directed at two object! ves« On the one vindj ONUC endeavoured to prevent the leaders holding the reins of power from using force to subdue their opponents within or outside the zones they comroHed. On the others it encouraged all leaders to seek a solution of thel.* differences through negotiation and conciliation Conciliation efforts were also made by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the C->ngo, established under the General Assembly resolution of 20 September I960. This Commission, which was composed of representatives of African and Asian ccintries having contributed troops to the United Nations Force, visited the Congo it the beginning of the year 1961 a After spending seven weeks in the count sv the Commission came to the conclusion that., while there was among most leadevs a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to achieve peaceful solutions to the crisis, a small number of other leaders9 among the very [email protected] holding the reins of power, appeared to prefer a military rather than a political and constitutional solution,, Because of their uncooperative ind intransigent attitude the attempts made by the Commission to reconcile the opposing groups had not led to positive results,, The Commission also cams to the conclusion that the crisis could be solved only if Parliament i-vas reconvened and a national unity government approved by it and that one of the nain obstacles to a speedy solution was foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo,, These views were very similar to vhose expressed by the Secretary- General. "They were largely reflected in the decision taken by the Security Council^ which met at the end of February 1961, to examine ones again the Congo problem. In its resolution of 21 February 1961., the Security Council urged that Parliament be convened and that the necessary measures of protection be taken in that eonriesdon. It also expressed the view that the solution of the Congo problem lay in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from oufc aid®9 that there could be no solution without con- ciliation and that the imposition of any solution, including the formation =25- i of any government not based on genuine conciliation would., far from settling any issue, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and of threat to international peace and security. After January 1961* a number of steps were taken by various Congolese leaders in an attempt to solve the crisis. On 25 January a preliminary round table conference was sponsored by Mr. Joseph Kasa«Vubu in Leopoldville. It was boycotted by pro-Lumumba and pro-Tshonbe leaders, which considerably limited its usefulness„ However, at the end of the conference$ Hre Kasa-Vubu decided to replace the College of Commissioners by a provisional government headed by Mr. Joseph Ileo, a decision which was considered by the Conciliation Commission as a step in the right direction. At the beginning of March 1961, a conference was held in Tananarive, Malagasy Republic., on the proposal of Mr, Moise Tshombe. It was attended by a number of top Congolese leaders, but Mr. Antoine GLzengap who had first agreed to come, did not show up. The Tananarive Conference proposed that the Congo be turned into a confederation of sovereign States. Under the proposed arrangements, the Central Government would be abolished* and legislative and executive powers vested in the individual States,, The Conference also provided for the establishment of new States., but did not determine the criteria to be followed in that connexion. This decision led Congolese leaders, through personal ambition and tribal animosities, to lay claims for the creation of a score of new Stateso But the influence of the Tananarive Conference was short-lived. Soon thereafter, Mr. Kasa-Vubu and other leaders revised their positions and made it clear that the decisions of Tananarive were mere statements of intentions and, unless approved by Parliament, had no force of Iaw0 Some time later, on 24 April 1961, a more important conference was ;convened in Coquilhatville, on the proposal of Mr0 Kasa»Vubu0 Mrc Gizenga again refused to attend. Mr0 Tshombe eamejand sought to re-create the Tananarive situation. VJhen his attempt was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the representatives, he decided to boycott the conference, but as he prepared to fly back to Elisabethville, ha was arrested by the Lebpoldville authorities. The conference continued nw@s*th@le3Sj, and at the conclusion of its work, it recommended a re-organization of the govern- ment structure of the Congo on a federal basis. From the outset, it had -26= been made clear that the decisions of the (inference would have to be endorsed by Parliament, and during the Conference^ on 12 May, President Kasa-Vubu announced that Parliament would be re-opened in the near future and requested United Nations assistance and protection for this purpose, While carefully avoiding interference in the discussions between Congolese leaderss ONUC facilitated those discussions whenever it was requested to do eo. Thus it placed a guard at the site of the preliminary round table conference in Leopoldville, It agreed to facilitate Mr. GizengaBs trip to Tananarive when he first accepted to go there. Before the Coquil- hatville Conference? Mr. Cl&ophas Kamitatu vent to Stanleyville oh an CNUC plane in an effort to bring about a rapprochement between Mr» Gizenga and Mr. Kaaa-VubUo Re^opening of Parliament After Mr. Kasa-Vubu announced his intention to reconvene Parliament, ONUC spared no efforts to help achieve this purpose* An essential condition for reconvening Parliament was a rapprochement between leaders of the Leopoldville and Stanlgyville groups« To these two groups belonged the great majority of parliamentarians and, if one of them refused to attend Parliament meetings, there would be no quorum. But the memory of Hr« Patrice Lumumba9s death and its aftermath was still vivid and leaders of the two groups were divided by deep suspicion and distrust* Through good offices and persuasion, CKUC officials did everything possible to dissipate their mutual suspicion and lay the ground for negotiations between them,, After Mr. Kasa-Vubu called the Parliament session in Leopoldvill@; Mr« Gissenga condemned his bid as illegal and ordered Parliament to meet in Kaminao Thanks to ONUC's good offices, Mr0 Gieenga softened his stand and agreed not to insist on Kasdna provided that full protection were given to parliamentarians by ONUC. Later, a meeting between Leopoldville and Stanley- ville representatives was arranged in Leopoldville* under QNUC auspicest to consider the modalities of the rs-opening of Parliament, The Stanleyville representatives ware brought to Loopoldvill© in an CttlUC aircraft and tha meeting took place at GNUC Headquarters, After long discussions, an agreement was reached by the representatives of the two groups. At their Joint request, GNUC accepted the responsibility for making arrangements for the session of Parliament and ensuring full protection to the parliamentarians,, -27- In accordance with the request made by both delegations, OKUC also sought to persuade Congolese leaders of South Kasai and South Katanga to subscribe to the agreement on the reconvening of Parliament* Both Kr. Albert Kalonji and Mr, Noise Tshonbe, vho was released from confinement by the Leopoldville authorities on 22 June 1961, promised to cooperate0 Mr. Tshombe even signed a protocol calling for the reconvening of Parliament <, but he changed his position after he returned to ElisabethvillOo Parliament re-opened on 22 July with more than 200 — out of a total of 221 «*• members attending. Host of them were brought to Leopoldville with the assistance of ONUC, On 2 August 1961, Mr. Cyrills Adoulas at the request of President Kasa-Vubu, constituted a government of national unityj which was unanimously approved by both Chambers,, Remaining obstacles With the approval of the national unity government, the constitutional crisis was ended. In response to a letter from Prime Minister Adoula, the Secretary«General confirmed that the United Rations would deal with his Government as the Central Government of the Republic and that whatever aid and support the United Nations was in a position to give to the Cong'i would be rendered to his Government. Howevers there still remained two obstacles to the achievement of full national unity. One obstacle to full national unity relates to the secessionist activities of Mr. Tshombe. Soon after the re=opening of Parliament9 Mr. Tshombe somewhat softened his stand and allowed the parliamentarism of his party to participate in the work of Parliament0 However, he himself remained in Elisabethville and showed no intention of relinquishing the powers he Siald iss Katanga0 Mien all attempts at negotiations £,'iileds Prime Minister Adoula resorted to sterner action. In order to remove what it believed to be the main obstacle to a peaceful solution of the Katanga question, the Central Government fomally ordered the esspulsios of mercenaries serving in Katanga and requested ONUC to assist it in carrying out this decision. The efforts made by OKUC to remove the mercenaries from Katanga and the hostilities which broke out when merc©nary~led gendarzwsa attacked United Nations forces are dealt with in the sections on law and order and on mercenaries,, After almost four months of hopeless deadlock8 the problen of Katanga seemed to be nearer a solution in December 196l0 Following a request made by Mr. Tshombe on 14 December9 a meeting was arranged at Kitona, in Leopoldville Province^ between him and Prime Minister Adoula with the assistance of the United States Ambassador in the Congo and ONUC, At the conclusion of the Kitona talks, on the night of 20/21 December 196ls Mr. Tshombe signed an eight-point declaration in which he accepted tho applica- tion of the Lpi ,fundamental©» recognized the authority of the Central Govern- ment and pledged himself to ensure respect of the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. Since then, OKUC has been exerting all possible efforts? through persuasion and good offices, to ensure that the provisions of the Kitona Declaration will be fully observed, as an indis- pensable step toward the solution of the problon of Katanga by peaceful means0 The other obstacle was the equivocal attitude of Mr. Antoine Gizenga,, At the time of the re-opening of Parliament, he had remained in Stanleyville and, although he was appointed Vice=Prime Minister in the new government* made no move to proceed to Leopoldville, Mr0 Adoula endeavoured to secure his cooperation with the active assistance of other Stanleyville leaders and ONUC« His efforts seemed at first successful. On 7 August 1961, Mr« Gizenga recognized the Adoula Government as the sole legal government of the Republic,, Four weeks later he came back to Leopoldville to assume the post of Viee-Prime Minister and accompanied Mr. Adoula in that capacity to a conference of non-aligned nations in Belgradef Yugoslavia. However., Mra Gisenga left again for Stanleyville at the beginning of ^ctober, ostensibly to collect ©oao personal effects* and refused to return to Leopoldville despite the many appeals from Mr0 Adoula6 While he was in Stanleyville? he attempted to form a new partyf the Pana-Lumumba, and made several statements strongly hostile to the Government, i. On 8 January 1962, the Chamber of Representatives adopted a resolution ordering Mr* Gisenga to return without delay to answer charges of secessionist. Mr0 Gizenga refused to obey the order and his defiant attitude led to the fighting, on 13 January 1962, between gendarmes supporting him and AHC troops loyal to the Government, which was easily won by the latter* Thereafter$ Mrc Gizenga was dismissed from the post of Vice-Prime Minister following a motion of censure by the Chamber of Representatives,, -29- The Stanleyville incident considerably increased the authority of the Central Government, which is now in control of all regions of the Congo, except South Katanga* 30 (d) Problem of Katanga Mgyement toward Secession The Congo, which became independent on 30 June I960 and was recommended for membership in the Uaited Nations on 7 July, was a well-defined entity consisting of six provinces. ?or three-quarters of a century it had been governed as a unit, the provinces being regarded as mere administrative divisions. T-Jhen the political future of the Congo was discussed at the Brussels round-table conference at the beginning of I960, all Congolese leaders agreed that "the Congo within its present frontiers shall constitute an independent State, the inhabitants of which ».« possess one and the same nationality". The Loi fondamentale 'sahich took into account th© varying views expressed by Congolese leaders at the round-table conference of Jariuary»Pebruary I960, kept the Congo a united country while permitting a measure of decentralisation. T-rith the appro.ich of independence, however, and with the intensification of political activity, there was a resurgence of demands for provincial autonomy or even independence, This development was especially marked in some sections of Katanga, the province which, with 12.1/2 per cent, of the Congo's population, contributed 50 per cent, of its total revenue. A reluctance to continue to share its wealth was not unrelated to advocacy of secession for K&tenga. At the same time, political differences gradually widened on the national scene between t'r. Patrice Lumumba, the main proponent of unitarism, end I'r. l-'oise Tshorabe, the Katanga leader who advocated n loosening of ties between the Congo's provinces. These differences w@rs paralleled elsewhere in the Congoj several parties found a government baaed 'on the Ltammba- lasavubu alliance not to their liking, and turned to separatist polieias. The trend gathered strength owing to the fast that, with one or two exceptions, Congolese political parties have strong tribal and territorial associations. At this point various foreign interests began to enter the picture, providing financial and political support to secessionist movements. As Belgian relations with Prime Minister Lumumba deteriorated, there was an increasing tendency among Belgians to support groups in the Congo which sought to escape Central Government control» With Belgian financial and political support Mr. Tshombe was accordingly in a position to proclaim the independence of Katanga on 11 July I960. 31 - But Mr. Tshombe's own position in the province was anythiog but secure. In the May I960 elections to the provincial Assembly, his party, the Conakat, won 25 seats out of 6C as compared to 23 seats for the rival Cartel Katangais. The latter group, which is dominated by the Balubakat party, felt aggrieved because, in its opinion, the distribution of seats did not tally with the popular vote. Hr. Tshombe was able to form a provincial government only with the support of independent and co~opted members, and after a last-minute revision by the Belgian Parliament of the Loi fondamentale had reduced the quorum for meetings of the Assembly from two-thirds to one-half. Foreign support was vital in helping Mr. Tshombe to assert his control over Eatangfl itself, as well as to make good his secession. He welcomed the occupation of Katanga by Belgian troops - which retrained there until the beginning of September 196C. He was also assisted by Belgian military personnel in the task of turning the Katanga gend?raeri® into an effective military force. When under the pressure of OKOC Belgian troops withdrew from the province, Belgian officers in command of the gendarmerie remained; they were instrumental in helping Tshombe carry out his subsequent secessionist policies. Secession and the OMUC mandate Along with the breakdown of law and order and foreign armed intervention, the secession of Katanga was thus one of the main problems which confronted the Congo when, in its hour of need, it appealed to the United Nations for help. In its appeal to the United Nations, the Congo Government specifically requested military assistance to end the secession of Katanga, but ths Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 contained no mention of this point. On 22 July, the Council recognized that it had dealt with the Republic as a unit, and asked all States to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. In August, the Council called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga; it also made it clear, however, that the United nations was not to take sides in Congolese internal conflicts, constitutions! or otherwise; nor was the Organization to be used to influence the outcome of any such conflict. -32 - Thus the United Nations position was clear from the beginning. It recognized and supported the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and was opposed to secession. The United Nations obviously could not go into a country at the invitation of its government, and there support or accept an effort of one area to break away from that country. But the problem was especially acute because l"r. Tshombe, in proclaiming the independence of Katanga, was not acting alone. The move was made with the unconcealed help of Belgian advisers. and was backed by Belgian troops. Thus, outside intervention became inextricably linked with the secession of Katanga from the very outset, and so it has remained. Since it had been brought about in great part through foreign support the secession of Katanga, which led directly to action by the Central Government. would have led inevitably to counter«=action by other states. This posed a threat to international peace and security in the inanediate area of the Congo and in Africa as a whole which was made more dangerous by the evident interest of certain groups in the riches of Katanga. Faced with this complex situation, the Secretary-General drew a clear distinction between what the United Nations could do in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, and what it could not do, and on this issue Prime Minister Lummdba chose to break with him. Mr, luimanba argued that the United Nations had been asked by his Government, and had agreed, to help maintain law and order throughout the Congo; from this he inferred that the United Nations u&a to help put down the lawless rebellion of the Katangese authorities. The Secretary-General's position was thf>t, while the United Nations Operation originated from a request by the Congo Government, the purpose of the United I»ations intervention as determined by the Security Council was not to achieve the domestic aims of the Government but to preserve inter- national peace and security. The United Nations Force therefore could not, under the Security Council decision, be used on behalf of the Central Govern- ment to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action in regard to an internal political controversy. Kor would (MFC transport Central Government civilian or military personnel into Katanga against the wishes of the provincial authorities, or protect such personnel - 33 - there beyond what followed from its general duty to mintain law and ordsr. Conversely, OKUC, according to Mr. Hasnmarskjold's interpretation, had no right to prevent Central Coverransn tactio n in relation to Katanga, if such action was taken by its own means, or similar action by Katanga, provided it was not carried out by foreign troops or resources. While freely using persuasion to bring about reconciliation on the basis of unity, OKUC accordingly refused to intervene directly to put down the secession! its mandate did not allow it to exercise military initiatives for this or any other purpose. ONUC refused to help the Central Government under Mr. Lumumba to subdue Mr. Tshombe, and its stand has not changed to this day. What the United Nations can do and has sought to do is to encourage efforts at reconciliation and eliminate foreign interference which has been instrumental in bringing about the secession of Katanga and which has helped it to endure. The withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga, was brought about by CKUC within the first six weeks of its operation. But after the departure of the ijelginn troops, foreign interference took more subtle forrcs ?>nrJ the secessionist regime, which had been set up following the Belgian military intervention, was strengthened by the introduction of foreign political advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, and the import of arms, ammunition and military equipment. To cope with this aspect of the problem, the Security Council strengthened the CI3UC mandate in February 1961 and age.in in November by authorizing it to eliminate those foreign personnel, by force if necessary, and to prevent further introduction of such elements as wall as of arms and military equipment. Consolidation of secession in Katanga As explained in previous sections, the internal situation rapidly deteriorated throughout the Oongo in the course of August I960, and this deterioration led to the constitutional crisis which broke out in Leopold- ville on 5 September. During.this crisis, the secessionist regime of Mr. Tshombe was able to consolidate its hold over South Katanga, with active foreign assistance. .Jhile Belgian officers, supplemented by an increasing number of foreign mercenaries, continued to strengthen the gendarmerie, Kr. Tshombe imported large quantities of arms and war materiel, -34 including aircraft, from abroad. With his improved ariaed forces, he launched a merciless extermination campaign against the Baliaba and other political and tribal [email protected]. Helping to maintain law and order in Katanga and protecting large parts of the Katsngese population against the brutal lawlessness of the gendarmerie accordingly became one of the principal aspects of the OHUC effort;, along with the removal of the foreign political advisers, nilitary and •r^a-'snilitaiy persoaae! aad mercenaries » la carrying out its functions in Katanga, .ONUC continually found itself opposed by certain foreign financial interests which in effect control the economy of the province. These interests, centred about the vast industrial and mining complex of the Union KinieTe du Haut-Katanga• with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium,.had apparently committed themselves to Mr. Tshombs's secessionist policies. The Union I'ini^rs supported Hr. Tshombe in four principal ways. First, it paid nearly all of its taxes not to the Central Government, to which they wore due, but to th« Katangese provincial authorities. Secondly, it shipped its production not by way of the traditional "national" route, but by way of Portuguese Angola; this enabled it to credit hard-currency export duties to the account of the provincial government. Third3y, the Congo's part of Union Miniere stock was withheld from the Central Government and was kept in Brussels. Fourthly, the firm allowed its industrial facilities in ElisaJiethville and other places to be used by the iaercenary-led gendarmerie for military purposes, including the making of some implements of war. It is estimated, on the basis of recenfc figures, that the Union Kinie're and connected companies supplied the pjajor part of Katanga's revenue and thus, in effect, may be said to have furnished the financial basis of the whole secessionist movement - including the high wages of the mercenaries, ample military equipment, end a vigorous propaganda machinery, with branches in some of the most important cities in the world, which spread tendentious and often viciously inaccurate reports directed against the United Nations. However, despite Kr. Tshombe's efforts and the powerful financial and political support he enjoyed, his separatist isoveraent never gained official international recognition either in Belgium or elsewhere. Moreover, neither Belgium nor any other Government publicly espoused the cause of Katangese secession. In fact, after the establishment of the coalition Govermsnt in 35 - Brussels in the spring of 1961, its Foreign Kinister, Kr. Paul-Henri Spaak, announced publicly its stand in opposition to the secession of Katanga. This stand did not seam to carry such T«eightj however, with the sup of secession abroad, and the foreign elements pressing for secession in Kataaga, who had gone far in their efforts to prevent reconciliation on the Conga's unity. &rai other, foreign alegients The problem of foreign elements Tssho sought to influence th© Congo's destinies in their own interests first came into prominence when these men instigated Katanga's declaration of "independene®" in July I960, asd this scourge has beset the Congo ever since. In the beginning, the bulk of these persons were Belgian professional military and civilian off icials (known aa "Minaf" personnel) placed at the disposal of the Central Government of the Congo under the treatj of friemS™ ship with Belgium, which was signed but never ratified. After the severance of diplomatic relations between the Gongp and Belgium, many of these men gathered in Katanga, iliere they gained prozainent. positions in the provincial administration and the, gendarmerie. From these vantage points th&y vigorously promoted secession. In effect they waged war on the Congolese Gweramemt at whose disposal they had bean placed by their Government. Later these Belgians were joined by some elements of other nationalities. On 21 February 1961 the Security Council urged "the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries". Implicit in this language was the finding that whils the Congo was admittedly and diroly in med of assistance fsrom outside, and especially of personnel to carry out technical and professional tasks which the Congolese had not hitherto been trained to perform, ther® were other tjpes of foreign personnel whose actions were incompatible with genuine Congolese independence and UHiity. In certain parts of the Congo, aad especially in Katanga, such personnel had ccsne to plaj an increasingly harm- ful role, obstructing the application of United Nations resolutions, and in effect working in their own interest and in the interest of certain financial concerns , to break up the country into a balkanized congeries of politically and economically unviable states. -36 - Immediately after the adoption of the resolution of 21 February, the Secretary-General undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the foreign military and political personnel. The Belgian Government took the position that there oust be no discrimination against Belgians in engaging non-Congolese technical personnel; as for military personnel and mercenaries, the Belgian Government divided them into several categories. Of thsse it undertook to recall those whom it considered that it had the legal right to request to return. But it would take no such action in respect of mercenaries, and of Belgian personnel engaged by the Congo Government,, arguing that it was tip to the Secretary-General to agree with the Congolese authorities on how to deal with them. The Seeretary- Gensral expressed the view that the measures indicated by the Belgian Govern- ment fell far short of full compliance with the Security Council resolution. f The exchanges with Belgium continued, fairly inconclusively, until the change of government in the spring of 1961, when some progress was made. The new Belgian Government notified 23 of its nationals serving in Katanga as political advisers to return to Belgium. It also acted to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries proper. But the effectiveness of these efforts soon became open to doubt. On 30 October 1961 the Government in Brussels acknowledged that this was the case and took more vigorous steps «* including the withdrawal of passports. Mr. Tshombe, however, would not co-operate with CNUC. He continued to recruit foreign personnel, whose influence in the councils of the provincial government in fact tended to rise sharply. The complexion of the group also changed noticeably as mercenaries replaced the "Minaf" staff* Thus the traditional colonial administrative and military elements were being supplemented through an influx of non=Belgian adventurers and soldiers of fortune, including outlawed elements previously involved in extremist activities in Algeria and elsewhere. Similarly, political Pdvisers active in the provincial government were increasingly committed to extremist, repressive and separatist policies; they drew political sustenance from the substantial non-Congolese community to which Katanga's extractive and processing industries had given rise. - 37 First United Nations action^againat foraign elements In Only after the United Nations had strengthened its position in April 1961 did the Katanga secessionist authorities, acting while Mr. Tshombe was under detention in the West, officially accept the resolution of 21 February. Those authorities drew up lists of persons whom they considered as falling within the terms of the resolution. Uy the end of June 1961, forty-four Belgian nationals were thus selected for repatri?tion, and the cases of twenty-two others were under consideration. It was noted, however, that persons clearly not coming under the resolution had been included for political reasons, while others notorious for their activities had been omitted. OlflJC representatives continued to press for revision of the lists, and brought home to the provincial authorities their determination to take drastic action, if need be, to comply with the United Nations mandate. In April 1961, forty-four mercenaries who were members of the "compagnie internationals" were apprehended by the United Nations and evacuated from the Congo. By mid-June an estimated sixty more mercenaries had withdrawn from Katanga, and on 24 June the mercenary unit known as "compagnie inter- nationals" was formally dissolved by the provincial goversimsnt. On 7 June 1961, following discussions with the Katanga authorities, the United Nations Force Commander dispatched a military mission to Katanga for the purpose of helping the authorities there to remove non-Congolese elements falling under the resolution. The mission reported that there were 510 foreign officers and non-commissioned officers active in the gendarmerie as against 142 Congolese "cadres". Of the non-Congolese. 