ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4, 1995 Thenation-state and underdevelopment ALAN CARTER

Themost coherent interpretation of Marx’s theoryof revolutionarychangeÐ that of G A Cohen1Ðclaims,in its barest essentials, that technological development selects economicrelations which are functionalfor further technological devel- opment,and that the economic relations select a politicalstructure which is functionalfor stabilising them. However, it can be argued that this stands the worldon its head. Rather, a politicalstructure selects economicrelations that furthertechnological development because that is functionalfor the political structurein so far asitis apreconditionfor developing its defensive capability. 2 Irefer tothis alternative theory of revolutionary transformation as theState- PrimacyTheory. According to this alternative theoretical perspective, state actors’perceptions of their interests determine the economic relations which cometo prevail. TheState-Primacy Theory might provide an explanation for the outcome of revolutionsin Europe,but isn’ t itwholly unsuited to accountingfor political and economicdevelopments in theThird World? Obviously, many assume, themajor actorsthere are transnationalcorporations ( TNCs), whichoften have turnovers exceedingthe gross nationalproducts of many Third World countries. Conse- quently,states inless developedcountries ( LDCs) seem powerlessto prevent thesegiant corporations from plundering their resources andpolluting their lands.Isn’ t thisan obvious case wherethe State-Primacy Theory is clearly wrong?Isn’ t ittransparent that it is transnationalswithin the global economy thatdetermine what states do,rather than state interests explaining the nature of theglobal economy? Globalinequality is, certainly, of fundamental importance. And it can be arguedthat, by repatriating pro® ts, TNCsincreasepoverty in the Third World, whileadding to theexcessive af¯ uence of the rich nations. But are wereallysure ofthe actual dynamic that lies behind all this? In short, what theoretical perspectivewill best clarify Third World political and economic developments? Themost in¯ uential work from a `bourgeois’perspective has undoubtedlybeen PoliticalOrder inChanging Societies bySamuel Huntington. 3 Huntington’s approachis bestseen as fallingwithin the tradition of elitetheory. However, in oppositionto `bourgeois’approaches there arose a`neo-Marxist’critique empha- sising`the development of underdevelopment’ or dependency in Third World countries.This became the orthodoxy of the Left in the1970s and is bestviewed as fallingwithin the tradition of class theory,as itsprimary focus is on exploitation.Both views have since proved to be inadequate. 4 Unfortunately,at presentthere is nowidely-held, alternative theoretical perspective that seems AlanCarter is Head ofthe Philosophy Department at HeythropCollege, University of London.

0143-6597/95/040595-25 Ó 1995Third World Quarterly 595 ALAN CARTER capableof providing a satisfactoryaccount of signi® cant developments in the ThirdWorld. 5 Inwhatfollows I arguethat much of whatHuntington claims is correct,while muchof itisinadequate.Similarly, I arguethat much of whatthe underdevelop- menttheorists claim is correct,while much of it, too, is inadequate.Most importantly,I arguethat, by omitting the inadequate claims of both positions, whileaccommodating their positive features within a generaltheory of revol- utionarychange, 6 theState-Primacy Theory, in effect, sublates them both. And thereason why such a sublationhas notbeen widely developed is becausethe vitriolicopposition between supporters of elite theory and class theoryhas obstructedany meaningful synthesis of these seemingly antithetical standpoints.

Thesis: anelite theoryapproach Letme commencewith Huntington’ s politicalrealism, which was aresponseto theunwarranted optimism of modernisation theory. The assumption had been thatsocieties contained traditional and modern sectorsÐ the `dualist hypoth- esis’ Ðandthat they were moving from being predominantly `traditional’ to beingpredominantly `modern’ . Althoughthe goal was, apparently, to bring aboutliberal democracies in the developing world, it had been recognised that thisprocess of`modernisation’could be facilitatedby an authoritarianelite that mightdecide to retain power. 7 Nevertheless,among modernisation theorists it was widelyassumed thatthere did exist a generalprocess oftransition towards pluralist,democratic polities built upon developed, capitalist economic relations. Inother words, the assumption was thateconomic modernisation would bring in itstrain political modernisation and the stability characteristic of the advanced Westerndemocracies.

Theproblem of modernisation Inthe 1960s this optimism was shatteredby thegrowth of authoritarian regimes andrevolutionary struggles in the Third World. Huntington’ s responsewas to pointout the destabilising effects oftransition and to indicate the contrasting stabilityof both undeveloped and developed societies. Whereas both traditional andmodern societies were stable, transitional societies were highly unstable. Huntington’s principalthesis is thatmajor violence and instability is `inlarge partthe product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of newgroups intopolitics coupled with the low development of political institutions’ . 8 The failureof modernisation theory can thus be attributed to a disjunctionbetween economicand political development, for although economic `modernisation’ involvesthe breakdown of the traditional polity, it does not always result in a modernpolitical order. Huntingtontherefore accepts a versionof thedualist hypothesis, but adds that atransitionfrom a pre-modernto amodernsociety is likelyto resultin violence anddisorder. And this leads him to some ratherdrastic conclusions: for example, thatreform can be destabilisingand can lead to revolution. 9 Oneimplication that 596 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT some mightdraw from this is thatit is betterto put up with a reactionary, authoritarianregime than to riskany reform that could prove to bedestabilising. However,Huntington does not, in fact,simply reject all revolutions. They are sometimesnecessary tobring about a stablepolity: Thesuccessful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization.Notall revolutions produce a newpolitical order. The measure ofhow revolutionary a revolutionis is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion ofpolitical participation. The measure of how successful a revolutionis is the authorityand stability of the institutions to which it gives birth. 10 Nevertheless,although there are successful revolutionsoccasionally, failed attemptsat producing a stablemodern society are common. Onesuch failure is whatHuntington refers toas a`praetorian’society, where differentgroups become politicised in `the absence of effective political institu- tionscapable of mediating, re® ning,and moderating group political action’ . 11 Theresult is asocietywhere `social forces confronteach other nakedly’ , 12 and variousdirect methods are employedfor in¯ uencing political outcomes: Eachgroup employs means which re¯ ect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthybribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup.In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms ofdirect action are foundon the political scene. The techniques of military intervention are simply moredramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, `When nothingelse is turned up, clubs are trumps.’ 13 Whenthere is noconsensus, when social groups do not accept constraints on theiraction, then governments will ultimately have to resort to force. And the problemarises because,as aresultof economic modernisation, new social groupsemerge with rising expectations and come to demand political partici- pation.But they cannot be incorporated into the polity because of its undevel- opedpolitical institutions. And given that the prevailing elite will wish to restrict anysuch participation, praetorian societies are especiallyviolent, con¯ ictual and authoritarian.Nevertheless, although Huntington identi® es praetoriansocieties as apitfallon theroad to development,his goal is clearlythe attainment of modern liberaldemocracies.

