NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS

Asia Report Nº163 – 19 February 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? ...... 2 A. WHAT’S LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS?...... 2 B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT: IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER? ...... 3 C. OLD : ALIVE AND WELL...... 5 D. THE RISKS OF FAILURE...... 6 III. PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDS...... 8 A. THE MAOISTS: BRINGING ON THE REVOLUTION?...... 8 B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERS...... 9 C. THE OPPOSITION: REINVIGORATED, BUT FOR WHAT? ...... 11 1. The ...... 11 2. The smaller parties ...... 12 3. A “broader democratic alliance”? ...... 12 IV. THE TWO ARMIES ...... 13 A. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSE...... 13 1. What the agreements say...... 13 2. The Nepalese Army position...... 14 3. The PLA position ...... 15 4. Other parties...... 16 B. NEW NEPAL, NEW ARMY?...... 17 1. Affordability...... 18 2. Democratic control...... 19 3. Accountability...... 21 4. Impunity ...... 22 V. THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES...... 23 A. REBUILDING THE PEACE PROCESS ...... 23 1. Consensus and confidence ...... 23 2. A fresh start? ...... 23 3. Mechanisms and monitoring...... 24 B. GETTING A GRIP ON GOVERNANCE ...... 26 1. Policy priorities ...... 26 2. Public security...... 26 3. Guiding international assistance ...... 27 C. CONSTITUTION-WRITING...... 28 D. JUSTICE ...... 30 VI. CONCLUSION ...... 31

APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ...... 32 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ...... 33 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 34 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006...... 35 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 37

Asia Report N°163 19 February 2009

NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite successful elections and a lasting military ist), UCPN(M), following its merger with a smaller ceasefire, Nepal’s peace process is facing its most se- group – shows the goal of a communist “people’s re- vere tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: there public” is still in place. Although leading the govern- is no agreement on the future of the two armies, very ment, Maoist leaders continue to threaten renewed little of the land seized during the conflict has been revolutionary struggle and the “capture of state returned, and little progress has been made writing a power”. Such threats have been underlined by cadres’ new constitution. Challenges to the basic architecture continued violent behaviour and an apparent drive to of the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides. consolidate alternative power bases through affiliated Key political players, particularly the governing Mao- organisations like trade unions. ists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need to rebuild consensus on the way forward or face a public However, the essence of the peace process, from the backlash. International supporters of Nepal must tar- November 2005 agreement between the CPN(M) and get assistance and political pressure to encourage the the mainstream seven-party alliance onwards, was a parties to face the threats to peace. double transformation. The Maoists were to renounce violence and accept multiparty democracy and inter- The April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections national human rights norms. The mainstream parties delivered a convincing victory for the Maoists but left were to develop more inclusive and democratic inter- them short of an outright majority. The major parties nal structures and renounce the bad behaviour that promised to continue working together but the NC, had weakened the post-1990 exercise of democracy. which came second, refused to join the government The old politics was discredited and still faces the that was eventually installed in August 2008. For all challenge of renewing itself – with the established its weaknesses, this government is Nepal’s best hope parties needing to earn legitimacy. but it is not living up to its promise and there are no viable alternatives. There can be no functional gov- The Maoists have made a greater effort to change ernment without the Maoists on board, let alone any than other parties but their democratic transformation hope of proceeding with a constitution-writing proc- is far from complete. They should take the lead to re- ess in which they can wield a blocking vote. build confidence by unambiguously renouncing vio- lence and reaffirming their commitment to political Yet the Maoists have not fully adjusted to democratic pluralism. The Nepali Congress is in a state of organ- politics, nor has mainstream politics adjusted to their isational and political disarray. The Maoists’ coalition arrival. There is little unity of effort or intent among partners also face internal power struggles and tough the governing coalition partners. Opponents of the policy decisions. In short, the democratic alternatives Maoists talk up the prospects of a government col- to the Maoists are alarmingly weak: the other parties lapse. Conservative wings of both the NC and the suffer from exclusiveness and weakened support and moderate (Unified Marx- offer no fresh options to complete the peace process. ist-Leninist), the largest coalition partner, have been reinvigorated. In the face of continued instability, The state of public security and law and order is wor- armed protest and burgeoning identity-based move- rying. Although the incidents that draw most attention ments, the immediate threat to Nepal is not Maoist – killings, explosions and shutdowns – have all de- totalitarianism but a dangerous weakening of the creased since peaks in the first half of 2008, there is state’s authority and capacity to govern. little sense of stability. Districts across the Tarai, from the eastern and central heartland of the Madhesi Maoist commitment to political pluralism is still movement to the far west, continue to be plagued by highly questionable. Debate within the party – re- insecurity and, in many areas, a near collapse of gov- named the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Mao- ernance and policing. While the police are demoral- Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page ii

ised, the Nepalese Army (NA) remains a law unto it- vember 2005 until the June 2008 multiparty self, resisting both democratic control and investiga- commitment; tion of alleged war crimes during the conflict. b) recognising the primacy of fulfilling promises International actors, , the UN and Nepal’s long- made to the Nepali people as a whole by mak- standing donors, have played important roles in pro- ing a fresh public commitment to this effect; moting peace and now need to maintain consistent c) promptly activating the CA committees and pressure on all parties to live up to their commit- ensuring they seek public input in their areas of ments. Allowing parts of the peace agreements to drift competence and maintain transparency in their into abeyance will put the entire process at risk. The discussions; and common struggle against the monarchy was not the d) making every effort to adhere to the foreshort- sole foundation for the original negotiations, nor were ened timetable but avoiding the temptation to the initial talks based solely on parties’ self-interest. meet deadlines by short-circuiting meaningful The search for peace was a powerful, and popularly debate. backed, rationale. All sides knew that the deal de- ferred some important, difficult topics but they were To the : right in opting to tackle them within a peace process, however contentious, rather than allowing the pursuit 3. Focus on peace process implementation by: of a perfect deal to threaten a return to war. Despite significant political differences, this spirit of consen- a) setting up the commissions and committees sus underpinned a remarkable peaceful transition. specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Nepal’s political leaders must urgently rebuild this (CPA) with as broad participation as feasible; collaborative spirit and recommit themselves to see- b) ensuring decision-making bodies have capa- ing through the process. ble, senior representation and are adequately empowered, and administratively supported, to RECOMMENDATIONS fulfil their mandates; and c) even if independent monitoring mechanisms To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and are established, using government systems to Constitutional Processes: report regularly to the cabinet on progress or problems. 1. Reestablish a basic consensus on completing the peace process and set up the necessary mecha- 4. Set clear peace process and development priori- nisms, for example by: ties by: a) forming an appropriate political coordination a) clarifying and restating, with the support of all mechanism, such as an inter-party committee coalition members, the key goals of the gov- or high-level commission, to set priorities, re- ernment’s September 2008 statement of poli- solve disputes and keep the process on track; cies and programs; b) establishing an independent monitoring body, b) shaping the agenda for donor support by de- with nationwide presence, convening capacity veloping clear requests for bilateral and multi- and neutral but respected leadership, to observe lateral assistance, and making the most of and report on all parties’ adherence to their technical assistance; and peace commitments and provide impartial, fac- c) improving public communications, framing tual updates on shortcomings; realistic timetables to manage expectations and c) seriously considering the possible benefits of building public confidence in the peace process international technical and/or secretarial sup- by highlighting success stories. port to such a body; and 5. Deliver tangible improvements in the weak law d) ensuring the newly constituted Army Integra- and order situation, by: tion Special Committee (AISC) promptly starts a) supporting the work of the home ministry’s substantive discussions on integration and re- public security task force and seriously consid- habilitation of Maoist army combatants. ering its recommendations, if appropriate request- 2. Ensure the constitutional process moves forward by: ing international support to implement them; a) adhering to the promises of consensus and co- operation set out in all agreements from No- Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page iii

b) cracking down through non-lethal methods on d) ending the obstruction by both state and non- illegal disruptive protests, while guaranteeing state security forces, in particular the NA, Peo- the basic right to strike and peaceful protest; ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Police, of investigations into crimes committed during c) keeping major roads and other infrastructure the conflict; and secure and well patrolled, as well as providing more intensive, community-oriented policing e) avoiding politicisation of promotions, transfers in unstable areas; and and operational matters, perhaps by empowering a multi-party body such as the AISC, in the case d) strictly controlling the illegal activities of party of the army, to scrutinise important decisions. youth wings, in particular their unlawful efforts to fulfil parallel policing functions. To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): 6. Do not use the stability of the peace process as an excuse for ignoring pressing calls for justice, by: 8. Start the process of restoring confidence by un- equivocally reaffirming the ceasefire and CPA a) ending the culture of impunity by pursuing in- conditions on ceasing all political violence and vestigations and prosecutions of all serious al- the commitment to political pluralism, in word leged crimes; and deed. b) empowering police to resist pressure to refuse 9. Fulfil the prime minister’s promise to put the to file cases or drop investigations and take ac- People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the con- tion against individuals and institutions seeking trol of the AISC and end the practice of PLA to pervert the course of justice; commanders speaking publicly on sensitive po- c) bringing draft bills on disappearances and the litical issues. truth and reconciliation commission into law 10. Fulfil outstanding peace process commitments, in only after consulting victims, experts and the particular: general public, meeting international standards and subjecting legislation to parliamentary ap- a) demilitarising the Young Communist League proval rather than using ordinances to bypass (YCL) and vacating seized premises it cur- debate; rently occupies; d) requesting appropriate international technical b) promptly discharging under-age and otherwise assistance for investigations; and disqualified combatants from the cantonments, cooperating with the government and interna- e) responding substantively to the UN Office of tional agencies on rehabilitation programs; the High Commissioner for Human Rights re- ports on serious and systematic human rights c) respecting press freedom, human rights and abuses during the conflict, by pursuing criminal political pluralism; investigations and prosecutions of those named d) returning property seized during the conflict; and as allegedly responsible for repeated, grave breaches of international humanitarian law. e) cooperating with investigations and prosecu- tions of alleged crimes committed during the 7. Improve the management of state security forces, by: conflict and ceasefire periods. a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic control, including establishing parliamentary To the Major Established Parliamentary Parties: oversight, fully auditing expenditure and de- veloping the constitutionally mandated work 11. Make efforts to win back popular legitimacy by: plan for democratisation of the army; a) reforming party structures with serious steps b) making the recently constituted National De- towards internal democracy and increased re- fence Council functional, providing it with se- sponsiveness to popular demands; cretariat support and using it as a forum to feed b) taking urgent steps to improve the representa- professional expertise into the political deci- tion of women and marginalised ethnic, caste sion-making process; and regional groups at all levels of party struc- c) building the functions and capacity of the de- tures; and fence ministry and embarking, if appropriate, c) considering, at the individual party level or with international support, on the joint adminis- collectively, a renewed public commitment to trative training of military and civilian officers; the promises for changed behaviour embodied Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page iv

in the 2005 twelve-point agreement accompa- a) developing programs to buttress public confi- nied by a clear program of action. dence in the peace process, for example by en- couraging the government to focus on creating To the International Community, in particular jobs and opportunities for youth; India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors: b) maintaining a strong emphasis on human 12. Recognise that the peace process is fragile and rights, political pluralism and conflict resolu- incomplete and maintain a commitment to high- tion at the heart of all policies, including devel- level political engagement, including: opment aid and military cooperation; and a) strongly warning the government and political c) supporting the government’s Nepal Peace Trust parties that relations will be damaged by any Fund, with appropriate emphasis on transparent breakdown in the peace process or failure to accounting and fiduciary risk but without ear- control political violence and underlining marking, as well as the UN Peace Fund. strong international expectations of consensus 14. Recognise that delay in reforming the security and cooperation; sector compromises all development by draining b) calling for a public and definitive Maoist re- resources and undermining political progress, by: nunciation of violence; a) pushing for concrete, step-by-step progress on c) pressuring all parties to adhere to the CPA and building democratic control of the security sector; other agreements and to have debates within b) providing technical assistance, as requested, to that framework; and parliamentary oversight mechanisms as well as d) urging investigations into the worst alleged the ministry of defence; and conflict abuses and offering technical support c) pressing the Nepalese Army to accept civilian as appropriate. oversight and assist in training and capacity 13. Recognise that completing the peace and constitutional building of civilian and military officers. processes is an essential basis for all development /Brussels, 19 February 2009 programs and target assistance appropriately, by:

Asia Report N°163 19 February 2009

NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS

I. INTRODUCTION The new government passed an ambitious budget, made positive steps in international relations and re- stored some order in the administration – not least by Nepal’s peace process has made remarkable progress holding regular cabinet meetings and improving deci- but now faces its most severe obstacles.1 Although the sion-making. The CA carried out some of its legisla- roadmap set out in the November 2006 Comprehen- tive duties and also agreed its constitution-writing sive Peace Agreement (CPA) was disrupted by dis- procedures, including setting a detailed timetable for agreements between the major parties and external completion of the new constitution and establishing challenges such as the Madhesi movement, the Con- thematic drafting committees. The presidency has stituent Assembly (CA) elections were held success- been a quiet success story. With no direct precedents fully in April 2008. The transition to a republic was to guide his behaviour, President peaceful and the unprecedented diversity of the new has deftly avoided controversy and remained above CA raised hopes of more inclusive politics. The elec- the political fray, while also issuing public reminders tion of a president and, in August 2008, the formation of the need for all to work together in the national in- of a Maoist-led government were both delayed by terest. The Public Service Commission has been re- wrangling but nevertheless took place.2 These steps constituted and there are signs that parties are close to were helped by a June agreement between the major consensus on creating local peace committees and lo- 4 parties, although few of its provisions have been im- cal government bodies. plemented.3 The new government, however, has faced problems with its dual responsibilities as an executive and as

guardian of the constitution-writing exercise. The dif-

1 On the process so far see past Crisis Group reporting: on ficult global economic context does not help: it is the CA election, Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, Nepal’s likely to squeeze overseas employment, reduce the Election and Beyond¸ 2 April 2008 and the companion post- remittances on which Nepal has come to depend and election Asia Reports N°155, Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful slow economic growth. Revolution? and N°156, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 3 July 2008; on the various peace agreements: Crisis Group Asia This report focuses on political developments that are Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Par- mostly taking place in Kathmandu. There is a ten- ties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005; Asia Report Nº126, dency for reporting on Nepal to focus on elite devel- Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December opments in the capital while ignoring key issues 2006; Asia Briefing N°68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, happening elsewhere, particularly in the Tarai flat- 28 September 2007; and Asia Briefing N°72, Nepal: Peace lands in the south. However the peace process has be- Postponed, 18 December 2007; and on the constitutional come an elite, Kathmandu-centred issue; indeed that process: Asia Reports N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005; and N°128, is one of its major flaws. Past Crisis Group reports Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. Full have examined issues in the Tarai and elsewhere and Nepali translations of all reports and briefings from 2007 will return to those subjects. onwards are available at www.crisisgroup.org/nepali. 2 Following its 13 January 2009 merger with the Unity Cen- tre (Masal), the CPN(M) was renamed the Unified Commu- nist Party of Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M). This report uses 4 Minister Ram Chandra Jha vowed that local bodies would “CPN(M)” for the pre-unification and “UCPN(M)” for the take shape by mid-February. The parties have agreed to allo- post-unification parties. cate leadership on the basis of the CA proportional represen- 3 The constitutional revisions proposed in the agreement tation vote, which would put the UCPN(M) in charge of 23 were implemented with the 15 July 2008 fifth amendment to districts, the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of the interim constitution but most other promises remain un- Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) sixteen each, the fulfilled. “Agreement between the political parties to amend Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) five and the Tarai Madhes the Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 Democratic Party (TMDP), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party June 2008, unofficial English translation at www.un.org.np. (RPP) and CPN (Marxist-Leninist) two each. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 2

II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? work in this area indicates some prospect for progress. The difference between reaching deals and managing their implementation – a serious problem for the A. WHAT’S LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS? peace process – bears lessons for the constitution.6

Control over the security sector remains at the heart The fundamental weaknesses of the political settle- of the power struggle; the impasse over the question ment have now been exposed. The consensus underly- of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) integration and ing the twelve-point agreement and CPA was based the broader issues are discussed in detail below. Many more on a temporary convergence of interests than on other aspects of the peace deal remain unresolved or a deeply shared vision for reshaping Nepal. In the unimplemented. Apart from a few exceptions, the post-people’s movement period almost no attention Maoists have not fulfilled their repeated promises to was paid to confidence-building between the parties. return property seized during the conflict, nor have The ever more insistent voices from outside the they fully dismantled parallel structures.7 Local gov- seven-party/Maoist fold were only listened to when ernment is yet to be re-established, although cross- protests or violence got them attention. party consensus on creating interim bodies appears Deferring decisions on critical areas such as the army close. Basic governance and service delivery is patchy and police enabled the elections to go ahead but has at best, with only six of the 75 districts having secre- allowed the most serious disagreements to fester and taries posted in all village development committees. positions to drift further apart. The election results made Most of the commissions and committees called for in the CPA and subsequent agreements have not been the rebuilding of a common minimum understanding 8 all the more difficult. For supporters of the status quo, created. The state of law and order and public secu- the Maoist victory was initially indigestible and lat- rity is dangerously weak, especially in the Tarai. terly unacceptable. As the losing parties have encour- aged each other to view the outcome as illegitimate, the public mandate for change has been devalued and 6 Major elements of agreements with the United Democratic the political equations underlying the writing of the 5 Madhesi Front (UDMF) and Federal Republican National constitution have been called into question. Front (FRNF) have not been implemented. The eight-point agreement with the UDMF is at www.unmin.org.np/downlo Decision-making remains narrowly based, exclusive ads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.NEP and non-transparent. The verdict of voters has had only .pdf; an unofficial English translation is at www.unmin.org. a slight significance in a political culture where estab- np/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt. lished leaders feel unchastened by electoral defeat. So UD MF.ENG.pdf. The five-point government-FRNF agree- far, there have only been nods towards public consul- ment is at www.un min.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03- tation and participation in the constitutional process, 02-Agreement. SPA. Govt.FRNF.NEP.pdf; an unofficial although the establishment of CA subcommittees to English translation is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/key docs/2008-03-02-Agreement. SPA.Govt.FRNF.ENG.pdf. 7 In June 2008 the Maoists explicitly reconfirmed their long- standing promise to return all seized property and added a 5 The major observer organisations, national and interna- tight deadline: “Within 15 days, the Maoists will implement tional, have published their full reports on the elections. the first point of the agreement between the eight political Some of them add considerable detail on pre-election clashes parties of 30 March 2007, which states, ‘All property, in- and campaign irregularities and all refer to the background cluding all private and public houses, land, offices, factories intimidation that coloured the election atmosphere. However, and vehicles, that has been controlled by the Maoists during none suggests that these factors undermine the election’s the conflict [will be] returned to the concerned individuals credibility. One of the principal national organisations con- and agencies. The administration will take legal action if cluded that “the Nepali people exercised their franchise in a anyone obstructs and hinders the use of [such] property, in- joyous, festive and peaceful manner and in overwhelming cluding houses, lands, factories and offices’”. “Agreement numbers. As a result, except for some minor incidences, no between the political parties to amend the Constitution and one seriously challenged either the total outcome of the elec- take forward the peace process”, 25 June 2008, Art. 4. In tion or the manner in which it was conducted.…[we] con- early 2009 the Maoists returned property in some three cluded, on the basis of observations and reports received dozen districts, including that belonging to other party lead- from its regional and district chapters, that those incidents ers including former royalist prime ministers Surya Bahadur [of reported violence, intimidation, unequal access to the Thapa and . “Sampatti phirta suru”, media and code of conduct infractions] did not severely af- Kantipur, 3 February 2009. fect the outcome of elections”. “Nepal Constituent Assembly 8 The June 2008 Agreement (Art. 5) promised: “During the Election 2008: Comprehensive Report”, National Election course of implementing those provisions that have been Observation Committee (NEOC), Kathmandu, August 2008, made in [past] accords and understandings, including those executive summary. yet to be implemented in the Comprehensive Peace Accord, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 3

