Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and
Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process
A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts
Jason A. Akbar
March 2012
© 2012 Jason A. Akbar. All Rights Reserved.
2 This thesis titled
Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and
Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process
by
JASON A. AKBAR
has been approved for
the Department of Political Science
and the College of Arts and Sciences by
Takaaki Suzuki
Associate Professor of Political Science
Howard Dewald
Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract
AKBAR, JASON A., M.A., March 2012, Political Science
Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and
Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process
Director of Thesis: Takaaki Suzuki
This thesis is a study of the institutional reforms in Japan, particularly the impact of electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms enacted during 1990s on the current policymaking structure and process. It is well documented that the
LDP politicians, government bureaucrats and powerful special interest groups controlled the policymaking process prior to the reforms. Different Japan scholars have offered differing opinions on the impact of the 1994 electoral reform, 1999
Diet and government reform, and 2001 administrative reform on policymaking process. Here I have evaluated the impact of the 1990s reforms by examining three policymaking initiatives of the Koizumi administration. I suggest that understanding the impact of the 1990s reforms requires examining the specific details of each policy initiative at each stage of the policymaking process from creation to implementation. My analysis suggests that the reforms significantly altered the policymaking process at certain but not at all stages of the policymaking. The reforms consolidated the policymaking process but failed to completely rid the influence of bureaucrats and special interest groups on policymaking.
Approved: ______
Takaaki Suzuki
Associate Professor of Political Science 4 Table of Contents
Page
Abstract...... 3
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………...5
Chapter 1: Japan’s Policymaking Structure and the 1990s Reforms………………………10
Chapter 2: Postal Reform……………………………………………………………………………………37
Chapter 3: Highway Reform…………………………………………………..……………………………55
Chapter 4: Anti-Terror Legislation…………………………………………………………………...…70
Chapter 5: Analysis of Koizumi’s Policymaking……………………………………………………85
Conclusion………………………….……………………………………………………………………………102
5 Introduction
In analyzing the structure of Japan’s postwar policymaking process, numerous scholars have pointed to the historical relationship of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), influential bureaucrats from government ministries, and powerful special interest groups in policymaking. For decades, members from these three groups built strong ties with each other, using their respective resources to exchange influence for power and to secure political and economic benefits for their cohorts and constituents. It is important to note, however, that this relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests groups, often described as an
“iron triangle,” was not a political phenomenon unique to Japan. Nevertheless, unlike the iron triangles in other political systems, scholars have noted that Japan’s iron triangle was not just one organization, but actually the combination of several divided networks, a so-called “multiplicity of iron triangles,”1 each charged with addressing specific policy interests. An additional feature of Japan’s policymaking structure, unlike other policymaking systems of modern democracies that have incorporated an executive authority, is that it was dominated by a network of decentralized iron triangles, developed completely outside of the executive’s purview, leaving Japan’s prime minister sidelined.2 The nature of this system has been attributed by many scholars to the overarching dominance of the LDP in what, for decades, was mainly a single-party system, as well as Japan’s electoral system.
1 Curtis, Gerald L. The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. New York: Columbia UP, 1999. 54. 2 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "Japan's Un-Westminster System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy." Government and Opposition (2003). 6 However, between 1994 and 2001, a series of electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms were enacted in Japan. These reforms brought about several institutional changes within Japan’s political structure. The 1994 electoral reform altered Japan’s Lower House electoral system by switching from multi-member districts to a combination of single-member districts and proportional representation districts. The 1999 Diet and government reform reduced the size of the Cabinet, removed bureaucrats ability to answer policy questions on behalf of politicians at Diet committees, and created a new standing committee to allow the prime minister and opposition leaders to openly debate policy issues. Finally, the
2001 administrative reforms established several new offices to address policy issues within the Cabinet Secretariat, such as the Office of Assistant Cabinet
Secretaries, created new positions within the Cabinet Secretariat to liaise with the prime minister on policy issues, and revised the Cabinet Law in order to clarify the prime minister and Cabinet’s role in policymaking.
A number of Japan scholars have analyzed the impact of these reforms on
Japan’s policymaking process. Some have argued that the prime minister’s role in policymaking has increased significantly due to the reforms, whereas others have concluded that the prime minister’s role in policymaking has not increased. Thus, the questions remain as to whether or not the reforms have disrupted the traditional policymaking process; and whether or not the reforms have empowered the executive to pursue a more active role in policymaking.
In order to further contribute to the growing literature concerning how institutional changes affect policymaking in Japan, I examine the traditional 7 policymaking process, the reforms that modified the old policymaking process, and assess the impact of these reforms on the current policymaking process with an emphasis on why different scholars have drawn differing conclusions about the same reforms. For this purpose, I examine the impact of the 1990s reforms on a set of policy initiatives namely, postal reform, highway reform, and anti-terrorism legislation, implemented under the Koizumi administration between 2001 and 2005.
I review these policy initiatives at five different stages of the policymaking process:
(1) where they originated and what their original purpose and details were, (2) how the they were promoted outside the initial policy drafting circle, (3) how they were challenged by the opposition and then revised, (4) how they were passed in the Diet, and finally, (5) how close the final bill were to their original drafts and purposes.
Examining the policy initiatives at each of these stages allows for a more critical analysis of the impact of the 1990s reforms on Japan’s policymaking structure.
My argument is that analyzing the impact of the 1990s electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms at each of the above mentioned five policymaking stages offers a better insight on the impact of the 1990s reforms on policymaking. Here, I show that the 1990s reforms significantly affected specific stages of the policymaking process. For example, the initial policy introduction and drafting stage was affected whereas other stages, such as the negotiation stage, were less affected. A better understanding of the specific impacts of the 1990s reforms also helps to explain the differences between scholars’ assessments on the reforms.
It is evident from the three case studies presented in this thesis that the 1990s reforms clearly increased the prime minister’s ability to lead policymaking in the 8 initial stages. However, the impact of the 1990s reforms at the later stages, such as the negotiation and passage through the Diet stages, is not as clear-cut and varies across the three cases. This variation denotes the limitations of the 1990s reforms and demonstrates their weakness in reforming the policymaking structure especially in cases of entrenched domestic political interest. For example, Prime
Minister Koizumi was unable to take advantage of the 1990s reforms to overcome opposition from within his own party to policy initiatives, such as the postal and highway reforms, without offering concessions that greatly compromised his goals.
In contrast, Koizumi’s anti-terrorism legislation was able to pass through the Diet without significant alteration.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Before examining the case studies of policy initiatives during the Koizumi administration, the traditional Japanese policymaking process and its connection to the “iron triangle” relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest groups is explained. Following this description, the three 1990s reforms, the 1994 electoral reform, 1999 government reform, and the 2001 administrative reform, as well as scholars’ analyses of the impact of these reforms, is presented. In the following sections, the three policy cases studies, which are postal reform, highway reform, and anti-terror legislation, are presented. Following these cases, an analysis of the prime minister’s role in directing those initiatives, as well as how the 1990s reforms influenced to his ability to lead policymaking, are presented. In this section, the degree to which the prime minister succeeded or failed in pushing his reforms will also be addressed. The 9 thesis concludes with a discussion of these three case studies and the insights they provide on changes in Japan’s policymaking process. 10 Chapter 1: Japan’s Policymaking Structure and the 1990s Reforms
Between 1994 and 2001, a series of electoral and administrative policy reforms were implemented in Japan. Some Japan scholars, as seen later in this chapter, have identified the 1994 electoral reform, the 1999 Diet and government reform, and the 2001 Hashimoto administrative reform as catalysts of change in
Japanese policymaking. However, the impact of these reforms on Japan’s policymaking process has been widely contested by other scholars who discount the significance of these reforms. In addressing scholars’ arguments and attempting to evaluate the significance of these reforms, it is necessary to ask: (1) Has the policymaking process become less decentralized?; (2) Has the relationship between the party and bureaucracy changed?; (3) Have party politics changed due to these reforms?; and (4) Has the executive branch’s role in policymaking changed?
In order to discuss the impact of the above stated reforms, it is first necessary to discuss how the policymaking process has or has not changed since the three policy reforms were enacted. In reviewing the analyses of the impact of these reforms, I am seeking to understand why there is such a widespread disagreement on how these reforms have affected Japanese politics.
In order to fully represent the breadth of this discussion, I have divided this review into four sections. The first section examines the policymaking process prior to the implementation the three reforms. The second section addresses electoral reform and examines the assessment of the changes brought by the new electoral system. The third section discusses both the government and administrative 11 reforms of 1999 and 2001 and analyses of their significance. The final section addresses the implications of the changes in the structure of Japan’s policymaking process.
The Policymaking Process Before Reform
Analyzing the effects of the ’94 electoral reform, ’99 Diet and government reform, and ’01 administrative reform policy first requires a description of Japan’s political and policymaking structure. A significant observation is that between 1955 and 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the ruling party in a one party dominant system.3 As a result, the LDP’s influence can be seen in all of the Japanese policymaking process. As noted by Aurelia George Mulgan, the party and the bureaucracy dominated the policymaking process for nearly four decades.
Furthermore, Mulgan asserts that the executive branch of the Japanese government not only played a weak role in policymaking, but also that the policymaking process existed entirely separate from the executive branch of government.4
Within the LDP, Mulgan identifies the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and Executive Council as two prominent parts of the policymaking process. These councils maintained a policy of ‘advance inspection’ and ‘prior approval’ for all proposed legislation before submission to the Diet. All proposed legislation, including policy initiatives from the executive, were required to undergo prior
3 For more details on this, see Gerald Curtis’ The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. 4 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "Japan's Un-Westminster System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy." Government and Opposition (2003): 76-77. 12 review by PARC and the Executive Council, which essentially gave the party control over policymaking.5
As a central part of the policy review process, PARC naturally became a place for LDP Diet members to address the interests of their constituencies. Furthermore,
PARC offered a venue where LDP members could interact with other party members representing special interest groups, such as farmers, construction workers, doctors, and postal workers, etc. Different policy tribes, referred to as zoku, represented these special interest areas by being comprised of LDP members who were experts in those specific areas.6 LDP members relied heavily on the expert knowledge of their policy tribe affiliates to aid them in drafting policies on a variety of issues.7
The LDP’s involvement in policymaking only represented one half of Japan’s policymaking structure. The bureaucracy controlled the other half of policymaking.
According to Mulgan,
“The power and autonomy of the bureaucracy was based on formidable control over the functions of policy advice, initiation, formulation and implementation. Bureaucratic authority was sustained by the power to make administrative rules comprising various kinds of ordinances and regulations, mastery of the technical details of policy, a virtual monopoly of policy information, dominance of the law-drafting process…”8
Due to their specialization, Japanese bureaucrats became, in many ways, the gatekeepers of the policymaking process. As a result, LDP members interested in
5 Mulgan (2003): 78. 6 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "The Leadership Role of the Prime Minister and Party." Policy and Society (2004): 10. 7 For more details on PARC and zoku, see Gerald Curtis’ The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. 8 Mulgan (2003): 80. See also, Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. 13 formulating policy had to forge relationships with bureaucrats. Ultimately,
Japan’s policymaking process was born out of this mutual relationship between the
LDP (the ruling party) and the bureaucracy. Party members relied on their connection with bureaucrats to draft legislation and receive financial resources for policy initiatives, whereas bureaucrats relied on their party connections to secure their interests, such as the passing of budget and other ministry-concerning policies through PARC and eventually the Diet.9
Beyond possessing the technical knowledge and resources required for policymaking, bureaucrats also wielded a tremendous amount of bargaining power through the control of financial resource distribution. LDP members seeking grants and subsidies for special interest projects depended on their bureaucratic ties to secure funding.10 As a result, an LDP member’s ability to deliver services to his or her constituency depended on connections with government bureaucrats. In this sense, a party member’s longevity as a politician was tied to his or her bureaucratic connections because without this relationship, it would have been difficult to provide for the needs of the constituents.
The connection between politicians, their constituents, and the bureaucracy represents a pivotal dynamic of Japan’s policymaking process. Moreover, it is important to note that a vast network of individual connections between politicians and bureaucrats characterized the policymaking process. This is an important
9 Mulgan (2003): 83. 10 Mulgan (2003): 80. 14 distinction in Japan’s policymaking structure, and its evolution may be attributed to Japan’s electoral system.
The electoral system in place prior to the 1994 Lower House electoral reform was a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system with multi-member districts
(MMD). Under this system, most electoral districts had between two to six seats.
Voters cast their ballot for a single candidate and seats were awarded to the top two to six candidates, depending on the district, who received the most votes.11
Due to the multi-member nature of the system, it was common for candidates from the same party to compete for seats within the same district. Within the LDP, candidates relied on their intra-party affiliation to their factions, which was their primary method for distinguishing themselves from other candidates within the party. Additionally, candidates relied on their faction for campaign support, which included financial and other resources. The findings that, between 1958 and 1990, only twelve percent of non-incumbent conservative candidates as compared to sixty-five percent of incumbent conservative candidates, were elected clearly demonstrates the importance of factional affiliation.12
Beyond receiving campaign support, politicians also relied on their factional affiliation to rise within the party. Moreover, the cost of leaving or switching factions was extremely high. In making such a decision, Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies noted that faction members needed to consider their “faction-specific social capital,
11Krauss, Ellis, and Robert Pekkanen. "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the LDP?" Journal of Japanese Studies (2004): 4. 12 Cox, Gary, Frances McCall Rosenbluth, and Michael Thies. "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." British Journal of Political Science (1999): 35. 15 faction-specific seniority, and the nature of electoral competition.”13 Switching from a faction essentially meant terminating the political network one cultivated through factional affiliation. Additionally, leaving or switching factions caused a member to lose his or her seniority and consequently the loss of one’s chance to be appointed in the Cabinet or other ministries. Finally, switching factions was risky because a candidate would not necessarily be able to gain the support of a new faction, considering that factions usually only supported one candidate per district.14
Faction bosses also played a crucial role in party politics, in particular, the selection of the party president. Within the LDP, this role was especially critical since becoming party president effectively guaranteed the prime ministership due to the LDP’s dominance since 1955. Selecting the party president typically occurred through voting along factional lines. In some instances, the presidential election was skipped and faction bosses determined the new party president based on assumed factional loyalties.15 The selection process for the party president demonstrated the importance and power of factions within Japanese politics prior to the 1994 electoral reform. Under this system, both faction bosses and factions members had a vested interest in working together; faction members relied on the support of their faction boss to secure resources needed to fund their campaign and deliver constituent services, and faction bosses required the support of their members during the selection of party president.
13 Cox, Rosenbluth, Thies (1999): 37-38. 14 Cox, Rosenbluth, Thies (1999): 38. 15 Cox, Rosenbluth, Thies (1999): 36. 16 Prior to the 1994 electoral reform in the MMD system, candidates from the same party often competed with fellow party members for seats in the same district.
However, a party is interested in winning as many seats as possible in the same district, this meant that campaigning had to be conducted to increase support for a particular candidate without decreasing a fellow party member’s chance for election.
This complex dynamic highlights the role of factions, the various policy tribes, and special interests in the election process.
Since a politician competed against fellow party members, he or she could not rely on party identity alone to win an election. As a result, the campaign process became highly personalized to each candidate, wherein citizens cast their votes based on loyalty to a specific person rather than to the party. Within their districts, politicians built up personal candidate support organizations (kōenkai), which were needed to increase support and mobilize voters during elections. Naturally, a key focus of politicians was to cultivate and maintain constituent loyalty. To do this, politicians had to consistently deliver services, which included various types of subsidies, public works projects, and construction contracts, to their constituencies.16
In seeking to deliver these services, politicians had to develop ties to party factions and policy tribes that addressed the special interests of their constituencies.
Over time, senior party members were able to advance to higher levels within their faction and policy tribe, thus increasing their involvement and expertise in policymaking. Political ties within the party, however, were not sufficient enough for
16 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 5. 17 politicians to deliver constituent services. Politicians also needed to secure the financial resources required to implement the various special interests projects their constituents demanded. By forging personal relationships with bureaucrats in the relevant ministries, politicians were able to obtain financial resources for projects in their constituencies.17
The final aspect of the Japanese policymaking process relates to the involvement of the Cabinet and government ministries. Here, the influential role of the LDP, especially its factions, in the policymaking process was visible through its ability to control the allocation of Cabinet positions. As earlier noted by Mulgan, the control over the policymaking structure lay in the relationship between the ruling party and the bureaucracy, which in turn, essentially weakened the autonomous power of the prime minister and cabinet from the process.