Thepriority of order Oneproblem with Huntington’ s approachis that,while he regards political modernisationas involving`the rationalization of authority,the differentiation of structures,and the expansion of political participation’ , 14 heassumes thatit is necessary tobring all these things about in the order in which he lists them: Theprimary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimatepublic order. Menmay, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty withoutorder. Authority has to exist before it can be limited,and it isauthority that isin scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercyof alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students. 15 But,it can be objected, even if political authority were a priority,that is notto 597 ALAN CARTER say thatit must come chronologically prior. It is a nonsequitur toarguethat, as onecannot have limited authority without having authority, then one must ® rst ofall have authority and then limit it. This is obviouslyfallacious, as itis logicallypossible to begin with limited authority. It is simplyconfused to claim a priori thatauthority must beestablished prior to its being constrained. Huntingtonnevertheless presumes preciselythat the powerful state must come notjust ® rst inimportance, but ® rst intemporal order. In his view, power must ®rst beconcentrated so as totransform the traditional society. Then the system mustevolve in order to assimilate those demanding participation. Finally, politicalchecks and a widerdispersion of powerare demanded. 16 However,one obviousproblem with this strategy is thatif power is centralisedand concen- trated® rst,it will come as nosurprise if those exerting that power are ableto remainin control and become exceedingly authoritarian in order to do so. YetHuntington is wellaware of theproblems of militaryintervention. In fact, hedescribes three types of military coup. The breakthrough coup is whena groupof army of® cersÐ usually young, educated, westernised of® cersÐ seize powerin order to rid society of a traditionalmonarch who is holdingup modernisation.Such of® cers identifywith the newly emerging middle classes, whicharise as aresultof capitalistdevelopment. A guardiancoup usually occurs laterwhen an incompetentor corruptmiddle class governmentis incrisis. After ashortwhile, perhaps, the military allows new elections and a returnto civilian government.The veto coup occurs when those who constitute a newsocial force, perhapsthe workers or the peasants, seek politicalpower and elect an adminis- trationsympathetic to them. The new administration is thendeposed by the militarybecause the latter seeks toprotect the middle class interestsit identi®es with.Clearly, at this point, the military is preventingan increase in political participationand has becomeovertly reactionary in Huntington’ s ownterms. 17 However,Huntington also argues that the expansion of democracy in the ThirdWorld will lead rural groups to elect into power those who will back agrarianrather than industrial development. 18 As thisis notin the interests of a modernisingmilitary, it isnotsurprising that it shouldengage in a vetocoup in orderto preserve the system itprefers.Interestingly, all of this is consistentwith theState-Primacy Theory, which claims that states selecteconomic relations that are intheir perceived interests, for it would be surprising if military of® cers valuinga `modern’economy were to allow rural groups to impede industrial development,especially when such development is requiredfor the military to `modernise’its equipment. More interestingly still, numerous veto coups are just whatHuntington’ s owntheory would lead one to expect. Thus,even on thebasis ofhisown argument, Huntington’ s wholestrategy of ®rst centralisingpower before expanding participation seems ofnecessityto lead tomilitary regimes seizing control. And this means thathis approach to modernisationhas extremelyreactionary implications. Rather than offer us some prospectof liberal democracy, it seems tolead us onlyin the direction of dictatorship.It is notsurprising, therefore, that those who had hoped for ThirdWorld polities to take the form of Western liberal democracies should havecome to feel so despondent in the 1970s. What is more,the whole `bourgeois’approach is seriously¯ awed,not only in its prescription for how to 598 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT createa liberalorder but also in its failure to theorise growing global inequality.

Antithesis: aclass theoryapproach Letme nowturn to a majorcritique of `bourgeois’ approachesÐ namely, underdevelopmenttheory, which emerged in the late 1960s. This takes far greatercognisance of international linkages, and emphasises thesystemic in- equalityin the global economy, focusing on thesustained exploitation of theless developedareas bythe more developed. As capitalismconsists of a world systemÐa viewmade famous by Immanuel WallersteinÐ it is inadequateto focusupon any country in isolation.

Developingunderdevelopment Wallersteinrefers totherelation between developed and less developedareas as oneof core and periphery. As aresultof concentrating on manufacturing industry,and as aconsequenceof the forms oflabour specialisation and organisationassociated with it, the countries of Western Europe were able to developa relativelystrong form of state. It is thesecountries, along with the USA,whichform the core. In contrast, the less developedregions adopted a formof production which required relatively little skill. Thus they became the exportersof primary products and form the periphery. But because the core countrieshave strong state machines, they are ableto extract surplus from the weakerregions at theperiphery, and this leads to the further strength of thecore states andthe increased weakness of theperiphery. For example, thanks to their strongposition, the core states canimpose terms oftradeon theperipheral areas whichare tothe advantage of the core. Hence, capitalist development does not developthe peripheral regions, but weakens and exploits them, widening global economicand social differences. 19 AndreÂGunderFrank describes the relationship between the advanced areas andthe less developedin a slightlydifferent way, using the terms `metropolis’ and`satellite’ . Inhis view, capitalism involves a worldwidesystem ofexchange wheremonopolies in the metropolis have become dominant and are ableto exploitthe satellites. Thus, surplus is continuallyextracted from various satel- litesby the metropolis, leading to a progressivepolarisation between the developedparts of theworld (the metropolis) and the underdeveloped parts (the satellites). Frankgoes on to argue that not only is therelation between the developed partsof the world and the less developeda metropolis/satelliterelationship, but alsothat each satellite is itselfa metropolis,of a kind,with its own respective satellites.And perhaps they too have their own satellites. The model is, thus, one ofachainof linkageswith a majormetropolis at thecentre, which feeds offthe surplusfrom a numberof satellites, each a sub-metropolis,as itwere, which in turnextracts surplus from its satellites. As Frankputs it, capitalism `generates at onceeconomic development and underdevelopment on international, national, localand sectoral levels’ . 20 599 ALAN CARTER

Theresult of all this is thatthe satellites are starvedof capital and stagnate oreven decay, while the advanced countries have an even greater surplus to investand can therefore develop very quickly. In a word,Frank does not see capitalismas developingthe satellites, but as `underdeveloping’them. And whereas`undevelopment’ signi® es thata regionhas simplyfailed to develop, `underdevelopment’means thatit has beeninhibited from developing or has evenregressed becauseof persistent exploitation by the metropolis. In short, whatmodernisation theory has regardedas development,Frank sees as `the developmentof underdevelopment’ . Thus,the backwardness of underdeveloped countriesis notthe result of any internal de® ciency. Rather, it is international capitalismwhich is responsible.Clearly, this is instarkcontrast to modernisation theory. Oneconsequence of all this is thatif satellites do everdevelop, then they will `experiencetheir greatest economic development if and when their ties to their metropolisare weakest’. 21 Andapparent con® rmatory evidence of the hypothesis thatdevelopment only occurs in poor areas whenthey are de-linkedfrom the rest oftheworld system comes fromthose periods of `temporary isolation caused by thecrises ofwaror depressionin theworld metropolis’ . 22 AsFrankbelieves that itwas becauseof `the consequent loosening of trade and investment ties during theseperiods’ that `the satellites initiated marked autonomous industrialization andgrowth’ , 23 heconcludes that breaking these links is theprerequisite for genuinedevelopment in the poor regions. Infact, the exploitation of satellites by the metropolis has beentaking place sincethe 16th century, in Frank’ s viewÐfrom the time of the Spanish and Portugueseconquests of South America. As itis dif®cult to regard the internal relationsof production within 16th century Latin America as `capitalist’, Frank claimsthat any region which is linkedin any way to the world market is part ofthe capitalist system andis, thereby, capitalist. 24 Andhe supports this claim byshowinghow the internal economies of LatinAmerica have been signi® cantly shapedby the effects ofcapitalist penetration. Whatthis implies is that,given that all regions are tiedto the international capitalistsystem andgiven that all sectors ofeachregion are similarlytied, there is littlepoint in arguing for further capitalist development. The whole world is now,in a sense, capitalist.The solution, instead, is toseize controlof the Third Worldstate in a revolutionand de-link from the exploitative capitalist world system.Only then will capital no longer be drained away and development becomepossible. 25 Forboth Frank and Wallerstein, then, capitalism is regarded as aglobalsystem ofexploitation, which must be radically transformed if genuinedevelopment is totake place.

Underdevelopmentor dependentdevelopment? However,as some areas ofthe Third World have clearly undergone develop- ment,it is notsurprising that underdevelopment theory has beensubject to criticism.It has beenvehemently opposed on the Left by those who prefer a `classical’Marxist approachÐ the most in¯ uential being Bill Warren. 26 `Classi- cal’Marxists have always viewed capitalism as progressivein so far as it 600 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT supposedlydevelops the material preconditions for a highlyabundant socialism. Consequently,underdevelopment theory, in claiming that certain regions will simplynot develop, poses athreat.However, the fact that some areas inthe ThirdWorld have developed fails to refute the general thrust of underdevelop- menttheory. For example, a sub-metropolismight have developed because less capitalwas transferedout of itthanit extracted from its satellites. But this would provideno groundsfor thinking that its satellites would be ableto develop.Quite possibly,the development of thenewly industrialising countries ( NICs) has been purchasedat the price of a greaterunderdevelopment of the hinterland they themselvesdirectly or indirectly exploit. Nevertheless,the fact that some developmenthas beenobserved in certain regionshas ledto a modi®cation of underdevelopment theoryÐ namely, depen- dencytheory. As FHCardosowrites: ` dependency, monopolycapitalism and development are notcontradictory terms: thereoccurs a kindof dependent capitalistdevelopment inthesectors oftheThird World integrated into the new forms ofmonopolistic expansion’ . 27 Inother words, there is, occasionally, developmentin the poorer areas, butthe development that takes place there is skewedbecause of thein¯ uence of internationalcapital. Moreover, Third World states are seen as dependentstates, serving international capital. This is thought tobe thecase evenwith military dictatorships, although Cardoso acknowledges that`new political analyses are neededto explain the bureaucratic± technocratic formof authoritarian state which serves theinterests of the internationalized bourgeoisieand their allies’ . 28

Thecentrality of thestate Butis itacceptable to regard Third World states as mere instrumentsof internationalcapital? As Warrenemphasises:

ThirdWorld states have shown the ability to take punitive action against foreign ®rms locatedin their territories, eg the forcible nationalization of oil in Iraq, Egypt’s nationalizationof the Suez Canal, Uganda’ s ¼takeoverof British assets, theoften unilaterally declared acquisition of majority share-holdings in foreign ®rms, suchas timber and mining in Ghana. 29

Moreover,`The potential threat of suchpunitive action is oftenjust as effective, andprobably more often used, than the action itself’ . 30 Furthermore,Third Worldstates havecalled for a NewInternational Economic Order, have attemptedto reducethe amount of capitaltransferred out of theircountries, have formedagreements among themselves concerning the trade in commodities they export,and have imposed numerous constraints on transnational corporations. Forexample, as StephenKrasner observes: `Governmentshave promulgated rulesregarding the establishment of af® liates,repatriation of pro® ts, debt ®nancing,transfer payments, employment of nationals, disclosure of infor- mation,and tax rates.’ 31 Allthese actions are patentlyinconsistent with the view thatthe Third World state is merelyan instrument of international capital. Onthe other hand, if Third World economies have expanded most rapidly 601 ALAN CARTER whenthe imperialist chain has beensevered, why do theynot remain de-linked? Thatthe chain is reforgedwhen the metropolis is nolonger in a politicalor economiccrisis surelydemonstrates that the Third World state is notan instrumentof indigenous capital either, when re-linking leads to the transfer of capitalfrom the satellite to themetropolis. In addition, states in LDCs have often deliberatelyencouraged the incursion of transnationalcapital to the detriment of indigenouscapital, which is somethingan instrument of indigenous capital obviouslywould not do. Butthere are furtherand far moreserious problems with viewing the state as amere instrumentof the economy or, more speci® cally, of classes. As Teodor Shaninpoints out, states have,occasionally, `produced class structures,trans- formedthem, or madethem disappear, as whena bourgeoisieor apeasantryhas beencreated by deliberate state policy, as inKenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, or Brazil’ .32 Whatthis entails is that,if states chooseto support new economic relationsthat will give rise toa newdominant class, statescannot possibly be theinstrument of thepresent dominant class ,whateverit is takento be. Shanin’ s examplesclearly demonstrate the inadequacy of any instrumentalist theory of the stateÐprecisely the theory that, by and large, pervades Marxism and which is especiallyevident in underdevelopment theory and dependency theory. How,then, are wetotheorisethe state, if not as aninstrument of thedominant class? Marxismhas, for the most part, reduced the interests of themodern state tothose of thebourgeoisie. At best,it has regardedthe state as havinga `relative autonomy’. However,as Wallersteinacknowledges: `To be apartlyautonomous entity,there must be agroupof peoplewhose direct interests are servedby such anentity: state managers and a statebureaucracy.’ 33 Butif state actors have interestsof their own, why assume thatthe state is onlypartly autonomous? The statecould act in the interests of a particularclass evenif it were fully autonomous.For instance, it would do so whenits own independent interests correspondedwith those of thatclass. Ofcourse,the state could not be morethan partlyautonomous unless it had the power to pursue its own interests. But Wallersteinevidently believes that core states haveconsiderable power, for he claimsthat `the development of strong states inthe core areas ofthe European worldwas anessential component of the development of modern capitalism’ . 34 Nevertheless,he explicitly rejects the view that states inthe periphery are of muchsigni® cance. 35 Sometheorists working within the Marxist tradition have realised that this will notdo atall.Instead, they have argued that states intheperiphery are extremely powerfulwith respect to their internal economic relations. Consider Hamza Alavi,who argues that the task of themetropolitan bourgeoisie in thecolony is:

tocreate [a] stateapparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenoussocial classes in thecolony. It might be saidthat the ª superstructureºin thecolony is therefore ª over-developedºin relationto theª structureºin thecolony, for itsbasis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from whichit is laterseparated atthe time of independence ¼ At themoment of independence weak indigenous bourgeoisies® ndthemselves enmeshed in bureaucratic controls by which those at thetop of the hierarchy of the bureaucratic± military apparatus of the state are able 602 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

tomaintain and even extend their dominant power in society, being freed from directmetropolitan control. 36 Thisis certainlyan improvement on Wallerstein, who, like other underdevelop- mentand dependency theorists, seriously undervalues and, consequently, under- theorisesstates inthe peripheryÐ apoint noted by John Saul: `The problem of ªthestateº as itpresents itself in the context of ª underdevelopmentºhas been undertheorizedand little researched.’ 37 Yet,ironically, Alavi undertheorises thesestates, too, because he remains trapped within a Marxistperspective that regardsthe state as aninstrument of the economy. His central proposition is that thestate is notthe instrument of oneclass; instead,it is thecollective instrument of several.38 Butthis is stillto undervalue both the power and the interests of the state,for we haveseen thatstates donot merely preserve the dominant mode of production,sometimes they use theirpower to create new ones. What Marxists havesystematically failed to do is totake seriously state power and state interests.The whole class theoreticalapproach thus seems tobeasinadequateas elitetheory.

Atheoretical synthesis: the State-Primacyapproach Theelite theory approach of Huntington is clearlyinadequate in failing to take intosuf® cientaccount the international exploitation of Third World countries. Thisis negatedby the class theoryapproach of Frank and Wallerstein, which doesemphasise international exploitation. However, this latter approach is also clearlyinadequate in reducingthe state to aninstrument of capital. Yet both the eliteand class theoreticalapproaches draw attention to important phenomena thatmust be recognised in any adequate theory. The task, clearly, is toretain whatis ofvalue in elite theory and class theorywhile discarding what is problematic.In other words, the task is tosublate both approaches by, in a sense, containingand negating them. And such a sublationcould be made possible by a`negationof thenegation’ : byatheoreticalposition that `negates the negation’ ofthestate, while including a class analysisthat is ableto highlight international exploitation.

Thenature of theThird World state If ThirdWorld states are assigni®cant as theyappear to be, how exactly are we totheorise them? The ® rst thingto be keptin mindis thatthey are post-colonial states.Theyare locatedwithin countries that were formerly colonies of advanced states,themselves now Western liberal democracies, and it isthosestates which imposedstate structures on their colonies. Why, then, have so manypost- colonialstates failedto develop the democratic institutions and practices modernisationtheory expected? Christopher Clapham sheds lighton this problemby usefully describing the Third World state as `neo-patrimonial’. Claphamdraws on Max Weber’ s distinctionbetween legal± rational, charis- maticand traditional types of authority. Authority in the modern state is ofthe ®rst kind.There is adistinctionbetween public and private life whereby 603 ALAN CARTER oneis supposedto be impartial while acting in the public sphere, but free to pursueone’ s owninterests in theprivate sphere. The bureaucrat, when acting as abureaucrat,is todisregard the fact that someone is hisor herfriend or relative andtreat everyone alike. While acting in an impartial manner within this legal±rational institution, the of® cial possesses legal±rational authority. The modernstate is basedon this sort of legal± rational approach. CharismaticauthorityÐ the second typeÐ is basedupon some personalcharac- teristic(usually messianic) of a risingleader, who usually wishes to change the socialorder in some way.However, when a successful charismaticleader comes topower, the society will tend to institutionalise the new authority structure, and socharismatic authority will often turn into the legal± rational kind. Thethird variety of authority is traditionalauthority, and this usually takes a patrimonialform. Authority resides ina particularperson, such as thevillage heador chief,rather than in an of®ce. And as theword `patrimonialism’ implies, therelationship between the leader and the rest is likethat of a fatherto his children.Unlike the case ofthe charismatic leader, the person who has tra- ditionalauthority possesses itbecauseof theprevailing social and political order, whichhe or she doesnot challenge. Authority is basedon traditionÐ for example,by being the child of the previous ruler when tradition requires that successionfollow on that basis. Most importantly, the authority structure is one wherethose with authority lower down the chain have it by virtue of a grant fromthose above. 39 Andthis differs from the legal± rational form where one has authorityby virtue of one’ s positionin a legal±rational institution. In a patri- monialsystem, anyone lower down the chain has authoritybecause it has been given,ultimately, by the ruler. Claphamargues that if one is tounderstand Third World states, patrimonial authorityis thekey. But such states are notsimply patrimonial, rather they are `neo-patrimonial ’ . This is: aform oforganisationin whichrelationships of abroadlypatrimonial type pervade apoliticaland administrative system which is formally constructed on rational±legal lines.Of® cialshold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formallyde® ned, but exercise those powers, so far asthey can, as a form notof publicservice but of private property. 40 Thusneo-patrimonialism means thatcorruption is rifein post-colonial states. Of®cials see theirpositions as asourceof wealth and use themaccordingly. As theyregard themselves as owningtheir positions, they think they can do what theylike with them, so long as itdoes not offend whomever has giventhem their positions.And as positionsare bestowed,nepotism is alsorife. Whatthis suggests is thatmodernisation theory is perhapsright in drawing attentionto adualitybetween a traditionalsector and a modernsector which has beenintroduced by colonial powers. But modernisation theory is onlypartly right,because the colonial legacy is notone of the modern sector having modernisedthe rest ofsociety;it ismoreone of traditional norms and behaviour havingcrept into a system thatis supposedto be legal± rational. And although theold traditional norms might have worked well enough formerly, their amalgamationwith a modernpolitical structure has ledto a disastrouspolitical 604 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT system characterisedby extensive corruption. Whereas modernisation theory assumed thatthe modern sector would dominate and replace the traditional one, insteadthe traditional sector has profoundlyin¯ uenced the nature of the post-colonialstate. Thecolonial state was, of course,set uptomaximisethe extraction of wealth fromthe colony. Hence the possession of anof®cial position in the post-colonial stateallows the extraction of considerableresources fromits people. And a state whichis gearedto maximise the extraction of wealth from its people is obviouslygoing to be a coerciveand an extremely powerful one. But it is only powerfulin one sense. Inanother sense itis extremelyfragile. Because controllingthe state is agreatsource of wealth, it is averyattractive prize for anypotential usurper. Therefore coups are commonin Third World countries; andthe Third World state, while being highly coercive, is simultaneouslyhighly unstable.As MarylinWaring calculates: `By 1985, 57 out of 114 independent developingstates weremilitarily controlled. There had been 138 successful coupsbetween 1960 and 1985.’ 41 Onething is clear: astatewhose of® cials regardthemselves as owningtheir positions and who view them as ameans of enrichment,and which is suchan attractive prize to individualsthat it is subject toperiodic coups, cannot simply be reducedto aninstrumentof anyclass incivil society. Ifaninstrumentalist theory of thestate will not do, how are wetotheorisethe state?Recall that states occasionallyback new modes of production, although theyusually preserve the existing one. The simplest answer as towhy states sometimesintroduce a newmode of production and sometimes stabilise the prevalentone which bene® ts existingdominant classes orclass amalgamsis that ineach particular case thecourse ofactiontaken is inthe interests of thestate . Theprecise reason why the preservation of the prevailing economic order is oftenin the interests of the state is thatthe state obtains its revenue from a functioningeconomy. And by obtaining revenue it isinapositionto develop its coercivecapacity. As SamuelFiner notes:

Militaryforces call for men,materials, and, once monetization has set in, for money,too. To extract these has often been very dif® cult. It has become easier and moregenerally acceptable as the centuries have rolled on ¼ Troopsextract the taxesor the forage or the carts, and this contribution keeps them in being. More troopsÐmore extractionÐ more troops: so a cycleof this kind could go on wideningand deepening. 42 Thestate can then employ its developing coercive capacity to preserve the existingeconomic structure. On the other hand, the state can employ it to transformthe economic structure. But why, exactly, would a stateprecipitate sucha transformation?And when would it do so? Thisis preciselywhat the State-Primacy Theory explains. It is ageneral theoryof revolution 43 whichidenti® es thestate as havingexplanatory primacy withrespect to the determination of a modeof production. According to this theory,the state tends to select relations of production that develop the productiveforces, for that is usuallyin its interests. If theprevailing mode of productionoffers adequaterevenue to the state, then the state has aninterest in 605 ALAN CARTER preservingit. The reason why a statewill introduce a newmode of production is becausethat new mode is perceivedto be more productive than the old and presentsthe possibility of offeringa greaterrevenue to thestate. If andwhen the prevailingmode of production does not offer adequate revenue to the state and analternative would be practicable, then the state has aninterest in promoting anewmode of production. And when states ®ndthemselves in military competitionwith other states, as theyusually do, they are drivento obtain as muchrevenue as possiblein order to fund the massive costs ofremaining militarilycompetitive. 44 Thatmight mean, in certain circumstances, that they haveno choice but to transform the prevailing economic relations to ones that are moreproductive. Inshort, states ordinarilypreserve relations of production that are intheir interests.But when new economic relations are perceivedto be more in their interests,then states rationallyselect those new relations. And this is compatible withHuntington’ s accountof breakthroughcoups, where a modernisingmilitary promotesthe development of capitalistrelations. Moreover, as states inmilitary competitionwith other states wouldnot have an interest in reverting to less productiveeconomic relations, the State-Primacy Theory is alsocompatible with Huntington’s accountof veto coups, where the military prevents political developmentsthat would put a brakeon industrialisation. The State-Primacy Theoryis thusconsistent with what is ofvaluein Huntington’s account.But, as wehave seen, Huntington leaves out international exploitation. How, then, can aState-Primacyapproach deal with this question? It must be able to do so ifit is tobe a genuinesublation of elite theory and class theory.

State-Primacyand underdevelopment Canthe State-Primacy Theory provide an account of underdevelopment? To beginwith, the theory prioritises the perceived interests of state actors. Interest- ingly,Robert Bates holdsa positionthat, at ® rst glance,seems toresemble the State-PrimacyTheory: Insteadof simply re¯ ecting the dominant mode of production, [the state] can also seekto transform it. In addition, rather than securing the fullest realisation of the productivepotentialities at society’ s command,the state can in fact both fetter and underminethem. The African case ¼ compelsrecognition of the possibility that politicalforces may be fullyautonomous and, as a consequence,may act at thecost ofeconomic rationality and solely in service of themselves. 45 Inwhat way, then, do state actors sacri® ce economicrationality? Cash crops playa majorrole in many Third World countries. In Africa, where Bates conductedhis research, the majority of governments `maintain publicly sanc- tionedmonopsonies for the purchase and marketing of these crops’ . 46 Rural producershave little choice but to selltheir produce to themat adomesticprice set belowthe international one. Bates regardsthe difference between these prices as tantamountto taxing agricultural producers. Signi® cantly, `the marketing agencieshave become the source of over a thirdof therevenues of some ofthe states ofAfrica’ . 47 606 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Inaddition, African governments, like those in many poor countries, fre- quentlyovervalue their currencies, and this is alsotantamount to taxing rural producers: Byovervaluing their currencies, governments in Africa seekto make it easier for industriesto import capital equipment; they thereby attempt to promote domestic industrialization.But in so doing they also lessen the purchasing power of those whoearn their incomes in foreign markets. For, with the overvaluing of their currency,earnings of foreign exchange convert into lesser amounts of local `dollars’. Themaintenance of an overvalued currency thus represents a taxon exports;export agriculture is hurt in an effort toassist the growth of the industrial sector.48 Now,this could be explained by the more powerfully expressed interests of the urbanclassesÐ whom states in LDCshavean interest in placating in order to avoidriots. Consequently, it is usualfor such states tokeep the price of food low.But, as Bates insists,the behaviour of Africanstates isexplainedneither by theinterests of the urban classes norby an attempt to reconcile the interests of allgroups within society. In other words, neither Marxist-type class theorynor pluralisttheories can account for many of thepolicies adopted by states in LDCs, forexample the toleration of inef® cient projects, subsidising farm inputsas opposedto alternative means ofkeeping down food prices, a preferencefor rationingand, in general, discriminatory treatment within the sector of rural production. However,the policies of African governments are quiteunderstandable when theinterests of state actors are takeninto account. Consider inef® cient projects: If aprojectfails to generate an adequate return on the public investment, but is privatelyrewarding for thosewho build it, provision it, staff it,or hold tenancies init, the political of® cials may none the less support it. For itwillserve as a source ofrewards for theirfollowers and as an instrument for buildinga ruralpolitical constituency. 49 Similarly,part of the revenue obtained from marketing agencies can subsidise inputsfor certain rural producers, just as asystem ofrationing allows govern- mentof® cials to allocate resources orpermitsto aselectedfew. In this way, not onlycan state actors purchase loyalty, but the opposition groups are weakened throughdivision. Hence such policies `enable governments to organize political support’and `to disorganizepolitical opposition’ . 50 Inshort,agricultural policies are `partof a repertoireof devices employed by African governments to secure politicalcontrol over their populations and thus to remain in power’ . 51 Such policiesare ofteneconomically inef® cient and, `in many cases, theinef® ciencies persist because theyare politicallyuseful; economic inef® ciencies afford govern- mentsmeans ofretaining political power’ . 52 Allof this is compatiblewith the State-Primacy Theory. But it is morea theory of undevelopment ratherthan of underdevelopment .If oneviews Third Worldstate actors as simplyparasitical on their nation’ s economy,or as so preoccupiedwith retaining or extendingtheir support within the country in order tohold onto power that they will preserve economic relations or pursuepolicies thatbene® t theirsupporters while fettering development, then one is 607 ALAN CARTER simplypresenting an account of a lackof development because of internal failings.Although this would explain stagnation in certain countries, it is less consistentwith a focuson international exploitation and fails to explain why states shouldtransform modes of production. So, while Bates’ account is, no doubt,part of the story, it is, at best, only a part. Clearly,the key to understanding the behaviour of Third World states liesin attendingto the problem they face inobtaining suf® cientrevenue. Much of the economiesof LDCscomprisessubsistence production, and much of theexchange thattakes place does so inthe informal sector. Unlike the formal economy that transnationalcorporations operate in, a largepart of the economies of Third Worldcountries offers alimitedsource of revenue to their states. Can this fact beusedin an extended analysis to explain not only cases ofundevelopmentbut ofunderdevelopment or dependent development, too? TNCsprovide`metropolitan states’ withrevenueÐ revenue such states would obviouslyseek toprotect. If aThirdWorld state were to receive military aid froma `metropolitanstate’ for preserving economic relations that the latter bene®ted fromÐ in other words, if a `satellite’were to be offered military assistance forallowing TNCstodo virtuallywhat they liked within its territoryÐ thenit isrationalfor the `satellite state’ to accede, as itwould enable it tobypass thenormal dif® culties of obtaining suf® cientrevenue to meet its military requirements(see Fig.1). In such a situation,the underdevelopment of its economywould not be amajorconcern for the `satellite state’ . Thisis precisely whystates cannotbe viewedin isolationÐ and viewing them in isolation is one ofthe weaknesses ofHuntington’ s approach. Butwhat of those states thatdo not receive military aid from `core states’ ? Well,surprising as itmight at ® rst seem, evenin these cases itis frequently rationalfor `peripheral states’ tostabilise economic relations that lead to the exploitationof their own nationals by TNCs. Stateschoose to stabilise economic relationsthat bene® t oneclass ratherthan another because by so doingstates maximisetheir income. For example, stabilising capitalist relations both under- pinsthe exploitation of oneclass byanotherand promotes the high productivity thatstates usuallyrequire. However, given the extent of both subsistence productionand the informal economy within the Third World, the most effective wayfor `peripheral states’ toobtain revenue is usuallyby imposing tariffs. As MichaelTodaro points out: `Duties on tradeare themajor source of government revenuein most LDCs, sincethey are arelativelyeasy formof taxationto impose andeven easier tocollect.’ 53 Consequently,Third World states oftenhave an interestin maintaining international trade, even when it leadsto the underdevel- opmentof their economies, because such trade does at least allow those states to® nancethemselves. Thereis anotheradvantage to `peripheralstates’ ofcooperatingwith TNCs. As theWorld Commission on Environment and Development ( WCED)notes:`de- fenceexpenditure is oneof the most import-intensive of activities, usually creatinga largesecondary demand for imported spares, ammunition,servicing, training,and fuel’ . 54 Whatis more,such advanced military equipment necessi- tatesa vasttechnological infrastructure. Hence much of the `development’ in ThirdWorld countries is gearedto providingthe background requirements of the 608 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The political structure Metropolis

