Akbar, Jason 03-08-12
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Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Jason A. Akbar March 2012 © 2012 Jason A. Akbar. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process by JASON A. AKBAR has been approved for the Department of Political Science and the College of Arts and Sciences by Takaaki Suzuki Associate Professor of Political Science Howard Dewald Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract AKBAR, JASON A., M.A., March 2012, Political Science Institutional Reform in Japan: The Impact of Electoral, Governmental, and Administrative reforms on the Policymaking Process Director of Thesis: Takaaki Suzuki This thesis is a study of the institutional reforms in Japan, particularly the impact of electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms enacted during 1990s on the current policymaking structure and process. It is well documented that the LDP politicians, government bureaucrats and powerful special interest groups controlled the policymaking process prior to the reforms. Different Japan scholars have offered differing opinions on the impact of the 1994 electoral reform, 1999 Diet and government reform, and 2001 administrative reform on policymaking process. Here I have evaluated the impact of the 1990s reforms by examining three policymaking initiatives of the Koizumi administration. I suggest that understanding the impact of the 1990s reforms requires examining the specific details of each policy initiative at each stage of the policymaking process from creation to implementation. My analysis suggests that the reforms significantly altered the policymaking process at certain but not at all stages of the policymaking. The reforms consolidated the policymaking process but failed to completely rid the influence of bureaucrats and special interest groups on policymaking. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ Takaaki Suzuki Associate Professor of Political Science 4 Table of Contents Page Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………...5 Chapter 1: Japan’s Policymaking Structure and the 1990s Reforms………………………10 Chapter 2: Postal Reform……………………………………………………………………………………37 Chapter 3: Highway Reform…………………………………………………..……………………………55 Chapter 4: Anti-Terror Legislation…………………………………………………………………...…70 Chapter 5: Analysis of Koizumi’s Policymaking……………………………………………………85 Conclusion………………………….……………………………………………………………………………102 5 Introduction In analyzing the structure of Japan’s postwar policymaking process, numerous scholars have pointed to the historical relationship of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), influential bureaucrats from government ministries, and powerful special interest groups in policymaking. For decades, members from these three groups built strong ties with each other, using their respective resources to exchange influence for power and to secure political and economic benefits for their cohorts and constituents. It is important to note, however, that this relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests groups, often described as an “iron triangle,” was not a political phenomenon unique to Japan. Nevertheless, unlike the iron triangles in other political systems, scholars have noted that Japan’s iron triangle was not just one organization, but actually the combination of several divided networks, a so-called “multiplicity of iron triangles,”1 each charged with addressing specific policy interests. An additional feature of Japan’s policymaking structure, unlike other policymaking systems of modern democracies that have incorporated an executive authority, is that it was dominated by a network of decentralized iron triangles, developed completely outside of the executive’s purview, leaving Japan’s prime minister sidelined.2 The nature of this system has been attributed by many scholars to the overarching dominance of the LDP in what, for decades, was mainly a single-party system, as well as Japan’s electoral system. 1 Curtis, Gerald L. The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. New York: Columbia UP, 1999. 54. 2 George Mulgan, Aurelia. "Japan's Un-Westminster System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy." Government and Opposition (2003). 6 However, between 1994 and 2001, a series of electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms were enacted in Japan. These reforms brought about several institutional changes within Japan’s political structure. The 1994 electoral reform altered Japan’s Lower House electoral system by switching from multi-member districts to a combination of single-member districts and proportional representation districts. The 1999 Diet and government reform reduced the size of the Cabinet, removed bureaucrats ability to answer policy questions on behalf of politicians at Diet committees, and created a new standing committee to allow the prime minister and opposition leaders to openly debate policy issues. Finally, the 2001 administrative reforms established several new offices to address policy issues within the Cabinet Secretariat, such as the Office of Assistant Cabinet Secretaries, created new positions within the Cabinet Secretariat to liaise with the prime minister on policy issues, and revised the Cabinet Law in order to clarify the prime minister and Cabinet’s role in policymaking. A number of Japan scholars have analyzed the impact of these reforms on Japan’s policymaking process. Some have argued that the prime minister’s role in policymaking has increased significantly due to the reforms, whereas others have concluded that the prime minister’s role in policymaking has not increased. Thus, the questions remain as to whether or not the reforms have disrupted the traditional policymaking process; and whether or not the reforms have empowered the executive to pursue a more active role in policymaking. In order to further contribute to the growing literature concerning how institutional changes affect policymaking in Japan, I examine the traditional 7 policymaking process, the reforms that modified the old policymaking process, and assess the impact of these reforms on the current policymaking process with an emphasis on why different scholars have drawn differing conclusions about the same reforms. For this purpose, I examine the impact of the 1990s reforms on a set of policy initiatives namely, postal reform, highway reform, and anti-terrorism legislation, implemented under the Koizumi administration between 2001 and 2005. I review these policy initiatives at five different stages of the policymaking process: (1) where they originated and what their original purpose and details were, (2) how the they were promoted outside the initial policy drafting circle, (3) how they were challenged by the opposition and then revised, (4) how they were passed in the Diet, and finally, (5) how close the final bill were to their original drafts and purposes. Examining the policy initiatives at each of these stages allows for a more critical analysis of the impact of the 1990s reforms on Japan’s policymaking structure. My argument is that analyzing the impact of the 1990s electoral, governmental, and administrative reforms at each of the above mentioned five policymaking stages offers a better insight on the impact of the 1990s reforms on policymaking. Here, I show that the 1990s reforms significantly affected specific stages of the policymaking process. For example, the initial policy introduction and drafting stage was affected whereas other stages, such as the negotiation stage, were less affected. A better understanding of the specific impacts of the 1990s reforms also helps to explain the differences between scholars’ assessments on the reforms. It is evident from the three case studies presented in this thesis that the 1990s reforms clearly increased the prime minister’s ability to lead policymaking in the 8 initial stages. However, the impact of the 1990s reforms at the later stages, such as the negotiation and passage through the Diet stages, is not as clear-cut and varies across the three cases. This variation denotes the limitations of the 1990s reforms and demonstrates their weakness in reforming the policymaking structure especially in cases of entrenched domestic political interest. For example, Prime Minister Koizumi was unable to take advantage of the 1990s reforms to overcome opposition from within his own party to policy initiatives, such as the postal and highway reforms, without offering concessions that greatly compromised his goals. In contrast, Koizumi’s anti-terrorism legislation was able to pass through the Diet without significant alteration. The outline of this thesis is as follows. Before examining the case studies of policy initiatives during the Koizumi administration, the traditional Japanese policymaking process and its connection to the “iron triangle” relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest groups is explained. Following this description, the three 1990s reforms, the 1994 electoral reform, 1999 government reform, and the 2001 administrative