The Ontological Security Complex: The Impact of System Altering Events on States’ Existential Identities ______A Thesis Presented to the Honors Tutorial College, Ohio University ______In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for Graduation from the Honors Tutorial College with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science ______Aliviah Chaplin
Chaplin 2
Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Chapter 1: Ontological Security in International Relations 13
Chapter 2: Change, Identity, and the Ontological Security Complex 27
Chapter 3: Stepping Up: The United States Post-World War II 40
Chapter 4: Ontological Misalignment: Post-Soviet Russia 56
Conclusion 76
Bibliography 80 Chaplin 3
Introduction
A New Cold War. The phrase is splashed across headlines, it titles academic articles, and it is often used by political pundits to describe the relations between the
United States and the Russian Federation.1 The anxiety encapsulated in these renewed hostilities is showcased by book titles such as The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the
Threat to the West and statements that “we are in a new cold war with Russia, fraught with hot war from Ukraine, to the Baltic regions, to Syria.”2 Much of the rhetoric surrounding the first Cold War included the ideas of the United States and then Soviet
Union representing a universal struggle of good vs. evil. The two actors were diametrically opposed in every way possible with incompatible identities, and only one could win. This harsh view of relations seemed to ease with detente in the 1970’s, but the next decade brought the Year of the Spy and renewed hostilities. A new wave of optimism that the two countries would finally be able to work together within the international system came with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Flash forward to
2019 and Russia has been accused of meddling in the 2016 American presidential elections,3 Russia has accused the United States of meddling in the internal affairs of
1 Chris Miller, “The New Cold War’s Warm Friends,” Foreign Policy (blog), March 1, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/01/the-new-cold-wars-warm-friends/; Simon Shuster “Exclusive: Gorbachev Blames the U.S. For Provoking ‘New Cold War,’” Time, December 11, 2014, http://time.com/3630352/mikhail-gorbachev-vladimir-putin-cold-war/. 2 Edward Lucas and Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin, The New Cold War: Putin’s Threat to Russia and the West, 1. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Fox News, Scholar: Right Now, We Are in a New Cold War, n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iW2EtFsBndg 3 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Government Officially Accuses Russia of Hacking Campaign to Interfere with Elections,” Washington Post, October 7, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/us-government-officially-accuses-russia-of-hacking-campaign-to-influence- elections/2016/10/07/4e0b9654-8cbf-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html; “Russia-Trump Inquiry: Russians Charged over US 2016 Election Tampering - BBC News,” February 18, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43092085. Chaplin 4
Venezuela and arming the anti-government opposition,4 and the two actors continually come head to head in the Middle East5—all while the country’s intelligence agencies battle it out in the covert world.6 It’s the era of the New Cold War. These events leave scholars and citizens alike with similar questions. Are the United States and Russia destined to be opposed in the international system? Is this truly a fight of good vs. evil that will last until it destroys the earth?
At the heart of these questions are issues of state behavior and the foundational elements of what makes up state identity. This commonplace rhetoric indicates concern from the American perspective about what kind of actor Russia really is. Is Russia’s behavior a rejection of liberal measures? However, the anxiety over these questions is a symptom of a larger issue. Why states act the way they do has been a question that has continually driven the field of international relations and has pushed the development of theories that can be used to explain past and current behavior. Additionally, the
4 Ana Vanessa Herrero and Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Warns U.S. Not to Intervene in Venezuela as Military Backs Maduro,” The New York Times, January 25, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/americas/venezuela-news-maduro-russia.html; “Russia Accuses U.S. of Planning to Arm the Opposition in Venezuela,” Reuters, February 23, 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-politics-usa-russia-idUKKCN1QB1BP; “Russia Ready to Help Venezuela Resolve Crisis, Warns U.S. Against...,” Reuters, February 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-idUSKCN1Q12AT. 5 John B. Alterman, “Russia, the United States, and the Middle East | Center for Strategic and International Studies,” July 21, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-united-states-and-middle-east. 6 Anton Troianovski and Ellen Nakashima, “How Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Became the Covert Muscle in Putin’s Duels with the West," The Washington Post, December 28, 2019 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the- covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a- 860ce2a8148f_story.html?utm_term=.0519484490aa; Greg Miller, “As Russia Reasserts Itself, U.S. Intelligence Agencies Focus Anew on the Kremlin,” Washington Post, September 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as- russia-reasserts-itself-us-intelligence-agencies-focus-anew-on-the-kremlin/2016/09/14/cc212c62-78f0- 11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html; Seth G. Jones, “Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare | Center for Strategic and International Studies,” October 1, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive- us-strategy-combat-russian-information-warfare. Chaplin 5 development of patterns to gain insight into possible future behavior and the analysis of state identity have been focal points for much constructivist research. International relations scholarship looks at the events unfolding within the international scene and asks how states will respond and what forces are at play when developing theories of state behavior. A careful observation and evaluation of state behavior can lead to the conclusion that some states act irrationally according to all conventional political theories encompassed in the three main international relations school of thought: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. However, expanding the reach of these schools of thought and using concepts from other social sciences can aide in the development of theories to explain seemingly irrational behavior. One such theory is that of ontological security.
Ontological security theory is a theory within international relations scholarship that builds off sociological concepts to evaluate state behavior. The theory and its application in research, especially in the evaluation of historical cases, is not an attempt to discover previously unknown facts that change the narrative around a particular case or uncover new empirical evidence. Ontological security provides a new way to look at cases, especially ones that have been examined according to conventional analytical categories for far too long. It is a different narrative, explanation, and way of looking at previous and existing conflicts where state behavior doesn’t make sense. By telling a different story about the same event, the theory provides different insights. Ontological security theory has been used by international relations scholars to evaluate state behavior and investigate how actions in the name of security by one state influence and effect the security of other states. Chaplin 6
I seek to build off this foundational work to develop a more in-depth conception of ontological security. Existing literature has approached ontological security as just one singular concept, limiting its ability to provide an in-depth analysis of a wider variety of cases. My conception disaggregates ontological security into its individual parts— ontological security building blocks and the more surface level identities that are built on top of them—in an attempt to more concretely understand ontological security construction.
This project looks at two of the most critical and system-defining events of the twentieth century—the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union—and attempts to glean new and deeper understandings of the forces at play in the international system. Not all states and not all people interact with their building blocks in the same way. In the case of the United States, the building blocks were a catalyst to propel the country into its role as global leader. Actors within the U.S. had argued that it was the destiny of the United States to lead the post-war world—determining the values that would define the international system and playing the central role in the construction of the post-war infrastructure. It was the ontological security building blocks and their compatibility with the United States’ post-war identity that allowed the country to step up into its inevitable role of global leader. Conversely, the building blocks acted as a hindrance in the case of post-Soviet Russia. While the country was trying to liberalize and integrate into the western-run international system, the ontological security of the
Russian Federation was rooted in Soviet building blocks and thus created the misalignment of the new Russian liberal identity with the durable Soviet blocks. Chaplin 7
Broadly, ontological security is the idea of an actor, whether that be an individual or a state, being secure and confident in themselves as a being, in their identity, and in their actions. The need for ontological security is the need for a sense of order and continuity regarding one’s understanding of themselves. Jennifer Mitzen, a leading ontological security scholar, defines the concept as “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice.”7
Foundational to the field of international relations is the idea that states seek physical security; they will act to protect their borders and to prevent a threat against their territory. In a similar way, Mitzen8 makes the argument that states seek ontological security. This assumption has become more widely accepted within international relations scholarship, and it is on this assumption that my project is built.
In his early development of ontological security within the field of sociology and psychology, Anthony Giddens explores the difference between fear and anxiety. Fear, he writes, “is a response to a specific threat and therefore has a definite object.”9 Anxiety, on the other hand, “disregards the object”; it is a generalized state of the emotions of the individual.10 Ontological insecurity creates an existential anxiety; it goes beyond fear because ontological security has a deeper connection—one with an actor’s existential existence. There is no specific object behind ontological insecurity because ontological security is not constructed on one identity or status alone; it is an intricate web of varying
7 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 344. 8 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics.” 9 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 43, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201412104570. 10 Giddens, 43. Chaplin 8 factors, build over years of existence and is a product of the time and age in which the actor exists.
Ontological security provides the foundation on which actors build in order to act and is essential for an actor to be a meaningful and productive member of the international community. Mitzen discusses how insecurity causes difficulty in acting, hurting and frustrating the action-identity dynamic, thus making it difficult to sustain a secure self-conception.11 Giddens describes it by saying that “to be human is to know both what one is doing and why one is doing it.”12 Ontological security serves as the foundation for both of these actions: a basis for self-understanding and a way to both know how to act in the international system and provide reasons for those actions.
The application of ontological security in evaluating state behavior is a two-step process. First, ontological security can be used to analyze how states construct themselves. It is a critical evaluation of how states come into their identities and their status and how these factors are existentially important to the security of that state. While it does include surface level identities, what sets ontological security apart is its ability to go deeper—to the very foundational and existential components of a state’s self- perception. It is only once this construction is broken down and understood that scholars can being to use this insight for the second step: explaining state behavior. Understanding the importance of ontological security and the factors that make up a state’s security allows for a new conversation about why states take certain actions. One area where this process is can be particularly helpful is when states are engaged in behavior that seems
11 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 345. 12 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 36. Chaplin 9 irrational when evaluated with realist, institutionalist, or even some constructivist theories such as a state’s continued involvement in long-standing, perpetual conflicts.
One pitfall of ontological security theory applied at the state level is the theory’s inability to account for the variety and internal diversity of state identities. The employment of ontological security requires researchers to generalize regarding large groups of people and the homogeneity of identity within populations. When evaluating ontological security at the individual level, researchers work with only one set of identities, opinions, and perceptions. This method of evaluation does not translate when using ontological security at the state level in international relations research. The individual self becomes the collective self and the identities, opinions, and perceptions become collective as well. In order to be the most accurate, researchers must construct an image of the majority opinion, resulting in the presentation and possible perception of a state as having a uniform identity. I recognize the problematic nature of these assumptions, and my account of ontological security is in part a response to the broader scholarly concern of the tendency to overgeneralize within various theories. The disaggregated nature of my conception seeks to start to remedy these issues.
Additionally, ontological security studies require that researchers assume that actors communicate their authentic beliefs and feelings in a reliable way.13 However, policymakers and political elites are often conscious of and concerned with image management, making this assumption problematic. Mitzen touches on this discrepancy in
13 Simon Frankel Pratt, “A Relational View of Ontological Security in International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, December 28, 2016, 79, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw038. Chaplin 10 her analysis of realist security typology,14 and Simon Pratt uses it to call for the further development of a relational view of ontological security.15
Variation and change in the international system are both important topics within international relations and due to the way ontological security building blocks interact in different ways with different actors, the concepts are important in ontological security theory as well. I have intentionally sought and further developed a theory that allows for this contextual variation. The need for this variation led me to a more granular approach to ontological security and the breakdown of the concept into its individual component parts. Through this process I present a new conceptualization of ontological security: The
Ontological Security Complex, which is comprised of the existential building blocks and the surface level identities built on top of them. I argue that the current debates within international relations, while important and productive, have not adequately captured how states come in and out of ontological security. Thus, I present the Ontological Security
Complex as a contribution to this debate about how this change takes place within the international system.
