“A SHORT BUT SANGUINARY BUSINESS”

th THE 14 (KING’S) LIGHT DRAGOONS AND THE BATTLE OF RAMNUGGUR NOVEMBER 22nd 1848

Wayne Price 1

Copyright © Wayne Price 2012

Wayne Price has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs And Patents act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.

“Every man thinks meanly of himself for never having been a soldier; or not having been at sea”

Dr Samuel Johnson 1709-1784

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Above, a map of the and its surrounding districts, taken from the Historical Record of the 14th (King’s) Hussars (printed in 1901). How to pick a war The first Anglo-Sikh war which had raged for a year between 1845 and 1846 came to an end with a number of treaties being signed by the two opposing powers, the British Empire along with the and the Sikh Empire of North-East . During the war there had been a number of sharp engagements not least the fight at Ferozepur which had been a close run battle but ultimately a British victory, as had the whole campaign. On the 9th of March 1846 the Sikhs were forced to cede the region of Jullundur Doab1 which sits between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej to the British in what was known as the

Treaty of . This land was extremely valuable in terms of Agriculture and, as if to add insult to injury the Lahore Durbar2 was also ordered to pay 15 million rupees as an indemnity to the British,

1The spelling of many Indian places, names, rivers etc. changes throughout all of the research materiel that I used whilst compiling this account. Different regions would spell names differently and then of course there would be the anglicised version too. I have used the spelling that was in whatever research document I was using at the time for any given section of this account. 3 a sum selected perhaps, because the failure to pay it would result in further land losses. As was expected and indeed intended by the British, the Lahore Durbar failed to raise this money and was consequently obliged to cede further land to the British consisting of Kashmir, Hazarah and all the ‘forts, territories, rights and interests in the hill country situated between the Rivers Beas and the Indus’. It was an extremely bitter pill to swallow for the proud and noble Sikh people, let alone their leaders. In the Punjab, Maharaja Duleep Singh (pictured left in later life) remained as ruler despite his tender age of seven, his mother Maharani Jindan Kaur (pictured below right), a clever and diplomatically astute woman initially acted as his regent. It was a dangerous time to be the leader of anything in India with political assassinations, even within, and perhaps especially within families, a common event. In order to see the Maharaja through to an age, (16), where he could command some respect amongst his people and give him a fighting chance of remaining Maharaja for any length of time the Durbar, after being coerced by a senior British diplomat, Frederick Currie, requested that, in the ‘interests of stability’, the British provide a military presence until the Maharajah reached the age of majority. Never ones to miss a trick, especially a trick that was one of their own making, (and due to the fact that Currie was the Indian Governor-Generals agent), the British accepted this kind offer and, on the 16th of December 1846 both parties signed the Treaty of Bhyroval which effectively forcibly pensioned off the Maharani3 and replaced her, as Maharaja Duleep Singh’s advisor, with a British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence who was an Officer in the East India Company’s Artillery4. He was assisted by a Council of Regency made up of handpicked, (read tame), Punjabi individuals who doubtless had an interest in the British ruling the Punjab. Other British officials were placed in the key towns and cantonments of the Punjab which gave the East India Company, and by default the British, control of the Punjab, something that the East India Company had coveted for as long as they had been in India. Despite being pensioned off, the Maharani was naturally worried about her son, (and herself one would imagine,) and made constant efforts to regain at least some power or influence as Regent within the Durbar. Sir Henry Lawrence vigorously rebuffed these efforts and, eventually, tiring of the game, he exiled the Maharani from the Durbar which was met with mixed reactions by the Sikh Generals, (Sirdars), some of whom welcomed her removal whilst others, ever distrustful, (with some reason), of British motives, wondered who, or what would be next. Following the end of the 1st Sikh war it would have been highly desirable for the British to disband the troublesome, impressive,

2Durbar is a Persian term meaning the Shah's noble court or a formal meeting where the Shah held all discussions regarding the state. It was later used in India and Nepal for a ruler's court or feudal levy as the latter came to be ruled and later administered by Persians and Perso-Turcomen rulers. A durbar may be either a feudal state council for administering the affairs of a princely state, or a purely ceremonial gathering, as in the time of the British Empire in India. 3 Maharani Jindan Kaur was awarded a pension of 15,000 Rupees. 4 The East India Company was the first real British influence in India and was for a long time completely separate from the British Government who came to India slightly later. The East India Company had their own army recruited from the Indians themselves although in the vast majority they were commanded by Europeans. During this account they will sometimes be referred to as ‘the Company’ as they were often called. 4 and their previous enemy Sikh Khalsa, (army), so that there was no temptation to rise against them again. The trouble was that the Muslim population within the Sikh Empire were showing signs of wanting to ally themselves with Dhost Mohammed Khan across the border in Afghanistan5. In order to prevent this and to maintain law and order it was going to be necessary to keep a large force in place, and the best force for the job, particularly as the British were not paying for it, was the Sikh Khalsa and so they remained largely as they had ended the war; albeit now commanded by British Company Officers and trusted Sikh Sirdars. Wars are expensive though and the 1st Sikh war was no exception; with the end of hostilities in 1846 the Governor-General of India, Viscount Hardinge (above left) was being hard pressed to make some cuts in his military budget. His eyes settled on the Bengal Army which had fought with loyalty and bravery alongside the British throughout the 1st Sikh war. Hardinge ordered that they were to be reduced in size by 50,000 men, a measure that the Bengal Sirdars did not take well at all. As if this was not bad enough, the Sirdars of the Bengal Army, quite reasonably, given their service to the British during the war and before, expected to be given some of the administrator posts that the British were filling in the towns of the Punjab. The fact that they weren’t given any of these jobs and that they were being forced to take orders from relatively junior officers and officials who had been, further annoyed them and piqued their own high sense of honour. The mistrust of the British by the Sikh’s was to be raised further in October 1847, just a few months after the British assumed control of the Punjab and responsibility for the protection of the Maharaja. In a letter to Henry Lawrence Hardinge revealed Britain’s real view on their position in the Punjab when he wrote: “In all our measures taken during the minority we must bear in mind that by the treaty of Lahore, March 1846, the Punjab never was intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of the State [the juvenile Maharaja] can neither make war or peace, or exchange or sell an acre of territory or admit a European officer, or refuse us a thoroughfare through his territories, or, in fact, perform any act without our permission. In fact the native Prince is in fetters and under our protection and must do our bidding." With references in this short paragraph to the lack of an independent status and, even more damming, that the ‘native Prince’ meaning the Maharaja, was ‘in fetters’ and ‘must do our bidding’, any reasonably intelligent Sikh could work out that Henry Lawrence and any of his successors were the de-facto Maharaja now, and that the British were unlikely to be going anywhere, even when the Maharaja reached his majority. As the historian John Clark Marshman said: “..an officer of the company’s artillery became, in fact, the successor to Ranjit Singh”6 As well as this inflammatory letter, the Sikh’s were further resentful at the eroding of their influence within their own sacred lands. The government of Lahore was now deeply unpopular amongst the Sikh people and the banning of Tigers in the Jullundur Doab as well as changes in the way land taxes were assessed and collected just made a bad situation almost intolerable, particularly amongst those Sikh’s that held land. Early in 1848, Sir Henry Lawrence (left), fell ill and departed on leave to England. He assumed that his younger brother John Lawrence would be appointed in his place but Lord Dalhousie (below right), who had by now replaced Hardinge as Governor-