2C8 were the remaining Belgian professional military men. 302 were mercenaries. But despite the unrelenting efforts of OIIUC, the provincial authorities refused to take effective action to remove the foreign elements without whom the secessionist movement might have collapsed. For its part, the Belgian Government said that it was prepared to help in the removal of its professional officers and NCC's who had been serving th© Congo and were now in command of the gendarmerie, but it professed itself unable to do anything about the "volunteers" and mercenaries. Fersuasion by the Secretary-General, who discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Spaak in Geneva on 12 July 1961, was unavailing in this regard. Gradually, the United Nations was compelled to shift its ground to more vigorous and direct measures to achieve compliance with the Security Council resolution* Mr. Tshombe's chief military adviser, Ilajor Weber, was compelled to leave on IS June 1961; Kr. Tftyssens. a prominent political adviser, was apprahended, taken to Leopoldville, and evacuated on 14 July. ONUC warned the Katangese authorities that it was prepared to compel the evacuation of other advisers and officers* Five French officers in politically sensitive gendarmerie posts were dismissed and repatriated, and a Joint commission, was established to list foreign political advisers, both those in official posts and others acting unofficially, vjho were to be repatriated. Events of August and September 1961 The formation of the Adoula Government, enjoying unquestionable and internationally recognized authority, was of crucial importance in enabling the United Nations to proceed with the elimination of foreiga elements. Before the for nation of a legal Government, the United Nations' efforts had been restricted by the requirement of avoiding political interference, or support of one Congolese faction against another. Now the United nations v/as able to do more effectively what the eleven-month-long constitutional crisis had impeded it from doing - that is, help the Government in removing the foreign elements which had furnished the backbone, and provided the teeth, of the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the Congo's richest province from the rest of the country. It was not the United Nations' intention - any more than it had been in the summer of I960 - to proceed against any Congolese elements, Katangese or otherwise. Kor would the United Nations seek to conquer or subdue Katanga on behalf of the Central Government; its action was to be directed primarily at the removal of non-Congolese elements, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. For weeks, ONUC representatives urged Mr. Tshombe to co-operate in removing nefarious foreign elements, but to little avails In the meantime, the Central Government issued its Lrdinance of 24 August 1961, which called for the expulsion from the Congo of the foreign officers and mercenaries who stood behind the secession policy, and requested ONUC assistance in carrying out the decision. • - 39 - On 28 August5 CNUC proceeded to round up the mercenaries for deportation* In the face of inflammatory rumours about an invasion by the AHC which had been disseminated by Mr. Godefroid I&nongo, the provincial Fdnister of the Interior, certain security precautions were taken by OKUC in Elisabeth ville, including surveillance over Radio-Katanga, gendarmerie, headquarters, and some other key points. Inflammatory broadcasts were thus prevented, and appeals for calm were put on the air. The precautions lasted for only a few hours. On this occasion Mr, Tshombe, who had been fully informed of the goals of GNUG's action, expressed his readiness to co-operateo He broadcast a statement to the effect that the Katangese authorities accepted the decisions of the United Nations, and that the services of the foreign military personnel were being terminated by his government. At that point, UllUC representatives mat with the Elisabethville Consular Corps, which was presided over by the Belgian "Consul". The latter offered to assume the responsibility, together with two senior Belgian officers formerly in the gendarmerie, for the orderly repatriation of the foreign personnel, most of whom were Belgians. CIJUC immediately accepted this arrangensnt, and suspended its own rounding-up operation, but three s®t@ of ominous developments soon marred the picture* In the first place, it developed that the foreign military men being made available for repatriation were in the main the "Minaf" personnel whose withdrawal had been earlier agreed to by the Belgian GoversaBentj there were also a few persona of other nationalities. By 9 September 1961, 273 had been evacuated and 65 were awaiting repatriation. Bui* while some of the volunteers araJ mercenaries proper had left, ninny others - about 104 of whom were known to be in Katanga - were "sissing", They were reinfiltrating into the gendarmerie, distributing arms to groups of soldiers over whom they could assert control, and getting ready for violent resistance. In the second, place, the political police (SuVete) under Mr» Munongo and largely directed by foreign officers, launched a campaign of assaults and persecution against anti-Tshombe Baluba tribesmen in Elisabethville. An effort was made to convince the world that GKUCss actions were eawBing disorder. The terrorized Baluba streamed out of the city and sought safety by camping in primitive conditions near ONUC troop quarters. OUUC arranged protection for the encampment, into which 35,000 Baluha had crowded by 9 September, creating a serious food and health problem, as well as continuing danger of tribal violence. In the third plfice, the foreign elements - including some French persons from Algeria and local settlers who had volunteered for the purpose - contrived terroristic actions against GwUC personnel. Led by a group of extremists in the Surete, they were reported planning to blow up OMJC head- quarters in Elisabethville. On 11 September 1961, they ^rt-cstcd th« deputy GliUC representative. When ONUC realised that the Katangese authorities had no intention of fulfilling their promises, it pressed its demand for the evacuation of foreign personnel in the Surete and of the remaining mercenaries by 9 September. The Katangese, however, led by Mr. Tshombe, had manifestly fallen back under the domination of the foreign elements, and had let themselves be persuaded to launch violent action agairst QHUC. GNUC's plans for a solution of the difficulties in Elisabethville were rejected, and when on 13 September 1961 security precautions similar to the ones of 28 August were applied, the United Nations troops were violently attacked by gendarmes led and instigated tgr non-Congolese personnel. In the morning of 13 September, Mr0 Tshombe requested a cease-fire, on the understanding that the United Rations troops would be enabled to continue their mission. CvfUC representatives agreed and repeatedly sought to meat the provincial president to secure a cessation of hostilities. However, !'r. Tshombe and some of his lieutenants *ere prevented by their foreign military advisers, or allowed themselves to be prevented, from appearing at scheduled meetings with OMJC representatives. In the meantime, the attacks on the United Nations troops continued, causing casualties* Front the building housing the Belgian consulate, where & number of Belgian officers were known to be located, sustained firing at the United Nations troops went on. The United Nations bass at Kamina was attacked, as were the United Nations garrison and installations at Albert- ville. Reluctfintly, United Nations troops had to return the fire. All over Elisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga, the foreign officers who had gone into hiding came out into the open to lead operations against the OMJC "blue helmets". It is noteworthy that hostilities occurred only where such foreign elements led or forced Congolese soldiers into them. Despite the apprehensions repeatedly expressed by Belgian officials, there were no difficulties whatever between GUUC troops and those Katangese units whose foreign officers and mercenary cadres had been duly withdrawn. Vfher® this was the case, GNUC and Katangese soldiers usually fraternized, and maintained order. Similarly, OMJC troops remained on friendly terms with Katangese civilian Africans. The situation became serious because efforts to reinforce the United Nations troops were frustrated by the depredations of a Fouga Kagister 5fit fighter, piloted by a non-Congolese mercenary, which quickly managed to immobilise OBUC's. unarmed air transport craft. The Fouga jet also played havoc with the ground movements of OKUC, which had deliberately refrained from securing offensive weapons such as fighter planes or tanks as incompatible with its mission as a peace force. This Jet, among other things, prevented action to remove a gendarmerie roadblock between Elisabethville and Jadotville in order to relieve an Irish CTJUC detachment ambushed and besieged in Jadot- ville. The Irish detachment, ironically, had been sent there et the request of the consular representatives in Elisabethville, who appealed for immediate protection of the iSuropean community at Jadotville. .ifhen the Irish detach- ment arrived there for that purpose, some members of that community helped in the attack which the gendarmerie promptly mounted against the detachment. At both Kamina and Albertville, where they were not faced with such treachery, ONUC forces were able to stand their ground successfully. Tragic flight of the Secretary-General; the cease-fire In the meantime, the Secretary-General had arrived in Leopoldville at Prime Minister idoula's invitation to discuss future prospects of the United Nations operation in what was hoped would be a new sotting created by the completion of the principal tasks assigned by the Security Council and General Assembly. Confronted instead ./ith a ruthless attack on the United Nations Force by foreign elements, Mr. Hacmarskjold threw himself into the task of securing a cessation of hostilities, achieving reconciliation asaong Congolese and fulfilling the United Nations mission peacefully. In pursuit of peace, he flew to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, to meet Mr. Tahombe, and on this flight on 1? September 1961 he lost his life. So did seven other United Nations staff members.-' The Secretary-General's mission was immediately taken up by the Officer=dn-Charge of OWGS Dr. Sture LLnner, and his colleagues. Mr. Mahmoud Khiaiy flew to Mola and, on behalf of the United Nations forces, signed a military cease-fire agreement on 20 September. This provided, among other things, for the establishment of joint cowanissions, exchange of prisoners, and for the prohibition of troop movenetits. It was understood as an express condition that the agreement would not affect the application of the Security- Council and General Assembly resolutions, including, of course, the continued removal of mercenaries. On this understanding it was approved by United Nations Headquarters. A protocol for carrying out the provisions of the cease-fire, including such matters ns prisoner exchange and the fixing of troop positions, was signed on 13 October 1961 at Eliaabethville. tfhile the protocol allow 3d firing back in case of attack, it prohibited Katangese and ONUC troop movements. In approving this protocol, United Rations headquarters stressed its military nature, re-emphasized. United Nations support of the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo ?nd, as indicated earlier, insisted on continued enforcement of the Security Council resolution which called for the evacuation of mercenaries. Although the prisoners were in fact exchanged and certain positions held by ONUC in Elisabethville throughout the fighting were duly released, Mr. TshouJbe's regime was soon flouting the provisions of the cease-fire. In Leopoldville, his emissaries made it clear that nothing less than Independence along the lines of the Tananarive decisions would be acceptable to the .lle authorities, Meanwhile, the remaining Katanga mercenaries were I/ Mr. H.A. Wieschhoffj, Director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairsj Mr. Vladimir Fabry, Special Counsellor to the Cfficer-in-Charge of CXUC; Mr. Jilliam Hanallo, Personal Aide to the Secretary-General} Kiss Alice Lalande, Secretary to the Officer-in-Chargej Sgt. Harold K. Julien, Acting Chief Security Officer; Sgt. Serg© L. Baxrau, Security Officer, and Sgt. Francis Eivers, Investigator. 43 leading the gendarmerie in a long series of violations of the cease-fir© agreement, going so far as to launch offensive air action along th@ Kssai- Katanga frontier. This was sternly protested by the United Nations, whieh warned that Katangese aircraft involved - all of them piloted by mercenaries - would be brought down. ''fails strictly abiding bj the cease- fire in Katanga, OKUG had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of the September situation when it found itself powerless to stop the attacks of Katanga's Pouga Magister Jet fighter. Three member States - Ethiopia, India and Sweden - had contributed jet fighter squadrons to the United Nations Force to strengthen its defensive capacity. At the same time, ho;\rever, the Force ground strength was being whittled away. In August3 the Tunisian contingent had been withdrawn in connexion with events at Bizerte; the Ghana contingent subsequently withdrew, and certain other 03IUC units were reduced. Not unaware of these developments, Mr. Tshombe and the foreign elements supporting him were determined to turn secession into an nccomplished f-ict. OMJC-sponsored tflks between the Central Government and Katangn were obviously subjected to stalling toctics. At le?st 237 persons, chiefly mercenaries, falling under the Security Council resolution remained in Katanga, many of -whom donned civilian garb. Despairing of a peaceful solution, the Central Government attempted to deal with Katanga's secession independently, by the use of force, in lats October 1961. AIJC strength was built up on the border of North Katanga in preparation for entry into that region. At the beginning of November, a detachment from the Leopoldville Grouping entered North Katanga in the Kaniama area, but was immediately repelled by Katanga gendarmes , Later, ANC units from the Stanleyville Grouping succeeded in reaching Albertville, Nyunau, Kongolo and other towns of North Katanga. To facilitate this move, the Government had requested ONUC assistance for the transport of its troops. The request was turned down because, as it had been from the begismisg, it remained against ONUC principles to become a party to an internal conflict. of ecember 1961 In the latter part of November 1961, the Security Council was once again to examine the situation in the Congo. By its resolution of 24 November 1961, the Council opposed the secessionist activities in Katanga and authorized the Secretary-General to use force to complete the removal of mercenaries. After the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Moise Tshombe launched an inflammatory propaganda campaign against OHUC which soon degenerated into instigation to violence. The results rfere not long in coning. On 28 November 1961, two senior United Nations officials in Elisabethville were abducted and badly beaten; later an Indian soldier was murdered and an Indian major abducted. On the following day, sever®! members of the United Nations Force were abducted, and others were killed or wounded. Roadblocks were established by the gendarmerie, impeding ClJUC's freedom of movement and endangering its lifelines. It subsequently became known that thia was part of a deliberate plan to cut off the United Kations troops in Elisabethville, and either force them to surrender or otherwise destroy them. For one week United Nations officials sought to settle the crisis by peaceful negotiations. But when it became evident that; in the fase of the bad faith displayed by Katangese authorities, no negotiations were possible, that, while pretending to negotiate, these Katangese authorities were preparing for iaor« assaults, and that they had a plan the purpose of which was its very destruction, ONUC finally decided to take action to regain and assure its freedom of movement and to restore law and order. Because this defensive action was forced upon it, ONUC had few troops in Elisabethville when the fighting broke out on 5 December 1961. Until 14 December, CNUC forces endeavoured to hold their positions and to maintain communications between them while reinforcements were hurriedly flown in from other parts of the Congo. On 15 December, having received enough reinforcements. ONUC troops moved to seize control of those positions in Elisabethville necessary to ensure their freedom of movement. In so doing, they worked their way around the perimeter of the city, in order to keep destruction and civilian casualties to the strict minimum. This objective was achieved within three days. During the fighting, GIJUC troops limited their attacks strictly to military objectives and so did th® ONUC aircraft which were sent into action only when absolutely necessary. Some civilian installations were, unfortunately, hit aceidently by aaisgisided fis»e but they w@r@ very few. Strict orders wera given to ONUC troops to safeguard to all ©3£tent possible the lives and properties of tha civilian population. Throughout the operation they exercised a remarkable measure of self-restraint, which was all the more noteworthy in viet? of the comportment of many non-Congolese - 45 - civilians which made their task extremely arduous. Tim© and again OKUC units found themselves stijected to murderous fire from civilian installations and by parsons in civilian dress. A flagrant instance of misuse of important civilian installations was the firing directed against United Nations troops from this plants of the Union Klni^re du Ilaut-Katanga, where many weapons wsrs subsequently found. Vehicles with Red Cross markings «ere frequently used as cover by mercenaries azsi their civilian volunteer allies. Since ths outset of the hostilities, United nations ssailitary and civilian officers did their best, in cooperation with the Red Cross, to relieve the distress caused to innocent civilians. Persons caught in areas where firing had been initiated by the gendarmerie were escorted to safety, at the risk of the OKUC personnel's lives; food supplies were provided where ne©d©dj special arrangements for the evacuation of women and children were made by GNUC. Notwithstanding the shortage of troops, OKUC employed a whole battalion to guard the Baluba refugee camp, where more than 40,COO anti~Tshombe Baluba lived under United Nations protection. OIIUC troops, on the one hand, prevented them from raiding the city and, on the other, protected them from the gendarmes who launched several attacks on the camp. On 19 Decenfcer 1961, having ensured the positions necessary for its security, GKUC ordered its troops to hold fire, unless fired upon. The same day, Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville to confer with Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula in Kitona? the United Nations military base in the Leopoldvill© Province. After that, major fighting between CKUC and Katanga forces ceased. CNUC immediately turned its effort to the re-establishment of normal conditions \ in Elisabethville. It co-operated closely with the local police to stop looting, to rid private houses of squatters and, in general, to restore and maintain law and order* .Kii'ona Declaration and its implementation The Kitona meeting was arranged tilth the assistance of OfJU G and the United States Ambassador in the Congo following a request ms.de by 14r. l.oise Tshombe on 14 December 1961 when the fighting in Eliaabethville was in full swing* After meeting Prime Minister Adoula all day long on 20 Dacetriber, Mr. Tshombe signed early in the morning of 21 December an eight-point Declaration. In this Declaration, he accepted the application of the Loi fondantentalg. recognised the authority of the Central Government in -46- Leopoldville and agreed to a number of steps ai&dng at ending the secession of Katanga* He also pledged himself to ensure respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly and to facilitate their implementation. Since the Kitona talks, ONUC has been exerting all possible efforts, through persuasion and good offices, to ensure that the provisions of the Kitona Declaration will be fully carried out, as an indispensable step toward the solution of the Katanga problem by peaceful means. But its efforts have been graatly hsmpsred by the changing attitude of Mr. Tshojnbe, who constantly shifted from lukewarm co-operation to calculated opposition and vice-versa. In accordance with the provisions of the Kitona Declaration, Mr. Tshombe sent the Conakat parliamentarians to Lsopoldville to participate in the session of Parliament. Three Katangese officials were also dispatched to the capital to participate in discussions for the modification of the constitutional structure of the Congo. In both cases, OWUC ensured the safety of the Katangese representatives during their journey to and from Leopoldville and their stay there. But while making those concessions, Mr. Tshombe stated that he had no authority to decide on the future of Katanga and summoned the Provincial Assembly to meet in Elisabethville for the purpose of discussing the Kitona Declaration. In this connexion, Mr. Tshombe requested the temporary assistance of a United Nations legal expert. After consulting Prime Minister Adoula and securing his agreement, the United Nations promptly acceded to Mr. Tshombe*s request and placed at his disposal the United Nations Legal Counsel. During the session of the Provincial Assembly, Mr. Tshombe made before it two statements strongly criticising the Central Government aid ONUC. However, on 15 February, the Assembly decided to accept the Declaration of Kitona as a basis for discussions with the Central Government. Following this action, Prime Minister Adoula invited Kr. Tshombe to meet with him in Leopoldville to discuss the procedure for carrying out the provisions of the Declaration. But Mr. Tshonibe was reluctant to go to Leopoldville and suggested that the meeting take place at the United Nations military base of Kamina. ONUC exerted its best effort to persuade Mr. Tshomb® - 47 to accept Mr. Adoula's invitation and gave him a full guarantee of his safety, throughout hia journey to and from Leopoldville and of his freedom to leave the capital at a time of his choice, should he decide to go there. At the time of writing this paper, t'r. Tshombe tins not yet directly replied to I'r. Adoula's invitation. While endeavouring to persuade the Katangeae authorities to co-operate with the Central Government, OIJUC pressed for the urgent and complete elimination of mercenaries from Katanga. After a series of discussions with ONUC officials in January 1962, Kr. Tshombe indicated the Provincial Government's intention to liquidate the problem of mercenaries once and for all, and firmly committed his Government to that course. In order to ensure the elimination of mercenaries, joint ccaanissions composed of ONUC and Katangeae representatives were established on the proposal of ONUC at the beginning of February. ONUC also insisted that in accordance with the principle that it was to enjoy absolute freedom of movement, its troops should have free entry to Jadotville, Kolwezi and other places in Katanga. But this request was so far opposed by Mr, Tshombe who, to support his stand, arranged for the "customary grand chiefs of Katanga" to meet in Jadotville. At the conclusion of their meeting on IS February, these