Nepal's Faltering Peace Process

NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS Asia Report Nº163 – 19 February 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................i I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1 II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? ......................................................................................2 A. WHAT’S LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS?.......................................................................................2 B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT: IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER? ..............................................3 C. OLD NEPAL: ALIVE AND WELL....................................................................................................5 D. THE RISKS OF FAILURE................................................................................................................6 III. PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDS.......................................................................................8 A. THE MAOISTS: BRINGING ON THE REVOLUTION?.........................................................................8 B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERS..............................................................................................9 C. THE OPPOSITION: REINVIGORATED, BUT FOR WHAT? ................................................................11 1. The Nepali Congress................................................................................................................. 11 2. The smaller parties .................................................................................................................... 12 3. A “broader democratic alliance”? ............................................................................................. 12 IV. THE TWO ARMIES .......................................................................................................13 A. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSE.......................................................................................................13 1. What the agreements say........................................................................................................... 13 2. The Nepalese Army position..................................................................................................... 14 3. The PLA position ...................................................................................................................... 15 4. Other parties.............................................................................................................................. 16 B. NEW NEPAL, NEW ARMY?.........................................................................................................17 1. Affordability.............................................................................................................................. 18 2. Democratic control.................................................................................................................... 19 3. Accountability........................................................................................................................... 21 4. Impunity .................................................................................................................................... 22 V. THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES.................................................................................23 A. REBUILDING THE PEACE PROCESS .............................................................................................23 1. Consensus and confidence ........................................................................................................23 2. A fresh start? ............................................................................................................................. 23 3. Mechanisms and monitoring..................................................................................................... 24 B. GETTING A GRIP ON GOVERNANCE ............................................................................................26 1. Policy priorities ......................................................................................................................... 26 2. Public security........................................................................................................................... 26 3. Guiding international assistance ............................................................................................... 27 C. CONSTITUTION-WRITING...........................................................................................................28 D. JUSTICE .....................................................................................................................................30 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ..........................................................................................................................32 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................33 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..............................................................................34 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006...................................................35 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES..........................................................................................37 Asia Report N°163 19 February 2009 NEPAL’S FALTERING PEACE PROCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Despite successful elections and a lasting military ist), UCPN(M), following its merger with a smaller ceasefire, Nepal’s peace process is facing its most se- group – shows the goal of a communist “people’s re- vere tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: there public” is still in place. Although leading the govern- is no agreement on the future of the two armies, very ment, Maoist leaders continue to threaten renewed little of the land seized during the conflict has been revolutionary struggle and the “capture of state returned, and little progress has been made writing a power”. Such threats have been underlined by cadres’ new constitution. Challenges to the basic architecture continued violent behaviour and an apparent drive to of the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides. consolidate alternative power bases through affiliated Key political players, particularly the governing Mao- organisations like trade unions. ists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need to rebuild consensus on the way forward or face a public However, the essence of the peace process, from the backlash. International supporters of Nepal must tar- November 2005 agreement between the CPN(M) and get assistance and political pressure to encourage the the mainstream seven-party alliance onwards, was a parties to face the threats to peace. double transformation. The Maoists were to renounce violence and accept multiparty democracy and inter- The April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections national human rights norms. The mainstream parties delivered a convincing victory for the Maoists but left were to develop more inclusive and democratic inter- them short of an outright majority. The major parties nal structures and renounce the bad behaviour that promised to continue working together but the NC, had weakened the post-1990 exercise of democracy. which came second, refused to join the government The old politics was discredited and still faces the that was eventually installed in August 2008. For all challenge of renewing itself – with the established its weaknesses, this government is Nepal’s best hope parties needing to earn legitimacy. but it is not living up to its promise and there are no viable alternatives. There can be no functional gov- The Maoists have made a greater effort to change ernment without the Maoists on board, let alone any than other parties but their democratic transformation hope of proceeding with a constitution-writing proc- is far from complete. They should take the lead to re- ess in which they can wield a blocking vote. build confidence by unambiguously renouncing violence and reaffirming their commitment to political Yet the Maoists have not fully adjusted to democratic pluralism. The Nepali Congress is in a state of organ- politics, nor has mainstream politics adjusted to their isational and political disarray. The Maoists’ coalition arrival. There is little unity of effort or intent among partners also face internal power struggles and tough the governing coalition partners. Opponents of the policy decisions. In short, the democratic alternatives Maoists talk up the prospects of a government col- to the Maoists are alarmingly weak: the other parties lapse. Conservative wings of both the NC and the suffer from exclusiveness and weakened support and moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marx- offer no fresh options to complete the peace process. ist-Leninist), the largest coalition partner, have been reinvigorated. In the face of continued instability, The state of public security and law and order is wor- armed protest and burgeoning identity-based move- rying. Although the incidents that draw most attention ments, the immediate threat to Nepal is not Maoist – killings, explosions and shutdowns – have all de- totalitarianism but a dangerous weakening of the creased since peaks in the first half of 2008, there is

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