The power of the executive was further reduced by minimizing the prime minister’s control over selecting Cabinet members. While the prime minister had the legal authority to select cabinet members, the influence of factions had created a system in which each group was represented equally. As a result, the prime minister chose cabinet members in a manner that balanced the requests of each faction.
Additionally, cabinet nominations were determined by the decisions of factional bosses and members’ seniority within the faction. In order to accommodate the high
17 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 5-6. 18 number of appointment recommendations, prime ministers had to reshuffle their cabinet about once per year.18
The role of factions in the cabinet appointments selection process, as well as the routine reshuffling of cabinet member, helped to protect the policy agendas of the ruling party and bureaucracy while simultaneously minimizing the ability of the executive branch to participate or affect policymaking. By organizing cabinet appointments based on their recommendations, faction bosses ensured that loyal, senior-ranking members would represent their faction in the Cabinet. Furthermore, the constant reshuffling of cabinet members meant that appointees were not in power long enough to exert any significant influence over the bureaucrats within their ministries. As a part of the prime minister’s purview in policymaking, the
Cabinet’s minimal sway over the relationship between the ruling party and bureaucracy was a significant part of the executive’s weakness in policymaking.
Even the prime minister’s Cabinet Secretariat had minimal influence in policymaking. Despite the executive authority conferred to the prime minister and
Cabinet Secretariat by the Japanese constitution, their role in policymaking was vaguely described through the Cabinet Law. For these reasons, policy initiation was left to the authority of bureaucrats from different ministries, who coordinated with experts from within the LDP’s PARC and various policy tribes for policymaking.19
18 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes." SAIS Review 23 (2003): 20-21. 19 Shinoda (2003): 21. 19 Electoral, Government, and Administrative Reforms
The Japanese policymaking process prior to reform was characterized by the strength of the LDP and bureaucracy and the weakness of the executive. Through numerous personal relationships between LDP politicians representing constituent interests, policy experts from PARC and other policy tribes, and bureaucrats with the technical knowledge of policymaking and control over crucial financial resources, the Japanese policymaking process developed into a structure that operated separately from the executive. This decentralized structure, as asserted by numerous scholars, was born out of several factors of Japan’s political system. For example, the MMD electoral system arguably created the need for candidates to adapt personalized campaign platforms representing the interests of specific constituencies in order to win seats in a district while competing with other members from the same party. These dynamics increased the importance of intra- party factions, which candidates relied on for campaign support. Additionally, the need for addressing specialized constituent interests increased the need for experts on specific policy areas. These policy experts, who were members of PARC and other policy tribes, coordinated with their fellow party members to draft policies addressing the special interests of their constituents. Furthermore, party members relied on their personal connections with bureaucrats to help secure the resources required to enact these policies. In exchange for this help, bureaucrats were able to rely on party members to uphold their own interests. Similarly, the role of factions in cabinet appointments and the vagueness of the Cabinet Law effectively tied the 20 hands of the prime minister and Cabinet Secretariat, thus preventing either from penetrating the LDP and bureaucratic control over policymaking.
Electoral Reform
The first, and perhaps most significant, reform was the electoral reform of the Lower House of the Diet in 1994. Under the reform, the MMD electoral system was changed to a new system of 300 single-member districts (SMD) and 200 (later adjusted to 180) seats based on proportional representation (PR). In the new SMDs, candidates had to compete among each other for the same seat. In the proportional representation system, each political party compiles an ordered list of candidates to run in each of the eleven regional PR districts. Seats in these districts are allocated to parties based on the proportion of votes a party received. As a result, voters cast two ballots. The first ballot is for the SMD election, in which a voter chooses a candidate to support, and the second is for the PR election, in which a voter chooses a party to support. Under the new electoral system, candidates are not prohibited from running in both the SMD and PR elections, meaning that a candidate who lost the SMD election could still win a PR seat if he or she was placed high enough on the party’s ranked list.20
The proclaimed affects of the 1994 Electoral Reform have been highly contested. According to Tomohito Shinoda, the electoral reform significantly reduced the power and function of factions in the policymaking process. Shinoda argues that the shift to SMDs reduced factional influence in elections because factions no longer compete against each other for seats in the same district. He
20 Shinoda (2003): 41. 21 asserts that this change has allowed junior-ranking party members to be more vocal within the party, even going as far as to criticize senior-ranking members.
Shinoda has attributed this ability to the fact that candidates in SMDs do not have to rely as heavily on the support of their faction to win an election. Under the old MMD system candidates from the same party (but different factions) competed against each other for seats and factional bosses regulated the distribution of factional funding for campaigns. In the new SMD system, however, only one candidate from each party ran in a single district. Additionally, under the new system, a candidate from one political party was not allowed to run against an incumbent candidate from the same party. Shinoda believes that this provision has also attributed to junior-ranking members’ new voice because factional bosses cannot threaten to support a new candidate if an incumbent decides to not “keep in line” with the faction.21
Shinoda also sees the increase of cross-factional cooperation between LDP members as a sign of factional decline. He cites the formation of inter-factional groups such as “The Group to Build a Japan for Tomorrow,” by Taro Kono, which focused on reforming the LDP, as one example of this. However, Shinoda sees the
April 2001 LDP presidential election as even more demonstrative of the effects of electoral reform. In March 2001, Taro Kono, backed by support from numerous junior-ranking LDP members, issued a plan that would allow local party members to participate in the party presidential election. As discussed earlier, party presidency was determined by an election among local party members. However, these
21 Shinoda (2003): 22. 22 elections were usually based along factional allegiances, with faction bosses even going as far as to select a party president through negotiations based on assumed factional allegiances without conducting a physical election. Such a scenario occurred early in 2001, when faction bosses quickly chose Yoshiro Mori to replace the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Agitated over this “backroom” decision- making, Taro Kono submitted an alternate plan that would incorporate votes from local party members in the party presidential election.22
Shinoda notes that support for Kono’s plan was high among junior-ranking party members, a new trend which he attributes to electoral reform and the decreased ability of factions to keep younger members in line. Eventually, these supporters were able to seek a compromise with the faction bosses and established that local party members would be given 141 votes. Due to this compromise, the
April 2001 party presidential election had 487 votes (141 local party members and
346 LDP Diet members). At the time of the election, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the leader of the largest LDP faction with 101 members, appeared to be high in the running for party president. Once again, numerous junior-ranking party members openly voiced their opinions, calling for their colleagues to not adhere to the practice of voting along factional lines. Additionally, these members called for and established a two- day question session for all of the candidates for the presidency. In the election,
Hashimoto received a mere 155 votes. Koizumi, on the other hand, received 298 votes, thus winning the party presidency and eventual prime ministership.23
22 Shinoda (2003): 22-23. 23 Shinoda (2003): 23. 23 Shinoda views the election of Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001 a proof of significant changes brought about by electoral reform in 1994. Koizumi was the first prime minister whose election had not been merely along factional lines.
Additionally, he notes that support for Koizumi had been promoted through the efforts of junior-ranking LDP members who called on their colleagues to break with the factional voting tradition. These members also helped to promote Koizumi throughout the local party districts.24
According to Shinoda, the role of factions has significantly changed as a result of electoral reform in 1994. Other scholars have drawn similar or contrasting conclusions about the impact of this reform. Similar to Shinoda, Krauss and
Pekkanen have noted that the role of factions has changed. They observed that one significant change is the declining reliance of candidates on their factions for support during elections. As discussed earlier, the new system of single-seat districts means that candidates no longer need help from their factions to create a personalized campaign platform to win seats while competing with other members from the same party. Krauss and Pekkanen have also noted that since the party only represents one candidate per district, the need for factions to fund a candidate’s campaign has declined. Rather than relying on their factions or kōenkai for financial support, Krauss and Pekkanen found that candidates turn to personal connections with businesses for fundraising instead. 25 They confirmed their findings by interviewing different Diet members. One interviewee stated, “Factions had three
24 Shinoda (2003): 23. 25 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 15. 24 roles, the most important one was helping you in the election. Until now you had an electoral struggle with a member of another factions but since it’s SMD, it’s one person for the party. Therefore, it [factions] no longer has any function.”26 Similarly, another Diet member asserted, “…Ultimately things are different than in the multi- member district system. Nobody looks after you in elections any more.”27
However, Krauss and Pekkanen assert that factions’ control over the distribution of posts and party advancement has not declined. For example, one Diet member has remarked that appointments to different committees, such as the Diet
Affairs Committee, or positions within PARC, are still decided by negotiations between factions. Similarly, another interviewee has revealed that Diet members who are not affiliated with a faction are usually last to receive Diet appointments.
Furthermore, unaffiliated members often do not receive assignments to their preferred posts, and are given the posts remaining after factions had a chance to negotiate for their members.28
In assessing the role of factions under the new electoral system, Cox et al., examined changes in candidate endorsements. In conducting this analysis, they first looked at changes in the kōenkai support system for candidates. They found that since parties only back one candidate in a particular district, the role of kōenkai from the old electoral system in helping support candidates compete against their fellow party members has become obsolete. In fact, kōenkai, which had once competed against each other for seats in the same district, now needed to cooperate
26 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 15. 27 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 15. 28 Krauss, Pekkanen (2004): 16. 25 in order to promote a single candidate from their party. In most instances, support for the party candidate in the new single-seat districts was given to the candidate who had the strongest kōenkai in the district. The remaining candidates and their kōenkai were expected to consolidate their support to the chosen candidate. This was difficult in many cases because several rivals from different factions of the same party were now expected to cooperate and demonstrate party unity. Moreover, in districts where it was harder to determine the strongest candidate, Cox et al. noted that there was little factional influence in choosing a single candidate for that district. Instead, they found that candidates seeking endorsement sought to construct cross-factional support. 29 In the case of a candidate’s endorsement for PR elections, Cox et al. found that factions played a minimal role because the endorsements were determined by regional party organizations. They also noted that rankings on candidate lists were usually based on seniority or on the level of LDP support within the regional district, rather than factional influence.30
In contrast, Krauss and Pekkanen assert while the role of kōenkai might have changed under the new electoral system, some important functions were still retained. For example, kōenkai were still necessary for generating personal votes for candidates. It has been argued that the SMD system has decreased the need for personal vote gathering strategies because parties only endorse one candidate.
However, Krauss and Pekkanen stress that the need for personal vote strategies
29 Cox, Rosenbluth, Thies (1999): 42-45. 30 Cox, Rosenbluth, Thies (1999): 46. 26 persists because candidates can lose an SMD election but still win in the PR election. Winning a PR election requires that a candidate be ranked high enough on the party list, which is usually determined by the number of votes a candidate wins in his or her single-seat district. As a result, candidates who wish to be competitive in a PR election need constituent support to receive a high ranking on the party endorsement list. To achieve the high enough ranking, candidates still rely on support from their kōenkai. Additionally, kōenkai remain important for candidates because voters who are not LDP supporters, may still support a particular candidate who happens to be from the LDP. In fact, Krauss and Pekkanen note that since the electoral reform, the diversity of kōenkai members has increased for several candidates, which may signify that party identification has remained unimportant to voters.31
Another aspect of the policymaking process that may have been affected by electoral reform is the role of PARC and the zoku policy tribes. Prior to the reform,
Krauss and Pekkanen noted that some scholars predicted that the need for PARC and policy experts from zoku would decline since the need for candidates to appeal to special interest constituency groups would no longer persist in single-seat districts.32 Contrary to this prediction, Kraus and Pekkanen found that the roles of
PARC and zoku have altered but not declined. While candidates no longer need to rely on policy specialization to attract specific voter-groups due to competition with fellow party members, they found that candidates now need to represent a wide
31 Krauss and Pekkanen (2004): 12. 32 Krauss and Pekkanen (2004): 14. 27 range of policy interests in order to maintain the support of different special interest groups within their constituencies. As a result, LDP members must turn to
PARC and zoku to help them become familiar with multiple policy issues, which ensures the continued influence of these organizations. The fact that LDP Diet members are no longer restricted to joining only two PARC committees, which was the rule prior to electoral reform, clearly demonstrates increased influence of PARC and zoku.33
In analyzing the influence of PARC and zoku in the new electoral system,
Mulgan found that their roles in policymaking primarily remain unchanged. In examining the outcomes of the new electoral system, Mulgan, like Krauss and
Pekkanen, acknowledges the persistent but altered role of kōenkai in a candidate’s campaign strategy. She also recognizes that electoral reform, specifically the shift to
SMDs, increased the need for LDP candidates to broaden their understanding of different policy interests to address a wider constituency base in their districts, which has helped maintain the need of PARC and zoku in educating party members.34
Mulgan, after assessing these changes, concluded that the policymaking structure has not been changed due to electoral reform. Specifically, Mulgan argues that electoral reform did not weaken factions, PARC, or zoku. In fact, she believes that electoral reform helped strengthen the ruling party and bureaucracy’s control over the policymaking process by strengthening the relationship between them. As
33 Krauss and Pekkanen (2004): 19. 34 Mulgan (2004): 13. 28 previously stated, the relationship between LDP politicians and the bureaucracy formed out of the need for politicians to create personalized campaign platforms and develop and deliver special interest policies in order to maintain the support of their constituencies. These dynamics was attributed to the nature of the MMD system, which created intra-party competition for the multiple seats in a district.
However, according to Mulgan the switch to SMDs did not eliminate the need for
LDP politicians to employ personalized vote-gathering strategies. On the contrary, she found that candidates must focus even more attention on creating personalized vote-gathering strategies that can attract supporters from a wide range of special interest areas. Furthermore, in order to maintain the support of their constituencies, candidates must secure special interest benefits. Since delivering benefits to constituents was conducted through the development of personal relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. Under the old electoral system, politicians relied on only a few personal networks in order to deliver targeted benefits to a specific group of voters, whose support was needed to win one of the multiple seats in a district. In the new system, candidates must focus on developing more personal networks with bureaucrats across a wider range of policy interests in order to deliver more targeted benefits to different interest groups within a single constituency. Thus, developing personalized vote-gathering strategies by increasing connections with policy experts and bureaucrats is even more important under the 29 new electoral system, which suggests that electoral reform did not weaken the traditional policymaking structure.35
Government and Administrative Reforms
The second major reform that has influenced the Japanese policymaking process was actually a series of government reforms of 1999. These reforms, designed to reduce bureaucratic influence on policymaking, were implemented as a result of negotiations between the LDP and the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party, led by Ichiro Ozawa, reached an agreement with the LDP that would reduce the number of cabinet ministers from twenty to fourteen starting in 2001. In doing so, Ozawa asserted that the cabinet would become more effective in policymaking because it would be easier to reach unanimous consensus on issues with fewer cabinet members.36
Ozawa sought to further reduce bureaucratic influence by eliminating the
“government commissioner system.” Under this system, Diet members often relied on bureaucratic officials to respond to policy questions from opposition parties during Diet deliberations, which gave bureaucrats influence as policy experts. Under the new system, bureaucrats are only permitted to answer “highly technical” questions in response to specific request from a Diet committee.37 Another outcome of the 1999 government reforms was the creation of a new standing committee on
35 Mulgan (2004): 13. 36 Shinoda (2003): 24. 37 Shinoda (2003): 24-25. 30 national basic policy as a venue for the prime minister and opposition party leaders to openly debate policy issues.38
In addition to the government reforms, a series of administrative reforms were also enacted in 2001 to strengthen the prime minister’s role in policymaking.
While the administrative reforms were developed under Prime Minister Hashimoto in the late 1990s, they were not implemented until 2001. The administrative reform led to the revision of the Cabinet Law to better define the role prime minister and
Cabinet Secretariat in policymaking. The revised Cabinet Law made it clear that the prime minister had the authority to introduce policies at cabinet meetings.
