Public Diplomacy and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation
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I SEPTEMBER 2020 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW “OLD” WAR: COUNTERING STATE-SPONSORED DISINFORMATION U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Co-Authors: Vivian S. Walker Executive Director U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Ryan E. Walsh Senior Advisor Bureau of Global Public Affairs Department of State Contributing Editor: Shawn Baxter Senior Advisor U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Transmittal Letter 2 Acknowledgements 4 Executive Summary 6 Recommendations 9 Structure, Methodology, and Key Terms 11 Part I: CSD Program Origins and Background 26 Part II: CSD Program Review and Diagnostic 39 Part III: CSD in the Field: Program Implementation and Impacts 54 Conclusion 58 Author Biographies TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: The United States Advisory weaken state credibility, perpetuate Commission on Public Diplomacy destabilizing narratives about (ACPD), reauthorized pursuant to national identity and values, and, Public Law 114-323, hereby submits most dangerously, erode public this special report, Public Diplomacy confidence in democratic institutions. and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation. The ACPD’s May 2017 special report Can Public Diplomacy Survive The ACPD is a bipartisan panel the Internet? examined aspects of created by Congress in 1948 to the disinformation threat and the appraise all U.S. government efforts implications for the future of public to understand, inform, and influence diplomacy programming. One danger foreign publics. The Commission featured in the 2017 report—state- makes recommendations to improve sponsored disinformation—remains the Public Diplomacy (PD) functions a particular concern. In addition vested in U.S. government entities to assessing recent Department of such as the Department of State, the State and U.S. Agency for Global U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Media efforts to counter this growing other interagency partners. threat, this report offers a set of recommendations that balance U.S. government public diplomacy longer-term resilience and capacity efforts are increasingly challenged by building measures with shorter time a sophisticated array of technology- horizon initiatives such as deterrence enabled, information-based threats. and messaging. Disinformation, or the manipulation and dissemination of information We greatly appreciate the skill and to adversely influence public dedication of public diplomacy perceptions and behaviors, has practitioners at home and abroad emerged as a major destabilizing who serve on the front lines of the force in the global information geostrategic competition for influence space. These sophisticated threats in the global information space. Respectfully Submitted, Sim Farar William J. Hybl Anne Wedner Chairman Vice Chairman (Illinois) (California) (Colorado) 1 SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This publication benefited enormously from expertise provided by an outstanding group of public diplomacy practitioners, policymakers, researchers, and scholars. The authors would like to extend special We also extend our thanks to other key thanks to the following individuals and elements of the wider public diplomacy institutions: community such as: Former acting ACPD Executive Director The U.S. Agency for Global Media, Ambassador Jeff Daigle; current and especially Shawn Powers and Olga former members of the State Department Stefanou, and external experts including public diplomacy community, including Graham Brookie of the Digital Forensics Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy Research Lab (Atlantic Council); Bret and Public Affairs Ambassador Bruce Schafer of the Alliance for Securing Wharton and Richard Stengel; Macon Democracy (German Marshall Fund); and Phillips, former Coordinator of the Matt Armstrong. Bureau of International Information Programs; Daniel Kimmage of the Global Additionally, we wish to thank the Engagement Center; the Bureau of Global dedicated public diplomacy officers and Public Affairs, its Research and Analytics locally employed staff at: team, especially Brittany DiPaolo; Brian Heath and Andy Loomis of the Office of U.S. embassies in Budapest (Diana Sitt), Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Helsinki (Bill Couch), Reykjavik (Oscar Under Secretariat of State for Public Avila), Riga (Chad Twitty), and Tbilisi Diplomacy and Public Affairs; and Rick (Catherine Schweitzer). Ruth of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 3 We would also like to acknowledge the following host country officials and academic and policy experts for their invaluable insights. Budapest, Hungary: Political Capital— Reykjavik, Iceland: Silja Bara Omarsdottir, Péter Krekó, Executive Director, and University of Iceland Institute for Lóránt Győri, Geopolitical Analyst; International Affairs; Maria Mjoll Jonsdottir, Nézőpont Institute’s Media Observer Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and Elfa Yr Center—Levente Bánk Boros; Mérték Gylfadottir, Director, Media Commission. Media Monitor—Gábor Polyák; Center for Media, Data and Society at the Central Tbilisi, Georgia: Ekaterine Metreveli, European University—Marius Dragomir, Director, Georgian Foundation of Director, and Éva Bognár, Senior Program Strategic and International Studies; Officer; National Public Service University Tamar Kintsurashvili, Executive Director, representatives; and the Heti Világgazdaság Media Development Foundation; Maia (HVG) editorial team. Mikashavidze, Georgian Institute for Public Affairs; Ramaz Aptsiauri, United Riga, Latvia: Ministry of Culture—Zane Nations Association of Georgia; and Vāgnere, Deputy State Secretary, Andris Giorgi Goguadz, Director, Georgian Mellakauls, Head of Information Space Center for Strategy and Development. Integration Division, and Klinta Locmele, Media Policy Department; Viktors Makarovs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Janis Sarts, Director, NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence. Helsinki, Finland: Jussi Toivanen, Chief Communications Specialist, Government Communications; and staff members at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 4 Public Diplomacy and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY United States government Public Beginning in 2016, the U.S. government Diplomacy (PD) efforts are increasingly (USG) made a concerted effort to adjust challenged by a sophisticated array its resources in order to counter the of technology-enabled, information- resurgent threat of disinformation. At first, based threats. Disinformation, or the the response was uncoordinated, with manipulation and dissemination of many actors responding independently information to adversely influence public based on their policy focus. However, perceptions and behaviors, has emerged with the passage of the 2017 National as a major destabilizing force in the global Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which information space. These sophisticated created the Global Engagement Center threats weaken state credibility, (GEC), a coordinated effort to counter perpetuate destabilizing narratives about disinformation effects began to take national identity and values, and, most shape. In addition to the GEC’s mandate dangerously, erode public confidence in to support and coordinate USG counter democratic institutions. malign influence efforts, the Department of State acquired new technical capabilities The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public for the monitoring of disinformation and Diplomacy’s (ACPD) May 2017 special dissemination of targeted messaging. report Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? examined aspects of the Legacy State Department public diplomacy disinformation threat and the implications bureaus, such as Educational and Cultural for the future of public diplomacy Affairs (ECA), acquired new vehicles for programming. One danger featured in the funding and programming against state- report—state-sponsored disinformation— sponsored disinformation. Meanwhile, the remains a particular concern. This report Department of State merged the Bureau assesses recent Department of State and of International Information Programs U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) (IIP) and the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), efforts to counter this growing threat. creating the Bureau of Global Public Affairs (GPA) to actively increase engagement in the global online conversation. Finally, as part of its rebranding effort, the U.S. Agency for Global Media launched an ambitious series of counter disinformation program initiatives, incorporating new technologies while building on existing infrastructure. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 5 It is clear that there already is a Actors…with equities considerable amount of interagency activity focused on countering state- in countering the sponsored disinformation (CSD). However, as new workflows and authorities are disinformation threat established to support existing resources, actors (offices, bureaus or agencies, field are increasingly siloed, posts, etc.) with equities in countering the disinformation threat are increasingly reporting on their siloed, reporting on their activities through narrow bureaucratic channels. activities through narrow This atomization of effort not only mitigates against a coordinated response bureaucratic channels. but limits a broader understanding of