“A Short but Sanguinary Business”

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“A Short but Sanguinary Business” “A SHORT BUT SANGUINARY BUSINESS” th THE 14 (KING’S) LIGHT DRAGOONS AND THE BATTLE OF RAMNUGGUR NOVEMBER 22nd 1848 Wayne Price 1 Copyright © Wayne Price 2012 Wayne Price has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs And Patents act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work. “Every man thinks meanly of himself for never having been a soldier; or not having been at sea” Dr Samuel Johnson 1709-1784 2 Above, a map of the Punjab and its surrounding districts, taken from the Historical Record of the 14th (King’s) Hussars (printed in 1901). How to pick a war The first Anglo-Sikh war which had raged for a year between 1845 and 1846 came to an end with a number of treaties being signed by the two opposing powers, the British Empire along with the Bengal Army and the Sikh Empire of North-East India. During the war there had been a number of sharp engagements not least the fight at Ferozepur which had been a close run battle but ultimately a British victory, as had the whole campaign. On the 9th of March 1846 the Sikhs were forced to cede the region of Jullundur Doab1 which sits between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej to the British in what was known as the Treaty of Lahore. This land was extremely valuable in terms of Agriculture and, as if to add insult to injury the Lahore Durbar2 was also ordered to pay 15 million rupees as an indemnity to the British, 1The spelling of many Indian places, names, rivers etc. changes throughout all of the research materiel that I used whilst compiling this account. Different regions would spell names differently and then of course there would be the anglicised version too. I have used the spelling that was in whatever research document I was using at the time for any given section of this account. 3 a sum selected perhaps, because the failure to pay it would result in further land losses. As was expected and indeed intended by the British, the Lahore Durbar failed to raise this money and was consequently obliged to cede further land to the British East India Company consisting of Kashmir, Hazarah and all the ‘forts, territories, rights and interests in the hill country situated between the Rivers Beas and the Indus’. It was an extremely bitter pill to swallow for the proud and noble Sikh people, let alone their leaders. In the Punjab, Maharaja Duleep Singh (pictured left in later life) remained as ruler despite his tender age of seven, his mother Maharani Jindan Kaur (pictured below right), a clever and diplomatically astute woman initially acted as his regent. It was a dangerous time to be the leader of anything in India with political assassinations, even within, and perhaps especially within families, a common event. In order to see the Maharaja through to an age, (16), where he could command some respect amongst his people and give him a fighting chance of remaining Maharaja for any length of time the Durbar, after being coerced by a senior British diplomat, Frederick Currie, requested that, in the ‘interests of stability’, the British provide a military presence until the Maharajah reached the age of majority. Never ones to miss a trick, especially a trick that was one of their own making, (and due to the fact that Currie was the Indian Governor-Generals agent), the British accepted this kind offer and, on the 16th of December 1846 both parties signed the Treaty of Bhyroval which effectively forcibly pensioned off the Maharani3 and replaced her, as Maharaja Duleep Singh’s advisor, with a British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence who was an Officer in the East India Company’s Artillery4. He was assisted by a Council of Regency made up of handpicked, (read tame), Punjabi individuals who doubtless had an interest in the British ruling the Punjab. Other British officials were placed in the key towns and cantonments of the Punjab which gave the East India Company, and by default the British, control of the Punjab, something that the East India Company had coveted for as long as they had been in India. Despite being pensioned off, the Maharani was naturally worried about her son, (and herself one would imagine,) and made constant efforts to regain at least some power or influence as Regent within the Durbar. Sir Henry Lawrence vigorously rebuffed these efforts and, eventually, tiring of the game, he exiled the Maharani from the Durbar which was met with mixed reactions by the Sikh Generals, (Sirdars), some of whom welcomed her removal whilst others, ever distrustful, (with some reason), of British motives, wondered who, or what would be next. Following the end of the 1st Sikh war it would have been highly desirable for the British to disband the troublesome, impressive, 2Durbar is a Persian term meaning the Shah's noble court or a formal meeting where the Shah held all discussions regarding the state. It was later used in India and Nepal for a ruler's court or feudal levy as the latter came to be ruled and later administered by Persians and Perso-Turcomen rulers. A durbar may be either a feudal state council for administering the affairs of a princely state, or a purely ceremonial gathering, as in the time of the British Empire in India. 3 Maharani Jindan Kaur was awarded a pension of 15,000 Rupees. 4 The East India Company was the first real British influence in India and was for a long time completely separate from the British Government who came to India slightly later. The East India Company had their own army recruited from the Indians themselves although in the vast majority they were commanded by Europeans. During this account they will sometimes be referred to as ‘the Company’ as they were often called. 4 and their previous enemy Sikh Khalsa, (army), so that there was no temptation to rise against them again. The trouble was that the Muslim population within the Sikh Empire were showing signs of wanting to ally themselves with Dhost Mohammed Khan across the border in Afghanistan5. In order to prevent this and to maintain law and order it was going to be necessary to keep a large force in place, and the best force for the job, particularly as the British were not paying for it, was the Sikh Khalsa and so they remained largely as they had ended the war; albeit now commanded by British Company Officers and trusted Sikh Sirdars. Wars are expensive though and the 1st Sikh war was no exception; with the end of hostilities in 1846 the Governor-General of India, Viscount Hardinge (above left) was being hard pressed to make some cuts in his military budget. His eyes settled on the Bengal Army which had fought with loyalty and bravery alongside the British throughout the 1st Sikh war. Hardinge ordered that they were to be reduced in size by 50,000 men, a measure that the Bengal Sirdars did not take well at all. As if this was not bad enough, the Sirdars of the Bengal Army, quite reasonably, given their service to the British during the war and before, expected to be given some of the administrator posts that the British were filling in the towns of the Punjab. The fact that they weren’t given any of these jobs and that they were being forced to take orders from relatively junior officers and officials who had been, further annoyed them and piqued their own high sense of honour. The mistrust of the British by the Sikh’s was to be raised further in October 1847, just a few months after the British assumed control of the Punjab and responsibility for the protection of the Maharaja. In a letter to Henry Lawrence Hardinge revealed Britain’s real view on their position in the Punjab when he wrote: “In all our measures taken during the minority we must bear in mind that by the treaty of Lahore, March 1846, the Punjab never was intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of the State [the juvenile Maharaja] can neither make war or peace, or exchange or sell an acre of territory or admit a European officer, or refuse us a thoroughfare through his territories, or, in fact, perform any act without our permission. In fact the native Prince is in fetters and under our protection and must do our bidding." With references in this short paragraph to the lack of an independent status and, even more damming, that the ‘native Prince’ meaning the Maharaja, was ‘in fetters’ and ‘must do our bidding’, any reasonably intelligent Sikh could work out that Henry Lawrence and any of his successors were the de-facto Maharaja now, and that the British were unlikely to be going anywhere, even when the Maharaja reached his majority. As the historian John Clark Marshman said: “..an officer of the company’s artillery became, in fact, the successor to Ranjit Singh”6 As well as this inflammatory letter, the Sikh’s were further resentful at the eroding of their influence within their own sacred lands. The government of Lahore was now deeply unpopular amongst the Sikh people and the banning of Tigers in the Jullundur Doab as well as changes in the way land taxes were assessed and collected just made a bad situation almost intolerable, particularly amongst those Sikh’s that held land. Early in 1848, Sir Henry Lawrence (left), fell ill and departed on leave to England.
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