Additionally, the reform established the Cabinet Secretariat as the “highest and final organ for policy coordination under the Cabinet,” giving it the authority to present and deliberate on policy initiatives without having to rely on the support of a given ministry.39
The administrative reform also created the Office of Assistant Cabinet
Secretaries, which was formed by merging the Offices of Internal Affairs, External
Affairs, and National Security Affairs and Crisis Management. Controlled by three assistant cabinet secretaries, the office was given the authority to create temporary offices for addressing specific policy areas. In consolidating the three former offices, the new Office of Assistant Cabinet Secretaries had a better organization for addressing policy issues more efficiently.40
38 Shinoda (2003): 25. 39 Shinoda (2003): 26. 40 Shinoda (2003): 26. 31 Lastly, the administrative reform established the Director for Crisis
Management position within the Cabinet Secretariat. The director was to help the
Cabinet Secretariat in having a stronger leadership role in responding to national crises by serving as a direct link between the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet
Situation Center.41
The implementation of the government and administrative reforms has significantly impacted Japan’s policymaking structure. Shinoda believes that the elimination of the “government commissioner system,” has weakened bureaucratic involvement in policymaking. He found that this change has encouraged prime ministers to give cabinet appointments to politicians with expert policy knowledge, since they can no longer rely on bureaucrats to answer questions from the opposition on their behalf. Shinoda argues that by organizing a cabinet with more knowledgeable members, prime ministers will also be able to better balance against the ruling party and bureaucracy’s historical control over policymaking. Shinoda also asserts that conducting open debates between the prime minister and opposition leaders, as established by the new standing committee on national basic policy, has helped strengthen the executive’s role in policymaking. Since these debates are televised, he argues that prime ministers can use them as a medium for voicing their own policy interests directly to the Japanese public.42
Concerning administrative reform, Shinoda finds that the revised Cabinet
Law has added more policymaking authority to the prime minister. At cabinet
41 Shinoda (2003): 28. 42 Shinoda (2003): 28. 32 meetings, rather than merely addressing pre-approved policy issues, the prime minister and Cabinet Secretariat have been able to reaffirm their policy agenda setting authority. This, Shinoda adds, has altered the traditional bottom-up policymaking process led by politicians and bureaucrats by enabling top-down policy initiatives from the prime minister. Similarly, by clearly describing the role of
Cabinet Secretariat, the revised Cabinet Law allows it to deliberate over and introduce policies independent of influence from a given ministry.43
However, Mulgan found that the policymaking process has not been significantly altered. While she admits that the reforms helped consolidate some control over policy initiation to the prime minister and extended more authority to the Cabinet Secretariat, she argues that the extent of the executive’s new power in policymaking is still limited by the traditional process led by politicians and bureaucrats. Moreover, Mulgan still sees cabinet ministers as being more loyal to their ministries than to the prime minister. She cites the open opposition from the ministers of health and education in 2002 against Prime Minister Koizumi’s proposal to allow private companies to run schools and hospitals in special structural reform zones as an example of the persisting lack of cabinet member loyalty to the prime minister.44 Ultimately, Mulgan sees a minimal impact of the government and administrative reforms on the policymaking process.
43 Shinoda (2003): 26. 44 Mulgan (2004): 9. 33 Implications of Reform
The electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms implemented between 1994 and 2001 have brought several changes to Japan’s political structure.
However, the question remains whether or not these reforms have specifically affected the policymaking process. Since the answer varies significantly among scholars, with some finding the process to be greatly changed, while others are not convinced.
One significant contrast of views between scholars seems to be those of
Aurelia George Mulgan and Tomohito Shinoda. Both Mulgan and Shinoda identified electoral reform in 1994, which introduced the SMD system, to have produced a change in Japan’s electoral structure. However, they see vastly different implications for the policymaking process. From Shinoda’s point of view, the significant change in the policymaking process, which he views is a result of the three reforms, is the strengthening of the executive branch’s role in promoting and implementing policy.
According to him the enacting of each of the three reforms has increasingly strengthened the executive power with a greater ability to engage in top-down policymaking.45
In Shinoda’s opinion, these reforms have been unprecedented. He argues
Prime Minister Koizumi’s election was the result of political changes set in motion by the 1994 Electoral Reform. The switch to the SMD system decreasing the control of factions over their members by decrease members’ dependence on factional support to win elections. This shift enabled junior-ranking members, for the first
45 Shinoda (2003). 34 time, to be more vocal within the party because the threat of being shut out by faction bosses had decreased. With their newfound voice, junior-ranking party members were able to express discontent over the party president selection process in 2001 and were able to negotiate changes. Rather than being left to the decision of faction bosses, who would most likely have chosen Hashimoto to lead the LDP, the party presidency was decided by election, and even included 141 new votes from local party members. Under this new system, Koizumi was able to win the party presidency election and become prime minister.
Electoral reform has also been argued to have strengthened the role of the executive in other ways. Ko Mishima asserts that under the new SMD system, inter- party competition has increased since there is now only one available seat per district. As a result, he argues that party endorsement has become a necessity for candidates, especially younger ones who have not yet formed strong kōenkai.
Furthermore, he believes this change has increased the leadership role of the prime minister due to his ability to endorse candidates.46 The extent of this power of the prime minister is addressed in chapter three concerning Prime Minister Koizumi’s initiative on privatizing the Japanese postal system.
Similar to Shinoda, Mulgan accepts the idea that a strengthening of the executive’s role in policy implementation represents a significant change in Japan’s policymaking process. In fact, she even suggests that administrative reform has in some ways strengthened the executive’s leadership role in policy. However, she
46 Mishima, Ko. "Grading Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's Revolution: How Far Has the LDP's Policymaking Changed?" Asian Survey 47 (2007): 734. 35 disagrees with Shinoda that ultimately the reforms have done little to disrupt the traditional policymaking structure dominated by politicians and bureaucrats.47 In analyzing the reforms, Mulgan not only argues that they have done little to disrupt the ruling party and bureaucratic control on policymaking, but she also finds that, in some ways, this system has been strengthened. As mentioned earlier, she believes that the new SMD system has increased the need for candidates to focus on personalized vote-gathering strategies because they now come to represent constituencies with a broader range of special interests. Similarly, she argues that the role of PARC and zoku has remained important, if not more so, because candidates must increase their knowledge of special interests across numerous policy areas in order to deliver a wider range of targeted benefits to their broadened constituency. Thus, the primary issue for Mulgan is that the executive branch has not significantly increased its role in policymaking, and that the ruling party and bureaucracy have also increased.48
In order to better define the influence of the electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms, it is necessary to analyze a set of policy initiatives that occurred during the Koizumi administration between 2001-2006. By analyzing three initiatives, postal privatization, highway privatization, and anti-terrorism legislation, I plan to examine the strength of Prime Minister Koizumi and his office in promoting, drafting, and implementing the above stated reforms. Analysis of the role and importance of the Koizumi government will help in determining whether
47 Mulgan (2003): 87. 48 Mulgan (2004). 36 the reforms have or have not strengthened the role of the executive in policymaking due to the ’94 electoral, ’99 governmental, and ’01 administrative reforms. 37 Chapter 2: Postal Reform
Prime Minister Koizumi entered office in April 2001 on a platform to reform
Japan’s political and economic systems. In addition to vowing to demolish the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was increasingly viewed as a politically corrupt party laden with pork barrel politics by the Japanese public, Koizumi also pledged to revitalize the country’s stagnant economy. He envisioned change through a series of reforms aimed at dismantling bureaucratic and political impediments to economic growth and implementing policies to promote small government and a free-market economy. At the heart of the country’s much-needed reforms was
Koizumi’s plan to privatize the Japanese postal system.
The state-run postal system presented political and economic problems for
Japan. Politically, the system had become a symbol of political corruption, as it had become part of a powerful union between special interest groups and LDP politicians. Economically, it represented the failures of state led economic planning, especially concerning the distribution of postal savings and insurance funds through the fiscal investment and loan program (FILP).49 For Koizumi, reforming the postal system was the first stepping-stone towards dismantling decades of mismanaged economic policies controlled by government bureaucrats and politicians.50 Although restructuring Japan’s postal service was a keystone of Koizumi’s reform plan as
49 "Koizumi's Reforms May Be a Sheep in Wolf's Clothing." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 20 Dec. 2001. 50 Nabeshima, Keizo. "Staying on Path of Resistance." Japan Times 4 Oct. 2004. 38 prime minister, he had first discussed the importance of postal privatization in
1979 while serving as vice finance minister.51
By reforming the postal system Koizumi was seeking to jump-start the economy by reducing the size of government, deregulating the market, and reducing corporate dependency on the state. 52 However, Koizumi’s push for postal privatization was divisive and resulted in a political struggle that spanned almost the entirety of his tenure as prime minister.
Before analyzing the issue of postal privatization, the political battle it entailed, and the degree to which Koizumi succeeded or failed in pushing his reform, it is first necessary to understand the structure of Japan’s postal system and its powerful influence on the Japanese government.
The Development of the Japanese Postal System
Established in 1871, the state-run postal system was introduced in the early stages of the Meiji period, when the newly centralized Japanese government began undertaking its transition towards modernization.53 The postal system was divided into a system of general post offices (futsū yūbinkyoku), which were controlled directly by state officials, and smaller special post offices (tokutei yūbinkyoku) controlled by local officials called commissioned postmasters. These local officials, referred to as “men of distinction” (meibōka), were often village leaders, landlords,
51 Endo, Yuzuru. "Postal Privatization-A New Era Dawns; A 26-year-long Fight against Vested Interests." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 16 Oct. 2005. 52 Maclachlan, Patricia. "Storming the Castle: The Battle for Postal Reform in Japan." Social Science Japan Journal 9 (2006): 1. 53 Maclachlan, Patricia. "Post Office Politics in Modern Japan: The Postmasters, Iron Triangles, and the Limits of Reform." Journal of Japanese Studies (2004): 285. 39 or former samurai.54 More importantly, these commissioned postmasters were required to have their own financial resources to undertake their new responsibilities because the state only supplied a stipend for basic expenses.
Commissioned postmasters were required to maintain their own facilities, which were often their homes. Initially, while the commissioned postmaster position was lacking in financial remuneration, the degree of local prestige associated with public service was more than compensatory. However, new regulations following the end of the Second World War provided funding to assist postmasters in maintaining their facilities, as well as monthly salaries. In contrast to other public service positions, commissioned postmasters were appointed, rather than selected on merit.
Furthermore, the private ownership of special post offices led to the inheritance of the commissioned postmaster positions.55
Commissioned postmasters also played a critical secondary role in their local areas as community volunteers. Postmasters engaged in volunteer activities ranging from coaching children’s sports teams and participating in parent-teacher associations to social work such as caring for the elderly.56 Postmasters’ care of the elderly provided a much-needed service in rural areas where older people were less likely to be able to rely on family members for daily assistance. By helping the elderly with their daily routines, commissioned postmasters provided somewhat of
54 Maclachlan (2006): 3. 55 Maclachlan (2004): 286-94. 56 Maclachlan (2004): 305. 40 a welfare role, which further solidified their importance and necessity within their communities.57
In addition to the formation of the state postal mail system, the Meiji government also introduced the postal savings system. The savings system implemented in 1875 was designed to attract revenue needed to fund economic development by encouraging Japanese people to save their money with post offices.
Postal savings, which offered better interest rates than banks, also attracted customers because the government guaranteed the safety of deposits. Furthermore, the trust and respect associated with local commissioned postmasters helped encourage the public to use the postal savings system.58
Over the next few decades, the social influence of commissioned postmasters continued to increase. During wartime in the 1930s and 1940s, the state looked to postmasters to lead neighborhood associations and other organizations to help promote support for national goals.59 However, the post-war period presented a new threat to commissioned postmasters. In 1946, the Zentei postal workers union, supported by the Japan Socialist Party and labor federation (Sōhyō) began to protest the commissioned postmaster system. In response, commissioned postmasters formed their own union, Zentoku (Zenkoku Tokutei Yūbinkyokuchōkai), with the mission to protect their status and represent their interests.60 For political support,
Zentoku reached out to conservative politicians. Despite the provision of the 1948
57 Maclachlan (2004): 305. 58 Maclachlan (2004): 287. 59 Maclachlan (2004): 290. 60 Maclachlan (2006): 3. 41 National Public Service Law that established commissioned postmasters as general public servants, which thereby prevented them from participating in political or electoral activities, Zentoku was able to seek protection within the newly formed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In the late 1950s, Posts and
Telecommunications minister Tanaka Kakuei helped solidify the LDP alliance with commissioned postmasters by expanding the number of special post offices and taking measures to protect the inheritance practice of new postmasters. Tanaka also helped expand the postal policy tribe (yūsei zoku), thus increasing LDP support for postmasters.61
Through his work in support of Zentoku, Tanaka Kakuei effectively created a system of guaranteed commissioned postmaster support for the LDP. Over the next several decades, the link between Zentoku and the LDP became a well-oiled political machine for protecting commissioned postmasters’ interests in exchange for increasing political support. In this system, LDP politicians collaborated with
Zentoku leaders to formulate plans for increasing party membership. These plans were distributed to the commissioned postmasters, who were expected to utilize their long established and close ties to their respective communities as a method of garnering party support. While the National Public Service Law prohibited postmasters from directly engaging in electoral activities, it could not restrict the actions of postmasters’ wives or of retired postmasters. Either way, postmasters
61 Maclachlan (2006): 4. 42 devised ways to circumvent the law, thus allowing them to achieve the electoral directives established by Zentoku and LDP leaders.62
While the political influence of commissioned postmasters reached its peak in the 1980s, they remained influential through the turn of the century.
Traditionally, postmasters were better suited to gather support for Upper House politicians when candidates were elected individually. In 1982, this system was replaced with proportional representation, making it more difficult for postmasters to use their influence because votes were now collected for the party and candidates were positioned on ranked lists.63 Postmaster influence was further reduced after electoral reform in 1994 in which winning a Lower House seat in a single member district required more votes than it did in multi-member districts.64
Despite their decline, commissioned postmasters retained a significant amount of political influence. The political organization Taiju, which included approximately 19,000 active and retired postmasters and their families, represented the largest support bloc of the LDP in 2001. In the 2001 Upper House election of Koso Kenji, the former head of the Kinki Postal Administration Office,
Taiju and its members helped to gather 480,000 votes.65
The role of commissioned postmasters and their link to the LDP represented only one aspect of the postal service’s connection to Japanese politics. The second part, which related to Japan’s economic system, was also connected to the country’s
62 Maclachlan (2006): 3-4. 63 Maclachlan (2004): 303-04. 64 Maclachlan (2006): 5. 65 "Special Postmasters Wield Special Power." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 27 Aug. 2001. 43 welfare structure. As already discussed, the postal service represented a connection to the welfare system through the involvement of commissioned postmasters in their local communities. However, the relationship between the postal service and the Japanese welfare system extended far beyond the role of commissioned postmasters.
Welfare and the Japanese Postal System
The Japanese welfare system is somewhat enigmatic in comparison to the welfare systems of other modern democratic states. Despite being a developed state,
Japan has not created a large welfare state. In contrast, Japan has approached the issue of welfare by focusing on ensuring high employment among its people. Sven
Steinmo has noted that unlike the welfare systems in other countries, which focus more on providing direct social services, the Japanese welfare model is based on
“…good wages with excellent benefits, relying on networks of family and social responsibility, restricting immigration and, finally, tremendous spending on “make work” public construction projects.”66 Two of these features, wages and public construction spending have ties to the postal system.
The traditional practice of lifetime employment has been a main component of the Japanese welfare system. This practice fosters a strong relationship between workers and their companies. Moreover, as noted by Steinmo, even if a company is losing money, it strives to keep the jobs of its lifelong employees. To do this, numerous companies turn to banks to receive loans in order to continue to pay their
66 Steinmo, Sven. The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States. Cambridge UP, 2010. 103-04. 44 workers. This process of operating at a loss can continue almost indefinitely, and companies will continue to receive loans to pay their workers. This unique approach to welfare, as noted by a senior official in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), “is how we support our society.”67
The second feature, public works spending, is also an influential part of the
Japanese welfare system, particularly in low economic periods, when the unemployed face difficulty in benefitting from Japan’s welfare system. To address this problem, the Japanese government actively increases public works and construction spending that allows many of the unemployed to attain part-time or temporary work.68
The relationship between the postal service and these features of Japan’s welfare system comes to light through the postal savings system. As previously discussed, the postal savings system was introduced in 1875, a time when the Meiji government was desperate to attract money to fund its industrialization. The postal savings system continued to grow well beyond the Meiji period and throughout the early twentieth century. Additionally, in 1916, the Postal Insurance system was introduced.69 In the post war period, the MOF and its Fiscal Investment and Loan
Program (FILP) took control of distributing postal resources. Between the early
1950s and late 1970s, FILP used the money collected from postal savings to invest heavily in Japan’s industrial sector, as part of a government led plan to rebuild
Japan’s economy. During this period, the financial resources collected through the
67 Steinmo (2010): 95-96. 68 Steinmo (2010): 96. 69 Maclachlan (2006): 2. 45 postal system and allocated through FILP played a crucial role in Japan’s economic recovery and growth.70 In later decades, the MOF used postal savings to fund public works construction projects throughout Japan. According to the MOF, approximately 77 percent of FILP funds are used for social purposes.71 Of these funds, approximately 53 and 39.5 percent, between 1970-1979 and 1980-1989, respectively, came from Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance.72
Interestingly, a substantial amount of government expenditure for public works went to rural parts of Japan. Shimane prefecture, which ranked forty-third among Japan’s forty-seven prefectures in per capita tax payments in 1984, received some of the highest numbers of public works construction contracts in comparison to other prefectures.73 Another rural prefecture, Niigata, received billions of yen throughout the 1980s for public works projects, such as highway and tunnel construction, new high-speed trains and stations, and shopping complexes, at a rate of three times of what it contributed in taxes. In several cases, large financial expenditures were used for projects that affected a small number of people; the
Shioya tunnel, built in 1983, cost approximately 1.2 billion yen, yet only serviced around sixty households in Niigata.74
The disproportionate amount of public works expenditures received by rural areas was directly tied to the relationship between the conservative LDP, their
70 Calder, Kent. "Linking Welfare and the Developmental State: Postal Savings in Japan." Journal of Japanese Studies 16 (1990): 49-50. 71 Steinmo (2010): 96. 72 "Fiscal Investment and Loans - Financial Resources (F.Y.1955--2000)." Statistics Bureau.