Change appears to be a slippery topic within international relations. What causes it? Why do some changes become permanent and have resounding effects while others barely clear the radar and quickly fade in the collective international memory? What was behind the transition from bipolar to unipolar system following the fall of the Soviet
Union and what changed in Russia following this collapse? What’s to blame for the rapid change in U.S. relations that brought about this seeming New Cold War? I argue that to
14 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics.” 15 Pratt, “A Relational View of Ontological Security in International Relations,” 79. Chaplin 11 understand these changes we must look deeper, to the foundational, ontological level of state behavior and identity.
Because of my approach to revisit and review familiar cases through a new lens, much of my preparation and research for this project was reading the scholarship of those in the field who have worked with ontological security. Additionally, I did scholarly research on topics that are deeply interrelated to ontological security, such as identity, security, status, and the historical events surrounding World War II and the fall of the
Soviet Union.
Within this thesis, the first chapter will give an overview of international relation’s use of ontological security and where the theory fits within the various schools of thought within international relations and visit some additional debates that exist within the field. Exploring the topics of identity and change in international relations, the second chapter will build off the concepts introduced in the first in order to put forth my argument and a new conception of ontological security. Finally, the last two chapters will put this conception to work by evaluating the United States after WWII and the Russian
Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union and how the ontological security of those states shaped their reactions to these systemic level, ontologically challenging events.
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Chapter 1:
Ontological Security in International Relations
Many international relations scholars have put forth arguments as to the merits of the ontological security framework. The assumption that states seek ontological security has become more accepted within the field, and overall the theory has been used to explain state behavior not explained by previous theories. However, international relations scholars are still in the process of figuring out how ontological security should be developed within the field.16 This chapter will be used to provide the necessary academic background information on ontological security as well as the current state of the field. Additionally, this chapter will preview peripheral topics such as identity and security studies in order to provide a more robust and holistic picture of ontological security.
First, I will provide an overview of ontological security’s place within international relations theory, including how it fits into constructivist approaches and how its conceptualization of security compares to those of other schools of thought. Second, I will use ontological security scholarship to provide a more in-depth, contextual definition of the concept. Third, I will explore some of the central themes and debates in ontological security research as well as give an overview of international relations concepts that are related and have overlap with ontological security. Finally, I will identify some of the gaps in the theory in preparation for a conversation as to how to fill those gaps.
16 Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Fit for Purpose? Fitting Ontological Security Studies ‘into’the Discipline of International Relations: Towards a Vernacular Turn,” Cooperation and Conflict 52, no. 1 (2017): 13. Chaplin 13
History of Ontological Security
While this project looks at ontological security within international relations, the concept has an interdisciplinary history. It was originated by psychiatrist R.D. Laing in
1965 during his research into schizophrenic behavior.17 The concept was first recognized by social science scholars after its use by British sociologist Anthony Giddens in 1991.
Giddens argued that individuals are constantly in a state of reflexive consciousness, and that “being a human being means knowing both what one is doing and why one is doing it.”18 He described ontological security as a sense of continuity in the order of events.
Ontological security made its way into international relations scholarship in the beginning years of the twenty-first century as a part of the constructivist school of thought. Constructivism is a theory within international relations that is built on two main concepts: that shared ideas rather than material forces determine human association and that identities and interests of actors are not inherent but constructed. Constructivism developed as a theory in international relations in response to both the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the inability of previous scholarship to predict and explain the monumental shift in the international system. It was also a response to the realist theory of scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, who insisted on the importance of systems-level analysis. Waltz argues that the system is the biggest influence on state action and while the units may change, the system forces acting upon them do not.19 Constructivism counters this argument and is built on the two ideas that “structures of human association
17 R. D Laing, The Divided Self (Viking, 1991); Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Fit for Purpose? Fitting Ontological Security Studies ‘into ‘the Discipline of International Relations: Towards a Vernacular Turn,” Cooperation and Conflict 52, no. 1 (2017): 14. 18 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, 47. 19 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland Press, 2010). Chaplin 14 are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” and that “identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”20
Ontological Security within International Relations
Within the wide range of thought within international relations, ontological security theory falls within the purview of constructivism. Constructivism shifted the field of international relations by working under the assumption that states behave like individuals and therefore have and express concepts such as identity in ways similar to individual human expression.21 Prominent constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt explains that “the concept of state personhood is a useful instrument for organizing experience and building theory.”22 Because of this underlying assumption, constructivism is based on the premise that sociological and psychological theories that were originated around human individuals can be transferred onto states to analyze and interpret state actions. Making the jump from ontological security as a sociological concept to one used in international relations has resulted in a shift in focus from the literal and individual
“self” to a broader, social sense of “self.”23 The underlying assumptions of constructivism have allowed international relations scholars to make this connection, however, some
20 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 21 Sarina Theys “Constructivism: An Introduction,” E-International Relations (blog), February 23, 2018, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Studies in International Relations (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 22 Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 290. 23 Pratt, “A Relational View of Ontological Security in International Relations,” 78. Chaplin 15 have argued that the framework of ontological security was altered in translating the theory from sociology to international relations,24 an idea discussed later in the chapter.
Constructivism also shifted international relations scholarship by introducing the idea that significant aspects of the international system are socially constructed. One of the foundational ideas within constructivism is the concept of identity. Identity is defined as a “representation of an actor’s understanding of who they are, which in turn signals their interests.”25 Constructivism has brought identity to the forefront of research as a central analytical category and argues that identity matters as it constitutes state interests, effects state behavior, and is socially constructed through interaction with other actors.
While ontological security theory is rooted in constructivist concepts, it is also built off ideas from the conceptualizations of security that are used by other schools of thought within international relations. Since the development of the realist school of thought in the post-World War I era by scholars such as Edward Carr and Hans
Morgenthau, the realist conceptualization of security has dominated security studies and the field of international relations. At its core, realism argues for a system of competing self-interested states that exist under anarchy. State interests are defined in terms of, and derived from, power,26 and states will not “sacrifice [their] interests to serve the larger community.”27 Realism assumes that the international system is one of anarchy and a state will use force to attain its goals under this system.
24 Croft and Vaughan-Williams, “Fit for Purpose?,” 26. 25 Sarina Theys “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations (blog), February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in- international-relations-theory/. 26 Hans J. Morgenthau, “A Realist Theory of International Politics,” The Realism Reader 53 (2014). 27 Benjamin Frankel, “Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (March 1, 1996): 9–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429274. Chaplin 16
The realist conceptualization of security revolves around the idea of the security dilemma, which stipulates that the security of one’s own state and the security of any other state are in an indirect relationship.28 Measures that improve the security of one state threaten that of another: a zero-sum game. This system gives rise to the need to balance power, and, under anarchy, states take actions to balance their security with those around them. Balance of power theory argues that because units have interests in maximizing their security, they will “check dangerous concentration of power
(hegemony),”29 thus preventing the formation of true hegemons and restore the balance of anarchy. States within the international system will respond to an actor among them seeking or gaining preponderant power by trying to balance against them.30
In response to the zero-sum conclusions of realism, scholars turned to liberal institutionalism and the school of thought gained prominence within international relations scholarship. This new school of thought argued that states can achieve cooperation under anarchy and institutions can and do play a vital role in this cooperation. The shift to institutionalism brought different rationales for the existence of security communities, including the economic interdependence of actors, membership in international organizations, and the Democratic Peace Theory.31 A major production of liberalist thought, the Democratic Peace Theory argues that democratic states never, or rarely, go to war with other democratic states, and when they do come in conflict with
28 John J Mearsheimer and 3M Company, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (S.l.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), http://ebook.3m.com/library/neworleanspubliclibrary-document_id-hukvr89. 29 William C. Wohlforth et al., “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 157. 30 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 44, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539097. 31 Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace Presidential Address,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 01 (March 2002): 4, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402004197. Chaplin 17 one another, threats of force are rarely used due to their perceived illegitimacy.32 The theory fights back against the realist argument that power and strategic interests are the only determining factors when it comes to involvement in conflict. Conversely it does not argue that shared democracy is the only influence preventing war. Unfavorable cost and balance analysis and shared democratic values are not necessary conditions for avoiding war, but they do constitute sufficient conditions.33
While these conceptualizations of security add to the general body of knowledge within the field of international relations, they fall short in certain areas. Because the conversation surrounding security studies has been dominated by realism and the way this school of thought conceptualizes security, physical security has been the only type of security included in the conversation, ignoring economic, environmental, and ontological factors.
While distinct in its conceptualization of security, ontological security builds on constructivist concepts. Constructivism argues that security, and lack thereof, is a result of the interactions of various actors with social values and the existence of various identities shaping these relations. Interests are shaped largely by identities and, as Ted
Hopf argues, “a world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty.”34 This uncertainty is key, as several security dilemma scholars identify uncertainty regarding others actions as a central part of the security dilemma.35
32 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 5, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539195. 33 Bruce Russett et al., “The Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 167. 34 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 175, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267. 35 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2009): 587–623, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050. Chaplin 18
Alexander Wendt, also in response to Waltz, details his argument of state identity formation being largely a social process. States acquire their identities through cultural and social interactions; they learn via other states in the system what the correct behavior is and their identities are formed, shaped, changed, and maintained in these interactions.
Wendt’s socialization process seems to characterize identities as something states can acquire and shed with relative ease, making the whole process seem superficial. The next chapter further engages with Wendt’s ideas and the various processes of state’s learning and acquiring their identities.
Ontological security builds on these ideas but puts greater emphasis on the existential importance of identities. The interactions states have within the international system hold up much more than their identity; in my opinion they play a crucial role in the maintenance of a state’s ontological security. I argue that the pursuit of ontological security is a continual process and that there are systemic level events that challenge the security that states have built for themselves. Understanding the processes that follow these events, namely the reconstruction of ontological security, are crucial to understand because how a state’s ontological security is constructed greatly impacts how a state behaves.
The Copenhagen School also offers a differing view of security, one that prioritizes how actors within the international system talk about security threats. This school of thought argues that there are three stages a referent object, the idea or object being threatened, goes through in order to become a security issue. Objects start as apolitical, nonpoliticized issues. Next, the object can be politicized and brought into political discussions and debates. Objects can become a part of the political world if a Chaplin 19 government is attempting to create policy that influences them, or they can be brought in by political actors in an attempt to use that issue for their gain. Finally, actors can take
‘securitizing measures’ and attempt to securitize the object by labeling it a security issue.36 Security agents must convince the public that the object is under threat due to a specific factor and then subsequently convince the public that extraordinary measures are needed to placate the security concern.
As will be seen in the following chapters, especially the case studies, ontological security has power, both culturally and in regard to state leaders. Because of this power, and because of a state’s need to respond to threats of ontological insecurity, ontological security is continually subject to strategic manipulation as leaders attempts to portray events, people, or other enemies as threats to their way of life. An example of this is seen in how ontological security theory interacts with the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of security.
