I

SEPTEMBER 2020 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW “OLD” WAR: COUNTERING STATE-SPONSORED DISINFORMATION

U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

Co-Authors:

Vivian S. Walker Executive Director U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

Ryan E. Walsh Senior Advisor Bureau of Global Public Affairs Department of State

Contributing Editor: Shawn Baxter Senior Advisor U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy TABLE of CONTENTS

1 Transmittal Letter

2 Acknowledgements

4 Executive Summary

6 Recommendations

9 Structure, Methodology, and Key Terms

11 Part I: CSD Program Origins and Background

26 Part II: CSD Program Review and Diagnostic

39 Part III: CSD in the Field: Program Implementation and Impacts

54 Conclusion

58 Author Biographies to THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, SECRETARY of STATE AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:

The United States Advisory weaken state credibility, perpetuate Commission on Public Diplomacy destabilizing narratives about (ACPD), reauthorized pursuant to national identity and values, and, Public Law 114-323, hereby submits most dangerously, erode public this special report, Public Diplomacy confidence in democratic institutions. and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation. The ACPD’s May 2017 special report Can Public Diplomacy Survive The ACPD is a bipartisan panel the Internet? examined aspects of created by Congress in 1948 to the disinformation threat and the appraise all U.S. government efforts implications for the future of public to understand, inform, and influence diplomacy programming. One danger foreign publics. The Commission featured in the 2017 report—state- makes recommendations to improve sponsored disinformation—remains the Public Diplomacy (PD) functions a particular concern. In addition vested in U.S. government entities to assessing recent Department of such as the Department of State, the State and U.S. Agency for Global U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Media efforts to counter this growing other interagency partners. threat, this report offers a set of recommendations that balance U.S. government public diplomacy longer-term resilience and capacity efforts are increasingly challenged by building measures with shorter time a sophisticated array of technology- horizon initiatives such as deterrence enabled, information-based threats. and messaging. Disinformation, or the manipulation and dissemination of information We greatly appreciate the skill and to adversely influence public dedication of public diplomacy perceptions and behaviors, has practitioners at home and abroad emerged as a major destabilizing who serve on the front lines of the force in the global information geostrategic competition for influence space. These sophisticated threats in the global information space.

Respectfully Submitted,

Sim Farar William J. Hybl Anne Wedner Chairman Vice Chairman (Illinois) (California) (Colorado) 1 SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication benefited enormously from expertise provided by an outstanding group of public diplomacy practitioners, policymakers, researchers, and scholars.

The authors would like to extend special We also extend our thanks to other key thanks to the following individuals and elements of the wider public diplomacy institutions: community such as:

Former acting ACPD Executive Director The U.S. Agency for Global Media, Ambassador Jeff Daigle; current and especially Shawn Powers and Olga former members of the State Department Stefanou, and external experts including public diplomacy community, including Graham Brookie of the Digital Forensics Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy Research Lab (Atlantic Council); Bret and Public Affairs Ambassador Bruce Schafer of the Alliance for Securing Wharton and Richard Stengel; Macon Democracy (German Marshall Fund); and Phillips, former Coordinator of the Matt Armstrong. Bureau of International Information Programs; Daniel Kimmage of the Global Additionally, we wish to thank the Engagement Center; the Bureau of Global dedicated public diplomacy officers and Public Affairs, its Research and Analytics locally employed staff at: team, especially Brittany DiPaolo; Brian Heath and Andy Loomis of the Office of U.S. embassies in Budapest (Diana Sitt), Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Helsinki (Bill Couch), Reykjavik (Oscar Under Secretariat of State for Public Avila), Riga (Chad Twitty), and Tbilisi Diplomacy and Public Affairs; and Rick (Catherine Schweitzer). Ruth of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 3

We would also like to acknowledge the following host country officials and academic and policy experts for their invaluable insights.

Budapest, Hungary: Political Capital— Reykjavik, Iceland: Silja Bara Omarsdottir, Péter Krekó, Executive Director, and University of Iceland Institute for Lóránt Győri, Geopolitical Analyst; International Affairs; Maria Mjoll Jonsdottir, Nézőpont Institute’s Media Observer Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and Elfa Yr Center—Levente Bánk Boros; Mérték Gylfadottir, Director, Media Commission. Media Monitor—Gábor Polyák; Center for Media, Data and Society at the Central Tbilisi, Georgia: Ekaterine Metreveli, European University—Marius Dragomir, Director, Georgian Foundation of Director, and Éva Bognár, Senior Program Strategic and International Studies; Officer; National Public Service University Tamar Kintsurashvili, Executive Director, representatives; and the Heti Világgazdaság Media Development Foundation; Maia (HVG) editorial team. Mikashavidze, Georgian Institute for Public Affairs; Ramaz Aptsiauri, United Riga, Latvia: Ministry of Culture—Zane Nations Association of Georgia; and Vāgnere, Deputy State Secretary, Andris Giorgi Goguadz, Director, Georgian Mellakauls, Head of Information Space Center for Strategy and Development. Integration Division, and Klinta Locmele, Media Policy Department; Viktors Makarovs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Janis Sarts, Director, NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence. Helsinki, Finland: Jussi Toivanen, Chief Communications Specialist, Government Communications; and staff members at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 4

Public Diplomacy and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

United States government Public Beginning in 2016, the U.S. government Diplomacy (PD) efforts are increasingly (USG) made a concerted effort to adjust challenged by a sophisticated array its resources in order to counter the of technology-enabled, information- resurgent threat of disinformation. At first, based threats. Disinformation, or the the response was uncoordinated, with manipulation and dissemination of many actors responding independently information to adversely influence public based on their policy focus. However, perceptions and behaviors, has emerged with the passage of the 2017 National as a major destabilizing force in the global Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which information space. These sophisticated created the Global Engagement Center threats weaken state credibility, (GEC), a coordinated effort to counter perpetuate destabilizing narratives about disinformation effects began to take national identity and values, and, most shape. In addition to the GEC’s mandate dangerously, erode public confidence in to support and coordinate USG counter democratic institutions. malign influence efforts, the Department of State acquired new technical capabilities The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public for the monitoring of disinformation and Diplomacy’s (ACPD) May 2017 special dissemination of targeted messaging. report Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? examined aspects of the Legacy State Department public diplomacy disinformation threat and the implications bureaus, such as Educational and Cultural for the future of public diplomacy Affairs (ECA), acquired new vehicles for programming. One danger featured in the funding and programming against state- report—state-sponsored disinformation— sponsored disinformation. Meanwhile, the remains a particular concern. This report Department of State merged the Bureau assesses recent Department of State and of International Information Programs U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) (IIP) and the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), efforts to counter this growing threat. creating the Bureau of Global Public Affairs (GPA) to actively increase engagement in the global online conversation. Finally, as part of its rebranding effort, the U.S. Agency for Global Media launched an ambitious series of counter disinformation program initiatives, incorporating new technologies while building on existing infrastructure. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 5

It is clear that there already is a Actors…with equities considerable amount of interagency activity focused on countering state- in countering the sponsored disinformation (CSD). However, as new workflows and authorities are disinformation threat established to support existing resources, actors (offices, bureaus or agencies, field are increasingly siloed, posts, etc.) with equities in countering the disinformation threat are increasingly reporting on their siloed, reporting on their activities through narrow bureaucratic channels. activities through narrow This atomization of effort not only mitigates against a coordinated response bureaucratic channels. but limits a broader understanding of how USG PD treats this issue overall, a deficit this special report intends to address. In addition to offering a unique diagnostic assessment of recent PD efforts to address the CSD threat, our report assesses program coordination and resource distribution. Our report also provides select U.S. embassy and host country perspectives on CSD program implementation and effects. Below we present our key recommendations based on the findings detailed in this report. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

1 DEFINE. 2 INVEST. Define the CSD challenge with Invest more in digital a Department-wide lexicon of capabilities, but not at the disinformation. expense of long-term person-to- person initiatives. A simple Google search turns up hundreds of ways to describe aspects of malign Everyone the ACPD interviewed concurred influence operations: misinformation, that the U.S. government has not yet disinformation, propaganda, information marshalled enough resources to combat operations, and psychological operations, this already complex and evolving threat. to name just a few. This lack of consensus More investment is required in the on basic terms creates vulnerabilities for identification and development of digital internal bureau, agency, or institutional tools. Because these new tools produce efforts, as well as significant challenges to an intensive competition for resources to interagency or joint operations. Without develop and implement them, we must agreed-upon definitions, it is hard to come also be able to identify which of them are to a shared understanding of the threat, to the most cost effective and produce the define a set of common strategic objectives, greatest impact relative to the investment or to concur on desired outcomes. It is in money and personnel. At the same time, also difficult to assess impact and define now is not the moment to abandon the success—or failure—when a number of proverbial last three feet. It is absolutely distinct and even competing definitions necessary to step up existing educational are in play. Moreover, competing exchange and training programs that focus definitions that fall along internal bureau on building resilience to disinformation and division lines discourage the creation effects through media literacy, capacity of Department-wide CSD initiatives. building, and content support for local Reliable deterrence measures begin independent media outlets and successor with the establishment of a lexicon of generation outreach initiatives. disinformation—a generally agreed-upon set of related terms and definitions. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 7

3 COMPETE. 4 SPECIALIZE. Compete in the information Create a job series for mid-career space by restructuring CSD specialists. overseas PD sections with We need professional expertise to support teams dedicated to modern effective engagement in the digital space, digital communications. particularly at the field level. As one interviewee told us candidly, “A lot of The private sector learned long ago that people understand what the problem is, online brand and image management but not a lot of people know what to do was not only a critical component of about it. We need a cadre of specialists.” overall marketing activities, but also that it We recommend the recruitment of mid- requires a full-time staff of specialized team career PD FSOs with expertise unlikely to be members. PD sections at USG posts should acquired through the existing avenues of be no different in that regard. However, government recruitment. We also suggest public diplomacy officers and their staffs the formation of a forward-deployed are tasked with managing a full suite of PD information specialist intake program. activities in addition to overseeing digital Given the rapid pace of change, the talent programming and outreach requirements. pool should be frequently refreshed. Further, sensitivities around host governments and/or shared adversaries complicate attempts at active messaging in the digital media space. The ongoing PD Staffing Initiative being led by the Under Secretary for PD’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR), part of a larger PD modernization effort that aims to update many of the tools and structures on which PD teams rely in the field, is a step in the right direction, but the pace should be stepped up to better face these digital threats. Front-line PD practitioners must have the capacity to keep up with constantly evolving malign influence operations. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 8

5 EXPERIMENT. 6 EVALUATE. Develop mechanisms to rapidly Evaluate, monitor, and assess redirect funding to seed the impact of CSD programs. programs and allow them to This ACPD report is the first attempt at scale or fail—fast. a broad examination of USG PD CSD programming. However, more needs to A culture of risk aversion must be be done to identify gaps in programming overcome to make meaningful in order to adjust resources to meet improvements. Many PD programs, once emergent needs – particularly in the established, exist for many years after rapidly evolving digital space. With respect they are developed. Given that programs to internal reviews, R/PPR should monitor conceived today are maintained through all CSD programs by a budgetary funding multiple assignment-driven personnel code in order to assure accurate tracking shifts, the programming is likely to fall of expenditures. Meanwhile, to monitor behind the pace of technological change. breadth and efficiency of CSD program Yet, practitioners in the digital space coverage, GEC should take the lead in improve mainly by iterative programming; identifying strategic programming gaps in they learn what can be achieved through priority regions. rapid implementation of the best available resources and information. Funding for Additionally, we recommend an external programming should be merit-based strategic review of CSD programming. and independently verified to ensure it is In the last decade the number of State modern and effective. Department initiatives to counter state- sponsored disinformation and malign influence strategies has increased exponentially. The proliferation of these programs risks the imposition of undue administrative burdens on already overstretched Public Affairs Sections (PAS) in the field. It also risks duplication of effort and inefficient resource distribution. An external historical overview of CSD program lessons learned and best practices would not only serve to minimize program inefficiencies but could also establish a baseline for future efforts to measure disinformation impact and effects. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 9