LDP, through its relationship with the commissioned postmasters’ union, Zentoku, has been able to reach out to rural citizens to increase party support. Conservative
LDP politicians, in return for support, repaid their constituents by ensuring that generous amounts of public works construction contracts went to those rural areas.
In the case of Niigata in the 1980s, the political clout of Tanaka Kakuei, who hailed from the prefecture and had become one of the LDP’s preeminent political bosses, guaranteed an influx of public works spending to even the most rural parts of the prefecture. Similarly, Takeshita Noboru, who was from Shimane and served for years as Minister of Finance and later as prime minister, in tandem with other LDP leaders, was able to bring in numerous public works construction contracts to a prefecture that ranked forty-third in national tax contributions.75
In addition to public works projects, government loans and subsidies to small businesses was also a prominent part of the Japanese welfare system. Historically, small firms comprised a major portion of Japan’s business sector. In 1981, 74.3 percent of manufacturing workers were employed at companies with fewer than three hundred employees. Additionally, more than half of Japan’s workforce was employed in companies with less than thirty workers.76 In most cases, private commercial banks were averse to loaning money to small businesses. As a result, small businesses traditionally depended on government controlled financial institutions for assistance. Two such institutions were the Peoples’ Finance
75 Calder (1988): 275. 76 Calder (1988): 314. 47 Corporation (Kokumin Kinyū Kōko) and the Small Business Finance Corporation
(Chūshō Kigyō Kinyū Kōko), both of which received funding through FILP. 77
Generally, funds from these institutions were given to small businesses operating within Japan’s domestic market. Additionally, starting in 1973, the Peoples’ Finance
Corporation began issuing no-collateral loans to small businesses. Between 1970 and 1986, loans to small businesses from the Peoples’ Finance Corporation and
Small Business Finance Corporation had increased from 708 to 5,284 and from 895 to 5,152 billion yen, respectively.78
In summary, the Japanese welfare system was not designed to produce universal benefits. Rather, the system was based on targeted benefits and focused on providing social protection in selected areas. To maintain high employment, the government issued loans, often administered through FILP, to subsidize the cost of labor and secure employees’ positions. Additionally, FILP resources helped subsidize social infrastructure through subsidies for small business and public works projects.79
Koizumi’s Push for Postal Reform
The postal system had become an integral part of the Liberal Democratic
Party’s, which maintained dominance for over five decades from 1955, political machine. In this system, LDP politicians made sure to protect the special interests of commissioned postmasters in exchange for their help in cultivating party loyalty
77 "Fiscal Investment and Loans - Agency (F.Y.1985--2004)." Statistics Bureau.
Despite the millions of people who benefitted from the LDP political machine, many Japanese grew tired of the system and increasingly viewed it as corrupt due to various scandals. Furthermore, issues of election regulation violations and fraud caused many people to question the relationship between the postal service and
LDP. One such scandal involved the Upper House election of Koso Kenji in 2001.
Koso, who had close ties to postmasters as the former head of the Kinki Postal
Bureau, came under suspicion for violating the Public Office Election Law and several postmasters associated with him were accused of using government transfer payments from the postal service to support his election. Other postmasters were investigated on the suspicion of vote gathering for Koso, which was a violation of the
National Public Service Law. Due to this scandal, Koso resigned in September
2001.80
While support for political and economic reform may have been growing in the early 2000s, the opposition to Prime Minister Koizumi’s postal privatization plan was substantial. Naturally, the opposition to postal privatization was comprised of various postal lobbies, such as Zentoku and Taiju, LDP politicians inside and outside the postal policy tribe (yūsei zoku), and other bureaucrats
Maclachlan (2004): 302-303. 49 connected to the LDP political machine, all of whom feared that reform would be detrimental to their social and political power structure. However, numerous ordinary Japanese were concerned about postal privatization. Many were concerned that privatization would change mailing rates, lead to the closing of less competitive post offices in rural areas, adversely affect postal savings and life insurance rates, and threaten the flow of financial assistance for public works projects received through FILP.81 During the postal reform debate, the privatization opposition played up these fears in order to gain public support. Despite opposition, a privatization bill was eventually passed in October 2005, but Koizumi’s struggle to arrive at that point spanned most of his career as prime minister.
Postal Privatization: Round 1
Within three months of entering office, Koizumi set up an advisory panel for postal privatization. Comprised of both government ministers and private sector experts, the panel was to design a plan to reform the mail delivery, savings, and life insurance aspects of the postal service, so that they could be incorporated into a new public postal corporation in 2003.82 However, these privatization plans faced strong opposition in the Diet before being enacted.
As a part of his resolve, Koizumi sought to introduce the postal reform bills directly to the Diet. Breaking with party practice, the bills were not submitted to the
LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) for advanced inspection and prior
81 Maclachlan (2006): 9 82 "Panel to Put Its Stamp on Postal Reform." Nikkei Weekly [Japan] 11 June 2001. 50 approval. 83 This action was a demonstration of Koizumi’s determination to submit reform bills to the Diet before PARC, which included members of the postal policy tribe who would have a chance to alter or dilute the bills. Nevertheless, deliberation in the Diet resulted in some significant changes to the reform bills.
According to Koizumi’s proposal, private firms would have been allowed to participate in mail delivery services starting with the formation of the Japan Post in
April 2003. However, the reform opposition was able to include a provision requiring government approval of uniform delivery fees.84 Additionally, firms were required to establish and maintain over 100,000 postboxes throughout Japan, maintain delivery and collection services six days a week, and were not permitted to close low-performance post offices in rural areas.85
After a careful scrutiny from the postal reform opposition, Koizumi’s first set of proposed reforms passed through the Lower House of the Diet in July 2002. While the reform bills had survived, they were far from unscathed. The strict regulations placed in the bills by the opposition created significant setback to Koizumi’s reform agenda; they severely limited the extent to which private competition could be encouraged among private delivery firms, and failed to rein in state intervention in the economy by stipulating that the government would oversee the establishment of uniform delivery rates. Moreover, these restrictions made it impractical, or even impossible, for private firms to participate because the cost of maintaining current
83 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "The Leadership Role of the Prime Minister and Party." Policy and Society(2004): 10-12. 84 Maclachlan (2004): 310. 85 Suzuki, Yumiko. "Watered-down Postal Bills Set to Pass Lower House." Nikkei Weekly [Japan] 8 July 2002. 51 post offices and postboxes was going to be too high for some. One company,
Yamato Transport, which had initially expressed interest in participating in mail delivery, dropped its plans due to the strict requirements.86 In the end, Koizumi’s postal reform initiative in 2002 was only a small step towards privatization.
Postal Privatization: Round 2
Despite the opposition’s persistence to impede postal privatization, Koizumi was determined to push his reform plan forward. In April 2003, a new public corporation, Japan Post, was formed and given control over mail delivery, postal savings, and postal insurance.87 In early 2004, the Council on Economic and Fiscal
Policy (CEFP) started making plans for the privatization process. By August, the council issued a plan for privatization to occur over a ten-year period commencing in 2007. Additionally, the CEFP’s plan was for each of the three postal services to be privatized into separate businesses, all managed by one holding company.88 Of the four separate joint-stock companies (postal savings, insurance, mail, and postal network operations), postal savings and insurance would undergo gradual privatization through the selling of shares by 2017.89
Numerous LDP members voiced their opposition to the CEFP’s plan. The proposed plan further solidified opposition with a provision to remove postal employees’ status as civil servants. While the plan promised to maintain postal
86 "Postal Bills Far from Satisfactory." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 4 July 2002. 87 Sekine, Tatsuo. "Losing Bureaucratic Jargon Vital Step in Postal Reform." Daily Yomiuri[Tokyo] 11 Feb. 2003. 88 "How Will Postal Privatization Help?" Japan Times 18 Aug. 2004. 89 Maclachlan (2006): 12. 52 networks and universal service, and included plans to maintain some of the community services that were common under the previous system, LDP lawmakers still refused to support the reforms.90 Tamisuke Watanabe, a prominent leader of the LDP postal lobby, expressed opposition, stating that the plan would not become official party policy because it had not been submitted to PARC or the LDP’s
Executive Council for review.91 In anticipation of the opposition, Koizumi took measures to secure his reform plans by shuffling the cabinet and appointing new ministers who were in support of privatization. 92
Under pressure from opposing LDP members, Koizumi’s reform bill faced several major revisions before being presented to the Diet. The most prominent change was that the government holding company in charge of the four privatized postal firms would be permitted to buy back one-third of the postal savings and insurance shares after 2017. The opposition pushed this measure on the basis of promoting unity and some management certainty, but it also served to weaken the scope of privatization. 93 Additionally, a provision was included to provide government funding to help maintain post offices in rural areas.94
Koizumi’s concessions to the LDP leadership were insufficient to garner full party support. In an attempt to crack down on the opposition, Koizumi removed
Matsui Hiroshi, the vice minister for policy coordination, and Shimizu Hideo, the director of the postal service policy planning bureau, from their posts for
90 Maclachlan (2006): 12. 91 Yoshida, Reiji. "LDP Lawmakers Pledge to Block Postal Reform." Japan Times 9 Sept. 2004. 92 "Nation's Future Depends on Koizumi Reforms." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 28 Sept. 2004. 93 "Postal Bills Head for Diet, Weakened by Concessions." Nikkei Weekly [Japan] 11 Apr. 2005. 94 Yoshida, Reiji. "Postal Reform Plan Watered down but moves forward." Japan Times26 Apr. 2005. 53 distributing literature that criticized Koizumi’s reform plan.95 However, Koizumi’s combined tactics of fear and conciliation did not prove sufficient to pass his reform bills through the Diet. In the Lower House vote in July 2005, the reform legislation passed by only five votes. Out of 250 LDP members, 37 voted against the bill and 14 abstained. Following this narrow victory, the legislation went on to the Upper House in August, where it was defeated.96
Koizumi responded to his defeat by dissolving the Lower House and calling for an election in September, stating, “The Diet said postal reform isn’t necessary. Is that really so? I want to ask the people whether they are for or against postal reform.
This election is all about postal reform. After the election, I’m going to once again submit the postal bills.”97 Koizumi also warned the Lower House members, who voted against privatization, that he would not work with them in the future unless they changed their position. Finally, all LDP members who voted against the bill were removed from the party’s candidate list.98 In place of the former candidates,
Koizumi handpicked new candidates, who supported postal privatization. These new candidates received party endorsement and ran against former LDP candidates, resulting in a showdown between new and former LDP members in several districts.99
The result of the September election was a complete landslide victory for the
LDP. Out of 480 seats, the LDP won 296, an increase of 47 seats. Koizumi
95 "Koizumi Cracks Whip by Firing 2 Opponents." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 15 May 2005. 96 Maclachlan (2006): 13. 97 "Koizumi Dissolves Lower House Sept. 11 Election Set after Upper House Rejects Postal Reform Bills." Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 9 Aug. 2005. 98 Endo (2005). 99 Maclachlan (2006): 14. 54 championed the victory as proof of public support for postal privatization. The postal privatization legislation was reintroduced to the Diet in October 2005 and passed.100 The case of postal privatization also represents significant implications for the 1990s reforms. These implications will be discussed following the next two case studies.
100 Maclachlan (2006): 14. 55 Chapter 3: Highway Reform
Prime Minister Koizumi’s platform to reform and revitalize Japan’s economy extended well beyond his push to privatize the Japanese postal system. In addition to postal reform, Koizumi called for reform in several government-run sectors, including the urban development, housing loan, and oil industries, etc.101 Among the proposed reforms, Koizumi’s plan to privatize several highway construction corporations was perhaps the most significant, not only because Japan’s public highway corporations were part of the road construction industry, which was one of the country’s largest industries, but also because the road construction industry was the recipient of some of the largest portions of public works finances. Between 1970 and 2002, roughly forty-five to thirty percent, respectively, of public works funds went to road construction projects.102
Koizumi found the road construction industry, being the most dependent on government spending, to be in a dire need of reform. Similar to the postal system, the government-run construction industry was increasingly viewed as an example of wasteful government spending and entrenched political corruption involving ties between special interest groups, LDP politicians, and bureaucrats. Moreover,
Koizumi asserted that the public nature of several of Japan’s highway corporations created many opportunities for economic inefficiencies due to bureaucratic
101 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Japan's Cabinet Secretariat and Its Emergence as Core Executive." Asian Survey (2005): 819. 102 Sorensen, André, and Carolin Funck. Living Cities in Japan: Citizens' Movements, Machizukuri and Local Environments. London: Routledge, 2007. 104-05 56 mismanagement and limited market competition. An example of these inefficiencies can be seen in the Japan Highway Public Corporation (JHPC), which by
2003 had accrued approximately ¥28 trillion (US $367 billion103) of debt due to overspending and poor methods of revenue collection.104
For Koizumi, privatizing Japan’s highway corporations encompassed three goals. First, he wanted to disrupt the system of particularistic clientelism between
LDP politicians and their constituencies, which was centered on the delivery of public works projects in exchange for re-election support. Similarly, Koizumi wanted to disrupt the relationship between LDP politicians and the bureaucrats from different ministries, who helped politicians secure the financial resources needed to deliver targeted benefits to constituent groups. Finally, in attacking these two areas, Koizumi hoped to eliminate the corruption and wasteful spending and reorganize the highway corporations into competitive and efficient businesses.105
Koizumi’s campaign for privatizing the public highway corporations spanned most of his career as prime minister and proved to be an intense political struggle within his own party against politicians trying to protect their special interests.
Before discussing the details of the reform policy debate, it necessary to provide a brief explanation of Japan’s highway corporations and their connection to Koizumi’s political and economic reform plans.
103 Based on the 2012 exchange rate of US $1 = ¥76. 104 Mizutani, Fumitoshi, and Uranishi Shuji. "Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Focusing on Organizational Structure Change." Transport Reviews (2008): 481. 105 Sorensen and Funck (2007): 98-99. 57 The Structure of Japan’s Public Highway Corporations
The creation of Japan’s public highway corporations was part of the government’s plan for the reconstruction and development of national infrastructure following the end of the Second World War. Around the end of the
Allied Occupation in 1952, Japan’s need to develop its road infrastructure could not be understated, as less than twenty percent of national roads were paved at that time.106 In response to this need, the Diet passed the 1952 Road Law, which established a framework for constructing a national road network under the supervision of the Ministry of Construction (MOC) 107 . To help finance road construction, the Diet also passed the Road Facilities Special Measures Law the same year. The law determined that construction revenue would be earned through implementing a network of toll roads throughout the country. Additionally, the law established that all road tolls would be pooled together and used to finance road maintenance and new construction projects.108 Finally, after determining that the toll collection would not generate sufficient revenue, the Diet also passed the Special
Road Improvement Accounting Law, which allowed money from the postal savings system to be allocated for road construction.109
Over the next several years, the construction of numerous highways took place under the authority of national and local governments. However, this joint development of roadways across the national and local levels often gave rise to
106 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 474. 107 Established as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) in 2001. 108 Woodall, Brian. Japan under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1996. 65-66. 109 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 474. 58 confusion over coordinating and financing construction. In response to these problems, the government established a centralized authority, the Japan Highway
Public Corporation (JHPC), to oversee the construction of the national highway system, according to the Japan Highway Public Corporation Law, passed by the Diet in 1956.110
In order to understand the creation of the JHPC, it is important to note that it was created as a special corporation (tokushu hōjin). The designation of ‘special corporation’ was a status created for public corporations involved with the reconstruction and development of Japan’s economy and industries following the end of the Second World War. As a special corporation, the JHPC was entitled to receive funding from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). 111 A substantial amount of FILP’s financial reserves came from Japan’s postal savings and life insurance programs. As a result, the JHPC was tied to the system of government- led public works projects controlled through the close relationships between politicians and bureaucrats.112
In addition to receiving funding through FILP, special corporations, while under the supervision of their respective ministry, were not directly controlled through the ministry itself, but were managed independently. In the case of the JHPC, it was under the jurisdiction of the MOC. However, it is important to note that upper-level management positions were often given to former ministry officials,
110 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 474. 111 Carpenter, Susan. "Koizumi's Reform of Special Corporations." Journal of International Business and Law (2004): 72-73. 112 See previous chapter on postal reform. 59 thus maintaining ministerial influence.113 In fact, the allocation of corporate positions to former ministry officials was a significant perk of bureaucratic life. This benefit, referred to as amakudari or ‘descent from heaven,’ was the practice of awarding retiring bureaucrats from various ministries lucrative corporate positions.
