Nepal's Future: in Whose Hands?
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NEPAL’S FUTURE: IN WHOSE HANDS? Asia Report N°173 – 13 August 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE FRAYING PROCESS ........................................................... 1 II. THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS............................................................................... 2 A. RIDING FOR A FALL......................................................................................................................3 B. OUTFLANKED AND OUTGUNNED..................................................................................................4 C. CONSTITUTIONAL COUP DE GRACE..............................................................................................5 D. ADIEU OR AU REVOIR?................................................................................................................6 III. THE QUESTION OF MAOIST INTENT ...................................................................... 7 A. MAOIST RULE: MORE RAGGED THAN RUTHLESS .........................................................................7 B. THE VIDEO NASTY.......................................................................................................................9 C. THE BEGINNING OF THE END OR THE END OF THE BEGINNING?..................................................11 IV. THE ARMY’S GROWING POLITICAL ROLE ........................................................ 13 A. WAR BY OTHER MEANS.............................................................................................................13 B. STATE ARMY OR ARMY STATE? ................................................................................................15 C. STRAINING AT THE BIT...............................................................................................................16 D. THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE ................................................................................................17 V. INDIA: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK..................................................................... 18 A. CHINESE WHISPERS ...................................................................................................................19 B. FEARS AND FRUSTRATIONS........................................................................................................21 C. DELHI’S DISARRAY....................................................................................................................22 D. REGAINING DIRECTION..............................................................................................................23 VI. THE FALLOUT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS ......................................................... 24 A. NEW REGIME, OLD PROBLEMS ..................................................................................................24 B. PARTIES BEYOND PARODY .........................................................................................................26 C. UNMIN: UNLOVED BUT ESSENTIAL ..........................................................................................28 VII. HEADING OFF TROUBLE: SOME SUGGESTIONS ........................................ 31 A. COPE WITH CHANGE ON ALL FRONTS ........................................................................................31 B. STRENGTHEN THE STATE’S CAPACITY AND LEGITIMACY ...........................................................32 C. HALT MILITARISATION ..............................................................................................................34 D. WORK ON DEMILITARISATION ...................................................................................................35 E. STOP SPOILING THE SPOILERS ....................................................................................................36 VIII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 37 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ................................................................................................................................39 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................40 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................41 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006 ........................................................42 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................45 Asia Report N°173 13 August 2009 NEPAL’S FUTURE: IN WHOSE HANDS? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Nepal’s peace process is in danger of collapse. The fall The Maoists had not proved as effective in power as of the Maoist-led government, a mess largely of the many had hoped. Moreover, they alienated two impor- Maoists’ own making, was a symptom of the deeper tant constituencies: India (both by appearing to make malaise underlying the political settlement. Consensus overtures towards China and by refusing to become has steadily given way to a polarisation which has fed a pliant, moderate force) and the Kathmandu upper the more militaristic elements on both sides. While all middle classes (by making them pay taxes and failing moderate politicians still publicly insist that there is to deliver basic services, in particular electricity). Yet no alternative to pursuing the process, private talk of a their main problem is their own refusal to give clear return to war – led by generals of the Nepalese Army and credible assurances on their commitment to politi- who have never reconciled themselves to peace – has cal pluralism and non-violence. Prominent ideologues grown louder. Outright resumption of hostilities remains within the party have given added credence to the unlikely in the short term but only concerted efforts to argument that they will never alter their strategic goal re-establish a minimal working consensus and a national of state capture and de facto totalitarian rule. In re- unity government including the Maoists can avert the sponse, the leadership’s insistence that the party has likelihood of a more dangerous erosion of trust. Strong embraced multiparty democracy has been less than international backing, with India eschewing short-term fully convincing. interference in favour of longer-term guardianship of the process it itself initiated, will be essential. On the other side, the army has adopted a more overt, assertive political role. It is encouraged and supported The immediate cause of the Maoists’ departure from by many who see it as the only credible opposition to government on 4 May 2009 was their bungled attempt the Maoists. It not only survived the republican transi- to dismiss the army chief. As the consent for action tion but has thrived. Helped by timorous parties, it has that they had secured from coalition partners unravelled successfully pushed for a substantial budgetary in- under external pressure, they pushed ahead unilater- crease, protected its de facto autonomy, retained its ally. Their legally dubious sacking order prompted an full strength and pressed for new lethal arms imports – even more contentious intervention by the ceremonial in breach of the ceasefire. president to countermand it. Maoist leader Prachanda quit on grounds of principle; the question of the bal- Behind much of the recent instability lies an Indian ance of power between prime minister and president change of course. New Delhi framed the peace deal remains in dispute. and acted as its de facto guarantor, pressing all parties to comply with its terms. Never able to digest the The Maoist resignation made the formation of a new Maoist victory and uncomfortable with popular demands administration an urgent necessity and, by Nepal’s stan- for change, it has pursued increasingly interventionist dards, the transition was relatively prompt and smooth. tactics through proxies in Nepali political parties while However, the new government, led by the centrist continuing its policy of ring-fencing the army as the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), most reliable bastion against Maoist takeover or anarchy. UML, is inherently unstable and incapable of address- Its resolute opposition to all but token People’s Lib- ing the most pressing challenges. Backed by 22 parties, eration Army (PLA) integration has unbalanced the it is yet to take full form and its major constituents are peace equation without offering any alternative. internally riven. Many UML leaders are openly scepti- cal of the new government, while the Madhesi Jana- The background against which Kathmandu’s incestu- dhikar Forum (MJF) is now formally split. Between ous intrigues are played out is neither stable nor un- them, they have achieved the unlikely feat of making changing. Public security remains weak, alarmingly so the Nepali Congress (NC) look the most cohesive and in several areas. Local governance remains patchy at best internally democratic of the non-Maoist parties. and non-existent in places. Peace committees bringing Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands? Crisis Group Asia Report N°173, 13 August 2009 Page ii together parties and civil society representatives are b) give shape to the proposed high-level political functional in some districts but lack a coherent agenda. coordination committee for purely peace process- Identity-based and other newer political movements