5 The British were rightly wary of any Islamic joining of minds with the Afghans. Dhost Mohammed Khan would prove to be a major thorn in the side of the British and emerge as one of the prominent leaders of the Afghans during the first Anglo-Afghan War. 6Ranjit Singh was the father of the boy-maharaja Duleep Singh. 5

General, appointed Sir Frederick Currie instead. Lord Dalhousie did however share the suspicions that Henry Lawrence had with the exiled Maharani and with regard to her true intentions he later said of her: “[She was] the only woman it the Punjab with manly understanding and in whom the British Resident foresaw as a rallying point for the well-wishers of the Sikh dynasty, she was kept under close surveillance. Henry Lawrence laid down that she could not receive in audience more than five or six Sirdar’s in a month and that she remain in purdah7 like the ladies of the royal families of Nepal, Jodhpur and Jaipur”. The new British Resident, Currie, was a legally trained man usually based in Calcutta, he was as unfamiliar with military matters as much as he was ignorant of the Punjab, not perhaps the best person to be placed in control of a region, of which he knew nothing about and was effectively controlled by military power. Not only was Currie bereft of probably the two most important knowledge bases that would help him govern well, he was also as far removed from Sir Henry Lawrence’s personality as it could possibly be. Whereas Sir Henry was affable and personable, taking an interest in all the agents that worked under him in the Punjab, Currie was a colder character, more aloof, prickly and tended to mistrust his agents; but then Currie wasn’t there to make friends. Although the British would be clever not to show their hand too early, Currie was there to make a war and create the conditions that would allow the British to take full control of the Punjab. The new regime of Dalhousie and Currie was quickly put to the test when a rebellion that was created by the British in Lahore, started in the city of . It had been sparked by a provocative and unreasonably high increase of the levy that was payable by the Sikh Governor there, Diwan8Mul Raj. As was no doubt the desired effect, Mul Raj was not able to pay the money and was forced to resign leaving the British free to appoint their own man. This Currie did in the form of Sirdar Kahn Singh Man; he was assisted, (and encouraged), by two British, (Company), Officers, Patrick Andrew Vans Agnew9 and William Anderson10. The party arrived at Multan on April the 18th 1848 they took possession of the Castle there from what must have been a very disgruntled Diwan, and then demanded to see the accounts for the last six years. Disgruntled the Diwan may have been but his soldiers were in a murderous mood at the treatment of their leader; when the two British Officers returned to their camp they were set upon by soldiers loyal to the Diwan and both British Officers were seriously wounded. The Diwan for his part rode off at some speed, obviously fearing the British response at what his men had done, whilst Vans- Agnew and Anderson were taken to a fortified Temple where their wounds could be treated; it was to no avail and both Officers died. The rebellion had started and, whilst the loss of these officers was no doubt deeply felt by the British in India, this was also just what the Company and Britain secretly wanted.

7 ‘Purdah’ is the Islamic custom of concealing women from the gaze of men. This can take the form of the Hijab in its mildest form, through to the actual physical removal of females from male company. 8 Sometimes spelt Déwan 9 Vans-Agnew was a man of some influence within the East India Company having previously been one of its directors. 10 William Anderson was an Officer of the Bombay Army. 6

Above, the memorial erected in memory of Patrick Andrew Vans-Agnew News of the rebellion reached Currie on the 21st of April and he in turn informed Lord Dalhousie who allowed the rebellion to nurture and spread over a period of five months. During this time, the flames of rebellion were fanned by the Resident Currie with various measures guaranteed to provoke the Sikhs. The Sikh Maharani, Jindan Kaur was now exiled not just from the Durbar, (she had been confined in the Fort of Sheikupura), but also from the Punjab entirely. She was taken first to Ferozepur and then on to Banaras, (modern day Kashi), on the banks of the Ganges in the province of Utter Pradesh. As if this was not bad enough, her pension was cut to 12,000 Rupees and her jewellery, worth alone a modest 50,000 Rupees was taken away as well as the 15,000 Rupees in cash that she had. The treatment of the Maharani by the British could not have been calculated better to enrage the Sikh’s, even Dhost Muhammad Khan in Afghanistan, a Muslim and no lover of the Sikhs was moved to say that, “such objectionable treatment is immoral to all creeds”. Perhaps afraid that the rebellion would spread to his district, and no doubt suitably enraged by Sikh impertinence, Herbert Edwardes, the agent responsible for the Bannu district of the Punjab began to raise troops from amongst the Pathan mercenaries with an intention of recapturing Multan and teaching the Mul Raj a lesson that he wouldn’t forget. He ordered the local military man, Henry Charles Val Cortlandt to march, with all despatch, to Multan and ensure, by force if necessary, that the city was returned to British control. The wider British reaction to this move was mixed, Currie supported Edwardes in this move whilst Dalhousie, publically anyway, was furious that such a low ranking civil servant should take such punitive action without permission from above. Dalhousie sent a strong letter to Edwardes as well as orders that he was not to proceed any further with his private war. Edwardes was obviously a man made of stern stuff. Undaunted by a rebuke from none other than the Governor General of India, he chose to ignore Dalhousie and marched his army across the Indus River where, at the village of Kineri on the 14th of June 1848, he met and utterly crushed the army of Mul Raj (left). This did nothing to endear the British to the Sikhs, and sentiment turned towards Mul Raj with many Sikhs rallying to his cause and the defence of their ancestral lands in the Punjab. Although they would never admit it, Dalhousie in particular, as well as the East India Company and the rest of the British, were delighted with the way things were turning out. Sensing the growing tension, the British started moving more troops towards the border between British controlled India and the supposed ‘protectorate’ of the Punjab. As well as the Lahore garrison receiving more troops, they were also gathered at Ambala in the South-West, and Ferozepur in the South. The figures were staggering when you consider that this was supposedly nothing more than a local rebellion, in all the British amassed over 21,000 troops to put against the uprising. Now there was more trouble; James Abbott who was the agent responsible for the district of Hazara suspected that the Sirdar, Chatar Singh, was also plotting, along with other Sirdar’s to rise against the British in that region. He acted without delay and charged the Sirdar with treason. Again the British authorities gave the impression that they were furious with yet another pen pushing civil servant getting above his station, they sent a Captain Nicholson to Hazara to conduct an inquiry into the allegations made against Sirdar Chatar Singh. The conclusions of the investigation completely cleared Chatar Singh of the charge but, in yet another crass and provocative gesture by the British, the conditions of the discharge that he was offered were utterly unacceptable to his honour, and he was forced to relinquish his position anyway, despite the fact that he had been found not guilty of the accusation of treason. 7