Once they arrived at their new corporate position, these former officials maintained ties with their friends in the bureaucracy, which helped to maintain bureaucratic influence. Moreover, the amakudari practice benefitted special interests groups. In the case of construction firms, the MOC often allocated special construction contracts to firms that promised to give retiring officials top corporate positions.114
Ministerial influence over special corporations extended beyond the filling of upper management positions. The JHPC, for example, did not have the authority to determine where highways were constructed. The decision of where to build highways was determined by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
(MLIT). The ministry’s construction plans were then confirmed in the Diet.
Following the deliberations of bureaucrats in the ministry and politicians in the Diet, highway construction plans were then given to the JHPC.115 The JHPC, in turn, then contracted construction companies to build the highways using government funding provided by FILP.116
As a special corporation, the JHPC was only responsible for constructing and maintaining highways. Other types of roads, such as national, prefectural roads, and
113 Carpenter (2004): 73. 114 Woodall (1996): 69-70. 115 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 476. 116 Carpenter (2004): 73. 60 municipal roads were the responsibility of either MLIT, prefectural, or local governments. Unlike highways, which were maintained through the combination of tolls and government subsidies, these types of roads were funded through automobile and gasoline taxes.117
While highways were built primarily through government funding, the revenue needed to pay back the subsidies was generated through the collection of tolls. In determining the price of tolls, officials had to determine the total cost of repaying construction costs over a designated number of years by estimating the number of people who would use the highway. Once a highway had been paid off, it would then become a toll-free road. However, the system for paying off highway routes was not separated according to each highway. Instead, the collected toll revenues from all highways were pooled and then distributed for paying off costs.
For this reason, several highways continued to collect tolls even if those particular segments of the road network had already been paid off.118
The creation of Japan’s public highway corporations, such as the JHPC, was done with the intention of improving the country’s road and transportation infrastructure. While the original aim of this mission was to improve Japan’s economy, over time, these highway corporations came to be somewhat problematic.
The main problem was that new highways were being constructed at a rate that was faster than old highways were being paid off. As a result, the highway corporations had collected a substantial amount of debt. The JHPC, which was only one of the four
117 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 475-476. 118 Mizutani and Uranishi (2008): 477-478. 61 public highway corporations, which also included the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge
Authority, the Metropolitan Expressway (MEPC), and the Hanshin Expressway
(HEPC), had its own debt of ¥28 trillion in 2003.
The debt accrued to the public highway corporations was only one of the reasons why Prime Minister Koizumi sought to reform them. The other reasons related to the political and bureaucratic control over public works finances, which were used to fund particularistic ‘pork-barrel’ projects for specific constituent interest groups. In fact, Koizumi attributed the increasing debts of these public corporations to the wasteful spending on construction projects designed for securing constituent support rather than improving Japan’s infrastructure.
Japan’s Public Highway Corporations, Construction, and Welfare
Japan’s government-run construction industry was an integral part of what many Japanese specialists regard as employment or welfare equivalent policies.119
In this structure, the postal system represented the revenue generating half of the welfare system. Through different postal services, such as the savings and life insurance, the government collected the funds needed to finance welfare projects.
Unlike other industrialized democratic states, Japan did not have a large and clearly defined universal welfare system. Rather, welfare was implemented through maintaining high levels of employment and good wages.120 The public construction industry represented the revenue consuming half of the welfare system, as it is
119 See Margarita Estevez-Abe’s Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan and Sven Steinmo’s The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States for more details on Japan’s welfare system. 120 See previous chapter on postal reform. 62 where the government expended its financial resources through programs such as FILP, in order to protect and increase the employment rate.
However, in understanding the construction industry’s connection to Japan’s welfare structure, it is also important to remember how public works projects were implemented. Public works projects were not implemented based on the objective needs of different regions. Rather, construction plans and the distribution of the financial resources required to fund them were heavily politicized. As a result, the distribution of public works projects depended on the political ties between bureaucrats, politicians, and special interest groups. The LDP, which had been the dominant party for decades, was able to reach out to rural Japan through its ties to the commissioned postmasters’ union and had created a strong support base for its party. With such a large support base throughout the country’s rural areas the LDP channeled a disproportionally high amount of public construction projects to rural regions.121
This led to Japan’s construction system, and therefore its welfare structure, to be characterized not by the universal distribution of benefits, but by a system of particularism wherein public works benefits (or ‘welfare’ benefits) were distributed to specific areas in exchange for continued support from the benefitting constituency.122 In order to distribute benefits, LDP politicians relied on their close relationships with bureaucrats, who controlled the purse strings of government subsidies and also decided where roads would be built. Politicians and bureaucrats
121 See previous chapter on postal reform. 122 Woodall (1996): 11. 63 cooperated with each other in awarding construction contracts to companies to build in regions that benefitted politicians’ constituencies. Ultimately, the construction and welfare systems were organized through a structure of mutual exchange; politicians delivered targeted benefits to their constituencies and awarded public works contracts to construction companies, constituents and contractors returned these favors by continuing to support their representatives through voting and campaign contributions. Politicians worked with bureaucrats to secure funds, and in exchange, bureaucrats relied on their politician friends to protect bureaucratic interests.
In this mutual exchange system, politicians, their constituencies, construction contractors, and bureaucrats all continued to benefit as long as they supported each other. Each party had a vested interest in participating in the mutual exchange system. However, as noted earlier, the system was highly particularistic, therefore while some groups benefitted tremendously, others were excluded from the system.
Furthermore, the problem with this structure was that the distribution of targeted benefits often continued indefinitely within the closed, particularistic system, which lead to wasteful spending. Throughout rural Japan, numerous modern roadways, tunnels, and other construction projects took place in areas where they went virtually unused.123 One example of this is the Shioya tunnel built in Niigata prefecture, home to LDP’s political boss, Kakuei Tanaka, in 1983. The cost of the
123 Sorensen and Funck (2007): 94. 64 project was roughly ¥1.2 billion, yet only about sixty households benefitted from its construction.124
In addition to the cycle of wasteful spending, the mutual exchange system was also highly susceptible to corruption. In particular, the acceptance of bribes from construction contractors eager to gain preferential treatment from politicians was not uncommon. One well-known example is the case of LDP Vice-President Shin
Kanemaru, who was found to be hoarding $50 million in cash and gold in his office in 1992. Investigation revealed that Kanemaru had acquired these assets through illegal political contributions from several construction companies. Similarly, in
1993, investigators uncovered a network of bribes between construction contractors and politicians that led to the arrest of officials from several construction companies, the governors of Ibaraki and Miyagi prefecture, and the mayors of Sendai City and Sanwa Town.125
As an integral part of the construction industry, the four main public highway corporations shared a significant connection to Japan’s welfare structure. These corporations, as argued by Prime Minister Koizumi, were also tied to Japan’s systemic wasteful spending. To remedy these problems, Koizumi wanted to privatize these four public corporations. However, these corporations were also connected to the system of mutual exchange between politicians, constituents, and bureaucrats. Consequently, any attempt to reform these corporations was met with opposition from those seeking to protect their special interests.
124 Calder, Kent E. Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988. 277. 125 Woodall (1996): 12-13. 65 Koizumi’s Push for Highway Reform
Prime Minister Koizumi placed a high priority in reforming Japan’s public highway corporations. Within a few months of taking office, he began to initiate the reform process by appointing Nobuteru Ishihara, a junior LDP diet member, as the head of the Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters (ARPH).126 Established during the Mori administration in January 2001, the ARPH was created within the
Cabinet Secretariat to oversee reform issues concerning special public corporations, the public servant system, and administration-commissioned public service corporations. 127 As the issue of privatizing the country’s public highway corporations was a reform concerning special public corporations, Koizumi and the
Cabinet Secretariat had the authority to initiate such policy.
However, various groups began to vocalize their opposition before Koizumi was even able to assemble a panel to review the issue of privatization. The two main groups of the opposition were officials within MLIT and members of the construction policy tribe, whose primary concern was that Koizumi’s reform would lead to a sharp cut in public construction projects. In particular, the groups were concerned that a previous plan to construct an approximately 9,342-kilometer national highway would be abandoned with a remaining 2,300 kilometers needing to be completed.128 The potential uncertainty of this plan, and future construction projects was a substantial concern for these groups, as together, the four highway
126 Mishima, Ko. "Grading Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's Revolution: How Far Has the LDP's Policymaking Changed?" Asian Survey (2007): 731. 127 Shinoda (2005): 818. 128 Mishima (2007): 741. 66 corporations employed thousands of workers and had a budget of over ¥7 trillion.129
In the face of growing opposition among members of his own party, Koizumi retaliated against anti-privatization campaigns by speaking directly to the public and labeling the construction policy tribe as a gang of ‘disloyal forces.’130 With growing public support for highway reform, Koizumi ignored the opposition and proceeded to work on the privatization plan. In November 2001, Koizumi announced at a local town meeting that the JHPC would stop receiving public funding from the next fiscal year, and that he was also assembling a third-party panel to discuss privatizing the four highway corporations.131
Early in 2002, Koizumi began to organize a committee to deliberate over the privatization plans. In selecting the committee members, Koizumi opted to not gain
Diet approval for the appointees. The decision was met with opposition from the
LDP, as well as the New Conservative Party, and the DPJ. The chairman of the LDP’s highway research commission, Makoto Koga, asserted that Diet approval should be required. Other Diet members expressed frustration that only people in favor of
Koizumi’s mission were selected to join the panel. One Diet member, however, stated, “If the bill is submitted without our [construction policy tribe’s] approval, it’s going to be like throwing a tomato at a stone wall,” indicating a staunch resistance to privatization.132 Once again, Koizumi ignored the views of the opposition and
129 Sorensen and Funck (2007): 104. 130 Mishima (2007): 742. 131 “Koizumi to Starve JH of All Public Funding.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 19 Nov. 2001. 132 “Diet Wants to Pick Privatization Panel.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 28 Jan. 2002. 67 continued his plans. By the summer of 2002, Koizumi’s seven-member panel was deliberating the details of privatization. The panel included professors Hideo
Nakamura and Kazuaki Tanaka, journalist Eiko Oya, writer Naoki Inose, businesswoman Yuko Kawamoto, chairman of East Japan Railway Co. Masatake
Matsuda, and honorary chairman of the Japan Business Federation Takashi Imai.133
In August, the panel released its preliminary privatization plan stipulating that the current highway corporations would come under the authority of a new public entity, which would take ownership of national expressways and lease them to private firms to manage daily operations. The process was designed to last for ten to fifteen years, after which the highways would become completely privatized.
Additionally, the leasing fees paid by private firms would be used to pay off the four corporations’ combined debt of ¥40 trillion.134
However, a major issue for the panel was determining what to do about the unfinished 2,300 kilometers of the 9,342-kilometer national expressway, estimated to require ¥20.6 trillion for completion. Due to the corporations’ already extremely high debt the necessity to complete the national expressway was contested among the panel members. 135 By December, the panel issued its final report, which recommended cutbacks on future construction projects and full privatization of the highways companies to occur after ten years. Furthermore, the report recommended that the transition towards privatization should begin on April 1st,
2005, and that all highway debts to be paid off within forty years. However, the
133 “Road Panel Still Deeply Divided.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 20 Jul. 2002. 134 “Highway Reform Plans Taking Shape.” Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 12 Aug. 2002. 135 “Execs Back Koizumi But Want to See Some Action.” Japan Times [Tokyo] 19 Jul. 2002. 68 recommendations were not unanimous, as committee chairman Imai resigned, stating that highway construction plans on certain routes should not be abandoned.136
Over the next several months, opponents of highway privatization attempted to delay further deliberations. In one instance, the president of the JHPC, Haruho
Fujii, attempted to withhold financial records of the company, particularly those detailing its significant debts. In response, Ishihara, who had been recently appointed as the head of MLIT by Koizumi, demanded Fujii’s resignation.137 In
November 2003, Koizumi picked Takeshi Kondo, a member of the Diet’s Upper
House and former businessman, to be the new president of the JHPC.138
All reform proposals required support from the LDP and its coalition partners. By December, the involved parties reached an agreement outside of the
Diet to allow the construction of previously planned highways with funding from toll revenues. Moreover, instead of relying on toll revenues alone, private firms would be able to leverage projected toll earnings to obtain loans to finance new construction projects. The agreed upon plan also allowed for about 2,000km of the
9,000km national expressway to be completed. Only about 140km were removed from the project. The proposal also granted private firms to opt out of undertaking construction projects deemed unprofitable. However, such plans would then be made available to other firms. Unfortunately, the revised proposal represented a significantly watered-down version of the committee’s original plan. The source of
136 “Majority Report Fuels Further Road Rage.” Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 9 Dec. 2002. 137 “Japan highway President is Sacked.” Japan Times [Tokyo] 6 Oct. 2003. 138 “Koizumi Makes Choice on Japan Highway Chief.” Japan Times [Tokyo] 14 Nov. 2003. 69 these revisions could be linked to the tremendous influence of the LDP construction lobby, led by Makoto Koga. Two members of the seven-member panel,
Matsuda and Tanaka, resigned after the coalition parties reached an agreement, expressing their concern that the plan no longer placed a high priority on paying off existing highway debts and would allow for wasteful spending to continue.139 Upon resigning, Tanaka blamed committee member Inose and Prime Minister Koizumi for giving in to demands of the opposition during private talks.140
In March 2004, the Cabinet approved the revised highway privatization legislation. In addition to the previous points of the plan, the JHPC was to be split into three separate companies. Together with the other three corporations, the six companies would be managed by a semi-public holding corporation and transitioned towards privatization. During this time, the government would maintain a significant amount of control over the companies by keeping at least one- third of the stocks of each.141 Voting on the legislation took place in April and June in the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet, respectively. In June 2004, the highway privatization legislation was enacted by the Diet. In October 2005, the six new highway corporations went into operation.142
139 “Highway Reform Turns to Road Kill.” Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 29 Dec. 2003. 140 “Highway Privatization Panelists Face Off.” Japan Times [Tokyo] 20 Jan. 2004. 141 “Potholes in Highway Privatization.” Japan Times [Tokyo] 12 Mar. 2004. 142 “New Highway Firms Start Operations.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 2 Oct. 2005. 70 Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Legislation
This case study reviews the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law (ATSML) enacted in 2001. Unlike the postal and highway reforms, which concerned domestic political issues, the anti-terrorism legislation was drafted in response to international events, specifically the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States. As prime minister, Koizumi was quick to announce Japan’s condolences and support, stating, “We will provide our maximum support for our ally, the United States. We want to take action with our own initiative in order to root out any terrorism.”143 A month later at the onset of the US and British-led military operation in Afghanistan, Koizumi expressed support, asserting that Japan was considering new methods to support coalition forces. At the heart of this support was the plan to expand the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) to fight terrorism by sending the SDF abroad to aid the US and British military efforts in
Afghanistan.144
This would mark a significant departure from Japan’s traditional security policy, in which Japan’s ability to contribute was quite limited. According to the constitution, specifically Article Nine, Japan was prohibited from engaging in military action against another country. Additional legislation, such as the 1999
143 Tsukimori, Osamu. "Japan Promises Logistical Support; Its Constitution Bans Armed Force." The Washington Times 20 Sept. 2001. 144 "Japanese PM "Strongly Supports" Strikes on Afghanistan; Security Tightened." BBC Worldwide Monitoring [Tokyo] 8 Oct. 2001. 71 Regional Crisis Law145 permitted Japan to assist specifically the United States with non-combat logistical support, but only in regions surrounding Japan. As the
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea were not traditionally considered to be within the surrounding area, permission to dispatch SDF ships and aircraft to these areas was difficult to attain in accordance with the Regional Crisis Law.146
As a result of the legal restrictions, deployment of Japan’s SDF personnel abroad to aid the United States in military operations required new legislation. In seeking to create new anti-terrorism legislation, Koizumi was well aware of the potential resistance from opposition that was firmly in support of the country’s
‘pacifist’ constitution. Furthermore, Koizumi also knew it was necessary to pass the new anti-terrorism legislation quickly, in order to allow Japan to promptly demonstrate its commitment to its ally, the United States, and avoid re-experiencing the disdain felt by members of the international community during 1990 Gulf Crisis, who deemed Japan’s support as merely “checkbook diplomacy.”147
Koizumi’s worries were soon allayed, as the anti-terrorism legislation passed in both houses of the Diet and was enacted on October 29th 2001. Before discussing the details of the political policymaking process involved in passing the anti- terrorism legislation, it is necessary to describe Japan’s historical approach to national security policy. This will help to better understand the significance of the
145 Also referred to as the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law 146 Midford, Paul. "Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea." Asian Survey 43 (2003): 331. 147 Midford (2003): 338. 72 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law for not only Japan’s security policy, but also for its policymaking process.
