Reflections on Cold Wars: the 1983 Oslo Atlantic Defense Symposium
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REFLECTIONS ON COLD WARS: THE 1983 OSLO ATLANTIC DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM by Dennison I. Rusinow 1983/No. 15 Europe/General [DIR-2-'83] In August 1983 the Norwegian Na- ly mentioned in passing ("if this seems tional Defense College sponsored familiar today '. They are, however, a symposium to discuss the ef- the purpose of this Report, which is fects on Western defense policies therefore not an account of the Sym- of the events and influences of the posium or a summary of its.findings and period from 1947 through 1953. conclusions per se. The putative "moral of the story" for today's world will in most The symposium was able to draw cases be left to the reader, in part on newly accessible materials and because it is often ambiguous, which is the memories of some of the par- what the "lessons" of history usually are. ticipants in the creation of NATO, but the lessons of =Cold War I," The Oslo Symposium was attend- like most of the lessons of history, ed by scholars from nine NATO coun- turn out to be generally ambigu- tries (Norway, West Germany, Great Bri- ous. tain, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Iceland, the United States, and Canada) and neutral Sweden. The discussions were enlivened and enlightened by the With "European and Atlantic presence of senior Norwegian par- Defense 1947-1953" as its theme, the ticipants in the creation and early years Oslo International Symposium organized of NATO, whose revisionist comments and reminiscences provided healthy reminders that documents from official History in August 18a was ostensibly archives and published memoirs, the principal grist of the historians' mills, rare- ly contain the whole truth and nothing but happenstance the meeting was held the the truth. The decision to omit partici- same week that the Defense Minist in pants and topics from the Mediterranean Oslo was preparing to release an official flank of NATO was taken, despite some repo on the latest (unidentified but misgivings, to achieve greater depth of focus and detail at a three-day meeting. "From War to Cold War" was the zling episode in Cold War II and a lively theme of the first day's sessions, based topic of discussion during conference on papers describing American, British, coffee breaks. The coincidence was an and French attitudes to security ques- appropriate symbol of the way current tions and spheres of influence in the events and scholarly reinterpretations of years 1945-50 and the formation of the the first Cold War were bound to cast Western Union and its expansion into a sha6ows on one another, nvtng com- North Atlantic Treaty Organization parisons and reflections on the past as (NATO) in 1948-49. The second day was a guide to the present, or at least a devoted to what Olav Riste, the Sym- source of useful lessons and monitions. posium's organizer and Director of the Such comadsons an6 mflectons Oslo Research Center, called "North were nt on the aen6a or amon the Atlantic Treaty Mark I: Limited Com- purposes of the Symposium, although mitments." The third focused on they hung in the air and were developments after the outbreak of the 2/DIR-2-'83 Korean War in June 1950, a period that ities, were turned upside down by the guaranteed to provoke disagreements, Riste labeled "NATO Mark I1: Defense Korean War pose a different, debatable, The Oslo Symposium, where the ques- Build-up and Integration." The penul- and contemporary set of questions. If tion concerned crucial turning points in timate paper that last day, entitled there was a misunderstanding of what Western attitudes to Soviet intentions "NATO goes Nuclear," carried the story Korea signified, it is also interesting to and consequently in Cold War and beyond 1953 and into a third phase in discover, in today's different but partly NATO history, was only a partial excep- NATO history, characterized by strategic analogous circumstances, that our Euro- tion.. Although there was an initial and planning and political dilemmas that are pean NATO partners shared it to a final consensus that February 1948 (the still, or again, on the agendas of NATO greater extent than most of us then knew Prague coup) and June 1950 (the out- commanders and political leaders in the and than many of them were later will- break of the Korean War) deserved the 1980s. ing to admit. label, several participants muddied the The recent publication or opening The extent to which NATO's waters for a time by nominating other of U.S. and some other NATO archives military capability, including the events and dates for the countries, for the years and subject under study American nuclear deterrent, was an issues, key individuals, or groups that provided one reason for holding the empty scabbard in the early years of the were the focus of their own studies. This Symposium at this time. These newly ac- Alliance was unknown even to most reminder that one must also ask "Whose cessible materials, frequently