Chatar Singh and his family had been one of influence in the Punjab since the time of Maharaja Duleep’s father, Ranjit Singh, in fact, Chatar’s daughter was engaged to the young Maharaja currently in the care of the British and his dismissal, (for despite the fact that he resigned it was in effect a clear dismissal), was deeply embarrassing, as well as highly offensive. Chatar Singh’s son, Raja Sher Singh, was equally as dishonoured. Sher Singh’s resentment went further though when he considered that he had actively supported Herbert Edwardes action against the Mul Raj, only for his family to be treated in such a heavy handed and disrespectful way by the British. He had no choice when, in September 1848, he found common cause with, and joined the deposed Diwan Mul Raj against the British. Mul Raj was delighted to now have an ally from such a powerful family, even better was the fact that Raja Sher Singh (left) and his father were angry men whose family had been affronted, that meant that there was no going back for them until honour had been restored, fighting for land was one thing but in the Sikh culture, an affront to the family was something else. Sher Singh’s lack of interest in the preservation of Punjabi borders had already been well demonstrated when he took sides with Edwardes against Mul Raj, but an affront to his family honour was to the death. Sher Singh now went to work with a purpose calling for all Sikhs to rally to his banner and join the fight against the hated and dishonourable British. It is likely that he and Mul Raj finally understood the full intensions of the land grabbing British and that if they did not fight, the Punjab would soon be annexed as part of the and lost forever to the Sikhs. This struck a chord with the impossibly proud Sikhs, and thousands, many of them old soldiers from the Sikh Khalsa army and veterans of the last war answered the call. It was now that the British showed their hand; when news reached Lord Dalhousie that a large Sikh army was forming within the Punjab, commanded by Chatar Singh, Sher Singh and the Mul Raj, he could not conceal his delight. The decision to let the Multan rebellion fester for the past five months had led the Sikh’s to the conclusions and actions that Dalhousie had wanted all along. On the 5th of October 1848 Dalhousie announced, without a shred of irony or shame, at a public banquet in Calcutta that: "Un-warned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and, on my words, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance....We are now not on the eve but in the midst of war with the Sikh nation and the kingdom of the Punjab....I have drawn the sword, and have thrown away the scabbard, both in relation to the war immediately before us, and to the stern policy which that war must precede and establish." Although there had been no formal declaration, the second Anglo-Sikh war had begun, just as the British had planned it.

The 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons in India By September 1848 the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons had been in India for over 7 years having left England in May 184111under command of Lt Col J Townsend. During their early time in India the regiment had mainly been based at Bombay and Kirkee as part of the Poona Division of what was

11 The14KDG left in two parties from Gravesend in Kent. The first party under command of the CO, Lt Col J. Townsend, left on the East India Company ship the Repulse on the 24th of May 1941, arriving at Bombay on the 7th of September. The second party under Major Barton also embarked at Gravesend on the East India ship Reliance but later on the 14th of June and arriving at Bombay on the 13th of October 1841. 8 then known as the Bombay army. In 1843 they took part, in the Maharatta Campaign and also the campaigning the following year when the forts of Monshin and Munsomtosh were captured.12 Lt Col Townsend was still at this time the Commanding Officer but went back to the UK on sick leave in November 1844 to his home of Townsend Castle in Co. Cork, he was suffering from what was euphemistically called the ‘Indian Ague’. Townsend arrived back in England in January 1845 but sadly died on the 22nd of April the same year, after almost 40 years of service, 16 of them as the Commanding Officer of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons. On receiving news of his death, Lt Col William Havelock who up until that time had been the 2nd Colonel in the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons was elevated to Command the regiment with Captain W. H. Archer as his second in command and Lt Col King appointed as the new 2nd Colonel. The regiment continued to be represented in the small but often bloody sieges and battles that were the norm for this period in India. As well as the fortresses mentioned above, the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons also took part in the capture of the fortresses of Panulla and Powrghur, as well as spending many months at a time marching to and from flashpoints as and when they were required. This type of soldiering was extremely harsh on both man and beast and many more soldiers succumbed to the harsh climate and exotic but deadly diseases so foreign to a western constitution, than they did to a musket ball or a sword in an enemy hand. A good example of the primitive conditions that the men of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, as well as the rest of the British army had to endure in India is when the regiment was moving stations from Kirkee to Umballa to become part of the Bengal Army. They left Kirkee on the 15th of December 1845 on a march to . In the excellent book ‘Historic Record of the 14th (King’s) Hussars1715 – 1900’13 it says of this march; “The Fourteenth now had to undergo a long and monotonous march of nearly three months, during which time the Cholera was raging in the Malwa Jungle. Lt F. D. Gray, 1 sergeant and 15 privates died in the passing through the jungles between Ahmednugger and Mhow”

There were also miraculous recoveries, the account continues: “Lieutenant Herbert Gall had a most wonderful recovery. At some halting place en-route he was left behind for dead, to be interred, but it is said that some Champagne brought him round. He was actually being placed in his coffin when he uttered some ejaculation and the hospital apothecary gave him some Champagne having been told by the surgeon to give him anything he asked for”. It wasn’t all death and disease on that long march, during a four day rest halt at Indore the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons witnessed an event that must have seemed farcical; the history of the regiment tells us: “A very remarkable circumstance occurred during the four days halt of the Fourteenth at Indore. Owing to some display of fireworks by the native prince, 250 of the Troop Horses broke loose in a stampede and were not recovered for some days, and then with great difficulty. The terrified animals broke away from their piquet-ropes in a dark night, and scampered far and wide over the surrounding country. In about 5 days however all were brought back, excepting 6 or 7, and these were afterwards discovered at Kirkee, over 400 miles away”. With the horses now gathered together the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons continued their march through the sub-continent passing through Agra on the 27th of February, on March the 16th of March and finally their destination, Umballa on the 2nd of May becoming part of Major General Sir W. R. Gilberts Sirhind Division of the Bengal Army.