Japan’s Postwar Security Policy
Japan’s national security policy was undoubtedly shaped by the Allied
Occupation that ensued after the end of the Second World War. The Occupation, in seeking to avoid future military conflict, sought to demilitarize Japan. In order to accomplish this, the US helped Japan create a peace constitution, in which Japan formally renounced its right to engage in military conflict. This provision, written in
Article Nine of Japan’s constitution, states,
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”148
While the inclusion of Article Nine in Japan’s constitution may have been due to pressure from the US, the notion of Japan as a peaceful state resonated with many
Japanese people who had suffered through years of hardship during the Second
World War. However, Japan’s dedication to pacifist principles is evident from its resistance to US pressure to provide assistance in the Korean War. At the center of this resistance was Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who reinforced Japan’s pacifist
148 Arase, David. "Japan, the Active State? Security Policy after 9/11." Asian Survey 47 (2007): 562. 73 position through the Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasized economic recovery and the avoidance of military conflict.149
While Japan remained firm in its resistance to assist the US in foreign military conflict, it did, however, allow the US to maintain military bases within its territory, as established by the Mutual Security Assistance Pact signed in 1951.
Furthermore, pressure from the US during the Korean War caused Japan to alter its security strategy. One significant change was the creation of the military Self-
Defense Force (SDF). Introduced through the Self-Defense Forces Basic Law in 1954, the SDF was created to respond exclusively to issues of national defense.
Additionally, it was established that SDF personnel could not be deployed internationally, could not engage in defense on behalf of another country, and could not possess offensive weaponry. As a result of these explicit stipulations, the formation of the SDF was deemed to be in accordance with the Japanese constitution, specifically Article Nine. To further reaffirm the SDF’s role, the Cabinet passed the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957, which described it as
‘exclusive defense’ (senshu bōei).150
Due to limited military capabilities in the early postwar period, Japan was reliant on its military alliance with the United States. Formalized with the Mutual
Security Assistance Pact in 1951, Japan’s alliance with the United States was further reinforced with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in
1960. However, it is important to note that the signing of the treaty was met with
149 Berger, Thomas. "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism." International Security (1993): 140. 150 Arase (2007): 563-64. 74 widespread discontent among many from both political groups and the Japanese public. The main opposition to the treaty was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), as well as other smaller leftist parties, which challenged the treaty as being an unconstitutional violation of Article Nine. Between May and June 1960, almost half a million protestors gathered in Tokyo to demonstrate their opposition to the bill.
Despite political and public opposition, LDP Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi was able to push the treaty through the Diet.151
While tension in Asia increased during the Cold War, Japan was able to maintain its pacifist stance. In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato introduced the
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which stated that Japan would not manufacture, possess, or import nuclear weapons. The three principles were passed as a Diet resolution in 1971, and have been reaffirmed by every succeeding administration.152
Japan’s security policy began to shift slightly in the 1970s. Following pressure from the United States, mainly the 1969 Nixon Doctrine that called for US allies to start providing more for their defense, Japan revised its ‘exclusive defense’ position towards a more autonomous defense capability. Under the proposed new system, Japan was to be responsible for its primary defense, only relying on the US for supplemental support. However, plans for building a stronger military defense that could repel any invasion, as outlined by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)
Director Yasuhiro Nakasone’s Five Year Defense Plan, were met with apprehension.
Instead, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which incorporated both
151 Pekkanen, Robert, and Ellis Krauss. "Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies." Orbis (2005): 432. 152 Hughes, Llewelyn. "Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet)." International Security(2007): 85. 75 ‘exclusive’ and ‘autonomous’ defense aspects, was introduced in 1976. While the
NDPO allowed for the expansion of SDF, it was not enough to make Japan’s defense capabilities autonomous. Furthermore, under Prime Minister Takeo Miki, a limit of one percent of Japan’s GDP was imposed on all military and defense spending.153
In addition to the NDPO, Japan signed the US-Japan Defense Guidelines with the United States in 1978. Under the defense guidelines, the US and Japan established an outline for cooperating on security issues, such as sharing intelligence. Additionally, the guidelines stated that Japan would consult with the US concerning its involvement in security issues occurring outside of its borders.
Furthermore, in 1981, Japan announced that it would take responsibility for patrolling sea-lines of communication within 1,000 nautical miles of Japan’s coast.154
A review of the security policies of Japan from the 1950s to 1980s clearly shows that several significant changes occurred in Japan’s defense strategy during that time. The formation of the SDF through the Self-Defense Forces Basic Law in
1954, the adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the NDPO, and US-Japan
Defense Guidelines were all added to Japan’s national security strategy that originally focused on pacifism and non-aggression, as outlined in Article Nine of the constitution. However, it is important to note that despite these additions to defense policy, Japan’s position of maintaining military capabilities for defensive purposes remained intact.
153 Arase (2007): 564. 154 Singh, Bhubhindar. "Japan's Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State." The Pacific Review (2008): 310. 76 In the 1990s, however, Japan’s security strategy experienced a few more significant changes. Although the Cold War had ended, the 1990s still came to represent a challenging time for Japan’s national security strategy. Starting with the
Gulf War in 1990, Japan once again had to endure pressure from the United States to provide assistance. However, as previously discussed, Japan’s constitution and legislation regarding its SDF restricted military resources for defense purposes exclusively and prevented any involvement in an international military conflict. In an attempt to enable Japan to contribute to the Gulf Crisis, the LDP, led by Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu introduced legislation to create a United Nations Peace
Cooperation Corps (UNPCC). Under the proposed legislation, the SDF would be permitted to provide non-combat support in military operations led by the United
States.155
The LDP’s proposed UNPCC legislation, however, was met with stark opposition from the leftist Socialist Party. Additionally, the Kōmei Party and
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which were both non-leftist opposition parties sided with the JSP against the LDP and challenged the legislation. Ultimately, the
LDP, which lacked both the majority in the Diet’s Upper House and the two-thirds majority required in the Lower House to override an Upper House legislation rejection, was forced to end deliberation on the UNPCC legislation. As a result,
155 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Japan's Parliamentary Confrontation on Post-Cold War National Security Policies." Japanese Journal of Political Science (2009): 271-72. 77 instead of providing personnel to aide in the Gulf Crisis, Japan opted to demonstrate its support through contributing $13 billion to the operation.156
Although the UNPCC legislation failed, a different bill, the UN International
Peace Cooperation (PKO) legislation, was passed in June 1992. 157 Initially introduced under Prime Minister Kaifu, the PKO legislation was resubmitted under
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in September 1991, following Kaifu’s resignation.
Under the terms of the bill, SDF troops would be permitted to participate in international peacekeeping operations led by the UN.158 Unlike the failed UNPCC bill, the PKO bill did not permit the SDF to participate in combat operations. Instead, SDF deployment overseas was restricted to non-combat missions aimed at providing humanitarian relief and economic development assistance.159
While the PKO legislation was reintroduced in September 1991 and had passed through the Lower House, opposition parties were able to delay its passage in the Upper House until April 1992. In the months before April, the Kōmei Party, which had supported the LDP in the Lower House deliberation, reached out to the
DSP for support in the Upper House vote. Despite increasing support for the bill, the leftist JSP and Japan Communist Party (JCP) remained firmly opposed. Together, these parties submitted non-confidence resolutions against members of the Cabinet and Diet committees in an attempt to suspend deliberation over the legislation.
Additionally, they organized a filibuster in order to delay voting in the Upper House.
156 Midford (2003): 337-38. 157 Also referred to as the UN Peacekeeping Operations bill. 158 Shinoda (2009): 272. 159 Midford (2003): 340. 78 After 75 hours of voting, the PKO legislation passed in the Upper House and was resubmitted to the Lower House, where it passed within two days.160
The next set of security policy changes came towards the end of the 1990s, and includes the 1999 revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Regional
Crisis Law. Originally issued in 1996, the revised Defense Guidelines reaffirmed cooperation between Japan and the US on security issues by expanding cooperation in policy coordination, intelligence sharing, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and military technology sharing.161 Beyond reaffirming these mutual commitments, the revised guidelines called for a provision that would permit the
SDF to conduct foreign vessel inspections authorized by the UN. Furthermore, the revised guidelines did not specify clearly what constituted regions ‘surrounding’
Japan, in which the US could expect support.162
Once again, the revised Defense Guidelines were met with opposition. At first the JSP, which had relaxed its strict position on unarmed neutrality under socialist
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, agreed to support the new bill. However, after losing seats in the 1996 general election, the JSP (now the Social Democratic Party, or SDP), decided to revert to its traditional stance on security policy and opposed the revised Defense Guidelines legislation in April 1998.163
As a result, the LDP was forced to form a new coalition in order to pass the
Defense Guidelines legislation. In January 1999, the Liberal Party joined the LDP
160 Shinoda (2009): 272-73. 161 Singh (2008): 314. 162 Shinoda (2009): 273-74. 163 Shinoda (2009): 273. 79 coalition. However, the Liberal Party, despite the alliance, disagreed with the LDP on several points of the revised guidelines. The party asserted that the provision for vessel inspection and the lack of clarification on the definition of areas surrounding
Japan were outside of the original US-Japan security treaty. Following a comprise, the vessel inspection provision was removed, and legislation to clarify Japan’s involvement in surrounding areas, which came to be known as the 1999 Regional
Crisis Law, was drafted. Despite opposition from the SDP and partial opposition from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, the new legislation was passed by the LDP and coalition partners, the Liberal Party and Kōmei Party, in May 1999.164
Ultimately, a few significant changes in Japanese security policy occurred within the decade of the 1990s. While the UNPCC legislation had failed, the PKO bill passed, which allowed Japan’s SDF to be deployed abroad. In some ways, this change could be viewed as a major break from Japan’s traditional security strategy since its creation in 1954. Now the SDF could participate in international peacekeeping operations aboard. However, it is important to note that this provision allowing SDF involvement abroad was restricted to UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations for the purpose of providing humanitarian relief. Therefore, it is arguable that Japan’s stance on a defensive security strategy did not change, rather it simply expanded its capabilities for providing international assistance.
2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation
For the majority of the five decades proceeding the end of the Second World
War, no Japanese military personnel had engaged in missions outside of Japanese
164 Shinoda (2009):274. 80 territory. In times where Japan’s SDF troops were dispatched abroad, such as to
Cambodia in 1992, the missions were restricted to UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations in non-combat areas.165 However, Japan’s national security strategy faced major changes in the fall of 2001. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States, Japan was quick to announce its support for its ally.
Additionally, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed eagerness for Japan to contribute a faster and more substantive response than it had under the Kaifu administration during the Gulf War. In the week following the attacks, Koizumi coordinated a response plan with a crisis task force comprised of cabinet officials from different offices, including the Cabinet Situation Center, and the JDA. A key focus of this response plan was to enable the deployment of SDF personnel and equipment abroad to aid the United States.166
A little over a week after the 11th, Koizumi announced Japan’s pledge to provide aid to the US. As a part of the response plan, Koizumi stated that Japan would dispatch at least one destroyer battleship to provide intelligence support, as well as deploy SDF forces to assist in non-combat roles, such as providing medical treatment and other forms of backup support.167 However, before implementing this response plan, Koizumi first had to gain the legal authority to do so. Under Article
Nine of the constitution, Japan had renounced its right to engage in international military action. Moreover, the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Basic Law limited the
165 Arase (2007): 339. 166 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes." SAIS Review (2003): 28-29. 167 Tsukimori (2001). 81 purpose of the SDF to defending only Japanese territory. The PKO legislation only allowed the SDF to be dispatched for UN-sanctioned humanitarian relief efforts in non-combat areas and was also restricted by the 1999 Regional Crisis law, which limited SDF international deployments to the regions surrounding Japan.
In the case of supporting the US-led mission in Afghanistan, dispatching SDF resources and personnel could not be justified through the existing legal framework; the mission did not fall within Japan’s regional surroundings, it was not sanctioned by the UN, and was not a non-combat operation. As a result, new legislation was required to allow the SDF to participate in the US-led mission in
Afghanistan. However, the time needed to pass the new anti-terrorism legislation was a serious concern. Previous legislations, such as the PKO bill and revised US-
Japan Defense Guidelines, took months or even years to finally pass through the Diet and be enacted. If Japan did not commit its support to the US in a timely manner, its pledge would be severely undermined. In order to cut down as much deliberation time as possible, Koizumi circumvented the traditional policymaking structure.
Under the traditional policymaking structure all proposed legislation was first brought to the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Within the various committees of PARC, policy experts evaluate proposed legislation during the processes of advanced inspection and prior approval.168 However, these processes are quite time consuming, as several policy experts and politicians are often eager to inspect and deliberate over legislation, especially when it concerns their areas of interest. In addition to approval from PARC, the legislation also needed to gain
168 See Chapter 1 for more details on this process. 82 support from the LDP’s coalition partners before finally reaching the floor of the
Diet for voting. Rather than waiting around for intra-party deliberations, Koizumi decided to seek approval from the coalition partners before the rest of the LDP. In doing so, he hoped the LDP could be persuaded to agree quicker, since the coalition partners would have already reached an agreement.169
In seeking cooperation from the coalition partners, the Kōmei and
Conservative parties, Koizumi and his administration attempted to allay the potential fears over the new security policy. The Kōmei Party, which had traditionally been more pacifist in its approach to security policy, expressed worries that participating in the US-led mission would violate Japan’s constitutional ban on engaging in collective defense operations. In response, the Koizumi administration assured that Japan’s participation would fall within the parameters of the constitution. Additionally, the Koizumi administration also agreed to a two-year limit on SDF deployment.170 The coalition parties reached agreement on September
25th, and the outline for the anti-terrorism legislation was subsequently submitted to the LDP for review.171
In early October 2001, Koizumi, with the support of the LDP and its coalition partners drafted the specific details of the anti-terrorism bill that would allow SDF ships and personnel would be permitted to be deployed to the Indian Ocean to assist the US coalition forces with support activities. Designated support activities included distributing supplies to US forces and allies and providing assistance to
169 Shinoda (2003): 30. 170 Pekkanen and Krauss (2005): 439. 171 Shinoda (2003): 31. 83 refugees. SDF personnel would be permitted to work in the territory of the country, if given permission by the host country, as long as the territory was not in the combat areas. Furthermore, under the bill, SDF personnel would also be allowed to engage in search and rescue operations in non-combat areas, and transport food and other supplies to potential refugee camps in Pakistan. The bill was also to enable SDF personnel to use firearms, but only to defend themselves and other under their supervision. However, the bill prohibited the SDF from supplying weapons and ammunition, as well as refueling aircraft used in combat operations.172
While Koizumi had garnered sufficient support from the coalition to pass the anti-terrorism legislation through the Diet, he desired to show more unified cooperation for this new security policy by seeking the support of the largest opposition party, the DPJ.173 The DPJ, while open to the idea of creating new anti- terrorism legislation, asserted that several changes to the draft needed to be made.