Ontological Security brings in a different set of intangible concepts, such as identity, status, power, etc. that become the security referent. These concepts, especially identity, are already routinely politicized and when they come under attack, or when the ontological security of a country is threatened, they are moved into the securitized zone and the security of the country is tied to the security of its identity. Through building a narrative of security surrounding concepts such as identity and status, actors can convince their audience and their fellow international actors to adhere and agree to extraordinary manners and behaviors, such as continued involvement in perpetual conflicts, all because
36 Dr. Jonathan Agensky, “Critical Approaches to Security,” n.d. Chaplin 20 ontological concepts have been securitized and ontological security has been prioritized over traditional or other types of security. Policy makers and international actors can convince their audience that the thing under attack is not their borders or their physical safety, but their “way of life”.
Current Applications of Ontological Security
Within the current body of international relations literature that employs ontological security, there is general consensus regarding the definition of ontological security. In addition, there is a basic assumption in international relations scholarship that states seek physical security. Ontological security scholars put forth the idea that in addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security. Jennifer Mitzen argues that states have the need to experience themselves as a continuous person in time.37 She looks at ontological security in relation to the security dilemma and argues that a break in this continuity, deep forms of insecurity, or an identity crisis can all cause an ontological security crisis. Ayşe Zarakol builds off this idea of the continuous self by adding the idea that ontological security requires a “consistent sense of self and having that sense affirmed by others.”38 Catarina Kinnvall describes ontological security as a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be.39 The next chapter builds on these ideas to make an argument about the conceptualization of ontological security.
37 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 344. 38 Ayşe Zarakol, “Ontological (in) Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan,” International Relations 24, no. 1 (2010): 6. 39 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 7463. Chaplin 21
In his 2005 evaluation of British neutrality during the America Civil War, Brent
Steele states that “an agent is ontologically secure when they choose a course of action comfortable with their sense of self-identity.”40 Steele effectively describes the differences between the traditional and ontological conceptions of security. Traditional security sees security as survival while the ontological theory sees it as being. The greatest challenge or source of insecurity to states in traditional system is fear, stemming from outside threats. Ontological insecurity is produced by anxiety and an
“uncomfortable disconnect with the self.”41 All of these descriptions of the same definition center around a state’s insecurity, both with its own identity, and with how it interacts in that identity with the surrounding world.
One central theme in ontological security scholarship is the idea that while states seek both physical and ontological security, the two can exist in a conflictual relationship.
Mitzen argues that “a harmful or self-defeating relationship can provide ontological security, which means states can become attached to conflict. That is, states might actually come to prefer their ongoing, certain conflict to the unsettling condition of deep uncertainty regarding identity—both theirs and other’s.”42 Conflict can provide an identity and a continuity that in turn provides security. She argues that states seek ontological security to maintain a sense of distinctness within the international system and the use of ontological security can provide a structural explanation for seemingly irrational conflicts and help address the problematic process of ending such conflicts.
40 Brent J. Steele, “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 526. 41 Steele, 527. 42 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 342. Chaplin 22
Ontological security has also been used to explain why modern societies return to nationalism and religion,43 and why Great Britain decided to stay neutral during the
American civil war. 44
Another fundamental question within ontological security scholarship is whether ontological insecurity a result of a state’s own uncertainty about their identity and is fostered by internal factors, or if it is generated by interactions with the international environment and external pressures. I make my argument regarding this central question in the next chapter, but Ayşe Zarakol evaluates this question by looking at state denial of historical crimes and uses Turkey and Japan as case studies. She argues that these states’ inability to apologize for past crimes, the Armenian genocide and World War II atrocities respectively, creates ontological insecurity.
In the debate on the source of insecurity, Mitzen’s argument, which focuses on state’s habitual social relationships, argues that interactions are the primary source of both ontological security and insecurity, while Steele focuses instead on the “reflexive self-understandings of states”45 in the development of security, or lack thereof. Zarakol takes the middle road and argues that is a combination of both factors. She describes how both sides have their merit, but they “are also incomplete because neither takes into account the uneven expansion of international society or the effect this expansion had on the identity of outsider states who were incorporated into the system at a later date.”46
She argues that a strictly social approach would lead to the conclusion that international
43 Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 742. 44 Brent J. Steele, “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005):. 45 Zarakol, “Ontological (in) Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes,” 19. 46 Zarakol, 19. Chaplin 23 pressure from norms, western condemnation, and the resulting loss of status would serve as strong incentive for Turkey and Japan to address their past crimes. However, as
Zarakol points out, neither country seems motivated to respond to the present-day demands from the international community.47 On the other hand, Both Japan and Turkey are “especially concerned about their international standing and hypersensitive to criticism by the West.”48 An approach that eschews states from all social influences and focuses solely on the internal identities of the states would be incomplete due to the relationship between state identities and system dynamics.
In their March 2017 article regarding fitting ontological security into the discipline of International Relations, Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-Williams discuss how the translation of ontological security from sociology to international relations altered the framework of the theory. They argue that “there is a particular character to the performance of IR scholarship…one that acts to close and police the boundaries of the discipline in ways that reflect dominant power–knowledge relations.”49 The closing and policing of these boundaries created two strands of research; two ways ontological security is incorporated into the wider field of international relations literature. The first strand, exemplified by works such as Mitzen, Steele, and Zarakol, moves to focus on the state and in doing so, altered the framework of ontological security from how it is used elsewhere in the social sciences. Croft and Vaughan-Williams do not find this alteration problematic or necessarily incorrect or invaluable, but they see it as in important distinction to make. They argue that scholarship like that of Kinnvall translates the
47 Ibid, 8. 48 Ibid, 8. 49 Croft and Vaughan-Williams, “Fit for Purpose?,” 13. Chaplin 24 concept of ontological security more directly from Laing and Giddens.50 In her explanation of why modern societies return to nationalism and religion in times of insecurity, she argues for the use of security as “thick signifier”. Moving away from the conceptual analysis of security and towards a view of how it determines social relations allows scholars to “throw light on contextual aspects of security.”51
Even though ontological security is a relatively new concept in the field of international relations, the concept has already undergone some criticism and calls for revision. While the theory has been beneficial in providing new insights to scholars, it, like all theories, has its faults and gaps. Some fallacies may be inherent to the nature of the theory and insurmountable, but often they are questions that have yet to be answered.
One of the largest gaps in the ontological security literature is that assessing the role of events in the creation of ontological insecurity and how states respond to this insecurity.
This chapter has reviewed much of the existing literature that employs ontological security and while this literature does a good job of overviewing the concept, providing a working definition, and showcasing the effects of ontological security at work, one thing lacking in the field in an in-depth look at how ontological security works. The next chapter works to reconceptualize ontological security in a tangible way that allows for further research and insights.
50 Ibid, 26. 51 Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 744. Chaplin 25
Chapter 2:
Change, Identity, and the Ontological Security Complex
While there has been a growing number of scholars applying ontological security theory to various case studies, employing its concepts in their research, and adding beneficial insights to the field of international relations, I argue we need to take a step back and evaluate the theory itself in order to be able to move forward. What is ontological security? We have a series of theoretical definitions that paint a picture of the concept, but many of the characteristics and foundational questions regarding ontological security have not been worked out.
Can ontological security change? Before one can answer even this question, we must address and define what we mean by change. Alexander Wendt puts an emphasis on change at the systemic level, but is this the only arena of meaningful change?
Additionally, I argue we need a deeper, more involved conception of what ontological security actually is, how it’s constructed, and how it interacts with state identity. Only once these issues are addressed, can we begin to move towards evaluating if ontological security can change.
This chapter will first overview the conversation that has surrounded change within international relations and identify the gaps in that conversation. It will then evaluate how constructivists have talked more specifically about identity change and where those conversations also fall short. Finally, it will propose a new conception of ontological security that more readily allows for scholars to evaluate the intersections of ontological security, identity, and change. Chaplin 26
The Change Conversation
The topic of change has been one of great interest to international relations scholars and research into change has produced a myriad of theories on both how the international system changes and reacts to change. Possibly one of the most well-known and cited works within international relations literature is Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of
International Relations. This research transformed the change conversation by introducing the idea that system level influences and changes were the only ones that mattered within the international system. The anarchical system of the world does not change and since all states perform the same and seek the same things, there is no unit level variation. Change only occurred with the redistribution of capabilities as a result of balancing, a slow but present process, or the dissolution of anarchy and implementation of hierarchy, something never seen in the international system.52
Waltz’s argument elicited many responses from international relations scholars over the years, including that from John Ruggie, who argued that there is indeed a distinctness and a degree of separation from one state to another. He argued that units are different and therefore when this differentiation is defined correctly, the unit level impact doesn’t drop out of the equation, but instead effects the various processes of change within the international system.53
A significant fault in change literature was revealed during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system had come from neither
52 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 53 J. G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35, no. 02 (January 1983): 279, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010273. Chaplin 27 a change in states’ various capacities nor a system change away from anarchy. To address this gap, Friedrich Kratochwil takes a constructivist stance to argue for the salience of norms and rules in the international system; power is not the only player influencing state behavior. He states that “norms and rules are constitutive of the international game in that they determine who the actors are, what rules they have to follow when they wish to connect certain consequences to their official acts…and how titles to possessions…can be established and transferred.”54 The growth of constructivism in the late twentieth century introduced new ways to talk about change; ways that differed from the neorealist conceptualization that came before it.
Overall however, constructivism lacks in its development of language to talk about change, especially, in the area of identity. Change is defined as a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties” by Ernst Haas,55 while Aseema Sinha clarifies that “change in international politics must span more than one country and envelop interstate relations and global institutions.”56
Change comes in several forms within in the international system, and Sinha argues that International Relations scholarship tends to privilege the phenomena of systemic and large-scale change. Sinha offers a typology of change that looks at both the process of change: slow and incremental vs. disruptive, and the potential outcomes: continuity or change just within institution vs. change or realignment of the entire system.
54 Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics,” Review of International Studies 19, no. 1 (1993): 76. 55 Aseema Sinha, “Building a Theory of Change in International Relations: Pathways of Disruptive and Incremental Change in World Politics,” International Studies Review 20, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 197, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy031. 56 Sinha, 197. Chaplin 28
She argues that International Relations scholarship needs to broaden its conception of change to account for “endogenous sources of change and incremental yet significant change.”57 While these scholars has expanded the conception of change in general, we must turn our attention to the specific area of identity change.
Identity Change
Most of the conversation on identity change comes from Alexander Wendt, however, his treatment of identity change seems a bit flippant; as if states can develop and shed identities with relative ease. Wendt mentions that under structural constructivism, identity is slow to change, but there is a difference between norms in the international system changing, which I believe he is referring to, and states changing their identity to fit a certain norm. Wendt refers to the former as a slow process, but his argument regarding identity is still incomplete. He breaks down the process of change into ‘natural selection’ and ‘cultural selection’ and makes the argument for cultural selection, and specifically, imitation, stating that “imitation can [change a population’s characteristics] as quickly as an idea’s success can be demonstrated, certainly within the span of a single generation,”58 and arguing that an idea could take over a system “very quickly.” 59
Granted, Wendt does differentiate between “simple learning”—a shallow learning— which affects only behavior, and “complex learning,” which is a deeper learning and brings about change to the identity. While this distinction is crucial, Wendt still talks
57 Ibid, 197. 58 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 226. 59 Wendt, 226. Chaplin 29 about cultural selection being something that can happen quickly. Wendt seems to categorize learning into these two binary categories, but I am suggesting a third, one that transcends identity and creates change in ontological security. I see this third category as a deeper level of “identity”; one that permeates the very foundation of a states’ existential identity. This security is durable and is not easily changed by the coming and going of international norms.