12 In actual fact it was not the entire regiment but two Squadrons which numbered 15 Officers, 289 men and 289 Troop Horses. 13 Written by Colonel H. B. Hamilton 9

The regiment remained at Umballa until the 15th of February 1848 when they left and moved to Ferozepur where, in May, the left wing consisting of the 3rd and 4th Squadrons were detached to Lahore in response to the Multan rebellion. The total strength of this detachment was 10 Officers, 213 men and 213 troop Horses. The rest of the regiment left Ferozepur in the August of that year as part of the armies that were being gathered by Dalhousie during his five month soak period that he was allowing the rebellious Sikhs. They entered Lahore on the 19th of August reuniting with the left wing and bringing the regiment up to its total strength of 9 troops which meant that there were 56 Sergeants, 12 Trumpeters, 8 Farriers, 40 Corporals, 627 Privates and 701 Troop Horses (Officers chargers were generally their own private property so was not counted within regimental strengths). With the tension rising and Sher Singh joining forces with the Mul Raj, a depot was created by the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons at Lahore for all the stores that were not required for field service, as well as the women and children of the regiment. On the 3rd of November 1848, following the outbreak of the second Anglo-Sikh War a guard force was left behind in Lahore along with the sick to provide security for the families and equipment whilst the rest of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, 442 men plus Officers, Commanded by Lt Col William Havelock took to the field as part of Lord Gough’s Army of the Punjab.

Lt Col William Havelock Commanding Officer, 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons William Havelock (left) was born on the 23rd of January 1793 the son of William Havelock of Ingress Park in Kent. He was briefly educated at Charterhouse School before his father enlisted a private tutor and had William schooled at home prior to joining the army which he duly did on the 12th of July 1810 as an ensign in the 43rd Regiment of Foot (later the Oxfordshire Light Infantry). At the age of 17, Twelve days after he had joined his regiment he carried their colours at the Battle of Coa during the peninsular war. He was also present at the battles of Busaco, Sabgual, Salamanca and Vittoria. He saw further action at the passage of Bidassoa, the battle of the Nivelle, the affair near Bayonne and at the battles of Orthes and Toulouse. During the 100 day campaign following Napoleon’s escape from his island prison of Elbe William Havelock took part in the Battle at Quatre Bras, the day before the Battle of Waterloo. During the action at Quatre Bras he was slightly wounded which may explain why he was appointed Aide-de-Camp to General Baron Alten, commander of the British 3rd Division during the main event, for which Havelock was awarded the Cross of the Hanovarian Order. Following promotion to Lieutenant in May 1812 and Captain in February 1818 he transferred to the 32nd Foot (later the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry) and then exchanged again to the 4th Light Dragoons on the 19th of July 1821 when that regiment was at Newcastle and Carlisle. Whilst in India with the 4th Light Dragoons Havelock found himself in a spot of trouble, a report in the Edinburgh Advertiser of the period says: “At a General Court Marshall held at Surat India on the 7th of December last, and continued by adjournment till 11th February, William Havelock Esq. Senior captain of his majesties 4th Light Dragoons was tried for assaulting and striking Lieut George Candy 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry, publishing him as a coward, and for falsely and maliciously reflecting on the character of Lieutenant-Colonel Elwood, of the 3rd Native Infantry, whom he had got under arrest. Captain Havelock was found guilty and sentenced to be cashiered from the service. The judgement has been confirmed by Lord Combermere, Commander-in-Chief”. Either William had friends in higher places than that of the Commander-in-Chief of India, or he was in fact cashiered and then obtained a commission later on, either way Havelock was appointed second Lt Col of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons in 1841 when they were ordered to India and then assumed command of the regiment following the death of Lt Col Townsend. He took the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons to the Punjab when ordered to under the command of General Gough, and 10 was killed on the 22nd of November 1848 whilst leading his men at the Battle of Ramnuggur. William Havelock had two brothers, Sir Henry Havelock, and Colonel Charles Havelock who was to have a distinguished career during the Crimean war.

Lord Gough’s Army of the Punjab 1848 The army that Gough commanded was, as usual for that time and for a century afterwards, mainly comprised of Indians bolstered, but by no means always bettered, by British Troops who were garrisoned in India to help protect Britain’s interests in the sub-continent. Britain, and by that I mean the East India Company, had always had a policy of recruiting their soldiers from the local population but employing European, (and some continental), Officers to command them. There were occasions when Indian Officers were used but in general terms these again would be commanded again by European’s. As Britain’s interests, (and financial gain), increased in India more and more of her own troops were being sent to India to ensure that the riches continued to flow into Britain’s coffers as well as having what one would hope was a guaranteed loyal force in the country should revolution occur ,(as it often did), amongst the fiercely proud Indians. It was usual practice to have at least one British regiment in an Indian Brigade be that one of infantry or cavalry, Gough’s army was no different. The army of the Punjab at the time of the Battle of Ramnuggur consisted of the British 3rd (King’s Own) Light Dragoons, (now the Queens Royal Hussars), the 9th Queen’s Royal Light Dragoons, (now the 9/12th Lancers, soon to be ‘The Lancers’) and the 14th King’s Light Dragoons, (now the King’s Royal Hussars). The Cavalry was commanded by another much loved 14th A fine portrait depicting a member of (King’s) Light Dragoon, Brigadier General the Bengal Light Cavalry. Charles Robert Cureton. The infantry component consisted of, the 24th of Foot, (now the Royal Welsh Regiment), the 29th of Foot, (now the MERCIAN Regiment) and the 61st of Foot, (latterly the Gloucestershire Regiment and now 1 RIFLES). Amongst the Bengal regiments that were part of Gough's Punjab Army the following took part, or were present during the Battle of Ramnuggur; 1st Bengal Light Cavalry (above), 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, 6th Bengal Light Cavalry, 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, 2nd European Light Infantry (later the Munster Fusiliers), 6th Bengal Native Infantry, 15th Bengal Native Infantry, 20th Bengal Native Infantry, 25th Bengal Native Infantry, 30th Bengal Native Infantry, 31st Bengal Native Infantry, 36th Bengal Native Infantry, 45th Bengal Native Infantry, 56th Bengal Native Infantry, 69th Bengal Native Infantry and the 70th Bengal Native Infantry. The Battle of Ramnuggur 22nd of November 1848 In order to increase the size of the force to be put into the field against the British, Sher Singh needed to join forces with his father, the recently dismissed Sirdar Chatar Singh, who was