An increase in general unrest, mostly strikes and At the same time, hundreds of other killings have shutdowns, has severely disrupted economic activity taken place across the country, especially in the cen- and deterred new investment.9 This has been com- tral and eastern Tarai, although levels have declined pounded by a growth in militant youth wings affili- since early 2008.13 The lack of any ceasefire or peace ated to political parties.10 Most of these were set up in process monitoring mechanism has become all the response to the Maoist Young Communist League more critical, making it easy for claims of infringe- (YCL), which remains a militarised organisation.11 ments to be made without investigation or redress. The release and rehabilitation of under-age and oth- erwise disqualified combatants from PLA canton- Criminal cases against Maoist and other political ments may soon get under way but is very belated. leaders have been dropped by executive fiat, regard- less of the seriousness of alleged offences.14 Slow Impunity is rife and extends from the heart of the state steps towards the establishment of an investigation to the activities of militant groups. There have been commission on enforced disappearances and the draft- many unpunished offences in the ceasefire period. ing of more satisfactory legislation for a truth and The most prominent violations include the Maoists’ reconciliation commission suggest that some progress abduction and murder of businessman Ram Hari on transitional justice may be possible. There has Shrestha and the killings of at least four journalists.12 been little effort, however, to cultivate a national de- bate on appropriate measures or listen to victims’ voices and address their pressing needs. Most significantly in terms of impunity, the national army’s apparent cul- a number of commissions will be formed within one month, pability for systematic war crimes including abduc- on the basis of political understanding. These will include a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth and tion, torture, rape and murder has not led to any action. Reconciliation Commission, a High-Level Commission for Restructuring the State, a Commission to Investigate the Disappeared, a Commission to Study and Give Recommen- B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT: dations on Scientific Land Reform, and the other commis- IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER? sions as stipulated under Article 154 of the Constitution”. The latter include possible commissions “to safeguard and The Maoists have had a mixed record in government. promote the rights and interests of different sectors of the The coalition has held together and has managed the country including women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, Madhesi, disabled, labourers or farmers” although the consti- basics of day-to-day governance. On some fronts tution states that the government “may” rather than “will” there have been unexpected, and largely uncelebrated, form them. Interim Constitution, Art. 154. successes. Ministers’ foreign trips – especially those 9 The number of districts affected by shutdowns and the of Prime Minister “Prachanda” number of groups calling both strikes and shutdowns peaked – calmed some fears about the possible implications at the start of 2008 (36 districts affected in February and sev- of Maoist rule. Against expectations, the government enteen groups involved in January), declined dramatically by has dramatically boosted revenue collection, putting it October (four districts affected by two groups) but surged on track to meet one of its ambitious budgetary tar- again in November (eighteen districts affected by ten groups). gets.15 A voluntary declaration of income scheme to “Locals”, rather than any organised grouping, were respon- encourage large earners to come into the tax net has sible for most incidents (locals often blockade highways fol- lowing incidents such as pedestrian deaths in vehicular discomfited some businesspeople but raised signifi- accidents); the next most prolific shutdown-caller was the pre-election UDMF alliance. “Nepal: Total Reports of Bandhs/Blockades in 2008”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kathmandu, at www.un.org.np. 10 Apart from the Maoists, the UML’s Youth Force has been houses, prompting a February 2009 international media mis- the most active. In mid November 2008, three further parties sion to warn that press freedom still faced a “serious threat”. formed new youth groups: the TMDP, RPP(N) and Chure “Nepalese media in great danger, International Press Freedom Bhawar Rastriya Ekata Party. Mission finds”, Reporters Without Borders, 8 February 2009. 11 On 24 January 2009 the YCL was renamed the Young 13 See detailed statistics in Section V.B.2, “Public Security” Communist Democratic League. This report retains the widely below. recognised “YCL” as most references to the organisation in- 14 On 23 October 2008 the government withdrew 349 crimi- clude the period before the name change. nal cases against political party cadres accused of crimes in- 12 Since 2006, four journalists, Uma Singh, J.P. Joshi, Biren- cluding rape, robbery and drug smuggling. 53 of these cases dra Sah and Pushkar Bahadur Shrestha, have been killed; had been registered after the signing of the CPA. Prakash Singh Thakuri has been missing since July 2007. 15 The first four months of the 2008-2009 fiscal year saw The Federation of Nepali Journalists recorded 342 press revenue mobilisation grow by 35.4 per cent to reach Rs.33 freedom violations in 2008, including a significant escalation billion (approx. $425 million). “Revenue collection soars to in the number of physical attacks on journalists and media Rs 33 billion”, nepalnews.com, 1 January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 4

cant sums.16 Even as revenue has risen, however, de- and adds to the pressures on the government, which velopment expenditure has declined.17 The profes- has no options for immediate relief. sionalism and good working relationship of Maoist Finance Minister and Finance Sec- The obstacles that a radical party working through retary Rameshwor Khanal has impressed donors. “Min- traditional institutions might face were always clear – ister for minister this government is far more serious and well known to the Maoists from their two stints in than the interim government”, says one diplomat. “At the pre-election interim government. Prachanda’s ex- least the cabinet actually meets and tries to shape an cuse that governing has proved more difficult than agenda – it’s far too soon to write off the govern- expected sounds naive at best. In fact, institutions ment”.18 The launch of a national literacy campaign, such as the staid bureaucracy and traditionalist judici- provision of free maternal health services and record ary are manageable. As successive transitions have tourist arrivals suggest there is good news to report.19 illustrated, they will orient themselves to a new power centre if given a clear lead. Bureaucrats are as likely But the Maoist-led administration is already widely to be inspired by dedicated, professional ministers dismissed as a failure. Partly this is due to an almost with vision as put off by ideological labels. Failing to universally hostile press and the government’s poor build on this possibility reflects the Maoists’ weak- grasp of communications. But its own weaknesses are ness in planning, and slowness to adapt to the busi- more to blame. The party has been strong on com- ness of running a government, rather than bureaucrats’ promise and conciliatory statements but weak on de- insurmountable intransigence. livery. The UCPN(M)’s commanding plurality in the CA has not translated into a decisive grip on power or In government, the Maoists have been more clumsy a clear lead on policy. An electricity crisis, the result than totalitarian. They have spent most of their time of a cumulative underinvestment for which the Mao- on the back foot, reacting to events rather than shap- ists are partially responsible (in attacking and disrupt- ing the agenda. In the maelstrom of day-to-day fire- ing hydropower projects during the conflict), has fighting, much of it in response to problems they have reduced supply to eight hours per day.20 This hits the created for themselves, ministers’ efforts to get back politically influential urban middle classes hardest in control have been ineffective. Initiatives such as introducing weekly “meet the press” sessions to ex- plain government policy, developing an ethical code

16 of conduct for Maoist CA members and the prime By the eve of the scheme’s deadline, property worth some minister vowing to avoid wasting time on unneces- Rs 3.45 billion ($45 million) had been declared, with a 10 sary ceremonial duties have yet to have much impact. per cent tax paid. Milan Mani Sharma, “Self disclosures touch Rs 3.45b”, myrepublica.com, 10 February 2009. 17 In November 2008, the CPN(M) and its largest coali- “Development expenditure tumbles by 23 pc”, nepal- news.com, 20 January 2009. tion partner, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified 18 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2008. Marxist-Leninist), UML, established a coordination 19 Gopal Sharma, “Record tourist numbers as Nepal emerges committee and in December they agreed to set up four from civil war”, , 10 January 2009. high-level commissions.21 But the partnership remains 20 The conflict is certainly not the only factor that has im- shaky. As long as they are at odds, it is no surprise peded power schemes. One former managing director of the that they fail to inspire confidence. The prime minis- Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), explained: “The pathetic ter’s most deft manoeuvring has been tactical rather security situation prevailing during the ten-year-old conflict than strategic. For example, Prachanda surprised the period did indeed prevent potential private investors from Nepali Congress (NC) on 11 November by signing a setting up hydro plants. However, this should not have pre- nine-point agreement conceding their demands, vented the government and NEA from adding new genera- tion capacity. With each change in government, heads begin thereby averting its threat to block the passage of the to roll in public enterprises, and in this manner, a new man- budget, but made no plans to implement his commit- aging director is appointed in NEA, not primarily on merit ments. Meanwhile, his and other Maoist leaders’ re- but on considerations which are at best questionable”. Ajit N.S. Thapa, “Extended load-shedding: symptom of deeper malaise”, The Himalayan Times, 19 January 2009. The fi- nance secretary has blamed local agents, “the invisible power that works between foreign contractors, goods importers and the government for commission”, for the delays in the Kali Gandaki A project (initiated in 1997 but with construction 21 These are the state restructuring commission, scientific only starting in 2004) and the Mid-Marsyangdi project land reform commission (to be headed by Maoist central (which came online more than three years late at the end of committee member Haribol Gajurel), commission on the in- 2008). “Parties accused of lacking political will”, ekanti- vestigation of disappeared persons and truth and reconcilia- pur.com, 22 January 2009. tion commission. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 5

peated warnings of a “new revolution” only increase Where they have reached out to former rivals, it has suspicions over the UCPN(M)’s intent.22 often been to bring on board surprisingly dubious ad- visers, including former royalists who neither burnish The Maoists are still outsiders in Kathmandu’s opinion- their radical credentials nor temper them with palpa- forming circles. Even though they have twice as many ble democratic commitment. Non-Maoists keen to see seats as their nearest rival in the CA, they have almost the government succeed at development were heart- no voice in the mainstream media. Apart from UCPN(M) ened by the appointment of Pitamber Sharma, a widely party members, next to no columnist, commentator, respected academic expert, to head the National Plan- civil society figure, human rights activist, lawyer, ning Commission.24 But the government so under- journalist or academic writes in support of them. The mined and alienated him that he felt forced to resign. NC, by contrast, enjoys a daily barrage of public praise from the very people – former Panchayat lumi- Many within the governing coalition and beyond imply naries, royal advisers and army emissaries – who or- that the Maoists are still an illegitimate force – either chestrated and applauded the two royal coups that because of their incomplete democratic transformation, toppled Congress governments and jailed their leaders. because they “stole” the election or because, in the words of Congress leader G.P. Koirala, theirs is only To a large extent, the Maoists’ predicament is of their a “caretaker government” with no brief to shape own making. Resolutely unclubbable, they have longer-term policies. Of course, the NC was less mostly kept their distance from the cocktail and semi- quick to question the unelected post-April 2006 in- nar circuit that generates the capital’s received wis- terim government, which it led. In contrast to that dom. Instead, they have consciously and repeatedly transitional administration, this government is both antagonised the press, business community and other mandated by a popular vote and constitutionally em- established forces whom they had initially courted powered and required to act as a normal government with talk of cooperation. The incontrovertible evi- at the same time as providing leadership to the consti- dence of their failure to fulfil commitments is brushed tutional process, just as the CA is entrusted with the off with implausible excuses. They have brought dual functions of drafting body and legislature. Criti- problems on themselves by starting to resemble the cism of the Maoists tends to fail to distinguish be- old parties. Their government has already been tar- tween their role leading a coalition government and nished by nepotism,23 patronage, indecision, junket- the bigger questions of their party’s position in the eering and factional fighting. peace process. But in both cases, answering such criticism is up to the Maoists themselves. They are no longer the opposition.

22 See, for example, “PM reiterates revolt warning”, nepal- news.com, 15 January 2009. C. OLD NEPAL: ALIVE AND WELL 23 UCPN(M) alleged nepotism includes the following posi- tions held by members of Prachanda’s family: Samir Dahal Despite the transition to a federal democratic republic (under-secretary of PM’s office), son of Prachanda’s younger and continuing rhetorical commitments to a progres- brother Narayan Dahal; Ganga Dahal (officer of PM’s of- sive, socially inclusive “new Nepal”, rumours of the fice), Prachanda’s younger daughter (Indian citizen); Gan- old Nepal’s death have been greatly exaggerated. The garam Dahal (un-appointed foreign relations officer), end of the monarchy has in many respects benefited Prachanda’s own brother; Renu Pathak (CA member), Prachanda’s daughter; Arjun Pathak (officer of CA), Prachanda’s the interests it used to serve: the scapegoating of for- son-in-law; Prakash Dahal (prime minister’s PA/accountant), mer king Gyanendra, much as he was responsible for Prachanda’s son, salary equal to the under-secretary; Nara- his own woes, has freed the Kathmandu elite to re- yan Dahal (CA member), Prachanda’s nephew. Baburam group and rebrand themselves. With the UCPN(M) Bhattarai’s relatives: Hisila Yami (tourism minister), Babu- now cast as the authoritarian ruler, and providing ex- ram’s wife; Taranaj Pandey (PM’s adviser), Baburam’s amples of continued illiberal behaviour, it is easier to nephew; Praya Yami (National Planning Commission), His- categorise anti-Maoist resistance as democratic. ila’s older sister; Timila Yami (chairperson of Drinking Wa- ter Project), Hisila’s older sister; Chirik Shova (member of The noisiest conservative revival has been spear- Kathmandu Drinking Water), Hisila’s older sister; Babu- headed by the urban upper classes. That the Maoists ram’s younger brother (tariff-fixing committee), head of are not the new Khmer Rouge they predicted has not Kathmandu Drinking Water. Arjun Gyawali, “Karyakartako kathgharama prachanda-baburam”, Drishti, 18 November 2008. Minister Hisila Yami also recommended her relative Kayo Devi Yami as a member of the Public Service Com- 24 The de facto head of the National Planning Commission is mission. “CC recommends PSC members”, nepalnews.com, the vice-chairperson; the prime minister is the ex officio 23 January 2009. chairperson. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 6

deterred constant cries of “totalitarian dictatorship”. state restructuring.26 A presentation by one NC leader For all their cadres’ sporadic brutality, the Maoists on the topic was cobbled together with quotes from have not muzzled the press, locked up political pris- Wikipedia;27 a more thoughtful proposal based on se- oners or indeed implemented any notably dictatorial rious research and wider consultation is, however, also measures. Ironically, it is only when they propose under discussion.28 In short, a lack of consensus among genuinely illiberal measures such as completely ban- political leaders over fundamental issues reflects ning strikes that the “liberal democrats” have rushed wider public divisions, while fears of change that are to embrace them. In contrast, a budget so un-Maoist yet to be channelled into practicable policies only ag- that it satisfied the World Bank and the International gravate the tendency for unconstructive opposition. Monetary Fund (IMF) was greeted with derision for its excessive ambition as well as claims that programs If the Maoists are not offering the fresh leadership they such as a national literacy scheme were camouflaged promised, nor is anyone else. The mass popular fer- steps towards a takeover of the state.25 ment of the people’s movement left the existing par- ties unruffled; the movement to overthrow the Underlying the ritual denunciations is a more serious monarchy did not throw up a single new leader. Ironi- fissure: many people do not want a “new Nepal”. The cally, it was the Madhesi uprising against the post- goal of radical transformation, which inevitably im- monarchical dispensation that brought some new faces plies some uncomfortable upheavals, is not univer- onto the national political scene. The CA election sally shared. Such fears are not confined to those at provided an opportunity for voters to have their say the top of the pile. Social inclusion is not a zero-sum on the old guard and they did so with gusto. But party- game but in the short term affirmative action of any controlled proportional representation lists allowed sort does create losers and a sense of reverse dis- some, such as G.P. Koirala, to sidestep the risk of al- crimination. Many of those who feel threatened be- lowing voters to deliver a direct verdict. The eighteen long to upper caste groups but are not “elite” in other of his relatives who lost first-past-the-post contests terms. As India’s experience since its introduction of initially seemed less fortunate until it transpired that quotas and job reservations for marginalised groups electoral defeat had little meaning. UML leader Bam illustrates, organised resistance from those who had Dev Gautam was nominated as home minister by his come to depend upon privileges is only to be ex- party while former general secretary Madhav Nepal pected. Given Nepal’s endemic poverty and the se- was parachuted into the CA as a nominee. Conserva- vere shortage of career opportunities for young people tive NC heavyweights such as Govinda Raj Joshi and of any background, managing a likely bitter struggle Khum Bahadur Khadka have become more, not less, will be a great challenge. vocal and influential since their defeats.