Identity has been a central analytical category within constructivist research so the process of how identity changes begs to be an area of vital importance to constructivist scholarship. However, identity has largely been viewed as a stable and stagnant concept, one immune to change and evolution. Where constructivism has evaluated identity change, it has largely viewed change as an external force acting upon states. This is seen in Wendt’s discussion on international norms and the process of the socialization of states through norm formation.60 The final stage in the development of a norm is the internalization of the norm by states, thus theoretically changing the identity of the state.
Because this research focused largely on the norm itself, it understandably lacked an exploration of the effects on state identity as norms are internalized.
Several other concepts within international relations help inform the ontological security discussion, including status, narrative, and respect. Much of the conversation regarding status starts with the idea of the status of being a “Great Power,” a long sought- after title belonging to the current leaders and influencers of the world. Status scholars point out though that what was needed for Great Power status in the past (military power)
60 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 399. Chaplin 30 is no longer the only determining factor. 61 States rising within the international system are doing so with other means, such as economic growth and strength and global diplomatic capabilities. This point lays the foundation for Iver Neumann’s argument: that material and symbolic resources work together to determine status and one without other has led to the unsuccessful acquisition of the Great Power status.62 Narrative can also play an influential role in the construction of a state’s ontological security, and, during times of crisis, narratives are “selectively activated” in order to prompt policy change that will satiate the physical security needs as well as preserving ontological security “through autobiographical continuity.”63 Finally, respect can be an influential factor in the evaluation of state behavior and construction of ontological security, specifically the
“intensity and duration of many cross-border conflicts,”64 as it can act as a significant goal for international actors.
The Ontological Security Complex
So, can ontological security change? I’ve discussed the various conceptions of change, but to continue to unpack this question, we need a deeper, more involved conception of what ontological security actually is. Previous scholarship has provided some nice definitional work and illustrative case studies of the effects of ontological security, but I am calling for a working conception that goes beyond these surface
61 T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William Curti Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 62 Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, 87. 63 Jelena Subotić, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 4 (2016): 611. 64 Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 01 (March 2011): 105, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000308. Chaplin 31 insights: a practical, usable, conception of not just what ontological security is, but more importantly, how it works.
This conceptualization of ontological security Identity is made up of three components: ontological security, ontological security building blocks, and identity. It is built on the idea that there is unit level variation Building Block within the international system. A visual representation of this conception can be seen in Figure 2.1: Ontological Security Complex Figure 2.1. For the sake of this conception, I use identity much in the way Wendt and constructivist scholars at large use identity. While it encompasses concepts such as governmental organization (democracy, monarchy, liberal, etc..), religion, and racial identities, it also involves identities that relate to international status (Great Power, regional power) economic and developmental status, and intangible values (equality, morality, secularity etc.). These identities exist on the surface level of the ontological security complex. They are the face-value layer that the outside world can see and potentially have influence on. These identities are also the easiest to change and shift. While they are not gained and shed as easily as Wendt seems to describe, they can be influenced by international norms and the changing international system.
Beneath these identities lie the ontological security building blocks. These are core, foundational concepts that speak to the existential existence of a state. They are formed through historical interactions and experiences within the international system.
Durable in nature, they are not easily shifted or changed. Due to the existential importance of ontological security, the process for challenging and possibly bringing a Chaplin 32
change among the ontological security building blocks is different than that of identity.
States cannot be socialized into a new security construction; more is needed than
adherence to a new international norm.
While separate and distinct, the building blocks and the identities that are built on
top of them have an important relationship. Together, their integration forms the
ontological security complex and work together to create security of the self. When the
surface level identities are compatible with the foundational
blocks, a state experiences ontological security. This Identity compatibility allows for the sense of self to make sense, and
thus, as Mitzen discusses, allows for the state to act within
the international system. However, when the building blocks Building Block and the identities are not compatible, it opens the state up to
ontological insecurity. It is helpful to think of these concepts Figure 2.2: Ontological Insecurity as puzzle pieces (Figure 2.1), and the gap that exists between
the blocks and incompatible identities is where ontological insecurity lies (Figure 2.2).
By forcing states to move towards identities that do not line up with their
ontological security building blocks, the durability of the blocks is challenged. The
implication for a misalignment of the foundational building blocks and component
identities is ontological insecurity at large, but this can manifest itself in a multitude of
ways. States may revert to old actions and identities that provide them security or
continue or enter into conflict that is detrimental to other types of security such as
physical and economic. Chaplin 33
Ontological security can be challenged when a state tries to assume identities that are not compatible with their building blocks. This can happen both on the end of the state, and on the end of the international system. For example, a state can identify as a
Great Power, but without all the necessary capabilities and recognition from the international system as a Great Power, this identity is continually challenged. If the state’s building blocks include the status of Great Power, but this status is not reflected in their surface level and internationally recognized identities, a gap is created between the layers and therefore the state is open to ontological insecurity.
The status of a state’s ontological security is not binary; it is a much more nuanced conversation than simply saying a state is or is not ontologically secure. All states have an ontological security complex; they have concepts such as status, identity, role, etc. on which they build a narrative and an understanding about their place in the international system. States experience challenges to these understandings and thus experience times of ontological insecurity. The world stage is dynamic, and new challenges and bolsters of ontological security are continually occurring.
The makeup of ontological security aids in the understanding of how ontological security fits into the theorizing of change within constructivism. The dynamic international system is constantly producing events that interact with states’ ontological security. These events can challenge or bolster both a state’s identity and security. The challenges to ontological security posed by these events force states to respond because under the assumption that states seek ontological security, there exists a need for stability at the most foundational level of a state’s existence and security. It is the big, disruptive, system altering events in which we see large scale challenges to ontological security and Chaplin 34 thus provide the best window into evaluating this process. Similar in severity to Thomas
Birkland’s “focusing events,”65 these moments of rupture, such as world wars or the collapse of great empires, allow for the reconfiguration of the components of the ontological security complex. These events become opportunities to see how the components of the complex are aligned or misaligned at any given time.
Adding ontological security to the conversation about state behavior adds the existential link to relations, identity, status, power, etc. These concepts are not just important to states or pivotal to academics in their attempts to understand the international system of state behavior. It provides a structural explanation for behavior that seems to be unproductive to a state’s security goals, such as perpetuating long standing conflicts.
It is important to note that I am not arguing that states are beholden to their blocks. Like Mitzen’s identity-action dynamic,66 states, and the actors within them hold up and reproduce the building blocks. Politicians enact and use them because they can appeal to large groups of people. We appeal to the building blocks because they have power, but in doing so, we are reinforcing this power. I am not putting forth a determinism argument that invests too much causal significance in the blocks. The ontological security complex, while important and influential, can be viewed as background conditions that shape what kind of policies are successful within a given state
65 Birkland defines a focusing event as one that “event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously”. For more on his argument, see Thomas A. Birkland, “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting,” Journal of Public Policy 18, no. 1 (1998): 53–74. 66 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 345. Chaplin 35 in a certain environment. Ontological security provides a foundation, a way to know how to act, but I argue that it is still a conscious decision to abide by or change a certain policy. There is a two-way relationship between a state’s actions and their ontological security. The ontological security complex affects state behavior, and in turn, state behavior bolsters and builds ontological security. It provides security to act in a way that satisfies that existential need for continuity and in accordance with one’s identity. In short, states are not programable robots, where certain ontological security building blocks + right international conditions = certain, solidified, outcomes. Predicting international behavior is a slippery task, but ultimately it is an art, not a science.
Conclusions
The use of identity as a central analytical category has allowed for constructivist literature to make valuable additions towards the conversation regarding change in the international system. Norms and rules can be regarded as salient influences and various types of learning effect can effect change at different levels of identity. Ontological security has vitally important things to say about how identity changes and the existential links between action and identity, but I argue that to truly understand these changes, we need a new conception of ontological security—one that moves beyond the superficial understanding of identity and views the concept as a working complex of its two main pieces: the ontological security building blocks and the corresponding identities that are built on top of them. The alignment, or lack thereof, of these components creates an environment of ontological security or insecurity and often, system altering events can give researchers an insight into how a state’s complex is organized and the degree of alignment. Chaplin 36
However, I also argue that we don’t know how ontological change works until we look at empirics. My aim with this project is to create a working theory that allows for variation in historical context. Change and the ontological security complex have quite a few moving parts and a theory that dismisses them in the name of uniformity would do a disservice to the complexities of identity.
The case studies in this project are looking at the process of ontological security surrounding disruptive change and realignment of the international system. They will look at two of the most disruptive events of the twentieth century—World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union—and how they challenged the ontological security of the
United States and the Russian Federation respectively. Both events challenged ontological security, but the outcomes for each case were very different. To understand why, we must employ the Ontological Security Complex.
Chaplin 37
Chapter 3:
Stepping Up: The United States Post-World War II
When it comes to re-evaluating identity and challenges to the core fabric of a nation, 2016-2019 has proved an eventful period for the United States as the country has seen many of its foundational democratic institutions challenged. Political and racial tensions and divides, sweeping sexual assault and harassment allegations, investigations into foreign collusion, and swift and stark policy changes, especially regarding foreign policy, have left citizens questioning what it means to be “American” and what exactly the country they call home stands for. The Trump administration has captured their policy goals in the now ubiquitous catchphrase “Make America Great Again.” It harkens back to an unspecified time where America continually “won” and was respected by the other states in the international system.
In the collective American memory, many see this time, or at least a prosperous time in American history, as the years following the Second World War—popularly known as the Golden Age of Capitalism. Fresh off two world war victories, experiencing unprecedented economic growth, and taking the lead on global affairs, it seemed the
United States was at its prime. But how did they get there? What changed in American ontological security during that period that creates such a desire to romanticize the
1950s? This chapter aims to evaluate the ontological security of the United States and the role the Second World War played in the process of the transformation in American ontological security during and following the war. Chaplin 38
This chapter will first give a brief overview of the events leading up to and during the Second World War that laid the stage for the Unites States’ ontological security shift.
Then, it will evaluate how other theories have told the story of America’s rise to power and where they fall short. Finally, this chapter will outline the various, interwoven ideologies and complexes that made up the United States’ ontological security during the mid-twentieth century and how the Second World War brought about a shift in this ontological security. The Second World War and the construction of global governance that followed are lauded as some of the most pivotal moments within the development of the international system, both economically and diplomatically. I argue that this time frame was also critical for the ontological security of the United States.