STRUCTURE, METHODOLOGY AND KEY TERMS

Part I of this report represents the unclassified cable traffic beginning in 2009 culmination of a year of research (2019- to gauge for shifts in PD priorities; we 2020) on one of the leading foreign policy analyzed Integrated Country Strategies, challenges of our time: how the U.S. Joint Regional Strategies, and Functional government (USG) currently approaches Bureau Strategies for mentions of counter- the public diplomacy aspect of countering disinformation; we consulted a database state-sponsored disinformation.1 To that tracks PD activities called the Mission define the parameters of the problem, the Activity Tracker for background; and, ACPD conducted a number of interviews perhaps most importantly, the ACPD with key stakeholders including, but not conducted a joint data call with the GEC limited to, those currently responsible in which all U.S. missions were requested for leading and/or implementing CSD to report on two years of CSD activities. initiatives, current and former officials, Other inputs originated from data directly relevant subject matter experts, authors, shared with us by the relevant teams. and academics—at home and abroad. We also performed an independent literature Part III of this report, structured as a review of the most influential academic series of mini-case studies, examines studies on the subject, as identified by field-focused efforts to counter Russian practitioners and experts themselves. Federation-sponsored disinformation strategies in Europe. Beginning with an While this report draws from thought overview of current political, social, and leaders inside and outside government, economic vulnerabilities to disinformation, this has not been solely an academic the report then addresses country-specific exercise; the bulk of the input was national and institutional experiences of collected from practitioners themselves, in and responses to disinformation effects. Washington and the field, as well as from These insights are based on in-depth implementers and partners of the wider conversations held with U.S. embassy USG public diplomacy community. Instead officers administering local public of limiting the discussion by preemptively defining the term “disinformation,” the data collection process required various actors and implementers to outline what they considered an activity principally designed to achieve CSD goals. Part II of this report offers a quantitative assessment of CSD programming based on several original data sets. We examined SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 10

diplomacy and civil society development ƒ Public diplomacy. The wider scope of programs as well as host country USG capabilities and tools in countering government, NGO, academic, and media malign influence activities, or their role representatives with a stake in the effort in hybrid warfare, are not included. to mitigate the destabilizing potential of malign influence strategies. The report ƒ Foreign activities. While discussions also provides brief synopses of CSD of disinformation often get conflated operations in Public Affairs Sections at with domestic issues, public diplomacy U.S. embassies in Iceland, Finland, Latvia, as a discipline, the ACPD as a federal Hungary, and Georgia. commission, and this report exclusively focus on activities that take place There are several procedural and outside of the United States. definitional issues that should be noted prior to any discussion of the findings ƒ State-sponsored. This paper focuses outlined in this report. First, this report on state-sponsored disinformation only covers those aspects of CSD threats rather than individuals or non- programming which fall under the purview state groups acting, knowingly or not, to of public diplomacy. For the purposes of spread false or misleading information. this report, public diplomacy is defined Given the scope and fast-changing nature as official State Department efforts to of the issue, this report does not attempt inform and influence foreign audiences to cover the full range of USG programs to promote the U.S. national interest and and activities to counter state-sponsored advance key foreign policy goals. This is disinformation, such as those carried an important distinction, as nothing in this out by the U.S. Agency for International report will include other aspects of a non- Development or the National Endowment PD nature, unclassified or otherwise. for Democracy. Instead, it offers a baseline Second, the term “disinformation” can be representation of key initiatives in order to used rather freely as a catch-all. However, set the stage for a conversation about the professionals in this space are quick to way forward. To frame this conversation, acknowledge that in a practical sense, this report provides indicators to “disinformation” as we know it is not a facilitate program assessment and lay the distinct threat area. Rather it is actually foundation for new initiatives. a subset of a larger range of adversarial activities designed to disrupt and weaken opponents, which are commonly known as “malign influence operations.” These operations usually can include other activities such as dark financing, which have little to do with public diplomacy. As such, any findings in this report should be understood as intentionally limited to: SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 11

PART I: CSD PROGRAM ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND

Cold War Redux

As we gathered background information foreign affairs agency. Its information, for this report, we noticed a pattern: cultural, and exchange components were experts and practitioners alike became integrated into the Department of State as, quick to turn to the past for cues on respectively, the Bureau of International how to proceed in the future. In fact, the Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau discussion of the historical framework of of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). disinformation as a threat area revealed a Meanwhile, oversight of USIA's regional common understanding that the challenge programs was turned over to the State of disinformation is “not new.” Several of Department’s geographic bureaus. USIA’s our interlocutors spoke reverently of the broadcasting components became part tools of the Cold War and cited the merits of the Broadcasting Board of Governors of the United States Information Agency (BBG–now the U.S. Agency for Global (USIA), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Media, or USAGM). The AMWG was formally Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and, most disbanded in 1992 with no heir apparent; notably, the Active Measures Working and at the BBG, the establishment of an Group (AMWG) as successful instruments independent board of directors removed of PD in countering disinformation.2 direct USG editorial oversight and created However, these experts agreed that they a firewall between Congress and the might be over-emphasizing the similarities independent journalism operations within between the disinformation threat then the VOA and RFE/RL. and now, while perhaps unintentionally underestimating the differences. In addition to the structural changes that have occurred since the integration of Much of the apparatus that supported USIA functions into the Department of Cold War-era counter disinformation State, the rapid convergence of connection efforts still exists today, albeit in a technologies -- the internet, mobile and somewhat disaggregated form. In 1999, social networks -- have fundamentally USIA closed down as an independent altered the domain in which information SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 12

competition occurs. About half of the 2011, new policies were established that world’s population has access to one encouraged State Department officials another via the combination of internet and to establish online profiles and pages social media access and mobile phones, with the intent to amplify public affairs which allow for disintermediated peer-to- messaging through these increasingly peer communication at scale. The global influential mediums. information space is marked by a constant fight for attention, and viewership is However, constrained by bureaucratic determined by complex interactions among inertia and, perhaps, overconfident that algorithms, professional media outlets, “traditional” public diplomacy measures corporate brands, and user generated transposed to the online space (i.e., press content via apps on mobile devices. releases, photos from speaking events and conferences, etc.) would have the intended As a consequence, modern public effect, innovation on USG social media diplomacy practitioners find themselves platforms largely stopped there. While in an environment that offers an these official Department social media overabundance of information—what accounts now number in the hundreds, Joseph Nye presciently described as a most PD officials agree that for a number “paradox of plenty” that leads to a “scarcity of reasons, including but not limited to the of attention.”3 This shift has irrevocably risk aversion that arises from engaging in changed the information environment in an often-frenetic online environment, the which PD officers operate, and it gives an overall impact remained relatively muted. asymmetric advantage to those who would attempt to alter, obscure, or destroy the With the intensification of Russian very concept of objective truth. disinformation efforts following Ukraine’s

An overabundance of information…has irrevocably changed the information environment in which PD officers operate, and it gives an asymmetric advantage to those who would attempt to alter, obscure, or destroy the very concept of objective truth.

Initial efforts to meet the most recent “revolution of dignity” and the subsequent iteration of these challenges began in annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became the 2010s, during a period of what some increasingly clear that the social media have described as U.S. government space had become, in effect, the front “overexuberance” about the ability of line in a new global competition for emerging social media technologies influence. Shortly thereafter, the threat of to advance democratic values. By the disinformation expanded far beyond the time the Arab Spring began to unfold in borders of Eastern Europe to become the SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 13

subject of intense focus from Washington, Recognizing a Resurgent State- D.C. to the Silicon Valley. The 2017 National Security Strategy included a section on Sponsored Disinformation Threat: Information Statecraft warning about the 2016-2017 exploitation of “marketing techniques.”4 Meanwhile, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg In the early stages of Russia’s attacks described efforts to combat disinformation on Ukraine’s integrity in the global on his platform as an “arms race,”5 and information space, the State Department’s Apple CEO Tim Cook warned that personal Bureau of European and Eurasian data was being “weaponized against us with Affairs (EUR) developed a nascent set military efficiency.”6 To paraphrase Peter W. of counter-disinformation tactics. But Singer, whose 2019 book LikeWar7 explored formal and far reaching alterations to this phenomenon in depth, tech executives PD CSD infrastructure originated with were starting to sound more like national the passage of the May 2016 Countering security experts, and national security Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation experts were starting to sound more like Act, which became a part of the 2017 tech executives. NDAA. The first legislation tasking an official lead in government-wide counter- disinformation efforts since the Cold War, the NDAA signaled that the USG once again recognized disinformation as a high-priority threat that warranted immediate action. The State Department’s GEC, established by Executive Order in March 2016, became the prime vehicle for CSD. It was originally envisioned as a mechanism to counter violent extremist (CVE) messaging and “foreign propaganda and disinformation” operations. However, the 2017 NDAA further charged the GEC with coordination With the intensification of Russian and building capacities across the interagency as well as private sector disinformation efforts following partners and allies to combat state and Ukraine’s “revolution of dignity” non-state disinformation campaigns. The and the subsequent annexation 2017 National Security Strategy crystalized the consensus that counter-disinformation of Crimea in 2014, it became work represented a key strategic priority, increasingly clear that the social noting that: media space had become, in America’s competitors weaponize effect, the front line in a new information to attack the values and institutions that underpin free societies, global competition for influence. while shielding themselves from outside information. They exploit marketing SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 14

techniques to target individuals reporting on disinformation themes, or based upon their activities, interests, organizing conferences or speakers that opinions, and values. They disseminate would generate awareness of the threat. misinformation and propaganda. Risks to U.S. national security will grow as Initial progress throughout 2017, competitors integrate information derived therefore, remained mixed. Those from personal and commercial sources interviewed by the ACPD described an with intelligence collection and data increasing awareness of the disinformation analytic capabilities based on Artificial threat through targeted educational, Intelligence (AI) and machine learning.8 training, and outreach programs. However, they also outlined challenges – most As a consequence of the NDAA and the notably, competing definitions about National Security Strategy, a number of what constituted “disinformation,” and an PD officers began to report back up the ongoing debate about what, if any, the U.S. chain on disinformation threats in their government’s role be in combatting it. regions. This new attention on the threat had a near immediate impact: cable traffic As such, in the earliest days after the formal with the keyword “disinformation” at the establishment of the GEC, few agreed State Department shows a 300 percent on what could or should be deployed to increase in the number of cables between counter disinformation. Moreover, the GEC, 2017 and 2019; and a ten-fold increase in its previous incarnation as the Center for in average monthly cable traffic between Strategic Counterterrorism Communication 2015 (8) and 2019 (81.5).9 (CSCC), focused exclusively on efforts to counter violent extremism. The GEC and its However, this activity focused largely staff had to figure out how to transition to its on generating awareness of the threat, new disinformation mandate using resources, rather than proposing or conducting processes, and programmatic structures actual responses to it. In 2017, 262 cables originally designated for its CVE mission. were sent mentioning disinformation, but few represented a concrete initiative The nascent GEC also encountered several or deliverable aimed at addressing the structural barriers to effective execution challenge. Instead, most focused on of its mandate, some of which were

USG CSD efforts from 2016 to 2017 were generally more consumed with assessing and preparing to meet the resurgent state-sponsored disinformation threat, rather than actively engaging it. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 15

entirely outside of the control of GEC Meanwhile, other elements of the leadership. First, the GEC launched in the wider public diplomacy community midst of a year-long State Department- began to seriously engage on counter wide hiring freeze, which complicated disinformation efforts. The BBG (USAGM), the recruitment and staffing of those for example, prepared to launch its dedicated to the CSD mandate. This was first new Russian-language satellite TV followed by a funding freeze that delayed and digital network Current Time, in the disbursement of the congressionally February 2017. Concurrently, VOA and allocated funding for GEC’s CSD effort. RFE/RL launched the English and Russian- Additionally, the absence of a permanent, language fact-checking websites— confirmed Under Secretary for Public Polygraph (2016) and Factograph (2017), Diplomacy and Public Affairs (“R”) for respectively—to identify and report false much of 2017-2018 meant that there was or misleading information. Despite this effectively no senior Department official new emphasis across the interagency, to vouch for the GEC at a critical time for however, USG CSD efforts from 2016 to the roll out of its mandate. Finally, the 2017 were generally more consumed proposed Department-wide “redesign” of with assessing and preparing to meet the 2017 raised questions about future roles resurgent state-sponsored disinformation and responsibilities of teams across the threat, rather than actively engaging it. Department—to include the GEC. Additional complications in the GEC’s first year included those associated with structural transitions, such as the legal and operational restructuring of existing offices and roles to meet the new mandate, the establishment of new vehicles for contracting and resource acquisition, and the development of new working relationships and mechanisms with partner bureaus, the field, and the interagency. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 16

