Preventing Strategic Defeat a Reassessment of the First Anglo-Afghan War
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Preventing Strategic Defeat A Reassessment of the First Anglo-Afghan War Adam George Findlay A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences University of New South Wales Canberra September 2014 i Table of Contents Acknowledgements ii List of Maps v Explanatory Note: Thesis Mapping Conventions and Military Abbreviations vi List of Figures viii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Britain’s Afghanistan Strategy to 1838 21 Chapter 2: The First Anglo-Afghan War: 1838–1842 67 Chapter 3: Ellenborough’s Strategic Deliberations: February – April 1842 122 Chapter 4: Ellenborough’s Strategic Deliberations: May – July 1842 159 Chapter 5: The Advance of the ‘Army of Retribution’: August – September 1842 194 Chapter 6: Kabul Operations and Withdrawal of the ‘Army of Retribution’: 242 September – December 1842 Conclusion 293 Bibliography 301 ii Acknowledgements This thesis began in 2009 as part of my preparation for the first of my two operational deployments to Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Reading the accounts of previous British and Russian Wars in Afghanistan, I was initially disconcerted with the prevailing view that any outside intervention in Afghanistan constituted a ‘graveyard of empires’. My reservation was reinforced with the brutal experiences of the ‘fighting season’ during the summer of 2009 in southern Afghanistan. ISAF’s Coalition Force operations were, at best, in a strategic stalemate against a resilient enemy in many of the locations that feature in this thesis – Kandahar, Gereshk, Qalat, Panjwa’i and the Arghandab River Valley. However to my surprise, upon reading Stocqueler’s biography of the British commander of the Kandahar Garrison in the First Anglo-Afghan War, Major-General Sir William Nott, I concluded that Britain’s Kandahar Campaign had indeed been an outstanding success. It appeared odd that such a success appeared to have been airbrushed out of the popular and prevailing historical narrative fixated on the destruction of the Kabul Garrison in January 1842. Examining Nott’s domination of southern Afghanistan, essentially a kinetic counter-insurgency campaign in modern parlance, provided much-needed succour and campaign validation in the dark days of 2009. Returning to Afghanistan in 2013, this time to HQ ISAF in Kabul, I had completed my primary thesis research at the University of Oxford and the Royal College of Defence Studies in London. I was more aware of the strategic effects achieved by the British during their concluding phase of the First Anglo-Afghan War through the actions of the ‘Army of Retribution’. Ironically, much of my operational planning throughout 2013 for Commander ISAF, General Joseph Dunford, was focussed upon successfully ending ISAF’s war and for the transition of security primacy to the emerging sovereign nation of Afghanistan. My academic research complemented my professional endeavours that were focussed on successfully ending hostilities on terms to ensure a long-term security equilibrium. Whilst the questionable excesses of the ‘Army of Retribution’ were certainly not included in the operational design for ISAF, my research reinforced that ending a war on favourable terms is the most important of strategic military endeavours. Given the centrality of the actions of the ‘Army of Retribution’ in achieving an enduring security equilibrium on the north- iii western borders of British-India for three decades, I was again perplexed by the popular perceptions of the ending of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Prevailing narratives tend to treat the concluding actions of the First Anglo-Afghan War by the ‘Army of Retribution – if they are considered at all – with distain and as an unnecessarily vindictive afterthought of little consequence. My academic endeavours since 2009 challenging these prevailing orthodoxies on the First Anglo-Afghan War, interspersed with nearly two years of fighting in Afghanistan, are greatly indebted to a number of key supporters. Firstly my loving wife and family have remained constant and true – accepting the many trials and worry with a normality that many could not even contemplate. To my supervisor Professor Jeffery Grey who throughout the many career interruptions of a professional Army Officer has provided an unflappable reassurance and pitched his guidance perfectly with a deft and assured touch. My primary research was only possible during a truncated stay in the United Kingdom through the generous support of Professor Sir Hew Strachan and Dr Robert Johnson at the University of Oxford, Major-General ‘Mungo’ Melvin at the Royal College of Defence Studies, and Dr Tony Heathcote who came out of retirement to generously provide his considerable expertise. I also thank the innumerable and dedicated staff who so generously supported my research at the British National Archives, the British Library, the Bodleian and All Souls College Libraries at the University of Oxford, the National Army Museum in London, the Prince Consort’s