Historical Background
With war raging in Europe, there was a divide in the United States regarding the country’s role in this Second World War. At large, the American people were strongly against entering the war. The United States was still handling the turmoil caused by the
First World War and the subsequent Great Depression. On an ideological level, many believed it was not the place of the United States to continue to get involved in the affairs of Europe. This idea can be traced all the way back to George Washington as he laid out the need for the United States to stay disentangled in the affairs of Europe in his 1776
Farewell address.67
More tangibly, the isolationist camp argued that the war in Europe provided no physical threat to the United States; the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provided a security
67 “U.S. Senate: Washington’s Farewell Address,” accessed October 17, 2018, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Washingtons_Farewell_Address.htm. Chaplin 39 barrier that no nation dare cross. Additionally, if there was a time to enter the war and come out successful, it had passed. Involvement would now only lead to damaging the possibility of continual peaceful relations with European countries. Pilot, and public face of the isolationist movement, Charles Lindbergh, declared that America’s sole task was
“building and guarding [her] own destiny.”68 Opposite the American people was
President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration. Franklin also invoked ideas of
America’s destiny, but he did so to call for the need of American involvement in the war.
He shamed isolationists and framed American isolationism as a fantasy—one that evoked a “nightmare of a people without freedom.”69 Franklin declared that American must become “the greatest arsenal of democracy,”70 and thus he directed his foreign policy to start supporting the war effort without actually getting involved.
In November of 1939, Franklin pushed Congress to repeal the arms embargo provisions of neutrality to allow arms to be sold to Britain and France and in June of
1940, the U.S. began the Lend-Lease program toward Great Britain. Franklin saw
America’s role in the international system as one greater than any of the foreign policies that had come before him. This vision was counteracted by the support for isolationism from the American people. However, come December 7th, 1941, American support for isolationism all but vanished.
The attack on Pearl Harbor had resounding effects within all levels of American society. It set off a wave of patriotism within the American population that overwhelmed
68 Susan Dunn, “The Debate Behind U.S. Intervention in World War II,” The Atlantic, July 8, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-debate-behind-us-intervention-in-world- war-ii/277572/. 69 Dunn. 70 Ibid. Chaplin 40 any previous desire for isolationism. Additionally, American pride would not allow for an attack on its own soil to remain unanswered. The attack also proved that the American homeland was not immune to attacks due to its relative geographic isolation from Europe and Asia. Roosevelt now had the popular support to back his decision to enter the war.
For Roosevelt, entering the war has always meant more than a response to a physical security threat. He saw what Henry Luce would write about in 1941: that the role of the
United States was no longer one of staying in the background and isolating itself from the rest of the world.71
Although the war at large started with Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in
1939, the United States’ collective memory of World War II begins with the U.S. entrance into the war in December of 1941. Roosevelt’s claim that America would be the
“arsenal of democracy” would prove to be a foundational principal of the United States’ strategy for the war. The U.S. fought with a relatively small ground force that focused its efforts on the maximization of its firepower, mechanization, and mobility. This ground force was supported by a large strategic air force with the ability to deliver large destruction on a precise scale. In his essay on the development of America’s hyperpower,
David Kennedy captures Joseph Stalin’s description of America’s strategy when he writes that “the United States…had decided to fight with American money, American machines, and Russian men.”72 The United States was the only country to have expanded its civilian economy while waging war and this boom in wartime economics propelled the U.S. to its high level of post-war economic success and affluence. Overall, the United
71 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” LIFE Magazine, February 17, 1941. 72 Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., The Short American Century: A Postmortem (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012), 27. Chaplin 41
States seems to be the only country that emerged from World War II in a more favorable position than they entered. This advantage helped pave the way for the U.S. strategic leadership position that allowed them to shape the second half of the twentieth century.
The end of the Second World War also brought the end of British rule over the international system. The United States was the only of the Allied powers that did not fight on their own soil and was left without the physical devastation of war within their homeland. Lacking the need to re-build the country, the United States had the resources available to take charge of the post-war reconstruction. Such was the case in Greece, where British diplomats called the U.S. State Department informing the Americans that they would be ending all aid to Greece in order to focus on re-building their own country.
“Britain, in effect, was asking the United States to take over leadership of the Western world. The United States was ready to accept this new responsibility.”73 However, the threat of communism was not limited to Greece. European economies started to deteriorate in 1946 and remained “susceptible to exploitation.”74
U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall called for a comprehensive plan to rebuild Europe. The Marshall Plan revitalized industry and investment into Europe as well as stimulating the American economy by creating and establishing markets for
American goods. This demand propelled the American economy forward and was a key aspect in the post-war prosperity within the United States, allowing the U.S. to expand its influence and dominance to the financial sector. Today, the U.S. State Department
73 “American History: The Rise of US Influence After World War Two,” VOA, accessed October 18, 2018, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/american-history-the-rise-of-us-influence-after-world-war- two-126735008/116180.html. 74 “Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian,” accessed October 18, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan. Chaplin 42 recognizes the Marshall Plan as a “great humanitarian effort”75 and a cornerstone for
American legacy and foreign policy. The United States hosted both the Bretton Woods conference that established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the San Francisco Conference that created the United Nations. Referred to as a “American order-building project,” the post-war global governance construction created “a sprawling international order, organized around open trade, alliances, client states, multilateral institutions, and democratic partnerships.”76 The United States led construction of the post-war international system and in doing so, took the role of global leader and stepped into a new era of ontological security.
Previous Approaches
As a foundational period in the construction of the current international system, many scholars have studied, evaluated, and offered their analysis of the systemic changes in the mid-twentieth century. I seek not to disprove or disagree with any of these scholars; their studies offer great insight into the events of the period and their significance both to the actors involved and the character and future of the international system. Instead, I use these analyses as a starting point for a study of ontological security.
The questions of ontological security go one step deeper—to an existential level—to understand the underlying motives and influences not just on state behavior, but on state identities, desires, and statuses.
75 “Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian.” 76 John Ikenberry, “The Quest for Global Governance,” Current History 113, no. 759 (2014): 16. Chaplin 43
One of the most common stories told when discussing the United States’ ascent to the top of global leadership is that of the transformation in American foreign policy from isolationism to globalism. Prior to the First World War, the United States stayed relatively uninvolved in European affairs and interacted with the world in bilateral agreements. Following the First World War and the United States’ involvement in war in
Europe, the U.S. had a choice to revert to its isolationism or to continue and expand its global reach. The country chose the former, exemplified by not joining the League of
Nations—the multilateral global governance mechanism and brain-child of American president Woodrow Wilson. Fast forward nearly twenty-five years later and the United
States was sitting once again at a crossroads, and this time, the choice was globalism.
Much of the reasoning for the United States making this drastic foreign policy change is rooted in economic factors—the growth of U.S. industry demanded new markets, global markets were expanding and the U.S. wanted a role, and a desire to put their revitalized and well-funded military to work. This is not an inaccurate telling of the story, it is just incomplete. The United States did transform its approach to foreign policy, but the isolationism to globalism approach lacks the existential answer to the question “why?”.
Great Power theories also give one narrative regarding the systemic shift in power following the Second World War, specifically, the idea of the rise and fall of Great
Powers. This idea tells a story of the balancing of powers and the role of resources and economic durability to a nation’s place in the international system.77 The United States
77 For more on Great Power theories and the rise and fall of Great Powers see Paul M Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=718555. Chaplin 44 entered the war in order to balance the rising power of the Soviet Union and maintained its position as global leader following the war for the same reason. The economic stability and success the United States developed and, along with the resources in the form in international institutions, provided the mechanism for America’s ascent. This line of reasoning also misses the existential dimensions of American leadership. It takes identity out of the equation and reduced the revolution of the international system to an inevitable systemic-level change. While the economic growth of the American economy was one vital factor that allowed the United States to rise into a position of global leadership, it does not strip the U.S. of its sense of agency and its portion of responsibility in the outcome of the post-war international system.
Building Blocks of Ontological Security
Before one can explore and explain why the Second World War both challenged and transformed the American identity and ontological security, one must evaluate the various concepts, events, facts, histories, and ideologies on which the United States has built its ontological security. Ontological security is not simply one identity; it is a complex web of intricate factors, all in relation with one another. I argue that these component building blocks—American exceptionalism, a moral superiority, and triumphalism—have a historical presence in the American psyche but were not the driving forces behind American actions and foreign policy until following the Second
World War. Following the war, the United States experienced a wave of self-assertion, among other things, that brought these elements to the forefront of American ontological security and allowed—nay, forced the United States to step up into the role of global leader. Chaplin 45
From its inception, the United States has claimed a unique history and identity when compared to its global counterparts. The United States is a relatively new country and its formation in the modern age has had great effects on the development of its identity and role within international relations. The history of what is now recognized as the United States seems to begin in 1620 with the landing of the English Pilgrims on the east coast,78 and the modern government was not solidified until the signing of the constitution ins 1878—more than 150 years later. Comparatively, the first British
Parliament was convened in 1215 after the signing of the Magna Carta. There was a sense of cultural difference with the America settlers even early on as English Parliament member Edmund Burke “noted that [the American colonists] were different culturally, that they were not simply transplanted Englishmen.”79 The United States is unique in that it is a large nation with a large population originating primarily overseas. While “other countries senses’ of themselves are derived from a common history,”80 the historical experiences of Americans have varied so widely across time and geography that the population has had to find its shared identity in other things, including its exceptionalism.
Because the modern-day United States truly is a nation of immigrants lacking one cohesive shared history, the evolution of American identity and the foundation for the ontological security of the United states have taken a more ideological and value-driven route. American identity is unique in that “being an American…is an ideological
78 I recognize that beginning history at this point it highly problematic and ignores the centuries that Native Americans lived in North America. However, “American history” and “The history of North America” are regarded and taught as two different topics, pointing to the overall exceptionalism within the American identity. While the historical American identity is built somewhat on a common history, this history is regarded as starting with the immigration of the English to North America. 79 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, 1. publ. in paperback (New York: Norton, 1997), 33. 80 Lipset, 31. Chaplin 46 commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values are un-
American.”81 Former Vice President Joe Biden exemplified this idea when he stated that
“America is an idea—based on a set of values.”82
One of the most prevalent concepts within American ontological security, and one that has carried itself throughout the twentieth century, is the American identity and role of taking the high moral ground. The ideals and ideologies on which American stakes its identity are regarded, at least in the western world, as the ultimate goal for both governmental systems and systems of morals. This idea couples with the belief that
America typifies the aspirations and hopes of the whole world,83 and creates the idea of a moral superiority that the United States exemplifies.
In their role as moral authorities, “Americans are utopians moralists who press hard to institutionalize virtue, destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.”84 The United States’ involvement in both World Wars was framed as fight against the evil enemy; a battle to stop the human rights atrocities of the enemy and free those under their rule. Additionally, justifications for the Cold War and its subsequent conflicts (the Vietnam and Korean Wars) were framed not as fighting communism because it was the geostrategic thing to do, or to protect America’s physical security, or to counter the U.S.’s new position of power, although all these things are definite factors.
The Cold War was framed as a fight between good and evil, communism and democracy.
81 Ibid, 31. 82 “Joe Biden (@joebiden) • Instagram Photos and Videos,” October 26, 2018, https://www.instagram.com/joebiden/. 83 Frederick (Heartmann), The New Age of American Foreign Policy (The Macmillan Company, 1970), 12. 84 Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 63. Chaplin 47
The United States had a destined role to destroy evil in the world. They had succeeded in defeating the Nazis and would do the same with the communist Soviets.