Establishing CSD Priorities: supported ECA’s people-to people initiatives by making its existing programs such as the 2018 - Present Speakers Program, American Spaces, Youth Networks, and Tech Camps available to Reinvesting in Long Term, posts that requested CSD support. People-to-People Engagement Beyond the strategic rationale for pursuing In 2018, after about a year of assessment this initial CSD posture, there was another and preparation, activity began to ramp reason why IIP and ECA programs were up considerably at the State Department so widely mobilized in response to the with the finalization and funding of CSD state-sponsored disinformation threat: proposals. Initially, much of the activity they already represented some of the involved PD programming focused on most well-understood and successful PD long-term people-to-people engagement. programs in the Department. Moreover, ECA and, to a lesser degree, IIP – now part many PD officers in the field had already of the GPA – supported post-led initiatives done a rotation through IIP or ECA, and such as workshops, exchanges, educational virtually all had been briefed on their seminars, and speakers programs. capabilities before deployment to their overseas assignments. As a result, these In July 2018, ECA took a big step forward programs were among the most easily in adjusting its programming specifically accessible to the field and relatively ready for CSD purposes when it was awarded to transform and deploy quickly to boost a $12 million package to increase posts’ CSD footprint. programming designed to counter Russian disinformation effects in the post-Soviet Acquiring and Developing New Tools space. These new programs included and Techniques a focus on improving media literacy, to include English language instruction The initial deployment of IIP and ECA with a media literacy component, resources in support of CSD initiatives capacity building and content support followed long-established procedural for local independent media outlets, and programmatic precedents. However, cross-sectoral professional training and growing awareness of the digital nature network development, and new successor of disinformation activities, enabled and generation outreach initiatives. empowered by big data and analytics, To prepare for an organized disbursement prompted internal efforts to update PD of these funds, ECA initiated a collaborative tools and techniques to meet emerging process in which it solicited input from other threats in the global information key stakeholders, including the GEC, the space. Initial attempts were made to Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, identify every office or bureau with a the Bureau of South Central Asian Affairs stake in the response to computational (SCA), public affairs sections in the field, propaganda, defined as a powerful and interagency partners. Though not a weapon for spreading disinformation recipient of supplemental funding, IIP also SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 17

To be effective in this new threat environment, CSD program content and implementation would have to be synchronized across the board. No longer could affected bureaus and offices work in an independent, ad hoc manner on issues specific to separate regional and functional priorities.

that encompasses the now-familiar be useful in elevating the issue to more phenomenon of “bots” and “trolls.” Steps senior officials and generating a genuinely were also taken to identify programmatic collaborative interagency conversation. vulnerabilities to computational propaganda and establish a basic In the first half of 2018, IIP started to nomenclature to facilitate collaborative scale its analytics effort to meet emerging responses. Finally, efforts were made to digital challenges. Initially made up of just address the increasingly siloed nature of a handful of analysts handling ad-hoc questions on social media engagement, CSD programming within the Department the team began to field a stream of queries of State. on issues ranging from digital marketing to strategic planning, measurement, focus Most significant, however, was the groups, and a wider array of consultative recognition that to be effective in this new services. Many of the requests touched threat environment, CSD program content on the topic of disinformation. To meet and implementation would have to be these rapidly growing challenges to the synchronized across the board. No longer effectiveness of PD programming, the could affected bureaus and offices work in Office of Analytics expanded, adding an independent, ad hoc manner on issues specialized personnel and acquiring new specific to separate regional and functional tools and technologies to better understand priorities, especially given the need to and engage in digital information maximize program efficiencies and reduce environments. The team also began the risk of compartmentalization. As to coordinate with content producers, awareness of the digital threat grew across helping meaningful content reach priority the Department, DOS bureaus and other audiences. By the end of 2018, IIP’s new analytics team had grown significantly, USG agencies including the GEC, IIP, and incorporating several dozen specialists to the BBG (USAGM) rapidly began to build cover major aspects of both behavioral new teams with capabilities that could and information science disciplines. About soon be deployed at scale. The early effort half of IIP’s analytics requests supported to identify and describe roles in countering the GEC’s nascent counter-disinformation digital disinformation also proved to initiatives during this time. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 18

Concurrently, the GEC was working to to identify vulnerabilities and needs, and secure new resources and personnel to synchronize and deconflict programs that would enable it to fulfill its mandate and other efforts. In 2019, in addition as coordinating mechanism and “force to its continuing focus on Europe, the multiplier” of U.S. government and partner Russia Team expanded its programming, efforts to counter state and non-state particularly in Latin America. disinformation activities.10 In February 2018, the Department of State announced The China Team has designed a that it had reached an agreement with the global strategy to counter Chinese Department of Defense (DoD) to transfer a Communist Party (CCP) disinformation maximum of $40 million to the GEC to fund and propaganda efforts. This strategy “counter propaganda and disinformation aims to 1) boost understanding of CCP from foreign nations.”11 This became propaganda and disinformation to the GEC’s primary source of funding as promote informed decision making; 2) outlined in the 2017 NDAA. Although the build resilience to disinformation and initial amount transferred represented only propaganda with programs that develop half ($21.1 million) of the total requested, a more robust and more capable civil it was nonetheless critical to GEC’s efforts. society and media; and 3) support In FY2018, GEC’s CSD funding totaled $41.1 content development and amplification of million, meaning that 49 percent of its CSD positive USG messaging. The China team operations were dependent on DoD, but coordinates with the Bureau of East Asian they were wholly GEC-led and added a and Pacific Affairs, the Deputy Secretary’s significant new element to the Department office, and other State Department of State CSD programming mix.12 bureaus. The team also works closely with the interagency, including the DoD, and In May 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo international partners. lifted the Department-wide hiring freeze that had been in place since the GEC’s The Iran Team coordinates the U.S. establishment.13 In the second half of government’s interagency efforts to 2018, with funding from DoD acquired counter disinformation and propaganda and the DOS hiring freeze lifted, the GEC inside and outside of Iran, assisting finally began to take shape. First, the GEC partners to expose the Iranian regime restructured its offices into four threat- and ensure that partners have the latest based teams: 14 assessments and analytics to support USG interests. The Russia Team focuses on understanding, opposing, and degrading The Counterterrorism Team focuses Russia’s global implementation of on the expansion and integration of information confrontation through international, regional, and national leadership of policy, programmatic, and networks of partners who can assist in analytic efforts across the USG interagency rolling back the counterfactual narratives and with foreign partners. The team works of terrorist organizations and their with EUR, DoD’s European Command, affiliates, engage vulnerable audiences, and several foreign partner governments and deny the adversary’s recruitment SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 19

and radicalization objectives. The team centers, private companies, and academic identifies best practices for the innovation institutions. Proposals are solicited in four and rapid deployment of audience major thematic areas: analysis, grievance mapping, content generation, and monitoring and evaluation a. Support for foreign independent of impacts and other data analytics tools. media best placed to refute foreign disinformation in their own Next, GEC supported these teams through communities; establishing several lines of effort: b. The collection and storage of foreign The Analytics & Research (A&R) disinformation, misinformation, and Team uses quantitative analysis (with propaganda targeted at the U.S. and context-specific qualitative input) to its allies; provide actionable insight to address disinformation and propaganda and c. The analysis of and reporting on shape strategic communication efforts. the latest tactics, techniques, and A&R, which originated in 2018, is a multi- procedures of foreign information disciplinary team, including data scientists, warfare; and statisticians, intelligence analysts, strategic d. Support for other GEC activities. communications professionals, and geopolitical subject matter experts. Other major initiatives funded by the initial tranche of IAF funding in 2018 include The Information Access Fund (IAF), support for the study of disinformation established at the end of FY2018, using data mining and computational allows for an open, competitive grant analysis at major U.S. universities for the application process for outside public purpose of development of independent and private organizations interested in media abroad and the establishment of CSD activities. Applicants include civil fact checking organizations. society groups, media content providers, nongovernmental organizations, federally The Technology Engagement funded research and development Team (TET) originated in 2018 as an interagency group focused on the identification of technological solutions and the development of public-private partnerships in the fight against foreign propaganda and disinformation. Today, TET convenes technology experts and programmatic authorities from the public and private sectors to identify, assess, test, and implement technologies against the problems of foreign propaganda and disinformation, in cooperation with foreign partners, private industry, and academia. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 20

Its programs include the Washington- based Tech Demo Series, overseas Tech Challenges, a technology Testbed, and its information repository at Disinfo Cloud. Under the Policy, Plans and Operations Division (PPO), the International and Interagency Coordination Cell (I2C2) links interagency and international partners to accelerate responses to adversary propaganda and disinformation. The I2C2 is responsible for building and maintaining a network of interagency, international, private, civil society, tech industry, media, and private sector partners. It also includes a Network Engagement and Training Cell that cultivates partnerships with foreign civil society, advocacy, communications, and other networks to build on and leverage counter disinformation capabilities. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 21

Mobilizing and Deploying In addition to resource and programmatic challenges, one of the most significant Resources barriers to the successful implementation of CSD programming is the lack of From 2016 to 2018 the "R" family, including social media outreach expertise among the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources PD practitioners. The National Foreign (R/PPR), IIP, ECA and GEC, steadily pivoted Affairs Training Center (NFATC), home of toward new disinformation-focused PD the State Department's Foreign Service capabilities. However, the deployment Institute (FSI), has emerged as one of of these initiatives in the field took place the major stakeholders in mitigating the at the discretion of the regional bureaus, widening digital education gap. Over which, to this day, have the authority to the past few years, FSI, which prepares adjust resource allocations and program Public Diplomacy officers for deployment implementation to meet specific field to the field, has significantly revised its level needs, or account for constraints training modules to address the tools and imposed by local operating environments techniques required to function effectively and bilateral policy priorities. As a in the global information space. Former FSI consequence, approaches to countering PD Training Director Will Stevens described state-sponsored disinformation effects the need for change in 2017: have varied significantly from region to region and even post to post. When we talk about public diplomacy training, we need to talk about the While each regional bureau coordinates tectonic shifts that are happening in digital support for the field, EUR went a step influence environments all over the further, establishing a standing StratCom world…Instead of having sages tell unit in 2018. EUR StratCom served as old war stories, what we’re doing is a line of coordination with the field on we’re teaching people skills and then priority PD topics, including articulating immediately giving them a chance to try the bureau’s overall CSD posture and to apply them. Immediately having them goals. In 2018, StratCom tasked each practice and practice again and practice post in EUR to develop a custom CSD again in different environments, so that plan, and region-wide workshops were they have the chance to actually solidify held to generate awareness and discuss that knowledge…Twitter is different today best practices among embassy teams, than it was six months ago, much less, including PD officers. By mid-2018, most you didn’t even learn about Twitter when missions in Europe had formulated a CSD 15 you went to the FSI course on how to be strategy. As these CSD coordination a press officer a decade ago. So how do efforts gained traction within the regional I get that training to you in the field in bureaus and additional R family resources a way that helps you when you need it? became available, the range of new tools, And that means directly partnering with expertise, and capabilities began to expand. our colleagues in IIP, in ECA, making sure This marked the beginning of a period of that we’re getting [training] to people Department-wide experimentation with when they need it.16 approaches to CSD. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 22