The enduring appeal for some of a unitary state is visible in the influential coalition that has emerged to D. THE RISKS OF FAILURE guard against the “threat” of ethnic federalism. The problem for those alarmed by the prospect of signifi- The peace process does not yet face an imminent risk cant restructuring is that few have realistic alternative of collapse. Although the original ideal of a broad plans, least of all the parties that agreed to federalism unity government working to shared goals is now without considering its implications. By January unlikely, the evidence suggests a prolonged process 2009, three years after formally agreeing to a con- marred by disputes and messy compromises is more stituent assembly and with a full nine-month gestation likely than a deliberate return to violent conflict. The period after the CA election, the NC’s internal com- international context is positive: no influential inter- mittees were still yet to prepare policy options on

26 Bishnu Budhathoki, “Koirala still reigns supreme”, The 25 The budget was coloured by some partisan concerns. For Kathmandu Post, 5 January 2008. example, it included a five-project “Program to Honour Po- 27 Govinda Raj Joshi, Nepalma sanghiya shasan pranali litical Sacrifice” bringing development to the mid-western (Kathmandu, 2008). See also Aditya Adhikari, “Stalled de- Maoist heartland; the Maoists’ informal “capital”, the north- bate”, The Kathmandu Post, 23 December 2008. Joshi has ern Rolpa village of Thawang will benefit from both con- made a serious effort to contribute to public debate, putting struction of the “Shahid Marg” (“Martyrs’ Road”, running his proposals forward in the media. See, for example, “6 vata from Tila to Rukumkot via Ghartigaon and Thawang) and a vyavaharik pradesh”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 12 February model integrated settlement development program. Budget 2009; “Bahulvadi samsadiya vyavasthaka pakshama”, Naya (2008-2009), Annex, “Building New Nepal Campaign”, Patrika, 12 February 2009. Item J. A generous Rs. 50 million ($650,000) has been allo- 28 Narahari Acharya, Nepali kangreka nimti prastavit gana- cated to building an enigmatic-sounding “Statue of Repub- rajya nepalko samrachana ra samvidhansabhako adhar- lic” at the former royal palace. Ibid, Item K. patra (Kathmandu, 2009). Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 7

national players want to see the government fall, en- III. PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDS courage a military takeover or provoke a return to conflict in other forms. Outside Nepal the desire for a period of stability, rebuilding and consolidating func- All of the political parties are in disarray, fighting tional democratic rule is genuine. For its neighbours, with each other and internally. Few articulate a con- particularly India, this desire is rooted in solid self- sistent position on major issues or present a united interest, such as seeing Nepal develop as a partner in face to the public. The UCPN(M) has done better than regional security, a market and an exporter of hydro- others at managing a heated internal debate but major power. New Delhi and other capitals are well aware disagreements over strategy remain; at the same time that such aims can only be achieved with political its transition to non-violence appears stalled. The in- stability and a functioning government. creasing volume of NC leaders’ public pronounce- ments is in inverse proportion to their organisational Nevertheless, the destabilising scenario of inter-party solidity. UML leaders busy themselves launching dissent and the unresolved future of two powerful for- regular assaults on the government of which they are mer warring armies means a return to war by mistake a part, while preparing themselves for the leadership is always possible. Should that happen, or the peace battle that is set to play out at their February 2009 agreement fall apart irretrievably, the chances for a general convention. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum new deal will never be as good as they were in 2005. (MJF) has averted a crippling split but appears unsure Then, a unique combination of circumstances forced of how to balance representing Madhesi interests with the Maoists to accept pluralism and the old parties to contributing to governance and the peace process. accept the need for reform. The king was discredited, international players were willing to support a fresh The major non-Maoist parties suffer from the same approach, the UN was in a good position to assist and, weaknesses: lack of internal democracy, no progress most crucially, people at large were inspired by the on making themselves more inclusive, incoherent and prospect of a new consensus for peace and change. shifting policy positions, lack of effort to rebuild links None of these factors is likely to recur as strongly and with voters, and indiscipline, in particular among the a renewed confluence of such forces is impossible. top-heavy leadership. There is no sign they are heed- ing their November 2005 commitment “not to repeat No one may want war but it is a real possibility the mistakes of the past which were committed while should the Maoists be forced out of government, or in parliament and in government”.29 If the constitu- choose to quit. The Maoists are not planning to go tion-writing process is completed on schedule, only back to war, as Prachanda has clarified, despite his the Maoists appear ready to go back to the electorate misleadingly bellicose statements about resuming a with a reasonably clear agenda and a functional cam- popular struggle should the UCPN(M) leave the gov- paign machine. But even the UCPN(M) is not demon- ernment. But the temptation for other parties to be- strating any visible enthusiasm for a prompt poll. come more militaristic if the Maoists are agitating from the streets will be hard to resist. The dividing line between “street pressure” and conflict is danger- A. THE MAOISTS: BRINGING ON THE ously thin. REVOLUTION? Resumed conflict, as in 2001 and 2003, tends to be more brutal and intense than before. Another return to war Strong criticism of the government’s performance has would most likely reinforce that pattern. The Maoists’ come from within the Maoist movement itself, where people’s war strategy remains in place and their there has been intense debate over tactics and strat- People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is, thanks to the egy. For outsiders, the state and direction of Maoist extended cantonment impasse, larger and better strategy is of great importance: Are they truly com- trained and organised than ever. But a new round of mitted to democracy and non-violence? Will more confrontation would be different: in place of rural base- radical elements settle for nothing less than a one- building, the Maoists are now positioned for an urban party state and force a return to conflict? For Maoist guerrilla struggle. There are no signs that the NA footsoldiers, the big question is simpler: Is this it? Is would show any more concern for respecting the laws this what we spent ten years fighting for? of armed combat, nor that the old parties have devel- oped any interest in democratic control or enforcing international humanitarian law. Needless to say, renewed conflict would close the window of opportunity to address the pressing social and economic problems that underlay the insurgency in 29 Twelve-point Agreement, 22 November 2005, Art. 7. the first place. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 8

Prachanda has swung between urging consensus30 and malmedia publishing house was disproportionate.34 threatening a capture of power.31 His party is em- But this incident, one of a number of assaults on jour- broiled in complex debates, where ideological and nalists and media corporations, has seriously damaged strategic considerations do battle with more pressing the Maoists’ international reputation and will leave a practical imperatives. The Maoist central committee cloud over their relations with outside players for remains divided on many issues but the fissures can- some time to come, even if they take action against not be reduced to a simplistic “hardline vs. softline” the offenders. For example, it has set back any battle.32 Indeed, there is no disagreement on the cen- chances of removing the CPN(M) from the U.S. ter- tral analysis – that the revolution is yet to be com- rorist exclusion list. pleted – and the central long-term goal – a people’s republic. The chief ideological architect of the Maoist The YCL has been a powerful tool but also a major approach to the peace process, Baburam Bhattarai, headache. There has been more talk of reorienting it has argued that it is precisely in order to bring the to development activities and time-bound promises to revolution closer that the UCPN(M) must stick with relinquish the buildings it had occupied and turned the constitutional process and use all forums – street, into de facto garrisons.35 The Maoist commitment in assembly and government – to hasten the next stage. the June 2008 agreement was unambiguous: In this context, he has even underlined the need for the Maoists to create the turmoil out of which revolu- The paramilitary functioning and activities of the tion will emerge, although he used the same address CPN (Maoists)’s Young Communist League (YCL) to party cadres to reiterate the party’s longstanding will be completely terminated, and all public, gov- line that political competition, rather than a Soviet or ernment and private buildings and lands under its Chinese-style one-party system, will be an essential control will be vacated and returned to the respec- feature of a Maoist republic.33 tive owners within fifteen days. The CPN (Maoist) has pledged to all of the political parties that YCL A November 2008 national gathering brought to- activities will fully comply with the laws of the gether some 1,100 leaders from different levels and land, from this time forward.36 regions; it endorsed the new compromise party line of a “people’s democratic national republic” and the Although much has been made of its more egregious formation of an internal advisory committee on inte- behaviour, its overall level of activity appears to have gration, including PLA commanders. In January been significantly scaled back from the pre-election 2009, the CPN(M) merged with the much smaller period. Nevertheless, its militarised structure and Unity Centre (Masal) to create the Unified Commu- sheer size, with many members expecting to be taken nist Party of Nepal (Maoist). care of and looking jealously towards their relatively comfortable and regularly remunerated colleagues in Transforming from an armed movement into a peace- the PLA, make institutional change difficult. Party ful political force was never likely to be an easy proc- leaders want to keep it intact and motivated as an ex- ess. Even the Maoists’ harshest opponents accepted tra force in uncertain times and as foot soldiers for the that it would take them time to get over the “hang- next election campaign. over” of their violent past. But as the third anniver- sary of the ceasefire approaches with the Maoists now Amid these difficulties, Prachanda is still in charge leading the government, excuses for thuggery and and has cards in his hand. He has ridden out the inter- brutal lawlessness ring hollow. nal criticism so far and can use the power and patron- age of the prime ministership to his advantage. But The continued violent conduct of some Maoist cadres, the barrage of dissent has a cumulative impact, weak- which has extended to abduction, torture and murder, cannot be dismissed as minor indiscipline. The media response to an attack by Maoist cadres on the Hi- 34 More serious incidents, such as the 18 November discov- ery of the bodies of two people allegedly killed by the YCL in Dhading district and the earlier killings of working jour- 30 “PM urges politics of consensus”, nepalnews.com, 13 nalists outside the capital, generated less press coverage. January 2009. There were, however, public protests. See, for example, 31 “PM warns against bid to topple govt”, The Himalayan “Protest against YCL over killing of two abductees”, ekanti- Times, 13 January 2009; “PM Dahal for capturing power if pur.com, 19 November 2008. govt toppled”, ekantipur.com, 13 January 2009. 35 Ganeshman Pun, “YCL ka agragami karyabhar”, Janadesh, 32 Dharmendra Bastola, “Kendriya samitiko baithakka 23 December 2008. nirnayko mahattva”, Janadesh, 23 December 2008. 36 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 33 “Yantrik dhangale sampanna hundaina kranti”, Naya Pa- Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June trika, 30 January 2009. 2008, Art. 3. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 9

ening his authority and limiting room for manoeuvre. port presented by its central committee at the general He is constrained by a greater range of pressures than convention does, however, offer a serious analysis of ever, needing to balance his own party’s interests with its past weaknesses and a detailed blueprint for its fu- those of coalition partners while taking into account ture positioning.40 It cannot reconcile itself to being a positions of the NC and the army and continuing to junior partner to the UCPN(M) on the left, but its ef- reassure international powers that the Maoists’ de- forts to stand up have been patchy and often, as in the mocratic transformation will move forward. case of its YCL-modelled Youth Force, counterpro- ductive. It is unlikely to be tempted into an NC-led “broader democratic alliance” (see below) unless B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERS there is an immediate incentive, such as the offer of the prime ministership. In the face of the Maoists’ The UCPN(M)’s two major coalition partners, the scepticism towards parliamentary democracy, the UML and the MJF, have faced internal debates and relevance of the UML’s alternative, “people’s multi- uncertainty over their role in government. There are party democracy”, is unclear.41 It identified the mon- signs, however, that policy and organisational diffi- archy as the main threat to democracy and, forged in a culties are manageable. period when the UML had signed up to parliamentary democracy, sits uneasily with the party’s call for a In the run-up to its February 2009 general convention, parallel system of a popularly elected president along- the UML has to cope with a leadership struggle and side a popularly elected prime minister. broader questions about its policy platform. Senior cadres regularly speak out against the government of Against this backdrop, the UML has made little of its which it is a coalition member. The most constant capacity to act as a mediating force. Following the barrage has been by K.P. Oli, who has announced his pattern established from the earliest negotiations of intention to challenge general secretary Jhalanath 2005, neither the UCPN(M) nor the NC have looked Khanal for his post. Later in 2008 he was joined by to it as a bridge, even when their relations have been former general secretary , who at their most strained; the UML’s own lack of a co- had maintained a dignified silence following his elec- herent approach has meant no initiative to establish tion defeat and resignation before launching a campaign itself as a credible honest broker able to boost its own to return to high office.37 Madhav Nepal’s January importance by bringing the two sides closer together. 2009 parachuting into the CA to head the constitutional committee will likely reduce his public outbursts. The 16-21 February 2009 general convention should K.P. Oli’s offensive, however, will probably be sus- help clear the air: it is slated to create new senior po- tained as he seeks publicity and momentum for his sitions, including a party president and vice president, bid to win the party’s leadership and push for a UML- largely to accommodate senior leaders irked at their led government. , as home minister current marginalisation. A decisive mandate for the and deputy prime minister the party’s most senior rep- new leadership may quell public dissent. The conven- resentative in the administration, has complained that tion may not take dramatic steps to reposition the UML leaders and activists have been undermining the party but will acknowledge organisational shortcom- government.38 He has, in turn, been subjected to sear- ings and initiate moves to reinvigorate the party. Pro- ing public criticism from the UML press.39 posed changes to the party constitution are likely to invite serious debate;42 there are, however, almost cer- The UML is still unsure where it stands ideologically, tactically and strategically. The extensive political re- 40 “Political Report”, CPN(UML) Central Committee, Janu- ary 2009. 37 In December 2008 Nepal said his party should not have 41 A week-long January 2009 central committee meeting re- joined the government and accused its leadership of seeking affirmed this policy, introduced by revered former leader power at the expense of cultivating its relationship with the in the wake of the 1990 transition to multi- wider public: “Nobody will follow the party if we fail to ad- party democracy, as the party’s basic line. “UML adopts PMPD dress the concerns of the masses”. “Joining govt a folly: Ne- as guiding principle”, The Himalayan Times, 15 January 2009. pal”, ekantipur.com, 16 December 2008. 42 The UML’s proposed new party structure has a chairper- 38 “UML not helping govt: Home Minister”, The Kathmandu son above the general secretary. “Vidhan Samshodhan Post, 20 December 2008. Prastav”, UML Central Committee, Kathmandu, January 39 One cover story pointedly observed that “In return for the 2009. The key elements are set out in “Emaleko samshodhit party making him deputy prime minister even though he lost vidhan tayar”, Budhabar, 28 January 2009. Some influential the election, Gautam has started publicly badmouthing party central committee members, including Pradip Gyawali and workers”. “Yi bamdev kaska hun kamred?”, Budhabar, 24 Shankar Pokharel, have registered an alternative proposal for December 2008. revisions to the party statute, as have a group of youth lead- Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 10

tain to be some moves towards more inclusive struc- the commerce minister and president of the Nepal tures and efforts to address the widely acknowledged , , was to accuse gap between leadership and grassroots workers. If the Maoists themselves of being foreign agents.45 nothing else, the convention should mark a serious Such public trading of insults may be partly theatrical effort to face up to the party’s difficulties and embark but suggests inter-party relations are disturbingly dys- on an overdue internal debate. functional.

The MJF had to cope with policy confusion over its “one Madhes” line as an internal rebellion was gather- C. THE OPPOSITION: REINVIGORATED, BUT ing steam.43 It is ill prepared to cope with any new FOR WHAT? Madhes uprising, having neither abandoned its claim to leadership of the “one Madhes” campaign nor done A vigorous opposition has enlivened the political scene much to deliver on it. Its stance towards armed groups and played a useful role in challenging government has long been unclear and is more problematic now policy. Some robust criticism and debate, especially that it is in government. Its relatively upper-caste and when the CA has functioned as legislature, has added better-off supporters and members will be threatened to the sense of a return to democratic politics. There by further identity politics movements. At the same are solid grounds for opposition: for example, the time, it could be outflanked by a more organised chal- prime minister’s failure to fulfil his commitment to lenge from the Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP), the assembly to implement the NC-backed nine-point Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) or other Madhesi par- demands by 15 December became not just a breach of ties if it cannot consolidate its base. Dissatisfaction inter-party agreement but a betrayal of a promise with party leader and foreign minister Upendra Yadav made to the legislature as a whole.46 But methods are developed into an open challenge, with senior figures not always helpful, as evidenced by the growing ten- calling for their ministers to resign from the govern- dency to resort to boycotting or obstructing CA pro- ment and force a change in policy and leadership. ceedings.47 More worryingly, the major opposition parties are in a bad shape internally and often prefer Nevertheless, its January 2009 general convention the spoiler’s role to constructive criticism. appears to have brought some stability. Although marked by disputes and unrest, it ultimately saw party president Upendra Yadav unanimously re-elected. On 1. The Nepali Congress 7 February, a meeting of its new central committee The NC has not made up its mind as to whether it is agreed to its strategy and endorsed its role in the coa- in or out of the peace process. Adopting the easy route lition, while directing its ministers to report regularly of spoiling for its own sake, party leaders have not to the party on their progress. Party leaders have be- decided whether to use their considerable leverage to come less ambivalent towards their position in the win specific concessions in return for cooperation or coalition, insisting the Maoist-led government is the whether to devote all their effort to wrecking the gov- only viable option and working hard to communicate ernment and hoping to supplant it upon its collapse. successes. For example, the MJF’s joint chairman, J. P. Gupta, presented the government’s February 2009 In the meantime, the party is less democratic than ordinances as a joint achievement for which his party ever. It has made no moves towards more representa- deserved credit, arguing that the ordinance on job tive or accountable leadership, rather the reverse. quotas in public services fulfilled several of the 44 Party president G.P. Koirala declared himself parlia- MJF’s pre-election demands. mentary party leader without any debate, let alone a vote. He then adjourned discussions on the appoint- Other coalition partners are also not fully in the fold. When the UCPN(M) expressed the view that Madhesi parties are working for foreign powers, the reaction of 45 “Maoists biggest foreign agents: Minister Mahato”, ekan- tipur.com, 18 December 2008. 46 See “NC set to disrupt next session of Parliament”, The ers who argue they have stronger proposals for internal de- Himalayan Times, 16 December 2008. mocracy. The stage is set for a genuine debate. 47 During the CA’s budget session, the Tarai Madhes De- 43 When MJF leader and government minister Bijay Kumar mocratic Party (TMDP) blocked proceedings for twelve days Gachhedar suggested the “one Madhes” policy had become (demanding implementation of the February 2008 Madhesi- irrelevant he was subjected to a barrage of criticism from government agreement), the NC for five days (demanding within the party. See “Gachhadar’s uttterings stir hornet’s implementation of their nine-point agreement with the gov- nest”, THT Online, 16 December 2008. ernment) and the smaller parties for four days (over scholar- 44 “MPRF not to quit govt”, myrepublica.com, 9 February 2009. ship quotas). Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 11

ment of a deputy leader in order to avoid the possibil- senior figures cannot be pacified with ministerial of- ity of an election for that position. The mute accep- fice, the succession battle has become more intense tance of his high-handedness (with only Narahari and more complex, with smaller factions coalescing Acharya voicing dissent within the Central Working around leaders including , Ramchandra Committee) is indicative of the weakness of the NC’s Poudel and K.B. Gurung.55 second-rank leaders, whom Koirala has reduced, in the words of one journalist, to “subservient sub- The NC has, however, taken to its opposition role jects”.48 Even usually supportive media outlets have with vigour, harrying the government with all weap- become restive in the face of the party’s wilful resis- ons available to it. Its choice of targets has sometimes tance to serve its own interests by reform.49 been ill-advised or disingenuous and its language never dispassionate, but it has kept the government on Koirala’s insistence on remaining parliamentary its toes. Koirala, still energised by his sense of be- leader does not extend to an immediate interest in par- trayal at having been denied the presidency, confi- liamentary functioning. The NC has repeatedly boy- dently predicts the imminent collapse of the government. cotted the CA; following the opening sitting, Koirala “The prime minister must have the guts to step down”, himself has not attended a single CA session and his threatens one CA member. “We are ready to run the main internal rival, , has only government”.56 Others, such as Ramchandra Poudel, shown up twice.50 The delay in finalising the parlia- are only slightly more circumspect, saying that the mentary party’s statute, which was eventually agreed Maoists working “under the guardianship of Koirala” on 4 February 2009, affected the Constitutional is the only way forward: “We don’t have any inten- Council, which makes appointments to important tion to pull down this government. This government bodies such as the Public Service Commission and will collapse because of their own contradictions”.57 Election Commission, as it required the participation of the leader of the opposition.51 The Maoists should take these warning shots seri- ously. Verdicts on the NC’s own stints in power have Party organisation is also in disarray. Despite his been mixed but none can deny that Koirala is an ex- autocratic hold on the party, Koirala has only visited perienced wrecker of governments. Since throwing the NC headquarters eight times in the last four away his own absolute majority in 1994, he has had a years.52 In October 2008 he promised to reinvigorate hand in the fall of most administrations, including the party within three months and launched an those of his own party under rival leaders Sher Ba- “awareness campaign” to rebuild its electoral base hadur Deuba and . But unless and, more importantly, to continue the still incom- the NC can show that its criticism is constructive it plete reunification of the party following its 2002 risks tarnishing its name further. Nepali voters deliv- split.53 Results have been mixed at best. The party ered a damning electoral verdict. Internationally, the remains riven, with the unseemly public tussles be- NC’s reputation has sunk to new depths. Formerly tween its two main wings even extending overseas.54 sympathetic observers despair at its undemocratic be- Since its refusal to join the government means that haviour and shambolic apparatus.58 If it does not pull itself together, an unreformed NC will continue doing a serious disservice to the sizeable section of the