Empowers Selects

Enforces ’Defensive’ Economic development Support relations

Encourage Supports Transfers Technological coercive Transfer development forces to capital to

The Empowers political Selects structure

Enforces ÔDefensiveÕ Economic development Support relations

Undermine or make Technological dependent development Satellite

FIG.1.Metropolis± satellite relations. military,rather than meeting the needs of the people. All of this requires advancedtechnologyÐ aprecondition of Third World states maintainingtheir militarycompetitivenessÐ and the prospect of moreadvanced technology is just what TNCs. Ofcourse, this prioritisation of military requirements, 55 withthe accompany- ingpro¯ igate expenditure on armaments, not only causes humansuffering, but terribleenvironmental damage in order to cash inon the natural resources neededto pay for it. In addition, arms build-upsoften lead to wars. `Yet’ , as Tim O’Riordanobserves, `despite the profound human suffering and ecological 609 ALAN CARTER devastationthat are causedeven by relatively small-scale wars, most nations persistin maintaining a crediblemilitary posture’ . 56 Inevitably,such a `crediblemilitary posture’ will pose a threatto neighbouring states.The result is atreadmillof exhorbitantmilitary costs anda complicityin devouringthe local economy in order to pay them, for whena nation’s securityis actuallythreatened, there is no reallimit to the diversion ofresources to ensure survival. The Middle Eastern countries (such as Israel and Jordan)currently invest about three-® fths of their national budgets (some 25% of totalnational wealth) in military expenditures even though this leads to high in¯ation and economic depression. 57 Consequently,with such a proportionatelyastronomical demand for resources to satisfytheir military preoccupations, if ThirdWorld states canobtain substantial revenueor new technology as aresultof the activities of TNCs, orif they can obtainmilitary assistance from`metropolitan states’ thatbene® t fromthem, it is rationalfor such `satellite states’ tosupport these activities. Thus, Third World statesfrequently have an interest in being complicit in the underdevelopment of theirnation’ seconomy .Thisonly becomes apparent when one realises thatwhat is intheinterests of ThirdWorld states isnotnecessarily what is inthe interests ofThird World peoples. Instead, it is often,though not always, what is inthe interestsof TNCs. Inshort, the interests of Third World states andthose of transnationalsoften contingently correspond. 58 However,if a ThirdWorld state is complicitin the underdevelopment of its owncountry’ s economybecause of the income it expects to be able to derive fromtrade, and should the potential revenue fail to be realisedbecause the TNCs are engagedin practicessuch as transferpricing, then it would not be surprising weresuch a stateoccasionally to objectÐ sometimes to the point of threatening tonationalise TNCs’ assets. Sense canonly be made both of the complicity of ThirdWorld states inthe underdevelopment of theirnations’ economies by TNCs andof their occasional hostility to transnationals by taking seriously Third Worldstates as autonomousagents rationally pursuing their own interests. Itis alsoworth noting that most TNCsultimatelyderive their power from the `corestates’ who,in bene® ting from their activities abroad, provide them with protection,both defensively and aggressively. 59 Andwhen a `corestate’ supports domesticcapital, that does not entail that it does so becauseit is theinstrument ofsuchcapital; for it isintheinterests of states toprotect the capital they obtain revenuefrom. 60 Inthe opinion of Stephen Krasner: states are `thebasic actors inthe international system. The behaviour of other actors, including multina- tionalcorporations and international organizations, is conditionedand delimited bystate decisions and state power’ . 61 So,as both`core states’ and`peripheral states’ obtainrevenue from TNC activity,the underdevelopment of Third World economies can thus be in the interestsof both. And correlative to this underdevelopment is themore rapid developmentof the economies of the `core states’ .Hencethere is global technologicaldevelopment but it is aggregative,not universal. Certainly, the `peripheralstate’ is therebylosing out in competition with the `core state’ that bene®ts mostfrom capital extraction. But this is rationalfor the `peripheral 610 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT state’, forin managing to obtain revenue, it bene® ts vis-aÁ -vis itsimmediate militarycompetitorsÐ namely, neighbouring `peripheral states’ .Furthermore,the revenueit obtains also allows it to retain control over its own nationals, which is oneof its primary concerns. Ihaveargued that it is rationalfor a weakstate lacking its own signi® cant formaleconomy and relying on the export of cash cropsor raw materials to be complicitin the underdevelopment of itsown country’ s economy.But it is also rationalfor a weakstate to support transnational-® nanced industrial develop- ment,even if thedevelopment is `dependent’or skewed,because such develop- mentmakes moreadvanced technology available and could provide a basis for later,wider-scale industrialisation that holds out the promise of greater revenue. Consequently,the State-Primacy Theory can accommodate not only some ofthe insightsof underdevelopmenttheory, but of dependencytheory as well.But even moreimportant, a strongerThird World state has aninterest in developing its ownindustry within its own `modern’ formal economy when it is ina position todo so, for that would offer it the greatest revenue. 62 Considerthe NICsTaiwanand South Korea. As James Manorobserves: `The Taiwangovernment has longpossessed formidablecoercive powers, but in recenttimes it has demonstrateda capacityto assist theprivate sector in achievingspectacular export success.’ 63 Moreover,the `tradition of centralized governmentcontrol over the private sector’ in South Korea is `pervasive’, 64 whilethe same was trueof Japan. 65 Inother words, the State-Primacy Theory canalso account for the rise ofthe NICs, whereasunderdevelopment theory is clearlyinadequate in so far as it`neither anticipated nor explained the rise of newlyindustrializing countries on the ª peripheryºof the international economic system’ .66

Fourproblem areas Clearly,the State-Primacy Theory has greaterexplanatory power than the alternativetheories. But surely, it will be objected, there are obviouscases that itwould have dif® culty in explaining. Let me thereforeconsider four highly contrasting,apparent counter-examples to the appropriateness of applying the State-PrimacyTheory to the Third World: Islamic fundamentalism, revolution- aryThird World states, `quasi-states’ , andglobal neoliberalism. Lack of space means thatthe following remarks willof necessity be cursory; however, they doindicate how the State-Primacy Theory could plausibly respond to such ostensibledif® culties.