Since 2017, FSI PD training has shifted to New Beginnings for Legacy focus on modules of data literacy, audience segmentation, landscape analysis, strategic PD Apparatus narrative development, measurement and evaluation, and program management. As By the end of 2018, new capabilities to recently as April 2020, FSI was conducting counter state-sponsored disinformation a needs assessment for developing a were established and implemented across course specifically to address foreign the Department and much of the wider disinformation and propaganda campaigns. PD community, and they would soon be supported by two high-profile changes to the legacy PD apparatus: the restructuring of When we talk about public USG broadcasting services into USAGM and diplomacy training, we the creation of GPA at the State Department. need to talk about the U.S. Agency for Global Media

tectonic shifts that are The USAGM has its institutional antecedents in the BBG, which was happening in influence established through the International environments all over the Broadcasting Act of 1994. Embedded within the USIA, the BBG supervised all non- world…Instead of having military broadcasting services, to include five full-scale, global media networks across sages tell old war stories, 100 countries, and produced programming what we’re doing is we’re in 61 languages. In 1999, the BBG became a standalone agency when USIA merged into teaching people skills and the Department of State. then immediately giving With a FY2018 budget of over $800 million and a full-time staff of more than 1,400, them a chance to try to the BBG was, historically, the single largest element of USG PD infrastructure. apply them. However, despite its scale and resources (and perhaps, in a sense, because of them) the BBG struggled to meet the challenges presented by the contemporary media environment. As a consequence, in an August 2018 tweet, BBG CEO John Lansing announced a formal organization-wide restructuring, complete with the re- naming of this legacy PD organization, citing a global media environment and “weaponized information” as a rationale: SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 23

The U.S. Agency for Global Media While this is encouraging and signals an [USAGM] is a modern media important shift toward more effective organization, operating far beyond communication in a complex media the traditional broadcast mediums environment, it still remains a relatively of television and radio to include small investment from such a large digital and mobile platforms. The term institution. Moreover, the vast majority of “broadcasting” does not accurately USAGM operations still rely on traditional describe what we do…USAGM is an broadcasting and radio formats. A 2019 independent federal agency that provides report19 commissioned by USAGM found, accurate, professional, and objective for example, that the Office of Cuba news and information around-the-globe Broadcasting (OCB)’s Radio and TV Marti in a time of shifting politics, challenging ineffectively engages Cuba’s emerging media landscapes, and weaponized youth population. Built for linear radio and information. Our identity and name will TV production, the OCB’s current operating now address these realities.17 structure and professional expertise remain fundamentally misaligned with To this end, the newly-renamed USAGM the informational needs and technological worked to develop the technological and sophistication of Cuba’s emerging and analytical capabilities now standard in a influential youth citizenry. The report modern, integrated news media operation. recommended a wholesale modernization For example, it began investing more in of the network, to include streamlining digital and mobile communications such as operations and relaunching as a digital short, shareable video content geared for first and agile news service to provide mobile consumption, and worked to build highly engaging content. out a nascent analytics capability with new digital media specialists. To implement While large scale change takes time, more data-driven decision making into the USAGM has made a concrete effort to overall workflow, a Chief Strategy Officer address state-sponsored disinformation. position was established. The 2017 launch of the Russian-language satellite and digital network Current Time Early signs of the transformation represents the most important of USAGM’s included the deployment of cloud-based CSD initiatives. According to USAGM, dashboards in the newsroom, which allow this joint effort by RFE/RL and VOA for real-time performance measurement. provides “Russian-speakers…with access USAGM reports that the re-focusing of to accurate, topical, and trustworthy efforts toward digital communications information,” and “serves as a reality check has yielded notable early results: views on disinformation that drives conflict in on YouTube for FY 2017 increased across the region.” Available via satellite and local the board, with RFE/RL reporting a 72 distributors in 20 countries (an additional percent increase in content viewed; Radio 15 countries carry specific programming), Free Asia’s Cantonese Service reported a the network is also, importantly, amplified 792 percent increase; and VOA reported by a digital division that engages audiences percentage gains in the “triple-digits” on through an internet-friendly content mix Facebook video engagement.18 SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 24

that includes short videos, longer-form digital environment has shown signs explainers, quizzes, and entertainment. of success. Continued experimentation with new technology and platforms has Since its launch, the Current Time network the potential to increase engagement has expanded rapidly, and USAGM directly with foreign audiences that reports that CT’s digital content – video may be otherwise susceptible to in particular – has been key in driving disinformation in a way that few other its growth. In 2018, digital video on the existing PD programs can replicate. As a network garnered 500 plus million views May 2020 USAGM report on countering online and across social media platforms; disinformation concludes, some very good one million plus followers across social progress has been made in recent years, media platforms; 900,000 plus followers but more can be done. Specifically, the on the network’s primary Facebook report recommends improving content page; and 600,000 plus subscribers on production to meet digital outlet best- YouTube. Perhaps most interestingly practices (i.e., user-generated content, live (and uniquely) for USAGM, Current streaming); leveraging distribution to reach Time’s digital platforms have acquired target populations on their preferred regular engagement from a key, growing devices/mediums; expanding cooperation demographic – a millennial-aged audience. with trusted local partners/messengers; According to data provided by USAGM, and expanding fact-checking efforts.22 45 percent of Current Time engagements are from users under 35 years of age, and Bureau of Global Public Affairs many are returning readers; the network averages of 160,000 daily engaged users The May 2019 formation of GPA occurred 20 on Facebook alone. in response to dramatic and accelerating However, there continue to be significant changes in the global information budgetary constraints. Even as USAGM environment, to include the malign made the transition to digitally-focused influence threat. The merger of PA and operations, Current Time operated on IIP was designed to permit more effective a $17 million budget--just two percent communication in the digital world, of USAGM’s then $800 million operating integrate existing capabilities, increase budget. Polygraph and Factograph, USAGM’s collaboration and impact, and deliver on fact-checking websites, have resources even Department communications objectives, smaller than that. By contrast, adversarial both foreign and domestic. The new outlets have had exponentially greater structure was intended to integrate the resources to draw from. For example, in communication of official Department 2017 the global media network Russia Today policies, previously the purview of PA, (RT) had an estimated operating budget of with creative, data-driven content and $323 million.21 storytelling around American values, as originally produced by IIP. Despite these challenges, the top-down re-imagining of how this sprawling, legacy As part of this merger, several entities PD organization can operate in the global from PA and IIP not aligned with the core SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 25

communications capability transitioned We know the news cycle is moving to other public diplomacy and training instantaneously, so we must work bureaus within the Department where quickly…to get our message out, to make they would be best optimized. The sure that the truth is out there before American Spaces, U.S. Speaker, and some counter-narratives from other folks TechCamps programs joined ECA to bring out there in the world…[We also need together people-to-people functions. to be effective in communicating] our Meanwhile, IIP’s regional and functional values over time.24 policy liaisons, judicial liaison, networks team, the ACPD Secretariat, and PA’s It remains to be seen whether the U.S. Diplomacy Center (renamed the configuration of information and outreach National Museum of American Diplomacy initiatives under the GPA will prove to in November 2019) staff moved to the R be more effective in countering malign Bureau's R/PPR to consolidate strategic influence effects than its institutional planning, capacity development, and predecessors. resource-to-policy alignment. Finally, the Office of the Historian joined the Foreign Service Institute to integrate the Department’s research initiatives and archival resources. Described as “the biggest structural change at the State Department in 20 years,” the new bureau was also intended to be “part of a broader effort to counter disinformation campaigns by Russia and China.”23 At an ACPD event in September 2019, former Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Michelle Giuda noted that the new bureau would be leveraging its new analytics capabilities in tandem with its messaging to monitor and pre-empt disinformation as it happens: SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 26

PART II: CSD PROGRAM REVIEW AND DIAGNOSTIC

To obtain a diagnostic overview of counter documents (2018); and a survey of field- state-backed disinformation activities based PD practitioners on “Countering across the USG PD community, the ACPD State-Sponsored Disinformation” ran three separate data collection efforts: (May 2019). Note that data tagged as a review of unclassified cables with the “regional” originates from posts in specific keyword “disinformation” (2009-2019); geographical regions rather than from the a keyword search of State Department Washington-based regional bureaus. country and functional bureau strategy

Dataset 1: Unclassified State Department Cable Traffic

Graph A: Number of Unclassified Cables Including the Keyword “Disinformation” by Year

Number of Unclassified Cables Including the The ACPD collected data Keyword “Disinformation” by Year on all unclassified State Department cables that mentioned the keyword 000 “disinformation” over the last eleven years. As Graph

00 A indicates, in 2009, the word “disinformation” was found just 13 times in

00 the entire calendar year (CY). From 2009 forward, the number of cables mentioning the word 00 increased by an average of 27 percent per year, with the largest single year jump 200 in cables between 2017 (262) and 2018 (825). That number increased again in 0 200 200 20 202 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 CY 2019, approaching nearly 1,000 cables. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 27

Graph B: EUR Proportion of DOS Unclassified Cables Including the Keyword "Disinformation" by Year

In recent years, cables originating in focus to the disinformation threat, and Europe and Eurasia (EUR) accounted EUR’s percentage began to decline as for a significant and growing proportion overall cable traffic on CSD increased. of overall cable traffic on the subject of As seen in Graph B, cable traffic from disinformation. Roughly tracking increased the other six regions mentioning the Russian activity in Eastern Ukraine and keyword “disinformation” surged by Syria, EUR cable traffic spiked from 13 over 700 percent between 2016 (52) and percent of total DOS unclassified cable 2019 (423). Meanwhile, the proportion of traffic mentioning “disinformation” in traffic originating in EUR that mentioned 2012 to a high of 72 percent in 2016. “disinformation” declined 13 percent over However, beginning in 2017, other that same period, from 72 percent in 2016 regions appeared to have turned their to 57 percent in 2019.

EUR Proportion of DOS Unclassified Cables Including the Keyword “Disinformation” by Year

1200 80%

70% 1000

60%

800 50%

40% 600

30%

400 EUR % of Total

20% Keyword “Disinformation” 200 10%

0 0% 200 200 20 202 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Overall Number of Unclassified Cables Including the

Total EUR % of Total SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 28

Graph C: Regional Breakdown of Unclassified DOS Cable Traffic Including the Keyword “Disinformation” in CY 2019 Perhaps indicating increased interest “Domestic” numbered only 11, but by from Washington, many of the non-EUR 2018, 85 domestic cables mentioned the cables mentioning disinformation did not keyword. As shown in Graph C, “Domestic” originate from the field and were labeled was second in overall traffic origin in 2019, as “Domestic” or Washington-origin behind EUR and ahead of East Asia and the traffic. In 2016, cable traffic including the Pacific (EAP). keyword “disinformation” and labeled

Regional Breakdown of Unclassified DOS Cable Traffic Including the Keyword “Disinformation” in CY 2019

SCA 3% WHA 6% AF 4% Regions

NEA 2% DOMESTIC AF: Africa 13% EAP: East Asia and the Pacific IO 5% EAP 7% EUR: Europe and Eurasia IO: International Organizations

NEA: Near East Asia

SCA: South and Central Asia WHA: Western Hemisphere

EUR 59% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 29

Graph D: Unclassified DOS Cable Traffic Including the Keywords “CVE” and “Disinformation” By Year The scale of the numbers suggests that Violent Extremism (CVE).” As Graph D in this period the Department of State demonstrates, the number of cables directed a historic amount of attention including the keyword “CVE” outnumbered at the global disinformation threat. For those including “disinformation,” but that context, we have compared the number gap has almost entirely closed. By the end of cables over the same eleven-year of CY 2019, “CVE” yielded 998 search hits, period with the theme “Countering while “disinformation” yielded 978.

Unclassified DOS Cable Traffic Including the Keywords “CVE” and “Disinformation” by Year

1500

1200

900

600 Number of Cables

300

0

200 200 20 202 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

“CVE” “Disinformation” SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 30

Dataset 2: 2018 Integrated Country Strategy and Functional Bureau Strategy Documents

Graph E: Regional Breakdown of ICS Including the Keyword “Disinformation” The ACPD ran keyword searches in all of several Regional Bureau Strategies were the 175 available 2018-2019 Integrated not available at the time of writing and Country Strategies (ICS), as well as 41 thus were not included in this dataset. available Functional Bureau Strategies. Working with available data, we found These DOS planning documents that most posts in EUR mentioned articulate U.S. strategic priorities in a counter disinformation programming given country, and for the Department’s as a priority in their respective country functional areas, such as arms control strategies, but that in other regions the or environmental policy. Unfortunately, numbers dropped significantly.