11 encamped in the area of . Sher Singh led his army up along the northern14 bank of the Chenab River stopping to rest at the small town of Ramnuggur where he kept the majority of his forces on the northern bank but sent some guns and infantry across to form outposts there in order to warn of the British should they come. Gough for his part was extremely keen to prevent the Sikh father and son joining forces and would rather beat them separately if at all possible, on ground of his choosing. Gough was not necessarily aware that Sher Singh was encamped at Ramnuggur because his intention at this time was merely to conduct a reconnaissance in force towards the Chenab and the town of Ramnuggur, yes, to see if any enemy was present, but ostensibly to explore the river and the potential for fording it. The 8th of December 1849 edition of the Gazette, a pro-British newspaper, explains

the movements of the British and Sikh forces during the build-up to the battle; “The enemy who had been reported in force in several places, but who had always evacuated them before we could be occupied by us, were at last ascertained to be determined to make a stand at Ramnuggur, and General Cureton [commander of the cavalry]) was directed to halt until more troops could come up. Brigadier General Campbell joined his camp on the 12th and took command as senior Officer and bringing up another Brigade. Another further advance was made shortly afterwards and on the 17th the camp was near Akalghur (commonly written Alleepoor in letters written from the camp). General Cureton went with a small party to look at the village in the afternoon but was fired upon ; some of the rebel cavalry was also seen on that occasion, but not a man after that on the 17th or 18th, though a report was still rife that Sher Sing had strengthened his

14 There can be some confusion between left bank and right bank depending on whose account (the British or Sikh) you are reading. Where possible I have stuck to Northern Bank or Southern Bank for clarity, the Sikhs being encamped on the Northern Bank. 12 forces on the left bank of the Chenab15. If he did so on that day then he certainly withdrew all his troops on the right because on the 18th as a party that went close up to Ramnuggur could hear nothing of them; and it could be ascertained that the village of Akalghur had been evacuated during the night of the 17th of December”. Information continued to flow into the Headquarters of General Gough and his commanders as to the movements of Sher Singh and his army. On the 21st of November General Campbell whose headquarters were encamped at Saharun 9 miles south of Ramnuggur, received what was described as ‘authentic information’ that Sher Singh had been joined by the Bunnoo Troops under the command of Ram Singh, the information continued that the entire Sikh force was now encamped on the left (northern) bank of the Chenab but had three regiments of infantry and four guns on the southern side, the side that the British were on. In light of this information and, also due to the fact that the Pathan troops commanded by General Nicholson had captured a number of boats16 at Wuzeerabad during an earlier advance by Cureton on the 7th of November, it was decided, by General Gough that the 22nd would be the day that the British/Bengal forces would commence offensive operations against the Sikhs. The orders for the advance to Ramnuggur were given in the camp of Brigadier General Campbell on the night of the 21st of November; Gough had ridden to Campbell’s camp that afternoon. The Delhi Gazette tells us that; “..the following troops [were to] parade on the ensuing morning [22nd of November] at 3 o’clock in front of the centre of the camp, without the sound of bugle trumpet or drum. The whole of the cavalry (Her Majesties 3rd and 14th Regiments of Light Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Regiments of Light Cavalry and the 12th Irregular Cavalry).Two troops of Horse Artillery, (Duncan’s and Warner’s) and two Field Batteries (Austin’s and Dawe’s). And, two brigades of infantry (those) of Brigadier Godby, (2nd European Regiment and 70th Native Regiment) and Hoggan, (Her Majesties 61st Foot, 36th and 46th Native Infantry). At the appointed hour the mixed British and Bengal force assembled and, leaving some infantry and Captain Duncan’s Horse Artillery behind to protect the camp, they set off to march the 9 miles with a stated intent to conduct a reconnaissance in force and, if fortune allowed, to destroy the Sikh forces that were on the southern side of the Chenab River. It was a very dark early morning that saw this force leave on its march to the river and it wasn’t long before the carefully placed columns of cavalry, guns and infantry became all jumbled together, it wasn’t until daylight came that any semblance of order was restored. The movement of such a large force however was bound to be noticed and the Sikhs were alerted, (no doubt aided by a few spies in the British camp). The vast majority of the Sikhs that had occupied the southern bank now withdrew across the river before Gough and his force could attack them; and the remaining small picket that was left behind soon also made their way back across the Chenab leaving their tents pitched where they stood. At 7 A.M as the sun came up the British reached the town of Ramnuggur and observed their enemy on the far bank of the Chenab. One contemporary description describes the scene that befell the British troops: “It became apparent that their camp was pitched along the bank of the river, which was seen to be crowded by thousands of men whose white and light coloured garments strongly contrasted with the bodies of the British troops, to which our officers had been for some time past accustomed”. One frustratingly unnamed Officer of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons also described in detail the Sikh position and the lie of the land in a letter written from the British camp after the battle. His

15 Northern Bank 16 It was deduced that these boats along with the existing pontoon train would be sufficient to cross the Chenab in enough force to be successful. 13 description of the Chenab and of the nullah that was to play a crucial role in the battle is key to this account as well as the battle itself. “The Sikhs to the number of 30,000 men occupied the right bank of the river Chenab, where they had a strong entrenched camp with several batteries erected. A little to the right in front of Ramnuggur the river formed a bend; in it was an island containing a couple of acres of ground and between that and the left bank the water was about 30 yards wide with a precipitous fall from the left bank of from four to six feet before you got into its bed, which in some parts was four feet deep. This part is called the nullah, as the main branch of the river is on the right of the island. It is as nearly as possible in front of the centre of the Sikh position; on it were about 4,000 men and a battery of six guns while the approach to it was swept by a cross fire from two Batteries on the mainland”.

Ever one to seize the initiative, and within half an hour of reaching Ramnuggur, Lord Gough ordered two batteries of Horse artillery along with the 61st Foot, some irregular infantry and elements of the 3rd Light Dragoons forward to the edge of the river to fire upon those Sikhs who were still crossing the river. At the same time as the British infantry were moving forward in skirmish order, a large force of Sikh Gorcharras, (Sikh irregular cavalry), crossed over the river to offer some protection to their Sikh comrades who were by now beginning to suffer casualties from the British guns. On seeing these Sikh cavalry, Brigadier White, along with the 3rd Light Dragoons was ordered, by Gough, to charge the Sikh reinforcements and force them back into the river; this they successfully did. It should be noted that at this time of the year the River Chenab itself was a comparatively thin winding stream, the real problem was the wide sandy bed either side of the stream which was a treacherous bog for man, horse and artillery piece alike. After forcing the Sikhs back into this sandy bog Brigadier White very wisely halted the 3rd Light Dragoons, his job being done for the moment. During this action the 3rd Light Dragoons suffered one man killed with three wounded and a number of horses also killed or wounded. When Gough had ordered the Horse Artillery forward It would appear that one battery had been a little too zealous in getting forward to engage the Sikhs, with some even descending the river bank and deploying amongst the sand. Now though, they were coming under some fairly effective fire from the Sikhs across the river, and their position was becoming tenuous. The artillery was ordered to limber up and return to a safer place out of range of the Sikh guns. Whilst doing this, one of the horses from Lt Colonel Lane’s 3rd Troop was shot in its traces and fell, the gun foundering in the sand, the Delhi Gazette again: “The Sikhs were not slow in perceiving this most inopportune embarrassment and directed so hot a fire upon the spot that it was found necessary to abandon the gun”. It wasn’t only the gun that was abandoned but the limber and a few other carts as well. Although this was a small and relatively minor incident, (except to the gunners whose colours are the very guns themselves), the Sikhs on the far bank were delighted and Sher Khan sensing the mood of his men began to push more troops, including a fairly significant force of cavalry across the river with a view of attacking Gough’s right flank. Following the earlier charge of the 3rd Kings Light Dragoons, and in reaction to the Sikh fire which was as accurate as it was heavy, Gough sent a staff officer to order his cavalry, including the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, to take shelter behind a sloping group of trees on the left of his line. As they were withdrawing a 9lb round shot struck the charger of Captain Ouvry17 (14th (King’s) Light Dragoons) passing straight through the beast but leaving the gallant Captain unscathed. During the whole of this move to safety round shot and musket balls were flying through the ranks of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons but miraculously did no other damage to either man or horse and the