The final building block of American ontological security is and was the powerful idea that America would always win. The United States had a culture of victory hundreds of years in the making that started with the colonial rebel’s successful revolution against the British empire. The Allied power victory in both World Wars could be viewed as the final manifestation of this victorious destiny. Ultimately the United States’ self- perception of its triumphalism came from the idea that the U.S. stood for all that is good—freedom, democracy, equality—and that good would always conquer over evil—
Nazis, communism, oppression, or whatever the enemy of the time was. This black and white view of global interactions has been perpetuated in the historical re-telling of the
Second World War.85
American triumphalism also rests on the idea that American national identity could not exists without external enemies. While this characteristic is not unique to the
United States, it still plays a vital role in the nation’s self-perception. How can one imagine America without also imagining its enemies and the “story of their slaughter and our triumph?”86 Not only would American triumph over their enemies, but the victory would be absolute. There was no room for compromise in the American battle, as seen in both the demand for the unconditional surrender from Japan—which ultimately led to the
85 John E. Bodnar, The “Good War” in American Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 86 Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 15. Chaplin 48 dropping of two atomic bombs—and the unwavering approach to stop the spread of communism in Asia and South America.
A New Approach
In his 1941 essay for Life magazine, prior to America’s entrance into the war,
Henry Luce calls for the United States to take the role of global leader and enter World
War II. Luce sees the shift in America’s ontological security as the country finally coming into its true duty and destiny to be the most powerful nation in the world and to exert its influence globally. He points out that it would have been possible to defend the western hemisphere without engagement in the war, even following the possibility of the fall of Europe. However, the Second World War created a threat to democratic principles.
The United States’ ontological security had historically been tied to democratic principles and recently tied to the spread of those principals and when those principals were threatened, so was the security of the U.S.
A careful evaluation of these building blocks of ontological security is necessary to start to understand both the significance and potency of ontological security and how durable these concepts are. All these ideals and concepts were central to the American ontological security, and it was the challenge of the second World War that brought them to the front of the country’s ontological security construction and incorporated the need to assert these ideals into the global system. It is vital to understand that the United States didn’t create new identities or gain new ideologies—this specific shift regarded the priorities of these various ontological security building blocks and how their prevalence and influence over American actions shifted. Chaplin 49
Just as these concepts did not appear in 1945, they did not fade away as the twentieth century progressed. Triumphalism and a moral superiority and the responsibility to fight for “good” has been weaved into the narrative surrounding every conflict in which the United States is involved, from defeating communism in Vietnam and overthrowing governments in South America to the War on Terrorism—a powerful example of the “good vs. evil” framework.
The building blocks of American ontological security facilitated the transformation of the United States into their role as global leader and Great Power. The foundational concepts complemented the new identities, status, and power into which the
United States was moving. I argue that American exceptionalism, moral superiority, and triumphalism have held a historical and significant part within the American ontological security complex, but they were not the most foundational and influential components— they did not exert the most influence on American actions. The Second World War brought about a shift in the prioritization and influence of American ontological security, and these three concepts, especially the moral superiority and triumphalism, became the most important concepts in the U.S.’s ontological security complex and began greatly influencing the state’s international actions.
What was it about World War II that shifted the building blocks of America’s ontological security to facilitate the rise to global leader and Great Power? Before the
Second World War, the international system was led by those with the greatest physical and economic might. The two often ran hand in hand as countries would imperialize other countries and use them to boost their economic power. The United States, lacking in both military might and substantial economic influence before the world wars could Chaplin 50 not rule in such a system. Following World War II, the United States not only had both the economic and military power to lead the international system, but they also helped create an international system that appealed to their moral superiority—one built on seemingly democratic principles and diplomacy. The United States possessed the various types of influence needed to be deemed a Great Power in the latter half of the twentieth century—military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural.
Conclusions
Leading up to and during the Second World War, a shift had been occurring in the
American ontological security complex and within American identity, a shift that has had lasting, modern day implications. Armed with American exceptionalism, a moral superiority and a strong triumphal identity, the United States emerged from WWII ready to ascend to its place as global leader and Great Power within the international system.
The United States transitioned from a place of isolationism—turning away from the opportunity to lead the post-WWI League of Nations, to not only hosting the Bretton
Woods conference but also facilitating the postwar reconstruction, kicking off what
Henry Luce would claim to be the American Century. These building blocks and their durability have remained at the foundation of American existential identity and shape
American behavior today, from intervention in the Middle East to the revived New Cold
War with Russia. Scholarship has studied the transition of the United States into this role and how it balanced with the power of the Soviet Union. However, the analysis needs to be taken one step deeper; to include the concept of ontological security and how these existential and foundational building blocks were the true agents of change in the rise of the United States. Chaplin 51
These building blocks, and their compatibility with the new identity, role, status, and power of the United States played a faciliatory role in the transition of the U.S. from their pre and inter-war period role to the post-war role. There was no gap between the foundational building blocks and the American identity and status, leading to a period of ontological security. As the “American century” progressed, this security would be continually challenged and defended, but the durable concepts on ontological security would always be influential in determining American international behavior.
Chaplin 52
Chapter 4:
Ontological Misalignment: Post-Soviet Russia
The fall of communism in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a wave of hope among western politicians and academia alike that liberalization had finally triumphed. Books such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of
History claimed the final victory of democracy over other governmental systems and as
Russia opened its economic and political systems: “scholars and politicians alike were eager to derive a… simple formula for creating democracy among the ruins of Soviet autocracy.”87 However, following the turn of the twenty-first century, it became increasingly clear that Russia was not on track to become the beacon of democracy in the east. There exists now a general consensus among democratic and transitional scholars that liberalization measures and the democratization process has failed in Russia.
The integral and existential nature of ontological security means that what seems like a story of foreign policy is actually a story of how ontological security is challenged and the processes it affects. Right before the turn of the twenty first century, Andrei
Tsygankov evaluated the changes in Russian foreign policy that had taken place since the fall of the Soviet Union. He writes that the reforms ushered in by Gorbachev sparked many a debate on various foreign policy issues and “a striking characteristic of these, ongoing debates is the degree of their depth and scope. Their focus in not only current foreign policy interests but also the very historical and cultural foundations upon which those interests were built during the Soviet era. Gorbachev questioned these foundations
87 Valerie Sperling, ed., Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 1. Chaplin 53 in a fundamental way, thereby triggering the process of reformulating Russia's cultural identity.”88 Tsygankov focuses his questions and evaluations on foreign policy, but the questions are applicable to ontological security as a whole because, as he states, these questions center around issues of national identity more than national interests. Caught between the pain and prestige of the past, and the desire to move forwards and upward in the international system, Tsygankov wonders “what kind of Russia has been born in the aftermath of the dramatic changes of the 1990s?”89
Tsygankov’s question rings especially true for a study of ontological security. If ontological security and its existential importance is a critical factor in how states are constructed and therefore how they act both domestically and internationally, how does a dramatic and ontologically traumatic event like the collapse of the Soviet Union affect the very foundation of a nation?
This chapter will fist give an overview of the historical events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It will then give a brief overview of some of the other way scholars have framed the story of the post-Soviet liberalization process and
Russia’s search for itself. Third, the chapter will explore some of the main building blocks of Russian ontological security and how these building blocks interact with each other. Finally, it will attempt to tell the story of how Russia’s ontological security impacted the general failure of liberalization measures within the country.
Historical Background
88 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia,” Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 2 (1997): 247, https://doi.org/10.2307/222669. 89 Ibid. 248 Chaplin 54
In an attempt to revive the stagnant Soviet economy and catch up with the quickly modernizing world, Mikhail Gorbachev quickly went about introducing vast reforms for the Soviet system following his appointment to leader of the USSR in 1985. Known around the world as glasnost and perestroika (гласность и перестройка) and translated as publicity/openness and restructuring, the sets of reforms targeted the Soviet economic, political, and social structures. Economically, partial responsibility for economic planning was given to state enterprises and individual entities were now allowed to conduct foreign trade independent of the Soviet state. Media censorship was lessened, allowing for criticism of the government and its officials. Increased freedom of the press also opened the Soviet public up to a new flood of information about the corruption and crime within their governmental system. Politically, Gorbachev opened the elections to a multi-party system and created the presidency for the Soviet Union, triggering a democratization process that would eventually contribute to the dissolution of communist control and the collapse of the Union.90
While public opinion in the Soviet Union is extremely difficult to accurately analyze, a 1987 survey of Soviet emigrants points to the idea that “even if [the Soviet people] might agree in the abstract with Gorbachev’s push for democratization of the system, [they] lack the kind of civic culture that would support the democratization he seeks.”91 While Soviet citizens seemed to view glasnost positively, there was far less
90 “Milestones: 1989–1992 - Office of the Historian,” accessed April 17, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union. 91 Robert D. Grey, Lauri A. Jennisch, and Alanna S. Tyler, “Soviet Public Opinion and the Gorbachev Reforms,” Slavic Review 49, no. 2 (1990): 269, https://doi.org/10.2307/2499485. Chaplin 55 support for actual democratization measures, meaning while there might not have been vocal opposition to the reforms, citizens were also not vocal supporters.
Despite their popular conflation, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union are not the same event. While deeply intertwined and certainly related, the end of Cold War is often marked as the December 1989 Malta Conference where
Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush met and discussed a number of proposals to end the conflict between the two countries.92 The Soviet Union formally ended on December 25,
1991, as Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union, and the hammer and sickle flag was replaced by the Russian Federation tri-color. However, the state had been slowly dissolving throughout the year of 1991. Following the attempted coup by hardline communists in August, Ukraine and Belarus declared their independence from the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev resigned as the head of the Communist Party, putting an irreplaceable divide between the power of the presidency and the power of the party.93
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union brought drastic change not just in Russia, but throughout the entirety of Eastern Europe. 1989 brought about troop withdraw from the Soviet bloc, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, waves of self- determination, and hard truth about crimes of the Soviet state came to light—all actions
92 “1989: Malta Summit Ends Cold War,” December 3, 1989, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_4119000/4119950.stm; Andrew Rosenthal and Special To the New York Times, “The Malta Summit; BUSH AND GORBACHEV PROCLAIM A NEW ERA FOR U.S.-SOVIET TIES; AGREE ON ARMS AND TRADE AIMS,” The New York Times, December 4, 1989, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/04/world/malta-summit-bush-gorbachev-proclaim- new-era-for-us-soviet-ties-agree-arms-trade.html. 93 “Milestones: 1989–1992 - Office of the Historian.” Chaplin 56 that challenged the building blocks that had propped up the Soviet Union since its inception.94
Despite the traumatic loss of identity and rupture in ontological security, the
Russian people and government had to begin the process of rebuilding the Russian state.
Though there were many approaches towards building the state, the “concept of
‘denationalized’ state-building” dominated the official policy of the Russian Government in 1991 and 1992.”95 It included Russia creating and securing new governmental institutions, setting and stabilizing the borders of the former Soviet states and beginning the process of developing relations with its now autonomous and sovereign neighbors.
However, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, more than twenty-five million Russians living outside what became the Russian Federation suddenly found themselves turned into foreigners.96 The state-building process largely ignored these new problems of both
Russian identity and the recently created diaspora, allowing for the wound in Russian ontological security to remain open and vulnerable.