Regional Breakdown: Percentage of Available ICS 00 Including the Keyword “Disinformation”

0

0

0 2 0

20

0 0 E E E S the Pacific E

The ACPD also looked at 41 Functional time of writing. They were: PA; ECA; GEC; Bureau Strategies available for review. Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and Only five mentioned “disinformation” in Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. their most recent strategy document at the SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 31

Dataset 3: Post-Led Counter-Disinformation Activities

In May 2019, the ACPD partnered with the GEC to conduct a survey with field-based PD practitioners. In consultation with the ACPD, the GEC established the data call parameters. The data call requested that all posts worldwide provide data on USG CSD activities that met the following criteria:

ƒ The activity was unclassified; ƒ Post executed the program directly, obligated the funding, or initiated it with ƒ It was initiated between January a Washington bureau for support; and 2017 and May 2019 (the date the data call request was approved and ƒ It included any program that was disseminated); conducted regionally or in collaboration with other posts. ƒ Countering state-sponsored disinformation is/was the primary Additionally, the ACPD and GEC directed strategic purpose; posts to include only grant activities awarded directly by post.

Graph F: Post Responses to CSD Program Survey Sorted by Region

The ACPD received responses from 44 posts representing Post Responses to CSD Program Survey Sorted by Region 34 missions around the world, as shown in Graph WHA 7% AF 0% F. Out of a total of 166 missions worldwide listed at SCA 9% usembassy.gov at the time of publication, this reflected a mission response rate of EAP 25% about 20 percent. NEA 7%

Regions

AF: Africa EAP: East Asia and the Pacific EUR: Europe and Eurasia NEA: Near East Asia SCA: South and Central Asia WHA: Western Hemisphere EUR 52% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 32

Graph G: Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Origin of Disinformation Threat The missions that responded reported a an indistinct or unspecified threat actor: combined 367 individual CSD programs 17 percent reported “Multiple,” “General,” initiated in the preceding 27-month period. “None,” or “Other,” and 18 percent reported These responses, together with data “No Response.” This may indicate either a gleaned from relevant cable traffic and reluctance on behalf of a post to attribute the ICSs, indicated that most CSD activity their program to a specific threat actor, occurred at European posts. In fact, over 50 or the inability to narrow the program percent of the responding posts and nearly goal to focus on a specific disinformation two-thirds of the number of individual threat. In either case, this suggests that PD programs reported were in the EUR region. CSD programming has frequently been, by design or not, more generalized than Not surprisingly, given the disproportionate threat-specific. Another explanation for number of responses coming from low response rates in some regions could EUR posts, Graph G illustrates that be competing bureau definitions of malign activities directed at countering Russian influence activities, including disinformation. disinformation accounted for 52 percent of the programs reported in the data call. The second and third largest groups of responses—a combined 35 percent—had

Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Origin of Disinformation Threat

China No Response 10% Iran 18% 1% North Korea Violent 0% Extremism 2%

Russia Multiple/ 52% General/None/ Other 17% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 33

Graph H: Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Activity Type In the survey, posts were given a wide types represented more than two-thirds range of GEC-defined activity categories of programs reported: conferences (7 to report on. The results depicted in percent), exchanges (9 percent), speakers, Graph H show that various forms of (23 percent) and training events (28 direct person-to-person interaction of an percent). By comparison, activities that educational nature, such as exchanges occurred primarily in the digital space that or training workshops, were, by far, the had the potential to reach larger audiences most frequently reported type of program. comprised only 8 percent of the responses. Taken together, the following activity

Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Activity Type

Audience Research Conference Not Categorized 1% 7% 7% Digital or Social Media Outreach 8% Training or Diplomatic Workshop Engagement with 28% Host Government 1%

Exchanges 9%

Other External Speakers/ Communications Presentations/ (Interviews, etc.) Seminars/Webinars 8% 23%

Internal Staff or Other Processing Change 8% 0% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 34

Graph I: Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Primary Objective Posts were also given a menu of GEC- 5 percent promoted freedom of the press; defined program objectives to choose 14 percent aimed to “increase awareness from, as well as a write-in option. As shown of the disinformation” threat; and 14 in Graph I, these objectives were more percent addressed media or digital literacy. evenly dispersed compared to the other categories of the data call. However, a A comparatively small proportion of combined 75 percent of programs were programming—just 15 percent—was designed to support long-term capacity aimed at actively countering current building or resilience efforts: 9 percent narratives that were already impacting supported “professional investigative the information environment: 3 percent journalism”; 6 percent bolstered host promoted “positive truthful narratives” government capacity; 4 percent aimed to about the United States; 1 percent increase “public access to reliable media exposed specific actors/outlets; 5 percent content”; 14 percent supported “foreign shared “American experience in debunking audience resilience to disinformation”; 9 fake news”; and 6 percent countered percent encouraged critical thinking; specific messaging.

Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Primary Objective

Build Foreign Audience Other/No Response Resilience to Disinformation 10% 14% Support Professional Build Host Government Investigative Capacity to Counter Journalism Disinformation 9% 6% Counter Specific Share American Messaging Experience in 6% Digital/Media Literacy Promotion Encourage and Debunking Critical Thinking Fake News 9% 5% Encourage Freedom of the Press or Promote Positive Free Speech Truthful Narratives About the U.S. 5% 3% Expose Specific Actors/Outlets Increase Media or 1% Digital Literacy Increase Awareness of Increase Public Access to 14% Disinformation Threat Reliable Media Content 14% 4% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 35

Graph J: Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Target Audience The pie chart featured in Graph J indicates (24 percent), youth or students (24 a clear preference for CSD programming percent), or academics (11 percent). that builds resilience and capacity building Other key audiences include civil society through training and education—with organizations, professional organizations, a strong successor generation focus. and implementing partners who serve Posts reported that 59 percent of their to further promote and sustain counter programs were intended for journalists disinformation efforts.

Post-Reported CSD Programs Sorted by Target Audience

Academic, Think Tank or Other/No Response Research Communities 15% 11% Civil Society Organizations 6%

Students General or Youth Population of Populations Host Country 24% 14%

Host Nation Government 3%

Implementing Professional Partners in Groups or Country Accredited Bodies 1% 1% Journalists or Media Senior Citizens Professionals 1% 24% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 36

Graph K: Does Your Post Have Adequate Resources to Fight Disinformation? As the Graph K pie chart shows, a little this likely indicates that the responses more than half of the respondent posts above most aptly apply to posts that are indicated they had adequate funding already engaged in what they believe is for CSD activities, while 25 percent an effective strategy to counter state- indicated that they did not. Rather than backed disinformation. Conversely, a concluding that half of all posts considered significant proportion of posts that did themselves adequately prepared to not respond likely either did not have meet the state-sponsored disinformation CSD programming to report, and/or did threat, however, we believe this should not meet their own assessment that they be interpreted to contextualize the were adequately countering the state- previous response categories. Specifically, sponsored disinformation threat. since posts self-selected to respond,

Question: Does Your Post Have Adequate Resources to Fight Disinformation?

No Response Yes 52% 23%

No 25% SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 37

Diagnostic Summation It is clear that from 2016 to 2019 there was a significant increase in focus on efforts to counter state-sponsored disinformation Experts…agreed that activities across the USG PD community. the disinformation threat While at first the CSD response was relatively uneven and disjointed, by 2019 cannot be countered the sheer amount of focused attention through educational had, by some measures, even matched the post-9/11 focus on countering violent programs alone; the threat is extremism. This led to a significant increasingly digital in nature, restructuring of the largest USG PD entities in a very short period of time. Meanwhile, and accordingly, the PD the Department of State and USAGM introduced critical new technologies community should prioritize and skills to the PD mix to better mastery of the digital domain. meet the reemergent state-sponsored disinformation threat. In each of the datasets the ACPD analyzed (raw cable traffic, strategic planning documents, interviews, and a data call sent manipulation campaigns” in 70 countries – a significant increase over an earlier study to all posts), EUR represented an outsized 26 proportion of overall CSD activity.25 just two years prior that found just 28. Furthermore, these activities fell into a Additionally, most experts and several familiar, Cold War-inspired programmatic former senior PD officials interviewed for framework, including long-term this study agreed that the disinformation investments in education-related activities, threat cannot be countered through sustained focus on host government educational programs alone; the threat capacity building, the development of is increasingly digital in nature, and independent journalism networks, and accordingly, the PD community should the promotion of resilience within key prioritize mastery of the digital domain. audiences. Deterrence and messaging While all believed that educational received far less attention, at least initially, programs were core to PD programming in terms of CSD programming. and critical to “creating a foundation for democracy and critical thinking,” they Virtually everyone the ACPD interviewed also warned that retrofitting the goals agreed that state-sponsored of existing educational programs to disinformation activities were not counter-disinformation priorities would exclusively a European issue, but not be a sufficient response because they instead represented a fast growing do not actively impact the information global phenomenon. In 2019, a study environment, which is constantly under by the Oxford Internet Institute found siege by advanced state-backed actors. evidence of state-backed “social media SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 38

A proactive digital presence alone cannot overcome the corrosive effects of deliberate disinformation campaigns. Narrative control is required.

Counter disinformation expert Clint Watts frame attitudes and opinions. This digital compares the problem of cyber threats to information manipulation might not make it today’s disinformation challenges, noting into a senior USG official’s briefing book on a need for more and better digital tools to a regular basis, but it is important because stay ahead of the threat: it has the potential to slowly and quietly undermine long-term USG policy initiatives. A decade ago, there was a similar problem in tackling the toughest cyber Ultimately, a proactive digital presence threats. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) alone cannot overcome the corrosive actors emerged, conducting sophisticated, effects of deliberate disinformation well-resourced hacking efforts that campaigns. Narrative control is required. access networks and remain undetected As a former senior PD official at the State inside them for prolonged periods… Department noted: “One of the truisms of Western companies and governments modern media is that the person whose have undertaken approaches for story wins is usually the person who understanding and combatting APTs frames the narrative, and we need to do that can be instructive for social media a better job of framing that narrative."28 companies as they defend against the Effective narrative framing in a hostile greatest challenge in their history. Tackling information environment begins with a the most advanced threats to platforms good understanding of prevailing contexts requires a new, sustained approach to and actors. The next section of this report thwart nefarious manipulation. This assesses both in a review of field-level CSD intelligence-driven approach begins with programs and impacts. an improved understanding of the threat actors and the methods they deploy via social media.27 This is particularly true in countering “grey” disinformation or propaganda, which, unlike outright fabrications, consists of distortions of real events that can SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 39

PART III: CSD IN THE FIELD: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACTS

In order to assess CSD program communications capacities of credible implementation and impacts in the field, messengers, including government the ACPD conducted a series of research officials, journalists, educators, and civil visits to five European countries—Iceland, society actors. Targeted training and Finland, Latvia, Hungary, and Georgia— short-term programs for journalists on in Fall/Winter 2019. This section of the topics such as investigative journalism and report provides an overview of current reliable content generation strengthen Washington-based resources for field independent media outlets. A number of programs before turning to an examination PD initiatives promote the development of CSD program implementation at the of open source information resources and USG post level. It then offers host country analysis through training programs as perspectives on current and future efforts well as the development of collaborative to combat malign influence threats. information exchange networks. Current Washington-Based PD programs have also enabled independent media platforms to play Resources for Field Programs an active role in deterrence, especially accessing and disseminating news Effective measures to counter and information from a broad range disinformation in the field begin with of sources to mitigate disinformation the effort to identify, classify, research, effects. For example, USAGM broadcast and monitor current malign influence and social media platforms provide strategies. This includes research initiatives access to objective, language appropriate to identify and track malign influence international, regional, and domestic news trends, themes, and behaviors, as well and news for use in domestic/regional as to obtain accurate analyses of target contexts. They also promote information audiences’ interests and vulnerabilities. flows into restrictive environments and The GEC plays a critical role in the effort marginalized communities with minimal to map the actual digital consumption access to credible media outlets. habits of target populations and to provide a clear picture of disinformation transmission patterns—and how to anticipate them. Resilience to disinformation Public diplomacy CSD speaker, specialist, begins with the information and short-term exchanges build resilience consumer. by supporting independent media. Programs aim to improve the digital SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 40