chiefs adopted a resolution opposing the entry of United Nations troops into the places indicated. In the meantime, the situation in North Katnnga underwent a change* For reasons yet undetermined, the A1IC troops withdrew from Kongolo, which was immediately reoccupied by Latanga gendarmes. There vrere no clashes between them, but the reoccupation of Kongolo by Katangese forces under- standably worried the Central Government, which decided to reinforce its garrison in Albertville. Shortly after it had learned the entry of Katanga gamara.es into Koagoloj ONUC sent a plane there to investigate the situation. It is exerting all possible efforts to prevent a deterioration of the situation in North Katanga. A3 this paper is written, the Katanga problem seems to be nearing a solution The Kitona Declaration provides an adequate basis for eeding the secession of Katanga. The provincial Assembly has now accepted the Declaration, although conditionally0 The next step is a meeting between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe to determine the procedure for earrj- ing out the provisions of the Declaration, ONUC has spared no effort to make such a meeting possible. There are reasons to hope that the meeting will take place in Leopoldville in the near future. (*') Civilian Operations When the United Nations went into the Congo, it found the country in the throes of a dire emergency, chief 3y caused by the breakdown of law and order. The mass exodus of Belgian technicians and administrators was threatening to paralyze the Republic's entire econos^j essential services ware in imminent danger of breaking down; unemployment was rising catastrophically in the cities\ hunger and disease loomed. One of the main objectives of tha United Nations in the Congo has been to provide the Congolese Government with technical assistance for th® smooth operation of all essential services aoi the continued development of th© national economy. But the situation faced by CliUC iaucediately assumed un- precedented proportions, of a nature different from thet of normal United Nations technical assistance operations! these presuppose a. reasonably functioning governmental and economic machinery which is prepared to receive and use expert advice, training services, and the aid of a few operational and executive of fieials for integration in the national civil service. Faced with this emergency, the Seeretary-»General mobilised ths resources of the United Nations family of organisations under the authority of a chief of civilian operations. A consultative group of experts was set up, consisting of senior officials of .the United Nations asid the specialised agencies concerned. The first task was to restore or maintain the operation of isizsisffism essential public services. Engineers,, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio operators, postal experts, physicians, teachers and other specialists were rushed into the country, to emergency project was carried out to halt the silting of the port of Matadi and restore navigation. In response to the Central Government*s appeal, the United Nations agreed9 in August I960, to provide $5 •> 000,000 to finance essential governmental services as well as essential imports. In the economic and financial fields, CHUG helped in setting up and managing monetary,, foreign exchange and foreign trade controls, without which the country's slender resources slight have been drained awpy and all semblance of & monetary system sight have collapsed. In all these fields, as well as in agriculture, labour and public administration, its effort was chiefly designed to improve the ability of the Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities toward the population despite the precipitous departure of non-Congolese technicians and adadsiistrators. As it Boon because obvious that the needs would continue for some time, the Secretary-General proposed, and the General Assembly in September I960 approved„ the establishment of a United Nations Pmid for the Congo, financed by voluntary contributions. Its purpose wns to restore the economic life of the country and to carry on its public services as best as possible. The Assembly's action coincided with the outbreak of the constitutioral crisis, as a result of which (MJC could not deal with any authorities, except for President Joseph Kasa-Vubus on the nation-wide plane, and could not furnish advice at the ministerial level. Since the emergency conditions continued, however, the ONUC effort did not flag, and was carried on in co- operation with such Congolese authorities as exercised de, facto control in the provinces or localities where United nations civilian operations were being undertaken. Famine conditions, in some areas, and widespread unemployment,, led the Secretary-General to .institute refugee relief and relief work prograsmes. The worst conditions developed in South Kasai in the autusm of I960, where some 200 persons daily were reported dying from starvation as a result of the disruption caused by tribal warfare. For six aaonttos, the United Nations shipped and distributed food and medical supplies in the ar©a. While several thousand persons died before the United Nations effort began., th@ number of lives saved approximates a quarter of a million, In the meaKfciisB, foreign exchange reserves were running short owing to the political and economic situation. Accordingly, in June 1961, an agree- ment was arrived at between President Kasa-Vubu and the Secretary-General by which the United Nations put funds at the disposal of the Republic for the financing of a programme of essential imports. It was agreed that such assistance must benefit the population of the country as a whole. Despite the constitutional crisis, United Nations training services continued os a working long-range operation^, and were regarded BS an invest~ msnt in the development of human resources so as to fill the huge void caused by the shortage of indigenous operational and executive personnel= Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, agricultural assistants, farm mechanics, foresters, medical assistants, labour officials, police commissioners, ®tc. To train Congolese operators and instructors, & Tele- communications Training Centre was set up$- to train primary and school teachers and inspectors, a National Pedagogical In&titute established* Undergraduate medical studies were fostered. A National School of Law and Administration was opened to produce competent civil servants} & technical college was set up to train Junior engineers, public works foremen and the like. Fellowships for study abroad were awarded to school directors, medical students, police officers, socle1 workers and others in need of training for whom adequate facilities wsr® not available in the Congo. Furthermore, as already Izsdieated in th® section on law and order, a program® has been prepared for the reorganisation and g°@tpainiEig of the Consoles© Sfetionai Anstf. Sine® the re-establishment of a constitutional g«yernraent in the suwsr of 1961, OMUC civilian operations have bsen agaia rendering advisory services to the Government, These services should gain in relative import^ ance as the Congolese authorities find it possible gradually to rely less on the United Nations for operative staff. In any cas$, bs it in the form of medical teams cd.th doctors from more than twenty countries, of school teachers from eleven different countries, in th@ provision of judges and prosecutors,, or in the form of more conventional technical assistance activities, United Hations assistance is now limited by the resources of the Congo Fund. Though originally envisaged to rea CONCLUSION Since its inception^, the United Nations Operation in the Congo has had many achievements,, It brought about the ndthdraisal of Belgian troops frosa the Congoj thanks to it^ law and order were maintained throughout this vast country to & large degree although a. number of acts of violence could not be prevented; it encouraged and mad© possible a peaceful solution of the consti<=- tutional crisis. Without the United Nations9 the Belgian military intarventiosi «ould have undoubtedly led to dangerous reactions by other govemasntsj, including the big Powers! fanned by open foreign intervention^ the civil war would have flared up with irresistible intensity j a situation comparable to,, or worse than, that of Korea or Spain would have prevailed in the Congo, The United Nations Operation has stopped all that0 Admittedly^ the Operation has met Trd.th great difficulties. Because one does not talk about a situation ufaen it is normal» ;m?.eh publicity was given to difficulties while achievements passed unnoticed0 It should also be pointed out that most of the difficulties which arose during the operation were the legacy of the pastj, the inevitable consequence of ©vents tMch had taken place long before the United Nations cams to the Congo * To solve those difficulties^ the United Nations had to act mthin the mandate given to it by the Security Council and the General Assembly and in accordance with the spirit of the United Hations Charter. In particular8 it firmly abided by two principles which bind any undertakings of the United Nations as an international organization composed of sovereign States and devoted to peaces non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and restraint on the use of force* It was a cardinal principle of ONUC not to attempt to impose a political solution by the use of force„ Whatever difficulties and delays may have baen entailed by such a policy how meh more dangerous It %»uld be if the United Nations used its armed fores to meddle in the internal affairs of the sover- eign count sy of the Congo9 siding mth on® party against another and helping Congolese subdue by force other Congolese,, ONUG has also showed notewrthy restraint in the use of force duriag ;\11 phases of the operation. The first directive given the United Nations Forco was neves' to use force except in self-defense. Laters as the crisis dangerctaty i deepened in the countrya ths Security Council authorised the S@eretas y<=6eneraX to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war and to eliminate mercenaries and other foreign personnel not under United Nations commando But even with the enlarged mandate,, OWJG has constantly showed the greatest restraint in the use of force,. During its operation, OUUC has been attacked mai^ times, but it has never launched an attack itself. Even when under attaekj, it resorted to force in self Defence only as a last resort >iien it was absolutely necessary to do so0 Such was the case in Elisabethville in December 196l« In this connexion, it isay be reesllsd that certain persons ha¥© wondered why 8 OWUC troops ha\?® fought Mr« Tshbatoe's gondanaes in Katasiga but not Mr0 Gisenga s forces" in Stanleyvillee The answer is quite sisipl©; OiUC was attacked by the former^ not by the latter,, This restraint has sosietiiisss been mistaken for a weakness« In partieulars ONUG has been criticised for not having dealt *dth ths AKC more forcsfully^ and more specifically, for not having disarmed it. Admittedly., it might have been easier to ensure Hie maintenance of law and order if certain unruly elements of the AKC had been disaraecU But ONUG could not and ^©uld not disam the AKG against the will of th® Congo Governmeatj, not oraly because it w>uld h&ve to use force to aehisv© this purpose, but mainly because its Force came to the Congo as a friend and partner., not as an amsy of occupation,, What OMIG has sought to do is to assist th© Congo Government in re-establishing dia= cipline in the ANC and the reorganising of its units. In carrying out its missione OHUC has resorted to persuasion rather thaa forces to co-operation rather than coercion. It considers it axiomatic that the solution to the Congo crisis oast come frora the Congolese themsslvesa 'Its action ±&s therefor®., mainly directed at encouragiag and facilitating the efforts of Go&golese leaders to settle their own problems? and to reach a solution of their difficulties in thsir own wsgr. It does so by persuasion^ by good offices^ bj technical and naterial assistance,} and final2^ by endeavour- ing to eliminate all foreign interference that seeks to drive them apart,, It is gratifying to note that the patient efforts of ONUC have begun to bear fruit„ The break-through occurred on 2 August 1961 when Parliament was re«=opened and a national unity government^ led by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoulaa was unanimously, endorsed by it« Another important step was nade on 21 December 1961 vshen, at the conclusion of the Kitona talksa Mr. Moise Tshombe signed an &ight=point Declaration recognizing tiie authority of the Central Govera-sento Admittedly nany difficulties still lie ahead on the road to a final solution of the Congo crisis. But it is the hope and indeed the conviction of ONUC that, in a not too distant future, the Congolese will be able to settle their rests ining differences and to achieve a satisfactosgr solution of a crisis that has too long plagued their country. When this has been achieved, the main task of OKUC will have endedo I tea EJattoaa l?aigs in the Csago) . J&tioaale CongolaAse C©OBgol§se Katiossal tegr) Usait of the AMO whos@ JsslH eonees-a is the sjslntsmnee of public order* It sjajr "ba sotetl tfest tlie sssossioaist of g^t@a@, is also Seeisrity police* Force, til© title of tSss Coi%goles@ A^^ Is^fors it I-©i r?ons?s®ental© Ftedassatsi Sa^. Size Rniasas©atsl tet? of 19 ernicernijag the structure of the (7©a®3. Sfeis laU, on tlae &asis of the resolutions o? the Bowid 5!^bl@ Sosf s^eaee of dairnazy-f&bruasy 3.960 ©Ss^^a fey the Beigiaa Z^rliei^atp is to ope^,t« &B the cosstitutioa for tl^ Republic of tli© Congo gsafling the adD|ftioa of a eL@f initiv© for for Af^icaa Affairs) ©f dai Miaing Haion ©f lopes' KSatanga. SaSusts-iml ecsrples witto sinln. g ®a-d otfees. , - -jinterest. s in ffes SSBJS of a s&rcesaEgr «nit la intcomationale fesgolal© (Congolese in Oetcfesi1 1958. ^s pa^t^ split in two sections in $uly 1959, ong lefl. fey iSe. Bs.tsr3.ee Isssasba C^H?-£) aast tbs fcgr 1®?. Albert f©3.° Alii^aes^ ggs Bateago CAllisaes1 of the founds^ in' Jsnu^Y 1959, -rr- PSA, Bagti Solidajy® Afrieain (African Soliditority Farty). Party founded in April 1959? 3&& ^ &&• ^ntoiae QIESB^.. HJHA Afetee^iatlon for P&rbi ga I'Uait^ Rationale (Katios^. Ifoity Ftoty fovmSsd in Sfeyefe 1960, led by !&•• Jeaa BoliMngo. fee goaf^geration gas Associations fet n of Associations of Satan^.). Bsrfcy in lal^-s du Katan^ (Association of -fehs 3^1yfea of ICat^aga) » Ba^ty led by Mr. J&SQB S©adi^. It ; uith two lesser parties in Katanga^ the ferfe©! ANNEX II Chronology of . 23 June Central GoveHunsnt led by Mr* Patrice LuKsaaba approved lag *- Parliament . 24 J«sns Mr, Joseph Kasa-tfubu elected Chief of State. 25 June Dr. Ralph J« Buncha arrives in Leopoldvill© to attend Independence Ceremonies as personal representative of Seeretaryo-GenQral Dag HammarskjoMo 29 June Representatives of Congo and Belgian GovemrasKt sign treaty of > friendship^ assistance and eo-opss atioa0 30 Juna Belgian Congo proclaimed iMepsndento 5 July Satii^r of Force^gublioue begins in Lsopoldvilles sooa spreads to other parts of Congo0 7 July Security Council adopts resolution recommending adndssion of Congo to membership isa United Nations0 10 July Belgian troops intervene in Elisafcethvill© as^l Luluabourg,, 11 July Mr0 Moise Tsho-Tibe proclaiias independenee of Katanga* Belgian troops attack Matadi0 12 July Congo Governasent appeals to UK for technical and 14 July Security Council adopts resolution calling upon Belgium to vdLthdraw its troops from Congo and authorising Seeretary-=General to provide Congo Govenirneat xdth military assistance. Secretary General sets up OMUC9 appoints Dr« Ralph J0 Bunch@ as Special Representative in Congoa Major-General Carl Carlssoa von Horn as Supreme Coasnandsr of UM Force and Dr» Stura Linner as Chief of Civilian Operations. o 15 July First OKUG contingent arrives in Leopoldville. 16 July Congo Government decides to sever diplomatic relations vdth Belgium. 1? July Congo Government addresses 'ultimatum to UH to clear all Belgian troops from the Congo before 19 July misJnighfc,, General von Kora arrives in Leopoldville« 22 July Security Council adopted resolution asking Belgium to implement speedily its resolution of 14 July 19&0 and authorising Secretar General to take all necessary action to that ©ffeet* 23 July Evacuation of Belgian troops from Leopoldvilla completed0 24 July Prims Minister Patrice Lumumba arrives in New York. 26 July Secretary-General arrives in Leopold-villa. 2? July Dr0 Ralph J» Bunchs and representatives of Congo Government signed basic agreement regarding OMUC0 2 August Secretary-General announces plan to send OKUC troops into Katanga on 6 August I960, 4~5 August Dr<> B\mche goes to ElisabethviHej, concludes that in view of unyielding opposition of Mr. Tshombe the entry of OKUC troops into Katanga could b@ achieved only by use of force, 5 August Secretary-General calls off plan for immediate entry of ONUC troops into Katangaa asks urgent nesting of Security Council^ leaves for New Yorko 9 August Security Council adopt a resolution calling £or iEmediate %dth«= drai«sl of Belgian troops from Katanga and reaffirming principle of non=interferene©o 10 August Mr<= Albert Kalon^i announces creation of Mining State ia South Kasaio -r? 11 August Secretary-General arrives in Leopolchd,lle0 12 August Secretary-General enters Elisabethville, with two Swedish companies of UN Force. August Secretary^©sneral returns to Leopoldville s is accused by Mr0 Lumumba of unilateral and erroneous interpretation of Security Council re solutions, ask© for meeting of Sssrurity Council asd leaves for Hew York*. 16 August Congo Government" decrees "state of asnergeney" throughout the Congo„ 13 August AKG elenssnts arrest and manhandle 14 Canadian members of UK Force at Mjili adrp©rt0 21-22 August Seeuritgr Council meets but does not vote on resolution. Ssjcretarj'=G©n©ral announces appointn©nt. Advisory Gommittes 0 on Congo8 also announces Belgian Government 3 assurance that all Belgian troops will beraithdrai* nb y 29 August 19600 24 August Advisor/ Conrndttes on Congo holds first maeting,, 25-31 August Pan^African Gonferense neets in Leopoldville,, 27 August AKC elejffisats arrest and mnhamH.® OISJC psrsonnel in Stanleyvillec 29 August ANC troops massacre Baluba population in Bakwanga<, 31 August Sseretary==Gsn«ral sends protest to Belgian Government regarding continued presence of Belgian military units in Congo after deadline of 29 August I960. 1 September Dr« Bunche returns to Mew Yorkj, is replaced by Mr0 Andrew W0 Cordier as Special Hepresentative in Congo until arrival of Mr, Hajeshwar Dayal« 5 September President Kasa~Vubu dismisses Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister* Shortly thereafters Mr« Lumumba announces he is dismissing Mr,, Kasa-Vubu as Chief of State. 5=6 September OMUC closes all major airports in Congo and Leopoldville Radio Station. 7 September Chamber of Representatives rescinds decisions of Mr. Kasa»Vubu and Mr, Lumuzaba dismissing each other and appointed Parliamentary conciliation conaaission0 & September Mr, Cordier leaves for New Yorkj, is replaced by Mr. Bajeshwar Dayal as Special Representative in Congo0 Senate opposes Mr. Kasa»Vubu8s decision to dismiss Mr. Lumumba0 12-13 September ONUC re^opens airports and Leopoldville Radio Station0 13 September Chambers of Parliament meet in joint session and confer full powers on Mrc Lumumba, 14 September Colonel Mobutu decides to "neutralize" existing central institutions. 14~17 September Security Council meets, fails to agree on representation of Congo9 fails to adopt a resolution* calls Emergency Special Session of General Assembly. 17-20 September General Assembly holds fourth Emergency Special Session,, adopts resolution 1474 (ES=»IV) of 20 September I960 requesting Secretary=General to continue to a ssist Congo Government in maintenance of law and order, appealing to Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution of the internal conflicts asking the Advisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission and calling upon all -to- States to refrain from providing unilateral assistance for military purposes to the Congo„ 20 September General Asssably begins fifteenth regular sessions decides to admit Congo to membership in UN, 14 October Mr» Antoin® Gizeaga arrives in Stanleyville0 5 November Conciliation Goimaissioa for Congo appointed by Adviscrj Committeeo 8 November President Kasa»Vubu addresses General Assembly and asks for seating of his delegation, Irish soldiers of UN Force ambushed in North Katangac 21 November ANC troops attack Ghana Embassy in Leopoldville and slash with Tunisian soldiers of UN Force guarding the Enbassy. 22 November General Assembly decides to seat Congo delegation appointed by President Kasa=Vubu0 2? November Mr0 Lumumba flees from his Leopoldville residence<, 29-30 November Nigerian unit of UN Force ambushed by tribesmen in North Katanga. 2 December Mr0 Lumisraba arrested near Port Fraracqui, brought bads to Leopoldville and then transferred to Thysville,, 7-15 December Security Council nsetsg but adopts no r®solutions0 12 December Mr0 Giaenga proclaims Stanleyville as Headquarters of Central Government and provisional capital of Republic 15=16 December ONUG Austrian medieal tsam arrested by ANCe 16-20 December General Assembly discusses Congo problem but adopts no resolutionso 19 December Bureau of Conciliation Commission for Congo arrives in Leopoldvilleo 20 December Secretary~General appoints Lieutenant General Sean MacEoin to replace Major General von Horn as Supreme Commander of United Nations Force in the Congo„ *» 22 Deeeaber Katanga authorities issue separate currency,, 4 2? December Stanleyville AWG forces take over Kivu5 arrest provincial president Jean Miruho0 1 January Colo Mobutu's AJJC troops flown to Usumbxira (Kuanda-Urundi) attempt unsuccessful invasion of Kivu» President Kasa=Vubu announces conM'enirig of round tablo conference of Congolese leaders on 25 January» 3 January - Conciliation CoEsalssion for Congo visits Congo 20 Febs-uary 0 8=9 January Stanleyville AKC troops invade North Katangae GoverniEaat of "Provinca of Liaalaba" set up in Manono« 13 January MG elements rautij^r In Thysvi.lle0 17 January Mj?0 Lumumba and two companions, Mr, Joseph Okito and Mr,, Maurice Mpolo^, transferred secretly from Tlxysvill© to Katanga, 25 January "Preliminary round table conference" opens in Leopoldvill@0 30 January Katanga aircraft boiab ManonOc 9 February President Kasa-=Vubu dissolves College of Gornmissioners and appoints provisional government headed by Mr0 Joseph Ileo0 10 February Katanga authorities announce "escape" of Mr., Lumumba and his twa companions„ H-=12 February Katanga gendarmss begin military operation in North Katanga. 13 February Katanga authorities announce that Mr. Lumumba and his companions have been murdered by tribesmen in an undisclosed place. 21 February Security Council adopts resolution authorizing Secretary- General to use force to prevent civil -war and urging *dth~ draisal of mercenaries^ re^opening of Parliament and reorganisation of Congolese armed forces« 28 February Mr. HaOf, Mr0 Tshoiab© and Mr0 Kalonji sign military and political agreeaent in Elisabethville0 4-5 March United Nations and ANC troops clash in Matadi. 6-11 March "Summit meeting" held at Tananarive^ Malagasy Republic0 10 March Mr0 Dayal leaves Leopoldville for New lorkj Mr* M©kki Abbas takes over as Acting Special Representative of the Secretary- General in the Congo, 30=31 March Katanga gend&Sftnerie enter ManonOo 7 April UN Force stops fighting between Katanga gendarraas and Baluba warriors in North Katang&» 15 April General Assembly adopts three resolutions on Congo0 Resolution 1599 C&V) calls for Tdthdra^sl of mereenariea and other foreign personnel} resolution 1600 (XV) urges re-opening of Parliament and establishing second Conciliation Commission; * t i resolution 1601 (XV) establishes Investigation Cotranission on death of Mr» Lumumba and his companions„ 17 April Agreement concluded bj representatives of Secretary-GenertO. and President Kase<=Vubu for implementation of Security Council resolution of 21 February 196l0 24 April 28 May Conference of Congolese leaders meets in CoquilhatviHe0 26 April Mr0 Tshombe arrested by Laopoldville authorities in Coquilhatville,, 27-23 April 1M garrison in Port Franequi overwhelmed and massacred, by ANC troops« 12 May President Kasa-Vubu calls for Parliament meeting» 19 May Mg»0 Mekki Abbas leaves LsopoldviHeo 25 May Mre Dayei resigns as Special Bapreseatativ@8 Mr0 Stiara Linear appointed Officar in Charge of OMJCo 22-24 June Mr0 Tshombe released, signs protocol calling for re-open-log of Parliament., 22 July Parliament ra-opens at Lovanium Uni-versity near Lsopoldvillao 2 August national Unity Gowrnffisnt headed by Prims Minister Cyrille Adoula Taanlmoualy approved by Parliament, 24 August Central Government issues ordinance for expulsion of msrcenaries from Katanga and requests OHU2 assistance to that effacto 28 August ONUC JBOV&B to round i^ sssrcenariaB in Ell sabethvillee Second Conciliation Commission holds first meeting in Kew York0 Mro Mafemoid Khiary appointed Chief of Civilian Operations0 September Mro Gizenga returns to Leopoldville to assume post of ¥ieo- Prime Minister0 Oa same day, he leaves with Prime Minister Adoula for Belgrade to attend Gonferanc© of Ion-aligned Motions0 13 September OMJC resumes operation of routing Tip aErcanaries, is attactosd by Katanga gecdarmss led by mercenaries <> Sscsetary-Geaeral arrives in Leopoldvill© at invitation of Central Governmanto 17 September Secretary-General flies to Ndola* Northern Rhodesias for cease-fire talks with Mra Tshombea dies in plane crash near Ndola0 20 September I-iTs Mahmoud K&iary concludes provisional cease-fire agreement tdth Mr0 Tshombe in Ndola0 k October Mr0 Gizenga returns to Stanleyville ostensibly to settl® personal affairs,, 13 October Mr0 Mahmoud. Khiary and Mr» Tshomb@ sign protocol fop implementation of cease-fire agr@©msnto 26 October General Assembly sets up Investigation Commission on death of Mr. Hanunarskjoldo 31 October MC elements from Leopoldville Grouping attaapt unsuccessful invasion of Katanga in Kaniama ares, 1=2 November ANC elements from Leopoldville Grouping assault Belgian civilians in Luluabourgo 3 November U Thant elected Acting Secretary ~General0 11 November ANC troops from Stanleyville Grouping massacre 13 Italian airmen ef 'M Fore® in Kindu0 of ItuuJxh Ir^eutisation Comroission issued0 13 November Congo Government issues ordinance regarding imprisonment of mercenaries „ 13=44 November ANC troops from Stanleyville Grouping, igho have entered Albertvillep corasiit loo ting0 24 November Security Council adopts resolution denouncing seceessionisfe activities and authorizing use of fore® for elimination of mercenaries,, 25 November => 5 December Katanga authorities launch series of attacks against ONUC^ 2? November Acting Secretary-General and Mr. Justin Bomboko sign status agreement regarding ONUC0 5=19 Deeember Fighting between UN troops and Katanga gendarrosa in Elis&bsthville* 19 December UK troops in Er.isabethville ordered to hold fire unless fired upon*, 2O=22 December Prime Miniate-.