Library in Aldershot, the National Library of Australia, and the Australian Defence Force Academy Library. I am grateful for the cartographic expertise of Keith Mitchell who has enabled the representation of the many significant but forgotten military actions of the First Anglo-Afghan War that this thesis has recreated from written historical sources. I am also indebted to the Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant- General David Morrison, for providing a brief career hiatus between demanding appointments immediately upon return from Afghanistan – effectively allowing the completion of this thesis. Lastly, I want to thank my Afghan brother Major-General Sakhi Ahmadzai at the Presidential Palace in Kabul. In addition to the complexities of our joint prosecution of violent extremists and his onerous responsibilities supporting President Karzai, he was able to guide my (literal) battlefield research and through the dark times share a much- needed laugh over many cups of chai. I hope that our current ‘Fourth Anglo-Afghan iv War’ finally provides what many societies take for granted – a secure and prosperous future, free from fear and intimidation where our children grow up to a better life – a future that all Afghans deserve. Tashakur! v List of Maps Central Asia 1838 ix 2.1 Battle of Arghandab River: 12 January 1842 108 2.2 Nott’s clearance operations around Kandahar: 7 – 12 March 1842 114 3.1 Sale’s ‘crowning mercy’ victory at Jalalabad: 7 April 1842 134 3.2 Pollock’s seizure of the entrance to the Khyber Pass: 5 April 1842 141 5.1 Monteith’s punitive operations: 17 Jun – 3 August 1842 196 5.2 Pollock’s advance from Peshawar to Kabul 206 5.3 Attack and capture of Mama Kheyl and Kali Kheyl: 24 August 1842 208 5.4 Forcing the Jegdalek Pass: 8 September 1842 214 5.5 Encounter battle at Tezin Pass: 12 September 1842 218 5.6 Battle of Tezin Pass: 13 September 1842 222 5.7 Nott’s advance from Kandahar to Kabul: 8 August – 17 September 1842 226 5.8 Battle of Khwaja Sei Ghar (‘Gonine’): 30 August 1842 229 6.1 McCaskill’s ‘Army of Kohistan’ Campaign: 248 25 September – 7 October 1842 6.2 McCaskill’s capture of Estalef (‘Istaliff’): 29 September 1842 250 vi Explanatory Note: Thesis Mapping Conventions and Military Abbreviations There is a paucity of battlefield mapping or schematics produced to accompany the written accounts of the many military actions and activities conducted during the First Anglo-Afghan War. The mapping and schematics within this thesis have been derived exclusively from contemporary written accounts by those directly involved in the military actions undertaken by the British Army in Afghanistan. As part of the original research for this thesis, I have synthesised these contemporary written accounts with my familiarity with the terrain over which many of the battles of the First Anglo-Afghan War were fought. Matching the contemporary eyewitness accounts is made difficult by the inexact nature of the nineteenth-century mapping, which was not subject to modern cartographic standards, with the more precise modern mapping of the same regions used in the current conflict in Afghanistan. This synthesis is further compounded, as any Afghan scholar will attest, because illiteracy is widespread in Afghanistan. Given the predominance of oral culture, Afghan place names are mainly spoken and have slight regional variations, therefore for contemporary British accounts these place names have been transliterated phonetically into English – a process that was far from standardised, hence the example of the many spellings of Kabul/ Kabool/ Cabool/ Caubul, and Kandahar/ Kundahar/ Candahar/ Qandahar, etc. For place-name naming convention within the thesis I have defaulted to the most common and recognisable use of place names, whilst restricting the contemporary spelling (when different) to direct quotations. Mapping Conventions I have used modern military conventions as a standardised shorthand to represent the military organisations represented on the battlefield during a particular encounter/ activity. The symbols are matched to the accompanying narrative in the thesis text. To assist in your interpretation, the following are examples of the mapping/ schematic conventions adhered to throughout the thesis: vii Infantry Battalion (approximately 1000 troops). Specifically refers to Her Majesty’s (HM) 9th Regiment of Foot of the Queen’s Army Infantry Battalion (approximately 1000 troops). Specifically refers to the 26th Regiment of Native Infantry (NI) of the East India Company Army Cavalry Squadron (approximately 100-200 troops). Specifically refers to the 3rd Irregular (IRR) Horse of the East India Company Army Engineer Company (approximately 100-200 troops). Specifically refers to Captain Broadfoot’s Engineers (or ‘Sappers’) of the East India Company Army Artillery Battery (minus) (approximately 60-80 troops and four guns). Specifically refers to a Horse Artillery (HA) Battery of the Queen’s Army Cavalry Troop (approximately 30-40 troops). Specifically refers to the 3rd Dragoon (DRAG) Regiment of the Queen’s Army Artillery Section (approximately 30-40 troops and two guns).