FundamentalistIslamic states. Fromthe end of the1970s several Third World states haveespoused and promoted Islamic fundamentalism. Often this has seemed togo hand in hand with a rejectionof capitalist values and the underminingof capitalist economic relations. This would suggest economic regression.Yet the State-Primacy Theory would lead one to expect states toseek economicprogress when practicable. Doesn’ t thispose a problemfor the theory? Itcertainly appears to be a dif®culty, but the State-Primacy Theory 611 ALAN CARTER candeal with it. We havealready seen thatstate interests can explain undevelop- ment.But fundamentalist Islamic states are aspecialcase. Mostare oilexporters, andtheir oil industries are, by and large, state controlled. This means thatsuch states canobtain considerable revenue directly. As aconsequence,they do not havethe need that most states havefor a highlyproductive capitalist economy. Inwhich case, theycan promote forms ofsocialcontrol requiring values that do notappear homologous with capitalism. If socialcontrol can be bettermanaged bypropagatinganti-capitalist values, then it is inthe interest of oil-richstates to propagatethem at the expense of redundant capitalist relations. Moreover,oil-rich states possess suf® cienteconomic strength for them to be neither`satellites’ nor `dependent states’ .Hence,they can afford to be far more explicitin theiropposition to imperialismthan weaker states whoare dependent uponthe activities of transnationals or `metropolitan’ military aid. An oil-rich statehas theluxury of being free notonly to denounce the West and all its values,but also to employ the anti-imperialist opposition that is thereby generatedto enhance its position with respect to its own people and render its internalcontrol more secure. For a statein such a situation,the promotion of Islamicfundamentalism is quiterational. This is notto deny that the leaders of suchstates are sincerein their religious beliefs. It is onlyto point out that promotingsuch beliefs does not actually con¯ ict with their interests.

Revolutionarystates in the Third World. What,though, of acountrylike China duringthe Cultural Revolution or, to take a morelurid example, Kampuchea underthe Khmer Rouge? In their purging of intellectuals,such countries appear highlyregressive with respect to development, yet they were certainly not oil-rich. Letme ®rst considerChina. Mao came topower at the head of a peasant- basedguerrilla army. The initial strategy adopted by the Chinese Communist Partyon gaining control of mainland China in 1949 was tofollow the Soviet modelof development.However, with even less centralisedindustry than in the earlySoviet Union, China switched to acourseof small-scale,rural industrialis- ation,which reached its peak in the Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958. However,with the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao lost face inthe Party. TheCultural Revolution of the1960s is bestseen as atemporaryreturn by Mao tohis power baseÐ the peasantry and the Red ArmyÐ in response to a power strugglein which he was embroiledwithin the Party. Canthe State-Primacy Theory deal with Kampuchea, though? In particular, canit deal with the de-urbanisation strategy of the Khmer Rouge, which led to de-industrialisationin the short-term? Well, Pol Pot has beenregarded as a Maoistwho believed that he was movingdirectly to a culturalrevolution of his own.This could be viewed as anirrational, blind adherence to a certain interpretationof Maoism or it could be seen as themost rational strategy for a leaderof apeasantguerrilla army. However, the price of Kampuchea’s de-indus- trialisationwas itsinability to maintainits defensive capability. Consequently, it couldnot defend itself adequately against a Vietnameseinvasion in response to thethreat the Khmer Rouge posed to all neighbouring countries. The relations 612 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT thatultimately prevailed in Cambodiawere those imposed by Vietnam in itsown interestsand which currently support the (now independent) Cambodian stateÐ a statewhich continues to be harassed bythe Khmer Rouge. Thisexplanation of the economic relations that came toprevail in Cambodia employsa Darwinianfeature of the State-Primacy Theory: Countries controlled bypolitical agents that (perhaps irrationally) select economic structures which failto support their defence requirements will tend to be defeated by those that havechosen more appropriate economic structures. And the latter will impose on theformer economic relations more suited to serving the (imperialist) state’ s interests.Hence by a Darwinianmechanism, the economic relations that ulti- matelyprevail will be those suited to serving a state’s interestsÐwhich is preciselywhat the State-Primacy Theory claims. SotheState-Primacy Theory can, in fact,deal with even the most problematic ofThird World revolutionary states. What is worthstressing, though, is the problemrevolutionary states ingeneral pose for Marxist theorists. Consider GordonWhite: thepre- (andpost-) revolutionary context of military threat and con¯ ict ¼ contributesto apervasivemilitarisation of society,ideologically and institutionally, aheavysecurity consciousness which tends to retain its strength when the actual levelof threat has [receded]. The heavily statist nature of Third World socialist societiesboth re¯ ects and reinforces these tendencies, a factwhich helps to explain theweakness of ª socialistinternationalismº and the frequency of wars between socialistcountries over the past decade. 67 Whilestruggling to explain the undesirable behaviour of `Marxist’ regimes in theThird World, some Marxiststhus offer explanations that seem far more compatiblewith the State-Primacy Theory than with the primacy Marxism accordsto economics.

`Quasi-states’. However,given that the State-Primacy Theory emphasises state interests,how can it explain the creation and persistence of post-colonial states thatseem barelycapable of defending themselves internationally? Robert Jack- sonhas dubbedsuch states `quasi-states’, andviews them more as supported`by internationallaw and material aid’ than as `self-standingstructures with dom- esticfoundations’ . 68 Howcould such weak states haveescaped colonial control andremained sovereign entities? De-colonisationdid not reach its peak until after the Second World War. The UnitedStates entered the war after the great European powers had begun to exhaustthemselves in mutual con¯ ict. Thus it emerged from the war as the world’s strongestmilitary and economic power. In order to become the `hege- mon’ 69 ofthe`free world’, theUSA hadan interest in thedecline of Britishand FrenchimperialismÐ perhaps most palpably revealed in itsresponse to theSuez invasion.Given that the European powers had created in their colonies the foundationsfor independent capitalist countries, given that US economicpower couldbe employed to exploit such independent countries without the need for directmilitary control, and given that the direct military takeover of the former Europeancolonies would have been impracticable and needlessly costly, US interestswere best served by supporting an international system ofsovereign 613 ALAN CARTER states.While the USA was atits economic peak and could effectively exploit independentnations, it had a clearinterest in leadinga `free world’in which the sovereigntyof states (thatmight otherwise succumb to Soviet imperialism) wouldbe guaranteed by `the international community’ . Ofcourse, the sover- eigntyof states thatappeared to threatenUS interests,such as Cuba,Nicaragua, Grenadaor Kampuchea, failed to attain an equal measure ofrecognition. In short,the emergence and persistence of so-called`quasi-states’ can be explained byreference to the interests of the world’ s mostpowerful state. Inaddition, many states desireto expand their military capabilities not becausethey intend to invade their neighbours, but because they fear thattheir neighbourshave imperialist designs on them.Clearly, it is rationalfor such weak states tosupport an international regime that purports to recognise and preserve eachstate’ s `right’to sovereignty.

Globalisation. Butsurely, it will be objected, doesn’ t globalneoliberalism, so-called,indicate that it is correctto accordeconomics explanatory primacy? In responserecent claims about globalisation are not,in fact, incompatible with the State-PrimacyTheory. According to Leo Panitch: capitalistglobalisation is a processwhich ¼ takesplace in, through, and under the aegisof states; it is encoded by them and in important respects even authored by them;and it involves a shiftin power relations within states that often means the centralisationand concentration of state powers as the necessary condition of and accompanimentto global market discipline. 70 Inshort, any `international constitutionalisatio nofneo-liberalism has takenplace throughthe agency of states’ . 71 Itwould not be dif® cult, therefore, in defence of theState-Primacy Theory, to arguethat any such development is inthe interests ofthose states responsiblefor it.