- Adoul.a and Mr. Tshombe hold talks at KItona at the conclt:sion of which Mr, Tshoiab© signs Eight=point Declaration recognising authority. of Central Government 0 2? December Belgian Entoas&y in Leopoldvill® re=opened0 1 29 Deeeiaber lift* , parliamentary inaaunity of Mra Albert 3=262 1 January European missionarias and African civilians maa sacred in Kongolo by ANC trooos from Stanleyville Grouping0 8 January Chamber of Sepresentativeij snjoins Mr0 Gizenga to return to Leopoldville to f-nawsr charges of secessionist 13 January fro-Giaenga gendarmes overpovrared by pro«»Gov©mment ANC troops after .clash in Stanleyville a 15 January Mr,, Giaenga dismissed as Vice=>P£droB Minister • 20 January Mr0 Gizenga brought back to Leopold-sills in ONUC plane « February Prime Minister visits Hew York^ addresses General Assembly 9 has talks with Secretary=Gen©ral and delegations0 10 February Mr0 Robert Gardiner replaces Mr0 Linner as Off iesr-in^Char-g© of OWUG0 11 February Chamber of Representatives approves Government6 s action regarding Mr0 Gisenga0 15 February Katanga Provincial Assembly adopts resolution accepting Declaration of Kitona as basis for discussions rith Central Government o 16 March 1962 For internal use only THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGO (July I960 — March 1962) ii. Table of Contents Beginning of the operation ...... 1 Objectives of the operation * 4 Difficulties confronting ONUC . . . . , 6 Tasks confronting ONUC . 8 (3) Withdrawal of Belgian troops - .... 8 (b) Maintenance of law and order e ...... 11 First achievements and difficulties ...... 11 Measures taken during the constitutional crisis . . 14 Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 . . 1? Incidents after the constitutional crisis .... 19 Reorganization of Congolese armed forces .... 21 (c) Constitutional crisis 22 Dismissal of Mr. Patrice Lumumba and its aftermath . 22 Conciliation efforts 24 Reopening of Parliament 26 Remaining obstacles ...... 2? (d) Problem of Katanga 30 Movement towards secession ... 30 Secession and the ONUC mandate ...... 31 Consolidation of secession in Katanga »«.... 33 Mercenaries and other foreign elements ...... 35 First United Nations action against foreign elements in Katanga ..... 37 Events of August and September 1961 ...... 38 Tragic flight of the Secretary-Generalj the cease-fire 41 Events of December 1961 43 Kitona Declaration and its implementation .... 45 (e) Civilian operations ...... 48 Conclusion 51 ANNEXES I. Glossary . 54 II. Chronology of Events 56 -1- BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION On 12 July I960, less than a fortnight after the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) gained independence from Belgium, the Congo Govern- ment addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hatnraarskjold, an urgent appeal for United Nations military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against the intervention of Belgian troops, which it saw as a threat to international peace. Specifically, the Congo Government requested the despatch of United Nations troops to the Congo to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops, which had intervened in its territory without its consent, and to end the secession of Ka,tanga which, it said, had resulted from.a conspiracy between "Belgian imperialists" and a small group of Katanga leaders. The Government also requested United Nations technical assistance for the re-organization of the army and the administrative machinery of government. The Secretary-General considered the Belgian intervention to be a source of tension which, if not removed, could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. He therefore immediately brought this request to the attention of the Security Council. The Council met on 13 and 14 July I960. By its resolution of 14 July I960, it called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo,-to provide the latter with such military and technical assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese national security forces were able fully to meet their tasks. The appeal to the United Nations was the culmination of a series of events which had their cause and origin in the unpreparedness of the Congolese for the independence which was granted to them on 30 June I960. Under the Belgian Colonial administration, paternalism was the guiding principle of policy. The Congolese enjoyed a standard of living higher than that found in most other African countries, but the Belgian authorities did not encourage their political advancement. The education of the African population was oriented to produce, at best, clerks, skilled - 2 S workers and sergeants rather than managers, engineers and officers. Not until 1957 were political activities by Africans tolerated in the territory. Arrangements for independence were made only at the beginning of I960 at a round-table conference in Brussels, Belgium, in which Congolese leaders participated. The first legislative elections ever held in the Congo took place in May I960] Parliament met for the first'time on 17 June, and tha first Central Government was established on 23 June, merely a •we^k before independence-Q A consequence of this policy i;ar, that when the Congolese were given independence they were tragically ill-prepared for it. There were at that time only 17 Congolese u."iv«rsity graduates, .not one doctor or en- gineer. There were few African political leaders with any experience and none with truly national experience, and there were no experienced administrators.. -In order to keep the administrative machinery and technical services running after independence, the Belgian Government put at the disposal of the Congolese Government, undsr the treaty of friendship, assistance and co-operation - signed by the two Governments but never ratified by their Parliaments - more than 10,000 Belgian administrators, technicians and army officers. Much hope was placed on the Force PuMlque, the African army of more than 25,000, which was well-trained and armed and entirely officered by Belgians, and which in the past had carried out its task of maintaining public order with great, if harsh, efficiency. On 5 July I960, five days after the Congo attained independence, strong elements of the Force Publique in Leopoldville, dissatisfied over the failure of the..authorities to1 Africanize their cadres, mutinied and ejected their Belgian officers, The mutiny soon spread to Thysville, Elisabethville, Luluabourg and elsewhere in the Congo, Some of the mutineers went on the rampage during which they manhandled Belgians in general and in some cases committed .rape. These disturbances led to a mass exodus of the Belgian population, including almost all the ad- ministrators and technicians put at the. disposal of the Congolese Govern- ment under the friendship treaty. Their departure entailed & nearly complete breakdown of the essential services .and the stopping of economic activities in many parts of the country. - 3.- When the disturbances broke out, the Belgian Government sought to impress upon Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba the need to invoke the Belgo~ Congolese friendship treaty and to request the intervention of the Belgian troops stationed in the military bases of Kamina and Kitona under that treaty to maintain law and order. This Mr. Lumumba flatly refused to do, for he contended that his Government was able to restore law and order without outside help. In this connexion, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, who had come to the Congo to attend the independence ceremonies as the representa- tive of the Secretary-General with instructions to regain thore for several weeks after independence to render such assistance as might be required, warned the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville of the serious consequences inhich could follow if the Belgian troops were called out without the Congo Government's consenta Ke had pointed out that the Belgian Government could appeal to the Security Council about the dangers to Belgian nationals. Despite this warning, the Belgian Government unilaterally decided to intervene. On the morning of 10 July I960, Belgian troops, following an appeal by the President of the Katanga provincial government, Mr. Moise Tshom.be> moved into illisabethville. Subsequently, other Belgian troops occupied Luluabourg, Leopoldville and other towns in the Congo. On 11 July, one day after the arrival of Belgian troops in ulisabethville, Mr. Tshombe proclaimed the independence of Katanga. With the national independence and territorial integrity of the country threatened by foreign military intervention and secessionist activities, and itself unable to maintain law and order and to ensure the operation of essential services, the Congo Government appealed to the United Nations. OBJECTIVJS. OF THE OPERATION • The United Nations Operation in the Congo -: known as ONUC, from the initials of the French title, Operation des Nations Unies au Congo - had initially three objectives: (a) It sought to remove the threat to international peace and security by bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga and the Belgian military bases of Kamina and Kitona. (b) It was to assist the Congo Government in restoring and main- taining lav; and order; this task included the training and reorganization of the Forge Publiqiie, now renamed the Arsu%. nationale^congplairie (ANC), (c) It was to provide technical assistance to the Congo Government to ensure the continued operation of all essential services, to restore and re-organize the administrative machinery of government and to train Congolese to run that machinerya In order to achieve these objectives, the Secretary-General set up, in addition to a civilian team of technical assistance experts, an international armed peace force composed of contingents from States other than the great Powers, mainly African. This force, named the United Nations Force in the Congo, was to follow a set of special principles. It was to be placed under the exclusive command of the United Nations, and its national contingents were not to take orders from their governments; it was not to be a party to internal conflicts in the country; and it was not to use force except in self-defence. The Force was to be under United Nations command because few, if any, governments of sovereign States would contribute troops to the United Nations if their contingents were to be placed under the orders of another government. As to the other two principles, obviously the United Nations could not send its Force into a friendly country to /' meddle in its internal affairs or to fight against its people. These principles were announced by the Secretary-General before the Security Council adopted its resolution of 14 July I960 and were therefore tacitly approved by the Council. The principles and objectives laid down by the Secretary-General for ONUC were upheld by the Security Council on 22 July, 9 August and again on 21 August I960 when the question was brought back before it. After the constitutional crisis broke out in Leopoldville on 5 Qeptember I960, ONUC continued to apply the same principles, but a new objective was added to the three already set: It endeavoured to encourage and facilitate the efforts of Congolese leaders to achieve a peaceful solution of the crisis through negotiation and conciliation. Later, as Congo internal conflicts dangerously deepened in the course of 1961, the Security Council twice strengthened the mandate of ONUC to enable it better to cope with increasing difficulties. On 21 February 196lj the Council authorized the Secretary-General to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war. On 24 November 1961 - shortly after the death of Dag Hamarskjold and the appointment of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General - the Council gave similar authorization for eliminating foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations command, and mercenaries, - 6 - ' . . • .DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING -ONUC In order to realise fully the magnitude of the task confronting Oi'JUC, it is important to bear in mind the land and people to which that task relates. With an area of 2,344*000 square kilometres (about 900,000 square miles), the Congo is as' large as ••"estern Europe or 80 ti,:,es tha size of Belg:iuriv its former ruler. A large part of this vast country, the "bush," is still .isolated from the outer world, al- though its main centres are linked to each other and to the exterior by an intricate system of rail, river and air traiispert. Its African population, which numbers about 1/+ million, is composed of a gveat many tribes having different languages and customs, and tribal animosities among them are still very strong. Besides the Africans, there is a sizable European community which plays an important role in the economic life of the country but has feu affinities with the rest of tho population. Many cf the Europeans,, most of whom are Belgian, do not reem to have fully under-stood the nature arid principles of the United Nations Operation in the Congo* When the United Nations Operation got under way in the Congo soon after the middle of July I960, it found the country in a state of chaos. The administrative machinery of government and the essential services had in a large measure collapsed. The economic life had al- most completely stopped, which resulted in widespread unemployment. There was an acute food shortage in many areas, not for lack of food but because the food distribution system had broken down. The Belgian military intervention had raised among the Congolese intense feelings of hatred and fear. As the Government was unable to assume its normal responsibilities, the task of maintaining law and order, ensuring the continued functioning of the essential services and restoring the normal economic activities fell almost entirely upon ONUC. In order to carry out this jjumense task, ONUC needed the full co- operation of the Congo Government and it has sought on all occasions to co-operate with that Government, Unfortunately, its relations with Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba became strained after the first few weeks over a sharp difference in the interpretation of its mandate. The divergent positions of the Secretary-General and Mr. Lumumba - 7- regarding the role of the United Nations Force in ending secession are dealt with in the section on the problem of Katanga-^j suffice it to say here that the resulting hostile attitude of Mr. Lumumba greatly hampered OMUC's work. After the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba by President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the Congo internal situation further deteriorated. Several factions engaged in a struggle for power which increased ONUC's burdens and hindered its action. During this struggle for power, OIJUC adopted an attitude of strict impartiality. At the same time, the promotion of reconciliation between the various factions became a crucial part of the ONUC effort. But this.policy, never well understood, was bitterly resented by the de facto authorities of the time. The difficulties experienced by ONUC have not all come from Congolese sources. Since independence, foreign interference has manifested itself in many forms in the Congo. It has been most active in Katanga, but has been by no means limited to that province. It has certainly constituted a major obstacle to a peaceful solution of the Congo crisis and has made OMUC's task considerably more difficult. I/ See p.31, et seq« - 8 - TASK CONFRONTING ONUC Since its inception, ONUC has had to deal with a complex set of problems that has had no parallel in the history of international operations, and has had to devise new solutions for many of them. For the sake of clarity, these problems and the actions taken to solve them are set forth separately below, although many of them are closely interrelated. (a) Withdrawal 'of Belgian troops The intervention of Belgian troops was the immediate event which caused the Congo Government to appeal to the United Nations, and the Security Council in its resolution of 14 July I960 called upon the Belgian Government to withdraw'its troops from the Congo. At the time of the resolution, there Were about 10,000 Belgian troops in the Congo, Some were in the two military bases of Kamina and Xitona; others were deployed throughout the country where they occupied a number of main centres. Because of the tension they generated, particularly the para- troopers who induced a state of frenzy among the Congolese, the presence of Belgian troops was a constant danger not only to the Congolese but also to the Belgian population whom it was their ostensible purpose to protect, for while they succeeded in occupying a number of cities, the country at large was beyond their ability to control. In this connexion, it may be recalled that there were in fact two series of mutinies of the Force Publjgue in July I960. During the first series, which took place from 5 to 10 July, unruly elements committed excesses, but the majority of the troops did not resort to hostile acts against Belgians. The second and much more violent outbreak took place after, and because of, the Belgian military intervention of 10 July I960,' particularly the attack on the port of Matadi. The objective of ONUC was to achieve the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic and without using force. Immediately after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960, and before the arrival of the first contingent of the United Nations Force, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, Dr. Bunche, - 9.- entered into negotiations with the. Belgian representatives in Leopold- ville for the speedy withdrawal of their troops. It was agreed that the Belgian troops would withdraw from the positions they occupied as soon as these positions were taken over by the United Nations Force. In order to achieve a speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops, it was necessary to bring in and deploy the United Nations contingents with the least possible delay. The plan was to take over all the positions occupied by the Belgian troops in three stagesj first, the city of Leopoldville; then, the rest of the Congo except Katanga and the two Belgian military bases ofIfemina and Kitonaj and, finally the three remaining areas. The first United Nations detachment, composed of about 70 Tunisian soldiers, arrived in Leopoldville on the evening of 15 July I960 and was joined by others in the following days. There were about 3,500 United Nations troops in the Congo on IS July, 11,000 on 6 August, and 16,000 at the beginning of September I960. A few hours after the arrival of the first contingent of the Force on the evening of 15 July I960, United Nations soldiers replaced Belgian troops in the central part of the city of Leopoldville. On the following two days, as more United Nations troops arrived, they took control of the remaining parts of the city and be^n relieving Belgian troops in the main centres of Bas-Congo. Although this remarkable speed was achieved only through strenuous efforts, the Congo Government did not consider it fast enough. On 17 July I960 Mr. Patrice Lumumba and Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu addressed an ultimatum to the United Nations whereby, if the Belgian troops were not completely withdrawn within 48 hours, they would appeal for aid to the Soviet Union-. The Secretary- General brought the matter before the Security Council which, by its | resolution of 22 July I960, commended the action taken by the Secretary- General and called upon Belgium to speed up the withdrawal of its troops. The original plan was therefore continued without change, As soon as new United Nations contingents arrived, they were deployed in the positions occupied by Belgian troops. Thus, they brought about the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Leopoldville and the surrounding area on 23 July I960, and from the whole of the Congo except Katanga and the two bases by the beginning of August I960. The next step was the .entry of United'.Nations troops into Katanga. On this question the Secretary-General ran into a grave conflict with the Congo Government. Mr. Lumumba wanted OMJC to help his Government to put down the secession of • Katanga by foree. This ONUC could not do, for under its mandate it could not be a party to, or in any way intervene in, or be used to influence the outcome of any political issue, in the Congo. Another difficulty encountered by the Secretary-General was the resistance of the Katangese secessionist authorities and the Belgian Government. The Katangese authorities strongly opposed the entry of United Nations troops, and, allegedly because of this opposition, the Belgian Government was reluctant to withdraw its troops from Katanga. On 4 August I960, the Secretary-General, who had arrived in Leopold- ville a few days- earlier,, sent Dr. Bunche to -Elisabethville to make arrangements with the Belgian representatives there for the entry of United Wations troops into Katanga, which, if no difficulties arose, would take place on 6 August. But in the face of unqualified and un- yielding opposition of the Katangese secessionist authorities, Dr. Bunche concluded that the entry of United Nations troops could not be achieved without resort to force. The Secretary-General, therefore, decided to postpone the original plan and brought the matter before the Security Council. By its resolution of 9 August I960, the Security Council confirmed the authority conferred upon the. Secretary-General by its -previous -resolutions and called upon Belgium immediately to withdraw its troops from Katanga. At the same time, the Council re- affirmed that the United Nations Force would not in any way intervene in any internal conflict in the Congo, After the adoption, of the resolution, the Secretary-General returned to the Congo and, on 12. August, personally led the first United Nations unit into Katanga. Since Mr.tHammarskjold did not take Central Government civilian and military representatives with him into-Katanga, lir. Lumumba strongly criticized the manner in which the Secretary-General had im- plemented the Security Council resolutions and refused henceforth to co-operate with him. In view;of Mrs Lumumba's violent reaction, the Secretary-General once again referred his Katanga policy to the Security Council. The Council met on 21 August I960,, but did not vote on any resolution. During the discussion, the Secretary-General - 11 - indicated that in the absence of any new directive, he would consider his interpretation of the ONUC mandate as upheld. He also made known his intention to appoint an advisory committee to advise him on future policy on the Congo. The committee would be composed of member States which had contributed troops to the United Nations Force. Tho entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on 12 August I960 led to the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga and the bases, which was completed by the beginning of September I960, Thus, despite serious obstacles, ONUC brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo within six weeks and, by so doing, removed one of the main sources of tension 'in the country at that time. (b) Maintenance of law and order First a.chieyements_ and difficulties The maintenance of law and order in the Congo undoubtedly has been the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon QMJC. In order to carry out that task, the Secretary-General set up a United Nations Force which, at its peak strength, numbered about 20,000, But, even at top strength, the United Nations Force was 'insufficient to discharge all of its res- ponsibilities in so vast a land as the Congo. On their arrival in the Congo, United Nations soldiers were told in official instructions that they were members of a peace force, not a fighting force, that they had been asked to come in response to an appeal from the Congo Government, that their task was to help in restoring order and calm in a troubled country and that they should give protection against acts of violence to all the people, Africans and Europeans alike. They were also told that, while they carried arms, they were to use them 'only in self-defence and that they were in the Congo to help everyone and to harm no one, Because the United Nations came "to the Congo to assist the Congo Government in maintaining law and order, it carefully avoided any action which would put it in the role of a government. What it sought to 'do was to assist the Congolese authorities to perform their normal duties; for instance, by undertaking joint patrols with the local police for the maintenance of law and order in a given area. V.Tien, however, this - 12.