48 population that would like to be represented by a Bishnu Budhathoki, “Koirala still reigns supreme”, The competent, committed liberal democratic party. Kathmandu Post, 5 January 2009. 49 See, for example, “Congress course correction”, editorial, Nepali Times, 12 December 2008. 50 “Samvidhansabha jandainan thula neta”, Naya Patrika, 7 January 2009. Prachanda also has a bad record for CA atten- dance, with only four appearances, although he might claim the excuse of government business. 51 “Koirala still reigns supreme”, op. cit. 52 Kiran Pokharel, “Sunsan kangres mukhyalay”, Annapurna 55 See Santosh Acharya, “Gut-upagutko birami”, Nepal, 15 Post, 24 December 2008. February 2009. 53 “NC will be reorganised within three months, claims 56 “NC is ready to form the government”, Navindra Raj Koirala”, ekantipur.com, 6 October 2008; and “Koirala in Joshi, People’s Review, 8 January 2009. Joshi insists, how- to begin NC ‘revival campaign’”, nepal- ever, that he was only speaking theoretically rather than call- news.com, 23 October 2008. ing for an immediate change in administration. Crisis Group 54 In New York, rival pro-Koirala and pro-Deuba interna- interview, Kathmandu, 12 January 2009. tional contact offices still struggle for supremacy. Crisis 57 Interview, Spotlight, 9 January 2009. Group interview, Nepali Congress supporter, New York, 8 58 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, Washington DC and December 2008. London, November 2008-January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 12

2. The smaller parties becomes necessary, if the Maoists continue to act the way they are doing and invite instability, we must go Many smaller parties are increasingly frustrated and ahead by forming a democratic alliance that includes fear that their presence in the CA is destined to be many political parties”, warned G.P. Koirala’s daugh- decorative. Although the CA committees were struc- ter, Sujata Koirala. But she tempered her comments tured to ensure full inclusion of all parties represented by adding: “We will form this alliance not to bring in the CA, the lack of debate on the assembly floor down the Maoist government or to bring instability, and the continuing pattern of major decisions being but to bring stability to the country and prevent it taken by only a few large party leaders has left them from becoming a failed state … if the Maoists are feeling sidelined. The symbolic challenge of Dalit concerned about the country and want to join the alli- Janajati Party leader Bishwendra Paswan to Madhav ance, they are welcome”.61 Former Prime Minister Nepal’s installation as chair of the constitutional has been a vocal proponent, as committee reflects this frustration. Of the parties out- have other former Panchayat luminaries.62 Some, side government, the TMDP is probably the most in- however, are more cautious. For example, influential fluential. Its decision not to join the administration former royal minister Kamal Thapa, who heads a roy- and, in January 2009, to launch an agitation calling alist splinter party, has doggedly stuck to his monar- for the implementation of past agreements and the ful- chist principles but has also insisted that the Maoist- filment of Madhesi demands may earn it some of the led government should not be brought down.63 credibility and organisational presence that it lacked going into the election. The former king has mostly kept his counsel. The one issue that prompted him to speak out was a contro- 3. A “broader democratic alliance”? versy over the Maoists’ attempt to replace Indian priests with Nepalis at the country’s major Hindu The right wing of Nepali politics, marginalised by the temple, Pashupatinath. The sight of the coalition that electorate and thrown out of step by the abolition of sprung up to oppose the move – royalists, conserva- the monarchy, is seeking to regroup. The strong con- tives in the major parties and press, India’s Bharatiya servative wing of the NC was happy to oppose the Janata Party (BJP) and Hindutva extremists such as party line on federalism and republicanism even in the the Bajrang Dal – may have made some nostalgic for run-up to the CA election.59 It failed to split the then the last days of the embattled monarchy. But it also seven-party alliance or to wean its party away from stood as a reminder of Gyanendra’s baggage. Even if the peace process consensus but has now joined hands the BJP return to power in New Delhi, a royalist re- with former Panchayat luminaries to call for a vival built on support from the neighbour’s Hindu “broader democratic alliance”. A conservative column right will not win mass support. outlines the plan:

The [NC leaders] have been making the necessary noises, but till now have failed to form strong and appropriate alliances. First and foremost, the UML and the most important Tarai parties have to be dislodged from the deadly embrace of the Mao- ists…. Then the NC must assiduously work toward integrating the smaller democratic parties like the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party and the Nepal Janashakti Party [sic] in the new coalition. The CPN-Maoists can join as a junior partner, or not at all. Then only can the agenda of a new Nepal really begin.60

The idea has been publicly promoted primarily by the smaller right-wing parties, although it has been ech- 61 oed sympathetically by influential NC insiders. “If it “The Maoists are trapped in a conspiracy”, interview with Sujata Koirala, The Kathmandu Post, 19 January 2009. 62 See, for example, “Thapa reinforces Koirala’s idea of BDA”, nepalnews.com, 6 December 2008; and “NC, now, 59 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Land- has to lead democratic forces, says RPP chairman”, ekanti- scape, op. cit., p. 8. pur.com, 5 December 2008. 60 Shashi P.B.B. Malla and Chandra Bahadur Parbate, “End 63 “No alternative to Maoist-led govt: Kamal Thapa”, ekanti- of the road for Maoists”, People’s Review, 18 December 2008. pur.com, 3 January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 13

IV. THE TWO ARMIES the government.67 This reincarnation of the erstwhile “146 Committee”, named after the interim constitu- tion article that mandated it but never a functional A. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSE body, was christened the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC). The challenge for the security sector is reaching The June 2008 multiparty agreement that led to this agreement on the integration of Maoist combatants. amendment further specified that verified combatants There is a serious difference of opinion over what would “be offered a choice between an economic form this should take. The impasse over this issue, package and various other alternatives for rehabilita- central to the peace process, is particularly debilitat- tion”.68 For those “who choose integration”, only ing: it hinders progress in other areas and indefinitely those duly registered in cantonments “will be deemed prolongs a UN arms monitoring role that was initially eligible for possible integration with the security bod- envisaged as only a short-term transitional measure. ies, after fulfilling the standard requirements”.69 In the meantime, those in the PLA cantonments who did not meet the UN’s verification standards – new The letter of the various agreements is thus confusing. and under-age recruits – have still not been dis- There are two extreme interpretations: that no Maoist charged. This is a result of Maoist foot-dragging but combatants should be allowed to join the Nepalese also due to uncertainty over their rehabilitation. The Army (NA), or that all should be allowed to join – Maoist-led government promised swift action to UN and in formed units rather than individually under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for existing chain of command and regulations. Negotia- Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaras- tors from both sides confirm that from 2005 onwards wamy, who visited Nepal at the beginning of Decem- the implicit mutual understanding was that a signifi- ber 2008. But getting this first program of discharge cant number, but far from all, of the Maoist combat- and rehabilitation right has broader implications, af- ants would be integrated into the NA.70 Both sides fecting the credibility of the whole integration and re- accept that there was no agreement on numbers (al- habilitation process. though the ballpark figures both speak of in private, in the low thousands, are not dramatically divergent) or 1. What the agreements say on modalities, hence the conscious vagueness of lan- guage in the formal deals. The numerous written commitments are ambiguous and deliberately vague. The November 2006 CPA There was, however, little will to implement the called for a special committee “to carry out monitor- agreement and build on the chances for compromise ing, adjustment and rehabilitation of the Maoist com- on numbers and methods. Nor did the signatories to batants”;64 the December 2007 Agreement on the various deals necessarily speak for the bodies they Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies purported to control. The NA was not answerable to (AMMAA) referred to “integration into the security the seven-party interim government and has made it forces”;65 the interim constitution specified that the clear it retains its own red lines. The PLA was under special committee would “supervise, integrate and re- CPN(M) control but appears not to have been fully habilitate the combatants of the Maoist Army”.66 This, consulted on the terms of deals, in particular on the in turn, was amended to stipulate “a special commit- June 2008 agreement’s implication that any integra- tee … representing all the major political parties in tion will be on the NA’s terms (with individual com- the Constituent Assembly” – a change prompted by batants having to meet its requirements) and delinked the need to include the NC despite its absence from from the parallel question of NA restructuring.

Following much wrangling, the CPN(M) and UML agreed on 18 December 2008 to expand the AISC to 64 CPA, Art. 4.4. include two members from each of the four major 65 “Those who are eligible for integration into the security forces will be determined by a special committee as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Accord. This integration proc- 67 Fifth Amendment to Interim Constitution of Nepal, 13 July ess will be determined in subsequent agreement with the par- 2008, Art. 20, “Amendment of Article 146 of the Constitution”. ties”. AMMAA, Art. 4.1.3. 68 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the 66 “The Council of Ministers shall form a special committee Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants of the 2008, Art. 2.2.2. Unofficial translation at www.un.org.np. Maoist Army, and the functions, duties and powers of the 69 Ibid., Art. 2.2.3. committee shall be as determined by the Council of Minis- 70 Crisis Group interviews, NC and CPN(M) negotiators, ters”. Interim Constitution, Art. 146. Kathmandu, October 2008. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 14

parties, thereby meeting the NC’s demand for parity tensive training. They also argue for putting formed of representation.71 It was decided that the prime min- units under joint command during a transitional pe- ister, rather than his deputy as formerly proposed, riod rather than assimilating individuals into the exist- would head the committee himself. The AISC was fi- ing NA structure (see below). nally constituted and met for the first time on 16 January 2009, with the initial task of defining its An unhelpful side debate has emerged, with many terms of reference and procedures. A second meeting pro-NA commentators citing “international norms” on on 5 February decided to discharge disqualified Mao- integration as a reason for barring any PLA entry into ist combatants as soon as possible and promised to the NA. Some have argued that including former provide appropriate rehabilitation packages. These guerrillas would make the NA ineligible for future steps had already been agreed; substantive discussion UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, there are no ap- on the central integration and rehabilitation questions plicable international norms, and the speciousness of will not be as straightforward. the claimed impact on UN involvement was exposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon during his More immediately, the AISC’s responsibility for visit to Nepal.73 overseeing the PLA has not been clearly defined. Ad- dressing the PLA at its anniversary program on 12 NA officers are genuinely frustrated that PLA com- February, Prachanda told combatants that while their manders get to speak out, giving frequent media in- existing command structure would remain in place, terviews and taking part in UCPN(M) policy the AISC would now be responsible for its direction discussion, while “no one speaks for us”. In contrast, and planning.72 Turning this commitment into reality the NA was neither involved directly in peace nego- will depend on both the AISC’s capacity to agree tiations nor represented by parties it fully trusted or such directions and the PLA’s willingness to follow who were placed to enter meaningful commitments its instruction. on its behalf. It remains suspicious even of the parties who have been most vocal in backing its stance on recruitment to fill vacancies (see below). For exam- 2. The Nepalese Army position ple, NA officers still feel the post-1990 democratic The NA was never in favour of integration and re- governments treated it with disdain – from the NC mains extremely reluctant to allow the process to go squeezing its budgets to the UML forcing out an army ahead. It sees itself as a professional and apolitical chief over corruption allegations. However, its force which should not be undermined by incorporat- strongest international ally, India, shares most of its ing former guerrillas. More importantly, it feels it was concerns over integration and can be relied upon to undefeated and remains the only legitimate armed resist any steps that appear to threaten its existing force in the country. structure and culture.

The NA’s insistence on any candidates for integration 3. The PLA position meeting “standard requirements” has added an addi- tional element of confusion. It is seen by PLA com- The PLA remains disciplined and subject to manders as a none-too-subtle means of excluding UCPN(M) political control but frustration is mount- large numbers of combatants who do not have the ing. More than two years after entering cantonments educational and physical qualifications specified in combatants still have no idea of their future. Ques- NA recruitment standards. Furthermore, NA officers tions are now being raised over the wisdom of enter- privately maintain that they can only accept candi- ing the peace process in the first place. It is not clear dates for integration on an individual, entry-level ba- what form the Maoists’ proposed internal integration sis, as ordinary soldiers or officer cadets. PLA recommendation committee will take but the tensions commanders insist they should be included at various on this issue are real and relate not just to process but ranks, although they accept that this may require in- to major differences on substantive outcome.

71 When the government had first announced the formation of the committee, on 28 October, it had two CPN(M) mem- bers to only one from each of the other parties. 73 In a question and answer session, the Secretary-General 72 Prachanda, speech at program to commemorate the four- clarified that “there were many such cases, even in peacekeep- teenth anniversary of the “people’s war” and the eighth PLA ing operations, in which even former rebels, when they were Day, Nawalparasi, 12 February 2009; edited extracts pub- integrated into the national armies of member states of the lished as “Shantiko ladainma samarpit bhaera lagnuhos”, United Nations, were recruited as part of UN peacekeeping Janadesh, 17 February 2009. operations”. Press conference, Kathmandu, 1 November 2008. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 15

PLA commanders’ concerns in some ways mirror may well be less motivated. This is especially so those of their NA counterparts. Although they are given that its numbers were bulked up with recent re- more integrated in the Maoist movement’s political cruits, while some commanders, in particular political structure, there is increasing evidence that they were commissars, were transferred to the YCL rather than never fully consulted on the integration question. being cantoned. (Payments to cantoned combatants Prachanda has clearly been well ahead of his party are now being made by cheque in the name of indi- with his regular assurances that a deal has been done viduals, so there is less chance for the party to divert a and the process will shortly be under way. He is now portion but all the more reason for YCL commanders facing a backlash. The seven Maoist division com- and others to be envious of their PLA colleagues’ manders have started indicating publicly that they will relative financial comfort.) insist on bulk integration, rather than individual entry, and that they will not accept the NA’s existing re- The separation of commanders who want to move cruitment standards.74 “We may agree to somewhat into politics and those staying with the PLA seems different modalities after further discussion”, said one more or less complete, although some (especially An- senior commander, “but there is no question of send- anta, who is close to Prachanda and still speaks for ing our people outside our command”.75 the PLA informally despite having joined the CA) bridge the gap. The PLA’s determination to ensure The PLA top brass are still committed to the concept impunity for its conflict-era and subsequent offences of integration as they define it. They are united in remains as solid as that of the NA. It is still sheltering wanting to move beyond being a party army and in individuals like Bibidh, a division commander sus- refusing to join an unreformed NA but differ on the pected of prime responsibility for overseeing the timetable and modalities. Influential senior UCPN(M) murder of Ram Hari Shrestha in Shaktikhor canton- leader ’s position, supported by PLA ment (see below). While more willing to admit to Deputy Commander Baldev, is that integration should “mistakes” in its past actions, it drags its feet on be carried out in parallel with constitution-writing and transparent investigations and resists action against should be completed only once the new constitution is those found responsible for crimes.77 in place – thus retaining some independent armed in- fluence and insurance against disbanding the PLA be- 4. Other parties fore the outcome of the constitutional process is set in stone. However, much of the PLA, like the party Apart from the UCPN(M), the major parties have not leadership, appears to favour getting integration un- been enthusiastic supporters of PLA combatants’ in- derway sooner. There has also been talk of a possible tegration into the NA. The NC has adopted an in- referendum on the question as a means of short- creasingly strident campaign against any integration; circuiting the AISC deadlock.76 The belated constitu- in this it has been supported by the MJF and, increas- tion of that committee may render such alternatives ingly if inconsistently, by some of the louder voices unnecessary, but only if it proves functional. within the UML leadership, although not the party itself.