cited in member-country ministers and senior of- turning point?" threatened at one stage Symposium papers and discussions, ap- ficers with a clear "need-to-know." to atomize the discussion and the con- parently contain no startling revelations. American military planners were fully cept, but it also suggested another way They do, however, suggest some minor aware and drew appropriate conclu- of approaching the subject. In this and revisions of Cold War history, alternate- sions, as their war plans of the period many other cases, one suspects that the ly confirming or raising new doubts about show. Other recently accessible answers for different individuals and previous interpretations of particular documents also reveal, however, that groups, weighted for their influence over events and policies. they tactfully refrained, as far as possi- policy or public opinion and charted over Among these confirmations and ble, from informing their European part- time, would point to specific moments revisions, those of greatest potential con- ners that these plans presumed an in- when the accumulation achieves a "criti- temporary relevance and interest for itial and unavoidable Red Army conquest cal mass" that brings about the kind of non-specialists include the following: of first all and in later versions almost all larger-scale dramatic or fateful changes The Communist coup d'tat in of continental Western Europe. For their that do deserve to be called "historic tur- Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and part, the governments and high com- ning points." Such an approach would the North Korean invasion of South mands of NATO Europe found good surely help to explain how and why cer- Korea in June 1950 were crucial in reasons, including concern for their own tain events in the history of Cold War mobilizing public opinion, especially a and their peoples' morale, for going had a "turning point" impact while others critical mass of "elite" or policy-making along with this game, indulging in self- that should and often did have equal or opinion, behind the creation of the delusion and not asking their American greater significance for individual actors Western European Union and NATO counterparts too many awkward ques- in the drama were denied this honor. As ("Mark I' in 1948-49 and for effective tions. for Cold War II, a current event, the same rearmament, including that of West Ger- In the light of the above and approach, with our definition of the quan- many, and integration of the latter after other considerations, NATO's "going tity and quality of a turning point's critical mid-1950 ("NATO Mark I1"). Without nuclear" in the Eisenhower era acquires mass sharpened by the historical exer- these events, NATO Marks and II either a firmer aura of eventual inevitability and cise, might also give us a modestly im- would not have happened at all, or would pertinence. The sigh of relief that passed proved predictive (and preventive?) have assumed different and probably through European chancelleries, in- capability. weaker forms. While this has long been cluding some neutral as well as NATO The Prague coup undeniably was common wisdom about the period, the ones, emerged clearly from the scholars' an event of this kind, an earthquake with Symposium shed new light on the who, papers and former participants' more serious and lasting consequences when, and how of the impact of Prague reminiscences at the Oslo Symposium. than earlier tremors in the same series. '48 and Korea '50, and on the dimensions The perpetuation and modernization of By the end of 1947 many key individuals of their importance. In this process in- NATO's nuclear dependence in later and groups on both sides of the Atlantic nocence, wisdom, idles fixes, and years, along with the nature and ra- had already been converted, or needed misunderstandings played a fascinating tionale of the Soviet nuclear buildup no conversion, to what one may for brevi- and often contradictory mixture of roles (anticipatory-offensive or responsive-de- ty call a Cold War perspective, but other at various levels, all with suggestive fensive?), are of course separate ques- views of Soviet intentions and the ap- analogies in Cold War I1. tions that may have different answers. propriate responses were still com- Although the origins of the However this may be, it is instructive to petitive. Western foreign and military Korean War and the Soviet role in its out- know more about what NATO planners policies reflected this ambivalence. The break seem to have been particularly and politicians thought they knew in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and the and fatefully misunderstood at the time 1950s, what they did not know or were launching of the Marshall Plan that sum- another piece of now common but this wrong about, and other accidents of mer had been significant harbingers, but time still contested wisdom the NATO decision-making on what is again a the Truman Doctrine's commitments response may have been a significant critical and contentious subject.