- was not possible because of the breakdown of the security forces, the United Nations Force alone had to perform the normal security duties in the place of Congolese authorities, but in so doing it always sought the consent and Cooperation of the Congo Government. Such was the case in Leopoldville during the early months of the'operation, when United Nations soldiers performed police duties on the main arteries of the city and ensured the protection of its essential services* Following these procedures, the Force restored law and order, protected life and property, and ensured the continued operation of essential services wherever it went. In many areas it brought under control unruly ANC elements, many of whom laid down their arms voluntarily or at the re- quest of their Government. Thus the Force carried out its task of mainte- nance of law and order with success in the initial phase of the Operation. Unfortunately, the task of the Force became more difficult after mid- Auguot I960, when relations between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Secretary-General deteriorated over the question of Katanga. More- over, as the inevitable consequence of the unpreparedness of the Congolese leaders for the responsibilities of independence, the internal situation began to worsen rapidly in August. Tribal rivalries, which had plagued the country before independence, flared up in Kasai between Baluba and Luluas with added intensity. Persecuted by Luluas without any effective intervention by the Government, the Baluba of the Luluabourg area fled en masse to their tribal lands in the Bakwanga region, where their leader, Mr. Albert Kalonji, proclaimed the secession of South Kasai on 10 August I960. In Equateur and Leopold- ville provinces, there was increasing opposition to the Government. To put down opposition and secessionist movements, Mr. Lumumba resorted to extreme action* Some opposition leaders were arrested and beaten, and 'anti-Government newspapers were suspended. At the end of August I960 AWC troops were sent to South Kasai, where they behaved in a most, cruel manner and killed many civilians, including women and children. Other ANC troops were being massed near the northern :border of Katanga in' preparation for 'the invasion of that province. To make possible these military moves, ^r. Lumumba sought' and obtained some direct assistance outside United :Nations channels. - 13 - During those days, the ANC, which the Government was using to achieve its political objectives but which at" times it was unable to control, was a constant danger to the civilian population. Even OMJC personnel were not always immune from its brutal assaults. There were, in particular, two s erious incidents in which ONUC personnel were the victims of brutal and unprovoked assaults by ANC elements. One of these incidents..took place at the Ndjili airport on 18 August I960, and the other in Stanley- ville on 27 August. Without the cooperation of the Congo Government which it had come to assist, ONUC faced a frustrating situation. Its.action was further hampered X7hen the Government itself resorted to actions which tended to endanger law and order, or to violate human rights. Whenever this happened, GNUC endeavoured to induce and persuade Congolese authorities to change their course of action. It also took measures, to the extent possible, to ensure the protection of the threatened persons. But it refused to use force to subdue Congolese authorities, or the ANC under their orders. When its own personnel were attacked, ONUC intervened only to prevent further excesses and to urge the Congo Government to take disciplinary action against the culprits. The policy of restraint of ONUC was not always understood. For example, in certain remarks made in August I960, Major-General H.T. Alexander, then Chief of Defence Staff of Ghana, viewed the restraint on the use of force as a weakness, Hs considered that the problem of maintenance of law and order could be solved only by disarming the ANC, and he proposed that the United Nations should do so even against the will of the Congo Government, This stand was firmly .rejected by ONUC. Dr. Bunche, the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, pointed out that the only basis the Force had for operating in the Congo was the Security Council resolution of 14 July I960 in which, acting upon the request of the Congo Government, the Council had decided to provide that Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until its national security forces were fully able to meet their tasks. In the light of this resolution, the United Nations policy in the Congo had been one of seeking to cooperate with the Government; it had neither sought to replace the Government nor to make it captive. The United Nations Force was in the - 14 - Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation, and had studiously avoided any suggestion of replacing in any way the former colonial administration. Obviously, Dr. Bunche added, if the Force began to use its arms to" wound and kill Congolese, its doom would be quickly sealed, for it could not long survive'amidst a hostile public. Measures taken during the constitutipnal, crisis Dr, Buncho left the Congo at the end of August I960 and was temporarily replaced by Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, pending the arrival of Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, who was to be the new Special Representative. On 5 September I960, the situation in the Congo was suddenly, changed as a consequence of President Joseph Kasa-Vubu's decision to dismiss Mr, Patrice Lumumba. The dismissal of Mr. Lumumba set off a grave constitu- tional crisis which was ended only 11 months later. During that period, there was no legal government in the country, and, after a confused struggle for power, the country found itself, in effect, divided into four camps, each ruled by a de facto regime based more on its armed forces than on popular support* The difficulties of ONUC were naturally increased by this state of affairs. There was now no government with which it could deal. Its policy in the field of maintenance of law and order was to cooperate with the authorities actually in control of the area wherever necessary. In so doing, it carefully avoided any interference in the political struggle under way and endeavoured to observe the strictest impartiality towards the various contending parties. As before, ONUC would use persuasion rather than coercion to achieve its objectives, and its troops were ordered not to use force except in self-defence. Immediately after the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba, ONUC took two emergency measures. The explosive tension among the population generated by the conflict between the two most powerful Congolese leaders, Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Lumumba, might well have led to a complete breakdown of law and order throughout the country and to an extension of the civil war al- ready under way in South Kasai. Therefore, immediately after the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba, ONUC took two emergency measures. It decided on the night of 5 to 6 September 1960 to close all major airports. The next day, in view of the dangerous effect of Inflammatory speeches on an already dis- turbed populace and after a number of violent demonstrations had taken place the city, ONUG temporarily clos^ clown the LeppoldvaOle radio station. measures were lifted on 12 and 13 September I960 as soon as the tension had subsided below the .explosive level. In response to.frantic appeals for protection from political and other leaders of all sides in I^poldville, OWUC also agreed to protect the threatened leaders, and in so doing it endeavoured to show absolute impartiality. ONUC guards were stationed around the residences of Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Lumumba. Protection was also given to the other leaders, though not to the same extent. Indeed, all political, and military leaders of consequence were given a measure of protection by ONUC, and not a few probably owe their lives to it. In the following months, the continued efforts of ONUC led to a number of important achievements. In South Kasai, ONUC helped in arranging a cee.se-fire between ANC troops and the secessionist army of Mr. Kalonji and in establishing a neutral zone placed under ONUC control. It also persuaded the ANC command to withdraw its troops from the northern border of Katanga* When these troops, which moved without any logistical support, engaged in looting and pillage along the routes they followed, ONUC trans- port planes were brought into use to airlift them to their destination. In North Katanga, where violent fighting broke out between pro-Tshombe gendarmes and the anti-Tshombe Baluba population, ONUC put an end to the fighting by setting up, in agreement with both parties, neutral zones under its protection. Elsewhere, endless efforts were exerted to prevent violence, to uphold law and to protect life. Protected areas were set up at various times and places, where threatened persons, Africans and Europeans alike, could repair for safety. Neutral zones were established to stop tribal warfare. During this period of unrest,. Europeans, many of whom were scattered settlers in remote areas, were often threatened by hostile local authorities or populations. Whenever possible, ONUC took measures to rescue and protect them and, if they so desired, to evacuate them to safer areas. In carrying out its mission of peace, the United Nations Force suffered numerous casualties. In the course of August I960, two Tunisian soldiers were killed and several others wounded while protecting Baluba refugees against the attacks of Lulua tribesmen in Kasai. On 8 November --16 -' I960, a patrol car of 11"Irish soldiers was'ambushed and eight of them killed in Worth Katanga. Another incident occurred on 24 November I960 when ANC troops attacked the Ghana Embassy in Leopoldville. The Tunisian unit which guarded the Embassy suffered several casualties, including one dead, • Here again, when the authorities in power indulged in actions which endangered peace and order, or violated human rights, ONUC could not always prevent these actions but sought to redress the situation by the use of persuasion or good offices. Thus ONUC could not prevent a number of political arrests by various local regimes* At the time, these regimes endeavoured to strengthen their armed forces by importing arms and military equipment from abroad. While ONUC did its best to stop such im- ports, its forces were insufficient to control all points of entry, and therefore could not prevent quantities of arms and equipment from being . smuggled into different parts of the country. One of the most delicate problems confronting ONUC during the constitutional crisis related to the fate of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, It was this question which so strained the relations between ONUC and the Kasa-Vubu-Mobutu regime that cooperation between them became almost im- possible. After the military coup of 14 September I960, the dg_ facto regime of Leopoldville, supported by President Kasa-Vubu, attempted re- peatedly to arrest Mr. Lumumba, but was prevented from doing so by ONUC. The position of ONUC was dictated mainly by its concern to maintain law and order, for it well knew that Mr. Lumumba's arrest would dangerously deepen the current crisis and make any reconciliation so much more difficult.' ONUC also held the view that, even though dismissed as Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba was still a deputy of the National Assembly and was under parliamentary immunity which only Parliament could lift. ONUC troops, therefore, vigilantly guarded Mr. Lumumba's residence, and, so long as he" remained there, he was in safety. However, it became impossible to protect him when he voluntarily left his residence on the night of 27 to 28 November I960, in an apparent attempt to get to Stanleyville, his political stronghold. Before he could do so, he was arrested by ANC soldiers near Port-Francqui and brought back to Leopoldville. Once Mr. Lumumba was arrested, ONUC had neither the - 17 - right nor the means to liberate him from his captors, but it exerted all possible pressure to ensure him legal and humane treatment. Upon learning of.- the arrest, the Secretary-General sent two messages to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, expressing his concern over the event and stressing the importance of giving the prisoner all the guarantees provided by law. Similarly repeated representations were later made to Mr. Kasa-Vubu by Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in the Congo. ONUC could not do more without exceeding the mandate given it by the Security Council. However, nothing was done to give Mr. Lumumba a trial. He re- mained detained in Thysville until 1? January 1961, when he and two other political prisoners, Mr. Joseph Okito and Mr. Maurice Mpolo, were transferred secretly to Katanga. This move brought strong protests from both the Secretary-General and the Conciliation Commission for the Congo, which was then in the territory. In particular, the Secretary-General took immediate action to urge the authorities con- cerned to return Mr. Lumumba to Leopoldville province and to apply the normal legal rules. But no remedial action was taken, and four weeks later the shocking news came from Katanga that the three prisoners had been murdered. The circumstances of their death were later in- vestigated by a United Nations commission, which accepted as substan- tially true the evidence indicating that the prisoners had been killed as early as 1? January 1961, and probably in the presence of high officials of the Katanga provincial government. Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 The news of the murder of Mr. Lumumba brought the crisis to its most dangerous point. It was followed by a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals by pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba leaders, including summary executions of political prisoners. The civil war, already under way in North Katanga, threatened to spread into other regions. In the shadow of this threat, the Security Council met again on 15 February 1961. After a long and tense debate, the Council adopted, on 21 February, a resolution by which it authorized ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo, It also urged that the various Congolese armed units be reorganized and brought under discipline and control. - 13 - The period immediately following the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 was a critical one for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. After the death of Mr. Lumumba, several con- tributing States, on political grounds, had withdrawn their national con- tingents from the United Nations Force, reducing its strength from a maximum of about 20,000 to less than 15,000. • Thinly deployed throughout the country, the United Nations Force had great difficulties in coping with its over- whelming tasks. Its difficulties further increased because of the hostile attitude of the authorities of Leopoldville and Elisabethville, These authorities interpreted the new resolution of the Security Council as an attempt to subdue them by force, and in retaliation they ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel. The most serious of these measures was the attack by ANC troops on the United Nations garrison in Matadi on 4 March 1961. In order to cope with these difficulties and to implement the new resolution of the Security Council, the Secretary-General took urgent action to increase the strength of the United Nations Force. New contri- butions were obtained from several governments, bringing the total of the United Nations troops to more than 18,000 in April 1961, In March 1961, Mr. Dayal left for New York for consultations with the Secretary-General and was temporarily replaced by Mr. ^ekki Abbas. In April, the situation began to improve, first because of the in- creased strength of the United Nations Force, and secondly because, after patient negotiations, ONUC reached an agreement with President Kasa-Vubu on 1? April 1961 for the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The limited use of force, as authorized by the Security Council, was resorted to by ONUC at the beginning of April 1961 to stop the civil war which was spreading dangerously in North Katanga. Since mid-March 1961, Katangese gendarmerie led by foreign mercenaries had launched an offensive against the anti-Tshombe forces in North Katanga in a determined effort to crush all opposition there. On 27 March, the United Nations Force Commander warned Mr. Tshombe to stop the offensive, but the warning was unheeded, and gendarmes entered Manono three days later and prepared to attack Kabalo. It was at this point that United Nations troops intervened, stopped the gendarmes and established control of the area between Kabalo and Albertville. - 19- At the end of April, a most tragic incident occurred when a United Nations detachment of Ghana troops in Port-Francqui was suddenly attacked and overpowered by hitherto friendly ANC troops and 42 Ghanaians as well as 2 Swedes were ruthlessly massacred. It was generally agreed that this brutal assault was mainly an act of abrupt madness by undisciplined and unpredictable armed troops. After this incident, the OMJC Command made it a rule not to station small units in isolated areas. OWUC realized that, as a result of this policy, many areas could no longer be covered by its troops, but it considered it had no right to jeopardize the safety of its soldiers. After the end of April, there were fewer incidents. The most im- portant one was the arrest of Mr. Tshombe by the Leopoldville authorities during the Coquilhatville Conference at the end of April. As in the case of other political prisoners, CNUC exerted its efforts, within its mandate, to ensure that Mr, Tshombe would be treated humanely and be given the guarantees provided by the law. He was released four weeks later, In. May, Mr. Abbas left Leopoldville and Mr. Dayal prepared to return. But President Kasa-Vubu, who resented Mr. Dayal 's policy of strict im- partiality during the constitutional crisis, opposed his return. In order not to jeopardize the United Nations operation, Mr. Dayal subsequently sub- mitted his resignation* The Secretary-General reluctantly accepted it and •appointed Dr. Sture C. Linner as Of f icer-in-Charge . From -May to August, the United Nations Force played a major role in the conciliation efforts between Congolese leaders which resulted in the reopening of Parliament and the sett-ing up of a national unity Government led by Mr.. Adoula.^ Incidents after the constitutional crisis After the investiture of the Adoula Government, on 2 August 1961, ' the task of ONUC became considerably easier. Once again, it could work with a legally constituted Government, and it did so in a spirit of co- operation and mutual confidence. However, law and order were threatened by several serious incidents, all of which broke out because national unity had not yet been fully achieved. I/ See p. 26 et seq. - 20 - On two occasions, as a result of attacks launched by the mercenary- led Katanga gendarmerie on United Nations troops, fighting broke out between them in Katanga.-' Another series of incidents was related to the ANC campaign, late in 1961, to occupy North Katanga. In connexion with this military campaign, several tragic incidents were caused by undisciplined ANC elements. At the beginning of November 1961, ANC soldiers of the Leopoldville grouping assaulted several Belgian women in Luluabourg. On 11 Novsmber, ANC soldiers of the Stanleyville grouping massacred 13 ONUC aircrew members of Italian nationality in Kindu, Two days later, ANC soldiers of the same grouping who had just entered Albertville began to loot houses and threaten civilians there. On 1 January 1962, 22 European missionaries and an undetermined number of Africans were killed in Xongolo by ANC soldiers, also from Stanleyville. In the first three cases, ONUC intervened to restore law and order and to protect the threatened population as soon as it learned of the incidents. It could not take punitive action, which was the responsibility of the Congolese authorities, but it urged the Congo Government to exert every effort to ensure that those guilty would be quickly found and severely punished. In the case of Kindu, where United Nations personnel were in- volved, a joint investigation commission was set up by ONUC and the Congo Government to investigate the incident and to identify the culprits. In regard to the Kongolo incident, the December hostilities in Elisabothville had obliged ONUC to withdraw most of its troops from North Katanga, and there were no United Nations troops in or near Kongolo at the time of the incident. ONUC immediately urged the Congo Government to take speedy action to identify and punish the culprits and to prevent the recurrence of like incidents, and it offered all possible assistance to achieve those objectives. With the agreement of the Government, two officers of the Nigerian contingent later went to Kongolo and organized the evacuation of other threatened persons from the area. It was also decided that the joint investigation commission on Kindu should investigate the Kongolo incident. Finally, an important incident took place in Stanleyville in January 1962. As a result of deteriorating relations between the Congo Government and Mr. Antoine Gizenga, fighting broke out on 13 January between pro- See p. 37 etr__secu - 21 - Gizenga gendarmes and ANC troops- led by General Victor Lundula, which were now loyal to the Central Government. The "fighting, which resulted in 14 deaths, stopped the 'next morning"wheri the gendarmes surrendered to General Luridula.: During the fighting, ONUC troops were en guard throughout the city to protect the civilian population, but they did not have to intervene. After the gendarmes had surrendered,'OWUC assisted ANC troops in disarming them at the request of the Central'Government. After the fighting, Mr. Gizenga was censured by the Chamber of Representatives and dismissed from, the post of Vice-Prime Minister, and the Central Government ordered a judicial investigation to determine his responsibilities in the incident. Here again, ONUC scrupulously avoided any-interference in the internal political struggle, but sought to ensure the observance of the law. The Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, addressed to Prime Minister Adoula a personal appeal in this connexion and was given full assurance that'Mr. Gizenga would be granted all practical and legal safeguards for the protection of his interests. Mr. Gizenga was "brought to Leopoldville on 20 January 1962 in an ONUC plane, at his re- quest and with the agreement of the Government, and he spent his first two days there at ONUC Headquarters. He left ONUC Headquarters on 22 January voluntarily and after informing ONUC that it was relieved of all responsibilities for his personal protection. At the beginning of February 1962, Dr. Linner,- having completed his extended tour- of duty, left Leopoldville and was temporarily replaced by Mr. Robert Gardiner as Officer-in-Charge» Reorganization of Congolese armed forces In reviewing the activities of the United Nations Operation in the Congo and its role 'in the maintenance of law and order, it is noteworthy that the incidents of concern have'been caused by unruly elements of Congolese armed forces, whether they be part of the ANC, the Katanga gendarmerie-or Kalonji's troops. From the outset, it has been considered an essential task of ONUC' to assist the Congo Government in establishing discipline in the armed forces. These armed forces were to be brought under unified command, the unruly elements eliminated and the remaining ones reorganized and retrained. In order to achieve these objectives, OWUC has, offered full support and co-operation to the Congo Government, - 22 - Thus, in August I960, ONUC took the first step toward the reorganiza- tion of jiNC when the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force, General Ben Hamou Kettani, was appointed adviser to the ANG at the request of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Shortly after this appointment, the nNC began to reform in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and men. But this programme was interrupted at the end of August because of the Government's plan to invade Kasai and Katanga, and later ONUC was compelled to abandon it altogether because of the political struggle Which began in September I960. after the setting up of the Adoula Government, in August 1961, ONUC's efforts were resumed. General Mengasha lyassu, who was appointed to continue General Kettani's work, has prepared a reorganization programme which is designed to be carried out in full co-operation with the Govern- ment. It is hoped that, with the improving political situation this pro- gramme can be successfully completed. ONUC will exert all possible efforts to that end in order that the national security forces of the Republic of the Congo might be able fully to carry out their tasks. (c) Constitutional Crisis Dismissal of Mr. Patrice Lumumba and its aftermath In the days following the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba, on 5 September I960, utter confusion prevailed in Leopoldville. Mr, Lumumba refused to recognize Mr. Kasa-Vubu's decisions and in turn dismissed him as Chief of State. Parliament supported Mr. Lumumba although it refused to endorse his decision to dismiss the Chief of State, but Parliament itself was soon suspended by Mr. Kasa-Vubu* Each contending party sought the support of the army and, whenever it could, ordered the arrest of its opponents. On 14 September I960, General Joseph Mobutu, then Colonel and Chief of Staff of ANC, imposed by a coup an army-backed regime run by a College of Commissioners and supporting Mr. Kasa-Vubu. But the coup was not very effective in that Mr. Lumumba and his supporters resisted the Commissionersr authority. Naturally, the contending parties turned to ONUC for recognition and support. ONUC adhered to its policy of avoiding intervening or taking sides in the internal conflicts under way. While it recognised the - 23 - unimpaired status of Mr. Kasa-Vubu as Chief of State, it refused to help him achieve political aims by force and, in particular, It refused to recognize the College of Commissioners supported by him. Without inter- fering directly, it favoured a speedy return to legality through re- conciliation between Congolese leaders and encouraged the efforts being made towards that end. Several moves were made at the time by Parliament leaders and others to reconcile Mr* Kasa-Vubu-and Mr, Lumumba. None of then? yielded positive results* The crisis was examined by the Security Council from 14 to 17 September I960 and, when the Council failed to take a decision by the General Assembly from 1? to 20 September. By its resolution of 20 Septsmber I960,, the General Assembly fully supported the position taken by the Secretary-General. In an effort to solve the constitutional crisis, it appealed to all Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution, by peaceful means, of all their internal conflicts and requested the Advisory'Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission to assist them in that endeavour* During the meeting of the Security Council two Congolese delegations, or-e appointed by Mr, Kasa-Vubu and the other by Mr. Lumumba, were sent to New York, but neither could win approval. Two months later, during the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly, Mi"» Kasa-Vubu himself came to New York as the Head of his delegation, which was seated by the General As?:embi,7 aftcsr- a long and bitter debate. The decision of the General Assembly considerably enhanced Mr. Kasa-Vubu's personal prestige but did not bring an immediate solution to the crisis. In the meantime, the internal situation rapidly worsened in the Congo. While the College of Commissioners consolidated its position in Leopold- vllls, Mr. Antoine Gizenga, acting on behalf of Mr* Lumumba, succeeded in establishing a government in Stanleyville which was formally recognized as the legitimate Government of the Republic by a number of Member States of the United Nations. With the support of the local ANC troops, led by General Victor Lundula, Mr. Gizenga extended his authority beyond the Orientale province to Kivu and the northern part of Katanga. At the same time, the secessionist governments of Mr. Moise Tshombe and Mr. Albert Kalonji consolidated their hold respectively over South Katanga and South Kasai with the active assistance of certain foreign powers. Thus the - 24 - Congo was divided into four major rival camps. Conciliation efforts ONUC's efforts at that time .were mainly directed at two objectives. On the one hand, ONUC endeavoured to prevent the leaders holding the reins of power from using force to subdue their opponents within or out- side the zones they controlled. On the other it encouraged all leaders to seek a solution of their differences through negotiation and con- ciliation. Conciliation efforts were also made by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, established under the General Assembly resolution of 20 September I960. This Coiranission, -which was composed of representa- tives of African and Asian countries which had contributed troops to the United Nations Force, visited the Congo at the beginning of the year 1961. After spending seven weeks in the country, the Commission came to the con- clusion that, while there was among most leaders a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to achieve peaceful solutions to -one crisis, a small number of other leaders, among the very persons holding the reins of power, appeared to prefer a military rather than a political and constitutional solution. Because of the uncooperative and intran- sigent attitude of these leaders, the attempts made by the Commission to reconcile the opposing groups had not led to positive results. The Com- K.ission also came to the conclusion that the crisis could be solved only if Parliament was reconvened and a national unity government approved by it. Finally, the Commission found that one of the main obstacles to a speedy solution was foreign interferance in the internal affairs of the Congo. These views were very similar to those expressed by the Secretary- General. They were largely reflected in the decision taken by the Security Council, which met at the end of February 1961, to examine once again the Congo problem. In its resolution of 21 February 1961, the Security Council urged that Parliament be convened and that the necessary measures of protection be taken for this purpose. It expressed the view that the solution of the Congo problem lay in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside. In this regard, it stressed the importance of achieving genuine conciliation among - 25 - Congolese leaders and stated that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issue, greatly increase the dangers of conflict within the Congo and of the threat to international peace and security. After January 1961, a number of steps were taken by various Congolese leaders in an attempt to solve the crisis. On 25 January a preliminary round table conference was sponsored by Mr. Joseph Kasa.