In the meantime the PLA is further consolidated as an Much of this opposition has been presented as a mat- organised force: discipline appears intact and military ter of immutable non-violent principle. But such ar- training has been stepped up – with the supposed ra- guments are largely spurious. The NC’s position on tionale of bringing combatants up to standard for en- violence has never been clear-cut. B.P. Koirala, the try into the new NA. The PLA’s formal organisation first NC prime minister, was proud to have entered is certainly greater than during the war, although it politics by being “drawn to the [Indian] terrorist movement of the 1930s” and arrested on murder charges.78 In preparation for the armed movement to 74 Naya Patrika, 8 December 2008, p. 1. 75 “NA is no longer a national army”, Baldev interview, The Kathmandu Post, 8 December 2008. “In line with Nepal’s new situation, we should create a joint command. In the first 77 The NA and CPN(M) responses to UN Office of the High phase of integration a coordination command of the top Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Bardiya inves- leadership of the two armies can be created. They can form tigations are instructive. While the NA attempted to cover up plans together, but the orders given will be passed down through its offences, the CPN(M) accepted responsibility for twelve separate channels. The units of the NA and PLA will remain of the fourteen killings attributed to its forces; in the remain- separate. Then according to the new policy, we will under- ing two cases there is credible doubt. However, neither side take downsizing. According to this decision, there may be a has supported criminal investigation and prosecution of its reduction in the numbers of both PLA and NA commanders”. members. “Conflict-related Disappearances in Bardiya Dis- 76 Basudev Ghimire, “Sena samayojan sahamatima va jana- trict”, OHCHR-Nepal, December 2008, pp. 46-50, 53-56. mat sangraha?”, Janadisha, 23 December 2008. 78 Anirudha Gupta, Nepalese Interviews (Delhi, 1997), p. 9. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 16

overthrow the hereditary Rana prime ministership in The first fear has solid theoretical grounds. As NC 1950 he found it easy to reject the Gandhian approach: leaders have cogently and correctly argued, Maoist “My own non-violence was always a matter of tactics strategy still calls for a complete capture of state rather than an article of faith”.79 The UML’s most power by all available means.83 From the prime min- outspoken opponent of integration, K.P. Oli, knows ister down, Maoist leaders have not only refused to well about political violence himself. Finding the revise this line but have repeatedly emphasised it. people’s war line of the UML’s precursor, the CPN(ML), Nevertheless, a few thousand former PLA combatants insufficiently radical, he became one of the leaders of diluted in a much larger national force would repre- the “Jhapali” movement that sought to bring forward sent a far less potent force than their current inde- the revolution by murdering landlords.80 pendent army. If seizing power is their aim, integration would be more of an obstacle than an advantage. Frequently aired insistences that the Maoists should follow the NC’s example from the 1950s by disband- The fear that the two militaries could cut a mutually ing their own armed units voluntarily and embracing acceptable deal is more pertinent. One commentator the state army as the sole legitimate force rest on a has observed that “the most significant change in similarly patchy reading of history. When NC ministers Kathmandu has been the growing warmth in ties be- joined the first post-Rana government, they not only tween the Maoists and the Nepalese Army (NA). For refused to fly the national flag of Nepal on their vehi- those who thought that their bitter past would not al- cles, preferring their party pennants, but retained their low the two sides to engage with each other, this may own “liberation army” bodyguards even when visiting have come as a shock. But this relationship, and rap- the royal palace for cabinet meetings.81 Current NC prochement, is happening at several levels”.84 Infor- leaders’ claims that they never sought, or achieved, mal talks between the PLA and NA (the latter integration of their guerrillas in the national army (in- represented by retired officers rather than current stead allowing them to become the backbone of the new commanders) have been constructive – and have not police force) are not supported by reliable historians.82 included the political parties. For all the argument over NA recruitment (see below), the Maoist defence Motivations for opposing possible PLA-NA integra- minister has sought not to ruffle feathers and has pri- tion are, in fact, threefold: the genuine fear that the vately lobbied for additional resources for the NA.85 Maoists would use the process to weaken or co-opt “Of course we’re scared of the army, just as we are of the state security forces and establish a totalitarian re- the Maoists”, noted one senior NC leader. “They both gime; the political opportunity of compensating for have guns and we don’t so why shouldn’t we be poor election results by cultivating the NA as a pow- scared?”86 Such worries only add to the case for erful, anti-Maoist ally; and, conversely, the worry prompt action to move the process forward. The longer that, despite their apparent enmity, the Maoists and the deadlock continues, the more it serves the more army top brass could cut a deal that would sideline militant camps on both ends of the political spectrum. unarmed parties.

B. NEW NEPAL, NEW ARMY?

79 With the pressing immediacy of the integration de- Ibid., p. 10. bate, it is easy to forget that the peace process was 80 Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John Whelpton, Peo- ple, Politics & Ideology (Kathmandu, 1999), p. 83. meant to deliver far more than just the assimilation of 81 Rajesh Gautam, Nepali Congress (New Delhi, 2005), p. 471. some former guerrillas into a national army. The es- 82 “The bulk of the Kirati section of the Rakshya Dal, which sence of the consensus on the security sector was two- had played a prominent role in the K.I. Singh revolt, was disbanded, and the remaining units were incorporated into either the state army or the civil police”. Bhuwan Lal Joshi 83 See, for example, Ram Sharan Mahat, “Betrayal of the and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case peace process?”, The Kathmandu Post, 14 December 2008; Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley, 1966), p. 101. and RJP leader Prakash Chandra Lohani, “Revisiting strate- Rajesh Gautam observes: “During that time [1950-1951] gic intent”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 February 2009. On the many Nepalese had the view that somebody among the unchanging fundamentals of Maoist strategy, see Crisis commanders of Mukti Sena [the NC “liberation army”] Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit.; also Crisis Group should be the Commander-in-Chief of the national army and Report, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, op. cit., p. 5. Mukti Sena should be as an independent army, and the gov- 84 Prashant Jha, “Troubled Beginnings”, South Asia Intelli- ernment of the multiple party should be formed. But those gence Review, 8 December 2008. views were ignored after the Delhi treaty due to the compul- 85 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Kathmandu, October sion and weakness of the leaders”. Gautam, Nepali Con- and December 2008. gress, op. cit., p. 470. 86 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2008. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 17

fold: the PLA would, through the integration of some The NA itself has indicated its awareness of the need combatants into state security forces and the rehabili- for some change, although concrete action has been tation of others, be in effect dissolved; the NA would limited to raising a Madhes-based battalion and steps be brought under democratic control and significantly such as advertising recruiting drives in languages reformed. The CPA contained detailed commitments: such as Bhojpuri and Maithili. Generals have also talked of formulating a new national security policy – The Interim Council of Ministers shall prepare and a necessary step for Nepal’s political leadership but implement the detailed action plan for the democ- perhaps put forward as a delaying tactic in the ab- ratisation of the Nepali Army on the basis of po- sence of any clear and present regional threat. The litical consensus and the suggestions of the other major parties have offered no policy proposals committee concerned of the Interim Legislature. for broader reform. Despite some revision of the leg- This includes, among other things, right-sizing, islation governing the army, the legacy of the NC-led democratic restructuring reflecting the national interim government was a further erosion of the and inclusive character and imparting training to minimal oversight that the palace had provided and a the Nepali Army on the values of democracy and concerted, if unsuccessful, effort to use the NA for its human rights.87 own partisan purposes.91 “Very few care to mention the elephant in the room: the Nepalese Army”, one The interim constitution specified that “the Council of commentator noted, and continued: Ministers shall, with the consent of the political par- ties and by seeking the advice of the concerned com- The challenge of reforming the Nepalese Army mittee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an will probably be even more complex than rehabili- extensive work plan for the democratization of the tating Maoist combatants. Despite its aggressive Nepalese Army and implement it”.88 The need for in- denials, the army is composed of even more politi- clusiveness was reaffirmed in the fifth constitutional cally indoctrinated members than the Maoists.… amendment, which added further legal stipulations for The reform of an institution as ossified as the Nep- action.89 Despite continuing debate within the party alese Army will be long-drawn. More inclusive re- over the modalities of integration, Maoist political cruitment policies, better orientation of soldiers leaders and PLA commanders have always had a clear and socialisation of officers will take time. The view on the parallel nature of the process. In the smooth transition of the military from a Gorkhali words of one senior commander: Army to the modern force of a new federal Nepal must underpin Nepal’s democratic future.92 As a party, we feel that integration is not simply a matter of the PLA being merged into the NA. PLA The NA has taken some steps to broaden its recruiting combatants will not join the NA just to get a job, base but has not adopted the quotas that apply to all under standards and norms created in the past. We other state bodies. It argues that setting targets would have made this clear. What we’re saying is that mean violating rights: “Recruitment is voluntary and both the PLA and the NA need to be raised to a competitive. Hence forcing citizens to sign up in the new standard. This means that the army can’t sim- proportion of the demographic breakup of the nation ply keep its old structure under which they were would violate the rights of the people who may not used and deployed by the feudalists and the mon- want to join the Army and at the same time be unfair archy. And the PLA also can’t remain as the army to those qualified and wishing to join”.93 Its own sta- of a single party. Both these armies need to be tistics indicate that Brahmans or Chhetris made up 74 transformed, a new national army and a new na- per cent of officer cadet applicants and 85 per cent of tional security policy created.90 successful candidates. Madhesis and Tharus, at only 0.5 per cent in total, are particularly poorly repre- sented. The suggestion that this results solely from “the lack of interest on the part of Madhesi communi- ties to join military services” seems inadequate.94 In 87 CPA, Art. 4.7. 88 Interim Constitution, Art. 144(3). 89 The fifth amendment introduced an additional sub-article (4A) to Art. 144: “In order to make the Nepalese Army na- 91 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, tional in character, the entry of citizens, including Madhesis, op. cit. indigenous nationalities, Dalits, women and those from mar- 92 C.K. Lal, “The proletariat and the Praetorian Guard”, ginalized areas, shall be ensured through legal provisions on Nepali Times, 28 March 2008. the principles of equality and inclusiveness”. 93 Nepalese Army, “State of Inclusiveness in Nepalese 90 Interview with Baldev, The Kathmandu Post, 8 December Army”, at www.nepalarmy.mil.np/inclusiveness.php. 2008. 94 Ibid. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 18

any case, the ceasefire-mandated freeze on recruit- Despite almost three years of ceasefire, Nepal remains ment should have pushed other reforms further up the one of the region’s most heavily militarised countries. agenda. Instead, as another analyst points out, the While less than one in every 1000 Indian citizens “real battle” occupying the attention and energies of serve in the Indian army, Nepal’s ratio is more than the NA and others is over control: three times greater – double that of and close to that of Pakistan, South Asia’s most army- The army has never been as autonomous in its dominated state.98 This does not include the Armed functioning as it is now. It would like to retain this Police Force or the PLA – either the 19,000 verified independence because of its deep distrust for the combatants or the 34,000 in total who continue to be political parties, its antagonism towards the Mao- paid for by the state.99 One of the few journalists to ists, and its contempt for the civilian bureaucracy. take up the question of affordability has noted: But political control does not mean the Maoists or a Maoist minister will control the army. It means Our poor country has been feeding a 92,000-plus the Ministry of Defence running the army affairs strong army and an additional 34,000 PLA per- and not being a mere postbox. It means strong all- sonnel (including disqualified ones). The size party parliamentary defence committees keeping should be reduced as soon as possible to at least a an eye on army finances and its professionalism. It pre-insurgency level– that is about 45,000 … whether means regular oversight by the whole cabinet. For or not the CPA allows new recruitment is less too long, the army has been in the hands of a tiny relevant here. What is important is, do we need nexus of generals from the hill elite.95 any more people in army uniform? Do we need more PLA? Or should we use every available op- There has been one important legal change. The NA, portunity to downsize the army and the PLA? The like the police and Armed Police Force (APF), will be army has argued that it needs new recruitment to covered by the February 2009 ordinance prescribing keep its daily functions going. But anyone who has quotas for recruitment to government services. A total seen the army’s vacancy announcement knows that a of 45 per cent of positions will be reserved for (in de- majority of the new recruits will be combatants.100 scending order of size of allocation) janajatis, Mad- hesis, women, Dalits and candidates from “backward Nepal’s donors are footing the bill. It is their aid to regions”. The ordinance was approved despite UML sectors such as health and education that leaves the concerns that it was not suitable for the army and that government free to divert such a generous portion of army officers should have been consulted.96 its own resources to the military. Development part- ners have been remarkably patient in supplying this 1. Affordability subsidy but the pursuit of more important objectives, such as the flagging effort to meet millennium devel- Nepal’s bloated security sector places an unsustain- opment goals on health and education, will bring the able burden on overstretched government finances. question of downsizing into sharper focus. Even The defence ministry budget, which expert observers prompt action will do little to reduce the long-term suggest does not include all expenditure on the NA, strain of a vast army pension budget101 but it can en- accounts for over 5 per cent of government spending. sure valuable financial and human resources are It is almost on par with that of the home ministry, channelled into more productive areas. whose functions include not only policing but also the nationwide structure of district-level administration, and more than four-fifths that of spending on the min- 98 These figures are based on 2008 population estimates and istry of health and population, which serves some of army figures excluding reservists. Nepalese Army: 95,753; Nepal’s most critical needs.97 population: 29.5 million; 0.32 per cent. Indian army: 1.1 million (plus 1.2 million reservists); population 1.15 billion; 0.10 per cent. Bangladesh army: 250,000 (estimate); population: 150 million (2007 estimate); 0.17 per cent. Pakistan army: 95 Prashant Jha, “Army amalgamation”, Nepali Times, 24 650,000 (plus 528,000 reservists); population: 172 million October 2008. (2008 estimate); 0.38 per cent. 96 Yuvraj Acharya, “Govt to issue 3 ordinances; All govt 99 The expense of maintaining the cantonments and paying services including army to be inclusive”, myrepublica.com, 5 PLA combatants’ salaries are also not included in the defence February 2009. ministry budget, being instead covered by donor grants ad- 97 Of a total budget of approx. $3 billion, the defence ministry ministered through the ministry of peace and reconstruction. receives some $159 million, the home ministry $161 million 100 Ameet Dhakal, “The cost of superficiality”, myrepub- and the ministry of health and population $193 million. Gov- lica.com, 10 January 2009. ernment of Nepal, Budget (2008-2009), at http://www.mof. 101 See Artha Beed, “Integrationomics”, Nepali Times, 7 No- gov.np/publication/speech/2008_1/index.php. vember 2008. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 19

2. Democratic control politics. According to the interim constitution, it re- quires the consent of the president on the question of The NA remains a law unto itself and its chief has in- any change in the army. The cabinet can only recom- dicated he will obey orders only insofar as they suit mend to the president”.106 In fact, the constitution is him. The army sees itself as answerable to the gov- unambiguous. Although the fourth amendment speci- ernment but consistently, if subtly, qualifies its will- fied that the president, as supreme commander, would ingness to obey orders. Before the election, Chief of manage the army on the recommendation of the coun- Army Staff (COAS) General Rookmangud Katwal cil of ministers, there is no provision for the president was careful to state that he would obey the orders of a to reject the cabinet’s advice unless it is clearly un- “constitutionally elected” government – thereby ex- constitutional.107 Army mobilisation for any purpose cluding the then interim government.102 After the other than natural disaster relief in any case requires Maoist victory, army officers have stressed their pri- parliamentary special committee approval, which en- mary responsibility is the protection of the state’s ables opposition scrutiny and dissent.108 sovereignty and territorial integrity, for which they are answerable to the . COAS Katwal A row over NA recruitment in late 2008 brought the has publicly stated that the army will only follow “le- issue into the daylight. The commitment “not to re- gitimate” orders and will continue to fight against cruit new people in their respective armies” was in- “extremism”.103 cluded in the ceasefire code of conduct, while the CPA specified that “neither side shall recruit addi- The appointment of a Maoist defence minister has not tional troops”.109 The NA had carried out recruitment led to any visible shift in the government-army rela- in 2007 without informing the tripartite Joint Moni- tionship other than an eruption of tensions over the toring Coordination Committee (JMCC),110 the UN question of recruitment. In the two years since the in- Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) or the PLA, prompting terim constitution’s promulgation, there has been no the latter to complain in the JMCC in August 2007. sign of the “extensive work plan for democratisation”. However, the defence secretary, then reporting to The NA has continued to carry out promotions and G.P. Koirala, who held the defence portfolio, backed transfers without cabinet approval. On one front there the NA.111 The NA argues that recruits to fill vacant has been some formal progress. In January 2009 the positions up to its strength at the time of the ceasefire National Defence Council was finally constituted.104 It do not constitute “additional troops”, although they has yet to start work but its remit is to provide “rec- are certainly “new people”. ommendations to the Council of Ministers on mobili- sation, operation and use of the Nepalese Army”.105 The argument is political rather than legal. Those pre- sent at the AMMAA negotiations report that the ques- Senior opposition politicians have sought to muddy tion of recruiting to fill vacancies was explicitly the waters over the question of who controls the army. discussed and not agreed, in accordance with the let- In the words of NC leader Ramchandra Poudel, “Nepali Congress will take all necessary steps if Mao- ists make any attempt to drag Nepalese Army into 106 Interview, Spotlight, 9 January 2009. 107 144(2): “The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese Army [amended: (2) The words ‘by the Council of Ministers’ in Clause (2) have 102 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Land- been replaced by the words ‘by the President on the recom- scape, op. cit. mendation of the Council of Ministers’]”. 144(3): “The 103 “Army Chief says don’t drag NA into controversy”, ekan- Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the tipur.com, 4 January 2009. Nepalese Army in accordance with the law [amended (3) 104 The June 2008 multiparty agreement (Art. 1.3) referred to The words ‘the Council of Ministers shall’ in Clause (3) the CA the question of whether an opposition leader should have been replaced by the words ‘the President shall on the be included, noting the disagreement between the CPN(M), recommendation of the Council of Ministers’]”. UML and (who argued against) and NC, 108 145(5): “Except in the case of mobilization of the Nepal- CPN(ML) and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) ese Army because of natural calamities, the decision made (NSP(A)) (in favour). The interim constitution (Art. 145) had by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Nepal for stated that the National Defence Council should be chaired the mobilization of the army shall be presented to a special by the prime minister and include the defence and home committee prescribed by the Legislature-Parliament within a ministers and three other ministers designated by the prime month of the decision, and be approved accordingly”. minister. It was amended to specify that the latter three posi- 109 Ceasefire Code of Conduct Art. 3; CPA Art. 5.1.2 tions should represent three different parties from among 110 The JMCC, established by the AMMAA, brings together those in the council of ministers. Interim Constitution Art. NA and PLA representatives under UN convenorship. 145(1)(d), as amended by the fifth amendment, Art. 19. 111 Briefing by Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Sec- 105 Interim Constitution, Art. 145. retary-General in Nepal, UN Security Council, 16 January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 20

