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Soviet-Yugoslavia Case Study

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Soviet-Yugoslavia Case Study Soviet-Yugoslavia Case Study The Yugoslavia and the USSR split Important Vocab and Terms Names Treaty Places Comintern London Memorandum Trieste Cominform Balkan Federation Greek Civil War Chetniks Non-Aligned Movement Balkans Partisans UBDA Forces Background: During WW2 ● (1941) - Germany invades Yugoslavia ● RESISTANCE!! ○ Serbian Chetniks ○ Communist Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito Background: End of WWII ● Communists win and Tito becomes Prime Minister ● Tito became very corrupt ○ Everyone 18+ (except Fascists) given universal suffrage ○ Opposition newspapers banned ○ Only pro Tito/Communists could vote Background: During Cold War up to 1948 Context leading up to the split: ● Tito saw himself as Soviet ally, not a puppet ● US mistook Tito as subservient and dependent on USSR ● Tito’s foreign policy decisions created conflict for Stalin Background: Key Term Comintern (Communist International) Cominform (Newer Comintern) ● 1919 - Formed by Soviet Union ● 1947 - Formed as result of Marshall Plan ● Used to lead/direct actions of → → ● Composed of 9 communist nations other Communist parties ● Goal was to enforce uniformity and ● 1943 - Dissolved to ease prevent Marshall Plan assistance tensions with US Trieste Background Description Outcome -Technically owned by -Allies sent New Zealand -Yugoslavia and Italy Italy from 1920 troops to stop Trieste both heavily depended from being 7th Republic on Trieste economically -Partisans liberated Trieste during WWII and -USSR pressured -Wary of communism ruled for 42 days Yugoslavia to step down and former Axis powers -Rumors that Trieste -Split up into Zone A and would become the Zone B seventh Republic Greek Civil War Background Description Outcome -Resistance (sides): -Shot down US spy -Greece refused aid from Royalists vs Communists planes Yugoslavia -Communist Greece lost -Neighbor support -Criticism to Stalin -Negative image -Show independence Balkan Federation (DH) Background Description Outcome - Yugoslavia became - Goal of Balkan - USSR invited Bulgaria & increasingly Federation: unite the Yugoslavia to Moscow expansionist Balkan Peninsula, (wanted the Balkan Fed. on their own terms) - Both integrate Greece into Albania/Bulgaria were Bulgaria & Yugoslavia, - Bulgaria didn’t object communist and expand into Aegean Sea - Yugoslavia withdrew closely linked to - US opposed Balkan Fed. from negotiations and Yugoslavia (feared spread of stopped all planned integration communism) - USSR: “Dang it.” FUN FACTS N STUFF Stalin considered the Yugoslavs the heirs to his throne and his most faithful disciples! (1948) - Stalin angered by Tito’s unwillingness to be a satellite state ● June - Cominform scheduled The Split meeting in Bucharest ○ Tito refused to go ● June 28 - Yugoslavia kicked out of Cominform Yugoslavia kicked from Cominform ● Economic blockades ● Soviet intimidation Non-Aligned Movement ● Tito accepted aid with both Outcome/Effects sides Return of Trieste ● US ceded Zone A to Italy ● Angered Yugoslavia, mobilisation ● US ceded Zone B to Yugoslavia Two resistance to Tito criticizes Stalin, Tito refuses a German occupation tension rises, negative Cominform meeting in formed, Tito won over image on Yugoslavia. Bucharest, removed Chetniks. from Cominform. Greek Civil Balkan WWII Trieste The Split War Federation Soviet pressured Tension increases as Yugoslavia to step Tito did not follow down, first spark of Stalin’s wishes, tension. seeking independence ● US realized Yugoslavia was independent from USSR ● Tito’s leadership in Non-Alignment Movement prevented countries from Impact on Cold becoming pawns of major powers ○ Countries focused on economic development War ● USSR began to attack Yugoslavia ideologically Sources Hart, Stephen A. “Partisans: War in the Balkans 1941 - 1945.” BBC (Feb. 17, 2011). http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/partisan_fighters_01.shtml Crampton, Richard J. and John B. Allock. “Balkans.” Encyclopædia Britannica (Feb. 27, 2019). https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans/Communism Sowards, Steven W. “Lecture 22: Balkan politics in the Cold War years.” Michigan State University (June 11, 2009) http://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect22.htm Gibianskii, Leonid. “Yugoslavia and the Cold War.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin10_p3.pdf Perović, Jeronim. “The Tito–Stalin split: a reassessment in light of new evidence.” University of Zurich (2007). https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/62735/1/Perovic_Tito.pdf Activity! Time for y’all to make a skit about the Split! ● Re-enact the Soviet-Yugoslav split ○ Can be funny, serious, stupid (but not) ● If you need to split (hehe get it?) into groups to specialize in each of the topics we covered, that’s fine ○ Just try to make it flow yo like some good Froyo bro.
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