Resilience to disinformation begins with academic exchange programs build skills the information consumer. It is essential and provide a deeper understanding of to teach vulnerable audiences to identify political, social, and economic contexts. false stories and hate speech, discern Finally, cultural and educational exchange fact from opinion, and crosscheck facts programs support greater receptivity to and sources. Media literacy training USG policy-oriented messaging. programs for journalists, educators, and civil society actors inoculate information Post Perspectives: consumers against the emotional, hyper irrational appeal of coercive or potentially Implementation at the Field Level destabilizing narratives. PD programs We wanted to understand how these have also supported the creation of Washington-designed and funded viable, professionally managed online fact programs play out at the field level. We checking organizations to provide accurate were particularly interested in challenges information, counter falsehoods, debunk to effective implementation raised myths, and expose disinformation tactics. during the 2019 global public diplomacy Sustained investments in soft power conference. Several public diplomacy initiatives create the conditions for officers currently working at overseas resilience. Specifically, a wide range missions, including those who described of cultural and educational exchange themselves as being on the “front lines” programs—the proverbial “last three feet” of CSD campaigns, noted that GPA and of public diplomacy engagement—builds GEC were not always able to support their audience capacity to resist the spread efforts. They expressed concern that the of disinformation effects. Art, music, new PD bureaus and offices were designed dance, theater, and film programming to respond to top-down messaging provide much needed context and priorities rather than supporting field- depth to an overloaded media space based initiatives. This focus on Washington in which an abundance of information could create a disconnect in CSD program results in a scarcity of attention and coordination, they warned, because it might understanding. Short-term professional come at the expense of post specific needs exchanges enable information sharing with respect to CSD program content as and collaboration, while longer term well as resources.

The success of CSD programs depended largely on post’s understanding of host country vulnerabilities to disinformation as well as public and private sector attitudes toward and experiences of malign influence effects. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 41

These observations were generally borne saturation, e.g. too many resources out during our field visits. Although we did directed at a relatively narrow range of not detect evidence of an outright strategic local CSD challenges. This can result in a disconnect between Washington priorities certain level of program fatigue among and post initiatives, we found that CSD key audiences, and raises questions about program resources required extensive effective resource distribution. tailoring to meet host country needs and capabilities. The success of CSD programs The following country-specific CSD depended largely on post’s understanding program descriptions illustrate the extent of host country vulnerabilities to to which post CSD programming has been disinformation as well as public and private successfully adapted to the local context: sector attitudes toward and experiences of malign influence effects. This is especially Iceland important when, for example, the host To address growing concerns country government does not consider about disinformation effects disinformation to be an existential threat. in Iceland, PAS Reykjavik We also found evidence of CSD program has focused its efforts on media literacy training with a view to building fact checking and data analysis into the national public school curricula. PAS Reykjavik has also stepped up efforts to support training in investigative reporting for local journalists to improve the credibility of media institutions among We also found evidence domestic audiences. This includes an effort to provide access to advanced of CSD program audience research and assessment saturation, e.g. too many tools as a basis for improved analysis of media content and sources. Finally, a resources directed at a PAS Reykjavik-sponsored grant offered relatively narrow range a speaker program on the intersection of technology and disinformation as well of local CSD challenges. as support for a University of Iceland This can result in a administered conference on hybrid threats co-sponsored by the European Union and certain level of program the United Kingdom. fatigue among key audiences, and raises questions about effective resource distribution. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 42

Finland COE experts report that typical government shortfalls include the failure To mitigate the potential to communicate effectively about electoral for malign influencer processes and outcomes with local interference, PAS Helsinki populations. Lack of situational awareness managed a $500,000 about the potential for external influencers GEC-funded grant to the to use social media platforms to interfere European Hybrid Center with domestic electoral processes is a of Excellence to conduct persistent problem. Finally, the absence electoral interference and of cooperative relationships between open source intelligence government and social media platforms training. U.S. speaker Rand remains a critical vulnerability. Waltzman, the Rand Corporation’s Deputy Chief Technology Officer, participated in Latvia a Hybrid COE/EU Commission minister- level panel on disinformation during PAS Riga CSD programming Finland’s EU presidency. Fulbright and focuses on developing public other U.S. speakers focused on topics awareness of disinformation such as “Truth Matters: Strategies for tools and objectives through Combating Manipulated Realities” and a combination of speaker, training, and “Making Democracies Resilient to Modern exchange programs targeting the spread Threats.” Finally, a PAS/GEC-funded regional of disinformation, media literacy, and reporting tour for 15 journalists from investigative journalism. Speaker programs France, Belgium, and Germany brought have addressed building media literacy journalists together with disinformation skills into public school curricula and and hybrid influence experts from civil providing hands on media literacy skills society, the media, academia, and the development for teachers. Various regional Finnish government, including from the professional journalist programs focus on Ministry of Defense, the Prime Minister’s issues such as advanced research and fact- Office, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. checking techniques as well as investigative reporting in vulnerable regions. Targeted With support from member states, to short-term professional exchange include the United States, the European programs have sent Latvian journalists on Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid disinformation-related reporting tours, with Threats has developed programming to a focus on developments in Ukraine and support NATO and EU allies to identify NATO exercises in the region. and combat disinformation and malign influence campaigns ahead of European Youth-focused CSD programming builds on elections. In addition to the traditional the presence of Fulbright English Teaching focus on citizen education and outreach Assistants and English Language Fellows and electoral process management, in higher education institutions, as well as Communications Center of Excellence targeted embassy outreach to students (COE) programs address resilience building in Russian language schools. Youth measures such as broad interagency entrepreneurship programs also reinforce cooperation and information sharing. basic media literacy skills. Grants to local SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 43

media NGOs have supported collaborative Georgia news and information verification initiatives. Finally, PAS collaboration with A large percentage of the NATO Strategic Communications PAS Tbilisi program Center of Excellence in Riga has facilitated funds focuses meetings with government leaders, media, on countering and civil society working on countering disinformation effects, much of it centered disinformation effects. on media training and capacity building. In cooperation with PAS Baku and PAS Hungary Yerevan, PAS Tbilisi hosts graduate level journalism training, to include PAS Budapest has professionalization and investigative partnered with local reporting. Direct grants to local media academic institutions, outlets enable the production of short thinks tanks, and NGOs to infotainment programs that communicate promote media literacy among journalists, the importance of sustained economic educators, civil society actors, university and security ties to the United States and students, and targeted rural populations. the West. PAS Tbilisi also supports media Approaches ranged from building audience literacy training programs that focus on capacity to identifying fake news and high school and university students as well propaganda to more sophisticated research as journalists. and analytical skills building. Speaker Other PAS-sponsored programs increase programs addressed propaganda threats the capacity of local influencers such as posed by social media technology and teachers, journalists, and civil society actors provided exposure to products and services to promote viable counter narratives to protect against advanced cyber threats. to extremism. A large PAS Tbilisi grant Targeted exchange programs have facilitated the development of a Strategic sent Hungarian media and academic Coordination Unit within the Georgian sector representatives to programs on government to foster coordination media responsibility as well as advanced and standardization of official strategic journalism and media literacy training. An communication efforts. Finally, small investigative journalism initiative trained scholarship programs in 29 vulnerable young reporters to produce stories minority communities offer English exposing evidence of corruption in the language classes as well as short courses public sector. Several American Corner on civics and technology topics. events supported CSD initiatives, such as a three-day course in one regional capital that provided students with hands on strategies for identifying, filtering, and analyzing information online. Another regional event helped teenagers to identify fake news and advertising, develop data protection skills, and create effective news content. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 44

Host Country Perspectives: Not surprisingly, a country’s historical, geographical, and cultural relationships Building Resilience, Improving play a key role in its relative vulnerability Deterrence to disinformation effects. For example, the former Soviet satellite states that In addition to learning more about post now share a border with Russia have implementation of CSD initiatives, we historically been at the mercy of Russian wanted a better understanding of the military and economic ambitions, as well program environment from the host as religious and cultural dominance. country perspective. Our conversations With the collapse of the USSR, the newly with government officials, journalists, independent states, also known as the academics, and media-focused NGOs “near abroad,” posed an even more revealed important similarities and existential threat to Russia’s security differences in each country’s experience and prosperity, especially as these of disinformation effects, and provided countries moved to greater integration useful context for assessments of CSD with transatlantic security and economic program effectiveness. institutions.

Our interlocutors agreed that the power of disinformation lies in the ability to exploit prevailing political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.

Our interlocutors agreed that the power Kremlin-produced disinformation of disinformation lies in the ability to narratives attempted to discredit exploit prevailing political, economic, and these efforts, employing both threat social vulnerabilities. In general, we found and suasion. The threat of sustained that these vulnerabilities fall into four or renewed conflict with Russia lends broad categories: historical, geographic, enormous power to disinformation and cultural legacies; current governance narratives that invoke Russia’s might while practices and adherence to the rule of law; denigrating a state’s capacity to guarantee economic conditions and the effectiveness national security and prosperity. At the of social security guarantees; and the extent same time, Russia’s morally superior, to which information is broadly accessible pan-Slavic narratives lay claim to culturally and free, and open and independent embedded shared values. media institutions prevail. Taken together, assessments of these four elements Inevitably, these narratives play to can serve as a fairly reliable indicator of deep-seated fears about the loss of disinformation impacts in a particular traditional social practices and beliefs as a country. They also provide a framework for consequence of integration into Western longer term resilience-building initiatives. security and economic institutions. While SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 45

these effects are less prevalent in the Baltic embrace of democratic principles and states, such as Latvia, which have achieved successful integration into NATO and EU full NATO and EU membership, aspirant institutions. More recently, Hungary’s countries such as Georgia are particularly increasingly authoritarian government susceptible to stories about the moral and has produced an anti-Western, anti- spiritual corruption of the West. democratic narrative that blames the West for Hungary’s security and economic The presence of ethnic minority vulnerabilities. Elements of this rhetoric populations in the countries of the near closely resemble those found in Kremlin- abroad offers additional opportunities based denunciations of Western aggression for narrative exploitation on the basis of and immorality. linguistic isolation, economic dislocation, and political disenfranchisement. It is easy Finland and Iceland present interesting for disinformation narratives to make variants on the domestic exploitation the case that these groups have been of disinformation narratives. No abandoned by the state to offer, instead, stranger to Russian invasion, most the assurance of support based on a recently during WWII, Finland built a shared common language—Russian— strong postwar democracy focused on and promises of sustained economic and strength through cohesion and collective security support. security. Nevertheless, the memory

While the countries of Russia’s near abroad remain uniquely vulnerable to Russian disinformation narratives, Central European countries are also at risk. Disinformation effects are propagated through domestic political exploitation of perceived failures to protect security and economic interests. of Soviet occupation and the need to While the countries of Russia’s near abroad remain vigilant has the potential to be remain uniquely vulnerable to Russian exploited by fringe groups on either end disinformation narratives, Central European of the political spectrum. As an island countries are also at risk. Disinformation nation far removed from the threat of effects are propagated through domestic Russian occupation, Iceland has had political exploitation of perceived failures little to fear from Russia. However, in the to protect security and economic interests. absence of a national military, conflicted For example, in Hungary, the painful legacy public attitudes prevail about Iceland’s of Soviet occupation and repression was reliance on the United States and an important driver for its initially strong NATO for security. This in turn provides SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 46

opportunities for fringe elements of the the unreliability of Western-inspired opposition to produce narratives about, democratic institution building. By contrast, for example, the government’s willingness Finland’s “depoliticization of equality,” to compromise national sovereignty. generous social welfare benefits, and regulation of the labor economy creates a With respect to internal governance, relative immunity to politically motivated vulnerability to disinformation effects disinformation narratives. appears to be greatest in countries that have relatively recently transitioned into Finally, deeply polarized societies with low democracies (what some experts have trust in media institutions and a history identified as the “young democracy” of government sanctioned controls on

With respect to internal governance, vulnerability to disinformation effects appears to be greatest in countries that have relatively recently transitioned into democracies.

phenomenon). Resilience requires relative information access and outreach are social cohesion, a general consensus especially susceptible to disinformation about national identity, trust in the effects. In newly independent states such political process, and confidence in the as Georgia, the early proliferation of capacity of government (popular trust) unregulated news media outlets, partisan to meet citizen needs—all more or less control over a significant portion of the present in established democracies. media landscape, and public mistrust of In countries like Georgia, by contrast, official media sources created the ideal popular frustration with the slow pace of conditions for the dominance of Russian- political, economic, and social reforms, driven disinformation narratives. By and perceptions of government corruption contrast, in Hungary, where the government and/or incompetence create receptivity has near complete control over the national to disinformation narratives that highlight media space, the disinformation threat is state failure to protect citizens’ economic largely internal, emerging primarily from and security interests. ruling party interests. Failures, perceived and actual, in a country’s social security network also create fertile Failures, perceived and ground for malign influence effects. In Georgia, for example, recent polls indicate actual, in a country’s social that people are most worried about job security network also create security, rising costs, pensions, and access to health care. Disinformation narratives fertile ground for malign exploit these concerns, attributing them to a failure in national leadership and influence effects. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 47

Deeply polarized societies with low trust in media institutions and a history of government sanctioned controls on information access and outreach are especially susceptible to disinformation effects…Low trust in governance also exacerbates vulnerability to destabilizing influencers, both external and internal.