«Vubu in Leopoldville, It was boycotted by pro-Lunumba and pro-Tshom.be leaders, and thus its use- fulness was considerably limited. However, at the end of the conference, Mr. Kasa-Vubu decided to replace the College of Cormissionsrs by a pro- visional government headed by Mr. Joacvpb. Ileo, a decisinn which was con- sidered by the Conciliation Commission as a sbep in the right direction. At the beginning of March 1961, a conference was held in Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, on the proposal of Mr. Moise Tshom.be. It was attended by a number of top Congolese leaders, but Mr. Antoine Gizenga, who had agreed to cone, did not attend. The Tananarive Conference proposed that the Congo be turned into a confederation of sovereign States, Under the proposed arrangements, the Central Government would be abolished, and legislative and executive powers would be vested in the individual States* The Conference also provided for the establishment of new States, but did not' determine the criteria to be followed in that connexion. This decision led Congolese leaders, through personal ambition and tribal animosities, to lay claim for the creation of a score of new States, But the influence of the Tananarive Conference was short-lived. Soon thereafter, Mr. Kasa-Vubu and other leaders revised their positions and made it clear that the decisions of Tananarive were mere statements of intentions and, unless approved by Parliament, had no force of law. Some time later, on 24 April 1961, a more important conference was con- vened in Coquilhatville, on the proposal of Mr, Kasa-Vubu. Mr. Gizenga again refused to attend. Mr, Tshombe came and sought to re-create the Tananarive situation. When his attempt was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the representatives, he decided to boycott the conference, but, as he pre- pared to fly back to Sliaabethville, he was detained by the Leopoldville authorities. The conference continued nevertheless and, at the conclusion of its work, recommended a reorganization of the government structure of the - 26 - Congo on a federal basis. From, the outset, it had been made clear that the decisions of the Conference would have to be endorsed by Parliament, and during the Conference, on 12 May, President Kasa-Vubu announced that Parliament would be re-opened in 'the near future. He requested United Nations assistance and protection for this purpose. While carefully avoiding interference in the discussions between Congolese leaders, ONUC facilitated these discussions whenever it was re- quested to do so. Thus it placed a guard at the site of the preliminary round table conference in Leopoldville. It agreed to facilitate Mr. Gizenga's trip to Tananarive when he first accepted to go there. Before the Coquilhatville Conference, Mr. Cleophas Kamitatu, a pro-Lumumba leader, went to Stanleyville in an OMJC plane in an effort to bring about a rapproche- ment between Mr* Gizenga and Mr. Kasa-Vubu. Re-opening of Parliament After Mr. Kasa-Vubu announced his intention to reconvene Parliament, ONUC spared no efforts to help achieve this purpose. An essential con- dition for reconvening Parliament was a rapprochement between leaders of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville groups. To these two groups belonged the great majority of .parliamentarians and, if either of the groups re- fused to attend Parliament meetings, there would be no quorum. But the memory of Mr» Patrice Lumumba's death and of its aftermath was still vivid, and leaders of the two groups were divided by deep suspicion and distrust. Through good offices and persuasion, ONUC officials did everything possible to dissipate their mutual suspicion and lajr the ground for negotiations between them. After Mr. Kasa-Vubu called the Parliament session in Leopoldville, Mr. Gizenga condemned his bid as illegal and ordered Parliament to meet in Kamina. Responding to ONUC's good offices, Mr. Gizenga softened his stand and agreed not to insist on Kamina provided that full protection were given to parliamentarians by ONUC. Later, a meeting between Leopold- ville and Stanleyville representatives was arranged in Leopoldville, under ONUC auspices, to consider the modalities of the re-opening of Parliament. The Stanleyville representatives were brought to Leopoldville in an ONUC aircraft, and the meeting took place at ONUC Headquarters. After long discussions, an agreement was reached by the representatives of the two - 2? - groups. At their joint request, C UC ~.ccep*ed the responsibility for •• making arrangements for the session of Parliament and: ensuring full ^protection 'to the parliamentarians. ' In accordance with the request made by both delegations, ONUC also sought to persuade Congolese leaders of South Kasai and South Katanga to subscribe to the agreement on the reconvening of Parliament. Both Mr. Albert Kalonji and Mr. Moise Tshombe, who was released from confinement by the Leopoldville authorities on 22 June 1961, promised to cooperate. Mr. Tshonibe even signed a protocol calling for the reconvening of Parliament, but he changed his position after he returned to Elisabethville. Parliament re-opened on 22 July with more than 200 members attending, out of a total of 221. Most of them were brought to Leopoldville with the assistance of ONUC. On 2 August 1961, Mr. Cyrille Adoula, at the re- quest of President Kasa-Vubu, constituted a government of national unity, which was xmanimously approved by both Chambers. Remaining obstacles With the approval of the national unity government, the constitutional crisis was ended. In response to a letter from Prime Minister Adoula, the Secretary-General confirmed that the United Nations xvould deal with his Government as the Central Government of the Republic and that whatever aid and support the United Nations was in a position to give to the Congo would be rendered to his Government. However, there still remained two obstacles to the achievement of full national unity. One such obstacle was the secessionist activities of Mr. Tshombe.-' The other was the equivocal attitude of Mr. Antoine Gizenga. At the time of the re-opening of Parliament, he had remained in Stanley- ville and, although he was appointed Vice-Prime Minister in the new government, he made no move to proceed to Leopoldville. Mr. Adoula en- deavoured to obtain his co-operation with the active assistance of other Stanleyville leaders and ONUC. His efforts seemed at first successful. On 7 August 1961, Mr. Gizenga recognized the Adoula Government as the sole legal Government of the Republic. Four weeks later he came back to Leopoldville to assume the post of Vice-Prime Minister and accompanied Mr. Adoula in that capacity to a conference of non-aligned nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. However, Mr. Gizenga left again for Stanleyville 2./See page 37 et - 28 - at the beginning of October, ostensibly to collect some peronal effects, and refused to return to Leopoldville despite the many appeals from Mr. Adoula. While he was in Stanleyville, he attempted to form a new party, the Pana-Lumumba, and made several statements strongly hostile to the Government, On 8 January 1962, the Chamber of Representatives ordered Mr. Gizenga to return without delay to answer charges of secessionism. Mr. Gizenga refused to obey the order, and his defiant attitude led to the fighting, on 13 January 1962,between gendarmes supporting him and ANC troops loyal to the Government, which was decisively won by the latter. Thereafter, Mr, Gizenga was dismissed from the post of Vice-Prime Minister after the adoption of a motion of censure by the Chamber of Representatives and is being detained. The Stanleyville incident considerably increased the authority of the Central Government, which is now in control of all regions of the Congo except South Katanga. -•29-- (d) PrgblgE^o Movement toward Secession . - The Congo, which became independent' on 30 June 1960 and was recommended for membership in the United Nations on 7 July, was a well-defined entity consisting of six provinces. For three-quarters of a century it had been' • " ' ' .f ' •' governed as a unit, the provinces being regarded as Eere administrative divisions. When the political future of the Congo was discussed at the Brussels round-table conference at the beginning of 1960, all Congolese leaders agreed that "the Congo within its present frontiers shall constitute an independent State,* the inhabitants of which...possess one and the same nationality". ' The Loi fondamentale, which took into account the varying views expressed-'by Congolese leaders at the round-table conference, kept the Congo a united country while permitting a measure of decentralization. With the approach of independence, however, and with the intensification of political activity, there was a resurgence of demands for provincial , autonomy or even independence. This'development was especially, marked in some sections of Katanga, the province which, with 12.50 per cent of the Congo's population, contributed 50 per cent of its total revenue. A reluctance to continue to share its wealth was not unrelated to advocacy of secession for Katanga. • At the same time, political differences gradually widened on the national scene between Mr. Patrice Lumumba, the main proponent of unity, and Mr. Moise Tshombe, the Katanga leader who advocated a loosening of ties between'the Congo's provinces. These differences'were paralleled elsewhere in the Congo; several parties found a government based on the Lumumba- Kasa-Vubu alliance not to their liking, and turned to separatist policies. " The trend gathered- strength because Congolese political parties, with one or two. exceptions, have strong tribal and territorial associations. At this,point, various foreign interests began to enter the picture by providing financial and political support to secessionist movements.' As Belgian relations with Prime Minister Lumumba deteriorated,-there was an increasing tendency among Belgians to support groups in the Congo which sought to escape Central' Government control. With financial and political support from Belgian sources, Mr. Tshombe was accordingly in a position to proclaim the independence of Katanga on 11 July But Mr. Tshombe's own position in the province was anything but secure. In the May 1960 elections to the provincial. Assembly, his party, the Conakat, won 25 seats out of 60, compared to 23 seats for the rival Cartel katangais. The latter group, which is dominated by the Balubakat party, felt aggrieved because, in its opinion, the distribution of seats did not tally with the popular vote and therefore decided to boycott the provincial Assembly. Mr. Tshombe was able to form a provincial government only with the support of independent and co-opted members, and after a last- minute revision of the Led fondamentale by the Belgian Parliament had reduced the quorum for meetings of the Assembly from two-thirds to one-half. Foreign support was vital in helping Mr. Tshombe to assert his control over Katanga itself, as well as to make good his secession. He welcomed the re-occupation of Katanga by Belgian troops. He was also assisted "by Belgian military personnel in the Katanga gendarmerie. When under the pressure of OWUC, Belgian troops entirely withdrew from the province at the end of August 1960, Belgian officers in command of the gendarmerie remained and were instrumental in helping Mr. Tshombe carry out his subsequent secessionist policies. Secession and the ONUS Mandate Along with the breakdown of law and order and foreign armed intervention, the secession of Katanga was thus one of the main problems which confronted the Congo when it appealed to the United Nations for help. In its appeal to the United Nations, the Congo Government specifically requested military assistance to end the secession of Katanga, but the Security Council resolution of ih July 1960 contained no mention of this point. On 22 July, the Council recognized that it had dealt with the Republic as a unit, and asked all States to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, In August, the Council called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga; it also made it clear, however, that the United Nations was not to take sides in Congolese internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise; nor was the Organization to be used to influence the outcome of any such conflict. - 51 - Thus the United Nations position was clear from the beginning. It ' • recognized' and supported the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and was opposed to secession. The United Nations obviously eo.und not go into a country at the invitation of it s;. government and there support or accept an effort of one area to break away from that country. But the problem was especially acute because Mr. Tshombe, in proclaiming the independence of Katanga,.'was not acting alone. The move was made with the unconcealed help of Belgian .advisers and was backed by Belgian troops. Thus, outside intervention became inextricably linked with the secession of Katanga from the very outset, and so it has remained. Since it had been brought about in great part through foreign support, the secession of Katanga, which led directly to action by the Central Government, would have led inevitably to counter-action by other States.. This posed a threat to international peace and security in the immediate area of the Congo and in Africa as a whole, which was made more dangerous by the evident interest of certain groups in the. riches of Katanga. Faced with this complex situation, the Secretary-General drew a clear distinction between what the United Nations could do in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, and what it could not do, and on this issue Prime Minister Lumumba chose to break with him, Mr. Lumumba argued that the United Nations had been asked by his Government, and had agreed to help maintain law and order throughout the Congo; from this he inferred that the United Nations was to help put down the lawless rebellion of the Katangese authorities. '" . The Secretary-General?s .position was that, while the United Nations Operation originated from a request by the Congo Government, the purpose of the United Nations intervention as determined by the Security Council" was not to achieve the domestic aim's of the Government but to preserve international peace and security. The United Nations Force, therefore, could not, under the Security Council decision, be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the.provincial, government to a specific line of action in regard to an internal political controversy. Nor would ONUC transport Central Government civilian or military personnel into Katanga against the wishes of the provincial authorities, or protect such personnel there beyond what followed - 32 - from its general duty to maintain law and o;.-dcr. diversely., CIIUC, tinder Mr. Hammarskjold's interpretation, had no right to prevent Central Government action in relation to Katanga, if such action was taken by its own means, or similar action by Katanga, provided it was not carried out by foreign troops or resources. While freely using persuasion to bring about reconciliation on the basis of unity, OKUC accordingly refused to intervene directly to put down the secession; its mandate did not allow it to exercise military initiatives for this or any other purpose. OEFUC refused to help the Central Government under Mr. Lumumba to subdue Mr. Tshombe, and its stand has not changed to this day. What the United Nations can do and has sought to do is to encourage efforts at reconciliation and to eliminate foreign interference which has been instrumental in bringing about the secession of Katanga and has helped the secession to endure. The withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga, was brought about by OMJC within the first six weeks of its operation. But, after the departure of the Belgian troops, foreign interference took more subtle forms and the secessionist regime, which had been set up after the Belgian military intervention, was strengthened by the introduction of foreign political advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries and the import of arms, ammunition and military equipment. To cope with this aspect of the problem, the Security Council strengthened the ONUC mandate in February 1961, and again in November, by authorizing it to eliminate those foreign personnel, by force if necessary, and to prevent further introduction of such elements as well as of arms and military equipment. Consolidation of Secession in Katanga As already indicated, the internal situation rapidly deteriorated throughout the Congo in the course of August 1960, and this deterioration led to the constitutional crisis which broke out in Leopoldville on 5 September. During this crisis, the secessionist regime of Mr. Tshombe was able to consolidate its hold over South Katanga with active foreign assistance. While Belgian officers, supplemented by an increasing number of foreign mercenaries, continued to strengthen the gendarmerie, Mr. Tshorabe imported large quantities of arms and war materiel, including aircraft, from abroad. With his improved armed forces, he launched a merciless extermination campaign against the Baluba and other political and tribal enemies. Helping to maintain law and order in Katanga and protecting large parts of the Katangese population against the - 35 - brutal lawlessness of the gendarmerie accordingly became one of the principal aspects of the OfiUG1 effort, along with'the removal of the foreign political advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries. In carrying out its functions in K? tense., GRJC continually .found itself • opposed by certain foreign fina-ncie.! interests which in effect control the economy of the'province. These interests, centered about the vast industrial and mining- complex of the Union Miniere du Ilaut-Katanga, with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, had apparently committed' themselves to Inc. TshoKbe's secessionist policies. The UniojijiimJere supported IJr. '.fshonbe in four principal ways. First, it 'paid nearly all-of its taxes not to the Central Government, to which they were due, but to the ICetc.ngese provincial authorities. Secondly, it shipped its production not by -way of the traditional "national" route, but by way of Portuguese Angola; this-enabled it to credit hard- currency export duties to the account of the provincial government. Thirdly, the Congo's part of Union I:^injLere stock was x-.-ithheld from the Central Govern- ment and -was 'kept in "Brussels, Fourthly, the firm alloired its industrial facilities in ^lisabethville and other pieces to be used by the nercenary-led gendaruerie for military purposes, including the making of some implements of war. It is -estimated, on the basis of recent figures, that the Union Miniere and connected companies, supplied the major prrt of Kctango's revenue and tlms, in effect, mas'-be s?±d to'have furnished tho financial basis for the T.-hole secessionist movement including the high payments to the mercenaries, ample military equipment, including warplaries, and vigorous propaganda machinery, with branches in some of the rxist important cities in the world, which spread tendentious and often viciously inaccurate reports directed, against the United Nations, • However, despite Mr. Tshonibe's efforts and the powerful financial and political support he enjoyed, his separatist movement never gained official international recognition either .in Belgium or elsewhere.- Loreover, neither Belgium nor any other Government publicly espoused the- cruse of Kstangese secession,. In fact, after the establishment of the coalition Government in Brussels in the spring of 1961, its Foreign linister, iir. Paul-Henri Spaalc, announced publicly its sta.nd in opposition to the secession of Katanga. This stand, however, did not seem to carry much weight Tidth the supporters of secession abroad, and with the foreign eleuents -Dressing for secession in K?tan.ra, who had gone far in their efforts to prevent reconciliation based on the Congo's -unity. Mercenaries and other foreign elements The problem of foreign elements who sought to influence the Congo's destinies in their OTJTI interests first came into prominence when these uen instigated Katanga's declaration of "independence" in July I960, and this evil has bedevilled Xatonga ever since, In the beginning, the bulk of these persons were Belgian professional nd.litp.ry end civilian officials (known as "MineJC " personnel) placed at the disposal of the Central Government of the Congo -under the treaty of friendship with Belclwi, which was signed but never ratified, After the severance of diplomatic relations between the Congo and Belgium, i-iany of these men ^fthered in Ilrtcnga, where they gained proninent positions in the provincial adminis- tration and the gendarmerie. From these vrntrge points they vigorously promoted secession, In effect they w?ged war on the Congo Government at \7hose disposal they had been placed by their country. Later these Belgians were joined by sone elenents of other nationalities, On 21 February 1961, the jecurity Council urged 'the immediate withdrawal and. evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries". Implicit in this language uas the finding that, while the Congo was admittedly end direly in need of assistance from outside, and especially of personnel to carry out technical and professional tasks vrhich the Congolese had not hitherto been trained to perform, there were other types of foreign personnel xvhose actions were incompatible with genuine Congolese independence and unity. In certain parts of the Congo, end especially in Katanga, such personnel had cone to play an increasingly harmful role, obstructing the application of United Nations resolutions and, in effect, working in their own interest and in the interest of certain financial concerns to break uo the country into a ballcanized congeries of politically and econordcally unvi?ble States, - 35 - Immediately after the adoption of the Gecurity Council resolution of 21 February, the wecretory-Generol undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to bring about the -withdrawal of the foreign military and political personnel. The Belgian Government took the position that there mist be no discrimination agcinst Belgians in engaging non-Congolese technical personnel; as for militrry personnel and mercenaries., the Belgian • Government divided then into several categories; Of these it undertook to recall those who;.i it considered that it had the legal right to request to return. But it would take no such action in -respect of mercenaries and the Belgian personnel engaged by the Congo Government; hoiir to deal with them, it argued, was a matter for agreement between the Secretary-General and the Congolese authorities. The 3ecretary- General e--.pressed the view that the measures indicated by the Belgian Govern- raent fell far short of full connlience with the Security Council resolution. The exchanges with Belgium continued, fsirly inconclusively, until the change of government in the spring of 1961, when some progress TOS.S made. The new Belgian Government notified 23 of its nationals serving in Katanga as political advisers to return to Belgium. It r'lso acted to prevent the recruit- ment of mercenaries. But the effectiveness of these efforts soon became open to doubt. On.30 October 1961, the Government in Brussels acknowledged that this was the case and took more vigorous steps - including the T-.dthdrawal of passports. ' • - ;.r. Tshombe, hotrever, would not co-operate v;ith Oi-iUC.. He continued to recruit foreign personnel, whose influence in the councils of the provincial government in fact tended to rise shcrrxLy. The comple;d.cn of the group also changed noticeably as mercenaries replaced the'"linef" staff. Thus the traditional colonial administrative and r:ilit?ry elements were being supplemented through an influx of non-Belgian adventurers, and. soldiers of fortune, including outlawed elements previously involved in-extremist activities.in Algeria and elsewhere. Similariy, politic?! advisers active in the provincial government were increasingly.committed to e;ctrei.j.st, repressive and seprrrtist policiesj they drew political sustenance from the substantial-non-Congolese com .unity to which Katanga's extractive and processing industries .had given rise. - 36 - First United Nations action "gaxnst for-'g?