Previous Narratives
Many of the past and current academic stories of the failure of Russian democratization are deeply technical and strategic accounts as to how the institutions didn’t line up, there was too much liberalization, not enough liberalization, or the wrong kinds of liberalization. They are tangible and technical explanations for the failure of
94 “Revolutions of 1989 Chronology,” June 22, 2010, https://libraries.indiana.edu/revolutions-1989- chronology. 95 George W. Breslauer, ed., Russia: Political and Economical Development, Monograph Series, no. 9 (Claremont, Calif: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1995), 27. 96 Breslauer, 25. Chaplin 57
Russian liberalization, spanning from energy resources, to corruption, to international support for good governance.97
Another common argument is that there lacked a clear national consensus; that the nation didn’t actually want to see the liberalization of their country. Ayşe Zarakol argues that after the accession of Gorbachev to General Secretariat in 1985, three groups emerged within Russian politics that influenced the political landscape both leading up to and following the fall of the Soviet Union.98 First, there emerged a pro-Western group that was in favor of liberalizing Russia’s domestic political and economic sectors. They saw Russia as a natural member of the Western civilization and integration into the international community would be beneficial to Russia’s security. The second group took more of a middle ground stance and was comprised of both moderate liberal and moderate conservatives. The former “favored a relatively pro-Western policy but emphasized the uniqueness of Russia’s geopolitical position.”99 The moderate conservatives did not entirely rule out cooperation with the West but did want to hold on to Russia’s sphere of influence and saw the “external environment to be generally hostile to Russia’s interests.”100 Finally, the ultra-nationalists saw Russia as an anti-western state, favored Russia’s expansion, and placed a high emphasis on the narratives of Russian civilizational uniqueness. These ultra-nationalists were made up largely of
97 Sperling, Building the Russian State. 98 Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West, 118 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011), 221. 99 Zarakol, 221. 100 Ibid, 222. Chaplin 58
“representatives of business and financial circles, influential regional leaders and executive officials,”101 who saw the West as an enemy and a danger to Russian values.
One of the most popular and widely accepted narratives regarding the transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation revolves around economic and political factors. In his 2005 book Democracy Derailed in Russia, Steven Fish identifies three main reasons for the failed liberalization in Russia: too much economic reliance on oil, too little economic liberalization, and a too weak national legislature. Fish argues that an economic reliance on oil has fostered corruption within the country and in turn, corruption has both undermined open politics and damaged public faith in the democratic process. The lack of economic liberalization “curbed the development and restricted the autonomy of societal association.”102 Finally, the centrality of the presidential position within the Russian government and subsequent weakness of the national legislature resulted in a host of issues, such as damage to the legitimacy of the post-Soviet regime, the lack of development of political parties, an anti-institutional “virus,”103 and an inability to fight corruption, all contributing and confounding factors in the failure of liberal reforms. Fish is clear, however, that he does not think that “cultural or historical factors provide compelling explanations for the failure of democratization.”104
I argue that Fish is right when it comes to evaluating the strategic and tangible reasons why democracy failed in Russia, but the analysis needs to be taken one step
101 Alla Kassianova, “Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse,” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 6 (September 2001): 825, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130120078513. 102 M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 247. 103 Fish, 249. 104 Fish, 3. Chaplin 59 deeper. Widespread corruption, the lack of political parties, and the super presidential system are definitely influential factors in the failure of liberal reform, but I think the problem begs deeper questions. Why didn’t Russia liberalize its economy enough? The conversation surrounding Russia always seems to stop at the fact that Russia did not take all the necessary steps toward liberalization or better yet, that those steps didn’t “stick”; the change wasn’t penetrable enough into Russian society to create permanent change.
The question that needs to be asked is “why not”? Why weren’t Russia’s measures, backed by the West’s hopes and dreams for a liberal Russia, enough to create lasting change in the country? And to answer that question, we must turn to ontological security.
Building Blocks of Ontological Security
Much like the previous chapter, in order to use ontological security in an analytical way, we first must understand the building blocks that make up Russia’s ontological security complex. I identify three components of Russian ontological security that I believe had, and continue to have, influence on Russia’s actions, especially within the international system, and contributed to the failure of liberalization measures within the country throughout the end of the twentieth century. These components— triumphalism, international status, and national pride—are deeply interrelated and both are a product and a reason for each other. Historical triumphs fuel national pride, thus resulting in a desire for a high international status. Pride demands modern day triumphs to obtain and maintain the desired status. An elevated international status supports national pride and push to achieve great triumphs.
However, one must also first acknowledge the state of flux in which Russian identity sits. While the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred over twenty-five years ago, Chaplin 60 the search for Russian identity is one that continues well into the twenty-first century.
Roman Szporluk writes that “Russian identity today is the paradox of power and the powerlessness engendered by the dissolution of this power.”105 The Russian people, caught in the paradox of being blamed for a system under which they themselves suffered,106 must define a new identity separate from the one that previously rested squarely on the international power of the Soviet Union. The Russian people “must define themselves as independent of that which had been their most visible symbol, they must separate themselves from what they were and establish what they will be.”107
The triumphal identity of the Russian people and nation has its roots deep in the history of the Rus people, from Peter the Great’s victory over Charles XII and Alexander
I’s victory over Napoleon, but its modern iteration most clearly emerges during and following the second World War. In the Western-central historical telling of World War
II, referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia, the crucial role the Soviet Union played in defeating Hitler is often overlooked. While objectively, a balanced view of both sides’ contributions is needed, in the eyes of Russians, it was Slavic blood and Slavic sacrifice that bore the brute of Hitler’s force and won the war.
Memorialization of World War II started in the Khrushev era and acted as a way to recover from Stalinism, re-defining his role in Soviet history. The narrative became about the everyday soldiers and their suffering and became a “central legitimizing
105 Roman Szporluk, ed., National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, The International Politics of Eurasia, v. 2 (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 80. 106 James H. Billington, “The Search for a Modern Russian Identity,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 45, no. 4 (January 1992): 31, https://doi.org/10.2307/3824597. 107 Szporluk, National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 85. Chaplin 61 moment for the Soviet State.”108 In the early 2000’s, Putin’s government played a central role in the sharp increase in memory projects memorializing the war.109 Parades and monuments honoring the war and its veterans became widespread and in 2008, the
Victory Day parade contained a large display of military might—a signal of “the Russian government’s attempt to tie the exultant memory of World War II to the resurgent assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy under Vladimir Putin.”110 The timing of this increase in memorialization projects also points to the post-Soviet search for a new definition of what it meant to be Russian. The triumphal identity of World War II provided both a unifying power, a positive memory of the Soviet Union, and place of prominence within the international system. Today, remembrance of the war plays a central part in the daily culture of Russian society: following weddings, bridal parties will head to the town’s local war monument to take pictures and honor the sacrifice of previous generations.111
Central to the World War II memorialization is another concept deeply intertwined in Russian identity and culture: the identity of suffering. The willingness to sacrifice and suffer for their society has been a hallmark trade of the Russian people that spans generations and many differing state models. From fighting the Tatars beginning in the thirteenth century, to the Russian revolution and subsequent civil war, violent struggle and the inherent suffering that comes with war has been a foundational and formative part of the Russian experience. The immense losses in both World Wars are a prime of
108 Seth Bernstein, “Remembering War, Remaining Soviet: Digital Commemoration of World War II in Putin’s Russia,” Memory Studies 9, no. 4 (2016): 425. 109 Mark Edele, “Fighting Russia’s History Wars: Vladimir Putin and the Codification of World War II,” History and Memory 29, no. 2 (2017): 90, https://doi.org/10.2979/histmemo.29.2.05. 110 Bernstein, “Remembering War, Remaining Soviet,” 422. 111 Steven Miner, “USSR in WWII” (January 16, 2018). Chaplin 62 example of this identity. The Russian conversation about WWII begins with the suffering. The triumph and the victory come, but they come second to the suffering and the immense loss of life suffered by the Soviet people.
Along similar lines is the centrality of the fight for Rodina (Родина)—the motherland. Sprawled across tanks and ubiquitous in WWII propaganda, za Rodinu (за
Родину), “for the motherland”, the idea of fighting for mother Russia was central to
Russian’s sacrifice—their allegiances were bigger than the current state system, bigger than a country.112 This attachment to the land and the sacrifice for it continued even in death. The families of soldiers who fought and died in other countries would take dirt from the Russian land and put in on their grave—a custom that has continued into the modern day.113
Historically, there has been a deep and intertwined relationship between church and state. Throughout the history of the Russian people, orthodox faith played a central role, both in identity114 and in the foundations of every aspect of society. Gregory and
Alexander Guroff write that “to be Russian was to be pravoslnaia (Orthodox)”115 Despite the atheistic influence and attacks on the church from the Soviet government, the orthodox identity within Russia remained and resurfaced following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Russian orthodoxy also provides the relationship between suffering and
112 Karel C. Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012). 113 Mila Shevchenko, “The History of Russian Culture” (Fall 2018); “Горсть Родной Земли (Григорий Кузнецов) / Проза.ру,” accessed April 22, 2019, https://www.proza.ru/2013/05/08/1358. 114 Walter Laqueur, “After the Fall: Russia in Search of a New Ideology,” World Affairs 176, no. 6 (2014): 72. 115 Szporluk, National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 82. Chaplin 63 righteousness. The orthodox tradition holds the belief that sacrifice and suffering leads to salvation, and therefore because the Russian people have sacrificed—in WWII and throughout history, eventually they will be triumphant. “Solzhenitsyn has argued that, today, it is the suffering of the Russian people that is the essence of their identity.”116
The second central building block of Russia’s ontological security is the country’s status within the international system. The Russian people and the various state’s that have represented them have had a long history with western relations. After the westernizing reforms led by Peter the Great, Russia finally managed to gain entry into the
“Concert of Europe”117 and in doing so, played a major role in rewriting the definition of
Europe. Where other states had failed in this endeavor, Russia seemingly succeeded largely due to their strong Christian identity—a staple throughout Western Europe.
However, almost as soon as Russia had entered the elite European club, the French revolution and the Enlightenment changed the qualifications for membership and they no longer revolved “around the idea of dynastic legitimacy and reciprocity.”118
One of the reasons the ontological security built upon the Soviet Union was and is so durable is because “the Soviet Union came closest to achieving Great Power parity with the West, and therefore was ontologically more secure.”119 At the same time, they were fully a part of the post-war international system, holding a seat on the United Nations
Security Council and being very involved in international affairs. Additionally, they did so while maintaining a unique identity, governmental structure, and economic system.
116 Szporluk, 87. 117 Zarakol, After Defeat, 205. 118 Ibid, 205. 119 Ibid, 236. Chaplin 64
The Soviet Union struck the balance of maintain the uniqueness of Soviet and Russian identity and being fully involved in the international system and provided a level of ontological security long sought after by the Russian people.