The following country-specific contributes to what one official described assessments of disinformation effects as a kind of “geopolitical illiteracy” or offer specific examples of vulnerabilities lack of awareness of and appreciation to disinformation effects as well as for Iceland’s external political, economic, measures necessary to address them. and security commitments. This in turn creates a certain vulnerability Iceland to disaffected narratives about the government’s failure to place its citizens’ Compared to the other needs above foreign policy imperatives. countries in this report, Iceland represents This is particularly true with respect to something of an outlier in the lack of public trust in the United its experience of disinformation effects. States and NATO. According to Ministry Indeed, according to Iceland’s Media of Foreign Affairs officials, the Russian Commission, Russian, and to a lesser disinformation narratives that have degree Chinese disinformation efforts, penetrated Iceland’s media space echo have only recently been acknowledged anti-George Soros themes, critiques of the as a national security threat within the international sanctions regime, the U.S. Icelandic government. This may have to and NATO-driven “militarization of the do with what several officials described as Arctic,” and the international community’s Iceland’s “island mentality,” which fosters responsibility for Syria’s humanitarian a strong sense of national identity and crisis inflicted by the U.S./NATO. While social cohesion. these narratives are concentrated in the 10-15 percent of the population But, while this island mentality may associated with far-right political parties, shield Iceland’s citizens from external their presence nevertheless represents efforts to inform and influence, it also a threat to Iceland government officials’ SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 48

attempts to make the case for greater Finland involvement in international political and economic systems and structures. The Finnish government claims a relatively low Increasingly, low trust in governance level of vulnerability also exacerbates vulnerability to to disinformation destabilizing influencers, both external effects owing to its and internal. For example, the 2008 “Comprehensive Security financial crisis is seen by many as the Approach,” which one Icelandic government’s failure to regulate official described as a the financial sector and protect citizens broad, multisectoral from bankruptcy. Iceland ranks high consensus on national (94/100) on Freedom House’s Free Media security priorities. A national identity index, and state media channels enjoy a built on shared values, a generally non- certain level of credibility. Nevertheless, polarized media landscape, and a high Icelandic officials are concerned about level of media literacy also provides a declining trust in commercial media, a certain immunity to disinformation which is perceived as “corrupt and gossip narratives that might otherwise exploit laden,” with editorial policies “driven perceived social and political inequities. by commercial interests.” Icelandic officials also note a deterioration in the Nevertheless, Finland is taking steps to relationship between Iceland’s political raise public awareness of propaganda figures and domestic media outlets, a gap to prevent the erosion of popular trust easily exploited by domestically-driven in government. These measures include disinformation narratives. A national identity built Government officials and academic and media experts see a need to broaden on shared values, a the Icelandic public’s understanding of key geopolitical issues such as energy generally non-polarized distribution and climate change. They also note that the politicization of issues media landscape, and such as Iceland’s role in NATO and its a high level of media “security dependence” might be mitigated by a more consciously transparent public literacy also provides dialogue about Iceland’s security needs. Finally, they seek measures to rebuild a certain immunity to credibility among commercial media disinformation narratives outlets in order to assure greater diversity in the Icelandic media space. that might otherwise exploit perceived social and political inequities. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 49

a national level campaign to expose favor. First, thanks to Latvia’s geographic disinformation narratives and provide proximity and long history with Russia, countervailing, fact-based rebuttals. The there is a high level of domestic Finnish government also cites efforts awareness of Russian disinformation to analyze disinformation sourcing and themes and strategies. Moreover, the methods—and to make research results Latvian government does not view broadly available to the public, including disinformation in isolation but rather journalists and educators. Finally, Finnish addresses it as part of a broader national government officials are working closely security challenge. This permits the use with private sector partners to address of multiple resources and a broad multi- the threats posed by Deep Fakes and sector approach to the problem. other Artificial Intelligence tools to national security and prosperity. Finally, the Latvian government understands that effective counter disinformation measures need to focus Latvia on building domestic resilience to its Latvia, like its neighbors most potent effects. As one official noted, Estonia and Lithuania, Russian behaviors—especially the reliance has experienced several on destabilizing influence measures—are hundred years of conflict not going to change. According to local with Russia, to include territorial aggression experts, what can (and must) change is and occupation. Situated on the border public understanding of and ultimately with Russia, Latvia looks to its NATO and EU confidence in Latvia’s political and media memberships as its best defense against institutions. This would require the Russian Federation attempts to destabilize Latvian government to focus on greater the country, both on the ground and in the information sharing, especially with information space. respect to policies that may seem to disadvantage or create short-term pain According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for domestic audiences. The conditions officials responsible for leading the effort required for resilience to disinformation to counter disinformation effects, there also include the fostering of a free and are several factors that work in Latvia’s open media environment.

The Latvian government does not view disinformation in isolation but rather addresses it as part of a broader national security challenge. This permits the use of multiple resources and a broad multi-sector approach to the problem. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 50

NATO Strategic Hungary Communications Centre of Hungary’s experience of Excellence (Riga, Latvia) disinformation effects As part of its is distinguished by its broad based, government’s increasingly multisectoral authoritarian behavior and apparent approach to rejection of the liberal democratic countering narrative. Some experts see Prime disinformation Minister Orban’s surprisingly forceful effects, the Riga-based NATO Strategic anti-Western rhetoric as a partial Communications Centre of Excellence COE reflection of the Russian Federation’s has prioritized monitoring and assessment core disinformation narrative about the of the information distribution channels corrupting influence of Euro-Atlantic used by social media platforms. COE institutions. Others view the Hungarian officials see the need to align the “Silicon government’s strident illiberalism as a Valley business model” of information legacy of its transition to independence dissemination and consumption with the in 1989 – the failure of the then new promotion of democratic values and the leadership to embed liberal democratic protection of individual rights and liberties. principles into its political philosophy. They also note the need for a broad-based In any case, Orban and his associates dialogue about the nature and quality have perfected a policy narrative that, like of social media sector governance that Russian disinformation narratives, builds addresses issues such as individual privacy on a basic mistrust of democracy and vs. collective security and transparency vs. democratic principles. Orban capitalizes operational security. on this fear to foster a collective sense of NATO COE experts recognize that insecurity in Hungary’s ability to project social media platforms have a dual power—and to justify illiberal measures responsibility to their users to guarantee such as legislated restrictions on judiciary their privacy as well as their security. and parliamentary powers and the slow Additionally, they acknowledge the need asphyxiation of Hungary’s independent to avoid content regulation and data media. Indeed, Orban’s return to power in privacy violations. At the same time, 2010 was marked by creation of a party- they feel strongly that social media driven media consortium along with a companies must share public interest legislative approach to limiting/controlling data about movements or trends that access to information. may have serious implications for Thanks at least in part to its highly national security. They also note the centralized and near monopolistic control need for greater transparency about of the press, the Hungarian government, consumer information data collection rather than outside actors, appears to and usage practices as well as algorithm be the primary source of disinformation. development, analytics, and applications. Though perhaps inspired in part by Russian SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 51

Thanks at least in part to its highly centralized and near monopolistic control of the press, the Hungarian government, rather than outside actors, appears to be the primary source of disinformation. sources, Hungary’s home-grown narratives information.” These experts go on to make emerge largely from the ruling party, to an interesting distinction between the a lesser degree from the opposition, and freedom of speech, which exists in Hungary, occasionally from fringe elements on the and the freedom to access information, far right and left of the political spectrum. which, in Hungary’s centralized media Some experts claim that pro-government environment, is at risk. Said one media media institutions actually function as representative: “Journalists are free to ask “disinformation factories” that essentially the hard questions. They just don’t get do the work of Russian disinformation answers.” Media experts also point to the outlets such as RT and Sputnik. “Fake news” “ghettoization of media in Hungary,” which stories, adapted to justify policy actions, is resource deprived thanks to government have become part of the government’s control of access to the advertising sector. political narrative. Finally, the uniqueness of the Hungarian language also intensifies Despite these challenges, local observers disinformation effects, which do not seem concur that the potential exists to counter to be mitigated by unrestricted access to disinformation effects in Hungary. First, social media platforms and international they recommend that a concerted effort be news and information sources. made to fill knowledge gaps in vulnerable rural areas, where information content is Experts warn that the government’s largely national in focus. Arguing that there ongoing restructuring of the media is a genuine desire for local and regional as landscape supports ruling party, rather well as international news and information, than national, interests—especially in several experts recommend the creation economically and socially vulnerable of a broad-based coalition of independent rural areas. This has created a potentially online media sources to provide content destabilizing information gap between targeted at local needs and interests. They Budapest and the regions. The also suggest the creation of a network centralization of information dissemination of regional correspondents reporting on also contributes to a growing sense of regional news. “apathy” among university students, especially in rural regions, who, according With respect to the national media scene, to experts, are more interested in Hungarian media and civil society experts preserving the status quo and finding jobs call for the inclusion of local and regional than engaging in political activism. issues in the now largely centralized discourse about political, economic, and A few independent media experts argue, social issues. They also advocate for with some asperity, that in general the more balanced popular understanding Hungarian majority doesn’t care about of and engagement in global issues with diminishing media freedoms because “it domestic implications, such as climate doesn’t see that it has been deprived of change and immigration. Finally, experts SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 52

note the need for more diverse content and outreach campaigns in support of EU generation, especially with respect to the and NATO integration, and so on. West, which is largely framed in negative, anti-imperialist or capitalist terms. Civil Nevertheless, the information environment society organizations must be empowered remains fragile. Local experts report that to produce alternative discourse elements disinformation in the form of fake or and expand content. manipulative news stories has become the “new normal” in the national media space. They also note that disinformation Georgia is increasingly domestic in origin, often As a former Soviet amplifying extremist (far left and right) satellite state seeking attitudes. Public and private sector lasting relationships representatives underscore the increasing with Euro-Atlantic polarization of Georgia’s commercial institutions, Georgia has been subjected to media space, especially domestic television long-term, punitive Russia disinformation stations. Reports indicate that trolling, campaigns since its independence in particularly by government-affiliated bots 1991. Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, and users, has intensified, most notably which resulted in a peaceful transition during the runups to parliamentary and of power, was heralded as a “new wave presidential elections. of democratization” for the region. But Experts also link the intensification of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and disinformation effects to the slow, and subsequent occupation of South Ossetia necessarily demanding, pace of EU and and Abkhazia, highlighted the fragility NATO integration. Both Russian and of Georgia’s status as an independent, domestic disinformation narratives sovereign state. Russia’s campaign to bring ably exploit the popular knowledge gap Georgia back into its sphere of influence about the EU integration and NATO has forced Georgia to confront existential accession processes. They also reflect questions about national identity, values, precise awareness of vulnerabilities, and prevailing models of governance. highlighting, for example, the short-term Despite these challenges, Georgia has economic and social risks and costs made some significant progress in the of the reforms necessary to meet EU effort to counter Russian disinformation benchmarks. These narratives focus on effects thanks to the support of the the relative ease of doing business with international community. NATO, the EU, Russia, to include higher short-term profit the United States, the United Kingdom, and margins, fewer tariffs, and the absence many other countries have contributed to of export regulations for locally produced this effort in the form of media literacy and agricultural products. journalism training programs, grants to With respect to NATO, disinformation support the development of independent messaging in Georgia is double edged. fact checking organizations, support for On the one hand, narratives suggest that the development of a viable strategic the slow pace of NATO accession means communications infrastructure within the that the West is abandoning Georgia. national government, targeted information SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 53