-rjr_ el£'e;'^.;.-y :' n J-^^angr Only after the United Ur.tions had strengthened its position in April 1961 did the Krtanga secessionist authorities, acting while ur. Tshombe was under detention in the West, officially accept the resolution of 21 February. Those authorities drew up lists of persons who:rovincial government. On 7 June 1961, after discussions with the Katanga authorities, the United Nations Force Commander dispatched a military mission to Latangs for the purpose of helping the authorities there to remove non-Congolese elements falling under the resolution. The mission reported that there were 510 foreign officers and non-com, issioned officers active in the gendarmerie as against 142 Congolese cadres. Of the non-Congolese, 203 were the remaining Belgian professional military men; 302 were mercenaries. But despite the unrelenting efforts of OMUC, the provincial authorities refused to t?ke effective action to remove the foreign elements without whom the secessionist movement might have collapsed. For its part, the Belgian Government said that it was prepared to hel? in the removal of its profession?! officers and HCO1s who had been serving the Congo and were now in command of the gendarmerie, but it professed to be unable to do anything about the "volunteers11 and mercenaries. Persursion by the Secretary-General, who discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Spaak in Geneva on 12 July 196ls wrs unavailing in this regard,. - 57 - Gradually, the United nations was compelled to shift its ground to more vigorous and direct measures to achieve compliance -with the Security Council resolution. lir, Tshoabe's chief military adviser, Major Weber, was compelled to leave en IS June 196l; Mr. Thyssens, ? prouinervt political adviser, xuas ap-orehended, taken to Leopoldville, and evacuated on 14 July, CNUC -warned the Katangese authorities that it wr.s prepared to compel the evacuation of other advisers and officers. Five French officers in politically sensitive gendar- merie posts were dismissed and repatriated, and a joint corardssion was establish- ed to list foreign political rdvisers, both those in offici?! posts and those actin unofficially, who were to be repatriated. Event.s of AUPUS^ andJjeptember^ 19,61 ' The formation of the Adoula Government, which enjoyed unquestionable and internationally recognized authority, was of crucisl importance in enabling the United Nations to proceed vdth the elimination of foreign elements, 3efore the formation of a legnl Governraent, the United lations1 efforts hrd been restricted by the requirement of avoiding political interference or support of one Congolese faction against another, Now the United Nations wrs able to do more effectively •what the eleven-month-long constitutional crisis hr.d impeded it from doing - that is, help the Government in removing the foreign 'elements which had furnished the backbone, and provided the teeth, of the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the Congo's richest province from the rest of the country. It w~s not the United rations' intention - any more thc.n it had been in the summer of I960 - to proceed against any Congolese elements, Ke.tangese or otherwise. Hor would the United Nations seek to conquer or subdue Katanga oh behalf of the Central Government; its action was directed primarily at the removal of non-Congolese elenents, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. • As already indicated, ONUC endeavoured, since the outbreak of the crisis, to encourage and facilitate the reconciliation of Congolese leaders, including those of Ketenga. But Mr, Tshombe rejected all attempts rt conciliation except on his own terms and, when Parliament finally reopened at Lovanium, the parliamentarians belonging to his party, the Conskat, vrere, with I Jr. Gizenga, the only absentees. Soon after the reopening of Parliament, ijr, Tshombe some- what softened his stand and allowed the parliamentarians of his prrty to participate in the work of Parliament, However, he himself remained in jlisp.bethville and showed no intention of relinquishing the powers he held - 38 - in Katanga. TThen all attempts at negotiation failed, ':"rime l3.rd.ster Adoula resorted to sterner action. In order to remove whet it believed to be the rarin obstacle to a peaceful solution of the I'atengr question, the.Central Government formally ordered, on 24 August 1961, the erqjulsion of mercenaries serving in Katanga and requested CNUC to assist it in carrying out this decision, ONUC, of course, was alrendy committed to this course and, for months, had urged Ijf. Tshombe to co-operate in removing the foreign elements, but to no avail. On 2B August, ONUC proceeded to round up nercenaides for deportation. In the face of inflammatory rumours about an invasion by the ANC which had been disseminated by Mr. Godefroid Munongo, the provincial Minister of the Interior, certain security precautions i-rere taken by 01UC in Elisabethville, including surveillance over Radio-Katanga, gendarmerie headquarters and some other key points. Inflammatory broadcasts were thus prevented, and appeals for calm were put on the air. The precautions lasted for only a few hours. On this occasion li", Tshombe, who had been fully informed of the goals of CHUC's action, expressed his readiness to co-operate. He broadcast a statement to the effect that the Katangese authorities accepted the' decisions of the United lotions, end that the services of the foreign militery personnel were being terminated by his government. At that point, OFUC representatives met v.ith the Slisebethville Consular Corps, which was presided over by the Belgian "Consul". The latter offered to assume the responsibility, together with two senior Belf,irn officers formerly in the gendarmerie, for the orderly repatriation of the foreign personnel, most of whom were "Belgians. 01-lUC immediately accepted this arrangement and suspended its own rounding-up operation, but three sets of ominous developments soon marred the picture. In the first place, it developed that the foreign military men being made available for repatriation were in the main the "Minaf" personnel whose with- dra.wal had been earlier agreed to by the Belgian Government. By 9 oeptember 1961, 273 had been evacuated, and 65 were awaiting repatria- tion. But, while some of the volunteers and mercenaries had left, many others - about 104 of whom were known to be in Katanga - were "missing". They were re- infiltrating into the gendarmerie, distributing arms to groups of soldiers over whom they could assert control, and getting ready for violent resistance. - 39- In the second place, the politxcr.1 pcC-r.cs .(G^te) under M*. Munongo'and largely directed by foreign officers, launched a cai-.ipa.ign of, assaults and persecution against anti-Tshombe Baluba tribesmen^ in jlisabethville. An effort was mc.de to convince the world that: QKUC's actions were causing disorder. The terrorized Baluba streaned out of the .city r.nd sought scfety by camping in primitive conditions near 01IUC troop quarters. C1-IUC arranged protection for the encampment, into which 35*000 Baluba had crowded by 9 September cresting a serious food and health problem, as well as a continuing danger of tribal violence. In the third place, the foreign elements - including some French persons from Algeria and local settlers who had volunteered for the purpose - contrived terroristic actions against OIIUC personnel. Led by a group of extrerdsts in the Surete, they were reported planning to blow up (WUC hepdquarters in Slisabethville, On 11 September 1961, they arrested the deputy DNUC representative, "When CHUG realized that the Katcngese authorities had no intention of ful- filling their proirdses, it pressed its demand for the evacuation of foreign personnel in the Surete and of the remaining mercenaries by 9 September. The "Katangese, however, led by IA-. Tshonbe, had. mardfestly fallen back under the domination of the foreign elements, ?nd had let themselves be persuaded to launch violent action against QKUC, OKUC's pl^ns for a solution of the difficulties in Slisabethville were rejected and, when on 13 September 1961 security precautions' similar to the ones of 28 August xrere applied, the United I'ptions troops were violently attacked by gendarmes led and instigated by non-Congolese personnel, In the morning of 13 September 1961, iir. Tshombe requested a cease-fire on the understanding that the United Nations troops would be' enabled to continue their mission. '(MFC representatives agreed and repeatedly sought to meet the provincial president to secure a cessation of hostilities. However, I jr. Tshombe and some'Of his lieutenants were prevented by their foreign military advisers, or allowed themselves to be prevented, from appearing at scheduled meetings with OWC representatives,' In the meantime,;the attacks'on the United Nations troops continued, causing casualties. From the-building in'which'the Belgian consulate had its offices, where.a number of Belgian officers were known to be located, sustained firing at the United Nations troops went on. The United Nations base at Kaaiina was attacked, as were the United Nations garrison and installations at Albertville. Reluctantly, United "ations troops had to return the fire. All over Slisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga, the foreign officers who hcd gone into hiding came out into the open to lead operations against the OiTJC "blue helmets11. - kQ - It is noteworthy that hostilities occurred only where such foreign elements led or forced Congolese soldiers into then. Despite the apprehensions repeatedly expressed by Belgian officials, there were no difficulties whatever between Cr-UC troops ?nd those Katangese units whose foreign officers and mercenary cadres hed been removed. LTaere this wrs the case, OHUG and Katangese soldiers usually fraternized, and maintained order. Sirdltrly, 01TUC troops remained on friendly terms with Katengese civilian Africans. The situation became serious because efforts to reinforce the United Nations troops wer~ frustrated by the attacks of a Fouga Magister jet fighter, piloted by a non-Congolese mercenary, which quickly managed to immobilize ONUC's unarmed air transport craft. The Fouga jet also played havoc with the ground movements of ONUC» which had deliberately refrained from procuring offensive weapons such as fighter planes or tc.n&s as incompatible with its mission e.s a peace force. This jet, among other things, prevented action to remove a gendarmerie roadblock between ^lisp.bethville and Jadotville in the effort to relieve an ONUC Irish detachment ambushed end besieged in Jedotville. The Irish detachment, ironically, had been sent there at the request of the consular representatives in XLisabeth- ville, who appealed for immediate protection of the European community at Jadot- ville. "Tien the Irish detachment crrived there for that purpose, some members of that community helped in the attack which the gendarmerie promptljr mounted against the detachment. At both Karnina and Albertville, where OKUC forces were not faced with such treachery, they were able to stand their ground successfully,. Tragic flight of the Secretary-General; the At this time, the Secretary-General had arrived in Leopoldville at Prime Minister Adoula's invitation to discuss future prospects of the United rations operation in whet was hoped would be e new setting created by the completion of the principal tasks assigned by the Security Council and General Assembly. Confronted instead with a ruthless attack on the United Nations Force led by foreign elements, IJr. Hammarskjold sought immediately a cessation of hostilities, and to achieve a reconciliation among the Congolese and fulfill the United Nations mission peacefull;*-. In pursuit of peace, he flew to Ndole, Northern Hhodesia, to meet .Jr. Tshombe, and on this flight on 1? September 1961 he lost his life in the crash of the aircraft, along vdth seven other United Nations staff menbers.-^ The Secretary-General's mission was'iEmediately taken up by Dr. Linner rnd his collergu.es., 1-ir. iiahraoud Khiary flev: to Fdola and, on behalf of the United Nations forces, signed a military cease-fire a^raenent on 20 Jeptember, This provided, pnong other things, for the "establishment of joint comuissions, exchange of; prisoners'and prohibition of troop movements. It was understood as an express condition that the agreenent ^vould not affect the application of the Security Council and General Asserably resolutions, including, of course, the continued removal of: mercenaries. On this understanding it was approved by United Nations Headquarters, A protocol for carrying out the provisions of the ce?se-fire, including such matters as prisoner exchange and the fixing of troop positions was signed on 13 October 1961 at ^lisabethville, ".Jhile the protocol allowed firing back in case of attack, it prohibited Katangese rnd CMJC troop raoveuents. In approving this protocol, United Nations Headquarters stressed its military nature, re-emphasised:United Nrtions support of'the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo and, as indicated earlier, insisted on continued enforcement of the Security Council resolution"Xfhich called for the evacuation of Biercenrries, Although the -prisoners were in fact exchanged, and certain positions held, by ONUC in Elisabeth ille throughout the fighting'were duly released, _.r, Tshorabe's regime was soon flouting the provisions of the cease-fire. In Leor>oldville, his emissaries made it clear that nothing less than independence along the lines'of the Tananarive decisions would'be acceptable to the Elisabeth'ville authorities. . Iieanwhile, the remaining Katsnga Mercenaries v?ere I/ Ir, Heinrich A. Wieschhoff, Dir-ector of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs; lyfr. Vladimir Fabry, Special Counsellor to the Offieer- in-Cha.-ge of 01 UC; Mr. William Ranallo, Persons! jdde to the. Secretsry-Generalj Miss Alice Lalande, Secretary to the Cfficer-in-Chargej Sgt. Harold M. Julien, Acting Chief Security Officer; Sgt. Serge L. Darrau, Security Officer, end Sgt, Francis livers, Investigator. leading the gendarmerie in a long series of violations of the cease-fire agreement, going so f?r as to launch offensive air action along the Kesai- Ka.tanga frontier. This was sternly protested by the United Fations, which warned that Kstangese aircraft involved - all of them piloted by mercenaries - would be brought down. '.Tiile strictly abiding by the ce.^se-fire in Ketanga, OrUC had token steps to prevent the recurrence of the September situation when it found itself powerless to stop the attacks of Katanga's Foug?. i^gister jet fighter. Three .'• .ember States of the United 1 ations - Ethiopia, India and 3weden - had contributed jet fighter squadrons to the United. Ifetions Force to strengthen its defensive cam city. it the seme time, however, the Force ground strength was being ivhittled away. In August, the Tunisian contingent had been withdrawn in connection vdth events at Bizerte; the Ghana contingent subsequently withdrew, and certain other OUUC units x\rere reduced. Tot unaware of these developments, ij". Tshorabe and the foreign elements supporting him were determined to turn secession into an accomplished fact. OfTUC-sponsored talks between the Central Government and Katanga were obviously subjected to stalling tactics. At least 237 persons, falling under the Security Council resolution remained in Katanga, They were chiefly mercenaries, many of whom had donned civilian clothes. Despairing of a peaceful solution, the Central Government attempted to deal with Ko.tanga's secession independently by the use of force, in Iste October 1961. ANC strength was built up on the border of North Kctanga in preppration for entry into that region. At ths beginning of ITovenber, a detrchment from the Leopoldville grouping entered ilorth lla.ts.ngs. in the Kaniama prea, but wca immediately repelled b~r K.?tangc. gendarmes.. Lrter, AHC units from the Stanleyville grouping succeeded in reaching Albertville, Nyunzu, Kongolo and other towns of North Ket?nga, ]^vents of December 1961 In the latter part of Noveniber 1961, the Security Council w?.s convened once again to examine the situation in the Congo. By its resolution of 24 IToveiiiber 1961, the Council opposed the secessionist activities in Katanga and puthoriaed the Secretrry-General to use force to complete the removal of mercenaries. After the, adoption of the resolution, Mr. Moise Tshombe launched an inflammatory propaganda campaign a gainst 01TUC which soon degenerated into instigation to violence. The results were not long in coming* On 28 November 1961, two senior .United Nations officials in Ulisabethville were abducted and badly beaten; later an Indian soldier was: murdered, end an Indian major abducted. The nejct day, several members of the United riations Force were abducted, and others were killed or wounded. Roadblocks established by the gendrrmerie impeded ONUC's freedom of movement end endangered its lifelines. Subsequently it became known that this was part of a. deliberate plan to cut off the United Nations troops in Elisabethville.and either force them to surrender or otherwise destroy them. For one week United Nations officials sought to settle the crisis by peaceful negotiations, but it soon beccme evident that, in the face of the bad feith displayed by Xatangese authorities, no negotiations were possible, fcr, while pretending to negotiate, these • Katangese euthorities were preparing for nore assaults, and indeed had e plan the purpose of which VJEIS the very destruction of OHUC.... Q1IUC therefore finally decided to tslce action to regain and assure its freedom of movement and to restore law and order. Because this defensive action was forced upon it, ONUC had few troops in Elisabethville when the fighting broke out on 5 December 1961. Until 1Z«, December, OKUC forces endeavoured to hold their positions while reinforce- ments were hurriedly flown in from other parts of the Congo. On 15 December, hcving received enough reinforcements, ONUC troops moved to, gain control of • those positions in "jlisabethville necessary to ensure their freedom of movement. In so. doing, they worked their my around the perimeter of the city, in order to keep destruction and civilian casualties to the barest minimum. This objective was achieved within three days. During the fighting, ONUC troops limited their attacks strictly to military objectives and so did the OHUC aircraft, which were sent into action only when absolutely necessary. Some civilian installations unfortunately were hit accidently by misguided fire, but they were very few in number. Strict orders were given to ONUC troops to ssfeguTrcl to ?11 extent possible the lives and properties of the civilian population. Throughout the operation, they exercised a remarkable measure of self-restraint, which was all the more noteworthy in view of the comportment of many non-Congolese civilians which - M* - made their task extremely arduous, Tiue and again Or/UC units found themselves subjected to murderous fire from civilian installations and tay persons in civilian dress. A flagrant instance of misuse of important civilian installa- tions V.TS the firing directed against United 'I ations troops from tiie plants of the Union Mirier e du Haut -Katanga, where mrny weapons were subsequently found. Vehicles with Ued Gross rnarkings were frequently used es cover by mercenaries and their civilian volunteer allies. From the outset of the hostilities, United nations military and civilian officers did their best, in co-operation with the lied Cross, to relieve the distress caused innocent civilians, persons caught in areas where firing had been initiated by the gendarnerie were escorted to safety at the risk of ONUC personnel's lives; food supplies were -provided where needed; specie! arrangements for the evacuation of women and children were made by CUUC. i'otwithstanding the shortage of troops, ONUC employed a whole battalion to guard the Daluba refugee crmp, where more than 40,000 anti-Tshombe Daluba lived under United Nations protection. 0%'C troops, on the one hand, prevented the '.3aluba from raiding the city and, on the other, protected them from the gendarmes who launched several attacks on the camp. On 19 December 1961, having ensured the positions necessary for its security, OITJC ordered its troops to hold fire unless fired upon. The same dry, ir. Tsho:±>e left TClisabethville to confer with ?rime Minister Grille Adoula in Kitona, the United "ations ndlitary base in Leopoldville Province., After thrt, major fighting between ONUC end Katanga forces ceased. C11UC immediately turned its effort to re-establishing normal conditions in Elisabeth villa. It co-operated closely with the locrl police to stop looting, to rid private houses of squatters and, in general, to restore end maintain law end order. Kitona Declaration aiid^its^ implementation The KLtona meeting was arrcnged with the assistance of OlUC and the United States Ambassador in the Congo after p request I-HG mrde by ijr, ..oise Tshonibe on 14 December 1961, when the fighting ia 31isabethville was in full f swing, .ifter meeting Iri.'.ie IVlLnister Adoula all day long on 20 December, Mr, Tshombe signed early in the morning of 21 December an eight-point Declarc?tion. In this Declaration, he accepted the application of the Loi f ondamentale, recogniaod the authority of the Central Government in Leopoldville and'-agreed-; to a number'of steps aimed at' 'ending the secession of Katanga. He also pledged- himself to ensure respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly and to facilitate their implementation. • Since the Kitona t?lks, OMJC has been'exerting all possible efforts,' through persuasion and good offices, to ensure that the provisions of the Kitona Declaration will be fully-carried out, as endndispensable step toviard the solution of the Katanga problem by peaceful neons. But its efforts have been greatly hampered by the changing attitude of .;r. Tshorabe, who constantly shifted from lukewarm cooperation to calculated opposition and vice-versa. In accordance with the provisions- of the Kitona. Declaration, Ir. Tshombe sent the Conalcat parliamentarians to Leopoldville to participate in the session of Parliament.. Three Kstcngese officials were also dispctched to the capital to participate in discussions for the modification of the cons- titutional structure of the Congo. In both crses, OilUC ensured the safety of the Katsngese representatives during their journey to and from Leopoldville snd 'their stay there. But, x-rhile making those concessions, IJr. Tshombe stated that he had no authority to decide on the future of Katanga and summoned the Provincial Assembly to meet in ^lisabethville for the purpose of discussing the Kitona Declaration. In this connection, Ir. Tshonibe requested the temporary assistance of a United Nations legal expert. After consulting Prime minister Adoula and obtaining his agreement, the United Nations promptly acceded to Ir, Tshombe's -request and placed at his disposal the United Nations Legal Counsel, During the session of the Provincial Assembly, Mr. Tshoribe made before it two statements strongly criticizing the Centre! Government and OFUC, Hovrever, on 15 February,; the Assembly decided to accept the Declaration of Kitona. as: a basis for discussions with the Centre! Government, After that action, Prir.ie Linister Adoula invited ir* Tshoribe to meet with him in Leopoldville to discuss the procedure for carrying out the provisions of the Declaration. But !r. Tshombe was reluctant to go to Leopoldville and suggested that the meeting take place at the United Nations military base of Karaina, OIJUC exerted its best effort to persuade ir. Tshombe to accept ljct Adoula's invitation and gave liira a full guarantee of his safety throughout his journey to and from Leopoldville and of his freedom to leave the capital at a time of his choice, should he decide to go there. On 15 Lrrch 1962, iir. Tshonibe went to Leopoldville for the proposed discussions with Priue liLnister .idoula. TIhile endeavouring to persuade the Ketangese authorities to cooperate with the Central Government, ONUC pressed for the urgent and complete elimination of mercenaries from Katanga. After a series of discussions itfith OI'JUC officials in January 1962, i-j?, Tshombe indie?ted the Provincial Government's intention to liquidate the problem of mercenaries once and for all, and firmly com: itted his Government to thr.t course. In order to ensure the elimination of mercenaries, joint commissions composed of CIIUC and Katrngese representatives were established on the proposal of ONUC et the beginning of February. ONUC also insisted that, in accordance with the principle that it was to enjoy absolute freedom, of movement, its troops should have free entry to Jadotville, Kolwazi end other places in Katanga. I.r, Tshombe first rgreed to this demand but Ir.ter changed his mind end, to support his stand, arranged for the "customary grrnd chiefs of K^tenga" to meet in Jsdotville. At the conclusion of their meeting on 18 Februrry 1962, these chiefs adopted a resolution opposing the entry of United Nations troops into the places indicated. In the meantime, the situation in North Katanga, underwent a change. For reasons yet undetermined, the ANC troops withdrew from Kongolo, which was immediately reoccupied by Keto.nga gendarmes. There xrere no clashes between them, but the reoccupation of Kongolo by Katangese forces under- standcbljr worried the Central Government, which decided to reinforce its garrison in Albertville. Shortly after it had learned of the entry of I'atanga gendarmes into Kongolo, OMUC sent a plane there to investigate the situation. It is exerting all possible efforts to prevent a deterioration of the situation in North Katanga, ...