17Ouvry was later to be a Colonel in the 9th Lancers 14 cavalry successfully reached the cover of the trees, where they were described as ‘remaining quiet for a time’. When the 3rd Light Dragoons under White had finished their charge and had pulled up, avoiding plunging down the nullah into the sand and bog, Gough, a man who did not mince his words, asked the question ‘why was the 3rd retiring’ which of course they were not. He was informed by a staff officer about the nullah that Gough couldn’t see from his position, and of the treacherous ground that would impede any serious cavalry action. Gough was not interested nor impressed at the 3rd Dragoons for not exploiting what would have certainly been a tactical mistake and, as one

witness said, “he pooh-poohed” the nullah as an irrelevence. He was soon to eat his words.

A map showing the action at Ramnuggur, taken from the 27th of January 1849 edition of the Illustrated London News In fact, Cureton was to tell Havelock just before the charge, and whilst they were still sheltering behind the trees, that Gough had said that, “he did not understand why a dry nullah should stop cavalry”. On hearing his commander in chief’s views and his obvious displeasure in the 3rd Light Dragoons stopping at the steep nullah, Havelock turned to his Adjutant, Captain R. P. Apthorp and said, “I have just seen Cureton and from what he says I expect to get immediate orders to charge to the front, as Lord Gough was displeased at the old 3rd Light Dragoons not pursuing the Sikhs further over the nullah”. It should be borne in mind that the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons still did not know the extent of the nullah and in fact thought that it was actually the river and that there was a ford across it. Now though, with the large force of Sikh cavalry re-crossing the river through the nullah Gough, despite being fully briefed of the dangerous and unsuitable ground that they would have to cross, ordered the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons to deploy and drive the Sikhs back across the Chenab. The official history of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons says: 15

“It was probably between the hours of 1 and 2 P.M. in the afternoon , or perhaps earlier , when Lieutenant Colonel Havelock received his orders from a staff officer sent by General Lord Gough, who was not far off, to charge the Sikh cavalry that had crossed the river in large masses and were clearly visible to the front”. Havelock was a known fire eater and was delighted at the chance of some action, he stated at the time that his ‘opportunity had arrived to win his golden spurs’. Ordering two of his Squadrons, the 1st Squadron, commanded by Maj Doherty and the 2nd Squadron, commanded by Maj Goddard, along with some of the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry forward, Havelock led them in two columns across the plain between the stand of trees where they had been sheltering towards the Sikhs who were now establishing themselves on the southern side of the river. For at least half a mile as these Squadrons advanced they were under a murderous hail of fire from the Sikh guns posted on the banks of the river and, in an unusual move, Havelock increased the frontage of the charge from troop size to squadron size, increasing the size of the target that the Sikh gunners had to aim at. The Sikh cannon were extremely well trained and well led, a contemporary account of the battle explains: “Nothing could exceed the accuracy of the enemies fire: their range was beautifully taken from certain points, showing that they must have discovered them previous to our advance; and our artillery officers say that they never saw anything finer than the way that their horse artillery were brought up to the edge of the river and formed up. No nation could exceed them in the rapidity of their fire. It is said that a Frenchman, late an officer in the Maharaja Runjeet Singh’s service and Aide-de-camp to General Avitahile, named L’Enfant commands them”. What Havelock did not know, because he could not see it, was that he was leading his men directly towards the nullah that contained the island described in the letter written by the adjutant above. In short, he was heading towards 4,000 rifles and a large number of well sited guns. General Cureton (pictured on the next page) who was sat with the remainder of the cavalry saw where Havelock was leading the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons and was horrified to see the thousands of Sikh soldiers armed with matchlocks occupying positions in ravines around the nullah as well as the island who would inevitably cause severe casualties to the approaching British cavalry. He immediately ordered the 3rd Kings Light Dragoons to follow him and sped off in an attempt to warn Havelock of the danger. Havelock though had by now given the order for his bugler to sound the charge and Cureton himself would never make it. As Cureton was galloping his way towards the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons he, and the 3rd(King’s) Light Dragoons, came under cannon and matchlock fire themselves, one musket ball killing General Cureton with a shot to the heart, his Aide-de-Camp was also wounded. The death of the

much respected Cureton was described at the time: “He [Cureton] was riding at 16 the time along with the Commander in Chief (Lord Gough), and the rest of the staff, among whom were Lt-Colonel J. B. Gough officiating as Quartermaster General, (in India) and Major F. P. Haines, Military Secretary. Following closely was the chief’s personal escort of 5th Light Cavalry. Cureton, perceiving that Havelock was forming up his Squadrons with the evident intention of making another charge, and not approving of this under the circumstances, rode off hurriedly to stop him, but was almost immediately shot dead by a bullet which struck him in the chest18” Above, a rather fanciful and very Victorian depiction of the death of Brigadier-General Cureton. He was in fact not at close quarters with the Sikhs when he was killed. Meanwhile the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons were at full gallop cheering and shouting as they closed on the Sikh cavalry. The enemy cavalry began to retire through the nullah onto the island, their infantry closing ranks in front of them as they moved rearwards. As soon as they came into range the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons were met with a murderous weight of fire from both the Sikh guns and the infantry on and around the island, an eyewitness records:

“Nothing daunted Colonel Havelock, cheering, led the first two squadrons of the Fourteenth down to the bank, then into the nullah, crossed it at a gallop, and sabred hundreds of the enemy under the most frightful of shower of missiles from the guns and the infantry”