ter and spirit of the ceasefire code of conduct. nently advertised in the media, including state-owned UNMIN’s position on this has been consistent.112 newspapers, and selection camps had been established Supporters of the NA, however, are unlikely to be in several locations, attracting almost 50,000 appli- swayed by the requirements of the peace deals, how- cants. The UCPN(M)’s belated complaints were fur- ever much they bemoan UNMIN’s inability to en- ther undermined by contradictory statements from its force other parts of the agreements. As one columnist leaders suggesting there was no clear party, or gov- argues, the “changed circumstances” following the ernment, line.115 election (specifically, having a Maoist prime minister and defence minister) are more important than the let- The army’s understanding of an acceptable level of ter and spirit of the peace agreement.113 democratic control is not one that most other militar- ies would recognise. “Of course we are happy with In November 2008 the NA again embarked on re- having a ministry of defence”, explained one senior cruitment without informing the JMCC, UNMIN or officer. “As long as it understands that its only duty is the PLA, prompting the UN SRSG to issue a state- to endorse whatever our headquarters tells it to. It’s ment in the face of PLA threats to undertake new re- too early to have our officers messing around with cruitment themselves. As both witness to the politicians – maybe in ten years’ time”.116 Gentle AMMAA and convenor of the JMCC, UNMIN’s pub- nudges from sympathetic donors have been brushed lic reiteration of the content of agreements might ap- off; the UK’s efforts to support capacity building in pear uncontroversial but was taken by some as a the ministry of defence have been quietly but system- deliberate effort to undermine the NA: atically thwarted. “There is currently no sign of any political will to grip the generals, or to build the ca- UNMIN’s Ian Martin has declared that any re- pacity to make civilian control of the military a reality cruitment by parties to the Comprehensive Peace – both essential foundations for a democratic state”, Accord (CPA) violates the letter and spirit of the warned a retired British general. “The rarity of Agreement on Monitoring and Management of meaningful discussion on the subject is just one Arms and Armies that his team is committed to measure of the size of the task and of the moral ensure. This is as clear an espousal of the Maoist courage required to champion its urgency and cause as is prudentially possible for the UN. importance”.117 Whether the position of UNMIN constitutes a 3. Accountability breach of protocol or merely violates accepted norms of diplomatic decency is for Foreign Minis- Meaningful democratic control would not only mean 114 ter Upendra Yadav to decide. taking orders from civilians but would also entail budgetary accountability. As the author of the only The Maoist handling of the controversy was confused recent book-length study of the (then) Royal Nepalese and inept. Despite their longstanding refusal to accept Army (RNA), retired Indian Maj.-Gen. Ashok Mehta, any NA recruitment and their control of the defence explained: ministry, they allowed the process to carry on for sev- eral weeks before crying foul. The recruiting was Since officers are poorly paid, corruption is ram- hardly carried out in secret: vacancies were promi- pant at various levels, especially at the very top. Indian military equipment is not popular because

there are no kickbacks. A number of local factories

112 “Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary- producing clothing, boots, etc, were closed down General, has written to the Minister of Defence, reiterating so that these items could be ‘profitably’ imported. UNMIN’s view that any new recruitment by the Nepalese Over-invoicing is rampant and the quality of ra- Army or the Maoist army would be a breach of the Ceasefire tions very poor.…The ostentatious lifestyles of Code of Conduct, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and many retired generals seem well beyond their ac- the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and countable income.118 Armies. UNMIN had expressed this view to the previous Government in the context of earlier reports of new recruit- ment by the Nepalese Army in 2007, and had also drawn the attention of the Minister of Defence in the current Govern- ment to its position. The previous Government had main- 115 For example, look at conflicting Mahara and Badal tained that the Nepalese Army could fill vacancies up to its statements. standing strength at the time of the signing of the Compre- 116 Crisis Group interview, October 2008. hensive Peace Agreement”. UNMIN, press statement, 23 117 Sam Cowan, “The Lost Battles of Khara and Pili”, Himal December 2008. Southasian, September 2008. 113 C.K. Lal, “It is Nepal’s army”, Nepali Times, 9 January 2009. 118 Ashok Mehta, The Royal Nepalese Army: Meeting the 114 Ibid. Maoist Challenge (Delhi, 2005), pp. 43-44. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 21

The only thing that has changed since April 2006 is motivation and camaraderie. Corruption is rampant that the palace no longer oversees this habitual cor- especially at higher echelons and morale low among ruption. The interim government was happy to turn a the rank and file”.122 This assessment by a sympa- blind eye, the Maoist defence minister has shown no thetic fellow professional suggests that greater ac- indication he wants to grasp this nettle and few inde- countability would enhance, rather than detract from, pendent observers dare speak out publicly. In one rare professionalism. The government appears to have example, a Nepali daily’s frontpage story enumerated made one move towards increased oversight, with a a litany of scams, from the grandiose to the petty. At 15 January 2009 cabinet regulation on the Army Wel- the upper end of the scale, the Army Welfare Fund fare Fund which reportedly includes a 22 per cent cap issued a letter of credit to purchase eleven Chinese on the salary deductions of troops on UN peacekeep- armoured personnel carriers for $5.5 million; the ve- ing operations that flow to it.123 hicles, for which no tender was issued, were report- edly destined for a possible peacekeeping mission in 4. Impunity Sudan that has not materialised.119 Large contracts for trousers, shirts, woollen vests and bags were also Since the ceasefire, solid evidence of war crimes awarded without tenders, an order for 30,000 boots committed during the conflict has been collated. Both that rejected the lowest offer for one more than a third warring parties regularly violated international hu- more expensive was justified on the grounds that manitarian law, most notably the Geneva Conven- boots are “of strategic importance”.120 A seasoned tions. Furthermore, the thorough investigations of the economics columnist observed: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have strongly suggested RNA offi- For decades, the Nepalese Army has managed to cers were responsible for crimes against humanity, a stay outside the normal accountability structure – category of grave offences that are viewed as contra- not due to lack of procedures but the [manner] in vening customary international law, which binds all which it operated, especially with the Supreme states.124 No action has been taken by successive gov- Commander (the king), the accountability institu- ernments, the courts or NA, police or PLA command- tion of last resort. The prime minister generally took ers to investigate these crimes.125 In contrast, the the ceremonial Defence Ministry and Palace Af- culture of condoning cover-ups continues unabated. fairs which literally meant that there were no com- petencies or systems to regulate the army. The Auditor Violations were both systematic and systemic. The General’s offices paid token visits to look through distinction in the terms is important. Abuses were sys- army accounts, and accountability was minimal. tematic in their execution: planned, sustained, en- Even the Army Welfare Fund, that belonged not to dorsed by commanders and following a fairly the state but the army personnel and their families, consistent pattern. They were systemic, on both sides, could get away from disclosure obligations.121 in that they stemmed from institutional cultures which refused to recognise crimes as crimes and resisted any Such arrangements surely boost the morale of the sen- form of investigation or prosecution. Even as their ef- ior officers allowed to dip their hands in the till with fects live on for victims, their families and wider impunity. They do little, however, to support an insti- communities, systematic war crimes are in the past. tution-wide esprit de corps. Maj.-Gen. Mehta sug- gested a link between corruption and an organisational culture which does little to foster good relations between ranks to the detriment of opera- 122 Ashok Mehta, The Royal Nepalese Army, op. cit., p. 71. tional effectiveness: “Few Nepalese have the courage 123 Ananta Raj Luitel, “NA welfare fund spending made to admit that RNA lacks offensive spirit – that it does transparent”, The Himalayan Times, 26 January 2009. not have the stomach to fight. Senior leadership is 124 The Accountability Watch Committee, a domestic body considered professionally inept, JCOs infirm and offi- bringing together many of the most respected human rights cers at junior command levels bereft of guid- activists, found that the OHCHR Bardiya report “presents a ance.…There is also no concrete concept of welfare, wealth of evidence that the acts of disappearance during Ne- pal’s armed conflict were crimes against humanity. It has recommended the Government of Nepal to conduct criminal investigations of these crimes and prosecutions”. Press re- 119 Parshuram Kafle, “Armed Personnel Carriers worth NPR lease, Kathmandu, 20 December 2008. 400 million purchased without tender”, Naya Patrika, 19 125 The NA has, by its own account, sentenced 66 personnel June 2008. for human rights violations with penalties ranging from im- 120 Ibid. prisonment to discharge or demotion. It is not, however, able 121 Artha Beed, “Integrationomics”, Nepali Times, 7 Novem- to release any information on individual cases. Nepalese ber 2008. Army Headquarters, email communication, February 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 22

The systemic failings which enabled them to happen V. THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES remain, however, very much a matter of the present.

Immediate investigation and redress for every viola- A. REBUILDING THE PEACE PROCESS tion is impossible but the peace process offers a unique opportunity to introduce a change in culture. 1. Consensus and confidence An unaccountable and predatory security sector that exploits citizens rather than protecting them is Conditions for cooperation are more strained than unlikely to contribute to lasting peace or stability. ever but there are no viable alternatives to working Whatever the shape of any deal on PLA integration together. The UCPN(M) must reach out to the NC and NA democratisation, these twin procedures offer which, in turn, must stop spoiling for spoiling’s sake. the chance to signal a clear change in direction. The UML can still play a crucial mediating role if it Screening all personnel to identify those on both sides resists the calls from both sides to help a process of suspected of grave abuses, including at the command polarisation. These three parties must jointly recog- level, and filtering them out of a reconstituted na- nise the need to respect the changed political configu- tional army would be a minimal first step towards re- ration since the elections – not only the CPN(M) building a respectable state force. victory but the fact that other parties, led by the MJF, represent significant constituencies whose active col- laboration in governance and constitution-writing is essential.

Calls for polarisation represent a fundamental chal- lenge to day-to-day governance and the concept of consensus as the basis for constitutional process. The move away from consensus was initiated in response to the surprise Maoist electoral victory. The NC insisted on dismantling part of the constitutional requirement for consensus by pushing for the simple majoritarian government/opposition structure which was instituted by the fourth and fifth amendments to the interim constitution.126 (Maoist leaders eventually agreed to this concession but insist they have not been slow to reach out to other parties, for example by offering the UML, specifically former leader Madhav Nepal, chairmanship of the constitution-drafting committee from the outset.127) Appointments to all positions – from the president and prime minister to the CA speaker and deputy and the chairs of drafting commit- tees – are now decided by elections, even if some of the latter were in effect settled through negotiation. Maoist Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai has re- sisted the call for polarisation: “We have a consensus on fundamental democratic principles like multiparty competition, human rights, rule of law and so on.…A majority government and minority opposition invites

126 The fourth amendment, passed late on the night of the CA’s first sitting, provided for the appointment and removal of the prime minister by a simple majority of CA members, rather than the existing consensus model with a two-thirds threshold for a no-confidence motion. The fifth amendment, passed on 15 July 2008, further amended Art. 36B (to enable the election of the president) and Art. 71 (to elect the CA speaker and deputy speaker). 127 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, December 2008 and January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 23

instability, which is what is happening now when new charter with the MJF and other significant parties what we need is a political consensus”.128 Speaking at on board might better represent the more inclusive the CA as the committee chairs were to be appointed, shape the peace process, and government, has assumed. Prachanda similarly reiterated the need for consensus. But the rhetoric from elsewhere in the Maoist move- Rebuilding a minimum common understanding on the ment has grown progressively more militant.129 fundamentals of the peace process remains possible and does not have to mean the reduction of all poli- Much of the more extreme language from political cies to the lowest common denominator. Consensus is leaders may be posturing, playing to the balcony necessary to complete the commitments of the CPA within their own parties and attention-seeking. It does and the writing of the constitution but not for gov- not all have to be taken at face value, especially in the ernment business. The UCPN(M) has a popular and context of jostling for leadership positions and other constitutional mandate to lead the government. Day- intra-party battles which encourage heightened rheto- to-day governance and the formulation of policies not ric. Many individual leaders may be persuaded to directly related to the peace process is the collective drop public criticism in return for personal prefer- responsibility of the UCPN(M) and its coalition part- ment. It is too late to offer G.P. Koirala the presi- ners. They do not have to submit executive decisions dency but the appointment of Madhav Nepal to head to consultation beyond the oversight that the legisla- the constitutional committee indicates the potential ture already provides – although this should not be an for co-opting powerful individual leaders. excuse for using ordinances to bypass parliamentary scrutiny, however temporarily. What is important is a 2. A fresh start? fresh impetus for the peace process and clear, realistic public commitments by all players on how they will There have been suggestions, including from the behave and what goals they will jointly pursue. prime minister, that the breakdown in trust calls for a new deal. Renegotiating the CPA, or reopening de- 3. Mechanisms and monitoring bate on its fundamental elements, is fraught with dan- ger: there is no scope to forge a new agreement and Agreement in principle will not translate into imple- undermining the authority of the existing framework mentation in practice without appropriate structures in could destroy what consensus remains. Behind-the- place. The first must be an overarching political coor- scenes efforts between the major parties that initially dination mechanism, in which all major parties can framed the process are keeping channels for construc- assess progress, air disagreements, discuss priorities tive dialogue open and maintaining some of the coop- and the means to achieve them and maintain a basic erative spirit of the early negotiations. But the June shared agenda. It should have the mandate and capac- 2008 multiparty promise that “consensus and coop- ity to keep the process moving forward, manage dis- eration will be both fostered and adopted in order to putes and have sufficient secretariat support to make make progress on building the constitution”130 was ei- informed decisions, whose implementation can be ther insincere or not robust and detailed enough to monitored and evaluated. It must also be inclusive withstand the further erosion of confidence. and authoritative – with sufficiently high-level repre- sentation that top party leaders cannot circumvent it There are, however, grounds for a new statement of and second-rank leaders cannot publicly undermine it. political intent. The major principles on which the peace process was built were set out in the November For now, the CA’s constitutional committee is the 2005 twelve-point agreement – a document designed main mechanism for high-level political dialogue as it to forge a joint anti-monarchical struggle rather than a includes most major party leaders. However, it has a far-sighted declaration of common cause. More sig- specific remit and is unable to tackle broader peace nificantly, the principal agreements were drawn up process-related issues. At the local level, the lack of and signed by a limited number of parties. The CA mechanisms is even more stark. Before the election, election showed they did not represent as broad a the seven-party grouping had functioned, however spectrum of public opinion as they had assumed. A imperfectly in some cases, as a confidence and con- sensus-building mechanism, as had regular meetings

convened by district election officials. The absence of

128 Interview, Nepali Times, 9 January 2009. any such structures has contributed to a worsening of 129 See, for example, “Janajagaranle tuphani abhiyanma local inter-party relationships and adds to the urgency pratigamiharu badharine”, Janadesh, 23 December 2008. of establishing all-party local government bodies and 130 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the broader-based peace committees. Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 2008, Art. 7.4. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 24

At a lower level, the thematic bodies called for by the agreement introduced more specific mechanisms but CPA, and others as necessary, must be established none was activated.134 The government’s own policies and made functional. Such mechanisms should allow and programs document only adds to the confusion, for a sensible measure of delegation. The concentra- suggesting a possible conflation of the peace, truth tion of all discussion and decision-making in the and reconciliation and disappearance commissions: hands of a few senior leaders has serious practical, as “Regarding a high-level Peace and Reconciliation well as political, implications. With all contentious Commission [that would] investigate into and make issues forced into one narrow bottleneck, disagree- public the cases of those who have been disappeared, ment on one question can easily stall progress on as per the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace many others. Top leaders do not have the time or se- Agreement, a separate Commission shall be created. cretariat support to examine complex topics in suffi- The Commission’s reports [and recommendations] cient detail to reach workable solutions. To take only shall be actively implemented”.135 the question of the return of seized land, for example, there is not even a central register of the property in The June 2008 agreement specifically called for a question, let alone a detailed breakdown of current mechanism to supervise the Maoist pledges on chang- occupants and options for resettlement or compensa- ing YCL behaviour: “A monitoring committee that tion. The multiple challenges demanding immediate includes representatives from the political parties, consideration have to be dealt with in series, rather human-rights defenders and local administration will than in parallel. Finally, compromises depend too be established, in order to monitor whether this much on personal relations and individual interests: [promise] has been implemented”.136 No such com- fine if trading favours can smooth the path to a prin- mittee has yet been established. A similarly unful- cipled agreement but too often reducing serious deci- filled pledge was to set up a parallel monitoring sions to the soothing of inflated egos in shabby committee on the return of seized property.137 The closed-door trade-offs. UCPN(M)’s failure to fulfil its promises is clear.

