ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 4, 1995 Thenation-state and underdevelopment ALAN CARTER Themost coherent interpretation of Marx’s theoryof revolutionarychangeÐ that of G A Cohen1Ðclaims,in its barest essentials, that technological development selects economicrelations which are functionalfor further technological devel- opment,and that the economic relations select a politicalstructure which is functionalfor stabilising them. However, it can be argued that this stands the worldon its head. Rather, a politicalstructure selects economicrelations that furthertechnological development because that is functionalfor the political structurein so far asitis apreconditionfor developing its defensive capability. 2 Irefer tothis alternative theory of revolutionary transformation as theState- PrimacyTheory. According to this alternative theoretical perspective, state actors’perceptions of their interests determine the economic relations which cometo prevail. TheState-Primacy Theory might provide an explanation for the outcome of revolutionsin Europe,but isn’ t itwholly unsuited to accountingfor political and economicdevelopments in theThird World? Obviously, many assume, themajor actorsthere are transnationalcorporations ( TNCs), whichoften have turnovers exceedingthe gross nationalproducts of many Third World countries. Conse- quently,states inless developedcountries ( LDCs) seem powerlessto prevent thesegiant corporations from plundering their resources andpolluting their lands.Isn’ t thisan obvious case wherethe State-Primacy Theory is clearly wrong?Isn’ t ittransparent that it is transnationalswithin the global economy thatdetermine what states do,rather than state interests explaining the nature of theglobal economy? Globalinequality is, certainly, of fundamental importance. And it can be arguedthat, by repatriating pro® ts, TNCsincreasepoverty in the Third World, whileadding to theexcessive af¯ uence of the rich nations. But are wereallysure ofthe actual dynamic that lies behind all this? In short, what theoretical perspectivewill best clarify Third World political and economic developments? Themost in¯ uential work from a `bourgeois’perspective has undoubtedlybeen PoliticalOrder inChanging Societies bySamuel Huntington. 3 Huntington’s approachis bestseen as fallingwithin the tradition of elitetheory. However, in oppositionto `bourgeois’approaches there arose a`neo-Marxist’critique empha- sising`the development of underdevelopment’ or dependency in Third World countries.This became the orthodoxy of the Left in the1970s and is bestviewed as fallingwithin the tradition of class theory,as itsprimary focus is on exploitation.Both views have since proved to be inadequate. 4 Unfortunately,at presentthere is nowidely-held, alternative theoretical perspective that seems AlanCarter is Head ofthe Philosophy Department at HeythropCollege, University of London. 0143-6597/95/040595-25 Ó 1995Third World Quarterly 595 ALAN CARTER capableof providing a satisfactoryaccount of signi® cant developments in the ThirdWorld. 5 Inwhatfollows I arguethat much of whatHuntington claims is correct,while muchof itisinadequate.Similarly, I arguethat much of whatthe underdevelop- menttheorists claim is correct,while much of it, too, is inadequate.Most importantly,I arguethat, by omitting the inadequate claims of both positions, whileaccommodating their positive features within a generaltheory of revol- utionarychange, 6 theState-Primacy Theory, in effect, sublates them both. And thereason why such a sublationhas notbeen widely developed is becausethe vitriolicopposition between supporters of elite theory and class theoryhas obstructedany meaningful synthesis of these seemingly antithetical standpoints. Thesis: anelite theoryapproach Letme commencewith Huntington’ s politicalrealism, which was aresponseto theunwarranted optimism of modernisation theory. The assumption had been thatsocieties contained traditional and modern sectorsÐ the `dualist hypoth- esis’ Ðandthat they were moving from being predominantly `traditional’ to beingpredominantly `modern’ . Althoughthe goal was, apparently, to bring aboutliberal democracies in the developing world, it had been recognised that thisprocess of`modernisation’could be facilitatedby an authoritarianelite that mightdecide to retain power. 