- (e) Civilian ^Operations 'When the United Nations went into the Congo, it found the country in the' throes of a dire emergency, chiefly caused by the breakdown of law and order, -The mass exodus of Belgian technicians and administrators was threatening to paralyze the Republic's entire economy; essential services were in imminent danger of breaking down; unemployment was rising catastrophically in the cities; hunger and disease loomed. One of the main objectives of the United Nations in the Congo has been to provide the Congolese Government with technical assistance for the smooth operation of all essential services' and the continued development of the national economy. " 3ut the situation faced by OHUC immediately assumed un- precedented proportions of a nature different from that of normal United Nations technical assistance operations; these presuppose reasonably functioning governments! and ecoriondc machinery which is prepared to receive and use expert advice, training services and the pad of a few operational end executive officials for integration in the national civil service. Faced with' this emergency, the Secretory-General mobilised the resources of the United Nations family of organizations under the authority of a. chief of civilian operations, 'A consultative group of experts was set up, consisting of senior officials; of the United Nations ; nd the specialized agencies concerned. The first task was-to restore or rapintain the operation of miniiaura essential public services. Engineers, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio -operators, postal experts, physicians, teachers and other specialists were rushed into the country. An emergency project was crrried out to halt the silting of'the port of i.atadi and to restore navigation. In response to the Central Government's appeal, the United Nations agreed, in August I960, to provide (»5»000,QOO to finance essential governmental services as well as essential imports. In the 'economic and financial fields, ONUC helped in'setting up r.nd managing monetary, foreign exchange and foreign trsde controls, x-iithout which the country's slender resources might have been drained away, and all semblance of a monetary system might hsve collapsed. In all these fields, as well as in agriculture,, labour and public administration, its effort was chiefly designed to improve the ability of the Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities toward the population despite the precipitous departure of non-Congolese technicians and administrators. iiS it soon beerme obvious that the needs would continue for some time, the Secretary-General proposed, and the General Assembly in September I960 approved, the establishment of a United Nations Fund for the Congo, financed by voluntary contributions. Its purpose inas to restore the economic life of the country and to carry on its public services in the best possible way. The Assembly's action coincided with the outbreck of the constitutional crisis, PS a result of which 01UC could not deal with any Authorities, except for President Joseph Kasa-Tubu, on a nationwide plane, and could not furnish advice at the ministerial level.. Although the emergency conditions continued the OI'TJC effort did not lag, and was carried on in co-operation with such Congolese authorities as exercised de_facto control in the provinces or localities where United Nations civilian operations were being undertaken. Famine conditions in some areas and widespread unemployment led the Secretary-General to institute refugee relief and relief work programmes. In the autumn of I960 the worst conditions developed in South Kasai, where some 200 persons drily were reported dying fron starvation as a result of the disruption caused by tribal warfare. For six months, the United Nations shipped and distributed food end medical supplies in the area. TTiile several thousand persons died before the United Nations effort began, the number of lives saved approximates a quarter of s uillion. In the meantime, foreign exchange reserves -rera running short because of the political and economic situr.tion. Accordingly, in June 1961, an agreement was arrived at between President Kesa-7ubu end the Secretary-General by which the United Nations put funds at the disposal of the Republic for the financing of a progrrmme of essential imports. It I\TFS agreed that such assistance must benefit the population of the country as a whole. Despite the constitution?! crisis, United Nations training services continued as a vrorking long-range operation. They were regarded as an invest- ment in the development of human resources so as to fill the huge void crused by the shortage of indigenous operational and executive personnel. Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, agricultural assistants, f»rm mechanics, foresters, medical assistants, labour officials, police comiissioners, etc. To train Congolese operators and instructors, a Tele- comraunicrtions Training Centre was set up; to train primary and secondary school teachers and inspectors, .a National Pedagogic;?! Institute we.s .established. Undergraduate medical, studies ..were.fostered.. • A National p.chool-of Law and Administration' was opened,to produpe. co.mpe 14 member Governments, and,it badly .needed, replenishment f, •. ..-?••/• •- : .• '•:. * v -.-.:• : In'I960 and 19.61, OI-IUC Civilian operations-have.•; been .able to provide •. '; about 600 experts and technicians to do the job of departing, Belgian personnel,- and the more than one thqusond OMJC fellowships awarded so ;fer. sre important seeds of-a Congolese(professional, technical s nd administrative, force;'" -They. have bee'n r i * of'unquestionabl. * ' i ' '. e' ' ' valu• e in'preventin' • ' g a collapse of .organized, economic life under uncertain-and trying Conditions. In 1962, -United Netions assistance in the 'civilian field' udll continue as,'funds permit. There as no, doubt-that this assistance has helped and will help the Congolese £n establishing them- selves and will put them on the way to full recovery and development as an independent nation. - 50 - Since its inception, the United Nations Operation in the Congo has had many achievements. It brought about the vriLthdrav;al of Belgian troops from the Congo. Thanks to it, law and order have been maintained throughout this vast country to r large degree, although ? nur±>er of acts of violence could not be prevented. It encouraged and made possible a peaceful solution of the constitutional crisis. Vithout the United Nations, the Belgian military intervention undoubtedly would have led to dangerous reactions by other governments, including the big Powers, Fanned by open foreign intervention, civil "war irould ha.ve flared up vjith irresistible intensity* A situation comparable to, or irorse than, that of Ilorea or Spain vrould hove prevailed in' the Congo, The United Nations operation has avoided all that. Admittedly, the operation has net with great difficulties, because one does not tall: about a situation when it is normal, much publicity was given to difficulties, while achievements passed unnoticed. It should also be pointed out that most of the difficulties which arose during the operation were the legacy of the past, the inevitable consequence of events which had taken place long before the United nations ca.me to the Congo. To solve those difficulties, the United Nations had to act within the mandate given to it by the Security Council and the General Assembly and in accordance rd.th the spirit of the Charter, In ^articular, it firmly abided by two principles which bind any undertakings of the United fictions as an international organisation composed of sovereign States and devoted to peace: non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and restraint on the use of force. It was a cardinal principle of ONUC not to attempt to impose a political solution by the use of force. irhe.tever difficulties and delays may have resulted from such a policy, how much more dangerous it would have been had the United Nations used its armed force to meddle in the internal affairs of the sovereign country of the Congo, siding with one party against another and helping Congolese subdue by force other Congolese, . ,- • ..-• :.:.• .. •- 51-• • • ''''".-. ..- ' .ONUC has shown noteworthy restraint'in the use of force during all phases of the operation. The first directive<'given the United Nations Force was never to use. force except -in self-defence. Later, as the crises dangerously deepened in the country, the .ecurity Council authorized the Secretary-General to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war and to elitainate mercenaries. But, even with the enlarged mandate, ONUC has constantly shown the greatest restraint in the .use of force. During its operation, OKUG he.s been attacked many times, . but it has. never launched atl-r.ttack itself, Even when under attack, it resorted to force in self-defence only as a last resort, when it WPS absolutely necessery to do so* Such was the case in Elisabethville in December 1961. In this connection, it may be recalled that certain persons hrve wondered why 01IUC troops at times fought hr. Tshordbe's gendarmes in Katanga but not .r. Gizenga's gendarmes in Stanleyville with one exception, The answer is quite simple: CffiUC w?s attacked by the former, not by the latter. This restraint has sometimes been mistaken for a weakness. In particular, ONUC has been criticized for not having dealt with the MFC more forcefully and, more specifically, for not having disarmed it. Admittedly, it might have been easier to ensure the maintenance of law and order, if certain unruly elements of the ANC had been forcibly disarmed. 3ut OI3UC could not and would not disarm the ANC against the will of the Congo Government, not only because it would have to use force to achieve this purpose, but mainly because its Force c^rne to the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an ?rmy of occupation,TChat. -ONU C has sought to do is to assist the Congo Government in re-establishing discipline in the AWC and in reorganizing its units. In carrying out its mission, ONUC has resorted to persuasion rether than force, to co-operation rather than coercion. It considers it axiomatic that the real solution of the Congo crisis must corae from the Congolese themselves. Its action, therefore, is mainly directed at encouraging and fed.lit?ting the efforts of Congolese leaders to settle their own problems and to reach a solution of their difficulties in their own way. It does so by persuasion, by good offices, by technical and material assistance, and finally by endeavour- ing to eliminate all foreign interference that seeks to drive them apart. - 52 - It is gratifying to note that the patient efforts of 01JUC have begun to besr fruit. The breakthrough occurred on 2 Au^st 1961 v/hen 7arlicaent Trias re-opened end a national unity government, led by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, was unanimously endorsed by it. Another important step t-xas taken on 21 December 1961 when, at the conclusion of the Kitona talks, Mr* Moise Tshombe signed an eight-point Declaration recogniaing the authority of the Central Government, Admittedly many difficulties still lie ahead on the road to a final solution of the Congo crisis, Dut it is the hope and indeed the conviction of OFUC that, in the not too distant future, the Congolese will be able to settle their remaining differences end to achieve a satisfactory solution of a crisis that has too long plegued their country, T7hen this has been achieved, the main task of ONUC xd.il have ended. S I- Glossary OMJC Operation des .Nations Unies_au Congo (United Uatiohs Operation in the Congo), ANC Armee Ilationale Congolaise (Congolese National Army). Gendarmerie Unit of the AMC whose main" concern is the maintenance of public order. It roay be noted that, the secessionist array of Katanga is also named "gendarmerie11, Surete State Security police, Force Publique Public Force, the title of the Congolese Army before it was renamed AiJC. Loi fondaraentale Fundamental Law. The Fundamental Law of 19 Hay I960 concerning the structure of the Congo. This law, prepared on the basis of the resolutions of the Round Table Conference of January-February I960 and adopted by the Belgian Parliament, is to operate as the constitution for the Republic of the Congo pending the adoption of a definitive constitution by the Congolese Parliament. MNAF Abbreviation for _M.nister e des Af f air e s af ri c a ine s (1-iinistry for African Affairs) of Belgium* Union Miniere du liining Union of Upper Ketenga. Industrie 1 complex with vast Haut-Katanga mining and other interests in South Katanga. Compagnie International Company. The name of a mercenary unit in internationale Katanga, MHO i louvement Nr t ionelr_Congolais (Congolese I'etional Nbvement). Party formed in October 1958, The party split in two sections in July 1959 1 one led by lir. Patrice Lumudba (HMC-L) and the other bv Ij. Albert Kalonji (UNC-K). ABAKO Abbreviation for Alliance des i3akongp (Aniance of the Bakongo), Party founded in January 1959, led by ir. Joseph Kasa-Vubu. PSA Parti Solidaire. Africain (Afric-rn Solidarity Party). Party founded in April 1959» led by Mr. Antoine Giaenga. PUMA Abbreviation for PartjL.de 1'Unite lirtipog.le (national Unity Party). Party founded in March I960, led by Mr. Jean Bolikango. CONAKAT Abbreviation for Confederation des Associations du Kr..tgnga (Confederation of Associations of Katenga). Party founded in July 1959» led by Mr. Moise Tshornbe. BAI.UiJAIOiT Abbreviation for Assooiation des 3fluba du jxatr.ngg. (Association of theBaluba of Katanga), Party led by jvp. Jason Sendwe. It formed, with two lesser parties in Katanga, the Cartel ICatangais, - 55 - .'-•' ' .•'• ' AHHEff II--. ' - Chronology of Main Events I960, • •; ' :'••'•• •••'•• 23 June Central Government led by $r; Patrice Luiauidba approved by Parliament* 24 June? .'.Mi". Josepn Kasa-vubu elected Chie'f of jtate. 25 June Dr. Ralph J, Bunche arrives in Leopoldville to a ttend Independence Ceremonies as personal representative of Secretary-General Dag Kammarskjold. 29 June Representatives'"of Congo and Belgian Governments sign treaty of - friendship! assistance and co-operetion. 30 June Belgian Congo proclaimed independent. 5 July Mutiny of Force publique begins in Leopoldville, soon spreads to • other':parts of Congo. 7 July Security Council adopts resolution recommending admission of Congo to membership in United rations. 10 July'- Belgian troops intervene in Slisabe'thville and Luluabourg. 11 July lir, Moise Tshombe proclaims independence of Katanga. Belgian troops attack Matadi. 12 July. Congo-Government appeals to UH for technical .and military assistance, 14 July Security Council adopts resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw : its troops from Congo and authorizing Secretary-General to provide .• '•' Congo Government i-dth militery assistance. Secretary-General sets up OIC(C, appoints Dr. Ralph J. 3unche as Special Representative in Congo,, Major-General Carl Carlsson von Horn as Supreme Commander of TO! Force . and Dr. 'Sture Linner as Chief of Civilian Operctions, 15 July First .ONUC contingent arrives in Leopoldville, 16 July Congo Government decides to sever diplomatic relations i-ath Belgium* 17 July Congo Government e.ddresses ultimatum to UH to deer all Belgian troops from the Congo before 19 July Midnight. General von Horn arrives in Leopoldville. 22 July Security Council'adopts resolution asking Belgium to implement speedily its resolution of 14 July I960 and authorising Secretary-General to take all necessary action to that effect. 23 July Evacuation of Belgian troops from Leopoldville completed. 24 July Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba arrives in Hew York, 26 July Secretary-General arrives in Leopoldville, 27 July Dr. 7ialph J, Bunche and representatives of Congo Government sign basic agreement regarding OMUC. 2 August Secret cry-General announces plan to send ONUC troops into Katanga on 6 August I960, 4-5 August Dr, Bunche goes to 31isabethville, concludes that in view of unyielding opposition of Kr. Tshombe the entry of ONUC troops into Katrnga could be achieved only by use of force, 5 August Secretary-General calls off plan for isnuediate entry of OMUC troops into Katanga, asks urgent meetin;; of Security Council, leaves for New York. 9 August Security Council adopts resolution calling for immediate with- drawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and re-affirming principle of non-interference, 10 August Mr. Albert Kalonji announces creation of ianing State in South Kasai. 11 August Secretary-General arrives in Leopoldville. 12 August Secretary-General enters Elisabetkville with two Swedish companies of UN Force. 1*1-15 August Secretary-General returns to Leopoldvills. is accused by Mr. Lumumba of unilateral and erroneous interpretation of Security Council resolutions, asks for meeting of Security Council and leaves New York. 16 August Congo Government decrees "state of emergency" throughout the Congo, 18 August ANC elements arrest and manhandle 14 Canadian members of UN Force at Ndjili airport. 21-22 August Security Council meets but dotss not vote on resolutions. Secretary- General announces appointment of Advisory Committee on Congo, also announces Belgian Government's assurance that all Belgian troops will be withdrawn by 29 August I960, 24 August Advisory Committee on Congo holds first meeting, 25-31 August Pan-African Conference meets in Leopoldville, 2? August ANC elements arrest and manhandle ONUC personnel in Stanleyville, 29 August ANC troops massacre Baluba population in Bakwanga, - 57 - 31 August Secretary-General sends protest to Belgian Government regarding continued -presence of Belgian military units in Congo after deadline of 29 August I960., 1 Sept,. Dr. Bunche. returns, to Hew York, is replaced by.ijr. Andrew W. .Cordier . as Special Representative in Congo until errival of Ijr. Rajeshwar Dayal. ..-.-..• 5 Sept. President £asa-7ubu dismisses M r.,Lumumba as Prime Minister. Shortly thereafter, -L.T. Lumumba announces he is dismissing Mr . Kasa-7ubu as Chief of State. 5-6 Sept. ONUC closes all major airports in Congo e.nd Leopcldville radio station. ; 7 Sept, Chairfoer of Representatives rescinds decisions, of Kr, Kasa-TTubu and tir. Lumuniba dismissing each other and appoints Parliamentary conciliation commission, 8 Sept. lir. Cordier leaves for Hew York, is reple.ced by Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal as Special Representative in Congo, Senate opposes Mr. Kasa-Vubu's decision to .dismiss Mr. Lumumba. , 12-13 Sept» ONUC reopens airports end Leopoldville radio station, 13 Sept. Chacibers of Parliament meet in joint session and .confer full poxirers on Mr. Lumumba. 14 Sept, iir. Kasa-Yubu suspends pprlisjnent for. one month. Colonel llobutu decides to "neutralize" e^dsting central institutions, 14-17 Sept. Security Council meets, fails to.agree on representation of . Congo, fails to adopt a resolution, calls emergency special s-ession of General Assembly, 17-20 Sept. General Assembly holds fourth emergency special session, adopts resolution 1474 (SS-IV) of 20 September I960 requesting Secretary- General to continue to assist Congo Government in maintenance of -law and order, appealing'to Congolese leaders to seek a speedy solution of the internal conflict, asking the /-.dvisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation comuiission and calling upon all States to refrain from, providing unilateral assistance to the Congo for military purposes. , 58 - 20 Sept. College of Commissioners installed, in Leopoldville. General Assembly begins fifteenth regulsr session, decides to admit Congo to membership in UN, 14 October Ij?. Antoine Gizenga arrives in Stanleyville, 5 Nov. Conciliation Commission for Congo appointed by Advisory Conmittee. 6 Nov. President Kasa-Vubu addresses General Assembly and asks for seating of his delegation. Irish soD.diers of Ul-I Force ambushed in North Katanga. 21 Nov. ANC troops attack Ghana, Urnbassy in Leopoldville and clash with Tunisian soldiers of UN Force guarding the Sabassy. 22 Nov, General Assembly decides toseat Congo deleg-tion appointed by President Kasa-Vubu, 2? Nov, Lr. Lumumba flees from his Leopoldville residence, 29-30 Nov. Nigerian unit of UN Force ambushed by tribesmen in North Katanga. 2 Dec. lir. Lumumba arrested necr Port-Francqui, brought back to Leopoldville and then transferred to Thysville, 7-15 Dec, Security Council meets but adopts no resolution. 12 Dec, I-Ir, Gizenga proclaims Stanleyville as headquarters of Central Government and provisional capital of Republic, 15-16 Dec, Oi-IUC Austrian medical team arrested by ANC. 16-20 Dec. General Assembly discusses Congo problem but adopts no resolution, 19 Dec, Officers of Conciliation Commission for Congo arrive in LGopoldville, 20 Dec. Secretary-General appoints Lieutenant-General iean I'acTCoin to replace Kajor General von Horn as Supreme Commander of United Nations Force in the Congo, 22 Dec, Katanga authorities issue separate currency, 27 Dec, Stanleyville ANC forces take over Kivu, arrest provincial president Je?n Miruho, 1961 1 January Col. Mobutu's ANC troops flowi to Usumbur? (Iteanda-Urundi) attempt unsuccessful invasion of Kivu, 2 January President,.K2,sa-Vubu announces,convening of round-table conference of Congolese leaders on 25 January.. , 3 January- Conciliation Commission for Congo visits Congo. 20 February 8-9 Jan. Stanleyville AHC troops invate North Katanga. Government of "Province of Lualaba" is set up in Ilanono. 13 January ANC,element s. mutiny in'Thysville,': 17 January Mr. Lumumba and two companions, Mr. Joseph Okito end Mr. Maurice Hpolo, are transferred1 secretly from Thysville to Katanga, ' 25 January "Preliminary round-table conference" opens in Leopoldville. 30 January Katanga'aircraft bomb Manono. 9 February President Xasa-Vubu dissolves College of Commissioners and appoints provisional government'headed by i-j?. Joseph Ileo. 10 February Katanga authorities announce "escape11 of Mr.' Lumumba end Ms two companions. .• . • 11-12 Feb. Katanga gendarmes begin military operation in North Katanga,, 13 Feb.* Katanga authorities announce that Mr, Lumutibri and his two companions have been murdered by tribesmen in -an undisclosed place. 21 February Security Council adopts resolution authorizing Secretary-General to use force to- prevent civil war and 'urging xdthdrawal of mercena- ries., reopening- of Parliament and reorganisation of Congolese armed forces, 28 February Er, Ileo, i-ir:. Tshombe and iir. • Kalonji sign military end political agreement" in SHsa.bethville. 4-5 United rations and ANC troops clash in Latadii 6-11 iiarch Conference of'Congolese leaders is held at Tananarive, Lalagasy •Republic, •••••'.•'-•' 10 March I-jr, Dayal leaves Leopoldville' for Hew York; lir. liekki Abbas takes over, as Acting Special Representrtive of the i5ecret£-ry-General in the Congo, • 30-31 Karch. Katanga, gendarmerie enter Manono. ' ' ' '' 7 April , UN Force stops fighting between Katanga gendarmes and Baluba. warriors in. North'Ketanga.-•' •-' '• . ' • • 15 April General Assembly adopts three resolutions on Congo, Resolution 1599 '(i£V) 'calls for withdrawal of merceharies; and other:foreign • personnel; resolution. 1600 (XV) urges reopening of pGrlicment and establishing second Conciliation Commission;"'resolution 1601 (XV) establishes Investigation Commission on death of M.r. Lumuniba, - 60 - 1? April Agreement is concluded by representatives of Secretary-General and President Kasa-Vubu for implementation of Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. 2k April- Conference of Congolese leaders meets in Coquilhatville. 28 May 26 April Mr. Tshombe arrested by Leopoldville authorities in Coquilh&tville« 27-28 April UN garrison in Port-Francqui overwhelmed and massaored by ANC troops* 12 May President Kasa-Vubu calls for Parliament meeting. 19 May Mr. Mekki Abbas leaves Leopoldville. 25 May Mr. Dayal resigns as Special Representative, Mr. Sture Linner appointed Officer-in-Charge of ONUC. 22-24 June Mr. Tshombe released, signs protocol calling for reopening of Parliament. 2.? July Parliament reopens at Lovanium University near Leopoldville, 2 August National Unity Government headed by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula unanimously approved by Parliament, 24 August Central Government issues ordinance for expulsion of mer- cenaries from Katanga and requests ONUC assistance for this purpose, 28 /ugust ONUC moves to round up mercenaries in Elisabethville. Second Conciliation Commission holds first meeting in New York. 1 September Mr. Mahmoud Khiary appointed Chief of Civilian Operations, 3 September Mr. Gizenga returns to Leopoldville to assume post of Vice- Prime Minister. On same day, he leaves with Prime Minister Adoula for Belgrade, 'Yugoslavia, to attend Conference of Won-aligned Nations, 13 September ONUC resumes operation of rounding up mercenaries, is attached by Katanga gendarmes led by mercenaries, Secretary-General arrives in Leopoldville at invitation of Prime Minister Adoula„ 17 September Secretary-General flies to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, for cease-fire talks with Mr, Tshombe, dies in plane crash near Ndola, - 61 - 20 September Mr. Mahmoud Khiary concludes provisional cease-fire agree- ment vdth Mr. Tshombe in Ndola. 4 October Mr. Gizenga returns to Stanleyville ostensibly to settle personal affairs, . , f. 13 October Mr, Mahmoud Khiary and Mr. Tshombe .sign protocol for imple- mentation of cease-fire agreement in Elisabethville. 26 October General Assembly sets up Investigation Commission on the death of Mr. Hammerskjold, 31 October ANC elements from Leopoldville Grouping attempt unsuccessful : *• . • invasion of Katanga in Kaniama area, 1-2 November ANC elements from Leopoldville Grouping assault Belgian civilians in Luluabourg., ... 3 November U Thant appointed Acting Secretary-General • 11 November ANC troops from Stanleyville grouping massacre 13 Italian airmen of UN Force in Kindu. Report of Lumumba Investigation Commission is issued,, .; 13 November Congo Government issues ordinance regarding imprisonment of mercenaries. . . • • 13-14 November ANC troops from Stanleyville grouping- commit looting in Albertville. 24 November Security Council adopts resolution denouncing secessionist activities and authorizing use of-force for elimination of mercenaries. . . . 25 November - Katanga authorities launch series of attacks against ONUC, 5 December 2? November Acting Secretary-General and Mr. Justin Bomboko sign status agreement regarding ONUC. 5-19 December Fighting between UN trcops and Katanga gendarmes in Elisabethville, 19 December UN troops in Eliaabethville ordered to hold fire unless fired upon. - 62 - 20-22 December Prime Minister Adoula and Mr, Tshombe hold talks at Kitona, at the conclusion of which Mr. Tshombe signs eight-point Declaration recognizing authority of Central Government, 27 December Belgian Embassy in Leopoldville reopenedo 29 December Parliament lifts parliamentary immunity of Mr. Albert Kalonji, 1962 I January European missionaries and African civilians massacred in Kon- golo by ANC troops from Stanleyville grouping. & January Chamber of Representatives enjoins Mr. Giaenga to return to Leopoldville to answer charges of secessionist activities, 13 January Pro-Gizenga gendarmes overpowered by pro-Government ANC troops after clash in Stanleyvillec 15 January Mr. Gizenga is dismissed as Vice-Prime Minister, 20 January Mr« Gizenga is brought back to Leopoldville in OHUC plane. 2-8 February Prime Minister visits New York, addresses General Assembly, has talks with Secretary-General and delegations,, 10 February Mr. Robert Gardiner replaces Dr, Linner as Officer-in-Charge of OWUC. II February Chamber of Representatives approves Government's action re- garding Mr. Gizenga, 15 February Katanga Provincial Assembly adopts resolution accepting De- claration of Kitona as basis for discussions with Central Government, 15 March Mr. Tshombe arrives in Leopoldville for discussion with Prime Minister Adoula„