Central to how Russia has perceived its place and role within the international system is the idea of the country and people possessing a certain uniqueness. Similar to the sense of transcendentalism provided by their almost holy suffering, “Russians have always had an abiding sense of living in a providential country with a special mission.”120 This uniqueness and sense of exceptionalism has manifested itself in various way throughout
Russia’s history, including the Third Rome theory, the pan-Slavic kingdom, serving as the epicenter for the communist movement, and finally, the modern idea of Eurasianism: the idea that Russia is neither European nor Asian, but its own unique blend of the two.121
Stephen Kotkin explains that “the sense of having a special mission has contributed to
Russia’s paucity of formal alliances and reluctance to join international bodies except as an exceptional or dominant member. It furnishes Russia’s people and leaders with pride, but it also fuels resentment toward the West for supposedly underappreciating Russia’s uniqueness and importance.”122 From their identity, to their values, to their role in their international system, the idea that the Russian people are unique and set apart from the rest of the international system has had a great influence on both the development of the country and its international behavior.
120 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,” Foreign Aff. 95 (2016): 2. 121 Kotkin, 3. 122 Ibid, 4. Chaplin 65
The third influential component of ontological security is Russian pride. Russian pride comes from many sources, including great military victories, cultural heroes, Soviet era achievements, and Russia’s influence in world events. Russia holds great pride in its military victories, including World War II, but also more historical battles such as
Napoleon and the French’s invasion of Russia in 1812 and the many battles against the
Mongols in the fifteenth century. Alexander Nevsky—a legendary Russian prince and soldier—is revered today for his victorious defense of the Russian lands from Sweden and German invaders, including the famous battle on the ice at Lake Peipus in 1242.123
The Soviet Union was the first country to successfully put a satellite in orbit as well as the first to put a man in space, a fact in which the Russian people and state take great pride.124 The Russian state, especially its political elites, take great pride in its identity as a Great Power125—despite its reliance on hard power and lack of the other dimensions of the Great Power status.
A Different Approach
Only once these depths and complexities of Russian ontological security are explored, can one start to understand why the liberalizing measures that took place following 1991 failed to truly take hold and transform the Russian Federation. The political, economic, and social changes in Russia were “shallow” reforms; they did not truly permeate into Russian society and therefore did not become a part of the state’s
123 John D. Windhausen, “Alexander Nevsky,” in Salem Press Encyclopedia (Salem Press, 2018). 124 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Wants to Extend U.S. Space Partnership. Or It Could Turn to China.,” The New York Times, December 12, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/world/europe/russia-space-us.html. 125 Hannes Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs: Images and Reality,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 71, no. 1 (1995): 35, https://doi.org/10.2307/2624009. Chaplin 66 ontological security. However, this process works both ways. Liberal identities did not integrate from the top down, but they also lacked a foundation from which to grow.
Historically, even before the Soviet Union, liberal ideas and identities were not ingrained in the ontological security of Russia. In other global examples of the transition from authoritarian and autocratic societies, philosophical movements such as the Age of
Enlightenment provided a foundation of liberal ideologies and paved the way for the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The movements that transformed how European societies thought about politics, government, and even art and religion did not take place in Russia. Catherine the Great instituted many reforms during
Russia’s own eighteenth century “enlightenment,” but these reforms focused on fine tuning the bureaucratic measures Peter the Great had put into place; she insulated and kept her own power, blocking any measures that would implement liberal or democratic ideas.126
Moreover, Russian identities did not stop in 1917 after the Bolsheviks took power and Soviet identities did not stop in 1991 with end of communism. It is impractical to argue that one could build a Russian state devoid of anything that helped defined the
Soviet empire for seventy-four years. Ontological security built on the Soviet era was weaved into the fabric of every aspect of Russian life. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Putin “declared that Russia should look to its history and traditional values to determine its post-Soviet development, not imitate Western political models.”127 This model for development also carried into Russia’s foreign policy.
126 Cynthia H. Whittaker, “The Reforming Tsar: The Redefinition of Autocratic Duty in Eighteenth- Century Russia,” Slavic Review 51, no. 01 (1992): 93, https://doi.org/10.2307/2500262. 127 Laqueur, “After the Fall,” 73. Chaplin 67
Some of the aggression in Russia’s modern-day foreign policy can be attributed to a response to the loss of pride following the collapse and a demand to once again be taken seriously and be viewed with respect by the international community. Russia was relegated to a relatively low position within the first-world community after the collapse of the Soviet Union—one of the many factors triggering the rejection of the liberal measures and a gradual return to the durable tenants of ontological security. Shortly before he assumed the presidency, Putin penned an article for a Russian newspaper, warning the Russian people to not let their country slip from the top tier of the international society. He wrote “for the first time in the past 200-300 years, Russia faces the real danger that it could be relegated to the second, or even third tier of global powers.”128 Russia’s post-Soviet economy was in despair, its global sphere of influence had been shattered, and the West was publicly celebrating the downfall of Russia’s mighty predecessor. The powerful combination of Russian pride and desire for high international status led Putin to command respect from the international community and came in the form of an aggressive foreign policy, manifested in the invasions of
Chechnya and Crimea.
Overall, the building blocks of Russia’s ontological security impeded the attempted transition from communist state to liberal member of the international system. The building blocks that were born out of hundreds of years of Russian history and solidified in the crucible of the Soviet System created friction as the nation tried to move past them.
The building blocks of ontological security remained solidly in place and incompatible
128 Shaun Walker, The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 16. Chaplin 68 with the liberal identities, new international status, and waned power that were built on top of them. The gap between the foundations of ontological security and the upper layer identities is where ontological insecurity lies. The reason the liberal ideologies of the post-Soviet movement did not penetrate the existential level is due to the impassible gap of ontological insecurity. The foundations of ontological security are durable and its existential connection to security results in building blocks that do not shift easily in the negative direction. While Russia’s ontological security building blocks inhibited a transition towards a liberal democracy, it did facilitate the transition away from the liberal ideologies back towards Soviet ontological security concepts. This process—commonly referred to by academics as backsliding129—allowed Russia to return to the security of its ontological building blocks but did not transition fully back into a communist state.
The case of the Russian Federation is a testament to the durability of ontological security—it is of existential and foundational importance and thus does not move or change easily. The transition of Russia was supported both by all the great western powers and the figureheads of the Russian state themselves, yet it was not able to overcome the incompatibility with the nation’s ontological security. Additionally, it didn’t help that after 2000, the leaders in power only supported nominal transition of
Russia to a democracy. Putin knew the foundational identity (the ontological security) of
Russia had not changed and he used this national pride to appeal to his people and paint the picture of a great nation fighting to regain its rightful place in the international system—and one that would be triumphant.
129For more on Backsliding literature see Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 5, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012. Chaplin 69
Conclusions
The fall of the Soviet Union is objectively one of the most important events within international relations of the twentieth century. It disrupted the bipolar system that had ruled the international system since the other great event of the twentieth century— the Second World War. Following the collapse, the world prepared for one of the strongest wheelhouses of communism and autocracy to transition to a liberal democracy.
On the surface, Russia took all the right steps. They held elections, privatized their economy, and started the process of opening the press and becoming a more transparent society. Fast forward to today, however, and Russia has backslid on every liberalizing measure the country initiated. Many scholars have attempted to tackle to the issue of what happened in Russia. They have argued that the initiatives were too much, or not enough; Russia lacked a national consensus, or the political climate was too corrupt. I argue that all these arguments have merit. The technical and tangible evaluations of what happened in Russian society after 1991 are valuable and important. But they are incomplete without a deeper look at the underlying influences and forces at work within all societies—the powers of ontological security.
Russia’s ontological security building blocks, specifically Russian pride, international status, and triumphalism, impeded the nations change to a liberal democracy because the new liberal identities and statuses and powers were incompatible with the foundational ontological concepts. This incompatibility created ontological insecurity, which caused the Russian state to turn back to what would provide ontological security—the identities and actions of the Soviet period because similar to how state seek physical security, they also seek ontological security. Chaplin 70
Conclusion
The existing literature within international relations and constructivism has provided a lot of key insights into the world of change and identity. However, when it comes to ontological security, the scholarship has treated ontological security as just one thing, a singular concept, instead of the complex interaction of several components.
Mitzen has argued for the inclusion of ontological security in the factors influencing state behavior and scholars such as Zarakol and Steele have applied the implication of this assumption to various case studies. However, I have argued that to truly understand these processes, a more in-depth, tangible conception of ontological security is needed. Only once we understand how ontological security works, can we move forward in using the theory to develop deeper understandings of the international system.
In response to this need, I have put forth the idea of the Ontological Security
Complex. This complex is made up of the foundational level ontological security building blocks which form the core of a state’s existential identity. Durable and resilient, they stand up to international challenges and system level events. The building blocks interact with the second component of the complex: the surface level identities. These identities are both what states believe about themselves and how those beliefs are replicated within the international system. While not as durable in nature as the building blocks, they are not shed easily, but can be influenced by international norms and other actors and their actions within the international system. When the building blocks and the identity of a state align, a state experiences ontological security. This security allows a state to have assurance in its existential security and act confidently in the international scene. However, when the building blocks do not line up with identity, states exist in an Chaplin 71 environment of ontological insecurity. Much like physical security, states will take steps to try and remedy this as states actively seek ontological security. System alerting events have the power to challenge ontological security building blocks and states’ responses to these events can give valuable insight into how their ontological security is constructed.
Prior to the Second World War, the United States was a relatively isolationist country. I argue that World War II challenged and transformed American identity and ontological security in a way that created a catalyst for the state to step up in the international system to its new role of global leader. The United States’ building blocks—
American exceptionalism, moral superiority and triumphalism—have a historical presence in the American psyche and ontological security complex but were not the driving forces behind American actions and foreign policy. The Second World war brought a reorientation of the United States’ building blocks and a wave of self-assertion that aligned the building blocks and American identity to create what would be the environment for the forthcoming American Century.
The ontological security building blocks acted in a different manor in the case of the Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Centuries of Russian history had built the state’s ontological security building blocks—triumphalism, international status, and national pride—which were solidified in the Soviet years with international prestige, global influence, and technological advancements. However, following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, building blocks of Russia’s ontological security impeded the attempted transition from communist state to liberal member of the international system. The Soviet era blocks remained solidly in place and were incompatible with the new liberal identities the country tried to assume. The gap between Chaplin 72 the building blocks and the identity created an environment of ontological insecurity, which led the backsliding of Russia away from democratic ideals and towards the existentially secure identities of the past.
The development of this new conception of ontological security has provided insights into not just the way ontological security acts as an influence on state behavior.
The ontological security complex and its component parts create an environment that either helps facilitate confident state behavior and self-assurance, or else calls for states to act to once again restore their ontological security. By disaggregating the concept, we can gain a deeper understanding of how ontological security actually works and why it helps produce the behavior it does.
The translation and application of ontological security theory into the field of international relations has allowed for scholars to explore and tell a new narrative about revisited stories and look at the current international system through a new lens. I hope to add to these insights with this conception of ontological security in order to continue to gain insights into the forces at play within the international system. By using this conception, we can start to understand further why certain changes seem to deeply influence the international system and why others have a shallow impact. Why some states are seemingly in permanent and perpetual conflict, why Cold Wars come and go, and why some identities are seemingly incompatible with some states. And maybe, just maybe, we can attempt to continue to understand why states act the way they do.
Chaplin 73
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