Conclusion TheState-Primacy Theory can explain political and economic developments in theThird World. Unlike other theories, it manages to cast lighton the relationshipbetween the interests of Third World states andthe development, dependentdevelopment, underdevelopment or underdevelopment of their econ- omies,rather than obscure it. Third World states are neitherthe instruments of internationalcapital nor of an indigenous bourgeoisie, but are rationalactors who willindustrialise their economies when practicable, but who often ® ndit intheir intereststo beaccomplicesin thedependent development or evenunderdevelop- mentof their own economies. And the reason primarily has todo with the dif®culties such states experiencein obtaining suf® cientrevenue. Furthermore, itis byfocusing on the independent interests of Third World states thatthe State-PrimacyTheory is ableto explain why it is thatthey sometimes threaten totake punitive action against TNCs, anaction inconsistent with neo-Marxist underdevelopmenttheory. Clearlyit is necessary tonegate the Marxist view, which undertheorises the state.But the State-Primacy Theory not only emphasises therole of thestate, it 614 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT simultaneouslyhighlights the exploitative nature of Third World societies and thefrequent underdevelopment or dependent development of their economies. Andthis underdevelopment or dependent development not only has disastrous humanconsequences, but also environmental ones. Yet these features of the ThirdWorld are underplayedand undertheorised both by modernisation theory andby Huntington’ s approachÐwhich is whythey, too, have to be negated. In short,the State-Primacy Theory solves the intractable problems in Wallerstein andFrank, on the one hand, and in Huntington, on the other, by transcending theirtheoretical positions. It effectively combines the valuable insights that can begleaned from Huntington’ s morestate-centred analysis with those from underdevelopmentand dependency theory, while leaving behind the ¯ aws characteristicof these approaches. Butthe State-Primacy Theory doesn’ t juststop there. Both modernisation theoryand underdevelopment theory, although in verydifferent ways, place their faithin the Third World state. The State-Primacy Theory, however, indicates that itwould be agravemistake to placemuch faith in the nation-state as thesolution toThird World problems. What the theory reveals is that both`core states’and `peripheralstates’ bear responsibility for theoppression and exploitation of the world’s poorand the environmental degradation that accompanies this . For example,bilateral aid primarily serves toprop up regimes that are complicitin theexploitation of theirpeople and the destruction of theirenvironment. Support forthe oppressed people of the world is, therefore, not the same as wantinga betterdeal for the disadvantaged states thatoppress them. We mustrely neither onrichstates noron poor ones for genuine liberation. Rather, it istothe peoples ofthis world (not their states) andto the nongovernmental organisations which helpthem to help themselves that we mustlook for a futurethat is non-exploita- tiveof people and the planet.

Notes Iam indebtedto Laura Summers fora numberof invaluable comments onan earlier draftof this article. 1 G A Cohen, KarlMarx’ sTheoryof History: ADefence ,Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1978. 2 See AlanCarter, Marx:A RadicalCritique ,Brighton:Wheatsheaf Books,1988, section 6.3; also see Alan Carter, `Functionalexplanation and the state’ ,inPaul Wetherly (ed), Marx’sTheoryof History: The ContemporaryDebate ,Aldershot:Avebury, 1992. This theoretical approach has beenemployed to construct anenvironmentalist political philosophy in Alan Carter, `Towardsa greenpolitical theory’ , inAndrew Dobson& PaulLucardie (eds), ThePolitics of Nature: Explorations in Green PoliticalTheory , London: Routledge,1993. 3 Forexample, ColinLeys informs us that`A surveyof US professorsin 1974 found that PoliticalOrder was thebook most often cited as amongthe ª mostimportant in the® eldº’ .ColinLeys, `Samuel Huntingtonand theend of classical modernizationtheory’ , inHAlaviand T Shanin(eds), Introductionto the Sociology of `DevelopingSocieties ’,London:Macmillan, 1982, p 349n. 4 As James Manornotes, `political development’ and `dependency’ , whichare `thetwo paradigms or schools ofthought that have dominated the study of Third World politics over the last quarter-century[,]have encounteredserious dif® culties’ .James Manor,`Politics and the neo-liberals’ , inChristopher Colclough & James Manor(eds), Statesor Markets? Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy Debate , Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1991,p 306. 5 However,`Some economists looked to the neo-liberal paradigm for the study of economic systems, which gainedin¯ uence justas theª politicaldevelopmentº and ª dependencyºschools were encounteringdif® culties 615 ALAN CARTER

¼Butanalysts of Third World politics have shown scarcely a¯icker ofinterestin this body of ideas. This is partlybecause theneo-liberal economists, like the earlier andmore optimisticgeneration of development economistsagainst whom they are reacting,lack atheoryof the state.’ James Manor,`Introduction’ , in Manor (ed), RethinkingThird World Politics ,London:Longman, 1991, pp 9± 10 n.Yet thenature of state structureswill determine theinterests ofstate actorsÐfor example, thestructure of the Third World state explainsthe need to satisfy certain clientsif state actors inthe Third World are toremain inpower. 6 Althoughthe State-Primacy Theory,like `realist’ positions,accords primacyto the state, itgoes beyond them inbeing a generaltheory of revolution in the Marxist senseÐ namely, from one mode of production toanother (see note43 below). For some clari® cations,see AlanCarter, `Fettering,development and revolution’(forthcoming). 7 See forexample, Gabriel Almond,`Introduction: a functionalapproach to comparative politics’, inGabriel Almond& James Coleman(eds), ThePolitics of theDeveloping Areas ,PrincetonNJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1960,p 53. 8 Samuel PHuntington, PoliticalOrder inChanging Societies ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1968, p 4. 9 Ibid.,p 363. 10 Ibid.,p 266. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.,p 196. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., p 93. 15 Ibid.,pp 7±8. The value he places onauthority visibly strays intoauthoritarianism when he writes: `Societies,such as Sparta,Rome, and Britain, which have been admired by their contemporaries for the authorityand justice of their laws, havealso been admired for the coherence anddiscipline of theirarmies. Disciplineand development go hand in hand.’ Ibid, pp 23±24. 16 See ibid,pp 145±146. 17 As hewrites: `themore backwarda societyis, the more progressivethe role of its military; the more advanceda societybecomes, themore conservativeand reactionary becomes therole of the military’ . Ibid, p 221. 18 See ibid,p 245.And as headds:`The upshot of democracy is todisperse power among a pluralityof more traditionalelites. Byincreasing the power of rural groups democracy alsotends to promote policies aimed at ruraland agrarian rather thanurban and industrial development.’ Ibid. In which case, itisdif®cult to see whya modernisingmilitary would be committed todemocracy. 19 Immanuel Wallerstein, TheModern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economyin the Sixteenth Century ,New York:Academic Press, 1974,especially p350. 20 AndreÂGunderFrank, Capitalismand Underdevelopment in Latin America: HistoricalStudies of Chileand Brazil,New York:Monthly Review Press, 1967,p xi. 21 AndreÂGunderFrank, `The development of underdevelopment’ , MonthlyReview ,41(2),1989, p 44. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.,pp 44±45. 24 Theclaim thatLatin America has beencapitalist since the16th century has beenthe subject of much controversy.See especially,Ernesto Laclau, `Feudalismand capitalism inLatin America’ , NewLeft Review , 67,May/ June1971. Much of the disagreement concernsthe issue ofwhether exploitation is basedsolely inproduction or also in exchange. On this point see JohnRoemer, `New directionsin the Marxian theory ofexploitation and class’ ,inRoemer (ed), AnalyticalMarxism ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986. 25 However,the view (see Frank, Capitalismand Underdevelopment in Latin America ,pp119±120) that super-exploitationof theThird World will eventually drive its peoples to rebel seems rather optimistic.As Huntingtonpoints out: `The simple povertythesis falls downbecause peoplewho are reallypoor are too poorfor politics and too poor for protest. They are indifferent,apathetic, and lack exposureto the media andother stimuli which would arouse their aspirations in such manner as togalvanize them intopolitical activity.’Huntington, PoliticalOrder inChanging Societies ,p52.This implies that if underdevelopment is infact takingplace, theprospects for revolution might be even grimmer thanthey would be otherwise. 26 See BillWarren, `Imperialism andcapitalist industrialization’, New LeftReview ,81,September/ October 1973.Also see BillWarren, Imperialism:Pioneer of Capitalism ,edJ Sender,London: New Left Books, 1980.For criticisms ofWarren, see ArghiriEmmanuel, `Myths of development versus myths of underdevel- opment’, andPhilip McMichael, James Petras &RobertRhodes, `Imperialism andthe contradictions of development’, bothin New LeftReview ,85,May/ June1974. Many of Warren’ sconclusionsdepend upon misleadingaggregations of data. Moreover, his prescription is oneof unhindered capitalist expansionas a preludeto socialism. Amore environmentallyirresponsible strategy is hardto imagine. 27 FernandoHenrique Cardoso, `Dependency and development in Latin America’ , New LeftReview , 74, July/August1972, p 89. 616 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