A solid, impartial monitoring mechanism is essential. Many of the allegations publicly traded between par- arrangements for the deal as a whole. CPA Part 9 “Imple- ties appear to have little basis in fact. But in the ab- mentation and Monitoring”. It did establish a National Peace sence of objective monitoring, political discussions and Rehabilitation Commission to assist in “normalisation of are destined to remain divorced from reality. For ex- the difficult situation that arose as a result of the armed con- flict” (Art. 5.2.4) and empowered it to “set up necessary ample, there is no reliable way of gauging whether the mechanisms for the success of the peace campaign” (Art. YCL is becoming more or less active, intimidating or 8.2) but left dispute resolution to an undefined “joint mecha- totalitarian in its behaviour. Some indicators, from nism comprising both sides” (Art. 10.4). their apparently lower public presence in urban areas 134 This included a High-Level Committee for Monitoring to donor reports that the drive to seize development the Effective Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace tenders has subsided, suggest the YCL has scaled Accord and other Agreements and a High-Level Peace back its activities. Political opponents, however, ar- Commission; formation of the latter apparently remains on gue the reverse. the agenda. Until the formation of the High-Level Peace Commission, a Peace and Conflict Management Committee, The peace deal was never backed by a coherent ap- composed of civil society and party representatives, was to proach to monitoring. The Ceasefire Code of Conduct serve as an alternative interim body. In October 2008 it met called for oversight “by national and international and decided to review the implementation of all peace proc- 131 ess commitments from the twelve-point agreement onwards monitoring teams” but the national body established but does not appear to have completed this review. was ineffective and rapidly dissolved. The 8 Novem- 135 Policies and Programmes of the Government of the Re- ber 2006 government-Maoist summit that paved the public of Nepal, 11 September 2008. The government also way for the CPA promised a “high-level committee announced it would form the following commissions: High- … to monitor if the agreements have been imple- Level Scientific Land Reform Commission, National Labour mented”132 but the CPA itself contained no general Commission, Administration Restructuring Commission, monitoring provision.133 The December 2007 23-point National Dalit Commission, National Women’s Commis- sion, National Muslim Commission. 136 “Agreement between the political parties to amend the Constitution and take forward the peace process”, 25 June 131 Ceasefire Code of Conduct, Art. 21. 2008, Art. 3. 132 SPA-Maoist agreement, 8 November 2006, Art. V.1. 137 “A central-level monitoring committee, which includes 133 It requested OHCHR and the National Human Rights representatives from the political parties, will be formed to Commission (NHRC) to monitor human rights, UNMIN to monitor the implementation [of this point]”. “Agreement be- monitor arms and armies’ management and the UN to moni- tween the political parties to amend the Constitution and take tor the CA elections but contained no mention of monitoring forward the peace process”, 25 June 2008, Art. 4. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 25

Other parties’ preference has been to pursue the issue Emphasising the practicalities of process is nothing solely through the media rather than through pressure new. But just because the case has been made, and to establish the promised committees. The CA’s 19 ignored, repeatedly does not mean it is false. It also bears January 2009 formation of an eleven-member cross- repeating that the peace process has seen only one party committee to monitor the government’s imple- successful monitoring body so far, the JMCC. It re- mentation of its promises to meet NC demands is an mains functional and has contributed significantly to example of steps that can be taken within the legisla- reducing the risk of direct NA-PLA tensions.141 It meets ture to involve parties in holding their peers to account. regularly, has an agenda and is professionally supported. Its tripartite format – with the UN included as witness Some state and non-governmental bodies do provide to the AMMAA that established it – is not replicable monitoring functions. For instance, the NHRC tracks elsewhere in the process. Nevertheless, the successful human rights violations, the peace ministry aspects of its functioning should not be ignored. coordinates claims for compensation and a variety of professional bodies and NGOs follow areas within In parallel, the other success story is the Election their own mandates. But none of this adds up to a Commission, which all parties praised for its techni- coordinated and neutral monitoring of peace process cal efficiency and political impartiality. It offers a implementation. The major parties and opinion- model for a potential monitoring body. Its constitu- formers have consistently opposed a substantive tionally mandated independence, coupled with the re- international role so the solution must be a national spect earned by its chief commissioner, kept it above body with a broadly acceptable, respected the political fray. Its representatives in each district membership and sufficient administrative and were a conduit for complaints by parties about rivals’ political support to carry out its role effectively. behaviour and they brought conflicting parties to- gether to discuss alleged violations and resolve low- Peacebuilding is not just a matter of forging high- level disputes. It collected and channelled information level political consensus. In many respects, the more and served as a focal point for higher level discus- critical tasks of dealing with the conflict legacy and sions in Kathmandu without becoming detached from rebuilding communities’ cohesion must take at the lo- ground realities. Most high-profile commissions (in- cal level. Here too, the failure of planned mechanisms cluding the ceasefire monitoring commission) adopt a has taken its toll. Local elections are not likely until top-down approach: the energy devoted to selecting after the constitutional process is completed, and in- and balancing civil society luminaries to head the terim measures to establish alternative local govern- body is rarely matched by attention to support struc- ment structures are stalled over questions of political tures. Successful monitoring might benefit from the representation. The July 2008 constitutional revision reverse: careful consideration of nationwide day-to- called for the government, until local elections can be day presence coming before the selection of capable, held, to “formulate an interim body at the district, neutral figures to provide oversight. municipality and village levels, with the participation and consensus of those political parties active at the local level”.138 Local peace committees (LPCs), first B. GETTING A GRIP ON GOVERNANCE discussed in July 2006, and formally endorsed by the CPA,139 would at least bring together parties and civil 1. Policy priorities society representatives to foster reconciliation, dialogue and peacebuilding at the local level. However, their Despite the large popular mandate for change and a establishment has been dogged by political wrangling, clear majority for leftist parties who have long es- their functioning sporadic and their impact minimal.140 poused people’s empowerment and radical transfor- mation, the government does not communicate policy priorities that meet such goals. People’s expectations

138 Interim Constitution, Art. 139(2) as amended by the Fifth Amendment, 15 July 2008. An explanatory note clarifies: “In this Sub-article, ‘political parties active at the local level’ plan but it was never constituted; the interim Peace and Con- shall refer to those parties represented in the Constituent As- flict Management Committee (formed one week before the sembly, and to those parties that filed for candidacy in the CA election) never had clear terms of reference. Neverthe- relevant districts under the first-past-the-post system”. less, LPCs were formed in 33 districts but were largely inef- 139 CPA Art. 8.3. fective, while an October 2008 rewriting of their terms of 140 The peace ministry almost got the scheme off the ground reference by the Maoist-led peace ministry was criticised for in September 2007 but was stymied by political disagree- placing all power in the hands of the CPN(M). ment. The High-Level Peace Commission called for by the 141 There was little it could do about the recruitment row as December 2007 23-point agreement could have overseen the the NA did not meet the obligation to inform the JMCC. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 26

may be tempered by experience but aspirations that While still alarming, however, nationwide statistics this government will deliver concrete benefits are show a clear reduction in the worst forms of crime high. The budget, the most extensive and thoroughly since their peaks in early 2008.145 In the Kathmandu developed statement of government intent, does set valley, there was a more dramatic drop in serious of- three major policy priorities: completion of the peace fences during the second half of 2008, with murders process and immediate relief; accelerated economic and kidnappings halved compared to the same period growth; and social security and inclusion.142 in 2007.146 In the eastern Tarai there was a spike in killings from December 2008, at least partially attrib- However, if a coherent strategy for economic and so- utable to the heavy-handed actions of additional po- cial development exists, it does not appear to be lice units deployed in the area, who have killed at shared by the governing parties, let alone communi- least seven people in “crossfire” since 19 December. cated to other development partners and the public at large. Ministerial in-trays have, like the newspaper Extra police forces may be part of the solution but lo- headlines, been dominated by unforeseen difficulties cal populations need a qualitative, not just quantita- such as the electricity generation crisis. The govern- tive, change in policing. Building trust in the police ment has been reacting to events rather than shaping will take time. With 45 per cent reserved quotas for and selling a longer-term agenda. With so much focus different marginalised groups in new recruitment, the on immediate concerns, continuing rapid population police have at least taken preliminary steps to build- growth and its implications are not receiving enough ing a more balanced profile. Longer-term measures attention. In particular, Nepal’s youth is a critical con- should centre on community policing and local ac- stituency. Already limited higher education and voca- countability. A home ministry task force on public se- tional training options and dismal domestic job prospects curity, headed by respected law professor Yubaraj will be exacerbated if the global slowdown reduces Sangroula, has started broad-based consultations to overseas employment. If prompt steps are not taken to develop proposals. For now, the government needs to mitigate such problems, disaffection will generate po- temper strength with sensitivity, ensuring the goal of litical pressure and add to instability. day-to-day law and order for ordinary residents is not eclipsed by the urge either to cut deals with shadowy 2. Public security armed groups or to resort to the counterproductive short cut of extrajudicial killings. The state of law and order is weak and threatens the completion of the peace process. Poor public security 3. Guiding international assistance reduces trust in the state and the political leadership, as well as undermining development efforts and the For donors there is a natural temptation to revert to delivery of basic services. Ongoing instability in the business as usual, if all appears to be normal, or to Tarai is a real and imminent concern.143 Tarai districts withdraw, if development seems frustratingly impos- have seen the worst effects of lawlessness, suffering sible. So far, Nepal’s major development partners from a combination of armed political protest, organ- have managed to steer a middle course but they are in ised crime and weak policing. Negotiations with vari- urgent need of clear guidance from the government on ous armed groups have been taking place but do not its priorities. The weaknesses of external supply- appear to add up to a coherent strategy. Opposition driven aid agendas have been thoroughly exposed: lit- complaints that the major national parties have no in- tle local ownership, huge wastage and corruption and terest in improving Madhesis’ lives reflect a genuine few lasting benefits. “We don’t want to repeat that”, discontent.144

145 There were 259 killings in the first half of 2008 and 181 in the second half. The peak was in the aftermath of the elec- tion, with 45 killings in April, 48 in May and 50 in June. A 142 Budget speech (English version), pp. 8-9. It also set sec- spike in December (32 killings) was attributable solely to toral priorities: transformation of the agriculture sector; de- violence in the central and eastern Tarai; other parts of the velopment of water resources; wider expansion of tourism; country saw a continuing downward trend. Reported bomb qualitative development and expansion of physical infra- blasts fell more or less consistently from 66 in January 2008 structure; human resources development; national industri- to thirteen in November, with another central and eastern Ta- alisation. Ibid, pp. 9-10. rai spike pushing the total to 23 in December. “Nepal: Re- 143 Daulat Jha, “The chilly winter ahead”, The Kathmandu ports of Security Incidents - 1 January to 31 December, Post, 23 December 2008. 2008”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af- 144 “Maoists, NC, UML united against Madhes: Tripathi”, fairs, Kathmandu, at www.un.org.np. interview with Hridayesh Tripathi, The Himalayan Times, 23 146 “Crime slumps in Valley”, The Kathmandu Post, 13 December 2008. January 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 27

says one donor. “We’d like the government to tell us could, for example, have assisted the impartial how to help and fall in line with its priorities – that’s monitoring and implementation of the return of the only way our input will be meaningful”.147 property, which has been a constant impediment to political cooperation. This would in no way have Large sums are at stake. The budget was attacked for detracted from the fact that the peace process has expecting unrealistic increases in foreign grants and always been a Nepalese process or infringed upon loans but growth is possible. The UN Peacebuilding national sovereignty. The parties have not made Fund has offered a new $10 million contribution to full use of what the United Nations has to offer, supporting the peace process.148 The UN has launched notwithstanding their recognition that UNMIN’s a $115 million humanitarian transition appeal for presence has had a value well beyond its specific 2009 under the consolidated appeals process that electoral and arms monitoring functions.150 brings together UN agencies, governmental and non- governmental development and relief agencies.149 It The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UK notes that the peace process is incomplete and “the Department for International Development, which are conflict’s residual impact has weakened social safety all preparing medium-term assistance strategies, have nets, causing a lack of basic services”. It also intro- some $1.5 billion available for the next three years. duces an “exit strategy” for humanitarian actors, “tar- All appear willing to follow a government lead; like geting ‘transition’ not only from war to peace but other donors, they have also gradually embraced the from international to local actors”. need for broader consultations with non-governmental stakeholders, from local communities to civil society Assistance to the peace process per se is a difficult organisations. area. The government would prefer donors to contribute to its peace fund, leaving it free to allocate Harnessing available international funds effectively resources and oversee their use. As the experience of and lobbying for increases depends on the govern- the repeated six-month extensions of UNMIN’s ment. It can set priorities and should be the first stop mandate has shown, politicians are extremely for coordination. Success stories in areas such as reluctant to call for help, however much they may revenue collection impress donors and boost the state’s privately wish to. This reluctance has in particular authority but have yet to add up to a strategy for shap- been conditioned by India’s strongly expressed ing international engagement. Aid-givers also need more distaste for any UN role beyond arms monitoring. In solid reassurances that mechanisms such as the Nepal his final briefing as UN SRSG, Ian Martin noted: Peace Trust Fund are properly managed and audited.151 The proposed Nepal Development Forum in May If I have one particular regret, it is that the parties 2009 will be a useful focal point only if priorities and did not take up our offer in late 2007 that the United options for further funding are agreed in advance. Nations could assist by supporting the implemen- tation of peace process commitments more gener- Donors themselves face difficult choices. Poor ally than in the case of arms monitoring alone. It coordination has led to a profusion of similar programs in certain areas – women CA members, for example, are overwhelmed by the demands of competing donor capacity-building projects in gender 147 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2008. promotion – while preparations for technical 148 “Secretary-General Approves $10 Million Contribution assistance to constitution-writing and security sector In Aid To Nepal”, UN General Assembly press release reform are of limited use until the processes they are SG/2141 PBC/41, 9 September 2008. This assistance will be designed to support get under way. Decisions on channelled through an existing funding mechanism, the UN Peace Fund for Nepal, managed by representatives from the sensitive topics such as social inclusion, federalism, UN, the government and the donor community. “Areas that PLA integration and public security are not only a are strong candidates for support include: support to Nepal’s matter of high politics: all will require significant Constituent Assembly and promotion of human rights and resources to implement solutions. Planning such protection; recovery of communities and areas affected by assistance without becoming involved in the political conflict, for example, through ‘food and cash for work pro- debate calls for sensitivity, and restraint in proposing grammes’, school feeding projects, skills training for youth external models. and other initiatives that accelerate the tangible benefits of peace and development; and conflict prevention and recon- ciliation issues, for example, assistance to cantonments and 150 Briefing by Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Sec- reintegration of former combatants and internally displaced retary-General in Nepal, UN Security Council, 16 January 2009. persons or support to land and property mediation”. 151 The NPTF moved to ministry of peace and reconstruction 149 “Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal 2009”, United control in December 2008; its functioning has been hard to Nations, at www.humanitarianappeal.net. evaluate so far. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 28

C. CONSTITUTION-WRITING party agreement, although Madhav Nepal faced a to- ken challenge.157 The constitutional process has in effect yet to start, Drafting a new constitution is necessarily an involved although there have been some positive develop- legal exercise and the thematic committees will have ments. The CA has agreed its rules of procedure and to grapple with complex issues. But the primary elected a speaker and deputy speaker and has fulfilled challenge is as much political as technical. If the its legislative function, when it works as parliament. major parties are so determined, they can produce a On the constitution-drafting front, progress has been reasonable draft quickly. This would require slower but not entirely stalled. On 14 November agreement on how to manage the small proportion of 2008, the CA agreed and published a timetable for its articles that will be highly controversial (mainly activities, vowing to complete the new statute by 28 around federalism and the shape of May 2010 – the limit of the constitutionally stipulated parliamentary/presidential government and electoral two-year timeframe.152 It is already behind schedule: systems). If that threshold can be crossed, the the CA’s budget session, due to finish by mid- experience of the interim constitution drafting December 2008, wrapped up 34 days late. committee demonstrates that a team of experienced The timetable is tight, leaving little room for slippage. drafters can translate the content of a high-level political deal into appropriate legalese with admirable For example, public opinion on “concept papers” is to 158 be gathered only until 26 February 2009 but no con- promptness. There are, however, two significant challenges. First, cept papers have yet been published. The public will any party, no matter how small, can delay the process. then be invited to comment on a full draft between The procedural rules require unanimous approval of September and December 2009 but the CA has allot- every article in the first instance; failing this, a poten- ted itself just four days, in January 2010, to consider tially time-consuming period of party consultations and public input.153 CA committees were established on a fresh vote, with a two-thirds quorum and two-thirds 15 December: a 61-member constitutional committee majority requirement, is mandated. The larger parties with overall drafting responsibility; ten thematic can singly (in the case of the UCPN(M), which com- committees mandated to prepare drafts under their mands over one third of CA seats) or jointly (NC and subject areas and finalise procedures;154 and three UML159) veto any article or simply stall the process by procedural committees dealing with areas including boycotting the assembly and leaving it without a quorum. public consultation.155 In breach of the timetable’s 156 first deadline, chairpersons were not selected. Still, Second, and more importantly, a constitution pro- most chairs were eventually allocated through cross- duced by a last-minute fudge by party leaders may meet the deadline and be technically sound but is unlikely to be publicly credible or durable. The his- torical precedent is not encouraging: Nepal’s longest- 152 On the process see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Consti- lived constitution, the 1962 Panchayat statute, lasted tutional Process, op. cit. The interim constitution gives the 28 years but despite being protected by authoritarian CA two years to complete its work, with a possible six- monarchical rule still had to undergo significant revi- month extension in case of a “declaration of an emergency sion following a 1980 referendum; the 1990 constitu- situation”. Interim constitution, Art. 64. tion, hailed by its drafters as the best in the world, had 153 “Calendar for constitution writing determined, new con- in effect collapsed after Gyanendra’s dismissal of the stitution by May, 2010”, nepalnews.com, 16 November 2008. elected government in October 2002, even before its 154 These are the fundamental rights and directive principle formal replacement with the January 2007 interim committee, committee to protect the rights of minority and marginal communities, state restructuring and state power allocation committee, committee to finalise the structure of the organs of the legislature, committee to finalise the shape of the administrative structure of the state, committee on ju- dicial system, committee to fix the structure of the constitu- 157 Apart from the fourteen constitutional committees, the tional bodies, committee on natural resources, economic CA has established ten committees to serve the assembly in rights and revenue allocation, committee on finalising the its legislative function. basis of cultural and social solidarity and committee on na- 158 On the work of the interim constitution drafting committee tional interest protection. see Crisis Group report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit. 155 These are the civil relations committee, collection of peo- 159 Any other blocking combination would require the par- ple’s opinion and coordination committee and capability in- ticipation of at least four parties and probably more. (The creasing and resource management committee. tight arithmetic depends on five pending by-elections and the 156 Liladhar Upadhyaya, “Constitution writing process takes question of whether the 26 nominated members would vote off”, The Rising Nepal, 16 December 2008. along party lines). Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 29

constitution.160 Madhav Nepal himself has cited the and establish a task force to delineate jurisdictions. 1990 constitutional process as a positive demonstra- Until the CA sorts out its own approach, a well- tion of prompt drafting but it would be unwise to for- planned process is unlikely. get the short lifespan of the statute produced.161