7 Nevertheless,among modernisation theorists it was widelyassumed thatthere did exist a generalprocess oftransition towards pluralist,democratic polities built upon developed, capitalist economic relations. Inother words, the assumption was thateconomic modernisation would bring in itstrain political modernisation and the stability characteristic of the advanced Westerndemocracies. Theproblem of modernisation Inthe 1960s this optimism was shatteredby thegrowth of authoritarian regimes andrevolutionary struggles in the Third World. Huntington’ s responsewas to pointout the destabilising effects oftransition and to indicate the contrasting stabilityof both undeveloped and developed societies. Whereas both traditional andmodern societies were stable, transitional societies were highly unstable. Huntington’s principalthesis is thatmajor violence and instability is `inlarge partthe product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of newgroups intopolitics coupled with the low development of political institutions’ . 8 The failureof modernisation theory can thus be attributed to a disjunctionbetween economicand political development, for although economic `modernisation’ involvesthe breakdown of the traditional polity, it does not always result in a modernpolitical order. Huntingtontherefore accepts a versionof thedualist hypothesis, but adds that atransitionfrom a pre-modernto amodernsociety is likelyto resultin violence anddisorder. And this leads him to some ratherdrastic conclusions: for example, thatreform can be destabilisingand can lead to revolution. 9 Oneimplication that 596 THE NATION-STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT some mightdraw from this is thatit is betterto put up with a reactionary, authoritarianregime than to riskany reform that could prove to bedestabilising. However,Huntington does not, in fact,simply reject all revolutions. They are sometimesnecessary tobring about a stablepolity: Thesuccessful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization.Notall revolutions produce a newpolitical order. The measure ofhow revolutionary a revolutionis is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion ofpolitical participation. The measure of how successful a revolutionis is the authorityand stability of the institutions to which it gives birth. 10 Nevertheless,although there are successful revolutionsoccasionally, failed attemptsat producing a stablemodern society are common. Onesuch failure is whatHuntington refers toas a`praetorian’society, where differentgroups become politicised in `the absence of effective political institu- tionscapable of mediating, re® ning,and moderating group political action’ . 11 Theresult is asocietywhere `social forces confronteach other nakedly’ , 12 and variousdirect methods are employedfor in¯ uencing political outcomes: Eachgroup employs means which re¯ ect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthybribe; students riot; workers strike;mobs demonstrate; and the military coup.In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms ofdirect action are foundon the political scene. The techniques of military intervention are simply moredramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, `When nothingelse is turned up, clubs are trumps.’ 13 Whenthere is noconsensus, when social groups do not accept constraints on theiraction, then governments will ultimately have to resort to force. And the problemarises because,as aresultof economic modernisation, new social groupsemerge with rising expectations and come to demand political partici- pation.But they cannot be incorporated into the polity because of its undevel- opedpolitical institutions. And given that the prevailing elite will wish to restrict anysuch participation, praetorian societies are especiallyviolent, con¯ ictual and authoritarian.Nevertheless, although Huntington identi® es praetoriansocieties as apitfallon theroad to development,his goal is clearlythe attainment of modern liberaldemocracies. Thepriority of order Oneproblem with Huntington’ s approachis that,while he regards political modernisationas involving`the rationalization of authority,the differentiation of structures,and the expansion of political participation’ , 14 heassumes thatit is necessary tobring all these things about in the order in which he lists them: Theprimary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimatepublic order. Menmay, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty withoutorder. Authority has to exist before it can be limited,and it isauthority that isin scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercyof alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students. 15 But,it can be objected, even if political authority were a priority,that is notto 597 ALAN CARTER say thatit must come chronologically prior. It is a nonsequitur toarguethat, as onecannot have limited authority without having authority, then one must ® rst ofall have authority and then limit it. This is obviouslyfallacious, as itis logicallypossible to begin with limited authority. It is simplyconfused to claim a priori thatauthority must beestablished prior to its being constrained. Huntingtonnevertheless presumes preciselythat