28 Ibid., p 94. 29 Warren,`Imperialism andcapitalist industrialization’, p12. 30 Ibid. 31 StephenKrasner, StructuralCon¯ ict: TheThird World against Global Liberalism ,Berkeley,CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1985,p 181. 32 TeodorShanin, `Class, state, andrevolution: substitutes and realities’ ,inAlavi & Shanin, Introductionto theSociology of `Developing Societies ’,p316.Even a leadingdependency theorist notes that, `Paradoxi- cally,the military have taken upon themselves thetask of modernization’ . TDosSantos, `The crisis of developmenttheory and the problem of dependence in LatinAmerica’ ,inHenry Bernstein (ed), Underdeve- lopmentand Development: The Third World Today ,London:Penguin, 1976, p 70.In addition, Ralph Miliband,a major Marxisttheorist of the state, whendiscussing post-colonial countries, admits that`the relationbetween economicand political power has beeninverted’ . See RalphMiliband, Marxism and Politics,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1977,pp 108±109. In other words, the moment one examines the ThirdWorld, it becomes clear thatMarxist theory has everythingupside down. 33 Wallerstein, TheModern World-System , p 355. 34 Ibid.,p 134. 35 See ibid.,p 349. 36 Hamza Alavi,`The state inpost-colonial societies: Pakistanand Bangladesh’ , inHarry Goulbourne(ed), Politicsand State in the Third World ,London:Macmillan, 1979, pp 40±41. 37 JohnS Saul,`The state inpost-colonial societies: Tanzania’ ,inRalph Miliband & JohnSaville (eds), The SocialistRegister 1974 ,London:Merlin, 1974, p 349. 38 See Alavi,`The state inpost-colonial societies’ ,pp41±42. 39 See ChristopherClapham, ThirdWorld Politics ,London:Croom Helm, 1985,p 48. 40 Ibid. 41 MarylinWaring, IfWomen Counted: A New FeministEconomics ,London:Macmillan, 1989, p 171. 42 Samuel EFiner,`State- andnation-building in Europe: the role of the military’ , inCharles Tilly(ed), The Formationof NationalStates in Western Europe ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1975,p 96.This pointis alsoacknowledged in Wallerstein, TheModern World-System , p 356. 43 Inthis respect, theState-Primacy approachis atheoreticaladvance on Huntington, for as Leyspoints out, Marx’s conceptionof revolutionrefers toa transition`from an epoch dominated by one mode of production (suchas feudalismor capitalism) toa new epochdominated by anew modeof production.For Huntington, however,ª revolutionºrefers ¼simplyto any ª rapid,fundamental, and violent changeº . ’Leys,`Samuel Huntingtonand the end of classical modernizationtheory’ , p346.Unlike Huntington’ s far less speci® c approach,the State-Primacy Theory is atheoryof revolution in this sense. 44 Sadly:`Since the early 1960s,military spending in developingcountries as awholehas increased ®vefold.’ GHBrundtland et al, OurCommon Future ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987,p 298. 45 RobertH Bates, Essays onthePolitical Economy of RuralAfrica ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983, p 147. 46 Ibid.,p 109. 47 Ibid.,p 110. 48 Ibid.,pp 110±111. 49 Ibid.,p 127. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.,p 125. 52 Ibid.,p 128. 53 MichaelP Todaro, EconomicDevelopment in the Third World ,New York:Longman, 1985, p 414. 54 Brundtland et al, OurCommon Future , p 299. 55 Inthe words of theBrandt Report: `It is aterribleirony that the most dynamic and rapid transfer ofhighly sophisticatedequipment and technology from rich to poor countries has beenin the machinery of death.’ WillyBrandt et al, North±South: A Programmefor Survival ,London:Pan, 1980, p 14. 56 Tim O’Riordan, Environmentalism ,London:Pion, 1981, p 22. 57 Ibid.Remarkably, `Global military spending in 1985was well inexcess of$900 billion. This was more than thetotal income of the poorest half of humanity.’ Brundtland et al, OurCommon Future , p 297. 58 As MichaelRedclift observes: `Criticism tendsto overlook the essentially rational and systematic way in which TNCs operate, usuallywith the support or complicity of national governments in less developed countries’(emphasis added).Michael Redclift, SustainableDevelopment: Exploringthe Contradictions , London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987, p 73.`Indeed,’ Redclift continues, `the state is frequentlythe guarantorof TNCs,not only by providing a legalbasis fortheir operation, but by underwriting them ®nancially.’Ibid. 59 See RobinMurray, `The internationalization of capital andthe nation state’ , New LeftReview ,67,May/ June 1971,pp 91± 92. 60 However,advanced states donot act as theydo with respect tothe Third World simply in order to bene® t 617 ALAN CARTER

theirown capitalists. As theBrandt Report insists: `The major powerssell weaponsmainly to suit their own foreignpolicy or to maintain regional balances, rather thanto bene® t theireconomies.’ Brandt et al, North±South , p 120. 61 Krasner, StructuralCon¯ ict , p 28. 62 Thiscan beused to help explain international economic crises. States havean interest in developing their own`strategic industries’, whichenable `military self-suf® ciencyand national economic independence’ . Gautam Sen, TheMilitary Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry ,London:Frances Pinter,1984, p 6.As Senwrites: `Sincethe bene® ts ofeconomies of scale, bothstatic anddynamic, can be reaped bylonger production runs the latecomer countrieswill ¼ needto establish a levelof capacity,when theyindustrialise, that allows them toreach thecompetitive threshold already prevalent in the ® rstcomer countries,with the attendant need for adequate export markets as well. Thus,they in turn may establisha levelof productive capacity inexcess oflocal consumption levels andhope to carve outa share inthe internationalmarket. Afurtherelement whichaccentuates theproblems of excess capacity is theneed to ensurethe ability to produce adequate quantities during war-time. Thus,the planned capacity may well exceed strictlynational peace-time needs.’Ibid, p 8.Such an account could be expanded to explain `Kondratieffcycles’ ,whichGilpin insists lack aconvincingcausal mechanism. See RobertGilpin, The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalRelations ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1987,pp 100± 106. Inthe run-up to major wars, theproductive capacity ineach country’s strategic industrieswould rise toa pointwhere globaloverproduction ensued. If industryremained intactafter thewar, there wouldbe aglobal surplusand a recession wouldfollow until excess capacity was cutback. If, on the other hand, industry was severely damagedduring the war, there wouldbe space forgrowth. This might explain why high growth occurredafter thesecond of the two World Wars, buta depressionfell between them. 63 Manor,`Politics and the neo-liberals’ , p309. 64 JohnToye, quoted in ibid. 65 `[I]nthe case ofJapan, industrialisation was engenderedby theState’ seffortsto create adomesticdefence industryduring the third quarter of the nineteenth century.’ Sen, TheMilitary Origins of Industrialisation andInternational Trade Rivalry ,p9.Interestingly, the state has alsoplayed a major rolein the changes takingplace inChina: `Economic liberalization in China has ¼beenattended by the shrinkage of certain partyand state agencies androles, but also by the very substantial growth of the state, bothas anarena withinwhich capitalism can operateand as anenabler of private enterprises.’ Manor, `Politics and the neo-liberals’, p309. 66 Manor,`Introduction’ , in RethinkingThird World Politics , p 2. 67 GordonWhite, `Revolutionary socialist development in the Third World: an overview’ , inGordon White, RobinMurray & ChristineWhite (eds), RevolutionarySocialist Development in theThird World , Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983,p 6. 68 RobertJackson, Quasi-States:Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World ,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990,p 5. 69 See Gilpin, ThePolitical Economy of International Relations ,pp72±80 for a summary ofthe theory of hegemonicstability. 70 LeoPanitch, `Globalisation and the state’ ,inRalph Miliband & LeoPanitch, SocialistRegister 1994: BetweenGlobalism and Nationalism ,London:Merlin Press, 1994,p 64. 71 Ibid., p 87.

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