Firstly, the DPJ asserted that the SDF should only be permitted to use firearms for their personal protection only. Secondly, they argued that the validity of the bill should be for only one year. Finally, they stated that SDF deployment should require prior approval from the Diet.174
After continued negotiations between DPJ and LDP officials, the DPJ agreed to drop its first two requirements. However, the DPJ stated that its support for the bill was conditional on requiring prior Diet approval for SDF deployments
172 “Cabinet Set to OK Antiterrorism, SDF Bills.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 5 Oct. 2001. 173 “Govt Seeking Broad Support for SDF Bill.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 6 Oct. 2001. 174 Aoki, Naoko. “Japan: Parliament Launches Debate on Anti-Terrorism Bills.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring 10 Oct. 2001. 84 abroad.175 During further deliberations between the two parties, party leaders,
Koizumi and Yukio Hatoyama, met in order to negotiate over the details of the bill.
At the meeting, Koizumi refused to agree to the DPJ’s provision requiring Diet approval prior to SDF deployments. However, he tried to seek a compromise by offering a revision that would require Diet approval within twenty days after SDF personnel had been deployed. Ultimately, the two leaders failed to reach an agreement and the negotiations ended.176
Despite the loss of potential support from the DPJ, the LDP coalition continued with its plans to pass the anti-terrorism legislation. Following a preliminary passing of the bill through a Lower House panel, opposition parties became more vocal. In addition to the DPJ, the SDP, JCP, and Liberal Party came out to oppose the bill. Kazuo Shii, leader of the JCP, stated, “It’s [anti-terrorism bill] a piece of legislation that will put Japanese military forces in danger of killing people in other countries for the first time since World War II.”177 Similarly, SDP leader,
Takako Doi, referred to Koizumi behavior in pushing the bill as “an act of arrogance.”178 Regardless of the opposition, however, the anti-terrorism legislation passed in the Lower House on October 18th with support from the LDP’s coalition partners. Approximately ten days later, the bill passed in the Upper House of the
Diet with a vote of 140 to 100.179
175 “Minshuto Support for SDF Bill Conditional.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 13 Oct. 2001. 176 “Minshuto Nixes Antiterror Bill.” Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 16 Oct. 2001. 177 “Japan: Opposition Slams Approval of Anti-Terrorism by Lower House Panel.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring 16 Oct. 2001. 178 Ibid. 196. 179 Watts, Jonathan. “Attack on Afghanistan: Japan: Tokyo to Send Warships in Support of US: New Anti-Terrorism Law Passed.” The Guardian [London] 30 Oct. 2001. 85 Chapter 5: Analysis of Koizumi’s Policymaking
Evaluating the Postal and Highway Reform Cases
After a drawn out political battle, Prime Minister Koizumi was finally able to pass privatization plans for Japan’s postal system and public highway corporations in the Diet. Reform in these two areas was a primary component of Koizumi’s platform of political and economic reform. As a result, the passage of these reforms seems to indicate a policymaking victory for Koizumi, given that the reform legislations originated from his office.
At first glance, Koizumi’s apparent victories in these two policy areas seems to credit the arguments of scholars, such as Tomohito Shinoda and Ko Mishima, who believe there has been a strengthening of the executive’s role in policymaking due to electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms, and discredits the views of scholars, such as Aurelia George Mulgan, Ellis Krauss, and Robert Pekkanen, who assert that control over the policymaking process remains primarily unchanged.
However, basing this conclusion solely on the eventual passage of the reform legislations is not sufficient for analyzing the impact of the 1990s reforms. Rather, the details regarding the reform legislations must be examined critically at all stages of the policymaking process: (1) where they originated and what their preliminary details were, (2) how the bills were promoted outside the initial policy drafting circle, (3) how they were challenged by the opposition and then compromised, (4) how they were passed in the Diet, and finally, (5) how close the new laws were to their original drafts and purposes. In evaluating the postal and highway 86 privatization bills at each of the above mentioned stages, the degree to which their passage represents a policymaking victory for Prime Minister Koizumi, as well as, the degree to which the 1990s electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms impacted the policymaking structure can be better analyzed.
The first stage to evaluate is the policy origination stage. As described earlier 180 , Japan’s traditional policymaking process was dominated by the relationship between LDP policy experts representing different policy tribes in the
Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and bureaucrats from related ministries.
Together, these politicians and bureaucrats worked closely to draft policies in a policymaking process that largely excluded the executive branch. Following the
1990s reforms, as argued by Shinoda, the executive’s role in policymaking significantly increased. According to Shinoda, the government and administrative reforms helped organize and consolidate policymaking authority to the prime minister by affirming his and the Cabinet Secretariat’s role in initiating policy. In reviewing the cases of postal and highway privatization, Shinoda’s assertions seem to be correct. In both cases, Koizumi took policy initiative by prioritizing the privatization plans at the top of his economic and political reform agenda.
Furthermore, Koizumi successfully utilized resources from within the executive branch, such as the Cabinet Secretariat and Administrative Reform Promotion
Headquarters (ARPH) to draft the privatization bills.181 Koizumi’s ability to take charge in introducing new policy was directly tied to the 2001 administrative
180 See initial chapter on Japan’s policymaking structure. 181 See cases studies on postal and highway reform. 87 reforms, which clarified the executive’s authority in initiating policy through the revised Cabinet Law. Additionally, the reform gave the prime minister the power to form special committees within the Cabinet Secretariat to address specific policy issues.182 Mishima found that during his tenure, Koizumi took advantage of this new power by creating thirty different special committees to deliberate on various issues.183
In formulating his policy agendas, Koizumi surrounded himself with appointees who shared his vision for reform, such as Nobuteru Ishihara, who he chose to lead the ARPH and oversee highway privatization. In addition, Koizumi made appointments without being influenced by external forces, such as the LDP’s factions or even the Diet. In both the postal and highway reform cases, Koizumi appointed private sector experts to help with privatization. Additionally, Koizumi ignored the demand from the LDP and other parties to seek Diet approval for his seven-member panel on highway privatization. 184 Once again, Koizumi demonstrated strong control over the initial stages of policymaking, which can also attributed to the 1990s reforms. According to Shinoda, the importance of factions began to decline after electoral reform because factional support became less necessary in single-seat district elections, as LDP politicians were not allowed to compete against incumbents from their own party. He argues that this shift allowed for junior party members to become more vocal and active within the party, as seen
182 See initial chapter on Japan’s policymaking structure. 183 Mishima, Ko. "Grading Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's Revolution: How Far Has the LDP's Policymaking Changed?" Asian Survey (2007): 731. 184 See postal and highway reform cases. 88 in the party presidency election of Koizumi in 2001.185 Similarly, the decline of factional influence enabled Koizumi to make appointments outside of factional control. Shinoda found that Koizumi’s first cabinet was comprised of many members, including three civilians, who were chosen independently from factional requests.186
The selection of junior LDP members, such as Ishihara to the ARPH, may also be proof of Koizumi’s avoidance of making appointments based on factional ties and seniority.
In the first policymaking stage, Koizumi seemed to have played a strong role in overseeing the development of the postal and highway reform bills. In the next stage, policy promotion, Koizumi also took a strong role. Koizumi was able to gain support for his policy goals by utilizing the televised debates in the standing committees on national basic policy. These committees were created in the Diet as a result of the 1999 government reforms.187 Additionally, Koizumi promoted his reforms by publicly challenging the opposition, such as in the highway privatization case when he openly labeled members of the construction policy tribe as ‘disloyal forces.’188
Koizumi’s tenacity to promote his reforms openly, by directly addressing the public and censuring the opposition, demonstrated his strength in policymaking.
However, Koizumi could not stave off the opposition forever. In the postal reform case, Koizumi attempted to demonstrate strong leadership by circumventing PARC,
185 See initial chapter on Japan’s policymaking structure. 186 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes." SAIS Review (2003): 23. 187 Shinoda (2003): 25. 188 See highway reform case. 89 which traditionally controlled policymaking through its ‘advance inspection’ and
‘prior approval’ procedures, and delivering the privatization legislation directly to the Diet. Regardless of this move, the postal legislation faced revisions in the Diet, which included a provision to require government approval on uniform delivery fees, a requirement for private firms to maintain 100,000 postboxes, and prohibited low-performance post offices in rural Japan from being closed.189 At first, the exclusion of PARC from the policy process seems like strong leadership and policymaking control for Koizumi. However, Mulgan argues that this was not a significant precedent or change in the policymaking structure because Koizumi eventually needed LDP support to pass the bill in the Diet.190 Koizumi was forced to further compromise on the postal privatization plans following the creation of Japan
Post public corporation in 2003. The LDP postal lobby continued to oppose the legislation even after Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which was in charge of designing the privatization process of the Japan Post, included provisions to maintain universal postal service and provide funds to maintain community services. Tamisuke Watanabe, leader of the LDP postal lobby, was determined to oppose Koizumi’s plan, stating that it would not be official party policy since it was not submitted through PARC. Eventually, the legislation was revised further and permitted the government to buy back one-third of postal savings and insurance shares after 2017 and established government funding to assist rural post offices.191
189 See postal reform case. 190 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "The Leadership Role of the Prime Minister and Party." Policy and Society (2004): 12. 191 See postal reform case. 90 In the case of highway reform, Koizumi’s reform package met a similar fate against the opposition. Pressure from the construction policy tribe led to revisions allowing the completion of the majority of roughly 2,000 kilometers remaining in a
9,000-kilometer national expressway. Additionally, the revisions permitted toll revenues to be used as collateral for obtaining loans for future highway construction projects.
Ultimately, the fact that Koizumi was forced to make a number of significant compromises with opposition from within his party is evidence of the executive’s weak control over policymaking and proof of strong control by the special interest policy tribes. The postal and construction lobbies were able to gain major concessions, despite Koizumi’s attempt to circumvent their authority. The implication here is that the 1990s reforms did not break LPD policy experts from
PARC and the policy tribes’ traditional hold on policymaking. As asserted by Mulgan,
Krauss, and Pekkanen, electoral reform in 1994 did not reduce the influence of the policy tribes, nor did it increase the prime minister’s control over policymaking.192
However, even though the reform policies were compromised, they were still passed and the process towards privatization, which Koizumi introduced, was under way, thus demonstrating that the prime minister did have some initiative in directing policymaking.
Furthermore, the resignation of several members of Koizumi’s seven- member panel for highway privatization may also show a sign of weak leadership.
As mentioned previously, the panel was divided on several details of the highway
192 See initial chapter on Japan’s policymaking structure. 91 privatization plan; for example, panel chairman Takashi Imai resigned after the committee’s initial plan curtailed numerous highway construction projects, and later, Masatake Matsuda and Kazuaki Tanaka resigned after the plan was revised to allow for continued highway construction.193 In viewing the disagreements among the panel members, Mishima asserted that Koizumi demonstrated weak leadership because he was not clear enough with his directives on what the privatization policy should entail. As a result, not only was there a lack of consensus among the members, but the lack of direction also weakened the committee’s stance on privatization, allowing the opposition to successfully gain concessions at later stages.194
The next stage of the policymaking process, the passage of the bills in the
Diet, also marked a difficult time for Koizumi. While the highway reform legislation passed easily through the Diet, most likely due to the degree to which it had been compromised, the postal reform was passed with much greater difficulty. Despite continual concessions to the opposition, the postal legislation only narrowly passed in the Lower House and was defeated in the Upper House. In response to defeat,
Koizumi dissolved the Lower House and called for an election. He the proceeded to remove all of the Lower House LDP members who voted against privatization from the party’s candidate list and replaced them with handpicked candidates. The election was a victory for the LDP and the postal legislation later passed in the
193 See highway reform case. 194 Mishima (2007): 742-743. 92 Diet.195 While postal reform was initially defeated, Koizumi’s move to dissolve the
Lower House appears to represent significant political strength. Hiroshi Kaihara asserted that Koizumi’s success in dissolving the Lower House was attributed to the weakening of factions due to electoral reform, noting that traditionally, powerful faction leaders could work together to impede a prime minister by keeping their members strictly in line.196 However, due to weakened factions, Koizumi was able to successfully dissolve the Lower House. Additionally, several of Koizumi’s handpicked replacement candidates (often referred to as “assassin candidates”) successfully beat former LDP politicians in several districts. Out of a total of thirty- seven “assassin” candidates, nineteen were successfully elected.197 While several of the “assassins” were successful, Patricia Maclachlan noted that thirteen of sixteen anti-reform candidates from rural areas were re-elected, signifying continued strength of the LDP’s traditional rural support.198 Nonetheless, Koizumi’s ability to dissolve the Lower House and field several successful “assassin” candidates demonstrates strength in leadership. This new strength can be attributed to the decline of faction influence as a result of the 1994 electoral reform.
Finally, in assessing Koizumi’s strength in policymaking, it is necessary to analyze the final bills that were eventually passed. Koizumi pushed postal and highway privatization on the basis of wanting to reform Japan’s political and
195 See postal reform case. 196 Kaihara, Hiroshi. "The Advent of a New Japanese Politics: Effects of the 1994 Revision of the Electoral Law." Asian Survey (2007): 758. 197 “Rock 'n' roll PM given mandate for reform: Privatization agenda: Koizumi's landslide victory transforms Japanese politics” The National Post [Canada] 13 Sep. 2005. 198 Maclachlan, Patricia. "Storming the Castle: The Battle for Postal Reform in Japan." Social Science Japan Journal (2006): 14. 93 economic systems. He wanted to destroy the old LDP system and implement free- market, liberal economic policies to help Japan’s economy. In evaluating Koizumi’s first aim, it seems clear that he was unable to significantly disrupt the LDP’s entrenched control over policymaking. In fact, the opposition to privatization primarily came from within the LDP. Furthermore, LDP interference significantly limited the ability of the bills to reform the economy. The primary goal of privatization was to reduce wasteful government spending and increase market efficiency by promoting competition. In both cases, these goals were impeded by the
‘watering-down’ of the bills by the opposition. Concerning privatization, both bills established a plan to privatize their respective structures. However, the government would be permitted to own a substantial amount of stock in the new postal and highway companies. By owning this stock, the government could maintain influence of these companies’ proceedings because it would potentially be one of the largest shareholders. Additionally, the highway legislation maintained construction plans to finish 2,000 kilometers of a national expressway, which ensured that local areas would continue to benefit by being awarded construction contracts. In terms of increasing market competition, the final legislations included provisions that would make it difficult for private firms to compete. In the case of postal reform, private firms were required to establish and maintain 100,000 postboxes throughout Japan, conduct mail collection and delivery six days a week, and could not close low- performance post offices. These stipulations ensured that operational costs for private firms would be exceedingly high, thus limiting the ability of firms to compete in the postal system. The postal legislation also included a provision for government 94 funding to help maintain post offices in rural areas, which arguably created the potential for wasteful government spending to continue. Finally, the operation of the new postal service and highway corporations was designated to be overseen by provisional semi-public holding companies. In the case of highway construction, the holding company was in charge of leasing ownership of expressways to private companies in order to manage daily operations. Since the government controlled it, politicians and bureaucrats with ties to special interest groups could still influence the leasing company’s selection of private firms.
Overall, it is arguable that the final postal and highway reform bills fell quite short of their original goals. From analyzing Koizumi’s involvement at each stage of the policymaking, it appears that the cases of postal and highway reform do not represent overall policy victories for Prime Minister Koizumi. However, it is an overstatement to assert that Koizumi failed to demonstrate strong leadership in pushing his reforms. While the policies were certainly compromised, the passage of the postal and highway privatization bills still represented not only significant policy changes, but also changes in the policymaking structure. For the first time since their creation, the postal system and highway corporations would no longer be under the direct control of the government. Additionally, Koizumi demonstrated his resolve to pass postal reform by dissolving the Lower House after the legislation did not pass in the Diet the first time. Furthermore, the success of his “assassin” candidates showed that Koizumi was able to defeat several incumbent party members. 95 In evaluating the impact of the 1990s reforms, the results are mixed. On one hand, the government and administrative reforms seem to have consolidated
Koizumi’s control in policy origination and initiation; postal and highway privatization were initially developed and introduced from the executive branch.
This marked a clear break from the traditional policymaking structure in which policies came from coordination between LDP politicians and bureaucrats. On the other hand, the degree to which Koizumi was forced to compromise his legislation to gain its passage, as well as the degree to which the compromised legislation fell short of the reforms’ original goals, indicated that the LDP, especially its special interest policy tribes, retained a substantial amount of control over the policymaking process. This signifies that the 1990s reforms do not seem to have significantly reduced the traditional influence of politicians and bureaucrats on policymaking. Nonetheless, the 1990s reforms still created opportunities for
Koizumi to demonstrate strong leadership in certain aspects of the policymaking process.