The official history also describes this charge; “They [the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons] were now exposed to the close matchlock fire of the enemy, and as the ground near the island was of a boggy nature, ill-suited to cavalry, the water having recently subsided, many horses floundered about and frequently got into difficulties, but the men rode gallantly forward against the opposing Sikhs, sabreing hundreds of them and driving the ‘Gorchurras back helter-skelter into the river and numerous channels which ran up the creeks and banks on all sides. It was now that Havelock perceived for the first time the large bodies of infantry concealed in these dry channels running along the bed of the river”. With this charge now spent and, due to the boggy sand, the momentum being lost, Havelock ordered his cavalry to return to a position on the river bank where the other two squadrons of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons along with the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry joined him. Having returned through the nullah and seen how utterly treacherous the ground was for the horses, a sensible decision would have been to use infantry if necessary, who could function better in the conditions, to attack the Sikh position. But Havelock was so fired up by the excitement of the hunt that it clouded his judgement, he was not finished and he was hell bent on making a second charge right into the centre mass of the Sikh position; one commentator said of him after this first charge: “Although his first attack had been eminently successful in driving back the Gorchurras as desired by Lord Gough, his characteristic dash and headlong pluck seem to have over swayed his

18 In his picture, ‘The Charge of the 14th Light Dragoons at Ramnuggur’, Henry Martens depicts Cureton being shot in both the throat and chest whilst galloping over the plains to warn Havelock. This may be based on a statement written by Brigadier Campbell which was written after the battle has some discrepancies with other accounts. 17 prudence and better judgement”. Another picture from the Illustrated London News showing the charge of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons at Ramnuggur Havelock now ordered his 4th squadron, commanded by Maj Scudamore to join him in the line and his 3rd squadron, under the command of Maj Wilmer to remain in reserve along with the regiments second Colonel, Lt Col King. Havelock was also joined now by the majority of the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry commanded by Brevet Lt Col Alexander. Thus reinforced Havelock took his place square in front of the first line and ordered the cavalry to charge yet again. During this second charge to the nullah the Sikhs, who were by no means tactically stupid, made adjustments to their positions forcing Havelock to readjust the direction of his charge on no less than three occasions. Each adjustment meant that some speed and momentum was lost, thus reducing the effect that Havelock was trying to deliver upon the Sikhs; the regimental history continues the story: “The squadrons were exposed to a murderous fire from the batteries on the right bank of the river, as well as from the guns posted on the island, yet nothing daunted they charged right into the centre of the Sikhs driving them back towards the river, and sabreing right and left in the mêlée which ensued”.

This was indeed a desperate and close quarter fight which was being fought with the tip and blade of the sabre as well as the rifles and bayonets of the Sikhs, Colonel Havelock was shot and killed as he plunged down the nullah with the full force of his regiment behind him bowling over his grey charger. In the desperate fighting, Captain Fitzgerald was surrounded by Sikh soldiers and pulled from his horse to be hacked to death on the ground, one sword cut penetrating his brain and another his spine. Fitzgerald was no lightweight and he, along with most of the British cavalry was weighing in at 18 to 20 stone when fully dressed in the saddle, his horse, like so many others having covered the ground twice at full gallop, was all but blown when it reached the nullah and he was defenceless against so many Sikhs. The Sikhs fought savagely and with huge courage being described thus: “No men could act more bravely than the Sikhs. They faced us the moment we came on them, firing all the time, and when we did come on them some opened out, and immediately after closed round us, while others threw themselves on their faces or turned their backs, protected by a shield from the stroke of a dragoons sabre, and the moment that was given turned around, hamstrung the horse and shot the rider; while the individual acts of bravery were the admiration of all. Many stood before a charging squadron and singled out a man, after killing or wounding whom, they themselves were cut down immediately; while many, before their blows could take effect, received the point of a sabre and fell in the act of making a cut”. Captain Gall, one of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons Troop Commanders, and the very same man who had survived against the odds when he contracted cholera, spotted an enemy standard that he desired to capture, but on grabbing it he had his hand all but severed and fell from his horse. Noticing the Sikhs swarming around their fallen officer, a number of Gall’s men made their way towards him and fought their way through to rescue the officer before a mortal blow could be delivered. They got their man out alive but the standard remained where it fell. One of his men was later to say of Gall’s gall in trying to capture the standard, “it was a gallant act but a very indiscreet one”. In Gall’s place Cornet D’Urban Blyth took command of the troop and, whilst still charging, he noticed a brother officer, Lt McMahon fall wounded from his horse and a large Sikh rushing forward to finish him off. Blyth spurred his charger forward and met the Sikh with the tip of his sabre penetrating right through his body, killing him instantly. This was no fluke for the brave Cornet and, on no less than three, (or four or five), different occasions during the charge, Blyth was to break ranks and kill an enemy in single combat. The Adjutant, having witnessed each combat, and being

18 so impressed with the young cornets skill with the blade excused him from further sword drill from that moment forward. He, the Adjutant, Apthorp was later to write in a letter after the battle: “With regard to Cornet Blyth, he had not long joined us, and I recollect that after his sabreing of four or five of the enemy and saving McMahon’s life, I dismissed him at once from any further sword-drill”. The battle still raged with both sides giving no quarter and perhaps the British having the better of the fight, but if so, then only just. The Sikhs for their part fought with skill, determination and immense bravery, Lt Col Alexander of the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry was shot in the arm by round shot which also forced his shoulder from its socket and he was forced to retire19. The cannon shot that struck Alexander had already passed through the quartermaster of the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry eviscerating him and then, after hitting Alexander, the same ball struck Lieutenant Reilly, another 3rd Dragoon, severely wounding him. As well as those already mentioned, the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry lost 12 privates killed, 15 wounded, as well as 40 horses killed or wounded during the battle. One account said of the fighting,