Experts also link the intensification of disinformation effects to the slow, and necessarily demanding, pace of EU and NATO integration. Both Russian and domestic disinformation narratives ably exploit the popular knowledge gap about the EU integration and NATO accession processes. Russia, on the other hand, is “winning experts see the need for broad- in the region” because it appears to be based cross sector coordination. So operating from a position of strength. In far, Georgian government efforts fact, Russia’s occupation of 20 percent of to counter disinformation remain Georgia’s territory, along with periodic relatively uncoordinated and reactive, escalation of hostilities along the disputed compromised by, on the one hand, borders, effectively holds Georgia in significant support for Russia on thrall. Disinformation narratives also economic grounds (Georgia’s rural exploit NATO’s reluctance to get drawn population depends on exports to Russia) into a conflict with Russia over Georgia’s and, on the other hand, by the all too sovereignty. real threat of Russian military aggression. The current absence of coordination A range of social and cultural factors on local, regional, and national lines contribute to the enduring power of among military, law enforcement, and disinformation narratives in Georgia. government ministries/agencies leaves Georgia’s Orthodox clergy remain Georgia vulnerable to asymmetric divided on the question of political and information attacks. spiritual association with Russia. In fact, some experts believe that the upcoming Government, media, and civil society succession battle for the new Georgian actors agree on the need for better Patriarch may fall along Russian vs. disinformation impact assessments EU lines. Armenian and Azeri minority to better understand the scope and communities, particularly those along the evolution of the threat in Georgia. border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, suffer They also call for improved program from linguistic isolation, a vulnerability monitoring and evaluation resources which promotes reliance on Russian for existing CSD programs. This includes language sources. Reports also indicate the development of language-specific the persistent presence of pro-jihadist software/analytic tools to monitor elements within the Georgian far right, and assess disinformation streams, primarily on the basis of a rejection of enhancement of audience research so-called Western values. Finally, small capacities, and enhanced mapping but persistent elements of xenophobia, of target audience vulnerabilities. homophobia, and religious conservatism Finally, experts need to foster proactive remain powerful disinformation drivers. cooperation rather than divisive competition and duplication of effort To address Georgia’s vulnerability to among the NGOs working on countering disinformation effects, government disinformation effects. officials, media, and civil society SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 54

CONCLUSION

These country-level assessments confirm term training and content development that effective counter disinformation programs, as well as long-term civil activities require a mix of broad society and democratic institution resilience building strategies and actor- building initiatives. specific deterrence tactics. The threat of disinformation emerges from its potential Nevertheless, more needs to be done to to exploit prevailing political, economic, address a continuously evolving operational and social deficits—both perceived and environment, from the emergence of actual. Therefore, building resilience new tools and technologies to shifts in to disinformation effects must begin geopolitical relationships. One senior with a realistic identification of these counter-disinformation official at the center vulnerabilities, as well as the national of the changes described in this report told capacity to address them. Once these the ACPD that “we have witnessed…the first vulnerabilities have been identified, structural innovations of a new post-Cold targeted deterrence measures which War internet era, but they won’t be the last.” push back on specific elements of The official cautioned, “Our ability to move disinformation narratives come into forward will come down to how we are able play. As this report attests, much good to change and adapt to the emerging order. work has already been done through Government institutions don’t change by 29 PD programs that build resilience to themselves.” disinformation effects while improving Indeed, what distinguishes the Cold War measures of deterrence through short- experience of disinformation effects from

We have witnessed…the first structural innovations of a new post-Cold War internet era, but they won’t be the last. Our ability to move forward will come down to how we are able to change and adapt to the emerging order. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 55

We have always been—and always will be—at war over influence in the global information space.

the current threat environment is the However, even as we advocate for rapid and multifaceted transformation short-term deterrence measures to of the global information infrastructure. improve responsiveness to information- This report indicates that current CSD based threats, we must continue to PD programs and resources must be engage in long-term knowledge and attuned and continuously responsive to relationship building initiatives. Sustained the digitization of the information space. At investment in education and exchange the same time, however, there needs to be programs remains the best antidote to consensus about strategic priorities, as well disinformation effects. Moreover, it is as a more realistic set of expectations about important to remember that the current influence management in the global arena. focus on malign influence threats is nothing new. Rather, it represents yet The ACPD’s recommendations focus on another in a series of technology-based improvements to the PD toolkit to address efforts to protect USG national security these evolving threats. The establishment interests in a complex information of a shared lexicon of disinformation environment. We have always been—and will facilitate overall CSD program always will be—at war over influence in the coordination and resource distribution. global information space. Greater investment in digital capabilities, and improved capability to fund short- term, experimental initiatives will improve program flexibility and responsiveness. Personnel and infrastructure upgrades such as the creation of a job series for mid-career CSD specialists and the reconfiguration of PD sections at post will improve field-level engagement with the digital information space. Finally, long- term program effectiveness requires the ability to evaluate and monitor CSD programs at scale and assess impact. All of these recommendations balance longer-term resilience and capacity building measures with shorter time horizon initiatives such as deterrence and messaging, which are no less important in a complete CSD platform. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 56

ENDNOTES

1 ACPD Data Call Request, “Public Diplomacy Program Data Call: Countering State- Sponsored Disinformation” (Jan 2017 - May 10, 2019). 2 https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3414.pdf. 3 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, March 2008, p. 99. 4 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 5 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43719784. 6 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-warns-silicon-valley-it-would-be- destructive-to-block-strong-privacy-laws.html. 7 P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018). 8 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 9 Data drawn from a May 2019 ACPD survey of field-based CSD programs and initiatives. 10 Hararo J. Ingram, Persuade or Perish: Addressing Gaps in the U.S. Posture to Confront Propaganda and Disinformation Threats, Program on Extremism, George Washington University,(February 2020), 11: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/ Ingram%20Persuade%20or%20Perish.pdf. 11 https://www.state.gov/state-defense-cooperation-on-global-engagement-center- programs-and-creation-of-the-information-access-fund-to-counter-state-sponsored- disinformation. 12 See “About Us,” https://www.state.gov/about-us-global-engagement-center/ (Accessed June 2019). 13 https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/387719-pompeo-lifts-hiring-freeze-at- state-department. 14 See the ACPD’s Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy & International Broadcasting for 2019 and 2020 (forthcoming), 131: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/01/2019-ACPD-Annual-Report.pdf. 15 https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/082118_Mitchell_Testimony.pdf. 16 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018-ACPD.pdf. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 57

17 https://www.usagm.gov/2018/08/22/statement-from-ceo-john-f-lansing-on-agency-rebrand/. 18 Targeted Inspection of the Governance of the United States Agency for Global Media, Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of State (April 2019), 10. https://www. stateoig.gov/system/files/isp-ib-19-22_0.pdf. 19 Embarking on Reform of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, U.S. Agency for Global Media (May 21, 2019): https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Embarking-on-OCB- Reform-English.pdf. 20 USAGM, “Expanding View of Current Time” (Internal Document, 2018). 21 See Steven Erlanger, “What is RT?” New York Times, March 8, 2017: https://www.nytimes. com/2017/03/08/world/europe/what-is-rt.html. 22 Yelena Osipova-Stocker and Nick Shchetko, Addressing Disinformation: Insights and Best Practices, Office of Policy Research, U.S. Agency for Global Media, 2020. 23 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-to-take-a- step-into-the-digital-age-in-effort-to-counter-disinformation/2019/04/12/c333bd8c-1b46- 44d9-a2be-83aa0c8e9114_story.html. 24 https://www.state.gov/acpd-official-meeting-minutes-september-4-2019/. 25 While some bureaus indicated that they refer to counter-disinformation programming with other terminology, none of the research methods the ACPD pursued – including direct outreach – reflected the same amount of attention as in EUR. The challenges generated by using different terminology and strategic approaches have been noted elsewhere in this report. 26 https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop- Report19.pdf. 27 https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/advanced-persistent-manipulators-part-one-the- threat-to-the-social-media-industry/. 28 Author interview with senior official, April 2019. 29 Author interview with senior official, October 2018. SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 58

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Vivian S. Walker

Vivian S. Walker is the Executive Director Officer (Haiti). Other assignments of the United States Advisory Commission include a two-year professorship in on Public Diplomacy. She has served as strategic studies at the National War Faculty Fellow at the USC Center on Public College, a yearlong assignment as the Diplomacy (CPD), the Guest Editor for State Department’s Regional Border the CPD Perspectives series, an Adjunct Coordinator in Afghanistan, and a Professor at the Central European fellowship on the Atlantic Council, where University’s (CEU) School of Public Policy she led the first interagency discussion on and a Research Fellow at the CEU Center public diplomacy in the aftermath of the for Media, Data and Society. She has also 9/11 terror attacks. been a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College in Dr. Walker has published and lectured Washington, DC and the National Defense extensively on the practice of public College of the United Arab Emirates. diplomacy in complex information environments. She graduated from In her 26-year career with the State Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Department, she rose to the senior Service and earned her doctorate in executive rank of Minister Counselor. English language and literature from the She twice served as a Deputy Chief of University of Chicago. She speaks French, Mission (Croatia and Armenia), twice as an Russian, and Croatian. Office Director (Southeastern European Affairs and the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy for Europe), a Public Affairs Officer (Kazakhstan, with coverage of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), a Cultural Affairs Officer (Tunisia) and an Information SEPTEMBER 2020 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 59

Ryan E. Walsh

Ryan E. Walsh serves the Department of transactions on its platform, Mr. Walsh State as Senior Advisor in the Bureau of was recognized for Digital Innovation Global Public Affairs (GPA). In this capacity, in Journalism by the Scripps Howard he identifies, designs, and implements Foundation in 2014. Earlier, as a Crisis digital and mobile innovations to public Management Analyst at Goldman Sachs, diplomacy programming in order to he responded to global incidents ranging establish effective, ongoing engagement from natural disasters, to terrorism, with foreign audiences. Prior to the social unrest, and political instability. He merger that created GPA, he led Digital began his career with the New York-based Product in the Bureau of International advertising agency Momentum Worldwide Information Programs. His previous work (McCann Worldgroup), advising Fortune with ACPD includes authoring insights into 500 clients on disintermediation in the a project which he directed, “U.S. 2016 communications environment and the Elections: A Case Study in ‘Inoculating’ emerging power of digital communities. Public Opinion Against Disinformation,” in the report Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Mr. Walsh holds a B.A. in History from Internet? (2017). Providence College in Rhode Island and a M.S. in Global Affairs from New Prior to government service, Mr. Walsh York University. His thesis at NYU was was on the launch team of a pioneering titled A Warning for the West: Connection data-mining digital news startup that Technologies and Social Unrest (2012). averaged over 5 million unique monthly visitors in its first year. For this work, which included publishing an investigative report that caused Facebook to change its terms of service as it relates to gun Public Diplomacy and the New “Old” War: Countering State-Sponsored Disinformation

SEPTEMBER 2020