Evaluating the Anti-Terror Legislation Case
In less than two months of deliberation, Prime Minister Koizumi was able to successfully pass the anti-terrorism legislation in the Diet and work on organizing
Japan’s physical contribution to the US-led military operation in Afghanistan. The anti-terrorism legislation represented not only a significant change in Japan’s national security strategy, as it was the first time SDF personnel would be permitted to dispatch overseas to provide non-combat support to military operations clearly outside of the country’s ‘surrounding areas,’ rather than humanitarian missions, but 96 also a significant policymaking victory for Koizumi. The swift introduction and passage of the legislation was unprecedented, especially when one considers that all previous security legislation took months, or even years, to pass.
In analyzing Koizumi’s clear policymaking victory, several scholars are quick to identify the impact of the electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms of the 1990s on Prime Minister Koizumi’s newfound authority in policymaking.
Scholars, such as Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, pointed to shifts in party politics due to electoral reform, and others, such as Tomohito Shinoda, point to the consolidation of executive authority due to the government and administrative reforms. Assessing Koizumi’s policymaking victory and its connection to the 1990s reforms requires evaluating the prime minister’s role at each of the five stages of the policymaking process.
Prime Minister Koizumi clearly demonstrated executive authority in the first stage of the policymaking process. Not only did the anti-terrorism legislation originate from the executive branch, but the prime minister also did not waste any time in working to draft the policy. Koizumi immediately declared the September
11th terrorist attacks a crisis for Japan and utilized resources within the Cabinet
Situation Center to coordinate a response plan among officials from the Cabinet
Secretariat and JDA. The response plan, which included physical and financial support for the US-led mission, was introduced in little over a week. Koizumi’s ability to quickly respond to the September 11th attacks and to announce Japan’s support for the US was directly tied to the 2001 administrative reforms. Firstly, the
2001 reform strengthened the executive branch’s leadership role in crisis situations. 97 The establishment of the Director for Crisis Management position, within the
Cabinet Secretariat, to head the Cabinet Situation Center enabled Koizumi to have direct access in dealing with the crisis. Additionally, the revised Cabinet Law helped to consolidate executive authority in introducing new policies.199 Shinoda argues that these new resources significantly contributed to Koizumi’s response efforts. For example, during the Gulf War, Prime Minister Kaifu did not label the issue as a crisis and Japan’s response organized through traditional diplomatic channels, which were quite time consuming. In contrast, once Koizumi declared the September attack as a crisis, he was able to quickly take charge in directing Japan’s response through new offices within the executive.200
In terms of policy promotion, Koizumi publicly declared Japan’s support for the US, emphasizing the alliance and friendship between the two countries. In comparison, Koizumi’s promotion of the anti-terrorism legislation differed from that of the postal and highway reform issues because the response time was much shorter, unlike the other two, which took place over several years. Koizumi was able to capitalize on the already high public support for his administration, which had a
Cabinet approval rating of 79 percent. Additionally, a poll conducted by the Nihon
Keizai newspaper in late September revealed that 70 percent of respondents supported assisting the US.201 Ultimately, these factors worked in Koizumi’s favor, because he had public support for proceeding with his policymaking plans.
199 See case study on anti-terror legislation. 200 Shinoda, Tomohito. "Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes." SAIS Review (2003): 29. 201 Shinoda (2003): 30. 98 The next stage of the policymaking structure analyzes how Koizumi dealt with the opposition to the anti-terrorism legislation. Koizumi once again circumvented the traditional policymaking structure by not first submitting his proposal to the LDP’s PARC, thereby avoiding dissection of his proposal by the policy tribes.202 He first brought his proposal to the LDP’s coalition partners, the
Kōmei and Conservative parties. In dealing with the coalition partners, Koizumi did agree to some compromises, such as guaranteeing that SDF involvement abroad would fit within the parameters of Japan’s constitution and that the legislation would be effective for only two years. Upon reaching an agreement with the partners, Koizumi then submitted his proposal to the LDP. The manner in which
Koizumi introduced his proposal to the coalition partners and LDP demonstrated strength in policymaking. By working outside the traditional process, he was quickly able to gain support for his legislation because LDP members could do little to protest once the coalition members had already given their support.203
While Koizumi showed strong and swift leadership in policymaking by attaining LDP and coalition support for the anti-terrorism legislation, he still faced opposition from the DPJ and other parties. In approaching the opposition parties, it is important to note that the coalition government had enough strength to pass the legislation. However, Koizumi wanted to gain wider approval. The DPJ did not oppose the bill completely, but demanded that a few changes be made. These included limiting the SDF’s use of firearms to only in defense of SDF personnel,
202 See initial chapter on Japan’s policymaking structure. 203 See case study on anti-terror legislation. 99 reducing the bills validity to one year, and required Diet approval prior to SDF deployment abroad. Eventually, the DPJ conceded on the first two points, but strictly maintained its stance on requiring prior Diet approval. Koizumi tried to seek a compromise by adding a provision to require Diet approval within twenty days after
SDF deployment, but the DPJ was not pleased. Unable to agree, negotiations ceased and the coalition proceeded alone.204 Koizumi’s attempt to reach out to the DPJ, a gesture that was not required considering the strength of the coalition, demonstrated a desire for strong leadership because he was seeking to widen the support of his policy,
In addition to the DPJ, the SDP, JCP, and Liberal party opposed the anti-terror legislation. However, these parties could not amount enough strength to block the bill’s passage. Historically, Japan’s leftist parties, such as the former Japan Socialist
Party (JSP), had been able to firmly counter the LDP’s attempts at passing new security policies. A clear case of this was the failed UNPCC legislation in 1990 due to strong JSP opposition.205 However, by 2001, the Japan’s leftist parties, namely the
SDP and JCP, were substantially weaker. Krauss and Pekkanen attribute the decline of these parties to the 1994 electoral reform. They argue that, in the new SMD system, voters were more inclined to vote for candidates from the two largest parties because small party candidates were less likely to win the single-seat.
Smaller opposition parties became even smaller and were then forced to join with
204 See case on anti-terror legislation. 205 See case on anti-terror legislation. 100 other moderate parties to survive.206 Arguably, the decline of socialist parties with traditional pacifist values, due to the 1994 electoral reform, helped Koizumi avoid potential opposition over the anti-terror legislation.
Despite opposition, the anti-terrorism legislation passed easily through the
Diet. Unlike previous legislation, such as the 1992 PKO bill, the leftist parties did not have the strength to attempt to delay passage through filibustering. With the passage secured, Koizumi obviously demonstrated enough strength of policymaking leadership to achieve his policy goal. Thus, the only stage left to evaluate is the final provisions of the anti-terrorism legislation in comparison to the details initially proposed by Koizumi and the Cabinet Secretariat. The initial details of the legislation included the dispatch of SDF ships and personnel to the Indian Ocean, permitted SDF personnel to enter non-combat territories with the permission of the host country, allowed SDF to engage in search and rescue operations and transport food and supplies to refugee camps, sanctioned the use of SDF to use firearms to protect themselves and those under their care, and prohibited the SDF from supplying weapons. The only significant changes between the initial and final bills was that its validity was set to two years, and that Diet approval of SDF deployment was needed within twenty days after dispatch. 207 These concessions did not undermine Koizumi’s original intentions for the anti-terrorism legislation. Koizumi had desired to formulate a policy that would allow Japan to quickly and
206 Pekkanen, Robert, and Ellis Krauss. "Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies." Orbis (2005): 435. 207 See case on anti-terror legislation. 101 substantially contribute to its alliance partner, the US. Overall, the provisions of the legislation allowed for precisely that.
The passage of the anti-terrorism legislation undoubtedly represented a strong policymaking victory for Prime Minister Koizumi. Throughout every stage of the policymaking process, from origination to implementation, Koizumi had a strong hold on guiding the policymaking process. Moreover, the compromises Koizumi agreed to make did not reflect a significant ‘watering-down’ of the policy, as seen in the case of postal and highway reform. Ultimately, in evaluating the effects of the
1990s reforms, it seems they positively impacted Koizumi’s ability to control policymaking, as demonstrated through his quick and decisive response, as well as his ability to avoid strong opposition and attain the bill’s swift passage. 102 Conclusion
Collectively, the postal reform, highway reform, and anti-terrorism legislation case studies represent a significant variation in Prime Minister Koizumi’s ability to demonstrate strong leadership in policymaking. In the first two cases, the prime minister was clearly restricted in his ability to lead strong reforms due to the strength of the opposition from the postal and construction policy tribes from within the LDP. While the reforms eventually passed, they were significantly diluted and fell short of the prime minister’s original intentions. In the third case, Koizumi demonstrated remarkable leadership in policymaking and was able to pass the anti- terrorism legislation in less than two months. Furthermore, the legislation was barely altered from its original form, thus attributing to Koizumi’s policymaking authority.
Koizumi’s strong victory in the anti-terrorism legislation case and his weak victory, or even failure according to some scholars, presents a paradox in evaluating the influence of the 1990s reforms on Japan’s policymaking structure. All three reforms took place before the Koizumi administration, but their argued influence did not occur uniformly across all three cases. If Koizumi had be able to demonstrate a similar degree in his policymaking authority across all three cases, then it would be easier to assess which scholars’ analysis of the 1990s reforms on the policymaking process was more accurate. However, as noted, this was not the case.
So, the question remains, why was Koizumi able to demonstrate strong leadership in policymaking in one case, but not the other two? 103 Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to note that not all scholars assessed victory and failure the same. For example, Aurelia George
Mulgan deemed Koizumi’s performance in the postal reform case as a failure because of the degree to which he was forced to change his policy due to the power of the opposition.208 On the other hand, Hiroshi Kaihara asserted that Koizumi was victorious in the postal reform case, citing the use of his power to dissolve the
Lower House and gain an electoral victory.209 From these contesting viewpoints, it seems that in determining Koizumi’s policy victory, it matters which stage of the process one assessed; this is the first important conclusion of this study. By assessing different stages in the policymaking process, scholars arrived at different conclusions.
The above conclusion is also significant in assessing the influence of the
1990s reforms. The significance of the changes implemented by the 1990s reforms that scholars identified as having an impact on Koizumi’s policymaking also depended on which stage of the policymaking process was analyzed. For example,
Tomohito Shinoda, who identified the 1990s reforms as having a strong impact on the prime minister’s role in policymaking, clearly noted the impact of the government and administrative reforms on Koizumi’s ability to steer policy in the case of the anti-terrorism legislation. In that case, Koizumi’s quick response to the
September 11th crisis and his involvement in directing the policy clearly showed
208 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "Japan's Un-Westminster System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy." Government and Opposition (2003). 209 Kaihara, Hiroshi. "The Advent of a New Japanese Politics: Effects of the 1994 Revision of the Electoral Law." Asian Survey (2007). 104 strong policymaking in the initial policy stages. Similarly, the prime minister demonstrated strong policy leadership in the initial policymaking stages in the other two cases as well. Koizumi’s leadership in the initial policymaking of all three cases was attributed to the effects of the 2001 administrative reform.
However, despite the prime minister’s new strength in directing the early stages of policymaking, his effectiveness in the later stages varied between cases. In the anti-terrorism legislation case, Koizumi demonstrated strong leadership throughout all policymaking stages, whereas in the postal and highway reform cases his effectiveness dwindled against the opposition from the postal and construction policy tribes. Scholars, especially Mulgan, noted that the reason for this was that the influence of these groups remained despite the 1994 electoral reform. Some scholars argued that the switch to the combination of single-seat and proportional representation districts for Lower House elections fundamentally uprooted a substantial element of the LDP’s power by disrupting its decentralized policymaking circles and forcing more unification among the party. In contrast, Mulgan argued that the 1994 electoral reform encouraged the persistence of the system by encouraging LDP politicians to strengthen their personal vote-gathering strategies in order to hold on to their positions in the districts.
The implication here is not that scholars disagreed on the how the 1990s reforms effected policymaking, but that some of the 1990s reforms had more of an impact on the policymaking structure than others. From the analysis of the three cases, it is clear that the 2001 administrative reforms helped Koizumi take initiative in policymaking by consolidating some authority in the executive. Even Mulgan 105 admitted that administrative reform increased Koizumi’s policymaking authority. However, she noted, “The administrative reforms to the executive have not generated sufficient power to override the entrenched policymaking structures in which the forces opposed to them are embedded.”210 Similarly, Ko Mishima stated,
“The typical pattern of Koizumi’s reform policymaking was success at dominating the formulation of program outlines at early stages but failure in preventing bureaucrats from manipulating concrete details at later stages.”211 Ultimately, this illustrated that Koizumi’s strength in leadership was highly determined by the strength of the opposition, rather than the strength of the executive. In the third case, opposition was weak, allowing Koizumi to proceed strongly. In the first two cases, the opposition was strong and the increase in executive policymaking authority due to the administrative reforms was not strong enough to overcome it.
In seeking to account for the variation of Koizumi’s success across the three case studies, a further conclusion becomes evident; the nature of the case study is important in trying to assess impact of the 1990s reforms on the policymaking process. The first two cases involved reforming national institutions, which had domestic implications. Privatizing the postal system and public highway corporations had significant and tangible implications for thousands of Japanese people, LDP politicians, businesses, and bureaucrats. For decades, these groups worked together in a system of mutual exchange to protect theirs and each other’s interests; a tremendous amount of resources were at stake. As a result, these groups
210 Mulgan (2003): 89. 211 Mishima, Ko. "Grading Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's Revolution: How Far Has the LDP's Policymaking Changed?" Asian Survey (2007): 732. 106 banded together to attempt to block and dilute Koizumi’s reform proposals. In the third case, Koizumi’s anti-terrorism legislation was not seeking to disrupt the influential and profitable status quo of the above-mentioned groups. Rather, his policy concerned Japan’s security agenda, which had no tangible risk on the LDP’s political machine, and gained increasing support as public opinion on security issues changed over time.
Overall, the case studies represent mixed results for the influence of the
1990s reforms in destabilizing the traditional policymaking structure by consolidating and increasing the executive’s role in the process. While the prime minister’s influence over policymaking increased in some way, the traditionally politician and bureaucratic control over the process remained. However, these mixed results should not detract from the significance of the 1990s reforms or changes in the prime minister’s policymaking leadership. While some scholars, such as Mulgan, Krauss, and Pekkanen have discounted several aspects of the 1990s reforms’ effect on the traditional policymaking structure, the fact remains that
Prime Minister Koizumi did lead policymaking in a manner that differed significantly from previous Japanese prime ministers. Koizumi’s postal and highway policies may have fallen short of his original intentions, but his policymaking leadership in challenging the entrenched political and bureaucratic policy machine should not be undersold. Koizumi was aware that his privatization plans would be extremely unpopular among his LDP colleagues, yet he resolutely pushed forward with his agenda, hoping to reform Japan’s economic and political systems. He exhibited a level of resolve that prior prime ministers would have been unable to 107 accomplish due to the former strength of faction bosses to control intra-party politics. In directing his reform initiatives, Koizumi utilized all of his executive powers in policymaking, many of which were established by the 1999 government and 2001 administrative reforms. These reforms allowed Koizumi to truly take charge of the initial stages, which prior to the 1990s reforms were exclusively controlled by the bureaucracy and policy tribes within PARC. Even though Koizumi had to eventually make compromises on his privatization bills with opposition from within the LDP, the fact that he was able to take control of policymaking at the initial stages represents a significant change from the traditional policymaking structure.
Furthermore, the compromises Koizumi made do not necessarily signify that his privatization legislations failed, or that he failed to exert strong policymaking leadership. Despite the compromises, the privatization of Japan’s postal system and public highway corporations was still passed. Moreover, these companies would no longer be under the direct control of politicians and bureaucrats, which represented a major change in their former structures.
Ultimately, Japan’s policymaking structure is not the same as it was prior to the electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms of the 1990s. While many aspects of political and bureaucratic control over the policymaking structure remained, the reforms created new opportunities for the prime minister to be involved in the policymaking process and make policy initiatives independently.
Koizumi may not have been able to completely ‘destroy’ the entrenched domestic political and bureaucratic structure, yet he still moved Japan’s political and economic systems in a new direction by passing the privatization legislations. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Thesis and Dissertation Services ! !