“On the other side of the nullah we came up to their guns and the whole force of the enemy. We were totally disorganised by the confusion caused by jumping into the nullah and out of it, and which was lined by sharpshooters under the taking-off bank”. Corporal William Todd of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, riding in the rear rank of one of the squadrons had his head taken clean off with a round shot and was seen, still in his saddle, albeit headless, charging on through the Sikhs. As well as Havelock, Fitzgerald and Todd the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons lost a further 11 men killed in that bitter hand to hand fight. In his letter written a few days after the action Apthorp continued: “It was of course helter-skelter afterwards until we emerged from our side of the nullah again, and it was some little time before the officers could restore anything like order as the Sikh horsemen followed us again”. It is a point of irony, but one generally agreed, that if it had not been for the nullah, which completely broke up the charge of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, they, (the British), would have suffered a great deal more casualties. The success of a cavalry charge usually rests on the fact that all the horsemen will arrive onto its objective in a solid mass of men and horses, therefore delivering the maximum force at one point. The accuracy of the Sikh guns during the battle of Ramnuggur was such that a large formed body of cavalry would have been decimated20. The fact that the nullah forced the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons, (and their brothers in the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry), into smaller groups meant that the Sikh cannons had too many small groups to fire at which is much more difficult. Now though this second charge has run its course and it too was spent. The 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons now needed to extricate themselves from the mass of Sikh infantry. As the regiment withdrew and tried to disengage from the Sikhs, Havelock’s grey horse was spotted and a couple of the men dismounted so that they could lead it back, it was not a very prudent thing to do and within seconds the Sikhs were upon them forcing the soldiers to remount and make off, only escaping being hacked to pieces by the skin of their teeth. Maj Doherty eventually brought the regiment out of battle leading the men and horses, all of who were by now exhausted, to join up with Maj Wilmer’s 3rd Squadron and the second Colonel, Lt Col King who had been left in reserve and was now to succeed Havelock as the Commanding Officer..

19 Alexander was later to lose the arm, and in some accounts of the battle it is described as being ‘shot off’. 20 A fact borne out all to clearly during the charge of the light brigade some six years later during the Crimean War. 19

Although the human cost of the battle had not, by the standards of the time, been high, the loss of Cureton and Havelock was keenly felt by the British. In all, the casualty list for the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons read:

14th (King’s) Light Dragoons Killed: Brigadier-General Cureton (shot through the heart), Colonel Havelock (found 12 days after the battle, he had been shot dead but later mutilated, having his head, one arm, one leg and his left thumb cut off). It is also recorded that his body was discovered surrounded by the bodies of nine of his men, Captain Fitzgerald (mortal sword cuts to the head and spine). Fourteen other soldiers of the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons were also killed during the battle or died of their wounds subsequently, they were: Sergeant J. Harwood, Corporal W. Todd, Privates J. Alderton, W. Alpin, R. Bagg, W. Brazeur, C. Fox, J. Hatton, R. Hungerford, B. Jennings, j. Raines, C. Tuttell, J. Ward, G. Williams.

14th (King’s) Light Dragoons Wounded: Lieutenant Hardinge (Cureton’s ADC, shot through the shoulder), Captain Scudemore (sabre cut to the face), Captain Gall (hand severed), Lieutenant McMahon21 (shot in the head), Lieutenant Chetwynd (bullet to the side). Twenty-five other 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons soldiers and 25 horses were also wounded. 34 horses were missing. On the day after the battle Lord Gough visited the wounded and ‘expressed himself to each in the kindest terms about his injuries and with the strongest praise of his brave conduct’. The charge at Ramnuggur may not be the best known exploit of Queen Victoria’s colonial wars and the Sikh campaigns may have been side-lined by later conflicts like the Crimean war, the Zulu war, the war against the Mahdi and that against the Boers later in the 19th century. Whether or not the charge was foolish, reckless or even criminal is beside the point, the men that took part were certainly brave, especially in light of the fact that during the second charge, most of them, (less perhaps the 4th squadron that did not take part in the first charge), knew exactly what they were getting into and still went forward with a cheerful heart. A letter written to the London Illustrated News just after the battle highlights this point: “An attempt will doubtless be made to cast some blame upon the commander-in-Chief for the result of these two affairs but not justly. The facts are that General Cureton ordered in the first instance both movements and if they had been carried out as he had wished, they would have been attended with the happiest of results, but on both occasions mistakes in the execution, to a great deal unavoidable, marred the original plan. In both cases the ardour of our troops was too great. It was a rush who should get to the enemy first, but it must come as most gratifying to the Commander-in-Chief to witness the brilliant conduct of the regiments engaged and the intrepidity with which they were led by their officers”. On the question of whether Havelock was tactically wise in charging over and into the nullah given the condition of the ground within it, especially in light of the fact that he went not once but twice, there is a backhanded comment to be found in the official history of the 14th (King’s) Light Hussars. Also contained within the passage is an admission that despite Lord Gough’s mutterings about Brigadier White halting the 3rd Light Dragoons at the lip of the nullah, it was the correct decision, it says: “It will be seen by the above casualty lists that the losses of the Fourteenth were much heavier than those of any other regiment engaged, and there is no doubt that they and the 5th Light Cavalry had the brunt of the affair to themselves. It is true that the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 8th Light

21 The unlucky McMahon was to be wounded again ten years later during the Indian Mutiny when he received severe sabre cuts to his legs and right hand during an action at Koonch. 20

Cavalry charged across the plain several hours before the charges of the Fourteenth took place, and the Sikh Irregular cavalry (Gorchurras) retreated before them, but neither regiment penetrated into the position of the Sikh forces posted beyond the nullah, as it is believed Brigadier White did not consider the ground suitable for cavalry, and was induced to retire his brigade from the ground subsequently crossed by Havelock, in the exercise, as was afterwards proved, of a very wise and soldierly judgement. This would naturally account for their lighter list of casualties”. Sometime after the battle the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry presented the 14th (King’s) Light Dragoons with what has become known as, the ‘Ramnuggur Cup’, its presentation, and its use has been described in the official history of the regiment, and, with regard to its use not much has changed, in 1901 it was recorded as: “The memory of that glorious day [of the battle] has ever since been held sacred by the Fourteenth and as year by year comes round; the anniversary is celebrated, especially in the sergeant’s mess, where a ball or other entertainment takes place. Past and present officers with other friends and guests are invited, and on these occasions it is the time-honoured custom to revive old memories and stirring scenes long past by toasts and libations freely taken from the celebrated ‘Ramnuggur Cup’, a handsome silver bowl presented to the sergeants mess many years ago, by the gallant 5th Light Cavalry who shared in the glories of that day, and charged along with the Fourteenth as brave and trusty comrades. The cup is emblematic of the occasion and has a suitable inscription engraved on it, with a glorious list of actions in which the regiment has been engaged with the enemy, in their campaigns in the Peninsular, Punjab, Persia and central India numbering no less than 28”. The Battle of Ramnuggur was considered an all cavalry affair, (as far as the British were concerned), and so was never named or awarded as a . That the men that took part in it were brave is beyond doubt, whether it achieved anything is also very clear, it didn’t. After the battle the two sides remained on their respective sides of the Chenab until the 30th of November when a large body of the British moved 22 miles upstream and forced a crossing at the town of Wazirabad. Events then moved on apace with both armies fighting inconclusive skirmishes until they met again in force, on the 12th of January 1849 at the battle of Chillianwallah, and the 2nd Anglo-Sikh war rumbled on, but that is another story......

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