Shaping a constitution that can win popular accep- D. JUSTICE tance and stand the test of time will require public participation, consultation and transparency of debate. The pursuit of peace in post-conflict transitions some- In particular, this calls for a solid framework within times calls for justice to be deferred. In the case of which to discuss ethnic and regional demands, which Nepal, however, the continuing failure to take serious are the most obvious potential flashpoints for future steps to end impunity and investigate war crimes is challenges or rejection. No matter how near perfec- more the result of the politics of convenience. There tion the document approaches, any constitution will has been movement on the establishment of a com- need to embody reasonable means for future adjust- mission on enforced disappearances; likewise, work ments and revision. The outcome of state restructur- to produce more widely acceptable legislation for a ing cannot be subject to constant questioning but truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) is pro- equally cannot be seen as being set in stone forever. ceeding. However, there are serious questions over Social, economic and political change means revisit- the government’s intent. ing some decisions is inevitable. Building a broadly credible statute will also mean making concrete pro- The cabinet approved the draft disappearance bill on gress in areas such as inclusiveness, for example by 19 November 2008 but it, and the TRC bill, were not ensuring the ground-breaking one-third representation put before the CA in time to be considered during the of women in the CA is more than just a cosmetic budget session. Plans to institute them as ordinances, achievement.162 bypassing parliamentary scrutiny, prompted serious concern in the human rights community.163 Neverthe- Some work in these areas has started. For example, less, the government went ahead, and an ordinance on despite the delay in appointing chairpersons, the CA’s disappearances was among three signed into law by constitutional and minority rights committees have President Ram Baran Yadav on 10 February 2009. In- taken out front-page newspaper advertisements call- ternationally, there have been quiet measures to debar ing for public input; the civil relations committee set Nepalese Army officers accused of serious violations up postboxes for the public to deposit suggestions. from senior UN posts, peacekeeping missions and Teams of CA members are planning to travel across military training offered by other states. At a 2 Febru- the country for direct consultations with local com- ary 2009 hearing on writ petitions filed in August munities. Donors are keen to help. The UNDP has a 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Nepal Police to body of expertise and other resources on hand; other proceed with investigations into the disappearances of agencies are pursuing individual efforts. Often these five students in Dhanusha District in October 2003.164 are overlapping: it is for the CA itself to ensure a de- gree of coordination and a setting of priorities for in- ternational support. The initial steps by separate committees have already prompted the chair of the 163 public opinion and coordination committee to com- Noting that a similar resort to ordinances had been at- plain that it alone should be managing the consulta- tempted before, an umbrella group of respected activists warned of “the ill-intention of the government to institution- tion process, prompting the CA speaker to intervene alize the culture of impunity”: “The deliberate attempt of the government to undermine the rights of the people’s represen- tatives while drafting such historically significant laws, 160 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting which are related to overarching issues of victim’s rights to Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005. justice and ending the pervasive impunity in the country, is 161 “Maoists must handover arms to NA: MK Nepal”, ekan- downright undemocratic”. “Introducing legislation via ordi- tipur.com, 16 January 2009. nances: an undemocratic step”, Accountability Watch Com- 162 Apart from longer term constitutional considerations, the mittee press statement , Kathmandu, 22 January 2009. provisions on women’s participation in conflict resolution 164 The police had refused to register first information reports and peacebuilding set out by UN Security Council Resolu- on these cases naming senior civil, police and military offi- tion 1325 establish a framework for immediate action. There cials and had not requested forensic assistance to conduct has been much civil society and donor mobilisation in sup- exhumations at a suspected burial site. In January 2008, the port of UNSCR 1325 objectives in Nepal and the UN has NHRC had recommended a full investigation and compensa- established a database to map related projects, at www.un. tion to the families. OHCHR-Nepal called on the govern- org.np/unscr/. A forthcoming Crisis Group report will exam- ment to take immediate steps to implement this and other ine progress to date and policy priorities in this area. Supreme Court decisions “to ensure that the perpetrators of Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 30

However, there has been no action on the most shock- Party leaders and security chiefs have a shared inter- ing abuses committed during the conflict and after the est in resisting pressure to investigate or prosecute. start of the peace process. In the most high-profile in- Victims’ voices are rarely heard, except when there is dividual case, the torture and killing of fifteen-year- political advantage to be gained from highlighting old Maina Sunuwar by army officers in 2004, the state their plight – such as when army chief Katwal pub- still appears unable or unwilling to pursue investiga- licly received a petition from victims of the Maoists. tions, despite promises to support police enquiries.165 Given the chronic inadequacy of national justice Despite the acknowledgement of “mistakes” during mechanisms, serious investigations or prosecutions the people’s war and beyond, the Maoists continue to are a remote possibility. Deferring trials in the inter- shelter the individuals responsible for atrocities, most ests of reconciliation and peacebuilding is not inher- prominently PLA commander Kali Bahadur Kham ently wrong, if there is a compelling case that Magar “Bibidh”. Accused of overseeing the abduction, proceeding immediately would threaten the peace torture and murder of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha, process. But those accused of the gravest crimes can he has not only been sheltered by the party but rein- still feel untouchable. stated to its central committee.166 Needless to say, these acts of omission and commission directly con- travene the explicit commitments made in the CPA.167

the Dhanusha disappearances, as well as other serious con- flict-related human rights violations, are brought to justice.” “OHCHR-Nepal calls for swift implementation of Supreme Court ruling on Dhanusha disappearance”, OHCHR-Nepal, press release, 5 February 2009. 165 On the fifth anniversary of Maina’s death, OHCHR- Nepal noted: “Despite a September 2007 Supreme Court rul- ing that police conduct an investigation and years of advo- cacy by the human rights community, the alleged perpetrators have yet to be brought to justice. The lack of progress in the case of Maina Sunuwar is emblematic of the overall lack of accountability for human rights violations which occurred both during and after the conflict in Nepal between 1996 and 2006”. “Impunity remains major obstacle to the peace proc- ess”, OHCHR-Nepal, press release, 16 February 2009. 166 “Ram Hari murder accused gets Maoist CC berth”, myre- publica.com, 15 January 2009. The UN has expressed con- cern that six months after five persons were charged in relation to the disappearance and killing of Ram Hari Shrestha only one individual has been arrested, police’s let- ters to the PLA requesting an interview with 3rd Division Commander Kali Bahadur Kham (‘Bibidh’) have not been answered and local Maoist leaders had not cooperated with Chitwan Police to enable them to carry out their investiga- tion and arrest those charged. The probe commission report submitted to the government on 16 July 2008 has not been published. “OHCHR-Nepal urges Home Minister to ensure accountability for killing of Ram Hari Shrestha”, OHCHR- Nepal, press release, 29 December 2008. The main accused, Govinda Bahadur Batala, is in police custody but Shrestha’s family continue to call for action against Bibidh, who was reportedly indicted by the July 2008 commission. “SC up- holds Apex Court decision to detain Batala”, ekantipur.com, 15 February 2009. 167 For example, “Both sides agree to make public within 60 and lawful action would be taken against individuals respon- days of the signing of the agreement the correct and full sible for obstructions in the exercise of the rights contained names and addresses of the people who ‘disappeared’ or in the agreement and guarantee not to encourage impunity. were killed during the conflict and convey such details to the Apart from this, they shall also guarantee the right to relief family members”. CPA, Art. 5.2.3. “Both sides express their of the families of victims of conflict, torture and disappear- commitment that impartial investigation shall be carried out ance”. CPA, Art. 7.1.3. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 31

VI. CONCLUSION such as the Maoist promise to return all property within fifteen days. Taking part in one election and leading a government has not in itself democratised Nepal’s peace process faces difficult days. Precedent the Maoists, nor can the rhetoric of “new Nepal” dis- suggests political leaders can rally round to avert cri- guise the unreconstructed weaknesses of their politi- ses at the last minute; there are some signs that they cal opponents. More seriously, the consensus at the have recognised the risks of a breakdown and pulled heart of the process has been at least overstated, and back from more intense confrontation. But complet- at times close to imaginary. In reality, very different ing the peace and constitutional processes in a way interests and positions remain to be bridged – a task which leaves lasting stability requires more than an- that is possible but that cannot be wished away with other round of short-term fixes, fictitious deadlines overoptimistic language. and half thought-out trade-offs between parties’ short- term interests. Addressing these challenges is the job of Nepal’s leaders. But the international community must recog- It is time to face up to some inconvenient truths. The nise the fragility of the process and be prepared to peace process has rested uncomfortably, and at times stick with it. A successfully completed peace process precariously, on several mutually convenient fictions. could have broad positive effects for the Nepalese The most obvious is the repeated pretence that rapid people and for the region. Successful elections do not PLA integration would remove the need for a UN in themselves mean a return to normal development role: UNMIN has now had three six-month extensions engagement. Instead, the need is for carefully targeted following the expiry of its original one-year mandate assistance and political pressure. in January 2008 and the latest term looks just as unlikely to be met. Most peace process deadlines, Kathmandu/Brussels, 19 February 2009 voluntarily set by the parties, have been unrealistic, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 32

APPENDIX A

MAP OF NEPAL

Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 33

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AISC Army Integration Special Committee AMMAA Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, December 2006 APF Armed Police Force CA Constituent Assembly COAS Chief of Army Staff CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement, November 2006 CPI(Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPN(M) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), now UCPN(M) HLPC High-Level Peace Commission JMCC Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee LPC Local Peace Committee MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (sometimes referred to in other sources as the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, MPRF) MoPR Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction NA Nepalese Army NC Nepali Congress NHRC National Human Rights Commission NSC National Security Council NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights PLA People’s Liberation Army (referred to in UN documents and agreements such as the AMMAA and December 2007 23-point agreement as “Maoist army”) RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) SRSG Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UCPN(M) United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal YCL Young Communist League Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 34

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, some 130 staff members on five continents, working Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Pakistan, Philippines, , Taiwan Strait, prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Tajikistan, , Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf violent conflict. Based on information and assessments States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, from the field, it produces analytical reports containing Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen ; and in Latin America practical recommendations targeted at key international and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela. a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg- ular update on the state of play in all the most significant Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol- lowing governmental departments and agencies currently Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed provide funding: Australian Agency for International De- widely by email and made available simultaneously on the velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry with governments and those who influence them, of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to Agency, Canadian International Development and Re- generate support for its policy prescriptions. search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan- The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For- figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign the reports and recommendations to the attention of Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral- Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, Department for International Development, United with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one Agency for International Development. in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates ten regional offices (in Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local field the Future Fund, include the Better World Fund, Carnegie representation in seventeen additional locations Corporation of New York, William & Flora Hewlett Foun- (Abuja, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damas- dation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish cus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Oua- World Watch, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, gadougou, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Tehran). John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Radcliffe potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Fund and VIVA Trust. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, February 2009 Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 35

APPENDIX D

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006

CENTRAL ASIA Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006 Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing February 2006 (also available in Russian) N°49, 19 April 2006 Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 N°113, 10 April 2006 May 2006 (also available in Nepali) Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian) Report N°116, 15 May 2006 Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia 6 November 2006 Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006 Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report (also available in Russian) N°119, 14 September 2006 Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007 Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006 Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia (also available in Russian) Report N°123, 2 November 2006 Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report 22 August 2007 N°124, 28 November 2006 Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008 N°125, 11 December 2006 Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126, N°150, 10 April 2008 (also available in Russian) 15 December 2006 Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm, Asia Briefing N°79, 14 Au- Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 gust 2008 (also available in Russian) January 2007 Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, Asia Report N°162, 12 Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February February 2009 2007 (also available in Nepali) NORTH EAST ASIA Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia Report N°130, 29 March 2007 China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean) April 2007 After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report N°132, Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in 18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali) Korean and Russian) Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, Asia Report Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and N°134, 29 May 2007 Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 in Korean and Russian) June 2007 North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 13 November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian) (also available in Nepali) After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, Asia Report or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also N°137, 31 July 2007 available in Korean and Russian) Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report N°138, 30 Au- North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendshi p, Asia gust 2007 Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian) Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee, 2007 (also available in Nepali) Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Briefing China’s Thirst for Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008 (also N°69, 22 October 2007 available in Chinese) Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern South Korea’s Elections: A Shift to the Right, Asia Briefing Consensus, Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007 N°77, 30 June 2008 Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°70, SOUTH ASIA 12 November 2007 Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006 (also available in Nepali) Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 36

After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008 Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, Asia Report Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4 N°145, 6 February 2008 October 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia N°146, 20 February 2008 Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai) Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142, (also available in Nepali) 19 November 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°151, 28 Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17 April 2008 January 2008 (also available in Tetum) Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful Revolution?, Asia Report N°155, 3 Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, July 2008 (also available in Nepali) 22 January 2008 Nepal’s New Political Landscape, Asia Report N°156, 3 July Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144, 2008 (also available in Nepali) 31 January 2008 Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Asia Report N°157, 14 July Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia 2008 Report N°147, 28 February 2008 (also available in Indone- Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?, Asia Re- sian) port N°158, 24 July 2008 Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31 Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict, March 2008 Asia Report N°159, 15 October 2008 The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, Asia Report N°160, 16 Mindanao, Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008 October 2008 Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua, Asia Report N°154, Bangladesh: Elections and Beyond, Asia Briefing N°84, 11 16 June 2008 (also available in Indonesian) December 2008 Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Brief- Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy, Asia ing N°78, 7 July 2008 (also available in Indonesian) Briefing N°85, 18 December 2008 Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, Asia Briefing N°80, 28 August 2008 (also available in Thai) SOUTH EAST ASIA Indonesia: Pre-election Anxieties in Aceh, Asia Briefing Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°81, 9 September 2008 (also available in Indonesian) N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Thailand: Calming the Political Turmoil, Asia Briefing Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006 N°82, 22 September 2008 (also available in Thai) Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Rela- Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006 tions, Asia Report N°161, 20 October 2008 (also available in Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, Chinese) 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian) The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, Asia Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, Briefing N°83, 23 October 2008 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The Case of North Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing Maluku, Asia Briefing N°86, 22 January 2009 N°53, 5 September 2006 Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency, Asia Briefing N°87, Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 9 February 2009 2006 (also available in Indonesian) The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao, Asia Brief- Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement ing N°88, 16 February 2009 (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006 Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS N°58, 8 December 2006 Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: 24 January 2007 (also available in Indonesian) • Africa Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report • Asia N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai) • Europe Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 22 • Latin America and Caribbean March 2007 • Middle East and North Africa Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing • Thematic Issues N°63, 3 May 2007 • CrisisWatch Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007 Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65, 12 June 2007 Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 37

APPENDIX E

CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs Kenneth Adelman Carla Hills Lord (Christopher) Patten Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Former European Commissioner for Exter- the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Trade Representative nal Relations, of and HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Lena Hjelm-Wallén UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign and Newcastle University Saudi Arabia to the U.S.; Chairman, King Affairs Minister of Sweden Thomas R Pickering Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Swanee Hunt Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, Studies Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nige- Kofi Annan President, Hunt Alternatives Fund; former ria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company Former Secretary-General of the United U.S. Ambassador to Austria Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Anwar Ibrahim President & CEO Louise Arbour Former Deputy Prime Minister of Gareth Evans Former UN High Commissioner for Human Mo Ibrahim Former Foreign Minister of Australia Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the Interna- Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim

tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Foundation; Founder, Celtel International Executive Committee Yugoslavia and for Rwanda Asma Jahangir Morton Abramowitz Richard Armitage UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Ambassador to Turkey Lord (Paddy) Ashdown Rights Commission of Pakistan Emma Bonino* Former High Representative for Bosnia and James V. Kimsey Former Minister of International Trade and Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal De- Founder and Chairman Emeritus of European Affairs of Italy and European mocrats, UK America Online, Inc. Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Shlomo Ben-Ami Wim Kok Cheryl Carolus Former Foreign Minister of Israel Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Former South African High Commissioner Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the UK and Secretary-General of the ANC Lakhdar Brahimi Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary- Former President of Poland Maria Livanos Cattaui General and Foreign Minister of Algeria Ricardo Lagos Member of the Board of Directors, Petro- plus Holding AG, Switzerland; former Sec- Zbigniew Brzezinski Former President of Chile retary-General, International Chamber of Former U.S. National Security Advisor Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Commerce to the President Novelist and journalist, U.S.; former Yoichi Funabashi Kim Campbell International Secretary of International PEN Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Former Prime Minister of Canada Shimbun, Japan Naresh Chandra Jessica Tuchman Mathews Frank Giustra Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and President, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Ambassador of India to the U.S. Moisés Naím Stephen Solarz Joaquim Alberto Chissano Former President of Mozambique Editor-in-chief, Foreign Policy; former Former U.S. Congressman Wesley Clark Minister of Trade and Industry of Venezuela George Soros Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Ayo Obe Chairman, Open Society Institute Europe Chair, Board of Trustees, Goree Institute Pär Stenbäck Pat Cox Christine Ockrent Former Foreign Minister of Finland Former President of the European Parlia- CEO, French TV and Radio World Services, *Vice-Chair ment France Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Victor Pinchuk Other Board Members Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Founder of EastOne Ltd and Victor Pinchuk Adnan Abu-Odeh Mark Eyskens Foundation, Ukraine Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah Former Prime Minister of Belgium Samantha Power II and to King Hussein and Jordan Perma- Joschka Fischer Anna Lindh Professor of Practice of Global nent Representative to the UN Leadership and Public Policy at the Carr Former Foreign Minister of Germany Center for Human Rights, Harvard University Yegor Gaidar Former Prime Minister of Russia Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 Page 38

Fidel V. Ramos Ghassan Salamé Ernesto Zedillo Former President of the Philippines; Former Minister of Culture of Lebanon; Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Chairman, Boao Forum for Asia, Beijing Professor of International Relations, Paris Center for the Study of Globalization Güler Sabancı Thorvald Stoltenberg Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey Former Foreign Minister of Norway

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. BHP Billiton Frank Holmes Ian Telfer Canaccord Adams Limited Frederick Iseman Guy Ullens de Schooten StatoilHydro ASA George Landegger Neil Woodyer Alan Griffiths Ford Nicholson Don Xia Iara Lee & George Gund III Royal Bank of Scotland Foundation

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey & Khaled Juffali Donald Pels and (Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey George Kellner Wendy Keys Elliott Kulick Anna Luisa Ponti & David Brown Amed Khan (Co-Chair) Geoffrey Hoguet John Chapman Chester Hamza al Kholi Shiv Vikram Khemka Michael Riordan Chevron Anglo American PLC Zelmira Koch Tilleke & Gibbins Richard Cooper APCO Worldwide Inc. Scott Lawlor Vale Neil & Sandy DeFeo Equinox Partners Jean Manas VIVATrust John Ehara Ed Bachrach Marco Marazzi Yasuyo Yamazaki Seth Ginns Patrick Benzie McKinsey & Company Yapı Merkezi Eleanor Holtzman Construction and Stanley Bergman & Najib Mikati Industry Inc. Joseph Hotung Edward Bergman Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Shinji Yazaki

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Malcolm Fraser Surin Pitsuwan Leo Tindemans (Chairman Emeritus) I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Ed van Thijn Diego Arria Max Jakobson George Robertson Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Alain Destexhe Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim Marika Fahlén George J. Mitchell William Taylor Stanley Fischer (Chairman Emeritus)